CATHOLIC ROYALISM IN THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE GARD, 1814 - 1851

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I wish to express my gratitude to the following persons who assisted me in the preparation of this thesis: Dr. G. Lewis, who aroused my interest in the subject and supervised the thesis; Monsieur Jean Sablou and Monsieur Yves Chassin du Guerny, of the Archives départementales du Gard, Nîmes; Monsieur le Comte de Bernis; Monsieur le professeur Bertier de Sauvigny; Professor A. Gough.
Summary of the Thesis

The thesis attempts to examine the character and motivation of the Catholic royalist movement in the Gard from the fall of the First Empire to the eve of the Second Empire. The thesis proceeds chronologically, with six chapters and a conclusion.

In chapter one, the origins of the Catholic royalist movement are traced to the antagonism between Catholic and Protestant élites in the late eighteenth century, and to the subsequent ascendancy of the Protestants during the Revolution and the Empire. During the First Restoration, Catholics resented the moderation of the royal government. The Hundred Days gave them a pretext to plan the counter-revolution they desired.

Chapter two presents the White Terror of 1815 as a calculated measure, designed to eliminate the Protestants as a political force, and to ensure Catholic royalist domination in the department.

Chapter three examines the unsuccessful struggle of the Catholic royalists to retain their grip on the Gard during the "liberal phase" of the Restoration.

Chapter four presents the revival of Catholic royalist dominance after 1820, when the murder of the duc de Berry discredited the liberal policies of Decazes, and the ascendancy of Catholic royalism until 1830.
Chapter five examines the transfer of power to the Protestant bourgeoisie after the July Revolution. Until 1833, Catholic royalists waged a "guerilla" campaign against the Orleanist authorities, but the failure of military opposition led many young Catholics to challenge the July Monarchy in elected assemblies. By the 1840's, there was a strong Legitimist opposition group in the Gard.

In chapter six, the effects of the 1848 Revolution on Legitimism are studied. Universal suffrage gave Catholics a numerical majority in the department, but revealed a split between the notables and the working classes. Nevertheless, in 1851, the coup d'état received the support of the Catholic population, while it was resisted by the Protestants.

The conclusion stresses the local nature of Catholic royalism in the Gard, and the importance of sectarian rivalry in sustaining it.
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE THESIS.

A.N. Archives nationales, Paris.
A.D. Archives départementales (Gard, Haute Garonne, Lozère, etc.)
P.R.O. Public Record Office, London.
F.O. Foreign Office Papers.
When the Constituent Assembly abolished the old French Provinces in 1789 and replaced them for administrative purposes with Departments, the Gard was one of eight new Departments created almost entirely from the former Province of Languedoc. As the other departments did, the Gard took its name and boundaries from geographical features. The Gardon rivers of Alès and Anduze join near Vézénobres to form the Gard or Gardons réunis which flows into the Rhône at Remoulins, between Nîmes and Avignon. The Gard is bounded on the east by the Rhône, the principal trade and communication route from north to south and the old boundary between the Comtat Venaissin and Avignon, both Papal possessions, and Provence. The northern and western limits, with the new Departments of the Ardèche, the Lozère, Aveyron and Hérault were determined by two more rivers, the Ardèche and the Vidourle, and by the Cévennes, the southernmost part of the Massif central. With the exception of the Rhône, the boundaries were, socially and economically, quite artificial.

The new Department of the Gard contained contrasting geographical features. To the south and east of Nîmes, the chef lieu of the department, there is a fertile plain that constitutes some 24% of the department's territory. There, vines, fruit, olives and cereals were cultivated on relatively large domaines which extended to the edge of the marshy and inhospitable Camargue. To the north of Nîmes, the land rises
steadily from the plain, determining the lines of communication between Nîmes and the sub prefectures of Alès, Uzès and Le Vigan. In this chalky Garrigue, a living could still be made from the land, but many of the inhabitants wove silk for the small entrepreneurs of Uzès, St. Chaptes, Sauve, St. Hippolyte and Anduze in order to supplement the produce of their holdings or property. In the small towns themselves, small scale industry, usually connected with textiles, flourished. In the north and west of the Gard, where the Cévennes rise steeply from the Garrigue, geography and climate differ significantly from the department's Mediterranean coastline and from the Rhône valley. In isolated valleys and on the lower slopes of the mountains which rise to the barren peaks of the Mont Lozère and Mont Aigoual, small peasant communities eked a living from chestnuts and goats, then from the cultivation of mulberry bushes that nourished the silk worms which were introduced to the area in the sixteenth century. In small towns like Ganges and St. Jean du Gard, situated on rivers at the foot of the mountains, or Lasalle, Sumène, St. André and Valler-augue, in sheltered valleys, small textile manufacturers flourished thanks to the abundance of water that flowed from the Cévennes. These manufacturers and peasants would sell their merchandise in the commercial centres of Montpellier, after 1789 chef lieu of the Hérault, and Nîmes.


3 ibid.

4 ibid.
Nîmes has a history that goes back to the Roman Empire, and the site is said to have been a prize offered to successful imperial war veterans. To this day, Nîmes boasts of many fine monuments to its founders: the arena—a large tenement and shopping centre at the time of the Revolution—, the Temple of Diana, the Maison Carrée and the Tour Magne. One of the outstanding advantages the Roman colony enjoyed was its position on the main routes from Spain to Italy and, via the neighbouring colony of Arles, to the north. After the Middle Ages, Nîmes grew from the size and importance of a trading centre to the status of eighth city of France at the end of the eighteenth century, when it was a major commercial, administrative and industrial centre. The city's expansion reflected its function as business centre for the buying and selling of silk and cotton which was farmed out by merchants to workshops in the nearby towns and to cottage producers in the hinterland. This function was undoubtedly enhanced by the proximity of one of the most important Mediterranean trade fairs which took place in the small town of Beaucaire, situated on the Rhône, just twenty five kilometers east of Nîmes.

The fair took place each year and lasted for eight days in the month of July. It attracted merchants from all parts of France and from the whole Mediterranean world. They came to

purchase silk and cotton goods, oils and wine. For a consider- able area of France, from Toulouse to Lyon, the fair was the principal barometer of prosperity, and its importance was stressed by the presence in Beaucaire each year of a representative of the Intendant of Languedoc, inspectors from the Nîmes factories and workshops, and the representatives of the Fermiers-Généraux. The fair gave Nîmes and its hinterland direct access to foreign markets for the purchase and sale of textiles, and the négociants of Nîmes, who rented spacious premises in Beaucaire, provided the lucrative function of middlemen. In 1788, in spite of the economic crisis that had been affecting France for some fifteen years, two hundred cargo vessels put in at Beaucaire for the fair. Of these, twenty-six were Spanish, and fifteen were Genoese. Sixty large French vessels arrived, as well as a hundred small ones that came on the Rhône and on the Languedoc canal. Nevertheless, the economic crisis, then the internal disorders in France and the British blockade severely reduced the importance and prosperity of the fair. The value of goods sold fell from 31,900,000 F in 1806 to 19,700,000 F in 1811.

6 H. Chobaut, "La Foire de Beaucaire de 1789 à 1796", Annales historiques de la Révolution française, 1929, pp. 359-71; Ch. de Gourcy, La Foire de Beaucaire (Montpellier, 1911).

7 Chobaut, op. cit.

During the period between 1790 and 1841, the population of the Gard increased from 313,000 to 376,000, reflecting a national tendency to a slight increase in the years after the Revolution. During the revolutionary period, the population had decreased temporarily to 300,000, but by 1806 it had risen again beyond the 1790 level, and some 315,000 people were recorded. Thereafter, the population rose constantly with a significant increase from 334,000 to 357,000 between 1821 and 1831. From 1814 to 1830, that is, during the period of the Bourbon Restoration, the annual net increase was about 2,000 per annum. The first years of the July Monarchy indicate an annual net increase of 3,000. Throughout the period 1790 to 1840, the population of Nîmes itself fluctuated around the 32,000 mark.

The population of the Gard was, however, unique in one respect. The presence of a Calvinist minority, representing about one third of the population and about one third of the total Calvinist community in France, complicated politics and society in the department and had a decisive effect on the political allegiance of the population during the Revolutionary period which, in so many parts of France, determined political choices and divisions for several generations. In

9 Rivoire, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 307-8. It should be remembered that the population figures for the period are approximate and often unreliable.


11 Archives nationales (hereafter AN) F7 9049. Notice sur les Protestants du Gard. (anon, n.p.n.d.). The document states that there were 112,000 Protestants on a total population of 322,000 in 1815. Also, Rivoire, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 397, says there were 128,533 Protestants on a total of 376,062 in 1841.
the Gard, the Revolutionary struggle was largely reduced to deep seated antagonisms, and served to impose fresh layers of resentment on them.

From its establishment in the area, the Calvinist community had developed quite apart from the Catholic majority. This separate development partly reflected Calvinist doctrine, but it stemmed also from physical isolation, largely imposed by the officially sponsored persecutions of Calvinists during the Wars of Religion and the seventeenth century. Even in the cities, each community had well defined residential quarters. Indeed, Protestant Catholic relations were characterised by clashes rather than by integration. The Catholics recalled the Michelade of 1567, when Calvinists massacred Catholics in an attempt to impose their will on the affairs of the city, and the Camisards, the Protestant peasant guerillas who had wrought havoc at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Conversely, the Protestants recalled the Dragonnades and forced conversions that marked the seventeenth century.

The distinct developments of the two groups produced quite distinct élites, each with a popular following. The Protestant élite, however, systematically excluded from


14 ibid., p. 249.
public office by the Royal authorities, consequently turned to commerce, industry and banking. By the second half of the eighteenth century, there was a powerful and wealthy Protestant Bourgeoisie that had a significant interest in the capitalist economy of Languedoc. Frequently, this strength was purchased at the cost of nominal conversion to Catholicism, particularly for trading purposes in towns like Nîmes, where the Protestant merchants were moderate enough to be outraged by the Camisards.15

The Protestant wealth was increased by those Calvinists who fled the country to avoid persecution. Through them, links were established with important European commercial centres like Amsterdam, Geneva and London.16 Unable to spread their growing wealth, Protestant families created dynasties through careful marriages with other entrepreneurs of their religion, and gradually established an exclusively Protestant commercial network. Thus, the Favantine family began its rise to power by purchasing wool from Protestant farmers in the countryside around Le Vigan and selling it to coreligionists in Montpellier. Gradually, Favantine accumulated enough money to process the wool himself and then retail woollen garments made up by Protestant cottagers. The Hôtel Favantines in Le Vigan is ample testimony of his success.17 Other striking examples of the growth of Protestant-Catholic Relations", pp. 250-51. The accommodation of the Protestant bourgeoisie to conditions in and around the main cities is stressed by D. Ligou in his article "L'Eglise réformée du Désert", Revue d'Histoire économique et sociale, 1954, pp.146-67.


17 See Chaussinand-Nogaret, op. cit., for a detailed account of this and other Protestant fortunes.
ant capitalist wealth are afforded by the Bonnier, Gilly and Mazade families. The Bonnier, residents of Montpellier for many years, illustrate the ease with which many of the bourgeois avoided persecution by their position in the king's service while furthering their own commercial interests in textiles and metallurgy. The family counted among its members in the eighteenth century a conseiller du roi, a trésorier de France and a commis spécial des vivres aux armées de sa Majesté.\(^\text{18}\)

The Gilly family, originally from Calvisson, had settled in Montpellier in the sixteenth century. The Gilly had taken a commercial interest in textiles, but two sons of Simon Gilly had emigrated after the revocation of the edict of Nantes. Instinctively they went to Geneva, where one of them married the daughter of another textile manufacturer from Montpellier. The other son went on to become Chamberlain to the King of Prussia. Other children established a trading agency in Cadiz, developing interests in the West Indies, and married into the Hugla family, as a result of which the Hugla bank was founded. The Gilly and Hugla were united to yet another Gard Protestant family, the Fornier.\(^\text{19}\)

Like the Bonnier and Gilly families, the Mazade had been in the Bas Languedoc area since the sixteenth century, and held the posts of Receveurs de Tailles à Lunel et à Toulouse and Conseillers à la Cour des Comptes à Montpellier. From 1754 to the Revolution, the post of Trésorier général de la Bourse de Montpellier remained in the family. In the period


\(^{19}\) ibid., pp. 72, 73.
1725 to 1790, the Mazade could count among their close relatives twelve **Fermiers-Généraux**, twelve **Receveurs des Finances** and three **Trésoriers-Généraux de France**.  

When Toleration enabled the Protestant merchants to act with greater freedom in the eighteen sixties and seventies, their economic power as employers and capitalists aroused the hostility of Catholic producers and workers in an economic climate that was deteriorating. Economic pressures on textile workers and Guild masters who began to realise that the greater part of their livelihood was effectively in the hands of Calvinists, who could dispose of work as they saw fit, encouraged working class loyalties to divide along sectarian lines.

At the same time, the emergence of a Protestant élite that was increasingly liberated from the traditional legal disablements brought it into conflict with the Catholic élites, the Church, lawyers and landowners who had been able to occupy unopposed the public offices of the Sénéchaussée. The clash between the two élites became evident in the 1780's, when a group of Protestant Merchants, with the support of some Catholic businessmen, sought membership of the city council, a body that had hitherto been composed entirely


21 **Hood, "Patterns of Popular Protest"**, p.265.


of Catholic notables, and it came to head in 1789, when the admission of all sects to full citizenship was combined with political participation based on wealth. These measures did not merely enable Protestants to compete for political power, but positively favoured the rich Protestant merchants, who were finally able to break into local government. When a Conseil permanent was formed in Nîmes in the summer of 1789, eight of its twenty-one members were Protestants.25 Protestants thronged to another Revolutionary institution, the Légion nîmoise, a local militia set up to defend order and property. Indeed, Protestants were generally better able to meet the costs of equipment necessary for this body, essentially bourgeois in character.26

The sudden emergence of Protestants into political life was, then, immediately identifiable with political change in France as a whole. Moreover, it coincided with the first moves by the National Assembly to reduce the influence of the Catholic Church. In an area so sensitive to religious cleavage, the Church symbolized the supremacy of the Catholic community in public affairs in the minds of all social and economic classes that made up the Catholic

24 ibid., pp. 269-70.
community, and it guaranteed that certain positions would always be held by Catholics. Thus, to many Catholics, it appeared that the Revolution and the emergence of Protestantism as a political force were inextricably bound, and that the gains of the minority had to be offset by the losses of the majority. Consequently, the antagonism aggravated by the Revolution polarized along the lines of the traditional sectarian rivalry.

At an early stage of the Revolution, Catholics expressed open hostility to the changes taking place. Among the most vocal opponents of the Revolution was François Froment, whose hostility was indeed associated with a bitter anti-Protestantism and with his family's economic dependence on the Church. At great personal cost, Froment was to remain a leading agent of the Princes until 1814.

27 The Froment family had traditionally held the post of Receveur des Biens du Clergé. Ch. Pouthas, Une Famille de Bourgeoisie française de Louis XIV à Napoléon (Paris, 1934), p.89.

28 In the 1780's, Froment's father had been forced to flee from Nîmes after accusations that he had been misappropriating Church revenues was made by a commercial interest group that included Protestant merchants. The family never forgot the accusation, for which it held the Protestants responsible. G. Lewis, "The White Terror in the Gard: Counter-revolution, Continuity and the Individual." Past and Present, No. 58, pp. 108-35

29 See note 27 supra.

30 For an account of Froment's activities on behalf of the princes, see: Froment, Lettre à Monsieur le Marquis de Foucault, Rapporteur de la Commission des anciens Officiers (Paris, 1817). Eventually, abandoned by the restored monarchy, Froment attempted to take legal action : Procès de Froment contre Monsieur, frère du Roi (Paris, 1823).
As early as the autumn of 1789, Froment was liaising with the Princes in Turin, and he had taken command of the embryonic counter-revolutionary faction in Nîmes.\(^{31}\) Shortly after the formation of the Légion nîmoise, Froment, seconded by his brothers and other Catholic officials including Vidal, Procureur of Nîmes, formed a number of Catholic militia companies drawn from the ranks of those Catholics who were financially ineligible for the new Légion.\(^{32}\) In 1790, Froment presided over an assembly of Catholics that drew up a document condemning the policies of the National Assembly with regard to the Catholic church.\(^{33}\) The declaration was overtly anti-revolutionary and anti-Protestant. It was made just after a Catholic victory in the Nîmes municipal election, and Froment pledged the support of his Catholic irregulars to the Catholic council.

The response of the Protestants to this onslaught was a reaffirmation of Protestant loyalty to the new institutions. The Protestant bourgeoisie hastened to found a Société des Amis de la Constitution\(^ {34}\), hostile to the

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attitudes of the Municipal Council. By late Spring, 1790, the "peaceful year of the Revolution", mutual hostility was at its peak because it was evident that political change was transferring power to the Protestant community's representatives at the expense of the Catholics. At the same time, the very symbol of Catholic ascendancy, the Church, was itself coming under attack.

Elections were held in June 1790 for a new body, the Conseil général, or departmental council. The Catholic party increased its counter-revolutionary agitation. White cocardes were flaunted, and Froment's men styled themselves Aristocrates. At the same time, they endeavoured to exclude the Protestants from the new council.

The efforts of the Catholic militants were in vain, and the Protestant bourgeoisie won a majority on the Conseil général. This left the Catholics with no other solution but force against their rivals if they were to try and salvage the situation, and the more exasperated Catholics sought a confrontation with the representatives of the new régime.

Such a confrontation did take place on 13 June, when firing broke out between Froment's militia and the official Légion nîmoise. The result was full scale civil war.

35 Pouthas, op. cit., p.95
36 The quotation is from S. Scott, "Problems of Law and Order in 1790", American Historical Review, 80, pp.859-88. The article examines disturbances that took place at a time that is held to be a quiet period of the Revolution.
37 Archives parlementaires 1ère Série. Assemblée nationale, Séance du 11 mai, 1790.
38 Lauze de Péret, op.cit., p.15; Pouthas, op.cit., p.96
the Bagarre de Nîmes, which lasted two full days and cost some three hundred lives\textsuperscript{39}. While the counter-revolutionary faction counted on assistance from the Catholic villages to the south and east of Nîmes, the Protestants received support from the western part of the department which was predominantly Protestant\textsuperscript{40}.

Thus, the first concerted and popularly supported attempt to resist the changes brought about by the Revolution was made along confessional lines. It was a failure, and its leaders were killed or forced to flee\textsuperscript{41}. The National Assembly, after demanding an inquiry into the affair, dissolved the Nîmes municipal council, and so removed the only remaining Catholic controlled body in the new order of things. From February 1791, the Protestant bourgeoisie remained the undisputed political masters of local politics\textsuperscript{42}.

The Bagarre de Nîmes is significant not simply because it was the first serious, popular challenge to the course the Revolution was taking, but because the lines of division were confessional - familiar and easily assimilable by the local population. Moreover, because the conflict took place during


\textsuperscript{40} "Comte rendu les 22 et 23 février 1791 a l'Assemblée nationale au nom de la municipalité de Nîmes par le baron de Marguerittes." Archives parlementaires, 1ère série, 23, pp.406-431; 470-487.

\textsuperscript{41} Froment, whose brother was killed, escaped from the massacre and fled to Turin from which town he renewed his counter-revolutionary endeavours. Lettre à Monsieur le Marquis de Foucault, p.15.

\textsuperscript{42} See Alquier's report to the National Assembly, 19 February 1791, Archives Parlementaires, 1ère série, 23, pp.299-320.
an early phase of the Revolution, before the monarchy was in
danger, while the Assembly was still moderate and reforming,
Catholic royalism in the Gard could be seen clearly to be lin-
ked closely to confessional rivalry and to distinct views
of how local society should be organised. In the liberal
atmosphere of France of the Constituent Assembly and of the
Fédération, the rigid and apparently brutal rejection of
change by Catholics was discredited. Nipped in the bud, Catholi
catholic royalism in the Gard was never to achieve the degree of im-
portance or notoriety that the Bretons and Vendéens were to
achieve later.

The clash did, however, reinforce the belief of many
Catholics that Revolution and Protestantism amounted to the
same thing in practical terms. The defeat of 1790 was
added to the list of previous misfortunes brought about by
the presence of the Calvinist community. Consequently, when
revolutionary regimes were brought to an end or appeared to
be tottering, the opponents of these regimes struck at the
most apparent representatives of the régimes - the Protestants.
Barely two months after the Bagarre, in August of 1790, a
gathering of National Guards from the Gard, Ardèche and Lozère
was held at the Château de la Banne, near Jalès in the Ardèche.
It was convoked at the request of local counter-revolutionaries
and sponsored by the Turin émigrés. Among the resolutions
moved by the gathering, the most concrete were to march on

43 Many years later, in 1815, a Catholic Royalist prefect
could state that "the Protestant religion has always
formed a political party, and this party is anti-monarchic
in principle". AN F7 9049. D'Arbaud Jouques to the
minister of police, 26 October, 1815.
Nîmes in order to release those Catholics held in custody since the Bagarre, and to massacre the Protestant populations of the south. While neither of these proposals was acted upon, the permanent committee elected by the assembly at Jales continued to conspire and it convoked a second assembly to meet in February 1792. The revolutionary authorities were aware of the movements of the committee, and a number of National Guard detachments were persuaded not to attend the assembly. Some groups did assemble at the Château de la Banne, and once again the demands were to march on Nîmes and Uzès, but 'moderate' views carried the day. The assembly disbanded shortly before patriot guardsmen from the towns marched to the Château in order to put an end to the deliberations. Then, in April 1792, the outbreak of war between France and Austria and Prussia inflated the hopes of the émigrés. Jales became the focal point of a projected popular rising which would help to crush the Revolution from within France. In many respects, the choice of the south east was obvious as far as the émigres were concerned. They knew of its almost constant agitation since 1789, and they were informed by such men as Froment. However, they had very little direct information, and their agents in the south were already well known. When an attempt was made to organise an insurrection in July 1792, it was quickly arrested.

45 ibid., pp.233-234.
46 ibid., pp.234-235.
It is significant that in these abortive counter-revolutionary attempts, the designated target of political violence was the Protestant community. The Protestant bourgeoisie was the very embodiment of Revolution in the early years, before the Représentants en Mission brought Parisian zeal into the provinces, and before the Sociétés populaires cast off the tutelage of the economic elites. Indeed, at the outbreak of the Revolution, Froment saw clearly the value of sectarianism in his plans to organise opposition to the Revolution in Lower Languedoc, and he and the Turin committee believed that the area was the most propitious terrain for mounting a counter-attack.47

The most celebrated areas of resistance, Brittany and the Vendée, were still far from the thoughts of the princes.

Because of its domination of local politics from the outbreak of the Revolution in the Gard, the Protestant bourgeoisie was closely involved in the Federalist revolt of 1793 and the ensuing reprisals and purges. Thus, among the 150 persons who died under the Terror in the Gard, 117 are indicated as Protestants.48 Even though the failure of

47 François Froment, Lettre à Monsieur le Marquis de Foucault, pp. 15,71; P. J. Lauze de Péret, Eclaircissements historiques, p.13.

48 A. N. F7 9049. Anon. Mss. n. d. Notice sur les Protestants du Gard; BB3 154. Cavalier, Procureur général de Nîmes, to minister of Justice, 12 November, 1815: "It is no less certain that, in 1793, the Protestants of this town furnished more victims to the Revolution than did the Catholics." Statistical evidence is given by H. Fajon, Pièces et Documents officiels pour servir à l'Histoire de la Terreur à Nîmes et dans le Département du Gard, An II de la République, Une et Indivisible (Nîmes, 1867); and Liste des Condamnés à Mort par les Divers Tribunaux et Cours à Nîmes de 1791 à 1884 (Nîmes, 1884).
federalism temporarily broke the local political power of the Protestant bourgeoisie\textsuperscript{49}, the Protestant community was able to reassert its supremacy after Thermidor, and to consolidate that ascendancy under Napoleon.\textsuperscript{50}

But if the fall of Robespierre signalled the end of the Terror and of the short lived rule of the Sociétés populaires, it heralded, too, the emergence of royalism and of a counter terror, organised by counter revolutionaries, which took a form of violence that was particularly


M. Ligou contends that there was no distinct peuple protestant to replace the Protestant bourgeoisie in 1793 because of the pre revolutionary persecution that had weighed on the lower classes more than on the bourgeoisie. (p. 39)

\textsuperscript{50} Public Record Office, London (Hereafter PRO), Foreign Office series 27/130. Colonel Ross to Sir Charles Stuart, 21 January, 1816: "The superiority of power and influence they (Protestants) enjoyed under the protection and fostering care of Bonaparte."

Also:

A.N. BB\textsuperscript{3} 154. Cavalier, Procureur général de Nîmes to minister of justice, 12 November, 1815; D. Robert, op. cit., pp. 151-2. Although smaller in numbers than the Paris community, the Nîmes Protestant community was more cohesive and prestigious, second only to Geneva. Moreover, certain clauses in the Concordat of 1802 had enabled Protestants to challenge successfully the right of Catholics to hold public religious processions. Nîmes was the only large town south of the Loire where this prohibition was successfully enforced for a considerable period. (ibid, pp. 97-8).
acute in the south east of France. 51

Professor Godechot points out that the intensity and different 'waves' of counter-revolutionary terrorism coincided with laws repealing the prohibition of hitherto proscribed categories of enemies of the people. 52

Many of the southern towns, particularly those along the Rhône valley, were the scenes of violence that usually stemmed from a thirst for revenge. Bands of counter-revolutionaries styling themselves Compagnies de Jéhu or Compagnies du Soleil were involved in many such acts of revenge. Leading Revolutionaries were incarcerated and formally executed if they had not already fallen victims of popular retribution. 53

In Nîmes, the former mayor, Courbis, and other members of the Revolutionary Committee and Tribunal were massacred by a mob, notwithstanding the presence of a military escort, in February 1795 as they were being taken to prison. On 25 May and 28 June of the same year, nearly one hundred political prisoners were massacred in the prisons of nearby

51 Excellent insights into the White Terror can be found in two of Professor R.C. Cobb's books: The Police and the People (Oxford, 1970), pp. 131-50; Reactions to the French Revolution (Oxford, 1972), Chapter 1.

52 J. Godechot, op.cit., Chapter 13. The law of 20 Nivose, An III, authorised the return of those who had fled after 31 May 1793. The law of 3 Nivose, An III, authorised the reopening of churches. The law of 5 Ventose, An III, ordered the arrest of all members of Comités de Surveillance and of local administrative bodies disbanded after 10 Thermidor.

53 In Vaucluse immediately after the fall of Robespierre, some 500 peasants accused of 'fanatisme' or federalism were released. Many were from the eastern Gard. This measure was followed by the release of 'tous les pretres et nobles' by Perrin and Goupilleau. Patriots were disarmed and arrested. See P. Vaillandet,"Les Débuts de la Terreur blanche en Vaucluse", Annales historiques de la Révolution française, 1928, pp.109-27.
Tarascon by groups of counter-revolutionary terrorists.\textsuperscript{54}

The elimination of local Jacobins like Courbis enabled the Protestant bourgeoisie to regain control of the Gard. During the Empire, the Protestant community flourished. Bonaparte granted the Calvinists freedom of worship and gave them their own churches, thus assuring their loyalty and adding another layer of resentment and hatred that would be exploited by the Catholics, still firmly attached to the monarchy.\textsuperscript{55}

In spite of the ascendancy Protestantism achieved during the Empire, Gard Protestants were not unduly disheartened when the Empire collapsed in 1814. Economic matters counted for more than loyalty to a man who appeared to be bent on personal glory rather than the prosperity of the nation, so the Protestant bourgeoisie accepted the Restoration of the Bourbons with the guarantees of religious freedom and full citizenship contained in the Charter.\textsuperscript{56} The promise of a document like the Charter appeared to rule out ar-

\textsuperscript{54} Godechot, op.cit., p.254.

\textsuperscript{55} See note 50, p.18 supra. Also, a group of English ministers, writing in defence of the Protestants of the Gard in 1816, stressed the consolidation of Protestant power under Bonaparte: "Those among them who solicited public offices obtained them... Could they do otherwise than bless a reign which recalled to their minds that of the bon Henri?" Notes intended as Materials for a Memoire in Justification of the Conduct of the Protestants of the Gard(London, 1816), p.7.

\textsuperscript{56} Articles 5 and 8.
bitrary government or reprisals and it guaranteed the inviolability of private property, including those biens nationaux that had been purchased. Consequently, when the news of the Restoration reached Nîmes on 13 April, 1814, the white flag, the standard of the Bourbons, was raised over the town, and the prefect of the Gard reported that both parties, that is, Catholics and Protestants, had received the news with joy.

The key to the subsequent events which led a future prefect of the Gard to describe his department as 'the most disgusting administration in the kingdom' lies in the attitudes of the local Catholic Royalists who hailed the restoration of the Bourbons as the signal to re-establish in the Gard the status quo of the ancient regime and thus to restore to themselves the monopoly of local office and prestige which had been lost to the Protestants in 1790. Moreover, the humiliation of 1790 had to be effaced. The single motive of revenge, of excluding from power the traditional enemy, was to colour politics in the Gard through the first half of the nineteenth century, so that sectarianism was at the bottom of political affiliations, and changes of government and regime fed sectarian bitterness. Further, the confessional dimension in the Gard meant that, whilst Ultra royalists in

57 Article 9.

58 A.N. F7 9049. Baron Roland, Prefect of the Gard, to director of police, 27 April, 1814. D. Robert, op. cit., p.260, argues that there were no signs among the Protestants of open regret at Napoleon's abdication, and no evidence of what he calls an association de fait of Protestantism and Bonapartism.

59 A.N.F16 I 176, dossier 14. Villiers du Terrage to the minister of the interior, 5 February, 1820.
many parts of France aspired to a vaguely medieval France, Catholic Royalists in the Gard sought to realise precise and concrete aims: the exclusive control of a locality.

That the exclusion of the Protestants from local affairs and the achievement of some measure of revenge were major elements of Catholic Royalism in the Gard was revealed by the observation of a police agent, Claude Eymard, who was sent to the Gard in the summer of 1814 to provide first hand information on the quality of the local officials for the government. In September, 1814 Eymard wrote:

"One can say without exaggeration that royalism had survived the fall of the Monarchy in the Catholic community of the department, and that it was not a shallow sentiment. Their part in the Camps de Jalès (61) their desire to contribute to the Lyon insurrection, the plan they had laid to hasten the end of Buonaparte's government are proof of it. The love of the king, which they never lost, was strengthened by the memory of the ills they had endured and the humiliations they had suffered by seeing themselves under the domination of the Protestants who occupied all the positions, having had only a few previously. Injured pride and resentment were powerful barbs which were linked in their case to the sovereign's cause." (62).

Lauze de Péret, who was to become one of the principal publicists of the Protestant cause, alleged that the raising of the white flag to acknowledge the restoration was accompanied

60 A.N. 124 A.P. (Archives privées) 1. Papiers Eymard. 2 Letters from Beugnot, director general of police to Eymard, 16 July, 1814.
61 See pp.15-16 supra.
62 A.N. 124 A.P. 1. Eymard to director general of police, 6 September, 1814.
by outbursts of anti-protestant sentiments, including personal attacks on the Protestant mayor of Nîmes, Boileau de Castelneu63. Far from being an isolated incident, an expression of spontaneous triumphalism, the attack on the mayor summed up the desire of certain people to 'de-protestantise' the administration, and it was but the first of a series of concerted attacks on Protestants in public office in the early days of the first restoration. Thus, in mid-April, in the course of a free gala put on in the salle des spectacles, there were cries of Vive le Roi! A bas le maire! On 1 May, a delegation of citizens from Beaucaire travelled to Nîmes for the ceremony of planting a 'May tree' in front of the Hôtel de la Préfecture. Another prominent Protestant, Vincens St. Laurent, conseiller at the Prefecture, was insulted64. No changes in the departmental administration had been made by the royal government which had not yet arrived in Paris, and the public could not have been aware of the degree of reconciliation Louis XVIII intended to foster in France, reconciliation that contrasted starkly with the demands of the group in Nîmes that was, by the month of May, identifiable by its composition and demands. Thus, on 28 April, a group of citizens of Nîmes drew up and circulated for signatures an address to the king, urging the rejection of compromise and the restoration of absolute power

63 Lauze de Péret, op. cit., pp. 95-7.

64 A.N. 124 A.P. 1. Eymard memorandum to director general of police, n.d.
to the royal person. The petition caused considerable unrest among the Protestants, who saw in it a conscious reproduction of the counter-revolutionary Délibération des Citoyens catholiques of 1790, drawn up under the guidance of Froment, and condemned as sectarian and inflammatory by the National Assembly. 65

The new petition emanated from a gathering that had adopted the title Société royale de Nîmes. According to Eymard, the society had some two hundred members, but most of its meetings were attended by a small number of these. The meetings were directed by a committee of twelve, and they took place in a room above a café. 66 This society, or its committee, was at the centre of the extreme royalist agitation that had been taking place, and much of the unrest was provoked by its members. 67

However, the society's interests went beyond displays of anti-Protestantism. At its head were men who had been in touch with the emigres during the Revolution, and who had worked for the exiled court in an energetic fashion. 68 Thus,

65 Baragonon, op.cit., vol 4, pp.201-2. See pp. 12, 13, supra for the context of the 1790 Délibération.

66 A.N. 124 AP 1. Eymard memorandum to the director general of police, n.d.

67 Lavondès, Terme and Vampere, three members of the Société royale, had been largely responsible for the anti-Protestant demonstrations of April 1814. A.N. F7 9049. Rolland to Latour-Maubourg, 8 June, 1814.

68 A.N. 124 AP 1. Eymard to director general of police, 1 September, 1814: "By the end of 1813, individuals devoted to the king had set up, on the instructions of the agents of the princes, groups in Nîmes, Arles, Marseille and Saint Gilles in order to assist the return of the royal family."
it enjoyed access to exalted royalist circles in Paris after the abdication of Napoleon, and was in a position to respond rapidly to changes in policy in Paris and so take whatever action suited the moment. In June 1814, the Société was in receipt of regular instruction from François Froment, then in Paris in the service of Louis XVIII69. It was then that the prefect of the Gard, Rolland, decided to detain the principal Nîmes agents of the society, in an attempt "to intimidate the society and put an end to its agitation"70. The interrogation of Lavondès, Terme and Vampère revealed that the extreme royalists were dissatisfied with the policies of Louis XVIII, and that they were now pinning their hopes on his brother, Monsieur, comte d'Artois, making "Vive les Bourbon!" their slogan, not "Vive le Roi!"71.

The dissatisfaction continued through the summer of 1814 with groups of men, women and children gathering to sing royalist songs and to insult passing Protestants. Men like Vampère and Terme were observed at the head of these gatherings on several occasions72, and were often seen travelling through the Nîmes countryside on the business of the sociéité royale73.

69 A.N. F79049. Rolland to Lautour-Maubourg, 17 June 1814.
70 A.N. F79049. Rolland to Latour-Maubourg, 8 June, 1814.
71 A.N. F7 9049. Latour Maubourg to director general of police, 3 August 1814.
72 A.N. F7 9049. Rolland to director general of police, 3 August, 1814.
73 A.N. F7 9049. Inspector of the departmental gendarmerie to director of police, August, 1814.
These disturbances increased after the arrival in Nîmes of Boyer, a lawyer, who was said to be one of Froment's associates in Paris, and who was the author and bearer of the petition of 28 April 74. Lavondès had nailed a slogan "Les Bourbon ou la Mort" above his door, and, because of his violent passions, the Commissaire extraordinaire du Roi, Latour-Maubourg, decided it was necessary to have him incarcerated in the fortress prison at Agde. By his action, Latour-Maubourg uncovered quite accidentally another dimension of the political unrest in the Gard. No sooner was Lavondès in custody than the director general of the Police, Count Beugnot, ordered his release. The dossier on the matter reveals that the Marquis Dreux-Brézé, Grand Master of Ceremonies of the King's Household, and the Chancellor of France, Dambray, had interceded on behalf of this man who was a bankrupt and had some twenty convictions for violence to his credit. They had been approached by a number of Gard notables, including the Vicomte de Rochemore and Baron, a Nîmes lawyer with pronounced anti-Protestant sentiments.

74 ibid.
75 A.N. F 9049. Mayor of Nîmes (Boileau Castelneau) to prefect June, 1814.
76 A.N. F 9049. Commissaire général de Police (Hérault) to director general of police, 1. July 1814.
77 Archives départementales du Gard (Hereafter A.D. Gard) 6M 3. Beugnot to baron Rolland, 13 August 1814.
78 A.N. F 9049. Latour Maubourg to Rolland, 8 June, 1814. Latour Maubourg added that Lavondès was taking advantage of the political changes to intimidate his creditors.
79 In 1814, he was one of the most vociferous denouncers of 'disloyal' Protestants. A.N. F 9049. Baron to Eymard, 12 September, 1814.
The relationship between these notables and a man like Lavondès is more comprehensible when one learns that he was proscribed by the Revolutionary Committee of Nîmes in the Year II for having "persisted in counter-revolutionary principles". Lavondès was mentioned, too, by Eymard as having been one of the chief royalist agents in the Nîmes area during the Empire. It was possibly this kind of discovery that led Decazes and Beugnot to send Claude Eymard to the area in order to assess the reliability of the administrators in the Summer of 1814. Unlike Latour-Maubourg, the Commissaire extraordinaire du Roi, Eymard was from the south but was unknown in Nîmes. Decazes, in particular, was to make much use of him in 1817 in his attempts to destroy the Catholic Royalist network in the Gard.

In the Summer of 1814, one incident in particular revealed the strength and intransigence of the Société royale. On 25 August, instead of participating in the municipal celebrations in honour of Saint Louis, the royalistes purs as they were now called, held a separate reunion in a café on the edge of town. The dinner and speeches were observed by Eymard, who drew up a list of people present. The list comprises Catholics from all walks of life - négociants, fabricants, avocats, propriétaires, taffetassiers, employés and crocheteurs. Among the individuals Eymard identified - thirty-five in all - were Lavondès, the Terme brothers, and others.

80 A.D. Gard, L 1198. Compte rendu des opérations du comité révolutionnaire de Nîmes, 4 Prairial An II.

81 A.N. 124 A.P. 1. Eymard memorandum to director general of police, 1 September, 1814.
Vampère and Thomas Froment. The membership of the société was, then, broadly based within the Catholic community, and the société had strong links with notables in Paris and with the Catholic working classes of Nîmes which it could mobilise to cause trouble. After the celebration, Vampère publicly insulted a retired officer who had chosen to wear his cross of the Legion of Honour in honour of the day, thus giving some indication of the tenor of the gathering in which he had participated.

The société royale was taking up a position of hostility to the administration in the Gard which, they said, was still in the hands of the king's enemies. In July, the mayor, Boileau de Castelneau, resigned. Boyer, author of the April petition, announced on his arrival from Paris, that he would be nominated. In the event the government chose to appoint another Protestant, David Daunant, who had been honoured by Napoleon with the title of baron. The government was not only unwilling to dismiss Protestants from the administration, but it was not even prepared to appoint royalists to vacant

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83 A.N.Fl III Gard 13. Mayor of Nîmes to director general of police, 7 October 1814.

84 A.N. F79094. Dreux Brézé, when he interceded on behalf of Lavondès, had been told that Lavondès was the victim of "a party only too powerful in the department". Letter to Beugnot, director of police, 6 August, 1814.

Baron, writing to Dambray on behalf of Lavondès said it was another case of "good royalists ill used by the opposing party which is still in control of the authorities". Extract of a letter written by Baron to the Chancellor of France, 10 August, 1814.

85 A.N. 124 AP 1. Eymard to director general of police, 30 August, 1814.
positions. What must have been the anger of the Catholic Royalists, who had believed that their counter-revolutionary pedigree would entitle them to occupy public office once more and enable them to humiliate the Protestants? At the end of August, Eymard reported that extreme royalist opinion had concluded that the king was not going to carry out a 'new revolution'.86 They looked even more to the Comte d'Artois for the realisation of their aims and even began to spread rumours of the imminent abdication of Louis in favour of his brother87. Shouts of 'Vive le Comte d'Artois' symbolised the hopes of the royalists88.

At the same time, their determination became greater and their intentions more sinister. As Daunant said, the extreme royalists expected a bloody reaction after the return of the Bourbons; for their part, the royalists of Nîmes had redoubled their communications with their associates in Paris, but had, at the same time, gone 'underground', hiding the minutes of their committee meetings and passing messages and instructions to each other orally89.

By the autumn, Daunant was sure in his own mind that the royalists had rejected the restoration as it was evolving. They awaited a true counter-revolution to re-establish all that had been destroyed by the Revolution, and to achieve

86 A.N. 124 AP 1. Eymard memorandum, 30 August, 1814.
87 A.N.F7 9049. Rolland to director general of police, 8 September 1814.
88 A.N. F7 9049. Rolland to director of police, 8 September, 1814.
89 A.N. 124 AP 1. Daunant to Eymard, 10 September, 1814.
their aim, they intended to use all the methods of the rev-
olution - "all the odious forms of Jacobinism" - and, more
significant in the area, "the firebrand of religious fanaticism."90

Religious fanaticism was the term used by Daunant to
describe the royalists' attempts to secure an all-powerful
role for the Catholic Church in the area, as this would
restore the supremacy of the Catholic community and eliminate
Protestantism as a political and economic force. The pe-
tition the Société royale sent to the King in April had been
intended to warn the Protestants not to expect any toleration
of their rights as defined by the Revolutionary and consular
laws as much as it had been a loyal protestation to the
monarch not to accept any limitation of his powers. That
petition was followed in January 1815 by a new address in
which the Société royale urged the King to authorise the re-
establishment in France of the Society of Jesus.91 The
Protestants were left in little doubt of the fate reserved
for them if the royalists had their way. A contemporary
wrote:

"By January 1815, the Protestants
could have no more illusions
regarding the intentions of their
adversaries; their most deep seated
fears were only too well founded."92

90 A.N. Flc III Gard 13. Daunant to minister of the interior,
7 October, 1814.

91 A.N. Flc III Gard 13. Daunant to minister of interior,
11 February, 1815. The address was described as dangerously
inflammatory by the abbé Montesquiou, minister of the

However, there was little to suggest in January 1815 that the extremists would have their way in the Gard. The prefect and conseillers had not been changed, the sub prefects had not been changed, and a Protestant mayor of Nîmes had been succeeded by another Protestant mayor. It required the return of Bonaparte in March 1815 and the ensuing civil strife to give the Gard extreme royalists the opportunity to take what steps they felt appropriate to crush the Calvinists. They had seen the spoils of victory slip from their hands in 1814, and were to make certain that there was no mistake made when the next opportunity arose. In many respects, the period known as the Hundred Days was an unexpected second chance for them.

In the complex and confused circumstances of the Hundred Days, Protestants became closely identified once again with bonapartism and treachery, while the royalists were forced to flee. The link between religion and politics was glaring. Catholic commentators were quick to point out that few Protestants rallied to the Royalist Volunteer battalions recruited by the duc d'Angoulême in order to halt Bonaparte's progress. Protestant commentators protested that those who did volunteer were rebuffed by the diehard royalists. After the rout of the Volunteers at La Palud, four volunteers returning to Nîmes were murdered in the Protestant village of Arpaillargues in confusing circumstances. While the Protestant accounts

93 Almanach impérial 1813; Almanach royal 1814-15.
94 See R. de Bernis, Précis de ce qui s'est passé dans le Gard et la Lozère (1818), pp. 10-15.
95 Lauze de Péret, op. cit., p. 37.
attribute the murder to panic because of rumours of assaults carried out by returning volunteers, the Catholics saw it as another example of Protestant perfidy and used it to promote, then to justify, the White Terror that was unleashed in the summer.

Yet it would be incorrect to conclude that the Catholics projected onto the Protestants a role that the latter were reluctant to accept. Official reports dating from the period March to June stressed that the Protestant cantons of the department, Alès and Le Vigan, were soundly bonapartist. When the local administrators who refused to serve Napoleon resigned, they were replaced by Protestants in the main.


99 A. N. F 9049. Baron Roggieri (Bonapartist prefect) to minister of police, 2 May 1815.

A little later, Roggieri wrote that the patriots of Nîmes were "not so much patriotic as anti-Catholic." 19 May 1815.

Rolland, before his dismissal, had reported that the Protestants were showing their anger at the Catholic party "which supports the claims of nobles, priests and emigres" 13 April 1815. This attitude contrasts with the silence of the Protestants in the face of provocation during the first restoration.

100 A. N. F 11b II Gard 4 shows that a number of posts went to men who would become leading Orleanists after 1830. It is also noteworthy that the Gard deputies to the new Corps LéGISLATIF were protestants; Gilly, the general who had handed over the Nîmes Garrison; Teste, and Vincens St. Laurent.
Daunant, the mayor of Nîmes since July 1814, was maintained in his office and did not resign. But he did not actively further the interests of the new regime, nor did the municipal councils of many towns wish to commit themselves to it unconditionally. Nonetheless, the fact that the Protestants had come into their own under Napoleon and that they were not seen to be actively opposing him now was enough for the Catholic extremists to identify Protestantism with Bonapartism. That Nîmes had been taken over by the so called bataillon sacré, a band of demi-soldes, while the royalist volunteers were on the Rhône trying to stop Napoleon was for many people reason enough to impute treason to the Protestants as well as collusion.

The Royalist volunteers raised by the duc d'Angoulême were, with the prominent extreme Royalists of the first restoration, marked men. Many, including Lavondès, Terme and Vampère were exiled from the department and put under surveillance. Many volunteers who decided not to return to their homes went south to the coast, where they formed a number of camps in the Camargue, thus avoiding capture and establishing contact with the duc d'Angoulême and his entourage, who had taken ship to Spain. Throughout the Hundred days, these

101 A.N. F7 9049. Roggieri to minister of police. n.d.
102 A.N. F7 9049. Roggieri to minister of police, 19 May 1815.
104 A.D. Gard 6M 7. Minister of police to Roggieri, 6 May 1815.
105 F. Daudet, Souvenirs d'un vieux royaliste (Nîmes, 1884).
Royalists created disturbances in the Gard and neighbouring Hérault, keeping royalist sentiments alive and organising support for an insurrection. 106

The Hundred Days throw light on another aspect of Catholic Royalism in the Gard, the involvement of a number of very influential and wealthy local landed notables whose affiliations with the Société royale had not existed or had not been noted during the first Restoration. The count René de Bernis and his brother-in-law, Marquis Jacques-Alexis de Calvière were among those who followed the duc d'Angoulême to Spain, 107 while a cousin of the latter helped organise a royalist network in the Aigues Mortes area, 108 aided by the Marquis de Montcalm. 109 De Bernis and De Calvière were landed by boat near Aigues Mortes shortly before Waterloo and were given command of the Gard and Lozère royalists.

Not only was an armed insurrection prepared. From exile in Spain, François Froment wrote a bitter letter to the duc de Blacas, whom he held responsible for the policies that had led to the usurpation. Froment outlined plans for France once Napoleon was defeated. The Press and mail, he said, must be censored, and in each department, a corps of loyal men must be set up under the command of a gentleman, armed and ready

106 A.D. Gard 6M 7 and A.N. F 7 9049 contain many gendarmerie reports of seditious gatherings, posters and slogans, mainly in the south and east of the department.

107 Château de Vézénobre. Mss. notes by Pulchérie-Cécile, Marquise de Calvière, née Saint Priest.

108 A.N. Flb I 157, dossier 3.

to defend the Monarchy against treachery. 110 Within months, such measures, which call to mind chapter twenty-three of Stendhal's *Rouge et Noir*, would be implemented in the Gard so systematically that it is not possible to accept the assertion of those historians who explain the White Terror after Waterloo as a spontaneous occurrence, an act of popular justice or revenge rather like the 1944 reaction to collaborators. 111 Amidst the apparent confusion and widespread bloodshed that the Midi experience in the summer of 1815, it is possible to detect, in the Gard and neighbouring areas, at least, a determined and carefully orchestrated endeavour on the part of the Blancs to chastise their rivals, and to realise by their own methods the outcome they had expected of the first Restoration, but had failed to achieve by pacific means.

110 In Froment, Recueil d'Écrits relatifs à la Révolution Mss. document, A.D. Gard, Fonds légal, 341.

Chapter 2.

The second restoration of Louis XVIII to the throne of his ancestors could have none of the optimistic joy of the first. The victory of the exasperated allies had overthrown Bonaparte and it was in the wake of the advancing allied armies that Louis and his exiles made their way to Paris. Moreover, unlike 1814, the second restoration could not claim that it would reconcile old wounds. On the contrary, there were now victors and vanquished, for those Frenchmen who had supported the Hundred Days could be charged with treason. At the same time, the facts were embarrassing: a significant number of Frenchmen had rejected the Restoration, and their defeat was due entirely to foreign armies. Thus, the Bourbons could in no way identify with patriotism. Also, their position as rulers of France was delicate, for the allies had even less reason now than in 1814 to restore the monarchy. At least in 1814 it appeared to enjoy the good will of the population and to be able to promise peace and stability in troublesome France. Ironically, it was largely due to the cunning of Fouche and the presence of Wellington that Louis XVIII was able to regain his throne a second time. The legitimacy of the restored monarchy was compromised even more by the emergence of a deep split between constitutionalists.

1 J. Cabanis, Charles X (Paris 1972), pp. 109-111. It was on instructions of Wellington that Louis and his followers made their way from Ghent to Cambrai, from Cambrai to Roye, then to Gonesse and finally to the Tuileries after the Prussian and English armies had camped in Paris.
and Ultra royalists, as they were now called. Those royalists who had rejected the principle of a constitutional monarchy in 1814 now had their fears and prejudices vindicated. The Hundred Days had hardened their attitudes and had encouraged their emergence as a coherent political force, whose leadership was to revolve around the Pavillon de Marsan, the residence of the Comte d'Artois, whose intransigence on constitutional government was no secret. A current of opinion, ill assorted and lacking cohesion in 1814, Ultra royalism was to be a constant embarrassment to the constitutional monarchy, refusing its support on the one hand, and provoking suspicion among "Revolutionaries" on the other by its indiscretion and provocation. The intransigence of the Ultra party can be held largely responsible for the failure of the constitutional experiment between 1814 and 1830. The Ultras constantly identified themselves with reactionary policies, pressing for the isolation and punishment of those who had played any part in the events between 1789 and 1814 in France. 

2 Thus, in 1815, the Ultras favoured the allied occupation of France. Three years later, in the Note secrète, they argued for a fresh occupation to put an end to the shift towards liberalism encouraged by Decazes. See Pasquier, Mémoires du Chancelier Pasquier (6 vols., Paris, 1893-5), vol. 4, p.251. The Note secrète also contained plans to destroy irrevocably the system of representative government. Later examples of the Ultras' intransigence can be seen in the bills concerning the Milliard des Emigrés, 1825; the question of primogeniture rather than the Napoleonic equal inheritance, 1825; and the question of punishment of sacrilege, 1825.
Coupled with their rejection of the Revolution, its principles and its works, the Ultra royalists displayed deep hostility towards the centralised state. In their demands for extensive decentralisation, Ultras were reiterating the demands of the 1788 Assembly of Notables, and were setting themselves squarely in the provincialist tradition that had already shown its strength in the Fronde, and tended to view with equal suspicion royal absolutism and democracy. The effects of the Revolution had, however, gone some way to reducing the differences between the Absolutists and Feudalists. In practice, decentralisation was the only practical way of ensuring that the counter-revolution triumphed when the king was deemed to be weak or suspect. In the South, a large measure of autonomy was sought by the local notables who had already accepted gladly the governorship of the duc d'Angoulême during the Hundred Days. The intensity of the White Terror would reveal the support enjoyed by men who sought freedom from the constraints imposed by Paris.

On their return to Paris, believing that they would enjoy great influence, the Ultras sought a severe purge

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4. See pp.33-5 supra. Blacas, now the scapegoat of the Ultras, believed that Artois and Angoulême were in agreement on the question of local autonomy. Blacas d'Aulps, Extrait d'un Mémoire justificatif (n.p., 1815), p.7.
of the nation and harsh punishment of those who had shown their true colours. According to Guizot, it was held that, of ten men who had served the king in 1814, seven deserved hanging, two the galleys and the tenth might just be considered an 'honnête homme'. During the exile of the Hundred Days, the Marquis de Chabannes had reflected the views of men like Froment when he wrote that 'a few years of absolute despotism' were the only remedy for the spirit of discussion and revolution that had afflicted France. Thus, from July 24 on, a series of measures were taken, by the king and by the Chambre introuvable, to seek out and punish those accused of aiding the usurpation, culminating in the laws which enabled the authorities to imprison without trial any person suspected of plotting against the royal family or the security of the state, and to have them tried, where appropriate, by special courts without the right of appeal. D. Resnick has calculated that in the twelve months following the second restoration, some 3,476 convictions for political offences were secured in the ordinary courts of the land, while there were a further 3,382 arrests without trial, resulting in detention. It is noticeable that the southern departments accounted for the highest number of political convictions in relation to

5 In Cabanis, *op. cit.*, p.105
7 Bertier de Sauvigny, *op. cit.*, pp130, 131.
the size of their population, and that among these, the Gard figured prominently with 154 convictions in the courts and 57 detentions without trial out of a population of 333,000. Yet the legal consequences of the restoration were simply one manifestation of the repression that was unleashed on France in the summer of 1815.

The events of the White Terror that raged across the south are well documented. The massacres in Marseille, the murder of general Ramel in Toulouse, that of Marshal Brune in Avignon are, with the events in Nîmes, the most notorious examples of violence enacted in the name of royalism. This chapter will seek to examine the events in Nîmes and its neighbouring towns in the context of a carefully planned effort on the part of certain Catholics to recreate a society in which they and their interests prospered, and to eradicate as fully as possible the Protestant party. Thus, the White Terror in the Gard was both a means to an end, and the occasion for settling old accounts.

9 The 8 departments of Ardèche, Aude, Bouches du Rhône, Gard, Hérault, Lozère, Pyrénées orientales and Tarn, with a combined population of 2,120,000, accounted for 678 convictions. The 10 south eastern departments accounted for 478 convictions, while 12 in the south west accounted for 593. D. Resnick, op. cit., pp. 128-9; 132.

10. ibid., p.128.


12 An example of this règlement de comptes is offered by Lavondès. Already, in 1814, he was abusing his royalism to intimidate Protestant creditors. A.N. F 7 9049. Latour-Maubourg to prefect, 8 June, 1814. See also G. Lewis, "The White Terror of 1815 in the Department of the Gard: Counter-revolution, Continuity and the Individual", Past and Present, 58, pp. 108-35.
Towards the end of June, when news of Waterloo had reached the south, the royalists, under the leadership of the duc d'Angoulême's special envoys\(^\text{13}\) began to congregate in the small town of Beaucaire, some 24 kilometres east of Nîmes. By the beginning of July, Beaucaire, Villeneuve les Avignon and Uzès were in their hands.\(^\text{14}\) From Beaucaire, René de Bernis and Jules de Calvière issued an ultimatum to the inhabitants of the Gard, urging them to consider their position carefully and to submit to the lawful government of France.\(^\text{15}\) This ultimatum was issued on the very day that five houses in Beaucaire, including those of the mayor's adjoints, were devastated.\(^\text{16}\) Royalist horsemen, wearing uniforms and white cocards were reported to be requisitioning horses in the area around Saint Gilles, a town to the south of Nîmes.\(^\text{17}\)

On 7 July, the municipal council of Nîmes, realising that a change of regime was imminent and fearful of the reaction of those royalists who had been singled out during the Hundred Days, sent delegates to Beaucaire in order to negotiate a peaceful transfer of authority in the department. The delegates returned to Nîmes with a written guarantee, signed by

13 See p.34 supra.

14 A.D. Gard 6M 7 contains a number of reports from Communes on the eastern side of the department recording the arrival of groups of royalists.

15 Lauze de Péret, Causes et Précis des Troubles, p.145


17 A.D. Gard 6 M 7. Commissaire de Police, St. Gilles to prefect, 3 July 1815.
Rent de Bernis, Jean de Barre and Jules de Calvière, that life and property would be respected if Nîmes offered no resistance to the Armée royale as it styled itself. The royalists entered Nîmes on the evening of July 17th and met no resistance from the Garde urbaine, the bonapartist national Guard, which allowed itself to be disarmed and stripped even of its uniforms, normally the property of each member. Then, the royalists approached the Barracks which contained a detachment of regular troops. The royalists demanded the artillery pieces in the charge of the troops, but these refused in the absence of any agreement. The commander of the barracks, Maulmont met Jean de Barre that evening to negotiate an honourable surrender. It was finally agreed that the troops would leave their weapons in the barracks and march out the next morning. As a matter of protocol, officers would be permitted to wear their swords. But while the negotiations were taking place, sporadic firing had broken out between royalists demanding the surrender of the cannons and the troops who refused to hand them over. The next morning, as the troops marched out of the barracks, Royalists demanded the surrender of the swords and fell upon the unarmed troops, murdering as many as they could lay their hands on. The massacre of the Bonapartist soldiers marked the first outrage among many that were to take place in the department of the

19 Lauze de Péret, Causes et Précis, pp.182-3.
Gard in the next two months by the so called royalist troops. Who then, were they?

Eyewitnesses of the entry into Nîmes, both royalists and liberals, agree that the Armée royale was composed of three groups - a body led by orderly officers which observed strict discipline, a second group, armed with a variety of weapons from rifles to pitchforks and batons, and a third group, a rabble, composed of the dregs of the population of the Gard and Bouches du Rhône, hoping to take advantage of the chaos to loot and steal. These men, calling themselves Miguelets and wearing a red fleur-de-lys on their coats, were responsible for the raids on the homes of guardsmen in order to get weapons and uniforms. Whatever their status, these bands of irregulars proceeded to pillage property in the town the day after they arrived and were able to do so unhindered, for the royalist leaders did not arrive in Nîmes until the evening of the nineteenth of July. Thus, in the words of a contemporary, "the pillage had been organised for some thirty hours!" The murder and violence that took place on the eighteenth and nineteenth was directed against Protestants, and the space of thirty hours or more was enough to allow the rank and file royalists to strike terror into the hearts of those known, or believed to be

21. F. Daudet, Souvenirs d'un vieux Royaliste, (Nîmes, n.d.). Louis Coulanges, the subject of Daudet's book, was a volunteer in Angoulême's forces, and later, a member of the Armée royale de Beaucaire; Ch. Durand, Marseille, Nîmes et ses Environs en 1815, par des Témoins oculaires (Paris, 1818).

22. A.N.F 9054. Anon., 25 August, 1815. The houses of Vincens, Devillers, Roux Amphous, Crouzat, Coste, Nègre, Durand and Mathieu were destroyed. In the night of 19 August, just before the elections, the houses of Clère, Duquet, Salle Dhombre, Lannes, Marvejols, Salles, Les Rouvejols, Carcassonne, Montlut, Muscat and Delord suffered the same fate.

23. Lauze de Péret, Causes et Précis, p.196.
hostile to the ambitions of the Catholic royalists. More than simple pillaging, it was the initial assault, intended to 'soften up' the town, and particularly the Protestants, and so prepare the ground for the establishment of an administration that would reflect the outlook of those who regarded the Protestants as the natural enemy. If anyone in Nîmes had hoped for an end to the violence and reassurances for the future when the royalist provisional government entered Nîmes, they would have been quickly convinced of their error. In a cortège formed by royalist cavalry and footsoldiers, the commissaire extraordinaire, René de Bernis, the provisional prefect, Jules de Calvière and the police commissioner, Vidal, rode into Nîmes. All three men were wearing the green and white cocarde in honour of the Comte d'Artois, a clear indication in the context of the First Restoration in the Gard that they were not partisans of constitutional government. Indeed, had the onlookers but known, a few hundred kilometres away in Toulouse, men were being murdered by royalists known as Verdets because they wore green and white in the same cause. Moreover, the three provisional administrators were local men, and their counter revolutionary pedigree was known to the Nîmois. De Bernis and de Calvière had spent some time with the émigrés, and both men had opposed the

24 Lauze de Péret, Causes et Précis, pp.196-207.
25 The most celebrated victim of the Verdets was General Ramel, who refused to recognise the irregulars. The Provisional authorities in the town did not or could not intervene to save his life. (Houssaye, 1815, pp.475-8; E. Daudet, Terreur blanche, p. 275). Subsequent efforts to uncover the authors of the crime were blocked by local officials (Archives municipales de Toulouse. SS 204, Fonds Remusat. Remusat, prefect, to minister of police, 30 November, 1815)
Hundred days actively. But possibly the most sinister appointment was that of Vidal. He had been, with Froment, one of the instigators of the bagarre de Nîmes in 1790, when he had been procureur of Nîmes. Thus his anti-Protestantism was well known. Subsequently, he was condemned by the Nîmes Revolutionary committee and spent several months of the run. A witness to his return to power in 1815 stated: 'The resurrection of M. Vidal, his appointment, indicate sufficiently the spirit in which the municipal authorities had been constituted'.

As provisional prefect, Calvière's first action was to replace the officials who were in office, and to put the local authorities in the hands of Ultra royalists. In his first report to Paris, he stressed that bonapartist opposition to the Restoration had obliged him to replace 'spontaneously' the sub prefects of Nîmes, Alès and Le Vigan and the secretary of the departmental council. The new appointees, de Larcy


Château de Vézénobres. Mss. notebooks of Pulchérie-Cécile, Marquise de Calvière.

Both men were from families long established in the area - de Bernis was nephew of the Cardinal de Bernis who had advised the pope to reject the Civil Constitution of the clergy in 1790.

27 Courrier de Beaucaire, No. 58, 26 May 1790. Also: 'Sommaire des événements arrivés à Nîmes depuis le décret de l'Assemblée nationale du 2 novembre 1789' (n.p.n.d.), p.18

Vidal was inciting counter revolution in the Gard.

28 A.D. Gard L 1198. Opérations du comité révolutionnaire de Nîmes, An II. Séance du 1er Prairial, An II.

29 Lauze de Péret, Causes et Précis, p.286.
at Le Vigan, Narbonne-Lara at Alès and Gabriac at Nîmes were, with the new secretary at the Prefecture, ardent royalists. De Calvière wrote that the appointments were:

"Dictated uniquely by a desire to serve the king well, (and) have received the approval of all the faithful servants of His Majesty."

At the same time, the police officials of Nîmes, Alès, Uzès, Beaucaire, Saint Gilles and Aigues Vives were changed on Vidal's orders. The eastern half of the Gard was completely controlled by the Catholic royalists.

In Nîmes itself, the violence wrought by the militia had produced a deep effect. On 23 July, the Procureur-Général, a Protestant, wrote:

"For the past eight days, Nîmes has presented the unhappy spectacle of pillage, destruction and murder. The police have had no effect in repressing these excesses. Measures which have not yet had their full effect have been taken by the authorities to put an end to the excesses."

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30 Narbonne-Lara emigrated in 1791 and fought in the Armée de Condé (A.N. Flb I. Dossier 168/1) He was found, in 1817, to be a member of the Société royale (A.N. F7 9050. Mss. document, "Clé d'une Correspondance")


Flotte-Montauban was found to be an agent of the Société royale (A.N. F7 9050."Clé d'une Correspondance").

31 A.N F79657. De Calvière to minister of interior, July, 1815.


33 A.N. BB3 154. Cavalier to minister of justice, 23 July, 1815.
In order to escape death or summary imprisonment, many Protestants fled Nîmes and tried to get up to the hills in the north west of the Gard, where Protestantism was strong and where they could seek refuge and help. The flow of these refugees in a part of the Gard that was known to be Protestant gave rise to rumours that Bonapartist resisters were forming large bands in the hills. The measures Cavalier mentioned amounted to no more than an order to such refugees to return at once to Nîmes on pain of having their property confiscated. At the same time, the rumours of brigandage and political gatherings served to justify an intensified repression of suspects and the organisation of punitive expeditions to Protestant areas where gatherings had been reported. The myth of imminent Protestant insurrection served to prolong the repression and to justify a sweeping purge of the department to outside opinion. On 1 August, seven men accused of being Bonapartists were shot in the streets of Nîmes. Vidal claimed that the authorities were powerless to prevent the

34 A.D. Gard 6M 28. As late as 22 August, a report came from Langlade estimating some 1,000 to 1,200 women and children refugees in the Arrondissement of Le Vigan. The same report said that the "exaltés" wanted to march on the groups of refugees.

35 A.D. Gard 6M 28. anon., 26 July, 1815, reports that the Cévennes, Gardonnenque and Vaunage are being fanaticised by rebels who have hidden there. A.N. F7 9049, Vidal to Director of police, n.d. Vidal states that Saint Jean du Gard, Anduze and Calvisson are in arms, that the gatherings are composed of political refugees and Protestants.

36 A.N. F7 9049. Vidal to minister of interior, 25 July, 1815.
incident\textsuperscript{37}. The punitive expeditions were often as doubtful as the status of the men who carried them out. There were reports of irregular companies disarming farmhouses and descending on villages in the night to demand contributions of money\textsuperscript{38}. The most notorious of these was the sortie carried out by a terrorist called Quatretaillons against St. Maurice at the end of August, when six prisoners were taken to Uzès and shot under the windows of the sub prefecture\textsuperscript{39}. In all such cases, the Gard authorities denied involvement and claimed they could do nothing to prevent the murders\textsuperscript{40}. It is, of course, possible that there were armed bands of Protestants in the countryside to the north of Nîmes; traditionally, the exposed Protestant communities in and near Nîmes could rely on the intervention of the remote communities, and the last time this had happened was in 1790, when the Protestants descended upon Nîmes and tipped the balance in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{A.D. Gard 6M 29.} Vidal to minister of police, 2 August, 1815.
\item \textit{A.D. Gard 6M 28.} Mayor of Brignon to sub prefect of Alès, \textit{27} August 1815. About 200 royalist irregulars commanded by the Marquis de La Calmette arrived in the village before sunset and, during the night, went about forcing villagers to part with whatever money they had. The same dossier contains reports of such raids in Garons, Bouillargues, Générac, Beauvoisin.
\item This episode was a scandal because of the notoriety of Graffand, alias Quatretaillons, and because the sub prefect, Darnand Vallabrix, was implicated in the affair (Dulaure, \textit{Les Tueurs de Midi}, p.42; Lauze de Péret, \textit{ Causes et Précis}, p. 362)
\item For example, Darbaud Jouques says that "men of high rank, of great honour could not possibly have been in collusion with the Dupont, Graffand and Lavondès. On the contrary, the administrators pursued them and brought them to justice." \textit{Troubles et Agitations}, p.43.
\end{itemize}
the bagarre. The presence of the former Bonapartist military commander, General Gilly, a Gard Protestant, in the Cévennes where he had taken flight after Waterloo lent credibility to the claim that an anti-royalist insurrection was being prepared. On 26 August, a detachment of Austrian occupation soldiers who had crossed into the Gard on the 23rd killed some eighty peasants near the commune of Ners, near Ales. The report to Paris following this incident claimed that timely Austrian intervention had nipped a plot in the bud. But against the background of Catholic royalist aspirations and threats during the first restoration, in the context of a provisional government led entirely by local men, and in relation to concerted action by the royalists in other spheres which we shall be examining, the White Terror cannot be seen simply as a spontaneous reaction by an exasperated population, as royalist leaders tried to claim. On the contrary, as many contemporaries pointed out, it was tolerated, if not encouraged by a number of men whose aim was to re-establish Catholic royalist supremacy and to pick up the

42 Lauze de Péret, Causes et Précis, p.208.
43 A.D. Gard 6M 33. Vidal to Director of Police, 26 August, 1815. Contrary to an agreement that allied troops would remain east of the Rhône, Austrians had crossed into the Gard in spite of the opposition of the local authorities. (A.D. Gard 6M 29. Vidal to minister of police, 19 August, 1815).
thread that was cut in 1790, and who had sometimes taken part as early as 1795 in the first White Terror.45

Ironically, the very day the provisional authorities took office in Nîmes, the king issued an ordinance terminating the special powers delegated to the commissaires extraordinaires. With the ordinance, a list of permanent appointments in each department—as published. Although it was promulgated on 19 July, the ordinance was not known publicly in Nîmes until 28 July, the day that Calvière's successor, the marquis D'Arbaud Jouques, arrived in the city to take up his duties.46 The arrival of a permanent prefect set off a series of events that illustrate another facet of the provisional administration in the Gard, namely its determined opposition to interference from Paris, even from the king. As far as they were concerned, the local Royalists had a permanent administration, and one that suited their requirements of a quasi-autonomous department.

The replacement of Calvière appears to have surprised the Gard royalists47, although one commentator said that...

45 The most consistent and outspoken criticism came from Lauze de Péret, a Protestant. He said the authorities "absolutely needed the existence of an anti-Bourbon plot", (Causes et Précis, p.340) and that the expeditions undertaken by royalist irregulars, sometimes commanded by notables, were the only causes of disturbance. (ibid., p.208). Both Péret (ibid., p. 362 and Eclaircissements, p.9) and Dulaure (Tueurs du Midi, p.42) say that Darnand Vallabrix, sub prefect of Uzès, refused to intervene when Quatre-taillons shot six men in public.

46 A.N. F79657. Jouques to minister of interior, 28 July 1815.

47 A.D. Gard 6M 29. Vidal to minister of police, 1 August, 1815.
Calvière had known about his imminent destitution and had tried to prevent it as early as the twenty-first of July. The change angered the royalists, and Vidal wrote to Paris that the Catholic population saw the change as a move to weaken the power of the duc d'Angoulême - which it was - and a repetition of the disastrous policy of the first restoration 'opening the administration to those who had sworn allegiance to Bonaparte'. Jouques, who had joined the émigrés and fought in the armée des princes, had returned to France after the 18 Brumaire and had served Bonaparte as a conseiller in his native Bouches du Rhône and as prefect in the Hautes Pyrénées in 1813, receiving an imperial barony. He was not, then, 'pure'. But, as Coulanges, himself a Nîmois and a royalist volunteer in 1815, points out, what made Jouques unacceptable to the Gard ultras was the fact that he was not a local man and could not be relied upon to see the situation in the Gard the way the ultra notables saw it.

However, the Gard ultras were not without support, for Jouques had no sooner arrived in Nîmes than he was summoned

48 E. Daudet, La Terreur blanche, p. 93.

49 A.D. Gard 6M 29. Vidal, to Minister of police, n.d. conveys clearly the popular allegiance to the duc d'Angouleme. In another letter, dated 8 August, Vidal questions the authority of the ministry to modify powers vested in him by Angouleme; showing once more that the Paris government was not 'recognised' by the Ultras in the Gard. F. Daudet, Souvenirs d'un vieux royaliste, p. 24, says that the change was seen by the Catholics as a first concession to the liberals.

50 A.N. F 1lb, dossiers 155-6. Personnel of the ministry of the interior.

51 F. Daudet, Souvenirs d'un vieux royaliste, p. 24.
to Toulouse, the headquarters of the duc d'Angoulême who was the commander of the Midi, by the duke's assistant, the Marquis de Villeneuve. The same communication confirmed the provisional prefect, Jules de Calvière, in his post. Jouques left for Toulouse early on August 1st and was absent from Nîmes for eighteen days during the most critical stage in the establishment of a new administration in the Gard. His summons to Toulouse, the 'capital' of Ultra royalism in the south, placed the events in the Gard in a much broader context, that of organised opposition to Paris and the King by groups of royalists throughout the Midi, whose ambitions centred on the duc d'Angoulême and Monsieur, the Comte d'Artois.

When the Marquis de Villeneuve summoned Jouques to Toulouse, he pointed out that only the duc d'Angoulême enjoyed the power to appoint and revoke officials and that this power had not been withdrawn. In the same letter, Villeneuve acknowledged receipt of a letter from Jouques dated 28 July and written from Nîmes. It seems probable that Jouques, on his arrival in Nîmes, had encountered opposition which claimed authority from Toulouse. He may then

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52 A.N. F79050. Marquis de Villeneuve, prefect of the Hautes Pyrénées and general civil administrator of HRH le duc d'Angoulême, to Jouques. n.d.

53 A.D. Gard 6M 29. Vidal to minister of police, 1 August 1815.

54 Vidal said that Jouques returned on the night of 16 August (A.D. Gard 6M 29, report of 19 August, 1815); Lauze de Peret said it was the eighteenth (Causes et Précis, p.310); Daudet said it was the nineteenth (Terreur blanche, p. 96).

55 A.N. F79050. Marquis de Villeneuve to Jouques, n.d.
have written to Toulouse in order to seek confirmation from the duc d'Angoulême, who was evidently the only recognised source of authority in the Gard. More extraordinary is the possibility that the royal ordinance, known publicly in Nîmes by the twenty eighth, was not known by the King's deputy in Toulouse. Much more likely is the thesis that the contents of the ordinance were in fact known by the Toulouse ultras, but that, in the chaotic situation, the duc d'Angoulême chose not to obey. De Sauvigny believes that Angoulême thought the King had made new appointments in the belief that Angoulême was not exercising his authority and, so, he ignored them and continued to create his own administration. The discord between Toulouse and Paris is reflected in a directive sent to the 'official' prefect of the Haute Garonne, Remusat, who had been unable to take office until mid August.

"The ordinance of 19 July did not ratify the choice of personnel made by the commissaires extraordinaires. In the southern departments, the restructuring of the administration was more thorough than elsewhere, and most of the persons chosen seem to think that their"


The view is put forward by Richardson also, who says that Angoulême 'established what was in fact, if not in intention, a quasi autonomous state'.

57 Bertier de Sauvigny, Le Comte Ferdinand, p.178
appointment is definitive. However, as these appointments may have been made in the heat of the moment, I have to present to His Majesty candidates for permanent posts. I am requesting a list of those appointments made by the commissaires, to which your detailed observations should be joined."

This letter is a clear statement of the King's intention to assert his authority alone throughout the kingdom in the face of what appeared to many people to be a plot to create a semi autonomous kingdom in the south of France. Certainly, throughout the first restoration, the Comte d'Artois and the duc d'Angoulême had cultivated links with the Midi. The former rapidly became the focal point of the extreme royalists' hopes as Louis' attempts to reconcile the different political traditions insensed them. Angoulême, too, had caught the imagination of the southern royalists by his spirited if ineffectual attempt to cut off Napoleon's advance in March 1815. So it is not inconceivable that they were involved in an attempt to create an ultra royalist controlled structure of government.

It was thought by some contemporary observers that the attempt was to create an independent Royaume d'Acquitaine, with its capital in Toulouse and the duc d'Angoulême as its regent. Santi suggests that a number of local notables including Villèle, Vitrolles and the Polignac brothers were involved in such an endeavour and that it was prevented by

58 Archives municipales de Toulouse minister of justice to Remusat, 16 SS 204. Fonds Remusat, August 1815.
Paris\textsuperscript{59}; de Sauvigny says that the Chevaliers de la foi were at the heart of the project\textsuperscript{60}. That the Ultras intended to create a separate state is not evident, particularly as their ideas on decentralisation were rather vague\textsuperscript{61}. Equally it is tempting to recall the long tradition of particularism in the south west and to assume that local royalists, led by the landed notables would seek to be independent. It is possible, too, that the Ultra royalists wanted to colonise as completely as possible local government in order to pressure the king and his ministers to implement policies that were dear to the Ultras. Control of a large, unified part of the country would enable them to threaten Paris with insurrection if necessary.

Whatever their ultimate goal, the Ultras succeeded in convincing a number of people, including the court, that they were mounting some sort of coup\textsuperscript{62} and, in the event, Paris prevailed. Angoulême was summoned to Paris and the official prefects took up their posts in the south by

\textsuperscript{59} M.L. de Santi, \textit{loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{60} Bertier de Sauvigny, \textit{Le Comte Ferdinand}, pp.171-178.

\textsuperscript{61} In contrast to their affirmation of the principle of decentralisation, the Ultras did not offer any radical plans, but limited themselves to remove from Paris certain powers which would be given to prefects and maiors - deconcentration rather than decentralisation. J.-J. Oechslin, \textit{Le Mouvement ultra royaliste} (Paris 1960), p.185.

\textsuperscript{62} A.D. Gard 6M 25. An anonymous tract in bad French but purporting to emanate from the King circulated at the beginning of August and threatened punishment for those involved in the "infernal plot" directed by the duke and duchess d'Angoulême against "my person and the Protestants". Houssaye, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 549-50, said that the court believed that Artois was at the head of a plan to set up a separate state in the south.
the middle of August 63.

Thus, when Jouques returned to Nîmes and took up his post on 18 August, he was not challenged by the retiring provisional authorities 64. But his acceptance was not a reflection of the submission of the local ultra leaders. It reflected his own 'conversion' to the principles that the provisional authorities had sought to implement since they arrived in Nîmes a month earlier. According to one commentator, Jouques had raised the hopes of liberals on his appointment simply because of the consternation he provoked among the Ultras. On his return, however, he made it appear that the government wanted the principles of ultra royalism to triumph 65. For the next eighteen months, until his dismissal in February 1817, Jouques would be a steadfast defender of the Gard ultras and enabled them to build the kind of empire that might have existed throughout the Midi had the king not removed the duc d'Angoulême. If

"The audacious attempt by the chevaliers de la foi to create in the Midi a political order based on their intransigent ideal collapsed" 66

the attempt continued in microcosm in the Gard.


64 Daudet, Terreur blanche, p.96 says Jouques took up his duties with "the devoted assistance of MM de Bernis and de Calvière."

65 Lauze de Péret, Causes et Précis, pp.310-13.

66 Bertier de Sauvigny, Le Comte Ferdinand, p. 178.
Jouques' departure for Toulouse had given the provisional government two additional weeks in which to lay the foundations of a Catholic royalist local administration. In that period, the ultras showed great audacity in the face of increasing pressure from Paris, where reports had been received from individuals containing details of a widespread sectarian pogrom, carried out with the tacit consent of the provisional authorities. Because of the rumours of a concerted conspiracy in the Midi as a whole, Pasquier, the minister of Justice, expressed his anger that Jouques had been challenged in the name of another authority, that of the duc d'Angoulême, on his arrival in Nîmes. Consequently, he instructed Jouques to take up his duties as quickly as possible and charged him to restore peace in the department, to the satisfaction of all citizens.

The case of police commissioner Vidal illustrates most clearly the determination of the Gard Ultras to accomplish their designs. Vidal had been denounced to the Minister of police, Joseph Fouché, for his partiality and for his

67 Anonymous letters had been written denouncing the provisional government. A.N. F7 9049, anon., 12 July. The writer, quite literate, speaks of the existence of a revolutionary tribunal "dans le sens royaliste." It was sent to Joseph Fouché comme particulier.
A.D. Gard 6M 25, anon., n.d. A letter condemns de Calvière, de Bernis, de Vogüé, Vidal, as well as a number of the more zealous Miquelets like Trestailions and Carteras.

68 A.D. Gard 6M 10. Pasquier to Jouques, 10 August, 1815. On 16 August, Pasquier stressed to Jouques that the royal ordinance had instituted a normal administration, so all provisional authorities were terminated.
corruption. In reply to Fouché, who had ordered Vidal to hand over his powers to the official prefect, Jouques, Vidal showed audacity and tenacity. He argued that he would normally obey the minister without hesitation, but the lawful prefect, as indicated by the minister, was in Toulouse. Then, playing on the conflict of authority that still obtained - it was 8 August - Vidal said that Angoulême had confirmed him in office on 29 July - after the royal ordinance. How could he, argued Vidal, abandon a moral responsibility placed upon him by "his prince"? When Jouques returned to Nîmes, an ardent servant of Ultra royalism, he naturally supported Vidal against Fouché, claiming that it would be impossible to maintain order without his presence.

With the support of Jouques, Vidal was able to stay in office until the end of 1815, in spite of the efforts of the Ministry to remove him.

Jouques returned to Nîmes just in time for the elections to the new Chamber of Deputies. The circumstances in which these elections were held in the Gard are further evidence of

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69 A.N. F7 9050. M. Burnet to the Minister of Police, n.d. Vidal is described as "an immoral man whose wealth is the fruit of theft and plunder".
A.N.F79049. anon., n.d. The writer says Vidal "is using his position to sell passports to people wishing to leave the city. He is ignoring the pro royalist criminals and is locking up Protestants."

70 A.D. Gard 6M 29. Vidal to minister of police, bulletin 191, 8 August, 1815.

71 A.N. F79050. Jouques to minister of police, 16 August, 1815
A.D. Gard 6M 29. Vidal to minister of police, 19 August 1815.

72 A.N. F79050. Vidal to minister of police, 6 December, 1815. Vidal seeks the creation of a new post for himself.
the concerted efforts of the Ultra royalists to gain complete control of all the organs of administration and representation in the department.

In order to achieve as much independence and freedom as possible to control their own affairs in the Gard, they needed not only full control of the internal administration, but the assurance that the Gard's representation would be in their interest, to secure appropriate benefits and also to contradict publicly any allegations of unfairness or sectarianism. Thus, it was vital to deny the Protestant community access to government circles and to a high level forum for debate - the Chamber. Indeed, by refusing the Protestants any representation at all, the Gard Catholic royalists would be able to deny the very existence of a coherent, separate Protestant community. It was in this spirit that the Ultras set about preparing the election in the summer of 1815.

Whilst the law determined the mode of election - in this case by arrondissement and departmental assemblies - the organisation of the election was the responsibility of the prefect, who drew up the register of citizens eligible to vote in the election and to stand as candidates. The most important qualification for voting was a tax valuation of three hundred Francs. Consequently, the electoral register could change considerably from election to election. The prefect was obliged to revise the register before every election. Moreover, if a person's tax contribution was difficult to assess accurately, the prefect had the discretion
to include or to exclude that person. In addition to these powers, in the election of 1815, the prefect was authorised to nominate ten additional members to the arrondissement assemblies, and twenty to the final departmental assembly, whose task it was to elect half of the deputies from among the lists of candidates chosen by the arrondissement assemblies, and to elect the remaining half of the department's quota without any necessary reference to the choice made by the arrondissement assemblies.

It is clear from these powers that the role of the prefect in the 1815 elections was crucial, for if he had any political sympathies, he could produce an artificially unbalanced electoral assembly.

The dates fixed for the elections in the Gard were 14 August for the arrondissement colleges, and 22 August for the departmental college. The preparations had been made by the provisional government in Nîmes, and Jouques had only to supervise the meeting of the departmental assembly, some four days after his return. De Sauvigny remarks that the royalist successes in 1815 are difficult to explain when one considers that the elections had been organised nationally by Fouché and Barante, that the King, Pasquier and Talleyrand counted on returning a constitutional Assembly. In the south, and in the Gard particularly, even if the prefects appointed by the king's ministers had all been imbued with constitutional principles, the short time at their disposal and the hostility of the Ultras would have made the task of undoing the work of the provisional

73 A.N. F1cIII Gard 4
74 Bertier de Sauvigny, Le Comte Ferdinand, p. 184
authorities extremely difficult. The ordinance calling for the organisation of elections was issued on 21 July and most departments in the south had not returned to normality until August. In the Gard, where the prefect proved to be sympathetic to the Ultras cause, the determination to obtain a royalist deputation was so strong that intimidation and violence were used to discourage potentially hostile electors from coming to Nîmes. On the three nights before the election was held, groups of armed men, sometimes numbering sixty, often wearing royalist uniforms, descended upon certain houses and hotels where they knew or suspected there were Protestant electors. They murdered as many Protestants as they could find, but a number of these, already frightened by the violence that had accompanied the far less important primary election a week earlier, had fled. Out of spite and greed, the bands pillaged the houses of these families.

75 A.N. F\textsuperscript{1c}III Gard 4

76 See pp. 55-56 supra.

77 Lauze de Péret, Causes et Précis, pp. 309-20. Péret says some people put the death toll as high as one hundred, but no conclusion was reached because of the lack of an inquiry. Among the victims were women, including the wife of an intended victim, Bigot, who was absent, and a woman who had been a paralytic for ten years. Pillaging was carried out on a large scale; Péret records ten Protestant houses pillaged, hordes transporting food and valuables on farm wagons (p. 319).

Péret remarks bitterly that the presence in Nîmes of a police commissioner, considered invaluable by the prefect, a guard commander, a prefect and a contingent of royalist troops did nothing to deter the brigands. (p. 315).
The Protestants of the Gard were in no doubt about the reason for this outburst of violence. It was to keep them away from the elections, and to take advantage of the folly of any of those who dared to come to Nîmes for the occasion. At the same time, the royalists were able to prove to Jouques that, in the Gard at least, the King's writ did not run. Moreover, the passiveness of the authorities - armed bands and wagon loads of stolen property were seen passing in front of guard posts in the city\textsuperscript{78} - indicated that the outburst was not spontaneous\textsuperscript{79}.

On the 22nd, the elections took place in Nîmes in an atmosphere of terror. Armed men, wearing uniforms, surrounded the building in which the electors were to meet\textsuperscript{80}. For one observer at least, the proceedings bore a sinister resemblance to the elections of 1790, when Froment's and Vidal's militia had invaded the hall during the municipal elections to make sure that no voters hostile to the royalists were present\textsuperscript{81}.

The intimidation produced the effect desired in the arrondissement assemblies and in the departmental assembly. Of the sixteen candidates recommended by the four arrondissement colleges, there were only three, poorly placed moderates,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{78} Lauze de Péret, Causes et Précis, p.309, states that the events had "rien d'aveugle," but were part of a reasoned plan, a cold logic.
\textsuperscript{79} ibid., p.317.
\textsuperscript{80} ibid., pp.315-16.
\textsuperscript{81} ibid., p.314.
\end{flushleft}
two from Le Vigan, the third from Alès. None of the arrondissement assemblies had a full complement of electors: eighty-three were absent from the Nîmes assembly; twenty-nine from Alès, fifty from Uzès and twenty-nine from Le Vigan.

The departmental college, which met in the circumstances described above, had been complemented by twenty men known for their intransigent royalism including de Calvière himself, Laboissière, a future ultra mayor of Nîmes, de Larcy, the newly appointed sub prefect of Le Vigan, Charles de Vogüé, the royalist military commander of the department since July, de Vallongue, the provisional mayor of Nîmes and Vidal, the police commissioner. In contrast, sixty Protestant electors failed to appear and gave no reason for their absence.

The assembly proceeded to nominate as deputies Jules de Calvière, who had been prefect until 18 August, Rene de Bernis, the former commissaire extraordinaire, Charles de Vogüé and, an example of the thread of continuity from the beginning of the Revolution, Charles-François de Trinquelaque, senior barrister at the Nîmes court, but who, as mayor of Uzès in 1790, had supported the Catholic counter-

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82 They were Guizot and Pièyre from Le Vigan, and Gallière from Alès. The largest concentration of Protestants was in these two arrondissements. A.N. FlcIII Gard 4.

83 ibid.

84 ibid.

85 ibid.
revolution actively. There was, then, a total electoral victory for Catholic royalism in the Gard. Jouques' summary of the proceedings for Paris is a masterpiece of hypocrisy:

"The operations of the electoral assemblies of the department were completed well before the time set down in the king's ordinance. The greatest calm reigned constantly in and around the assemblies, and one can say in truth that never were electors so aware of the gravity of the functions they were asked to discharge."

Proof to the most incredulous Ultras in the Gard that he was their man.

The electoral victory, the assurance of the prefect's connivance - normally the prefect was the representative of the central government, whose task it was to ensure that policies made in Paris were implemented in each department - meant that the Ultras realised their ambitions of making the local administration no more than the tool of their will and the department a state within a state. Consequently, they felt that the process of conforming local political life to their ideals could be continued at a more leisurely pace and in much more depth. The principal organs of administration which had contact with the outside world had been 'colonised': the only potential political opposition, the Protestant bourgeoisie, had been numbed by the White Terror.

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86 See Fajon, Pièces et Documents officiels, pp. 36-37. The Comité révolutionnaire of Uzès described Trinquelaude as "an 'Aristocrate' since the dawn of the Revolution, Principal Author of the bagarre d'Uzès."

and continued to fear new outbreaks at any moment as royalist gangs under the leadership of terrorists like Dupont, alias Trestaillons, and Graffand, alias Quatretaillons\(^88\), who was responsible for the particularly sinister murder of six villagers in Uzès on 27 August \(^89\), roamed the department extorting money and committing murder in the name of royalism.

Indeed, these bands of irregulars, many of whose deeds recalled the brutality of the chauffeurs\(^90\), were becoming an embarrassment and a threat to the Ultras, having outlived their usefulness now that an Ultra regime had been installed. Incidents like that involving Quatretaillons at Uzès were likened by contemporaries to the worst excesses of the Revolution\(^91\) and brought unwelcome attention from Paris\(^92\).

It became a matter of urgency to make respectable the battalions of the Armée royale of Beaucaire\(^93\) and the irregular militias that had sprung up 'spontaneously' in many of the towns in the department\(^94\). Because the Uzès incident had involved the local guard and the sub prefect, the government demanded the arrest of Quatretaillons and the

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\(^{88}\) 'Trestaillons' was the name taken by Dupont after the story that he used to cut his victims into three parts. Graffand, not wishing to be surpassed in brutality by a rival gang leader, adopted Quatre as his trade mark.

\(^{89}\) See p. 48 supra.


\(^{91}\) Lauze de Péret, *Causes et Précis*, p.10.

\(^{92}\) A.N. F9049. Minister of interior to Jouques, 9 September, TBT5.

\(^{93}\) F. Daudet, *Souvenirs d'un vieux royaliste*, p.23.

\(^{94}\) A.D. Gard. F 6M 52. Sub prefect of Nîmes to Jouques, 26 August 1815.
suppression of his band\textsuperscript{95}. The obvious solution was to adopt the National Guard framework to absorb the irregulars, merely reshuffling them in the perfectly legal local defence force, yet which would be in practice what the Ultras wanted - a state subsidised private army. As such, it would fulfil one of the ambitions Froment and the counter revolutionaries had sought first in 1790\textsuperscript{96}, and had prescribed again in 1815\textsuperscript{97} - the creation of a Catholic royalist militia under the command of local notables.

The plan was fraught with difficulties, however, if it was to be achieved legitimately. Men like Graffand, Dupont and Carteras, who appeared to exercise a great amount of influence on the irregulars, were clearly anarchists and thugs at bottom. Their activities had been so scandalous that it would be impossible to incorporate them into a national and public force even if there were any guarantees that they would accept the discipline of that force. Furthermore, membership of the National Guard was based on tax evaluation, and most, if not all the royalist volunteers were penniless, from the lowest classes of society, and had exploited the unrest to plunder\textsuperscript{98}. The numbers of 'volunteers' had risen significantly because of the unemployment caused by the

\textsuperscript{95} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7}9049. Minister of interior to Jouques, 9 September 1815.

\textsuperscript{96} See pp.12-13 supra.

\textsuperscript{97} See pp.34-35 supra

\textsuperscript{98} E. Le Gallo, Les Cent Jours (Paris, 1924), p.165. F. Daudet, Souvenirs d'un vieux royaliste, p.23. E. Daudet, La Terreur blanche, p.82.
collapse of local industry and agriculture in the political upheavals of the Spring and Summer of 1815, an aspect of the troubles to which the incidence and extent of brigandage in the countryside testified.

The need to comply with the government in order to obtain the subsidies allocated to the National Guard gave the Gard authorities the pretext they needed to turn on the most disreputable of their 'soldiers'. Graffand had to be arrested, ordered Paris, and Dupont refused to be incorporated into the National Guard because he would lose his rank of captain. He was also on a list of terrorists to be arrested. Consequently, the National Guard could be organised without reference to these two men and their followers. In fact, a National Guard had been created as early as July 1815 by Charles de Vogüé, who was given responsibility for the military command of the department by de Bernis. Jouques was required to regularise its structures and its hierarchy. This he proceeded to do, issuing instructions to the departmental command on August 28 to weed out of each company unsuitable and undesirable men who were to be disarmed and dismissed. At the same time, the commanding

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100 See p. 48 supra.

101 A.N. F 9049. Minister of Interior to Jouques, 9 September, 1815.

102 F. Daudet, Souvenirs d'un vieux Royaliste, p. 23.

103 E. Daudet, La Terreur blanche, p. 117.

104 A.N. F 9657. Jouques to minister of interior, 17 October, 1815.

105 A.N. F 9657. Jouques to minister of interior, 28 August, 1815.
officers were confirmed in their rank; all were ultra royalists. On 14 September, Jouques ordered the dissolution of the irregular companies, that is, those bands who had not been incorporated into, or had chosen not to join the National Guard. Jouques said that the result was a body from which nobody with the necessary qualification and good record was excluded. What had really happened was a tightening of the control of the Ultras over their militia; the period between the order to purge the companies and that dissolving the irregular companies served to identify those bands, like Trestaillon's and Lavondès which would not accept the discipline of officers, and would be a source of embarrassment to the Ultras in the future. These could then be outlawed by the second decree with an easy conscience and their dissolution used to placate Paris. Meanwhile, the reorganised Guard would ensure the existence of an armed, disciplined group of Catholic royalists on every point of the department. Jouque's claim that the purge had opened the guard to all sections of the community was refuted by Cavalier, the

106 The departmental inspector was Charles de Vogüé; The Colonel of the Nîmes company was de Surville, who had been proscribed by the comité révolutionnaire in 1792 (A.D. Gard L1198, opérations du 2 Prairial, An II); Du Roure was colonel at Alès, and the Marquis de la Fare at Uzès.

107 A.N. F7 9657. Jouques to minister of interior, 17 October, 181!


109 Lavondès was arrested in November for attacking the mayor of Nîmes who had prohibited the men Lavondès 'commanded' from collecting money for uniforms. A.D. Gard 6M 28. Lavondès to Mayor, 28 October, 1815.
procureur-général who wrote that the Protestant community had been excluded from the Guard, subsequent events were to reveal how accurate his evaluation of the position was.

Even though the Ultras were under pressure to rid themselves of the irregulars and self-styled royalist bands, they could not turn sharply on their former allies. This was in part because they did not want to alienate the populace of towns like Nîmes and Alès, many of whom could not be fitted into the Guard structure, but who would provide a significant contribution in any unrest the Ultras might want to cause, but in part, too, because men like Trestaillons and Quatre-taillons were so unpredictable and rebellious that firm pursuit of them might provoke accusations and indiscretions by them of a dangerous nature. It is noteworthy that Trestaillons was not apprehended until 18 October and only then because of the action of an outsider, the new military commander of the department, General Lagarde, who would pay very soon for his spirited attempts to ensure that justice reigned in the Gard, and that notorious thugs like Carteras, Pocheville and Trufémi, who had been roaming about Nîmes unimpeded by the authorities, ceased to be a cause of scandal and fear. In Uzès, Quatretaillons was able to remain free for a month after the particularly revolting murder of six peasants in public.

110 A.N. BB3 154. Cavalier to Minister of Justice, 23 October, 1815.
111 A.N. F7 9049. Vidal to Minister of Justice, 23 October, 1815.
112 F. Daudet, Souvenirs d'un vieux royaliste, p.23.
Indeed, normal judicial proceedings had been suspended since the White Terror. On 21 August, Vidal wrote to the Minister of Police, informing him that the two procureurs, Cavalier and Despuech, and their substitute, Vincens-Saint Laurent fils, had gone into hiding because they were proscribed by the royalists. From hiding, Cavalier explained the situation to the Minister of Justice and declared that he was helpless in a place where crime was being instigated by the very authorities that should be repressing it. He spoke in a tone of despair of cupidity and ambition masquerading as royalism, and of vice having become the only virtue expected of magistrates. Then, in a passage that pointed out the close relationship between Catholic notables and the 'peuple' involved in the disorders, Cavalier revealed that he had been threatened by Vampère, whom he described as the secretary and 'creature' of Trinquelague, one of the recently elected ultra royalist deputies. Vampère, whose anti-protestantism and extreme views had been well known since the beginning of the First Restoration, was aided in his intimidation by Prat, a bailif working for Boyer, who had been one

114 A.N. F7 9049. Vidal to minister of police, 21 August, 1815.
115 A.N. BB3 154. Cavalier to minister of Justice, 1 September, 1815.
116 ibid.
117 ibid. This particular incident may illustrate the way many people took advantage of the confusion to settle scores: Cavalier had been prosecutor in the court that fined Vampère for insulting a retired officer on the Fête Saint Louis in 1814. (A.D. Gard 6M 3. Prison register for 1814).
of the leaders of the Société secrète\textsuperscript{118}.

Jouques, in a letter to the Minister of the Interior, said that everything possible was being done to bring criminals to court, but the lack of respect for the magistrates, who were said to be Bonapartists, made the task difficult. At the same time, he advised the minister that he intended to bring to trial in the first place those people accused of crimes against Royalists, so going back to March and April 1815\textsuperscript{119}. Thus, nothing immediate would be done to reassure the Protestants that at least when it was available, justice was not partisan. On the contrary, by proceeding to the trial and judgement of those designated as enemies of the local royalists, the authorities added to the impression that the restored monarchy's representatives in the Gard were bent on nothing less than vengeance and punishment. Indeed, this well founded impression was to be truly reinforced by the marked contrast of the execution, in September 1816, of five Protestants from Arpaillargues, found guilty of the murder of royalist volunteers in April 1815\textsuperscript{120}, and the acquittal, for lack of evidence of Trestaillons and Quatre-taillons. Moreover, the Ultras were happily abetted in their attempts to upset justice by the series of special powers of July and October 1815, which allowed individuals:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{118} A.N. BB\textsuperscript{3}154. Cavalier to minister of justice, 1 September, 1815.
  \item \textsuperscript{119} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9657. Jouques to minister of interior, 17 October, 1815.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9053. Jouques to minister of police, 24 September, 1815.
\end{itemize}
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accused of political crimes to be interned without trial.\textsuperscript{121}  

Cavalier's correspondence with the Minister of Justice reveals that as late as December 1815, the organisation of the Nîmes courts was incomplete, and that justice was being dispensed in a most unsatisfactory manner.\textsuperscript{122}

Meanwhile, the prefect had ordered the final steps to be taken to ensure Catholic royalist domination of the Gard: the disarming of the population and the replacement of all administrators whose views were not known to the Ultras.

The continual disturbances and the flood of refugees across the department had helped the authorities to perpetrate the rumour of an imminent revolt led by Bonapartists and Protestants, who, Jouques was to write later, were "Republicans in their social outlook, in their reasoning and in their hearts."\textsuperscript{123} The clash between an Austrian detachment and a large number of peasants near Ners\textsuperscript{124}, had lent even more substance to the rumours, and, with the presence of so many gangs of brigands in the Gard, the order to hand over all weapons seemed perfectly justified. Yet in the way it was applied, the order served to leave the royalists the only inhabitants with access to guns. An envoy of the

\textsuperscript{121} See pp. 46-47 supra. A.D. Gard 6M 41 indicates that 37 persons were detained between July 1815 and June 1816 under the terms of the special laws for 'holding opinions hostile to the Bourbons'. It should, of course, be stated that the introduction of the special laws, which amounted to a 'legal' white terror, was very much the will of the Ultra royalist deputies who formed the bulk of the newly elected Chamber of deputies; their application to the Gard was, however, unforeseen.

\textsuperscript{122} A.N. BB\textsuperscript{3} 154. Cavalier to minister of justice, 1 December, 1815

\textsuperscript{123} A.N. Flc III Gard 13. Jouques to minister of the interior, 10 February, 1816.

\textsuperscript{124} See p. 49 supra.
British Ambassador noted:

"Whilst the order comprehended those of both persuasions, it had been but partially acted upon, and in many places, the Protestants alone were left without means of self defence."

Indeed, while some 15,000 weapons were taken, the number of weapons taken from the Arrondissements of Alès and Le Vigan - those with the largest Protestant communities - far exceeded the number taken from the Arrondissements of Nîmes and Uzès. But not only did the disarming leave the Protestants at the mercy of the Catholics, it also produced statistics which could be used to point to the untrustworthiness of the Protestant community.

In the course of an administrative purge carried out during the Autumn, some six hundred and fifty mayors, deputy mayors and municipal councillors were removed from office because of their political opinions. Among the first to go was Baron Daunant, Mayor of Nîmes since July 1814; a Protestant, his presence was intolerable to the extreme royalists,


126 A.D. Gard 6M 42. "Etat du désarmement effectué dans le département du Gard, mois de septembre 1815." The numbers of weapons involved were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrondissement</th>
<th>Number of Weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nîmes</td>
<td>867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzès</td>
<td>2,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alès</td>
<td>6,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Vigan</td>
<td>5,447</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

who had already refused to accept Protestant officials in Nîmes at the beginning of the First Restoration.

Jouques explained Daunant's replacement by saying that Daunant had lost the respect of the people of Nîmes because he had not resigned when Bonaparte's return led to the overthrow of the restored monarchy in March 1815. Worse still, Daunant had not been dismissed by Bonaparte during the Hundred Days\textsuperscript{128}. However, the fact that Darnand Vallabrix, at the moment Jouques was writing, was sub prefect of Uzès, in spite of his written offer to Gilly, the General who handed Nîmes to Bonaparte behind the backs of the Royalists, leads one to conclude that the Ultras were quick to forgive 'mistakes' but objected to the presence of Protestants in the administration\textsuperscript{129}.

Thanks to the connivance of the three sub prefects, Jouques was able to extend his purge to the personnel of the sub prefectures, to the tax officials and to the employees of the postal and transport services\textsuperscript{130}. Consequently, all sections of the local administration that dealt with Paris and the movements of individuals were subjected to the scrutiny of Ultraroyalist agents.

As a final gesture of humiliation, Jouques issued instructions to the prosecutors to provide him with lists of

\textsuperscript{128} A.N. F\textsuperscript{1b} II Gard 15. Jouques to minister of interior, 9 September, 1815.

\textsuperscript{129} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9051. Savagnier (Police agent) to Decazes, 14 March, 1817.

\textsuperscript{130} A.D. Gard 6M 40. Dossier on the inquiry into the Political opinions of department officials.
those people charged with Bonapartist activities and who were in receipt of a state pension. The intention was to withdraw the pension from all those who were in any way connected with the Hundred Days regime.\(^{131}\)

By autumn 1815, the Ultra royalists of the Gard had achieved a degree of autonomy in their department that the other centres of royalism in the south had not succeeded in realising. In the words of Cavalier, the prosecutor in Nîmes:

"The authors of the disorders belong to a faction which is perhaps peculiar to this department because of the division between Catholic and Protestant. The Catholics are Royalists, but only in this sense that they hoped the King would put affairs back in their old state, at least as far as the position of worship and entry to public office were concerned: that they would obtain rank and pre-eminence, an exclusive domination. They came out against the Charter because it betrayed their hopes, and then against the King because he did not indulge them. Thereafter, the incidents of last year, their provocations, their rumours, their threats outbalanced any promises of fairness made by the king in the minds of the inhabitants of the Gard. The plans which these men are putting into effect now, were announced and discussed a year ago in Nîmes, Uzès and Pont Saint Esprit.\(^{132}\)

It seemed, then, that the Catholic population of the Gard had picked up once more the thread of continuity that had been broken by the events of the Revolution - continuity with a past that was more real than the emotional visions of a

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\(^{131}\) A.N. F79049. Jouques to minister of interior, 11 October, 1815.

\(^{132}\) A.N. BB3 154. Cavalier to minister of justice, 23 October, 1815.
harmonious, feudal France that many returned émigrés held, and which one commentator has aptly called 'political romanticism'. Indeed, there was very little romanticism in the precision of the measures employed by the Gard Ultras in the Summer and Autumn of 1815, and their demands in the future were to remain, until 1830 at least, very clearly defined.

Superficially, the events that had taken place in the Gard after July 1815 reflected the dominant outlook of the Chamber of deputies - demands for revenge, protestations of loyalty bordering on loyalism, the belief that France should be purged by a minority of Frenchmen who were purer than the king, who knew better than the king. The composition of the famous Chambre introuvable, the utterances of many of its members in the Autumn of 1815 must certainly have given the Ultras in the Gard confidence that their achievements would be defended; Talleyrand and Fouche had been removed, and the new Prime Minister, the duc de Richelieu gave the Ultras reason to suppose that the Liberals and Constitutionals would not exert much influence on decisions, a supposition that events were to show as very misguided. Indeed, the extravagant demands of the Ultra delegation in the Chamber of deputies were to bring them into conflict with Richelieu and his ministers in no time at all. Within a year, the achievements of the Gard royalists would be threatened by the unexpected rise to power of Elie Decazes whose ascendancy over Louis, coupled with the latter's determination not to

134 On repressive measures against collaborators, for example.
submit to the increasing popularity of Artois, led to the rejection of the Ultra party, and with it, the isolation of the Gard.
Chapter 3.

While the situation in the Gard appeared to calm and to return to 'normality' in the Autumn of 1815, the Catholic Royalists announced the establishment of a new society, known as the Cercle Augier after the house in which its initial meetings were held. The aim of the society was to contribute to the 'maintenance of union, peace and good order.' The president of the Cercle was Henri de Bernis, brother of the deputy, and its secretary was Trinquelague. Among its founder members were: René de Bernis and Jules de Calvière; the newly appointed mayor of Nîmes, de Vallongues; Boyer and Baron, two lawyers who had marked themselves out by their violent anti-protestantism during the First Restoration, and a number of lesser officials in the newly constituted local administration: Chazelles-Chusclan, senior 'conseiller' in the prefect's office, de Vassimon, colonel in the departmental Gendarmerie, Gibrat, a police official, a judge whose name is unknown, and Fajon, styled a businessman, but, in fact a bankrupt.

This society, successor to the Société royale, was to be the centre of Catholic royalist activity in the Gard, and, in correspondence with similar societies in other major towns, would constitute the vehicle assuring the decentralised yet

1 A.N. F7 9052. Prospectus of the Société dite Cercle d'Augier. October 1815.

2 A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 8 December, 1811. The same report indicates that Hyacinthe Bernavon, another member is also bankrupt. Bernavon was present at the extremists' separate celebration of the Fête St. Louis of 1814. See pp. 27-28 supra.
highly organised network that had enabled royalism to survive the Revolution and Empire. On the submission of its constitution and membership to the minister of police, the committee of the cercle stated that its membership would not exceed two hundred\(^3\). The continuity between the old Société royale and the Cercle d'Augier was clear: the new society even met in the room attached to the café Bolze after its preliminary meetings. But the men who directed the new society enjoyed power and influence on the political life of the Gard in a way that the sociétaires of 1814 could only dream of.

Its prompt foundation, its membership, comprising the leading Gard notables and Catholic royalists indicate that it was part of the grand design of the White Terror, namely the creation of a "parallel" government in the Gard, an inner cabinet which would determine decisions made by the official administration\(^4\). One contemporary observer remarked that "nobody could fill any post, however insignificant, without the approval of the society"\(^5\). The principal external links the society had were with Paris, through the deputies in the new Assembly, and with similar societies established through the south, from Marseille to Bayonne\(^6\). The government, without being able to take any action against the extreme royalists, viewed the network in the south with a certain

\(^3\) A.D. Gard 6M 10. Minister of police to prefect, 18 November, 1815.

\(^4\) In 1820, Madier de Montjau was to use the expression "gouvernement occulte" to describe the influence of the Ultra royalists in the Gard. Petition to the Chamber of Deputies, 25 April, 1820.

\(^5\) Lauze de Péret, Causes et Précis, p. 392.

\(^6\) P.R.O. F.O. 27/30. Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh, 8 January, 1816.
amount of anxiety in the light of the suspicion that had surrounded the duc d'Angoulême and his lieutenants\textsuperscript{7}. In the Autumn of 1815, it was still not clear that these were salon conspirators. However, circumstances in the Gard were to produce an increasingly inward looking brand of extreme royalism there, and for a number of years, the links with Paris were to be far more critical than those with other towns in the south.

Because it was a secret society in fact if not on paper, there is no documentary information on the workings of the Société de Bolze. In 1817, an informer, Fajon, told the prefect that there were degrees of membership, and that the majority of the sociétaires did not attend meetings, but were contacted when their services were required. Information and instructions that came from Paris and other towns were passed on by word of mouth from the local notables who controlled the committee\textsuperscript{8}. The organisation of the secret society reminds one of the Chevaliers de la Foi, the Ultra royalist organisation established during the Empire by Ferdinand de Bertier and the Polignac brothers\textsuperscript{9}. Indeed, there is evidence that the Gard royalist leaders were members of the Chevaliers de la Foi: Jules de Calvière, his relative, Jacques-Alexis de Calvière-Vézénobre, René de Bernis, de Vogüé, the Vicomte de Rochemore and the duc de Crussol are

\textsuperscript{7} A.D. Hte, Garonne 4M 35. Minister of police to Remusat, 4 December, 1815. Also pp.50-55 supra.

\textsuperscript{8} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9051. Dargout (prefect) to minister of police, 20 April, 1818.

\textsuperscript{9} See Bertier de Sauvigny, Le Comte Ferdinand de Bertier, for a detailed study of the Chevaliers.
listed among the **Chevaliers** in the National Assembly in 1824. But there is no reference in reports on the Gard to the **Chevaliers de la Foi** or to the influence of the notorious **Congrégation**, and it is doubtful that Catholic royalist policy in the department was influenced by the **Chevaliers** to a significant degree. It is clear from correspondence in 1830-31 relating to the possibility of an armed insurrection on behalf of the exiled Bourbons that the Midi in general and the Gard in particular was involved with the conspiratorial network that Ferdinand de Bertier and de Montmorency, 'founder members' of the **Chevaliers** continued to direct. Also, the emphasis the Ultras gave to decentralisation and the revitalisation of the provinces coincided with the Gard royalists' desire for local autonomy; nevertheless, the impetus of Catholic royalism in the Gard derived from anti-Protestantism, from the desire humiliate and to weaken definitively the Protestant community. Whatever grand designs the **Frondeur** leaders may have entertained, the rank and file had specific demands that had to be met. Moreover, the Gard was already in the hands of Ultras whose concern was to maintain that control, chiefly by ensuring that the Paris government interfered as little as possible in local affairs. Militant action by the Ultra royalists could bring unwelcome publicity.

The Gard notables saw clearly that their own position depended on the limited ambitions of the Catholic populace.

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10 ibid., p.356
11 See Baron de Bordigné's report on the southern departments in the correspondence with the duchesse de Berry, 1831, in *Etudes d'Histoire moderne et contemporaine*, III, pp.18-35.
and had to remain sensitive to feeling in the department. The consequences of disregarding grass roots opinion in favour of more sophisticated or self interested aims were apparent in 1818, when the former prefect, Jouques, lost the support of the Société de Bolze for publishing an apologia of his term as prefect in the Gard, so bringing the department into the public eye and, worse still, admitting that atrocities were committed by Catholic terrorists. Trinquelague, too, lost the support of his 'party' because he had begun to urge the ultras to obey the king's ministers for the moment. The Catholic royalists appear to have been incapable of appreciating tactical volte-faces, and even Jules de Calvière, who appears to have devoted more time to 'local affairs' than the other deputies, was to be seriously misunderstood.

The extent of the Société de Bolze's influence was discovered in the Spring of 1817 by an official of the ministry of Police, Eymard, who was in the Gard to assist the prefect who replaced Jouques that year. Eymard intercepted a number of letters to and from Paris and he managed to identify the correspondents and persons mentioned in the letters. The Ultra royalists most frequently mentioned and the most influential as well were Jules de Calvière, René de Bernis,


14 A. N. F 79051. Dargout, 'prefect, to Decazes, 20 April, 1818.

15 A. N. F 79051. Dargout to De Cazes, 31 May, 1817. Trinquelague was able to salvage some of his lost credit by his involvement in the attempt to have the Concordat of 1801 revised.

16 see p.136 infra.
Charles de Vogüé and Jacques de Calvière-Vézénobre, as could be expected. But the letters referred also to a wide range of local officials, including de Vallongues, mayor of Nîmes; de Surville, commander of the Nîmes National Guard; du Roure, commander of the Alès National Guard and de Vassimon, a colonel in the Gendarmerie of the department. Moreover, there were references to the duc d'Angoulême and to Vitrolles. The correspondence was directed from Paris, usually through the Gard's parliamentary representation, but also under the seal of the Headquarters of the National Guards of France, to a number of points in the Gard. One of the principal recipients was the wife of Jacques-Alexis de Calvière-Vézénobre, Pulchérie, the daughter of the count Emmanuel de Saint Priest who was one of the duc d'Angoulême's gentlemen. She was, it was claimed, a close friend of Vitrolles. Some letters were sent in the official correspondence of the Ministry of the Interior to the prefecture, where Chazelles Chusclan or de Surville took receipt of them. The presence of so many agents in positions of authority enabled the "parallel"

17 A.N. F7 9050. Mss. document, "Clé d'une Correspondance", anon.
18 A.N. F7 9051. Eymard to Decazes, 7 April, 1817.
19 A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 18 April, 1817.
20 A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 19 December, 1817. Also Château de Vézénobre. Mss. notebooks of Pulchérie-Cécile Guignard de Saint Priest, marquise de Calvière. Madame de Calvière recounts frequent visits to Paris with her husband, when they were received by the Comte d'Artois.
21 A.N. F7 9050. "Clé d'une correspondance".
22 A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes 15 April, 1817.
government to receive and send its communications largely unnoticed, as well as giving it access to privileged information, not only in the prefecture, the clearing house for all official papers, but also in the police department, thanks to Vidal and Gibrat\textsuperscript{23}, and in the official press which was published by Gaude and edited by Greleau, both agents of the sociétè de Bolze\textsuperscript{24}.

The power of the Société was known locally. An eminent Protestant lawyer, Henri Fornier de Clausonne wrote in the spring of 1816:

"The town is quite tranquil, but confidence and warmth have vanished from educated circles, and the most cultivated feeling of hatred is the only one visible among the lower classes. The disturbances and violence have been suspended rather than stopped, and I see no reason to think they will not start again, for I doubt the best intentioned authority could be strong enough to contain them." \textsuperscript{25}

Yet another observer wrote shortly afterwards that the king's government was trying to bring the department under the royal writ, but 'the same men are still in office, Monsieur D'arbaud Jouques was still prefect and the so called 'royal society' and its secret committee retained an authority quite beyond that of the law.'\textsuperscript{26}

The influence of the royalist organisation can be seen in

\textsuperscript{23} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7}9051. Eymard to Decazes 26 March 1817.
\textsuperscript{24} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7}9051. Eymard to Decazes 28 March 1817.
\textsuperscript{25} A.D. Gard Chartrier de Clausonne 123. H. Fornier de Clausonne to G. Fornier de Clausonne. 6 March, 1818.
\textsuperscript{26} P.J. Lauze de Péret, Causes et Précis, p.398
a number of ways. There was a concerted resistance to the government's attempts to abolish Vidal's post as commissaire de police. On 16 October, the minister of police, Decazes, decreed the suppression of the post following a series of letters accusing Vidal of abusing his powers, which were temporary in any case. The very night the decree had arrived in Nîmes, rioting broke out in Nîmes and lasted three days until it was ended by the energetic intervention of General Lagarde, the military commander. According to the prefect, the rioting was a reaction to his own decree dissolving the irregular militia bands on 14 September. It seems most improbable that the reaction Jouques reported would have taken a month to make itself felt, particularly as the dissolution order appears to have had little effect on the leading terrorists - Trestaillons was reported to have made an "arrest" in the name of royalism as late as 20 September, in Nîmes; his victim was charged with having broken a bust of the king "some time in the past". Moreover, the coincidence of the rioting and news of Vidal's imminent dismissal is remarkable. Whilst only 12 arrests were made, Vidal, in his report, claimed that there were nearly three hundred rioters on the streets. The incident may have been a reaction

27 A.N. F7 9049. Minister of police to Jouques 16 October, 1815. The government had sought Vidal's dismissal as early as August 1815, but Jouques had resisted. A.N.F7 9050. Minister of interior to Jouques, 16 August, 1815.

28 A.N. F7 9049. Jouques to minister of police, 18 October, 1815.

29 A.D. Gard 6M 77. Commissaire Paulin to Vidal, 20 September, 1815.

30 A.N. F7 9049. Minister of war to minister of police, 31 October, 1815.

31 A.N. F7 9049. Vidal to minister of police, 18 October, 1815.
to the dismissal of an "understanding" police official, or it may have been arranged to prove that Vidal was indispensable. Jouques' own attitude to the matter of Vidal's dismissal offers no evidence to the contrary. Even after Vidal's corruption and partisan exercise of police powers had been investigated by Lagarde at the request of Decazes\textsuperscript{32}, Jouques continued to support a man whose reputation was no more than that of a criminal and a profiteer. After seeking four thousand Francs in payment for Vidal's service since July, Jouques requested an additional sum of twenty thousand Francs to enable Vidal to establish a secret police in the Department\textsuperscript{33}. In his request, Jouques pointed out that Vidal had been a loyal servant of the monarchy, two of whose sons had been royal volunteers in March 1815\textsuperscript{34}. Seemingly unaware of the changing attitudes in the government, Jouques was exposing himself to the minister least favourably disposed to Ultra royalism in France. It was a process that continued until his dismissal in 1817.

The rioting was quelled principally because of the decisive intervention of General Lagarde who arrested Trestaillons and had him taken in chains to the military prison at Montpellier in the face of threats of violence\textsuperscript{35}. Yet Lagarde's determination was to mark him out to the Ultra royalists as a threat, and he soon became the centre of an

\textsuperscript{32} A.N.F\textsuperscript{7} 9049. Lagarde to minister of police, 7 December, 1815

\textsuperscript{33} A.N.F\textsuperscript{7} 9049. Jouques to minister of police, 3 December, 1815; 13 January, 1816.

\textsuperscript{34} ibid.

\textsuperscript{35} A.D. Gard 6M 26. Lagarde to minister of war, 18 October, 1815.
affair that illustrated more clearly than anonymous letters and suspicious behaviour that the Gard was ruled by men whose ambitions were sinister.

Lagarde was an outsider appointed to the VIIth military division by Clarke, minister for War at the time. Unlike Jouques, Lagarde showed no sympathy for the Catholic royalist cause. His arrest of Trestaillons had identified him as an enemy of the royalists, as had some of his public statements. At the beginning of November 1815, the duc d'Angoulême made a visit to Nîmes. During the visit, Louis Terme, one of the more notorious anti-Protestant agitators of the First Restoration, was recommended to the prince to be decorated for his services to the royal cause. His testimonial was signed by Vallongues, Vidal, Carteras, a former self styled commander of Nîmes, the sub prefect of Nîmes and by Jouques himself. The same sponsors assured Angoulême that rumours circulating in Paris about trouble in the department were false, that "the enemies of the king were working quietly but with great astuteness" to discredit the local administration. Lagarde's was the only voice to express disquiet and dissatisfaction at the developments in the department. On Sunday, 12 November, an attempt was made to murder him. The Protestant Grand temple had been closed since the

36 A.D. Gard 6M 40, anon. to duc d'Angoulême, 2 November, 1815.
summer because of the anti-Protestant feeling in the town. The first service was to be held on 12 November, and that morning a large, hostile crowd assembled outside the temple. The civil and military authorities were present, with a contingent of the National Guard to guarantee access to the temple for the Protestants. As the congregation began to arrive, elements of the crowd pressed closer and hurled abuse at the Protestants. Lagarde, on horseback, intervened characteristically. One demonstrator stood his ground and, when Lagarde attempted to push him back, drew a pistol and fired at the general. The man disappeared into the crowd and made his escape. The incident provoked a sharp and rapid response from Paris. Angoulême, who had only left Nîmes, returned to the city and showed his disgust to the authorities by refusing a National Guard escort on the grounds that the force was an insult to justice. He immediately ordered Jouques to supervise a further purge of the Guard which had shown itself incapable - or unwilling to - discharge its duties. It soon became known that the would-be assassin had been identified as Louis Boissin, a former Miquelet and currently a sergeant in the Guard company commanded by Vidal fils. The possibility of the crime having no sinister motivation was diminished when a number of persons said they

39 A.N. BB3 154. Procureur général to minister of justice, 1 December, 1815.

40 E. Daudet, La Terreur blanche, p.124.

41 A.N. BB3 154. Procureur général to minister of justice, 1 December, 1815.
had seen Boissin leaving Vidal's house on the morning of the incident, accompanied by two men and armed with a pistol and sword. It took eight months to find Boissin.

The incident was utterly counter productive. Whilst the Catholic royalists had hoped to remove Lagarde, whom they saw - and quite correctly - as an obstacle to their designs, the crude assassination attempt merely focussed the attention of Paris on their presence even more. As a form of disgrace, the king ordered that the citizens of Nîmes should pay an additional tax contribution of 15% for the year, and Decazes, minister of police began to make inquiries into the quality and trustworthiness of the local administration. While many letters commenting on the departmental administrators were anonymous and couched in the classic phraseology of the man with a grudge, some sound reports indicated that things were far from normal. Thus, an envoy of the British embassy, Colonel Ross, commented in January 1816:

"The provincial magistrates should be men of vigorous, enlightened and unprejudiced minds, possessing the confidence of all parties, which is far from being the case at present."

42 A.N.BB³ 154. Procureur général to minister of justice, 13 December, 1815.

43 He was arrested near Arles (Bouches du Rhône) at the end of July 1816. A.N.F7 9049. Commissaire de Police, Nîmes, to minister of police, 23 August, 1816.

44 PRO F.O. 27/130. Colonel Ross to Sir Charles Stuart, 21 December, 1815.

45 ibid, 21 January, 1816. While these reports were made to the British embassy, there is every reason to believe that they were made available to the French ministry of police. The number of French provincial police reports filed regularly in F.O. 27/150 testifies to a high degree of collaboration between the British embassy and the French police ministry.
Lagarde, previously entrusted with the task of reporting on Vidal's activities, commented:

"My opinion on the troubles in this region is that they are fomented by indefatigable agitators". 46.

Again, Cavalier, procureur général, revealed that a confidential report, known only to himself and to Gibrat, a police official, had been handed to the Société de Bolze - presumably by Gibrat 47, and that the mayor, Vallongues, had been very sympathetic to the extreme royalists during the first restoration 48.

As a result of these reports, Decazes instructed Jouques to prepare a report on the suitability of the men mentioned 49.

In an attempt to cover himself and the local administration, Jouques wrote an epistle to the minister of the interior, Vaublanc, a known supporter of the Ultra royalists. Jouques claimed that there were utterly unfounded rumours circulating in Paris because the Protestants of the Gard had a number of well placed advocates "totally dominated by a spirit of sectarianism and philosophisme (sic)" and whose leader was almost certainly Guizot. These men, having witnessed the failure of their sect in the elections, had determined to prepare the next elections from within the government itself 50.

46 A.N. F7 9049. Lagarde to minister of police, 7 December, 1815.
47 A.N. BB3 154. Cavalier to minister of justice, 13 December, 1815.
48 ibid., 12 November, 1815.
49 A.D. Gard 6M 11. Minister of police to Jouques, 10 January, 1815.
50 At the time, Guizot was secretary to the minister for justice.
was endeavouring to win the support of the Protestant community of the Gard by engineering Jouques' destitution. Moreover, the Gard was like no other department in France and should not, therefore, be administered like the others. The Protestants had always been opposed to the Bourbon Monarchs, said Jouques, claiming that his office was full of documents proclaiming the elation of the Protestant community at the return of Bonaparte. Only four Protestants had joined the volunteers raised by the duc d'Angoulême in March 1815 - was this not proof enough of their perfidy? On what grounds did they who 'had united to support tyranny' now demand a share in the administration of the legitimate government? No force, no authority could assuage the indignation of the people if the government, fooled or misguided, entrusted to the Protestant party, which the people regarded with so many good reasons to be the enemies of the beloved king, any of the major posts in the department. It was true, Jouques continued, that the people of Nîmes had mistakenly pillaged one Protestant house, that of Vincens Mourgue, whom they had confused with a notorious Bonapartist, Vincens Maigre, but on realising their error, they had stopped in the middle of the pillage. Apart from this isolated case, only known Bonapartists had suffered - a fact that contrasted starkly with the "premediated" murder of royalists during the Hundred Days.

In taking this stand, Jouques had reversed the role of the prefect; the instrument of central authority had become

the advocate of local interests. His unguarded justification of and support for policies of discrimination in the Gard, his assertion that there was a Protestant plot ranked him unequivocally among the Ultra royalists.

In spite of Jouques' attitude and the numerous comments on the situation in the Gard, the government took no action beyond the inquiries requested by Decazes. It should be remembered that the Chambre introuvable was at the zenith of its influence and that, as yet, no coherent policy had been formulated by the king's ministers. If Decazes, the up and coming police director was arriving at the conclusion that Ultra royalism had to be destroyed, other ministers like Vaublanc and Clarke were flaunting their royalism. The prime minister, the duc de Richelieu, was preoccupied with the fundamental problems of balancing the budget and the cost of the allied occupation, and the clear intention of the Ultra royalist dominated assembly to play an active part in political decisions meant that the government had to be most careful not to alienate the majority if it wanted to discharge its duties. Action taken against royalist supported administrators at the time would almost certainly have led to charges of Bonapartism and treason. Nonetheless, Jouques, at least, had revealed himself and the existence of reports such as the one he had just written in the ministry's files could do nothing but harm to his career as an administrator when Decazes emerged as the leader of the government in the Autumn of 1816.
But in the early part of 1816, a time of exaltation for the Catholic royalists of the Gard, disaster seemed too remote a possibility to consider. In May, at the end of the parliamentary session, the reception accorded to Jules de Calvière in his home town of Saint Gilles du Gard illustrated the mood of Catholic royalist triumphalism. The Journal du Gard, itself controlled by the royalists, reported a banquet held in his honour during which the following lines were sung:

"O Darbaud, Montauban , Grenier, Vassimon, Calvière, Survile, How could we forget you? Your names stand out among thousands! These names that make the miserable regicide quake with fear will always serve as a guide to us in the pursuit of honour." 52.

The newspaper was filled with odes which reflected the same delirious adulation, and the editor of the Journal du Gard remarked that "the true friends of the king feel the irresistible desire to seek each other out and to remain together 53."

The Journal du Gard took great care never to miss an occasion that served to underline the dominance of Catholic royalism and to give an impression of a society united behind love of the monarch. Thus, when the Nîmes National Guard company entertained the Tarn departmental company, the newspaper proclaimed that "hundreds of loyal toasts and oaths were offered" that royalist songs were sung and that the gathering declared repeatedly that they would "die rather than suffer the least sleight against the royal family".

52 Journal du Gard, 13 July, 1816.
53 Ibid.
The reporter assured his readers that "such unions of strength would make us all the more daunting in the eyes of intriguers, more terrible to the partisans of illegitimate government".\(^{54}\)

Catholic royalist solidarity was increased that year in another way. The deteriorating economic situation had increased unemployment and the price of bread\(^{55}\). The Catholic notables were thus able to increase the allegiance of the working poor by alleviating the hardship with food and money distributions, thereby reaffirming the quasi feudal relationship that characterised the Catholic community in the Gard\(^{56}\).

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54. ibid., 10 August, 1816.

55. The price of wheat rose to a peak in June 1816, just before the harvest, and then, from November, 1816 to May 1817 high prices were sustained. E. Labrousse, G. Romano, F. Dreyfus, *op. cit.*

Ross reported from Nîmes that food prices were high and the commercial crisis was contributing to the hardship. P.R.O. FO 27/154 to Sir Charles Stuart, 22 January, 1816.

Evidence of the hardship of that winter in the Gard is offered, too, by crime reports. Brigandage occurred on an unusually large scale. Thus, the procureur's report deals with many incidents like the robbery of a charretier on the road between Nîmes and Beaucaire by seven men who took 39 Louis d'or (14 December); the robbery of 1200 francs from a man between Sommières and Le Vigan on 17 December, the holding up of the Montpellier mail coach and theft of 1600 francs from it by seven brigands. In most cases, the weapons used were knives and fusils de chasse. The brigands must have been local men from the references to their idiom and accent. (A.N. F7 9050)

56. A police report passed on to the British embassy described the Catholic working class of Nîmes as "a considerable mass of hirelings, capable of anything without the tight control of their leaders". P.R.O. FO 27/155 police report, 3 March, 1817.
The supremacy of Catholic royalism was reflected in the outcome of two trials concerning the recent troubles and which were held in 1816.

At the court of Assises of Riom in the Puy de Dôme, three of the leading royalist terrorists, Jacques Dupont, alias Trestaillons, Jean Graffand, alias Quatretaillons, and their henchman, Pocheville, were released without a trial. They had been arrested at various times - Graffand in September 1815, Dupont and Pocheville by Lagarde in October - and were accused of murder and pillage. The charges had to be dismissed because it proved impossible to obtain witnesses for the prosecution or even sworn statements from them for fear of reprisals. Thus, at the beginning of August 1816, the three former Miquelets returned to Nîmes in triumph, where their presence was a source of scandal to the Protestant community, deprived even of justice: "these atrocious faces, remarked here and there in the streets or on the boulevards spread a sadness tinged with indignation." The release of these men, whose freedom had been assured by more crime, contrasted sharply with the sentence of death passed on eight Protestants found guilty of having murdered royalist volunteers at Arpaillargues during the Hundred Days. When the Minister of Justice remarked to Jouques on the obvious contrast between the two cases, and on the effect the imminent execution of the Protestants was likely to produce, Jouques replied in a fashion that revealed once more the extent to which he was

57. A.N. BB³ 154. Memorandum of Ministry of Justice; 31 May; 1816.

58. Lauze de Péret, Causes et Précis, p. 398.
the Catholic royalists' representative and not the government's. Jouques felt obliged to defend Graffand (Quatretaillons) saying: "It was only after his arrest that the voice of the local magistrates was raised against him". He went on to say that Quatretaillons had had no part in the principal crime of which he had been accused, namely the murder of six "prisoners" taken by his band near Uzès in August 1815. On the contrary, he had gone to seek out the authorities in order to have the rebels arrested. In contrast, the crimes of the "assassins of Arpaillargues" as he called them, were incontestable and incontested. "Never have the freedom, independence and impartiality of the judges and jurors been so evident than in this trial and condemnation"... "if the accused escaped the sword of the law, a complete subversion of public spirit would hit this unhappy department".

The Protestants did not "escape the sword of the law": they were executed on 24 September in the course of an event that Jouques described as "this great act of the most impartial justice" which "produced the most salutary effect on the public". A later assessment of the trial and execution notes that it elicited a wave of anonymous letters accusing the Gard courts of being in the pay of the "brigands of

59. A.N. F79657. Jouques to minister of justice, 2 September, 1816.

Just over a year later, Jouques was to write of the three terrorists: "If they were acquitted by the courts it was only because of the cowardly silence of those who know only how to accuse in odious pamphlets and whose mouths close before the august tribunal of the laws". Troubles et agitations, p.50.

60. A.N. F79657. Jouques to minister of justice, 2 September, 1816.

Angoulême 62. Even if the accused were guilty, it was grotesque that such a politically sensitive trial should have been allowed in Nîmes so soon after the acquittal of the three terrorists, whose own trial had been set in a distant town to avoid agitation.

The elation of Catholic royalist sentiment was not troubled unduly by the surprising news that the Chamber of deputies was to be dissolved during the recess. Decazes had come to the conclusion that effective government would remain impossible as long as the extreme right dominated in the chamber, and he persuaded the King to dissolve the chamber and to hold fresh elections. Decazes devoted himself to managing the elections in an attempt to reduce the number of ultras elected. In the south, liberal opinion rejoiced at the dissolution 63, while the Ultras saw the move, quite correctly, as an attempt to produce a parliamentary majority docile to the ministers 64. With hindsight, it has been said that the constitutional coup d'état organised by Décazes with the support of the allied governments was a rejection of the principle of a democratically elected assembly, and so compromised the future growth of parliamentary government during this critical first half of the century, when so many conflicts exposed or created by the Revolution still had to be resolved 65.

63. Durand, Marseille, Nîmes et ses Environn, pp. i, vii.
64. A.N. F 7 4349. Froment to Misspoulet, 12 October, 1816.
65. Eertier de Sauvigny, La Restauration, p.138
This point of view is, of course, founded on the assumption that the extreme right would constitute a responsible majority, something that was not evident at the time. Indeed, it appeared that the Ultra royalists were 'constitutionals' only as long as they were the majority. In reality, the dissolution that took place in September 1816 was the outcome of a conflict about the interpretation of the Charter, not simply a measure taken for political convenience.

The elections took place in October. The total number of deputies had been reduced to 262 to conform to the Charter. The Gard's representation was also reduced - to three. Like many of the southern departments, the Gard, whose electorate not changed since the previous elections, returned three members of the Chambre introuvable: Charles de Vogüé, Jules de Calvière and Trinquelague. René de Bernis had been elected in the neighbouring Lozère, where he was commander of the National Guard. The only apparent effect of the dissolution and the government's propaganda before the elections was a schism in the ranks of the royalists. One observer said that a minority had expressed demands for a monarchy "as they imagine it existed forty years ago", while the majority had expressed their preference for a constitutional monarchy. The split had only affected the leisured and educated classes.

66 A.N. F1c III Gard 4. Elections of 4 October, 1816.
67 A.N.F9051. Dargout to Decazes, 19 December, 1817.
68 Bertier de Sauvigny, La Restauration, pp.139-140.
who tended to follow politics in the newspapers; popular attitudes remained crude and extreme. The extreme royalists were vaunting Châteaubriand's Monarchie selon la Charte which had just been banned by the government. The ban, they proclaimed, was part of the constitutionals' plot to mislead the king.

Indeed, the events in Paris appeared to have very little effect on affairs in the Gard, which remained calm. Even the acute substitutes shortage and high prices failed to provoke the disturbances that occurred in many parts of France in the cruel winter of 1816-17. Yet, the apparent security of Ultra royalist rule in the Gard was about to be shaken. The dissolution of the Chambre introuvable marked the beginning of the period generally referred to as the "liberal" phase of the Restoration which lasted until the murder of the duc de Berry in February 1820, swung political opinion firmly to the Right. The chief architect of the liberal government was Decazes who remained minister of police, but whose ascendancy over the king gave him unquestioned primacy in the government. Moreover, shortly before the dissolution, Decazes had obtained the replacement of Vaublanc at the department of the Interior, by a moderate, Laine. Thus, the key departments concerned with internal security, Police and Interior, were in the hands of liberals by the autumn of 1816; two more, War (responsible

69 A.N.F7 9050. Commissaire de police to minister of police, 29 October, 1816.
70 ibid.
for the national Gendarmerie) and Justice would be given to Gouvion-Saint Cyr, Marshal of France, and to Pasquier, last Prefect of Police of Napoleon, respectively.

The event that brought the Catholic royalists of the Gard into conflict with the government was the trial of Louis Boissin, the man accused of attempting to murder General Lagarde, the former military commander in Nîmes. Boissin was captured in the summer of 1816 near Arles and transferred to Nîmes in September\(^{72}\) while evidence was assembled for his trial which was to take place in January 1817. As early as Boissin's arrest, Decazes had written to Jouques, stressing his personal interest in the case and instructing the prefect to report regularly and in detail on the organisation of the trial\(^{73}\). For some reason, Jouques had not notified the government of the arrest of this man whose crime was of a most serious nature\(^{74}\). Jouques' subsequent handling of the trial reflects both the gulf that separated the thinking of the Catholic royalists and that of the government and Jouques' own blindness to the mounting pressures that were being put on him. With Guizot in the department of Justice, middle class Protestant attitudes to the Jouques administration could not have gone unnoticed. These attitudes may be summarized by the following appraisal: "It is impossible for peace and

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72 A.N. F79050. Police report to minister of police 16 September, 1816.

73. A.D. Gard 6M 11. Minister of police to Jouques, 3 August, 1816.

74. ibid.
calm to be restored as long as M. Arbaud Jouques, the subprefect of Uzès (Darnand Vallabrix) and the mayor of Nîmes have any say in the administration". In spite of the mass of unfavourable comment on his biased administration, Jouques continued to isolate himself from the government.

The trial was due to begin on 3 February, 1817, and a few days beforehand, Jouques wrote to Lainé informing him arrangements had been made to have strong military reinforcements in Nîmes during the trial as a precaution. He hastened to add that rumours of Catholic royalist support for Boissin were unfounded. The trial would take place in scrupulously honest circumstances, for Jouques had personally drawn up the list of jurors. According to a retired general who was in residence in Nîmes at the time, Boissin did, in fact, enjoy the support of the local royalist organisation, the Société de Bolze. Shortly after Boissin was brought to Nîmes, Greleau, owner of the Journal du Gard and member of the Société, took charge of the matter. Then, the leaders of the société set about hiring 'witnesses' who were given statements to learn at the home of Gaussin, a cloth dyer. It was true, however, that Jouques had chosen the members of the jury himself. It was composed of seven landowners, two retired colonels - one of whom, Despouches, was shortly to be dismissed from command of a National Guard company for his

75. A.N. F 19 10358, anon., Notes on a conversation with Chabaud Latour and Delaville, December 1816.
78. ibid.
extreme views —, two mayors and Gaude the printer. Fornier d'Albe noted that "the list (of jurors) was prepared by Monsieur d'Arbaud Jouques, prefect in office, entirely to the satisfaction of Boissin and his friends." Then, after the hearings, a lawyer was heard to tell Gaude that it was clear that the evidence against Boissin was overwhelming. Gaude, a member of the Jury retorted that Boissin would be acquitted without the slightest difficulty.

The circumstances in which the trial took place recalled the elections of 1790 and August 1815. A Catholic lawyer, a liberal nonetheless, described the scene in the courtroom:

"All around the building, cries of Vive le Roi! could be heard during the proceedings and deliberations of the Jury. A farandole* was danced on the Esplanade, and Planchet, one of the judges was mocked. Amidst all that, the other marquis, de Vallongues, was enthroned in the court flourishing his hat and saluting the people."

* A Provencal version of the 'conga' which had become a manifestation of Ultra royalist triumphalism in the Midi.

79. See p.115 infra.
82. ibid.
83. P.R.O. F.O. 27/154. Copy of a letter written by Madier de Montjau, 8 February, 1817. Madier de Montjau (1785-1865) was to become notorious for his denunciation, in April 1820, of the "gouvernement occulte" of the Ultras.
The proceedings were designed to provide the Catholic royalist supporters with further proof of the victory of their cause. Small wonder, then, that a Protestant lawyer, Horace Fornier de Clausonne, could write to his brother on the eve of the verdict that in spite of the vigorous and exhaustive case brought by the public prosecutor, in spite of the courageous sworn statements made by the witnesses for the prosecution, there was no doubt that Boissin would be acquitted. Indeed, the jury found Boissin not guilty of attempted murder on the grounds that he acted out of self defence. Not only had he been acquitted, Lagarde had been depicted as the aggressor. That night, 8 February, Louis Boissin was guest of honour at a dinner given by Gaude. A sum amounting to 300 Francs, collected by Madame de Surville, wife of the commander of the Nîmes National Guard, was given to him with a passport valid for Spain.

But in the changed circumstances in Paris, this clear violation of justice did not go unremarked. The Prime Minister, Richelieu, was scandalised, and the Departments of Justice and Interior began an immediate inquiry, the result of which was the annulment of the verdict "in the interest of justice".

89. A.N. F7 9049 Report from Cour de Cassation, 13 March, 1817.
The first effect of the government's action was felt when Jouques was dismissed. The decision to remove him was taken as soon as the outcome of the trial was known in Paris\textsuperscript{90}. Jouques was inextricably linked with the trial either through his weakness or his complicity, and this most recent example of his failure to discharge his duty overshadowed the succession of earlier ones. Nonetheless, news of his dismissal was received with shock by the Catholic population of Nîmes\textsuperscript{91}, who had evidently failed to appraise the shift in government policy since the dissolution the previous September. A year later, in an apologia for his term of office in the Gard, Jouques wrote:

"I am completely unaware of the reasons for my destitution. I would tend to believe, as many of the principal leaders of a long intrigue have not feared to boast, that the government finally tired of rebutting the perpetual manoeuvres of a number of agitators in the Gard whom I did not cease to indicate to the government, and whom I believed were no longer a threat to anyone but myself, and not for the department as a whole, whose peace and tranquillity was the fruit of my labours, my honour and most cherished attention" \textsuperscript{92}.

Still Jouques stressed, for the public, at least, the theme of a Protestant plot, and in doing so, underlined once again the peculiarly local preoccupations of the Gard Ultra

\textsuperscript{90} P.R.O. F.O. 27/154. Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh, 17 February, 1817.

\textsuperscript{91} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7}9050. Police report to minister of police; 2 March, 1817.

\textsuperscript{92} Darbaud Jouques, \textit{Troubles et Agitations}, pp. vi-vii.
royalists. The former prefect of the Gard remained without public office until 1823, when he was appointed prefect of the Côte d'Or by the Villèle government which reflected Ultra royalist attitudes more clearly than any previous Restoration government.

The dismissal of Jouques, and the appointment of Emmanuel Dargout in his place marked the end of an era in the Gard. In common with Ultra royalism throughout France, Catholic royalism in the Gard was to exist in the wilderness for the next three years, as the government of France displayed more marked intentions of liberalism. Unable to function as a responsible opposition party, the Ultras resorted to cloak and dagger activities like the "Conspiration du Bord de l'Eau", allegedly an attempt to kidnap the king in order to impose on him a 'right thinking' government in 1818; the Lyon affair of 1817, apparently a Republican insurrection, but in which the Prefect and local military commander were implicated, men who were sympathetic to Ultra royalism. A more sinister attempt to undermine the liberal government was made in the Summer of 1818, when it was revealed that a memorandum known as the Note secrète had been sent to the representatives of the Allied powers in Paris by Vitrolles. The memorandum "represented France as a volcano of revolution, threatening to consume Europe" and urged the allies to put an end to the government of Decazes. These schemes, however real a threat

93. A.N. F1b 155-6. Personnel of the ministry of the interior.

94. Canuel, the military commander, was involved in the Conspiration du bord de l'eau as well.

they may have been96, provided the government with propaganda and came to nothing. Meanwhile, the government proceeded to introduce a number of bills that seemed to assure respect for the Charter and more freedom and participation for Frenchmen, to the chagrin of the Ultras, who saw the laws on army recruitment (1817), on the extension of the franchise (1817) and on the press (1817 and 1819) as evidence of a renascent Jacobinism. In fact, the extension of the franchise did accelerate the progress of the "Left". From some twelve deputies in 1816, the Left won twenty seats in 1818 and then took thirty five of the fifty five seats contested in 1819, the year the notorious ex conventionnel Grégoire was elected at Grenoble97. The existence of irreconcilables like the Right and Left undoubtedly weakened the government, which had not forseen a threat from the Left, but at the same time, there can be no doubt that the intransigence of the Ultra royalists and their unwillingness to oppose constructively contributed to the collapse of the attempt to evolve the constitutional monarchy that a number of Frenchmen had aspired to in 1814. Ultimately, the failure of parliamentary democracy during the Bourbon restoration was due to a lack of consensus among the political class. The same lack of consensus existed in the Gard, but there, the lines of division

96. Characteristically, Bertier de Sauvigny, La Restauration, pp.148-150, minimises the importance of these affairs and suggests that Decazes exaggerated them to discredit the party of the Comte d'Artois.

remained confessional.

The new prefect of the Gard was a man whose background reflected the qualities of the liberals. His career in the administration had begun in 1806, and by 1814 he was director of the Rhine navigation authority. As an officer of the Paris National Guard, he took part in the last defence of the city before the allied armies entered. The first Restoration appointed him prefect of the Basses Pyrénées, and he remained in office after the usurpation in March 1815. In 1819, Decazes elevated Dargout to the peerage, and made him conseiller d'État - a rank of which he was deprived in 1824 when Charles X became king. Dargout did not emerge as a public figure again until after the July Revolution, when Louis Philippe appointed him as Minister of the Marine. As Minister of the Interior between 1832 and 1834, he acquired notoriety among the politicians of the Left for his ruthless suppression of the Lyon revolt of 1834. His public career led him ultimately to the governorship of the Bank of France.

A man whose loyalties were to France rather than to a dynasty - although his successor in the Gard accused him of possessing "an extreme flexibility of opinions" and of destituting even the lowest garde champêtre in the Basses Pyrénées because their royalism was not as fervent as his own, just as later in the Gard he destituted "hundreds of mayors because their liberalism was not striking enough" - Dargout could not have


anything in common with the Ultras, but, on the contrary, depended on the government and the state for his advancement.

Dargout was sent to the Gard to reconcile the two 'parties', to win their allegiance to the constitutional monarchy. After he had left for Nîmes, Decazes wrote to him explaining that it was his task to "royaliser la nation et nationaliser le roi". In this task, Dargout was told to "Count on Monsieur Decazes as well as on the King's minister, just as I count on Monsieur Dargout as well as on the prefect".100

Immediately after his arrival in Nîmes, Dargout met the military, civil and judicial authorities of the department and then reviewed the National Guard. The Guard's commander, de Surville, gave a dinner in his honour, during which the prefect was the object of much praise.101 Quite clearly, the notables were scrutinising him and endeavouring to impress him with their sincerity, perhaps in the hope that he would prove amenable, for as Dargout commented:

"It would have been more natural that those who admired Monsieur Darbaud Jouques, who referred to his humane and moral qualities, should have displayed more reserve and coldness towards me" 102.

Dargout concluded that they were afraid that the dismissal of Jouques might only be the first in a series of destitutions.

100. A.N.F7 9051. Decazes to Dargout, 8 March, 1817.

Decazes also informed Dargout that he could depend on General de Briche, a new military commander for the department, and Eymard, the official of the Ministry of the interior who was already familiar with the Gard. ibid.

101. A.N. F7 9050. Dargout to Decazes, 3 March, 1817.

102. ibid.
to make way for the Protestants. If this was the assumption of the Catholic Royalists, they were wrong. Dargout had not been sent to carry out a witch hunt, and was to show a great deal of patience in his endeavours to bring the administration of the department within the principles of justice and democracy.

While the authorities were behaving courteously, the Société de Bolze was assessing the changed situation. As soon as Dargout's appointment had been made public, Baron, son in law of the deputy Trinquelague and one of the founder members of the société, travelled to Nîmes, where he met the other leaders of the société in their committee room above the Café de Bolze. After the meeting, Vampère, Trinquelague's 'secretary' was one of a number of couriers seen in the villages around Nîmes delivering messages.

On 13 March, the court of appeal annulled the verdict on Louis Boissin. Immediately, there was a marked change in the attitude of the Catholics:

"Quite suddenly, the Catholic notables have kept away from de Briche and myself. Many subordinate officials have passed from the warmest cordiality to the most noticeable coldness. Absolutely no reason for this change has been indicated to us."

103 ibid.
The sudden volte face was not limited to the Catholic notables. In a manner that emphasised the cohesion of the Catholic party, the Catholic working class quarters, notably the Bourgades, to the north east of the city, began to respond to the instructions of Catholic notables who were known for their extreme views and unusual gatherings and groups were seen on the streets\(^\text{107}\).

War had been declared by the Catholic royalist organisation on the representative of Decazes, since 1816, the Bête noire of the Ultras, and now the man held responsible for reversing the verdict on Boissin. The most sinister aspect of the Catholic royalists' manoeuver was the illicit mobilisation of the National Guard. Acting on information given to him anonymously, de Briche had a number of houses searched and the home of one guardsman contained 220 home made cartridges, a pistol, a hunting gun and a military musket\(^\text{108}\). De Briche learnt that the Guard had been put on an alert and instructed to make cartridges by its company commanders\(^\text{109}\). Thus, the Catholics made the first hostile move, and in doing so revealed to Dargout beyond all doubt that there was a chain of command that co-ordinated all social classes in the Catholic community and even controlled the department's armed militia.

Apart from the overruling of the Boissin verdict, there were, in the first weeks of Dargout's administration, other

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107. ibid. Also F\(^7\) 9051, Dargout to Lainé, 24 March. Dargout refers to the daughters of the Vicomte de Rochemore "whose exaltation is well known" and to the sister of Jules de Calvière, Madame de Bonnafoux "an audacious and scheming woman".


109 A.N. F\(^7\) 9051. Dargout to Lainé, 24 March, 1817.
events that must have humiliated and worried the royalists. A number of reports from most parts of the department indicated anti royalist demonstrations taking place as news of the change of prefect spread. Farandoles, seditious cries - most often "Vive l'Empereur!" - seditious slogans scrawled in public place, tricolours and threats against officials proliferated\textsuperscript{110}. One police report attributed the outbursts to the popular belief that the change of prefect would lead to change of policy\textsuperscript{111}. Thus, a town hall official at Martignargues proclaimed that Jouques had been dismissed for arming 'brigands and thugs'\textsuperscript{112}. Other observers believed that the disturbances had been organised by the Catholic royalists in order to discredit the Protestants in the eyes of the new prefect\textsuperscript{113}.

It is almost certainly true that some of the demonstrations were spontaneous but that others were staged\textsuperscript{114}.

\textsuperscript{110} A.D. Gard 6M 66. Commander of the departmental Gendarmerie to minister of war, 13 March, 1817. The report mentions Caveirac, Clarensac, Vergèze, Saint Cosme, Codogan and Bernis in particular.

\textsuperscript{111} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7}9050. Commissaire de Police, Nîmes, to ministry of Police, 14 March, 1817.

\textsuperscript{112} A.D. Gard 6M 47. Sub prefect of Alès to Dargout, 4 March, 1817.

\textsuperscript{113} P.R.O. F.O. 27/155. Bulletin de Police dated Nîmes, 7 March, 1817. This might be from Eymard.

\textsuperscript{114} The demonstration that took place at Vézénobres, arrondissement of Alès was provoked by the National Guard of Alès, commanded by Du Roure. A.D. Gard Chartrier de Clausonne 331. Mss. notes of general Fornier d'Albe.
Dargout's arrival was also met by a flood of petitions, allegations and denunciations concerning Jouques' administration of the department.\(^{115}\)

Convinced of the concerted hostility of the Catholic party, Dargout began to probe into the nature and extent of the influence of the *Société de Bolze*. He was assisted by Eymard, Thiers and Savagnier, three officials of the Ministry of Police whom Decazes had sent to the south to support Dargout.\(^{116}\) These men soon revealed the degree of control the *société* exercised. In the dismay that followed the reversal of the acquittal of Boissin, Eymard was able to learn from the indiscretion of de Surville at a dinner that Boissin's acquittal had been determined by the *société* to avoid humiliation in the eyes of the Protestants as well as to ensure that Boissin did not turn state evidence in order to minimise his sentence. Indeed, had he not been acquitted, it had been decided to poison him before he could reveal the motivation behind the crime.\(^{117}\)

The National Guard of Nîmes had revealed how unreliable it was already. Further investigations showed that, in spite of the 'reforms' Jouques had reported:

"The National Guard of Nîmes is composed of four thousand men, of whom only one fifth pay the taxes required for eligibility."

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\(^{115}\) A.D. Gard 6M 67 contains over 100 documents imputing unjust and arbitrary actions to Jouques and his subordinates.

\(^{116}\) A.N. F\(^7\)9051. Decazes to Dargout, 20 and 31 March 1817.

\(^{117}\) A.N. F\(^7\)9051. Dargout to Decazes, 24 March, 1817.
Four fifths are hirelings - porters and veterans of civil strife (...) dressed in the uniforms they took from the Protestants* in July, August and September 1815. Their officers are, broadly speaking, men of hatred and violent passions."

Far from being a guarantee of peace, the National Guard was a constant threat to it.

The discovery of the secret correspondence linking Nîmes with the Pavillon de Marsan and other provincial cities placed the organisation of Catholic royalism in a national context and revealed the extent of its links.

Catholic royalism was, then, an apparently formidable force, and certainly one that had no intention of renouncing its claim on the control of the department when Dargout arrived. Indeed, the two years of Catholic ascendancy since the White terror had hardened the divisions between the communities. A visitor to Nîmes noted in 1818 that "Protestant businesses only employ Protestant workers, and the Catholics have long made it their practice to employ only Catholics". Protestant and Catholic areas of Nîmes were clearly segregated and burnt-out houses were a constant threat.

*From the members of the Garde Urbaine of the hundred days.

118 A.N. F79050. Savagnier to Decazes, 2 March, 1817.
119 See pp. 82-84 supra.
120 La Minerve française, 1818. p. 324
121 J.D. Roque, "Postitions et tendances politiques des Protestants Nîmois au 19e siècle". In Droite et Gauche de 1789 à nos jours. (Montpellier, 1975)
reminder of the presence of two irreconcilable foes\textsuperscript{122}.

Dargout's task of integrating both communities into a harmonious society appeared impossible to achieve by relying on the good will and reason of the local population\textsuperscript{123}. Some form of leadership had to be given by the government to the mass of the middle classes whom Dargout believed could be brought together\textsuperscript{124}. But the Protestants were profoundly suspicious of the Catholics and would have to be reassured.

Dargout's first move to modify the relationship between the two communities and the local administration was the dismissal of a small number of notorious Catholic royalists who occupied positions in the administration that could impede the prefect's endeavours. Thus, he secured the dismissal of the secretary at the prefecture, Flotte-Montauban; the National Guard commander at Uzès, de Pançay; the commander of the Guard at Sommières, Despouches - a member of the jury that had acquitted Boissin - and Gibrat, the police official who had been accused by the procureur of passing confidential reports to the société secrète. A further gesture to the Protestant community was the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{122} La Minerve française, année 1818, pp.405-406.
\item \textsuperscript{123} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9051. Decazes to Dargout n.d. "The Protestants should share the benefits of the community more or less in proportion to their numbers. It is possible to choose excellent people from among them, and there are, of course, communes where a Protestant mayor is more appropriate".
\item \textsuperscript{124} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9051. Dargout to Decazes. 1 August 1817.
\end{itemize}
withdrawal from the printer Gaude of the right to publish the Journal du Gard. In Dargout's own words, the dismissals 'produced a sensation', throwing the société de Bolze into disarray and uncertainty. Fearing a purge by this 'Jacobin from Paris', the leaders of the société de Bolze, under the guidance of Jules de Calvière, who journeyed to the Gard shortly after Dargout's arrival, renewed the exaggerated cordiality they had shown the prefect on his arrival, trying to impress him with their reasonableness and good will in order to limit the extent of further destitutions which they saw as inevitable. But the effect of this new volte face was more confusion in the ranks of the Catholic royalists. Dargout esteemed that Jules de Calvière

125. A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 10 April 1817. Gaude was a staunch supporter of Catholic royalism in the Gard, and had recently distinguished himself by his ostentatious defence of Boissin as a jury member. Thiers, one of the agents sent to support Dargout had formed the opinion that a moderate, constitutional newspaper would help rally liberal Catholics and Protestants and present a viewpoint that had hitherto had no outlet (A.D. Gard 6 M 44. Thiers to Dargout, 9 March, 1817). Consequently, the right to print the newspaper was given to Guibert, while Thiers was to write the editorials. Unfortunately, there is a lack of copies of the Journal du Gard for this period in Nîmes and in Paris. It could be supposed that the dismissal of the strategically placed royalists would not only be seen as a gesture of liberalism by the Protestants, but that it would frighten the royalists into co-operating to some extent.

126. A.N. 124 AP 2. Dargout to Eymard, 23 April, 1817.
127. A.N. F79051. Dargout to Decazes, 3 May, 1817.
128. A.N. F1C III Gard 13. Dargout to Lainé, 10 April, 1817.
129. Ibid.
was outstanding by his intelligence, skill and sang froid\textsuperscript{130}, but these qualities were lost on the rank and file supporters. Accustomed to crude and unmitigated anti-Protestantism, they failed to comprehend the overtures made by their leaders to a man who was perceived as a threat to Catholic supremacy\textsuperscript{131}.

At the same time as he worked to weaken the grip of the Ultra royalists, Dargout endeavoured, without much success, to encourage the emergence of a new leadership in local affairs, based on "men who, having little or no contact with Paris, cannot be part of vast intrigues but instead use their energy and influence in the King's cause"\textsuperscript{132}. Among such potential leaders, Dargout mentioned Esperandieu, "a rich manufacturer"\textsuperscript{133}. The prefect also used as much influence as he could to draw supporters away from the Société de Bolze, notably the mayor of Nîmes, de Vallongues, and the Commander of the National Guard, de Surville, both of whom Dargout considered to be misguided rather than hostile\textsuperscript{134}. Indeed, Dargout even declined the offer made by Decazes to dismiss de Surville, because he was sure that de Surville could be used to moderate the attitude of the National Guard\textsuperscript{135}.

\textsuperscript{130} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 10 April, 1817.
\textsuperscript{131} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 3 June, 1817.
\textsuperscript{132} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 1 August 1817.
\textsuperscript{133} ibid.
\textsuperscript{134} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 24 March 1817. Also A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9050. "Clé d'une Correspondance."
\textsuperscript{135} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 3 May, 24 July, 1817.
This attempt to impose a moderate policy in the department and which marked the greater part of the first year of Dargout's administration was not rewarded with any significant results. Certainly, Dargout was able to provoke confusion and a measure of fear among the Catholic royalists, but he was not achieving a response from the moderates he pinned his hopes on. In the late Spring, Dargout commented in a very frank note to Eymard:

"The department is as calm as a lake. It is not that hatred has been extinguished, but simply compressed. They (the Niçois) are all frightened and are keeping quiet. On the other hand, they all detest me in the most polite manner possible, Protestants and Catholics alike. The former think that I have not done enough for them; the latter believe that I am a Jacobin. Anyway, it is impossible to displease the extremists of both camps more courteously."

The Catholic royalists may have been "compressed" by fear of further destitutions, but the société de Bolze remained the determining factor in Catholic political attitudes and behaviour. Throughout the Summer of 1817, its leaders met regularly at the Château de Vézénobres, near Alès, home of the Marquis Jacques-Alexis de Calvière, whose wife, the daughter of the Count Emmanuel de Saint Priest, member of the personal entourage of the duc d'Angoulême, was in touch with Ultra royalist circles in Paris using the code name Les

Beaux Yeux 137. The Château was informed of the Lyon insurrection and had been assured that similar revolts were to take place in other provincial towns 138. Known extremists were seen in the Gard, evidently on missions on behalf of the sociéte de Bolze 139, and ex-police official Gibrat, now in the service of Jules de Calvière, was steadily pulling Vallongues into the sphere of extreme royalism 140, to the point where Vallongues was publicly hostile to Dargout 141. Moreover, the deteriorating economic situation gave the leaders an opportunity to strengthen their popular support by alleviating the hardship of the working population of the towns 142.

In November, Dargout was obliged to admit that although the extremists were fewer in number, "they are less subdued

137 A.N. F 7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 18 June, 1817. Also A.N. F 7 9050. "Clé d'une correspondance".

138 This uprising, ostensibly inspired by Bonapartists, involved General Canuel and the Prefect of the Rhône, Chabrol, both known Ultra royalist sympathisers. See de Sauvigny, La Restauration, pp. 148-149.

139 Carteras, Magnier, Lavondès and Boissin were observed on several occasions between Nîmes and Marseille in July and August. A.N. F 7 9051. Dargout reports 24 July, 8 August, 1817.

140 A.N. F 7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 6 August, 1817.

141 A.N. F 7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 27 October, 1817.

142 A bankrupt draper, Fajon, who had joined the sociéte de Bolze in 1815 was often seen cashing bank drafts on Jules de Calvière and René de Bernis. He distributed the money among the poorer National Guards and the people of the Catholic Bourgades. A.N. F 7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 19 December, 1917.
than I had imagined. Moreover, the parliamentary session of 1817 had stimulated political polemic once more. For their part, the Protestant middle classes were no more convinced of the success of Dargout's policy. As 1817 drew to a close, a Protestant lawyer, Fornier de Clausonne, noted:

"Monsieur le préfet is full of good intentions, but he is surrounded by men who have great interest in hiding the truth from him. Some are in the higher ranks of the National Guard, others are in the administration, still others in the courts. All these men belong to the Société de Bolze, which is supported by the National Guards, among whom there are some three hundred porters, shoe shines and road sweepers."  

The lack of success was all the more disappointing against the perspective of legislative elections due to be held in the Gard in the Autumn of 1818.

In February 1817, the government had won a majority for its bill modifying the electoral system. Henceforth, there would be only one electoral assembly in each department and one fifth of the Chamber of Deputies would be renewed each year. The first measure increased the prefect's ability to 'monitor' the proceedings, and, according to some commentators, facilitated the attendance of the urban bourgeoisie - the shopkeepers and professional classes.

143 A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 27 October, 1817.
144 Ibid.
who were more likely to be liberals. The second feature ensured that there could be no durable and obstructive group in the Chamber, but that there would be a continual renewal of membership. The first partial renewal had taken place in September 1817 and the Right had lost a dozen seats to the government's candidates. The Gard was one of the departments affected by the second partial renewal, and it was clear that victory or defeat would have great significance for the Constitutionalists and for extreme royalists. At the close of 1817, Dargout realised that he would not be able to temper the political antagonisms in the department, but, on the contrary, he would have to contest the election against the Ultra royalist party and wrest the departmental representation from its clutch in order to bring moderates into public office. In November 1817, Dargout wrote:

"There are 1 200 electors, of whom some 400 will do what the government wishes. The trick will lie in creaming off from the remaining 700 enough people to achieve a majority."

The electoral proceedings could last several days because of the need to elect the committee, swear the required oath and receive the president's communications. This fact, in addition to the distances involved in travelling to the chef lieu of the department on bad roads, allegedly thinned out the supporters of the extreme right, who were chiefly from a rural background. C.f. R. Rémont, La Vie politique en France 1789 - 1848 (vol.1, Paris, 1965), pp.284-5. Also: Bertier de Sauvigny, La Restauration, p 144.

A.N. 124 AP 2. Dargout to Eymard, 15 November, 1817.
He saw clearly the need to have a reliable administration, and so planned to make a number of changes. Above all, he had to destroy the influence of the Secret Society, and had to do so by reducing its most powerful weapon, the National Guard.

The prefect's attention had been drawn to the question of the National Guard shortly after he arrived in Nîmes in February 1817, and he was aware of its importance to the Secret Society. Indeed, Decazes, the minister of Police, had given Dargout a file on the Guard, composed by agents of the Police ministry operating incognito in the Gard and neighbouring departments in 1816 as a result of the prolonged unrest in the area, and the prefect had instructions to investigate the matter in depth.

Since the Summer of 1815, the National Guard of the department had been nothing less than the military arm of the Société de Bolze. In spite of the reorganisations and

148 A.N. F7 9041. Dargout to minister of police, 26 November, 1817: "I shall not omit anything in order to realise the will of the government (...) and I shall operate all the changes necessary to exert my influence on the electorate".

149 A.N. 124 AP 2. Dargout to Eymard, 15 November, 1817. "The major obstacle is the national guard leadership which disposes of the votes of all the electors in it".

150 A.N. F7 9050. Dargout to Decazes, 8 April, 1817.
purges Darbaud Jouques claimed to have operated\textsuperscript{151} because of the manifest inability or unwillingness to discharge its duties impartially, the Guard continued to be composed largely of elements drawn from the Miquelet battalions, having lost only the more notorious criminals like Carteras, Lavondèes and Quatretaillons\textsuperscript{152}. That its own conception of its role as a partisan militia had not changed is clear from its internal correspondence and from the reports of the three Police officials, Eymard, Savagnier and Thiers.

In the Arrondissement of Le Vigan, where there was a majority of Protestants everywhere except in the town of Le Vigan itself\textsuperscript{153}, there was never a full strength National Guard contingent because the Etat major refused to enrol

\textsuperscript{151} The 'reorganisations' took place between September 1815 and December 1815. In September, the Miquelet companies who formed a large part of the Armée royale de Beaucaire were given the choice of seeking integration into the regular structure of the National Guard or of dispersing. In December, a further reorganisation was thrust upon Jouques by the government and the duc d'Angoulême after the riot that accompanied the reopening of the Protestant church in Nîmes and the attempt on the life of General Lagarde.

In January 1816, Jouques reported the 'excellent views' of the Guard, its 'perfect discipline'. He stressed that it was not the sectarian body reports had made it seem. A.N.F\textsuperscript{7} 9052. to the minister of interior, 16 January, 1816.

\textsuperscript{152} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9050. Savagnier to minister of police, 2 March, 1817.

\textsuperscript{153} D. Robert, \textit{op. cit.}, p.149
Protestants. Applications for commissions in the Guard reveal the qualities required of the officers by the Etat major: Victor Arnal, captain of the Guard detachment drawn from the communes of La Nuejols, Saint Sauveur and Revens, attached to the 4th Alzon company, had emigrated to Spain in 1791 and had fought in the Armée de Condé and Armée des Princes until 1796 before returning to France in 1801.

Jean Louis Sauzet, in his application for a commission in the company formed at Saint André de Majencoules, stressed that he had been among the first to volunteer with the duc d'Angoulême in March 1815.

Such ardent royalism was marked by a high degree of militancy. Almost immediately after the reorganisation of the Guard in December 1815, de Vogüé addressed a memorandum to the arrondissement commanders, requesting a list of men who could be mobilised, if required, for three months. He emphasised that it was a precaution, and one that had to be treated with the utmost secrecy, going no further than the

154 A. D. Gard. IE 966. Charles de Vogüé, inspector of the national guard of the Gard, to the Marquis Jean Charles d'Assas, Commander of the national guard of Le Vigan, 17 January, 1817 (n.b. this is after the report referred to in footnote 151). De Vogüé states that Le Vigan is an arrondissement in which "half the inhabitants could not be considered for service because of their political opinions".

There are other examples of discrimination. Aigues Vives, a Protestant town of 1637 inhabitants had only 9 guards, while Redessan, a Catholic village of 792 inhabitants had 99. A. N. F 9051, Dargout to minister of police, May, 1818.


ears of *chefs de bataillon*\(^{157}\). In Nîmes itself, the Guard permanently manned two cannons in the square in front of the city hall, and some of its members affixed slogans like:

"*Les Bourbon ou la Mort*" above their doors\(^{158}\). The presence of 16,000 armed men\(^{159}\) of that disposition was far from offering guarantees of peace and order. Indeed, Savagnier noted that the Royalists of Nîmes were using the methods of 1793 in order to undo the results of 1793\(^{160}\).

In Uzès and Alès, the character of the Guard was no better. The Uzès Guard was composed exclusively of Catholics, some of whom had been publicly associated with Quatretaillons. None of the 46,000 Protestants in the arrondissement appeared to belong to the Guard\(^{161}\). In Alès, many of the guardsmen were unemployed ex *Miquelets* who were being subsidised from contributions levied on the Protestant community which was not represented in the Guard\(^{162}\).

Shortly after Dargout's arrival, and while seconding the prefect in his inquiries, Eymard was able to establish the links between the National Guard, its commanders and the *Société de Bolze*. The undercover correspondence between the society's committee and the Ultra royalist committees in

\(^{157}\) A.D. Lozère 3F 600. Du Roure, colonel of the Alès Legion to baron de Gras, commander of the 4th bat. 31 January, 1816.

\(^{158}\) A.N. F\(^7\) 9054. Savagnier to the minister of police, 2 March, 1817.

\(^{159}\) A.N. F\(^7\) 9051. Dargout to minister of police, May, 1818.

\(^{160}\) A.N. F\(^7\) 9054. Savagnier to minister of police, 2 March, 1817.

\(^{161}\) A.N. F\(^7\) 9050. Eymard to minister of police, 3 May, 1817.

\(^{162}\) Ibid.
Paris revealed that the National Guard was being kept in readiness by the local royalists, and that its overwhelming Catholic membership was far from accidental. De Vogüé and the commanders at Nîmes and Alès, de Surville and du Roure were members of the secret society. The Guards were referred to 'Les chiens de Michel et d'Alès' while the Catholic population was called 'les Romarins'. At the same time, Dargout discovered that the company based on the Saint Gilles area had been falsifying its rolls in order to obtain more funds from the municipality.

Faced with this disturbing picture, Dargout and his aides gave serious consideration to dissolving the National Guard, but Dargout believed that the sudden and complete dissolution of the guard so soon after the appointment of a new prefect would destroy his chances of negotiating with the ultras, would raise the expectations of the Protestants to a dangerous level, and could provoke the Catholics into starting a civil war. It was known that the Guards had gone on an alert when the change of prefect was known, and that they had, in some places, demonstrated against the change.

163 A. N. F 9051. Eymard to minister of police, 4 April, 1817.
164 A. N. F 9050. "Clé d'une correspondance." Michel (les chiens de Michel et d'Alès) was the code name used by de Vogüé.
165 A. D. Gard 6M 33. Dargout to minister of police, 3 April, 1817.
166 A. N. F 9051. Dargout to minister of interior, 8 April, 1817.
167 A. N. Flc III Gard 13. Dargout to minister of interior, 8 April, 1817.
168 See pp. 132-133 supra.
Dargout, therefore, decided to pursue the same policy with regard to the National Guard that he pursued in other areas of public administration, namely, a combination of persuasion and threat, designed to woo as many people as possible from the influence of the Société de Bolze, and to dismiss those who totally rejected co-operation and moderation. Such a policy, Dargout thought, was more likely to heal divisions than a thorough purge of suspected Ultra royalists would.

In this spirit, Dargout assiduously wooed de Surville, the commander of the largest contingent, that of Nîmes, whom he felt was attached to the Société out of weakness rather than conviction and who was, in the Prefect's view, a stabilising force in the otherwise highly volatile Guard and so worth keeping at its head in the short term. He did not hesitate however, to obtain the dismissal of two other local commanders, de Pançay of Uzès and Despouches of Sommières, when he felt that they were resisting his policies.

169 A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 24 March, 1817. "It is in his interest to follow the wishes of the king, but he is embarrassed by the links he contracted with the most extreme Catholics".

170 ibid. "He is, of all the Nîmois, the one most concerned that the National Guard should behave correctly".

171 Both men were dismissed in accordance with Dargout's powers over the provisionally organised Guard. De Pançay had openly rejected Dargout's suspension of four Guardsmen for breach of discipline; Despouches was president of another National Guard disciplinary committee which, according to Dargout, took a light view of breaches of discipline. Despouches had also voted the acquittal of Boissin. A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 25 April, 1817.
The prefect and his aides considered that their strongest weapon was the continued temporary status of the National Guard in the department. Because of the history of disturbances involving the corps, and the repeated attempts to reorganise it, permanent status and the corresponding degree of autonomy had been withheld. Such important areas as finance and internal discipline had been entrusted to the prefect, and Dargout believed he could use these extraordinary powers to weed out the undesirable elements in the Guard, and to broaden its membership to include the Protestant middle classes. However, the Guard's Etat major was aware of its vulnerability, and made determined efforts to minimise Dargout's interference in its internal business. At the same time, the commanders pressed for the permanent status that would free them from the

172. A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police (decazes), 8 April, 1817.
A.N. F1CIII Gard 13. Dargout to minister of interior, 8 April, 1817.
prefect's scrutiny. At the end of the year, Dargout was still unable to report any improvement in the National Guard's outlook, and he had to admit, too, that he had achieved less than he hoped in his efforts to win some "reasonable" Nîmois away from the secret society. Indeed, the dismissal of two company commanders, and the close scrutiny of the Guard's budget and accounts had augmented the hostility of the corps to the prefect, and had strengthened the resolve of the royalists to consolidate the Guard. As soon as Dargout questioned the Guard's

173 Dargout reported: "They did all in their power to hide from me details of their accounts and expenditure". A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, May, 1818.

Both sides were clearly aware of the importance of this special power Dargout enjoyed. In another letter, he wrote: "If this power (dismissal) is denied me, the Guard would be free to function as if it were permanently organised and, using its inviolability, would be impossible to control". A.N. F1c III Gard 13. To minister of interior, 8 April, 1817. Dargout emphasised that the Etat-Major had not refused Jouques the very same powers A.N. F7 9051. Letter to minister of police, 8 April, 1817.

To counter Dargout's efforts, the Etat-Major produced letters, allegedly written by Kentzinger, Chief of Staff, promising that the organisation would be sanctioned soon at the request of the Comte d'Artois himself. The Guards were told that Insignia and colours were to be offered by the Duchesse d'Angoulême in honour of the brave Miquelets of Nîmes. A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of Police, 18 April, 1817.

The letters were effective, for Dargout noted that in one day, the work of the previous month had been undone. A.N. 124 AP 1. Dargout to Eymard, 21 April, 1817.

expenditure, de Vogüé instructed his arrondissement commanders to use their personal influence and "that of any other person devoted to the royal cause" to overcome any possible objections from the finance committees.\textsuperscript{175}

The obstacle that a unified and buoyant National Guard would put in the way of Dargout's election arrangements was clear. Apart from controlling the way the Catholic electors, nearly all of whom were in the Guard, would cast their vote, the Guard offered the Secret Society the perfect means of making their own electoral arrangements in the countryside by providing a 'parallel' administration to thwart the endeavours of the prefect. As the 'campaign' gathered momentum, Dargout felt certain that, unless the Ultra royalists were sure of a clear majority, the Guard would be used to intimidate Protestant electors\textsuperscript{176} as it had done in 1790 and in August 1815.

The recalcitrant attitude of the Catholic royalists and the pressure of time forced Dargout to adopt the harsh measures he had rejected initially - destitution of officials who were not committed to the government, and the disbanding of the National Guard.

In a detailed memorandum to the ministers of Police and Interior, Dargout made his proposals.\textsuperscript{177} The dissolution would have to take place before the election in October so

\textsuperscript{175} A.D. Gard IE 966. De Vogüé to Marquis d'Assas, 11 October, 1818.

\textsuperscript{176} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9051. Memorandum on the organisation and political character of the National Guard, written by Dargout and addressed to the ministers of police (Decazes) and Interior (Lainé), May, 1818.

\textsuperscript{177} ibid.
that the threat would be gone and the Sociétaires disconcerted; it would also need to be carried out when there would be the least possibility of trouble. August was proposed as a time when the political class in the department would have dispersed to its country residences after the Beaucaire fair which was scheduled to take place during the last week of July. The reasons given for the dissolution should not be the unreliability of the Guard or its sectarian composition and outlook. Such a statement would be considered as a Protestant victory and would lead to civil strife. The dissolution could be justified amply by the evidence of fraud Dargout had gathered. A strong contingent of regular troops should be present - the Beaucaire fair would justify their presence in the department, and a list of moderate officers should be drawn up so that they could be decorated for their services and exert a pacifying influence at the time of dissolution.

The ordinance dissolving the department's National Guard was issued on 26 July. Its contents were known throughout the department early on Sunday 1 August, a day Dargout had chosen as most people would be resting or absent. Detailed instructions were sent to the sub prefects, whom Dargout had changed the previous Christmas, concerning the

178 Besides the inflation of budgets and the falsification of rolls, Dargout had discovered that the Etat major had been actively involved in the extortion of contributions from certain communes in 1815. Baragnon, an eminent lawyer who defended Boissin, had signed letters demanding 2000 francs in July 1815. A.N. FlcIII Gard 13. Dargout to minister of police, 9 September, 1817.

179 A.N. F1c III Gard 13. Dargout to minister of interior, 3 August, 1818.
collection of powder and weapons, which was Dargout's greatest concern.

Other than one minor riot in the town of Alès, involving a recalcitrant artillery company and resulting in eighteen arrests, there were no serious reactions to the ordinance, and the disarming was carried out smoothly. The Etat major did try to counter the allegations of corruption, however. De Vogüé instructed his commanders to present "a single figure" representing the sums paid to the National Guard out of the municipal budgets and wrote to baron Kentzinger to protest. But it was a rearguard action and one that came to nothing, for the National Guards knew that the prefect enjoyed the support of the government and of the king. Indeed, the smooth dissolution of such an apparently bellicose and committed organisation must be seen against the background of national affairs if one is to comprehend it.

The affaire of the Note secrète had just resulted in the dismissal of the Ultra royalist minister Vitrolles and had allowed the government to discredit the group of Ultras who advised the Comte d'Artois. Shortly afterwards, the

180 A.D. Gard 6M 34. Dargout to minister of police, 3 August, 1818
182 A.N.P7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 17 August, 1818.
183 A.D. Gard 1e 966. De Vogüé to Marquis d'Assas, 3 August, 1818.
184 A.N. F1c III Gard 13. Dargout to minister of Interior, 14 September, 1818.
185 See p.105 supra.
Conspiration du bord de l'eau, a rumoured plot to kidnap the king, implicated the ultras once more and provoked a serious rupture between the king and his brother, who was also commander in chief of the National Guards of France. In such circumstances, there was little chance that the Catholic royalists of the Gard would be treated sympathetically by a government that was depicting their Paris leaders as a threat to democracy. On the contrary, the dissolution of the National Guard heralded strong measures to be taken against the whole National Guard structure in France. In September, an ordinance was issued which removed the force from the authority of the Comte d'Artois and his Etat-major and decentralised it, placing the guards in the control of the departmental authorities. Mayors and prefects were invited to recompose their local guards as they saw fit. Paradoxically, this measure which was intended to remove from the control of the Pavillon de Marsan a centrally commanded and disciplined armed force, would, in the near future, admirably suit the theoretical and tactical predilections of the Ultra royalists for decentralisation. In 1816, the duc d'Angoulême, writing from Nîmes, criticised the idea of a National Guard as a Jacobin concept, "the blind instrument of the first man who brandishes the slogans Liberty and Equality that is, Disorder and Pillage". Instead, he proposed the creation of local companies, picked and commanded by local
gentlemen. In the years after the 1820 reaction, the formation of such companies was facilitated by the nomination of Ultra royalist mayors and prefects. Indeed, the Gard contingent was a prototype of this kind of local militia taking orders from the local gentry. Even though it had been officially disbanded and disarmed in 1818, its organisation was maintained, and its officers met regularly, making it possible for a Catholic, Carlist militia to take to the streets in 1830 after the July Revolution, still largely under the orders of the leaders of 1817.

186 A.N. 239 AP (Papiers Vaublanc). Angoulême to Vaublanc, January, 1816.

On 25 August, the Fête St. Louis, the Nîmes officers attended mass in a group, according to tradition, but in civilian clothes. A.N. F 7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 26 August, 1818.

A battalion commander from St. André, arrondissement of Le Vigan, wrote that his battalion of 354 men would be always ready to rally if the interest of the throne was at stake. A.D. Gard 1E 966. Chabbat, chef de bataillon, St. André, to Marquis d'Assas, 17 September, 1818.

188 A.D. Gard 6M 104. Montalivet, director of Police, to Chapert, prefect of the Gard, 20 January, 1831. Referring to the troubles in Nîmes at the time of the July revolution, Montalivet said: "de Surville, ex-colonel of the National Guard, offered to put two thousand armed men at the disposal of the (Bourbon) prefect within twenty four hours".

Mouzet fils, writing in December 1830, assured the Minister for War that the Marquis de Valfons was storing three hundred muskets that used to belong to the National Guard. A.D. Gard 6M 103.
In the short term, however, the dissolution was considered to have been a major factor in Dargout's electoral preparation, obviating the possibility of intimidation by the Société de Bolze at election time, and demoralising many Ultra royalist supporters at a time when great cohesion and determination were required\textsuperscript{189}.

The election of 1818 was the first one in which the Catholic royalists were facing an organised and powerful opponent. After two years of unchallenged supremacy they were being forced to adopt a defensive stand in what was to be a 'modern' election, in which both contestants committed themselves uncompromisingly to the task of winning at all costs the three seats the department held in the Chamber of Deputies.

In some ways, the struggle was more straightforward for the extreme royalists than it was for the prefect, whose ambition to create a non sectarian moderate party entailed not only the elimination of the Secret society's influence on the Catholic population, but also the manoeuvering of the still skeptical Protestant community into a partnership with the liberal Catholics\textsuperscript{190}. When the initial deliberations were held by the political class in the Gard, three distinct electoral lists emerged. The Ultra royalists intended to present the former prefect, the Marquis D'Arbaud Jouques, 

\textsuperscript{189} A.D. Gard 6M 56. Sainte Colombe, sub prefect of Alès, to Dargout, 8 September, 1818. The letter mentions that some Ultra royalists are so depressed that they see no purpose in going to Nîmes to vote.

\textsuperscript{190} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 20 March, 1818
General Donnadieu and Jules de Calvière

Dargout hoped to present on behalf of the government the Marquis d'Aramon, a liberal Catholic landowner, Chabaud Latour, a Protestant, ex-Girondin and imperial baron, and baron Reynaud Lascours, prefect of the Gers. To the Left, however, the Independents had produced a list of their own: Baron d'Alphonse, the bonapartist commissaire extraordinaire in the Gard during the Hundred Days, and two Protestant Generals from the department who had gained fame during the wars of the Empire, Fornier d'Albe and Vignolles.

This third list was, in effect that of the Protestants, and Dargout would have to persuade them to abandon it if he wanted to secure the election of his own candidates.

Conscious of the task that faced him, the prefect 'opened' the campaign by securing the dismissal of the sub prefects of Alès and Uzès and the mayor of Nîmes. The men he chose to replace them were trustworthy and acceptable to the Protestants. The measure produced a sharp reaction from...
the Catholic royalists. In Alès, the National Guard was involved in demonstrations designed to embarrass the Protestants¹⁹⁶ and in Nîmes, Vallongues attempted to provoke the resignation of the staff of the city hall¹⁹⁷. Dargout capitalised on the effect of these unexpected dismissals¹⁹⁸ to pressure as many members as possible to break their ties with the Secret Society, and so to weaken it further¹⁹⁹.

The Society began to experience other setbacks, too. Since Dargout had cut back the budget for the National Guard, there was no longer a surplus which could be used by the Society to buy the services of the Catholic working classes as there had been in previous years. The sudden loss of funds, on which many of the unemployed and poorly paid Nîmois depended, loosened some useful popular support for the Society and even led to criticism of the Royalist leaders for not making any personal financial sacrifices for the cause²⁰⁰.

Moreover, one of the Society's election candidates, Darbaud Jouques, had published an account of his term as

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¹⁹⁶ A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, Decazes, 5 December, 1817.
¹⁹⁷ Ibid.
¹⁹⁸ A.N. Flb II Gard 15. Dargout reported that the Ultras were consternated. (5 December, 1817, to Decazes).
¹⁹⁹ A.N. F⁷ 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 4 February, 1818. Dargout noted that he was wooing de Surville as his defection to the government's cause would be of great value.
²⁰⁰ A.N. F⁷ 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 20 April, 1818. The prefect learned this from Fajon, a member of the Society who had agreed to collaborate with the prefect. De Bernis, de Vogüé, and J-A de Calviere were under attack.
prefect of the Gard from August 1815 to February 1817. According to the new mayor of Nîmes, Laboissière, the pamphlet had been sponsored by the Society in order to revive the passions of 1815 and to remind the Catholics of the perfidy and treachery of the Protestants with whom the present prefect was encouraging union. However, Jouques, in his endeavours to justify his actions and to portray himself as the victim of a plot, had admitted that over-zealous Royalists had indeed committed criminal and unworthy deeds during the period that had been called the White Terror. This admission incurred the anger of members of the Society, and Jouques lost his support in the election, leaving the Catholics without a clear list around which to rally their dwindling support. The shortage of money, the defection and wavering of many former sympathisers who had never before been offered a reasonable alternative to Catholic royalism, and the apparent disloyalty of the leaders provoked a rift between the leadership and its following. Dargout, who followed the developments within the party closely, noted:

201 Darbaud Jouques, Troubles et Agitations.

202 A.D. Gard 6M 8. Laboissière to Dargout, 15 April, 1818.

203 A.N. F 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 20 April, 1818.

204 A.N. F 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 22 June, 1818. There were now doubts about Trinquelague, Jouques and de Vogüé.
"Fajon (the informer) said something I had often noted myself: the aristocrats are not loved by the Ultras. The party has no desire to be exploited for the benefit of the nobility alone. Its members hope to win some personal advantage from their resistance to the King's will. The spirit of Republicanism is present even here, in the midst of those who would destroy the Charter in order to restore the old system." 205.

Indeed, in those circumstances, some members of the Catholic royalist party were prepared to adopt a stratagem that would be used by the Legitimists many years later - an alliance with the Independents to block the Constitutionalists and ensure at least some representation at Paris. 206.

In contrast to the increasing difficulties of the Catholic royalists, Dargout's own electoral endeavours were crowned with success. Assured by Fajon of the success his measures against the Secret Society were achieving, the prefect gave his attention to the question of rallying the Protestants. This he managed by seeking the co-operation of the Protestant clergy through the synods 207 and by arranging soirées attended by people of the two confessions whom he hoped to coalesce. 208 In both endeavours, Dargout was able to point to his success in weakening the Secret Society as a token of his sincerity.

205 A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 20 April, 1818.
206 A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 22 June, 1818.
207 A.N. F1c III Gard 7. Note sur la situation dans le Département, 1818.
208 A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of Police, 30 January, 1818.
Shortly before the elections, Dargout dealt his most crippling blows when he dissolved the National Guard and so deprived the Ultra royalists of the chance of obstructing the elections, and when he dismissed some forty-four mayors as a precautions in case the royalists attempted subversion after the election.209 Indeed, Dargout was so zealous that his activities caused some amazement even on the part of Liberals210 so ill accustomed was society to the blatant canvassing of electors211 and the pressuring of public officials that was to become such a regular occurrence in French political life. Dargout even went to the trouble of printing a pamphlet that parodied a leaflet distributed by the Secret Society 'in order to turn M. de Calvière's efforts to ridicule'212.

Deprived of resources, access to electors and effective promises, the Catholic royalists were reduced to anger and frustration. As a last resort, they spread rumours that the

209 A.N. F1b I Gard 4. Dargout memorandum to minister of police, June 1818.

210 "The prefect is working for the election, and in a manner that is quite scandalous. He does not try to conceal that he is doing all he can to achieve his goal. He is the director of this election". A.D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 317. H. Fornier de Clausonne to general Fornier d'Albe, 8 September, 1818.

211 A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 16 June, 1818. The prefect recounted that he had taken advantage of a number of performances in Nîmes of Talma, the actress, to speak to the electors who attended the theatre. He claimed he had "cathechised" over forty.

212 A.N. 124 AP2. Dargout to Eymard, 17 October, 1818.
government was on the point of collapse, threatened to prevent the elections from taking place and to 'punish' any voters who dared to attend and attempted to intimidate the Protestant population of Nîmes, where the middle classes had been most influenced by Dargout's policy.

In spite of the threats, the list proposed and supported by Dargout was elected in its entirety. The result was nothing less than a disaster for the Catholics, and their reaction to this confirmation of their loss of power was as characteristic as it was pathetic. On the one hand, novenas were made, praying that God would come to the aid of religion and the throne; on the other, physical and verbal assaults on Protestants took place, resulting in the 'knifing' of three Protestants.

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214 A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to minister of police, 9 September 1818.
215 A.N. F7 9050. A Police report for September 1818 records bands of men and women roaming the streets shouting aggressive and insulting slogans.
216 A.N. F1C III Gard 4. Election of 26 October, 1818. Of 1565 eligible voters, 1385 attended. The results were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saint Aulaire*</td>
<td>963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chabaud Latour</td>
<td>949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reynaud Lascours</td>
<td>937</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Stood instead of the Marquis d'Aramon.

The Ultras, finally put up Trinqueilague 398
J. de Calvière 410
Ch. de Vogüé 433

218 Ibid.
Chapter 4.

Complete electoral defeat left the Catholic royalists without even the representation an opposition party might hope for. But their tradition and policies, based on sectarianism, made them particularly ill-suited and ill-inclined to accept the role of an opposition party within the framework of a constitutional monarchy. As in 1790, the Catholic party had experienced defeat because of the cens, which denied the vote to their lower class co-religionists and enhanced the political strength of the Protestants. After the defeat of 1790, the Catholics had taken up arms in an endeavour to redress the balance; in 1818, such a course of action was out of the question. All over the country, the party of the counter revolution was being eclipsed, largely because of the effects of the 1817 electoral law which had extended the vote to a record number of citizens - 110,000 in all - and favoured the more liberal middle classes.

Decazes, whose influence on the king was notorious, and who had sought to establish the ministry on the support of the 'centre left' since the dissolution of the Chambre introuvable

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1 The size of the electorate during the Bourbon Restoration was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Electorate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1824</td>
<td>99,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827</td>
<td>89,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A list of electors in the Gard in 1817 shows that 251 were commerçants and fabricants; a further 796 had "other professions" and only 237 came from the magistrature, church and legal professions.

in an attempt to end the antagonism between the 'two Frances', had emerged as the chief architect of policy in the cabinet after the resignation in December 1818 of the duc de Richelieu. Whilst the rather unimpressive Dessolles held the title of president of the council, Decazes accumulated control of the ministries of the Interior and Police, so acquiring the greatest possible control over internal security. Relations between the King and Artois, always strained, were exceedingly bad since the Note secrète and the Bord de l'Eau, and Monsieur had been stripped of his command of the National Guard because so many of the rather romanesque conspiracies of the Ultra royalists led back to his own entourage in the Pavillon de Marsan\(^2\). The Catholic royalists of the Gard were particularly handicapped by the disarming of their own armed force, the National Guard, and by the fact that one of the new deputies, Saint Aulaire, was Decazes' father in law.

With national and local events against them, the Catholic royalists adopted the tactics they had used in 1814, when the First Restoration had disappointed them. Sectarian antagonism was kept alive and fostered by the Ultras to prevent any lasting union growing from the liberal electoral alliance Dargout had forged. The men of 1815 were seen again in the countryside on mysterious and disquieting errands; meetings were organised to generate fear that a new White

\(^2\) P. Reboul, in *Châteaubriand et le Conservateur* (Paris, 1973), gives a survey of Ultra royalist intrigues and of Artois' involvement in Chapters II and III.
Terror was being planned³.

Besides maintaining constant and unsettling pressure on the community, the Ultras seized every opportunity to make their intentions known, to provoke unrest that might lead to open conflict. Thus, the Mardi Gras festivities were exploited for the purpose of disturbing the peace, and, in March 1819, the visit to Nîmes of Huet, an actor known for his Ultra-royalist sympathies, led to serious rioting that followed an all too familiar pattern. The performance given on 7 March, 1819 was attended by a group of men, described variously as porters⁴ and "prolétaire"⁵, led by one known as sac à merde. They were all wearing white cocades in their hats, and throughout the performance, they proferred royalist slogans of the kind that had "heralded the murders of 1815"⁶. After the performance, the group repaired to a cafe opposite the theatre, where a crowd of some two hundred

³ A.N. 124 AP2. Eymard to Decazes, 2 February 1819. Magnier, Carteras and a Marseillais called Battaglia were particularly active. On 22 January, a meeting was held and was attended by some six hundred persons "of the class that, in the events of 1815 distinguished themselves by their cruelty".


⁶ Ibid.
gathered quickly. Sporadic cries of 'Vive Charles X!' were heard\(^7\), and the efforts of the police to disperse the crowd failed\(^8\). The situation became precarious when a crowd of Protestants formed on the other side of the Boulevard de la Comédie\(^9\).

Similar scenes took place the next evening, and Nîmes was on the brink of open conflict. After the recent political changes in the department and in the country as a whole, the Protestants, far from being intimidated by the Catholics, retaliated from a newly acquired position of strength. Fornier de Clauson note:

\[ \text{"This time the Protestants will have no thoughts of hiding. They proclaim loudly that they will not let themselves be slaughtered as they did in 1815."} \]

Indeed, by the second night of the disturbances, Cévenol Protestants were arriving in Nîmes in considerable numbers to defend their brethren, repeating the events that had led, in 1790, to the bagarre that took some three hundred lives\(^11\).

A curfew was imposed on the city on 12 March, but it did not prevent two deaths on the fourteenth, when a Catholic mob

\(7\) A.D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 317. H. Fornier de Clauson to Fornier d'Albe family, 15 March 1819.

\(8\) Masse. loc cit.


\(11\) ibid.
attacked a café frequented by the city's Demi-soldes\textsuperscript{12}.

The upsurge of violence weighed on Nîmes for ten days and showed just how fragile peace and order were. The removal of the Catholic royalists from power had done very little to resolve the basic tension that poisoned political life in the department. Indeed, the changes that had taken place since Dargout had arrived as prefect had embittered the Catholics and had spawned a militant faction in the Protestant community, too. In short, in the Spring of 1819, a transfer of power to the Protestant community had taken place and it gave more cohesion to the Catholic royalist opposition\textsuperscript{13}. The near riots revealed, too, the weakness of the local administration. At the time of the outbreak, Dargout was preparing to leave the Gard, having been included

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\textbf{\textsuperscript{12} A.N.F.\textsuperscript{b} Gard 4. Dargout to Decazes, 14 March, 1819. Also: PRO F.O. 27/203. Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh, 29 March, 1819.}

The Demi soldes, of whom there were some 198 in the Gard (Vidalenc, \textit{Les Demi soldes} \textit{Paris 1955}, p.216), were generally ill-disposed to the Bourbons, whose restoration had led to the retirement on half pay of many imperial officers. The Nîmes Demi soldes were held responsible for stabbing the Royalists in the back in 1815 when they conspired with General Gilly to recognise Bonaparte while the Royalist volunteers were attempting to cut him off in the Drôme.

\textbf{\textsuperscript{13} Dargout's successor, Baron d'Haussez, remarked: "The Protestant party was all powerful because of the protection it enjoyed from M. Guizot, senior counsellor in the Department of the Interior; from Saint Aulaire, father in law of M. Decazes, and from M. Chabaud Latour, both deputies of the Gard; from Boissy d'Anglas and Pelet de la Lozère, zealous Protestants and peers..."
Mémoires, vol. I, p.260}

Moreover, the reorganisation of the courts Dargout had recommended after the 1818 elections had placed the senior positions in the hands of the Protestants - Cassagnolles, Fornier de Clausonse and Cavalier. \textit{Almanach royale}, 1820.
by Decazes in his celebrated Fournée of peers whose promotion was intended to give the government a majority in the upper House.

Until the new prefect arrived, responsibility for the department rested with the senior counsellor at the Préfecture, Chazelles de Chusclan, and the mayor of Nîmes, Laboissière. Both men were criticised by Dargout and by the Gendarmerie for their lack of initiative, and Dargout's last administrative act in the Gard was a request to have both men dismissed.

The disturbances ceased when the new prefect, the baron d'Haussez, arrived. Nonetheless, the Gard remained tense and divided. Like most Nîmois, Haussez was acutely conscious of the precarious character of local political stability:

"The existence of an organisation in both camps is certain, just as it is certain that they are both armed. The Catholics have always possessed weapons,

14 A.N. Flb I Gard 4., Dargout to Decazes, 14 March, 1819. Also A.N. F 9050. Colonel of gendarmerie, 9 March, 1819.

Both men were dismissed when Haussez arrived, and they were replaced by Protestants, Cavalier and E. de Pelet. A.N. F 9050. Haussez to Decazes, 21 March, 1819.

15 Lemercher d'Haussez, born in 1778, was mayor of his home town, Neufchâtel (Seine inférieure). From 1813, he had organised support for the Bourbon cause, and was elected deputy for the Seine inférieure in 1815. His administrative career was to take him as prefect to Dax (1817 to March 1819), Nîmes (until January 1820), Grenoble (to April 1824) and Bordeaux, until 1829, when he was appointed minister of Marine.

A.N. Flb 166, dossier 25. Personnel of the ministry of the interior.
and the Protestants have managed to procure them. On both sides there is hostility. A single shot, a sign from Nîmes and the whole department would be in flames". 16

The Catholics refused to co-operate with the new Protestant administration. Thus, in Le Vigan, the Catholic adjoints resigned when the Catholic mayor was replaced by a Protestant, and it proved impossible to find Catholics willing to serve under the new mayor17. Even social contacts were rejected. In Uzès, the distance between the Liberals and the Royalists was so great that the educated devotees of the two parties consciously avoided each other for fear of causing an incident18.

In Nîmes itself, Haussez experienced the same hostility as he tried to continue the policy of socialisation begun by Dargout:

"My soirées were well attended and popular, but they served only to show more clearly the hatred that people bore each other. By a kind of tacit agreement, people never attended two consecutive weeks, so that one evening would be exclusively Catholic, the next exclusively Protestant." 19.

16 A.N. F7 9050. Haussez to Decazes, 20 March, 1819.
17 PRO. F.O. 27/204. Police report, Nîmes, 8 April, 1819. The report observed that one of the reasons why the Catholics refused to co-operate was that "things would be different in a while" implying that Protestant supremacy was to be a fleeting phase.
18 PRO. F.O. 27/204. Police report, Nîmes, 14 April, 1819.
Fornier de Clausonne summed up the atmosphere in the department as one of armed neutrality, in which the Liberals, as he called the Protestant party, dominated. The more sinister aspects of this armed neutrality were soon discovered by the new Procureur, Pataille, who came to Nîmes as a result of Dargout's reorganisation of the courts. Pataille's first task was to conduct an enquiry into the disturbances that took place early in March. The inquiry satisfied him that the ex National Guard was still active and organised. Its only concession to the dissolution appeared to have been the removal of the notice board from the building in which it continued to meet.

Pataille's assistant, Guillet, interrogated a man about illegal arms, and found that the whole Guard would turn out on the Esplanade on a given signal from the captains. Thus, the sporadic and apparently popular outbursts of anti-Protestantism, carefully fed by rumours that the King was about to abdicate in favour of Monsieur, could be transformed into an organised onslaught on 'Jacobinism' and its supporters at the appropriate time. Ultra royalism

23 On 28 April, youths wearing cocardes hurled abuse and stones at Protestants near the Place de la Bouquerie, (A.N. F7 9050. Haussez to Decazes, 28 April, 1819). On 18 May, groups of youths paraded up and down the Cours, on the edge of a Protestant quarter of Nîmes shouting "Les Bourbon ou la Mort!" Police were required to break them up. A.D. Gard 6M 85. Cavalier to Haussez, 18 May, 1819.
was becoming impatient. Excluded from parliamentary power, its network became more active in the country. In Avignon, Jules de Calvière was involved in the local committee with the circulation of an Ultra paper, either the Moniteur royaliste or the Conservateur, in which he had shares.

Such was the intrigue of the Catholic royalists that the arrest of Trufémy and Servent, two of the untried terrorists of 1815, provided the party with an occasion for publicity and rallying support instead of demoralising members.

Servent and Trufémy were sentenced to death by a court at Riom in December 1819 but the secret society had given both men maître Baragnon, Boissin's defence counsel and former officer of the National Guard, and, in the course of regular and frequent visits to the two while they were

24 A.N. F 9050. Haussez to Decazes, 21 May, 1819.
25 Cabanis, Charles X, p. 222.
26 Decazes had instructed the authorities to pursue alleged criminals. The policy was opposed by Haussez and by Pataille who were convinced that instead of intimidating the Ultras, successful convictions of Catholic royalists and, worse still, executions, would create martyrs and raise the spectre of 1815. (A.N. 18 F 9050. Haussez to Decazes, 6 April, 1819; A.N. BB 1048. Pataille to minister of justice, 16 April, 1819.)

Trufémy was accused of murdering a retired Napoleonic officer, Bourillon, on the Esplanade in Nîmes during the White Terror, and of shooting a man named Lichaire during the rioting of 16-17 October, 1815. In both cases, the charges were brought by the widows. (A.N. BB 18 1048. Pataille to minister of justice, 2 November, 1819). Trufémy and Servent appealed against the death sentence, but the appeal committee included Dargout and Guizot who upheld the sentence. Servent went to the guillotine protesting his innocence. Haussez, Mémoires, vol. I, pp. 291-4.
in Nîmes, the Royalists had made them into heroes. Haussez remained in the Gard only until January 1820. While he attributed his transfer to Grenoble to his “assiduités près de quelques femmes de la société”, there is evidence that he was, in fact, the victim of local political manoeuvres. Never liked by the Protestants, who regarded his policy of reconciliation as futile, he had also failed to take the hard line against the royalists that a number of highly placed Liberal spokesmen demanded.

Haussez's reluctant successor, Villiers du Terrage, in an attempt to avoid being sent to the "most disgusting

27 A.N. F7 6740. Commissaire de police, Nîmes, to chef de la 5e division, 21 December, 1819. Also a report in the newspaper La Renommée, Saturday, 23 October, 1819.


29 Fornier de Clausonne noted that most Protestants were suspicious of his "grande oeuvre de fusion ou réconciliation". He remarked, too, that the prefect enjoyed little respect in the department. A.D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 317, to Fornier d'Albe 15 April & 23 July, 1819.

30 Haussez had criticised the purge on suspected terrorists ordered by Decazes. He had also sought a reprieve for Trufémé and Servent, and was over-ruled by Dargent and Guizot (Mémoires, vol. I, pp.291-294). In contrast to the proceedings Decazes favoured, Haussez preferred to encourage the terrorists to leave the department quietly. (A.N. F7 9050. Haussez to Decazes, 2 April 1819). Decazes and Haussez had been in conflict over the matter of the ex-National Guard, as well. Decazes accused Haussez of neglecting to report on aspects of its existence which had been made known to him (Decazes) by the minister of Justice, who had received the details from Pataille. Again, the disagreement reflected a difference of style. Haussez remarked that there were no proofs that the Guardsmen were active - it was all rumour (A.N. F7 9050. Haussez to Decazes, 27 April, 1819).

It is not surprising that a man who was to be appointed minister in the Polignac cabinet should disagree with the views and methods of Decazes.
administration in the kingdom" asked: "the intrigues to which Monsieur d'Haussez fell victim, are they not still present, ready to devour me as well?" 31

Haussez' failure in the face of local political manoeuvres coincided with the failure on the national level of Decaze's 'liberal phase'. After the elections of September 1819, in the course of which the Conventionnel and constitutional bishop Grégoire who had approved of the execution of Louis XVI, was elected in Grenoble, it was clear that liberalism had not effaced the antagonism between the two Frances, but that it had simply favoured the rapid and frightening growth of the Left. Against the wishes of certain ministers, Decazes proposed to abandon the centre Left, and to seek support from moderate conservatives. To this end, he proposed to change the electoral laws yet again, in order to reduce the number of electors favourable to the Independents, as the Left called itself, and he entered into talks with the extreme Right using Richelieu and Vitrolles as intermediaries. The Ultras, however, held back, preferring Decazes to operate the shift to the Right alone, and so to cut himself off from his former allies. But all Decazes' plans were wrecked when, on 14 February, 1820, the duc de Berry died after he had been stabbed.

The murder of the only Bourbon with a chance of providing heirs to the throne of France released the Ultra royalists

31 A.N. F1b I 176, doss. 14, du Terrage to minister of interior 1 March, 1820.
from the distasteful task of negotiating with a cabinet that contained Decazes. The many accusations that were made against Decazes are well known, and in spite of the king's protection, the architect of the liberal policy that had determined the course of France for four years was obliged to resign.

Unlike some 'national' disasters, the death of the duc de Berry, while it produced a movement of sympathy among the people, did not produce any sense of unity among the politicians. On the contrary, it seemed to justify the predictions of the Ultras and strengthened their determination to eradicate the influence of the Revolution, which they saw spreading around them once more. In 1819, Kotzbühel had been murdered by a German student who believed the writer to be an agent of the Tsar. In January 1820, the Cadiz insurrection had obliged Ferdinand VII of Spain to accept a liberal constitution, and the same constitution was imposed on Ferdinand of Naples in July of the same year. In France itself, there was an upsurge of conspiracies such as the Bazar français, and Epingle noir (bonapartist conspiracies conceived by soldiers and named after the cafés in which the conspirators met), and the Charbonnerie was becoming active.

The new cabinet, presided by the duc the Richelieu once more, tried to steer a course that would reassure

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32 These conspiratorial activities are examined in D. Porch, Army and Revolution in France, 1815-1848 (London, 1974) and A. Spitzer, Old Hatreds and Young Hopes, (Cambridge, Mass., 1971)
moderate conservatives without playing into the hands of the Ultras. In doing so, it pleased nobody. The Liberals found that its legislation was repressive - habeas corpus suspended, the introduction of censorship before publication and the new electoral law, which gave a second vote to the richest quarter of the electorate in each department. The Ultras, realising that they were in a position to exploit the divisions in the assembly, gave only half hearted support, and that until December 1821. Aware of the king's diminishing interest in politics and of his fascination with madame du Cayla, the last of the favourites, the Pavillon de Marsan had its own cabinet ready and obtained the king's consent, having made Richelieu's position un-tenable.

After 1822, the trend to the Right was more marked; with the exception of the Martignac cabinet, from January 1828 to August 1829, the cabinets were dominated by men who had been waiting nearly ten years for the opportunity to implement the counter revolution. The reaction took place under the leadership of Villèle, the former mayor of Toulouse, provincial gentleman par excellence, and chevalier de la foi, who had been chosen by Artois himself. The succession of Charles X marks a turning point. The character of his coronation in May 1825, intended to stress the continuity of the Bourbon monarchy and its role as defender of the Catholic faith, indicated the orientation of his reign as clearly as the laws compensating those who had forfeited their property
by fleeing from France during the Revolution and reviving sacrilege as a crime punishable in a particularly brutal and medieval way.

Nonetheless, the Ultras, who believed that their hour had finally come, engineered by their narrowness their own downfall. If in 1824 the monarchy had never been so popular after the successful intervention in Spain, by 1827, the government was being defeated on issues like censorship and the bourgeois National Guard was dissolved because of its hostility to the king's government. When revolt finally broke out in 1830, the regime had very few defencers. Having finally obtained what they coveted and conspired for, the Ultras showed themselves incapable of reading the signs of the times and proved themselves to be as inept as their political opponents believed them to be in the matter of governing a people whom they distrusted and which had changed beyond their recognition. From united opposition, the Ultras, on gaining power, were transformed into a variety of nuances which weakened their strength in parliament. As early as 1824, Châteaubriand broke with Villèle and led the Journal des Debats into a systematic critique of the government that strengthened the Liberal opposition. A "purer than pure" faction, led by La Bourdonnaye emerged on the Right, and yet another group, guided by men like Montlosier and Dumesnil, criticised strongly the increasingly clerical nature of the regime.
In spite of their overwhelming majority in the 1824 Chambre retrouvée, the Ultras refused to re-establish parliament in the role of supremacy they had demanded in 1815. Under Charles X, decisions were the result of consultation between the king and his ministers only, another aspect of the reign that alienated the affection of parliamentarians. Moreover, in spite of their avowed hostility to the centralised state, the Ultras did nothing to change it, finding on the contrary, that the degree of centralisation was as valuable for their own electoral preparation as it had been for the Liberals. While there was a very definite reaction in France after 1822, there were no profound changes in the political and administrative structures of the country, thus giving a widespread impression that France was being governed for the benefit of a small and disliked minority of Frenchmen.

The shift to the right after the murder of the duc de Berry, the 'ultracisation' of French society and its consequent provocation of an opposition mood and the fragmentation of the erstwhile united ultras can be traced in the Gard from 1820 to the July Revolution. René Rémont comments:

"The accession of the Comte d'Artois (September 1824) will remove its (Ultra royalism's) raison d'être. From the day that Monsieur is on the throne, there is no longer, in the real sense of the term, an ultra royalist party for the sentiments of the faction correspond to those of the sovereign."

33 R. Rémont, La Droite en France, I, p. 29.
In 1827, the secretary at the prefecture of the Gard, writing in the absence of the prefect, assured the minister of the Interior that l'Esprit public in the department was good, displaying as it had in 1815 loyalty and devotion to the king, "only now, royalism is calm and satisfied, having lost the effervescence that had led to some trouble in its early period of triumph." Another feature of Administration of the Gard after 1820 is the sympathy of the prefects with the Catholic royalists, or, at least their reluctance to become involved in local grievances which might well rebound on their careers. Lavallette, prefect from 1824 to 1828, was a deputy for the Isère at the same time, and spent most of the year in Paris, leaving the administration of the department to the secretary at the préfecture, de Brigand.

The death of the duc de Berry provoked an outbreak of verbal violence directed, as usual, against the Protestants of Nîmes, and by the Headquarters of the former National Guard which had become known as the Cercle Triaire. Although the Catholic royalists were reiterating the views of

34 A.N. F7 6769. Secrétaire général de la préfecture de Nîmes to minister of the interior, 5 March, 1827.
35 A.N. F1b I 170, dossier 17. Personnel of the ministry of the interior.
37 A.N. F7 6696. Etat faisant (sic) connaître le caractère politique des cercles ou cabinets littéraires (sic) dans le département du Gard, juillet 1820.
Clausel de Coussergues\textsuperscript{38} and it was rumoured that the Cévenol and Vaunage Protestants were armed and ready to march on Nîmes if the threat to the Protestants there became immediate\textsuperscript{39}, the Protestant bourgeoisie did not appear to be very concerned and expressed their confidence in the ability of the local authorities, still largely in their own hands and free to react to any danger in the absence of Haussez' replacement\textsuperscript{40}. The military commanders were known to be sound as well - the Ultras had endeavoured to have them transferred the previous year\textsuperscript{41}.

Gradually, signs of change came. When the new prefect, Villiers du Terrage, arrived in March, he filled two vacant posts with Catholic royalists without consulting the local administrators and notables\textsuperscript{42}. In August it was learnt that the royal ordinance re-confirming Cavalier as mayor for another term had been held up in the prefecture until the Ultras had made certain that one of their men, the Marquis d'Urre was promoted from third adjoint to first adjoint\textsuperscript{43}.

\textsuperscript{38} A. N. F\textsuperscript{7} 6745. Police report, 24 February, 1820.
\textsuperscript{39} A. N. F\textsuperscript{7} 6745. Police report, 23 February, 1820.
\textsuperscript{40} A. D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 318. G. Fornier de Clausonne to General Fornier d'Albe, 24 February, 1820.
\textsuperscript{41} ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} One post, that of Commissaire de police in Anduze was filled by a policeman who had been dismissed from Nîmes by Decazes. The other, assistant medical officer at the Nîmes hospice was given to one of the Froments of 1790 fame. As a result "the Protestants will not go there any more for fear of being poisoned". A. D. Gard Chartrier de Clausonne 1315, H. Fornier de Clausonne to G. Fornier de Clausonne, 14 April, 1820.
The most striking evidence of the growing influence of Ultra royalism is to be seen in the elections that were held in November 1820 according to the terms of the new law, passed in June 1820, and which provided for a restricted college of the richest men in each department to complement the arrondissement colleges that already favoured the Right in most rural departments. There was talk of a new Chambre introuvable and, in the Gard, a new White Terror. In April, Madier de Montjau had laid a pamphlet before the Chamber of deputies in which he asserted that he had evidence of a gouvernement occulte in the South of France, operating under the instructions of the Pavillon de Marsan\(^44\), and in doing so, he had made the Nîmes Liberals feel very exposed without producing any results\(^45\). Tension rose as the new electoral law was being debated, and du Terrage decided to put a prohibition on the holding of Missions in the department, as they would undoubtedly rekindle old passions and

\(^44\) The petition, presented on 25 April, 1820, referred to Ultra circulars sent to Nîmes. Number 35 included: "A while ago we asked you to assert yourselves. Now we advise calm, the greatest calm. We have won a decisive victory in having Decazes removed. The new cabinet can render us great services and it is vital not to be hostile towards it. We repeat, calm, great calm!"

\(^45\) A.D. Gard 6M 81. Police report dated 8 May, 1820, notes that the liberals were embarrassed and worried by the affair, and felt sure it would be held against them by the Right.
tensions\textsuperscript{46}.

Both the Liberals and Ultras worked hard for the elections which were to take place within the restricted colleges only and so add two deputies to the present number from each department. Jules de Calvière, apparently the organiser for the Gard Ultras, wrote:

"The consequences of the coming elections are of such importance for our future destinies that no one can pretend that it would be hard to compromise our honour, our fortunes and our very existence through sheer negligence." \textsuperscript{47}

In the autumn, shortly before the election, du Terrage remarked that the different factions had shown no regard

\textsuperscript{46} Since 1819, the Société des Missions de France, directed by the Abbé Rauzan, had been spreading their activities into the provinces of France, preaching repentance, Hell fire and the Throne and Altar. The Recueil de Cantiques à l'usage des Missions de France (Rusand, Librairie imprimeur du Roi et du clergé, Lyon) contains hymns with refrains such as:

"Vive la France
Vive le Roi
 Toujours en France
Les Bourbon et la Foi!"

The missions, lampooned by Stendhal in his novel, Lamiel, lasted from a week to a month and involved sermons, processions, ceremonies of repentance and general communion. At the end of the mission, a large cross was planted in a public square of the town to commemorate the mission. Mission de Montpellier par G-M B., chez Auguste Séguin, librairie, Place neuve. n.d.

The mission crosses that Nîmes had 'collected' were to be the occasion of rioting after the July Revolution.

\textsuperscript{47} A.D. Gard 1E 974. Jules de Calvière to Marquis d'Assas 30 July 1820.
for civility, and individuals on both sides had exposed themselves to indignities and accusations that would not normally be tolerated. But in the bitter struggle, the Catholic royalists knew they had the prefect's support. He informed the Minister of the Interior that he had not failed to impress upon the royalists that the moment had come for the party to revive the honour of the country. It was up to them, he said, to show that the 'horrible excesses' committed in the past were attributable only to the 'unfortunate times, the flight of the population and the absence of authority'.

The prefect commented, too, that there had been disagreement in the Royalist ranks. While the candidature of Charles de Vogüé was certain, there was a split on the second candidate. Some thought it should be de Ricard, while others wanted Jules de Calvière. The Liberals were going to offer de Boisse, mayor of Pont Saint Esprit, General Gilly, who deserted to Bonaparte in 1815, and General Fornier d'Albe. Nonetheless, du Terrage predicted that the Left would obtain 130 votes for each of its candidates and that the Parti royaliste pur would get 160

48 A.N. F7 9658. Du Terrage to director of police, 20 October, 1820.

49 A.N. F7 9658. Du Terrage to minister of the interior, 7 November, 1820.

50 A.N. F7 9658. Du Terrage to director of police, 2 November, 1820.
votes. Du Terrage's forecast was very close, as one might expect. On 23 November, De Voguë and de Calvière each obtained 157 votes, some 58% of the total votes. By a slender margin, the Catholic royalists had acquired a foothold in the Chamber of deputies again.

The result produced no dramatic effect in the Gard. There were, after all, still three liberal deputies. But the country was one step nearer a chamber, therefore a government dominated by the Ultras. Notables like Madier de Montjau were in constant touch with the Nîmois of Paris, always trying to foresee the next move of their adversaries. After Monsieur withdrew his support for Richelieu's moderate royalist cabinet and imposed his own men on the country, Madier de Montjau commented bitterly:

We continue to enjoy
perfect tranquillity here,
tranquillity that is
guaranteed by the paternal
goodness of the White cocarde,
the impartiality of the gov-
ernment and the clemency of

51 A.N. F7 9658. Du Terrage to director of police, 7 November, 1820.


53 A.D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 316. Madier de Montjau to general Fornier d'Albe, 27 September, 1821. "Better placed than we are, the Nîmois of Paris will see more easily the views of our new masters, the ferocity of those we will have in six months.."
Trestaillons. Oh miracle! A fortnight ago, a curate in the Ardèche demanded the immediate revival of the tithe (disme)... 54

About the same time, Pataille, the procureur appointed by Decazes, was dismissed, and Fornier de Clausonne, at the time a juge d'Instruction, commented that the Ultras in the Courts were speculating on future electoral success quite shamelessly 55. For the Gard was preparing for its third election in six years. The law of June 1820 had maintained the principle of partial renewals of the Chamber, and, as usual, the Gard came in the second 'batch' of departments.

Once again, collusion between the prefect and the royalist party was evident. In the first place, the constituencies of the department, based traditionally on the arrondissements of Alès and Le Vigan were merged into one electoral constituency. In both arrondissements, the Protestants, the principal Liberal electors, were numerous and could conceivably obtain a majority for their candidates in the two arrondissement colleges 56.

54 ibid., 29 March, 1822.
56 The combined population of the arrondissements of Le Vigan and Alès was 129 000 in 1820 (A.N. Flc III Gard S. Statistique électorale 1820). The protestant population of the same area was about 70 000. (D.Robert, Les Eglises Réformées, p.149).

A survey made in 1835 of the religious and political tendencies of the department's cantons showed that four of the nine Alès cantons were predominantly Protestant, while the town of Alès was mixed. Six of the ten cantons in the arrondissement of Le Vigan were Protestant.

The survey, designed to evaluate support for the July Monarchy, equated Protestantism with Liberalism or Orleanism (A.D. Gard 6M 122. Prefect to minister of interior, 25 March 1835).
Yet, while there was no significant difference in the populations of the three 'rural' cantons in the Gard, both Alès and Le Vigan had roughly half the number of electors that Uzès had\(^{57}\). While unequal distribution was possible in a censitary regime, the disproportion seems great in view of the commercial wealth of the Protestant communities. It is difficult to believe that so few would qualify for the 300 F cens of the arrondissement colleges\(^{58}\). Thus, by merging Alès and Le Vigan an electorate similar to that of Uzès was obtained, but the Protestants or Liberals were deprived of the possibility of winning two seats in the Chamber of deputies.

Jules de Calvière was 'election manager' for the Ultras once more, and was also appointed president of the electoral college of Nîmes, the most important of the arrondissement colleges with some 650 electors, and president of the restricted departmental college. Two months before the elections, de Calvière wrote to the Minister of Justice predicting that four of the five seats would go to the Royalists, and that the fifth, Alès -Le Vigan would be left

\(^{57}\) Nîmes had 659 electors and 119 300 inhabitants.

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<td>Uzès</td>
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<td>Alès</td>
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<td>Le Vigan</td>
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The figures are those drawn up by du Terrage for the year 1820. A.N. Flc III Gard 5. Statistique électorale,1820.

\(^{58}\) Thus, Robert, Eglises réformées, p.149, comments that the Protestants in the arrondissements of Alès and Le Vigan were "often landowners but also small industrialists".
to the Liberals. It is clear that the Royalists had little interest in the new constituency, for while de Calvière notified the Minister of the presidents of the colleges - de Vogüé was to preside at Uzès - he commented that the college of Alès - Le Vigan was being left to organise itself. Jouques referred to the prefect's approval of the electoral arrangements. De Calvière's forecast was, of course, accurate. The arrondissement colleges of Nîmes and Uzès returned Ultra royalists - François de Ricard, avocat général at Montpellier, and Charles de Vogüé respectively, while the Alès-Le Vigan college re-elected Saint Aulaire, Decazes' father in law, and then with only some 60% of the votes cast. A week later, the restricted college elected Jules de Calvière and Jacques Alexis de Calvière-Vézénobre who had been deprived of his army command in 1818 on account of his extreme views.

The new White Terror expected by many Liberals did not come, nor did any sweeping purge of the local administration. Just as some Catholic royalists had survived the Decazes period - de Surville was the most striking example - so many

61 ibid.
moderates or non Ultras remained in office after 1820. The changes of personnel were gradual, taking place usually when a post fell vacant. Indeed, the pattern of appointments tends to reflect a desire to reward loyal service to the Catholic royalist cause and to reinstate men who had suffered for it rather than a desire to ensure that every branch of the local administration was in their hands. Thus, in 1823, the government requested a list of communes in the department that took the pro-government Journal des Maires "vivement recommandé par le gouvernement". Only 123 communes took the journal, out of a total of 345, but there is no evidence that the non subscribing mayors were victimised or even proselytised63. On the other hand, in 1821, Ferrand Demissol, who volunteered with the duc d'Angoulême and refused the oath of allegiance to Bonaparte in 1815, was appointed to the Assises in Nîmes64. Jean Baptiste Veau Lanouvelle, imprisoned in 1792, then removed from his position as procureur at Alès by Dargout in 1818, was appointed to the court at Privas in the Ardèche in 182265. In 1823 Jules de Calvière was elevated to the préfecture of the Vaucluse, an appointment which permitted him to remain in contact with his native Gard66.

63 A.D. Gard 6M 249. n.d. (Filed under 1823).
64 A.D. Gard 4U 5/200 (Parquet).
65 ibid.
66 A.N. Flb I 157, doss. 3. Personnel of the ministry of the interior.
1824 brought a more marked change in personnel. The successful outcome of the Spanish campaign had encouraged Villele to dissolve the Chamber at the end of 1823 and to seek a greater majority for the government. The elections held in the Spring of 1824 produced a parliament that was christened by the King the Chambre retrouvée. The Gard elected a deputation that repeated the tendencies of 1822; Alès/Le Vigan alone elected a Liberal to a Chamber dominated by Ultras. Like other notables in the Chamber who had connections with the Gard, de Calvière and de Crussol, two of the Ultra deputies, were members of the secret organisation known as the Chevaliers de la Foi.

After this election, which marked the zenith of Ultra royalism, Cavalier, the Protestant mayor of Nîmes since 1820, was dismissed because of "his liberal opinions". So too was Bleynié, a police official who had been in Nîmes since 1816. Two outstanding ultras, dismissed by Dargout, were reinstated in the public administration:

67 The Ultras elected were: de Ricard (Nîmes), de Crussol (Uzès), Jules de Calvière and Jacques-Alexis de Calvière Vézénobre (both by the restricted college). The Liberal was General Vignolles, whose death in 1825 led to the election of Chabaud Latour for Alès/Le Vigan. A.N. Flc III Gard 5. Elections of 25 February and 6 March, 1824; Election of 23 January, 1825.

68 Bertier de Sauvigny, Le Comte Ferdinand de Bertier, p. 356.
Among the Chevaliers in the Chamber in 1824 were: René de Bernis (Lozère), Charles de Vogué (Ardèche) and the new prefect of the Gard, Piennelli de Lavallette who was deputy for the Isère.

69 A.N. F 1b II Gard 15. Secretary of the préfecture to minister of interior, 26 July 1824.

Vallonuges, mayor from 1815 to 1817, and removed by Dargout, was reappointed to the Nîmes city hall to replace Cavalier. Chazelles de Chusclan, removed from the prefecture for collusion with the Ultras at the time of the March 1819 riots, was made president of the Conseil général of the department. At the beginning of 1825, the sub prefect of Alès, appointed in 1818 by Dargout, died. His position was given to du Roure, the former commander of the National Guard of Alès, the man who organised demonstrations to oppose Dargout's arrival in the department.

Yet, when Vallongues died in office in 1825, Chastellier, a moderate who would be elected deputy for Nîmes in 1831 and 1834, was appointed to replace him.

One case, that of Narbonne Lara, former sub prefect of Alès, illustrates clearly the patronage aspect of many appointments. Lara was transferred from Alès in 1817 to the sub prefecture of Florac in the Lozère, a neighbouring department. From 1824, René de Bernis, who had appointed Narbonne Lara to Alès in July 1815, was Prefect and deputy of the Lozère, as well as being Inspector of its National Guard. In 1828, Narbonne Lara sought the influence of de Bernis to obtain a re-transfer to Alès. De Bernis made an

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71 Journal du Gard, 1 September, 1824.
72 ibid., 28 August, 1824
73 ibid., 19 March, 1825
unsuccessful request to Martignac, observing that Narbonne-Lara had been transferred to a post "beaucoup moins agréable" than Alès, and that a move back to Alès "would compensate for the injustice". A later report on Narbonne Lara by an official of the July Monarchy remarked he was a member of "the brazen circle of Congréganistes who met in the Chateau de Salgas, the home of Monsieur de Bernis".

The shift of political influence in the department was revealed, too, in the attitude of the authorities to partisans of the Catholic royalist cause. In 1823, Souchon, one of the principal royalist agitators of 1814, died. His obituary in the Journal du Gard spoke of the persecution he endured from the enemies of the monarchy, culminating in his destitution in 1819. The notice ended: "The King has lost a faithful servant".

The same newspaper feted the reappointment of Vallongues as mayor, declaring of the man who had held office through the White Terror that "the firmness and wisdom of his term in tempestuous circumstances will always be a tribute to his zeal and to his love for the Bourbons".

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75 A.N. F1b I 168, doss. I. De Bernis to Vicomte Martignac, 2 December, 1828.
76 A.N. F1b I 168, doss. I. Note to minister of interior, 30 November, 1830.
77 Journal du Gard, 1 February, 1823.
78 ibid., 1 September, 1824.
Indulgence was not restricted to newsprint. In 1820, Pataille had established a list of eight capital offences committed by Jean Graffand, alias Quatretailons. However, Quatretailons remained free in the Gard, and in 1825, Guillet, the new procureur, observed that "the passage of time seems to dictate that Graffand should not be pursued for crimes committed under the banner of Royalism". Quatretaillons lived on to take part, in a terrorist capacity, in the reaction to the Revolution of July 1830.

The increasingly clerical character of the reign of Charles X gave a good deal of scope to the triumphalist tendencies of the Catholic people of the Gard. There was no question, after 1824, of prohibiting the Missions as du Terrage had done in 1820. In December 1825, fifteen missionary fathers arrived in Nîmes and conducted a mission that lasted until Ash Wednesday 1826. The mission raised popular passions to high pitch, and Chabaud-Latour, the Protestant deputy, wrote to the Minister of Justice complaining of the ordeal the Protestants suffered:

"It (the mission) was a great trial. The effervescence and enthusiasm of those whose beliefs led them to the mission reached a peak.

79 A.N. BB 1048. Memorandum to Procureur, Riom, 22 July, 1820.

80 A.N. BB 1048. Procureur général of Nîmes to minister of justice, 17 August 1825.

81 A.N. F 6769. Prefect to minister of interior, 12 December, 1825.
an unavoidable feature of the people in a country so prone to emotions and to extremism" 82.

During the mission, the sacraments had been refused to Catholics married to Protestants, and such public humiliation, said the deputy, served to provoke antagonism 83. Shortly after the Mission, an ugly scene took place outside the Protestant Temple when a Catholic girl marrying a Protestant went to the Temple, where the Pastor was to bless the union. The crowd that gathered to insult the wedding party was so violent that the police had to disperse it 84. The procureur attributed the demonstration to religious fervour caused by the mission, for "marriages between Catholics and Protestants, particularly among the working classes, are so frequent that they never cause an eyelid to be raised" 85.

In 1828, the Corpus Christi procession through Nîmes was the occasion of a brawl between Catholics and some Protestants who were in the café de l'Ile d'Elbe. The Catholics charged the Protestants with failing to show respect for the sacrament 86.

82 A.N. BB 18 1136. Chaubaud Latour to minister of justice, 23 March, 1826.
83 ibid.
84 A.N. BB 18 1137. Procureur général to minister of justice, 24 April, 1826.
85 ibid.
Such occasions of violence were infrequent, but the mutual suspicion between the two communities remained. Moreover, it was not confined to the lower classes. In March 1829, the prefect just appointed by Martignac\textsuperscript{87}, issued four hundred invitations to a ball to notables of both persuasions. But he found that a number of Catholics 'who use religion to keep a monopoly of power', realising that the prefect was not going to look to them alone for support, set about dissuading many of their co-religionists from accepting. Indeed, many invitations were never delivered to their destination\textsuperscript{88}.

The prefect noted, too, that Protestant allegations that they were often discriminated against in local public appointments was well founded. Some communes, he said, resorted to the lowest classes of Catholic society rather than appointing a respectable Protestant to a vacant position\textsuperscript{89}. But such instances of blatant anti-Protestantism in the late 1820's appear to have been based on a suspicious attitude to the Protestant community as a whole, or on some local jealousy, for, quite on the contrary, there was evidence that, having gained power both in the department and in the

\textsuperscript{87} Herman's dossier contains a memorandum stating that an essential part of his task was working towards a rapprochement between the two communities. A.N. Flbl 162, dossier 5. Personnel of ministry of interior.

\textsuperscript{88} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 6769. Prefect to minister of interior, 20 March, 1829.

\textsuperscript{89} A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 6769. Prefect to minister of interior, n.d. 1829.
Country as a whole, the Catholic royalists were more tolerant of the Protestants in political life if the latter's demands were modest. Thus, the royalists raised no objection to the appointment of a Protestant opposition deputy, Achille Daunant to the Conseil général to fill a vacancy left by the death of another Protestant, Boileau Castelnau. Neither did the royalists exploit the worsening economic situation in the department as they had done in the past - and would do in the future - when seeking more power.

Probably the most striking aspect of Catholic royalism in the Gard in the last years of the Restoration was its extraordinary transformation from a highly disciplined movement to a weak, fragmented one. Only three years after the Chambre retrouvée, Fornier de Clausonne, voicing the liberal bourgeoisie, could write:

"Success is complete...
The yoke that weighed on the department is broken". 92

90 A.N. Flb II Gard S. Prefect to minister of interior, 29 June, 1829; Royal ordinance, 21 July, 1829.

91 The price of wheat had risen to 30F a hectolitre in February 1828, the highest since February 1817. Labrousse, Romano, Dreyfus. Le prix du Froment en France, 1726 - 1913, p.102.

In October 1828, the prefect wrote that unemployment was widespread as the crisis affected Nîmes industries. A.N. F7 6769. Report of 16 October, 1828.

He was referring to the result of the election called by Villèle at the end of 1827 as a sort of plebiscite for the government's policy. Only one traditional Catholic royalist, the duc de Crussol, was elected. The college of Alès - Le Vigan elected a liberal, Reynaud Lascours, and the Nîmes college, which had elected François de Ricard as an Ultra in 1824, now elected the Liberal Protestant Achille Daunant.

A week later, the restricted departmental college confirmed the swing by electing De Ricard and the moderate mayor of Nîmes, Chastellier, in preference to René de Bernis and Jules de Calvière. The results were obtained under the administration of an Ultra royalist prefect, and without intimidation.

The unexpected results were caused by a split in the hitherto compact royalist ranks. As in many other parts of France, an anti ministerial faction, led in Nîmes by de Ricard and largely inspired by Chateaubriand's concept of Royalism, had voted with the opposition instead of for the ministers.

93 A.N. F1c III Gard 5. Elections des 17 et 24 Novembre, 1827.
94 ibid.
95 Plannelli de Lavallette stood as an Ultra against Grégoire in 1819; he was a Chevalier de la Foi and deputy for the Isère. (Bertier de Sauvigny, Le Comte Ferdinand., p. 278.). Fornier de Clausonne said of him in 1827: our prefect is like all prefects of this honourable epoch, that is to say, an evil man. (A.D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 126. n.d. (fragment)
96 Bertier De Sauvigny, La Restauration, pp. 390-2.
The 'defection' as it was called, dated back to 1824, when Chateaubriand abandoned Villelé. It was compounded by differing views on the alliance between Throne and Altar, and it was a division from which the Ultra royalist movement would not recover, having lost the cohesion it displayed in opposition up to 1821. When in 1830, Charles X dissolved the Chamber rather than part with his unpopular ministers and decided to gamble his future on fresh elections, the Royalists, without unified leadership and unable to recognise the gravity of the political impasse, split their vote again. In the Gard, the 'defection' and the Liberals planned the election - for which they had only one month's notice - together. But the Liberals were the most committed, exploiting the division and loss of morale in the royalist ranks to the full as their unwitting allies guaranteed them the votes they needed. Consequently, the deputation of 1827 was re-elected.

When the Chamber met, the various opposition factions could muster 274 deputies against 143 who supported the government. Unwilling to submit, Charles X and his ministers embarked on a course that was blocked only by revolution and the fall of the monarchy. Too late to act, the royalists


99 A.N. F1cIII Gard S. Elections des 12 et 19 juillet 1830. In Paris and 19 other departments including the Gard, the elections were delayed for two weeks because the results in those departments would certainly be hostile to the government and could have an artificially demoralising effect. De Sauvigny, La Restauration, pp.431-2.
observed the consequences of their divisions and looked on as the regime they had struggled for so long was swept away before their eyes.\footnote{Baragnon, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. 4, p. 391.}
Chapter 5.

The divergence of opinions that weakened the Ultra royalist organisation in the Gard after 1827 and encouraged the emergence of a centre party which drew support from both Catholic and Protestant moderates was dramatically affected by the July revolution. The Gard was singular in that the collapse of the Bourbons reanimated antagonisms dating from the Revolution instead of confirming the principles of 1789. The very delicate modus vivendi that permitted a small number of public offices to go to the Protestants and which depended on unchallenged Catholic royalist supremacy did not survive the immediate response of militant Catholic royalist leaders who saw in the downfall of the Bourbons the reversal of their own political fortunes and the inevitable triumph of the liberal Protestant bourgeoisie. Mounting political antagonism, leading predictably to a sectarian conflict would forge a new unity in the Catholic camp.

News of the ordinances of 25 July and of the political


agitation in the capital reached Nîmes on the twenty-ninth\(^2\). The prefect, Herman, requested an additional regiment for Nîmes, and the political class of the city resigned itself to waiting for further reports from Paris\(^3\). In the atmosphere of tolerance that prevailed in bourgeois circles Liberal and Royalist members met separately, then consulted each other in order to maintain public order. Delegates were sent through the city to keep the inhabitants calm and informed of events in the capital and in Nîmes\(^4\).

There were, however, indications that the efforts of the élites to maintain order were bound to fail. Already the Catholic suburbs to the East of the city were excited, and Bourbon flags and cries of "Vive Charles X" were evident\(^5\). Moreover, when a deputation of fifty notables went to the city hall to offer their support to the local administration,
Fornier de Clausonne, one of the Protestants in the deputation, commented that de Surville was opposed to proposals for a non-sectarian alliance to maintain order in the city, and accepted them with great reluctance.

On 5 August, some of the notables were in the préfecture at five a.m. to witness the opening of the latest dispatches from Paris, and to discuss their implications. The prefect was instructed to fly the tricolour over the town, but the local military commanders would not recognise the validity of unsigned dispatches and so opposed the instruction. A number of Liberals present tried to obtain the support of de Surville, believing that his agreement would sway the soldiers. But de Surville refused to be involved in the attempts to raise the tricolour. Fornier de Clausonne accused him quite correctly of seeking a pretext to turn the Gard into a centre of resistance to the Revolution by provoking a civil war there. Indeed, there were signs of another outbreak of violence between the Catholic royalist population and the Liberals. Besides the shouts of Vive Charles X and the flag waving that had taken place, relations between the two parties bordered on violence on the fourth:

7 The Nîmes Garrison, manned by a Swiss regiment, was pro Bourbon.
"This day has been very difficult. The two parties were face to face all day, and on twenty occasions we thought they would be at each other's throat. This did not happen, largely because of the efforts of the notables of the two communities. There were still some fist fights."

The ominous tone of this report by the prefect contrasts sharply with the optimism of the Orleanist lawyer Viger, soon to be appointed Procureur général. His reports stress the excellent state of affairs in the department during the first fortnight of August, and are probably examples of his wishful thinking than they are realistic observations.

The uneasy truce was maintained until 15 August, the day on which the new regime was officially and publicly proclaimed in Nîmes. That day, the feast of the Assumption, could hardly have been less fortunate a choice for the solemn proclamation of a regime that replaced the Bourbons.

The flag and the Charter were paraded round the three principal boulevards of Nîmes that form a triangle bounded on two sides by Catholic working class quarters. As the officials of the new regime processed, they were jeered by the Catholics who lined the boulevards off which their homes

9 A.D. Gard 6M130. Prefect to minister of interior, 4 August, 1830.

10 Thus, on 8 August, Viger wrote: "the parti vainqueur has been admirable. This will be a glorious page in our history and will prove on which side truth and justice are to be found". A.D. Gard 1E 107.
lay. Still, nothing happened until the evening, when groups of Catholics, or Carlists as they were already called, assembled at two cafés on the edge of the Catholic Bourgade, the café de Riche and the café de la Garnison. From these points, they unleashed a torrent of abuse and the occasional physical assault on people recognised as Liberals or Protestants. The partisan views of the Swiss regiment, lodged in the barracks next to the café de la Garnison, rendered its presence useless to the new authorities.

The outbursts of violence continued sporadically through the sixteenth, leaving three dead and nine badly wounded. Only three of the victims were Catholics, whose attackers were unknown. The rest were Protestants, whose injuries were attributed to 'Royalists'. Viger, clearly disheartened by the violent opposition to the July Monarchy, opposition he would have to admit in his reports, gained some satisfaction from his conclusions that the middle classes had not been involved.

11 A. N. BB181515. Viger to minister of justice, 17 August, 1830.
12 ibid.
13 A. N. BB181515, dossier 3998 A7. Viger report, n.d. The procureur reported that five Liberals were knifed: Gideon Avon, cordonnier; Etienne Honoré; Etienne Telle, ouvrier menuisier; Auguste Rouvière, boulanger; Pierre Crouzat. Honoré's assailant shouted: 'Voilà pour toi, chien d'un Libéral!' as he knifed him.
14 A. N. BB181515. Tableau moral des événements des 15-17 août 1830.
15 A. N. BB181515. Viger to minister of justice, 17 August, 1830.
Nonetheless, the coalition of notables was disintegrating, and Herman, dismissed by an ordinance of 6 August, had left the departmental administration in the hands of the former liberal deputy, Chabaud-Latour. But Latour was ill, and had no support from the Catholic staff at the prefecture who had left their duties when Herman was removed. Latour urged the new military commander, Bachelin, to collaborate with Viger in the prompt formation of a National Guard to restore order. When it was eventually constituted, the new guard heralded the character of the July monarchy in the department. Viger, chief architect of the Orleanist tendency, commenting later on the conditions in which the Guard was recruited, said:

"The Guard is composed entirely of Patriots who, with very few exceptions, are Protestants. It is contending with an embittered and vicious Catholic population that looks to the moment it will be able to free itself from a condition it believes to be oppressive, tyrannical and hostile to its privileges." 17.

An Orleanist prefect, Lacoste, arrived on 15 August, but the department was without a proper administration as late as the twenty-sixth, principally because of the obstructionist tactics of the royalists, who had withdrawn in

16 A.N. F9512. Lieutenant-general Bachelin to minister of war, 10 August, 1830.
in circumstances that precluded the usual introduction of
the new incumbent\textsuperscript{19}.

In Nîmes, hostilities subsided after the seventeenth,
but the atmosphere in the town remained tense and inflamm-
able. Violence, never far below the surface, erupted again
at the end of the month. This time, it was occasioned by
the departure of the pro-Bourbon Swiss regiment. On the
morning of the twenty-ninth, the regiment marched out of the
barracks and off towards the road to Beaucaire. It was
accompanied to the outskirts of the city by a crowd of
Catholics who sang seditious songs and gave the traditional
shouts of 'Vive Charles X'. Then, the crowd made its way
back to the north eastern suburbs of the city, where they
congregated between the church of St. Charles, on the cours,
and the Caserne, near the Beaucaire and Avignon roads, on
the edge of the Catholic Bourgade. Among cries and shouts,
including one of "Charles X ou la Mort!", a shot was fired.
It hit nobody, but the word spread around Nîmes that an
attempt had been made by Carlists on the life of the military
commander\textsuperscript{20}.

Insensed by the rumour, and by the persistent agitation
of the Catholic population, some of whose troublemakers had
just been freed from detention because of the lack of evidence

\textsuperscript{19} Thus, d'Anglas (Beaucaire), Narbonne Lara (Anduze), and
de Rivière (St. Gilles) had left their towns without
administration and the "important and difficult town of
Uzès was still without administrators". ibid.

\textsuperscript{20} A.N. BB\textsuperscript{18} 1315, Dossier 3998 A7. A detailed report by
Viger dated 8 October, 1830.
of their part in the disorders of 15 August, supporters of the new regime marched to the prefecture and demanded to be armed so that they could defend the regime. The prefect refused, so the Orleanists broke into a gunsmith's shop, taking arms, powder and shot. In the absence of an effective and equipped National Guard, they organised vigilante patrols and established checkpoints around the town, including one at the Porte d'Alès, overlooking one end of the Bourgade. The next morning, the thirtieth, a crowd of Catholics marched up to the post and commenced abusing the Orleanists manning it. By three in the afternoon, shots were being exchanged, and the two regimes in the form of the Protestant and Catholic communities were dug in and firing continuously. By the time the army intervened between the two sides, five Orleanists and two Carlists were dead, seven Orleanists and two Carlists were wounded. In his report of the battle, Viger said the Carlists had fired first.

Meanwhile, the effects of the battle had reached alarming proportions. The demands made by the Liberals for weapons the previous day had incited a number of Carlists to visit the Catholic villages of Redessan, Manduel, Bouillargues, Marguerittes and Garons, to the east and south of Nîmes. In these villages, the Nîmois told stories of an onslaught on the Catholics by the Protestants who were now in control of

21 ibid.
22 ibid.
the town, and of the systematic pillaging of Catholic homes and monuments - notably the mission crosses, erected in the 1820's to commemorate missions held in the city\textsuperscript{23}. An army of Catholic peasants was raised on the thirtieth and that night, some two thousand Catholics, armed with hunting guns, old sabres and pitchforks, assembled outside the city, on the Beaucaire side. On seeing the army of peasants outside the city, the Protestants sent for the help of their co-religionists in the Vaunage, to the North of Nîmes. Consequently, on the thirty first of August, Nîmes offered the spectacle of a besieged city, with hundreds of Protestants camped out on the Esplanade and erecting barricades around the city. A full scale battle, reminiscent of the Bagarre of 1790 seemed inevitable until the curé of St. Charles, Bonhomme, went out and persuaded the assembled Catholics that the Catholics of Nîmes were in no danger, and that the Protestants who had flooded into Nîmes - and whom Viger, in his report, called National Guards - were not an occupying force, but were as afraid of the Catholics as the latter were of the Protestants. The two sides remained face to face until 1 September when a cavalry squadron was sent from the city to disperse the villagers. Eighty arrests were made, and martial law was imposed on Nîmes. Characteristically, Viger observed that the 'Carlist army' fled at the sight of the troops. In contrast, he praised the patriotism and discipline of the

\textsuperscript{23} ibid.
Vaunage militia contingents.  

Such violence had taken place nowhere else in France, and it was so serious that an official inquiry was instigated. The inquiry recorded thirteen deaths by violence in the second fortnight of August. A Pastor, Tachard, was instructed to draw up a list of victims and their dependents in accordance with the conditions of the Commission des récompenses nationales, a body created to compensate 'les Héros de juillet!' Tachard's report brought the final official figures to forty-four dead and maimed, all from the lower social classes. The government granted annual pensions of 500F to the widows of five Orleanist supporters, pensions of 250F to five orphans, payment of 500F to two maimed victims of the Catholic royalists and payments of 300 to 1500 Francs and short term pensions of one to ten years to nine other victims. The inquiry also requested a royal amnesty for all involved. This, said Viger, would avoid the long, costly and dangerous procedure of apportioning guilt in the courts. The amnesty was granted by royal ordinance on 9 October.

24 ibid.
25 ibid., "Désordres politiques à Nîmes, août 1830".
26 A.N. Fl1d III. Bilan des désordres politiques à Nîmes, août 1830.

Tachard lists 4 travailleurs de terre, 2 taffetassiers, 2 menuisiers, 2 portefaix, 2 faiseurs de bas, 2 Tailleurs de pierre among the victims.

27 ibid.
The threat of civil war and of a full scale confrontation like that of 1790 between Catholics and Protestants, counter revolutionaries and patriots, had been avoided. Unlike that of 1790, the patriot victory of 1830 was not clear cut. The counter revolutionaries were not demoralised and would continue to harbour an unshaking belief in the efficacy of military action against the new regime for almost three more years. Reports from communes throughout the department reflected the fragility of peace that autumn in their frequent references to unpredictable outbursts of violence and provocation directed against officials of the Orleanist regime.29 In Nîmes itself, Viger observed that peace was maintained only because of the presence of a strong contingent of regular troops and the strict imposition of a curfew.30

In the same report, Viger remarked:

"We would be closing our eyes to the truth if we doubted the odious plans of our enemies to create a Vendee in the south, with Nîmes as its headquarters. To the east of our city there are many villages in which agitators have sought to incite people in the name of religion, recruiting under the banner of the cross." 31

Shortly afterwards, Viger reported that attitudes to the July Monarchy were almost wholly determined by the traditional

29 A.D. Gard 6M 103 contains many reports dealing with incitement and violence. E.g., Sub prefect of Alès to prefect, 6 September 1830: In St. Ambroix, it is exactly the same individuals who have been provoking trouble for the past month - all of them Carlists.

30 A.N. BB181315. Viger to minister of justice, 8 September, 1830.

31 ibid.
religious rivalry in Nîmes. This appraisal was confirmed afterwards by the prefect who noted that the Catholic clergy was, generally, unwilling to co-operate with the authorities and had refused to take the oath of allegiance required of members of the teaching profession and agents of the bureaux de charité.

In the small village of Parignargues, the Catholic mayor, having refused the oath of allegiance, was replaced by a Protestant. The outgoing mayor took the official bust of Charles X and locked it in the church. When his successor sought the keys of the church in order to remove the seditious object, an angry crowd barred his way and threatened that any Protestant or Liberal to set foot in the church would be carried out dead.

Some months later, the anti-clericalism of the July Monarchy would provoke a more threatening and significant reaction from the Catholic community.

Meanwhile, harassment of July Monarchy officials continued through the autumn. In November, Chaubaud-Latour remarked that not a day passed without officials in the three large towns of Nîmes, Alès and Uzès being subjected to insults and threats from the Carlist population. In the village of

32 A.N. BB181315. Viger to minister of justice, 8 October, 1830.
34 A.D. Gard 6M 103. Mayor of Parignargues to prefect 25 October, 1830.
35 A.N. BB18 1315. Chabaud Latour to Minister of Justice, 5 November, 1830.
Arpaillargues, charged with bitterness since 1815, the liberals "tired of the threats made against them, and in the absence of adequate protection, have taken up a collection to purchase arms and powder for themselves"\(^\text{36}\). Tension increased in the department during the preparations for the trial of Charles X's former ministers\(^\text{37}\). Angry liberals clamoured for similar charges to be brought against de Surville, de Vogüé, de Bernis and de Calvière for their part in the White Terror\(^\text{38}\).

Viger remained convinced that militant Carlist hostility was restricted to the Catholic working classes, and did not come from the "Carlist classes aisees" as no Catholic notables had been arrested since the July Revolution\(^\text{39}\). Equally, even though he had reported that the Carlists were planning a "Vendée méridionale", neither he nor the Prefect, Chaper, attached any importance to the increasingly detailed information that the Catholic royalists were organising militarily under the leadership of the notables whom Viger discounted in his appraisal of the Carlist threat\(^\text{39}\) to the

\(^{36}\) ibid.

\(^{37}\) One of the State prosecutors, Adolphe Crémieux, was a Niçois.

\(^{38}\) A.N. BB\(^\text{18}\) 1315. Gasquet to minister of justice, 3 December, 1830.

\(^{39}\) A.N. BB\(^\text{18}\) 1315. Viger to minister of justice, 27 December, 1830. Dossier 3998 lists 57 arrests on charges of sedition in the last quarter of 1830.
security of the new regime. Their error was revealed at Christmas, when the Gard Legitimists held a meeting in Nîmes to rally their supporters. More than a hundred Catholic royalists attended the meeting, including the son of the Marquis de Calvière-Vézénobres, and Quatretaillons who had emerged from a well protected obscurity, armed with two pistols, a carbine and full

40 A.D. Gard 6M 103. Mouzet fils to minister of war, 3 December, 1830: "The Marquis de Valfons has a cache of over three hundred rifles that were in the possession of the National Guard until its dissolution in 1818."

Commissaire de police, Beaucaire. Report of 6 November, 1830. Money was being distributed to the Carlist population of Beaucaire.

Anon, n.d. (postmarked in Nîmes) to minister of justice, affirming that the villages to the south and east of Nîmes, were the principal points on which a Carlist militia was being organised.

Viger, (A.N. BB 18 1315,) had reported to the minister of justice on 6 December that a number of Catholic drapers had sold out their stocks of green cloth recently. It was said that the cloth was to be used to make Verdet and Miquelet uniforms.

In January 1831, the minister of justice received a note from the minister of war underlining that the 'secret organisation, denied by the local administration and by the general officer commanding the military division around Nîmes' was deemed to exist by the troops of the local garrison, who believed, too, that it was being funded.

A.N. BB 18 1315. Minister of war to minister of justice, 7 January, 1831.
bandoliers at this hour of need. The meeting spent much time discussing plans for an armed insurrection which would overthrow the July Monarchy.

The publication by professor de Sauvigny of the correspondence of that indefatigable conspirator Ferdinad de Bertier with the duchesse de Berry and Charles X, then in exile in Scotland, during the autumn and winter of 1830-31, places the Nîmes meeting and the rumours of a Catholic militia in the broader context of a conspiracy to overthrow the July Monarchy. The correspondence also leaves no doubt about the importance of the royalist organisation in the Gard. While the Vendée was considered the more reliable and devoted part of France, the Gard was considered the best disposed of the southern departments, and the only one with a military potential comparable to the Vendée. An assessment made by Ferdinand de Bertier echoed the thinking behind the 1790 counter-revolution: "We can only intensify the war (in the

41 The meeting had been infiltrated by a spy working for the prefect of the neighbouring Bouches du Rhône, who passed on details to Chaper. A.D. Gard 6M 105. Thomas to Chaper, 27 December, 1830.

Concerning Quatretaillons, Viger had written to the minister of justice complaining that changes brought against Quatretaillons by procureur Guillet in 1819 had never been pressed by officials after 1820, and that Quatretaillons had been left free to terrorise his native Pougnadoresse knowing he 'enjoyed the protection of powerful interests in the department'. A.N. BB 18 1048. Reports of 8 October and 16 November, 1830.


43 ibid., pp.18-35. Report by baron de Bordigné, n.d.
Gard) by making it a war against the Protestants". The main value of the Gard would be as a diversion supported by Spanish troops who would, it was believed, cross the frontier and engage the major part of the French army so that the Vendée could rise and march unhindered on Paris. The French Ambassador to Spain after 1827 had been Jacques de Calvière's brother in law, the Comte de Saint Priest. He assured the Legitimists of the goodwill of Ferdinand. In the wake of the insurrection, a significant degree of political autonomy would be given to each province, and the electoral laws modified to exclude the liberal bourgeoisie by allowing for an alliance between the local notables and what the Legitimists called the 'classes inférieures'. In January 1831, Bertier was able to argue to the duchesse de Berry that the Gard was organised militarily, and a further report mentioned de Surville and Jacques de Calvière as the principal organisers. Ultimately, the Spanish monarch was unwilling to risk war in order to return the favour he had received from his French cousins in 1823, and the project was abandoned until the duchesse decided to land in France and rely solely on the Legitimists and their followers.

45 ibid., pp.40-41. Report by Baron de Bordigné, October, 1830.
46 ibid., pp.33-34. Report by Baron de Bordigné, October, 1830.
47 ibid., pp.14-15. Report by Bertier, January 1831. The Gard was part of the Carlists' 5th military division with the Hérault and Bouches du Rhône. According to Bertier, it could muster 5 000 men.
48 ibid., pp.18-35. Report by Baron de Bordigné, 1831.
However, at the height of the conspiracy, the French government did not dismiss the preparations in the Gard as lightly as the prefect did. In January 1831, Montalivet, minister of the interior, gave Chaper information he had received from the neighbouring department, the bouches du Rhone, where police agents frequenting Carlist travellers between Nîmes and Marseille had discovered that the Catholic quarters of Nîmes were being funded by Catholic notables and that de Surville had offered the last Bourbon prefect two thousand armed men when news of the July revolution reached Nîmes.49

Instructed to pay close attention to movements in his department, Chaper noted an unusually high number of travellers between the west and the Nîmes Marseille area50, and three men were arrested on charges of drawing up lists of men based on the rolls of the 1815 National Guard51. More conclusive evidence of the intrigues was found in February, when an anti-clerical mob broke into the Archbishop's palace and the seminary in Nîmes. Angered by the growing rumours of a Carlist plot and by the ostentation of the Paris Legitimists on the anniversary of the death of the future pretender's father, the duc de Berry, a crowd ransacked both buildings in search of weapons and incriminating documents. While no weapons were found, a letter was found in the seminary that linked

50 A.D. Gard 6M 104. Chaper to director of police, 4 February, 1831.
de Surville with the intrigue and indicated that the Legitimists were counting on foreign military aid to overthrow the July Monarchy\textsuperscript{52}.

Conspiracy gave way to rioting in March, when the government, acceding to pressures from its anti-clerical supporters, authorised prefects to remove from public places the huge crosses erected during the 1820s to commemorate missions preached in the towns. In the Gard, a number of crosses had been attacked at the same time as the seminary, and they were a Catholic cause célèbre when the Prefect instructed the municipality to remove them. The prefect made a serious error, too, in authorising the measure on a Friday afternoon. When they left work or congregated in cafés, the Catholic working classes quickly formed crowds, and thronged the boulevards shouting "Vive la Croix et Vive Charles X". On the Saturday, 12 March, "at six o'clock, the whole Carlist population was in the streets". During the morning, a deputation of Catholic notables went to ask the prefect not to touch the crosses on pain of leaving Nîmes swimming in blood, its buildings burnt to the ground. The prefect replied by offering to have the crosses placed inside the various Catholic churches. The compromise was greeted with an angry refusal from the crowds, who set about stoning the workmen involved and the National Guards protecting them. Shots were fired, but nobody was hit. The National Guard, terrified, withdrew, and regular troops were called out to

\textsuperscript{52} ibid.
take over the task of removing the crosses. The Catholic demonstration continued through the weekend and led to the burning of property owned by Orleanists.53

Similar scenes occurred in Alès, where the sub prefect noted that, while the Protestants, "who had scarcely any co-religionists of the working class" would undoubtedly welcome the measure, "the Catholic or Carlist party" would almost certainly seize an opportunity to demonstrate its hostility to the regime.54 During three days of rioting, police found arms and powder stored in many of the Catholic households they searched for rioters.55 The towns of Uzès and Le Vigan sought permission to leave the crosses alone: Le Vigan because the Protestant majority felt no need to provoke the local Carlist population unnecessarily, and Uzès, because the Protestant minority felt it would be exposing itself dreadfully if the measure were carried out.56 After the experience of Nîmes and Alès, the prefect agreed with the sub prefects and left the crosses. Finally, the removal of the crosses benefited only the Legitimists of the Gard, turning away from

53 A.N. F76780. Gendarmerie reports, 13-14 March, 1831. The property destroyed included a barn filled with hay for the post horses and the home of a National Guard commander.

54 A.D. Gard 6M 104. Sub prefect of Alès to prefect, 13 March, 1831.


56 A.D. Gard 6M 104. Sub prefect of Le Vigan to prefect, 12 March, 1831.

57 A.D. Gard 6M 104. Sub prefect of Uzès to prefect, 14 March, 1831.
the regime many moderate Catholics whose influence would have been useful to the local administration.\textsuperscript{58}

Some weeks after the March disturbances, Viger told the minister of justice that while two thirds of the department's population was Carlist, the party did not pose an immediate threat to the local administration because its leaders believed that a successful insurrection could only take place with foreign support. In the absence of such support, the Catholics - the procureur, like many Orleanist officials, used the terms Catholic and Carlist interchangeably - were resigned to the government, indulging in nothing but sullen and deceitful opposition.\textsuperscript{59} Indeed, their opposition expressed itself chiefly in anonymous threats to Orleanists and malicious damage to their property, so contriving to maintain a feeling of uncertainty and fear in the Protestant community until the insurrection they dreamed of could become a reality.\textsuperscript{60} There could be no doubt, however, that the Catholic royalists were preparing for a future rising.

Police vigilance gave the authorities a more comprehensive picture of the intrigues of the Gard Legitimists in the second half of 1831. René de Bernis and the two Calvière's

\textsuperscript{58} A.D. Gard 6M 104. Prefect to Casimir Perier, 26 December, 1831. "You cannot imagine how much damage was done to our cause, how many good citizens have cut themselves off from our administration because of it (the removal of the crosses)."

\textsuperscript{59} A.D. Gard 1E 1071. Viger to the minister of justice, 23 April, 1831.

\textsuperscript{60} A.D. Gard. Chartrier de Clausonne 127. Mme Fornier de Clausonne to Gustave, Easter Sunday, 1831.
emerged as the ringleaders, while other veterans of the White Terror - de Surville, Baragnon, Darnand-Vallabrix were their lieutenants 61. There was a constant movement between Spain and the French coast, allegedly to obtain more guns and to negotiate with the Spaniards for more direct aid for a rising 62. Shooting practices and drill were held at remote farms between Nîmes and Arles 63, while activity in the Catholic quarters of Nîmes increased significantly. Baragnon, apparently the paymaster, assisted by Coulanges and Rouvière, spent many hours in the Bourgades and Enclos Rey 64, distributing money that was all the more welcome for the increasing economic hardship in the town 65.

In November, the first Lyon insurrection of the 1830s took place and its ramifications were felt in Paris and in Rouen,

61 A.D. Gard 6M 106, Reports of Commissaire general de Police, 21, 29 September, 1831.
62 ibid., Reports of 23, 24 September, 1831. Catholic royalist links with Spain were long standing. René de Bernis and Jacques Alexis de Calvière had emigrated to Barcelona during the Hundred Days, and the latter's brother in law had served Charles X as Ambassador in Spain until the July revolution.
63 ibid., Report of 26 September 1831.
64 ibid., Report of 18 October, 1831.
65 In 1831, the number of looms working in Nîmes fell from 7,200 to 5,500, and the value of the cloth produced fell by 300 000 francs. H. Rivoire, op. cit., II, pp.28-29.

The commissaire general of Nîmes remarked that the low wages and the prospect of unemployment were providing many hirelings. A.D. Gard 6M 106, report of 13 November 1831. By December, the wage offered for a 12 hour day was 16 sols for men, 8 for women. ibid., Report of 9 December, 1831.
where hardship was increasing, too\textsuperscript{66}. In Nîmes, however, the working classes remained calm and orderly\textsuperscript{67}. The new prefect, Lacoste, who had already served in Nîmes for a month in August 1830, remarked that working class agitation in the city was invariably related to sectarian matters, that the paternalism that characterised relations between the Catholic notables and their "peuple" was powerful enough to preclude "movements similar to that of the Lyon artisans"\textsuperscript{68}. Remarkably, the Legitimists did not even attempt to exploit the Lyon insurrection for the sake of publicity:

"In the days following the events of Lyon, when it seemed to me impossible that the party could not remain detached from this great catastrophe, I naturally assumed that it was at the root of our own unrest. I was wrong. Sound sources have told me independently that the Carlists are taken aback and determined not to compromise themselves. The clergy is in no way involved either."


\textsuperscript{67} There was a rumour of a Camp de Jalous ouvrier, of workers in the north of the department meeting on the site of the château de la Banne and marching on Alès. A.D. Gard 6M 104. Sub prefect of Alès to prefect, 6 December 1831. The prefect later said it was nothing but a rumour (see below).

\textsuperscript{68} A.D. Gard 6M 104. Prefect to minister of interior, December 26, 1831. He had already seen that the Republicans were so few that they were unable to exercise any influence. A.D. Gard 6M 106. Commissaire de police to prefect, 24 November, 1831.

\textsuperscript{69} A.D. Gard 6M 104. Prefect to Casimir Perier, 26 December, 1831.
The unrest Lacoste referred to, amounted to the uprooting of three trees of Liberty and a café brawl which involved Orelanists and a number of reluctant conscripts. Their refusal to make use of the domestic troubles of the July Monarchy is possibly the clearest indication of the Legitimists' outright rejection of the regime. A police report at the time of the Lyon rising noted that they were assuring their followers that the allied powers would intervene on behalf of Henry V in the Spring, that all must be ready to speed his return.

The agitation that characterised the Carlists through the early Spring of 1832 culminated in the landing of the duchesse de Berry at the end of April. In spite of the absence of support from Spain and the disapproval of Charles X and a number of well placed sympathisers, including Chateaubriand, the mother of Henry V was determined - and supported in her determination by Ferdinand de Bertier - to attempt a restoration by force.

By 1832, however, the police could identify most of the leading conspirators and knew their functions in the organisation. At its head in the south was the count Narbonne-Pelet, who resided outside France in Nice. He was in correspondence with Charles de Surville, ex-colonel of the Nîmes National Guard, who divided his time between Nîmes and

70 A.D. Gard 6M 104. Prefect to Casimir Perier, 21 December, 1831.
71 A.D. Gard 6M 106. Reports of Commissaire général de police, 14 November; 9, 11, December, 1831.
Marseille. De Surville was the general secretary and treasurer of the organisation. He corresponded with a number of regional subalterns: Charles de Vogüé in Roussillon; the Marquis de Montcalm in Montpellier; René de Bernis in the Ardèche; Jules de Calvière in Saint Gilles; Jacques de Calvière in Alès; and the count Chazelles Lussac in the hillside village of Marguerittes, just outside Nîmes. These local commanders were assisted by other leading Catholic royalists: the Vicomte de Rochemore, a former cavalry officer; Henri de Bernis; Trinquelague père et fils; de Surville's two sons; the Marquis de Valfons; Baron, Boyer and Baragnon.73

The organisation was dominated by landowners and local nobles, all of whom had long histories of counter-revolutionary activity. But they were supported by a number of influential Catholics in various walks of life. The police identified twenty four landowners, twenty merchants and industrialists, twelve members of the liberal professions, eight public officials, six former officers or police officials and four cures among the organisation's militants.74

From the beginning of the year, the Catholic royalists concentrated their attention on the countryside between Nîmes and Arles, the most convenient route from Marseille to Nîmes and the south west. De Surville and de Bernis made journeys to Nice and Genoa,75 where the duchesse de Berry had gone in the summer of 1831; Vampère and a retired captain, Payan,

74 ibid.
75 A.D. Gard 6M 106. Commissaire général to prefect, 6 November, 1831.
were seen regularly in Bouillargues, a Catholic village to the east of Nîmes. But their activities were being followed very closely by the police, who deduced from the military preparations and from the journeys to Piedmont that the duchesse de Berry was involved. The prefect of the Bouches du Rhône, Thomas, had managed to infiltrate the Legitimist organisation in Marseille, and only two days before the landing, wrote to Lacoste in the Gard:

"Our more fanatical Carlists have never been so audacious before. They are preparing for an insurrection which they believe will be imitated in Nîmes. They are relying on the arrival by ship of the duchesse de Berry on the 28th. Marseille is to be the starting point of a revolt." 77.

An agent provocateur informed Lacoste that Rochemore and de Surville had designated Payan to occupy the prefecture and city hall of Nîmes with a battalion of volunteers from the villages of Bouillargues and Garons. De Nuty was instructed to seize the National Guard armoury. The volunteers were being paid 16 sols per day, and the promise of plunder had been made to encourage them. 78.

When the landing took place, the Marseille police were waiting and the conspirators walked into a trap. 79.

77 A.D. Gard 6M 106. Prefect of the Bouches du Rhône to Lacoste, 26 April, 1832.
78 A.D. Gard 6M 106. Police report to Lacoste, 29 April, 1832.
duchesse de Berry was spirited away from Marseille to a country property near Arles belonging to de Surville's son in law. In Nîmes, the leaders of the intrigue - including general Bourmont - met with Charles de Surville in the Hôtel du Midi to discuss the next moves, and a number of strangers were seen to offer unusually high prices for gold, resulting in the sale of almost all the gold in Nîmes. But the duchesse de Berry did not pass through the city. Using the passport of de Surville's daughter, Madame d'Emery, she travelled to a country house near Sommières, belonging to the bishop of Montpellier. Then, on 5 May, she went on to Montpellier and the west.

Meanwhile, on 30 April, Rochemore, Nuty, Payan, Vampère and Roux were arrested for conspiracy. While Nuty was released the next day, the others were detained, and Vampère and Rochemore were not released until 24 May, when the authorities had given up trying to find evidence of their part in the intrigue. Their prolonged detention had been the occasion of disturbances in the Catholic quarters, as the Catholic population protested against the incarceration of its notables. In June, a summons was issued on de Surville

80 ibid.
81 A.D. Gard. 6M 107. Thomas, prefect of the Bouches du Rhône, to Lacoste, 8 June, 1832.
82 A.D. Gard IE 1071. Viger to Minister of Justice, 30 June, 1832.
83 ibid., and A. Pièyre, Histoire de la Ville de Nîmes, I, p. 37.
84 Pièyre, loc. cit.
that he had held banker's orders signed by the count Blacas to fund the rising, but de Surville had fled France to stay in Piedmont. The total failure of the insurrection to gain support was to have a dramatic effect on the Legitimist movement in France. Not only did it mark the end of reasonable hopes of a restoration brought about by force, but it also strengthened the position of the government. The arrest of the duchesse de Berry and the subsequent birth of a second "enfant du miracle" turned a romantic conspiracy into a fiasco. Moreover, the importance of the episode had been eclipsed in June by the more violent rising that the Republicans commenced at the time of the funeral of general Lamarque. By showing it could cope with attacks from Left and Right, the government consolidated its position and established itself more firmly.

In the south, where the duchesse's plot had been nipped in the bud, the local leadership had been identified easily, and the popular support expected for such a rising was simply not forthcoming. Two years of determined conspiracy had led only to failure and disillusion, while their dogged refusal to involve themselves in politics left the Legitimists without political influence.

René Rémond points out that a change in attitude, particularly among the younger devotees, became evident in


86 A.D. Gard. IE 1071. Vigor to minister of justice, 30 June, 1832. "since the July revolution...500 individuals belonging to this party (Carlists) have been on trial".
Legitimist circles after 1832\textsuperscript{87}. More pragmatic than their fathers and reluctant to consign themselves to a premature retirement, many younger Legitimists concluded that henceforth the Orleanist system should be contested from within. Thus, while the older generation persisted in increasingly fruitless drawing room conspiracies or shunned politics completely, Legitimism gradually emerged as a political force after 1833.

This divergence of attitudes was apparent in the Gard. There, however, peculiarly southern considerations obtained: the proximity of two borders across which strong links had existed since the Revolution of 1789, the importance, in a largely traditional economy, of a factious and independent minded local gentry. These factors, combined with confessional antagonism and a deep rooted tradition of clandestine opposition to unacceptable regimes had helped maintain the appeal of the conspiratorial brand of royalism in spite of the reversal of 1832. Unrelenting in their hostility to a regime they held to be illegal, de Calvière, de Rochemore, Chazelles Lussac and de Surville continued to favour unconstitutional methods of opposing the July Monarchy. As in 1817, the Chateau de Vézénobres, home of the Marquis de Calvière, became a centre of Catholic royalist activity\textsuperscript{88}.

\textsuperscript{87} R. Rémont, \textit{La Droite en France}, I, pp. 68-70

\textsuperscript{88} Château de Vézénobres. Mss. notebooks of Pulchérie-Cécile de Saint Priest, Marquise de Calvière.

Also A.D. Gard 6M 115. Prefect to minister of interior, 13 February, 1833; and 6M 116, prefect to minister of interior, 22 April, 1833.
The Marquis' son, Charles, had been involved with Emmanuel de Saint Priest, brother of Madame de Calvière, in the ill-fated conspiracy of the duchesse de Berry, and in May 1833, after the Montbrison trial and amnesty, it was to the Château of Vézénobres that the southern ringleaders retired.

Their regrouping coincided with renewed intrigues in the Gard. Rumours circulated that the Catholic royalists were preparing for an insurrection planned by the Bourbon pretender in Spain, Don Carlos. When the War of succession broke out, it involved the Basque provinces on the French border, and offered the French Carlists an exceptional opportunity. Their involvement in Spanish affairs for the next four years was one of the two principal focal points for their relentless resistance to the July Monarchy, and it gave them hope of carrying out the plans for an insurrection drawn up in the winter of 1830 by Ferdinand de Bertier, Blacas and General Bourmont, who had just assumed a command in the army of Don Carlos. In effect, it was proposed that a victorious Don Carlos would carry the war across the Pyrenees, and the Midi and west would rise against Paris with the support of a

89 Château de Vézénobres. Mss. notebooks of Pulchérie-Cécile de Saint Priest, Marquise de Calvière. They had been members of the secret society since 1815. A.N. F7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 20 April, 1818. In the autumn of 1833, Saint Priest accompanied the duchesse de Berry to Italy, and acted as her secretary. (Chateaubriand, op. cit., II, pp. 815-18; 828.


91 A.D. Gard 6M 109. Minister of interior to southern departments, 28 April, 1833; and 6M 109, prefect of Bouches du Rhône to prefect of Gard, 8 May, 1833.
Spanish army. Communications were established with Spain and the west via Bayonne, and fund raising activities recommenced. The principal organizer in the Gard, indeed in the Midi, was the Vicomte de Rochemore. He made frequent journeys to Spain and organized the visits of Spanish envoys who came to France on recruiting missions. De Rochemore was not the only Catholic notable actively involved. The Marquis de Calviere-Vézénobres allowed his chateau to be used for meetings and to shelter Spanish emissaries, and he was


93 A.D. Gard 6M 110. Prefect to minister of interior, 10 December, 1833.

94 A.D. Gard 6M 115. Prefect to minister of interior, 13 February, 1835. "M. de Rochemore is indeed the very soul of the Carlist faction here. He directs all the intrigues and plans. There is not one agent who does not report to him regularly."

95 A.D. Gard 6M 110. Prefect of the Bouches du Rhône to prefect of Gard, 19 October, 1833; 6M 116. Minister of interior to prefect of Gard, 11 June, 1836. "As M. de Rochemore is a serving officer in the army of Don Carlos, it is regrettable that the authorities in Bayonne saw fit to give him a visa for Nîmes."

96 A.D. Gard 6M 115. Minister of interior to prefect, 27 January, 1835; prefect to minister of interior, 11 December, 1835. 6M 116. Minister of interior to prefect, 2 July, 1836.

involved in briefing Spanish agents sent to recruit in the Gard and Bouches du Rhône\(^98\). The duties of general secretary to the Catholic royalist organisation were discharged by the Comte de Chazelles Lussac, another Catholic country squire whose property was near the notoriously Catholic royalist stronghold of Marguerittes\(^99\). Chazelles Lussac received most of the letters from Carlists in all parts of the Midi, in Spain and in Italy, and was described by the authorities as one of the most energetic agents involved in the Spanish war\(^100\). Contacts with the Spanish Carlists were so numerous and frequent by sea as well as by land that the authorities gave serious consideration to the creation at Aigues Mortes - the principal entry and exit point used by the Carlists for both Spain and Italy - of a special police post charged with the surveillance of the Camargue and the Crau\(^101\). As events in Spain began to prove disappointing to the French Carlists, the authorities remarked on the return of volunteers to the department\(^102\).

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98 A.D. Gard. 6M 115. Prefect to minister of interior, 11 December, 1835. One such meeting took place in the rooms rented in Nîmes by the members of the 1815 National Guard.

99 A.D. Gard. 6M 114. Prefect to minister of interior, December, 1834.
6M 114 Minister of interior to prefect, 18 October, 1834.

100 A.D. Gard. 6M 114. Prefect to minister of interior, 8 November and 19 December, 1834.

101 A.D. Gard. 6M 118. Prefect of Gard to prefect of the Bouches du Rhône, 16 March, 1837. Prefect of the Bouches du Rhône to prefect of Gard 20 March, 1837. Ultimately, the idea was considered impossible to implement effectively given the size of the Camargue.

The other major consideration of the Catholic royalists was consolidation on the home front. Whatever foreign invasion might give an initial impetus to an insurrection, an equipped and prepared organisation would be required to assure military and civil control of the department. Thus, the royalists set about restoring their organisation and communications through the Midi, with Paris and the west.\(^{103}\)

The authorities, aware of the Carlists' movements and meetings, generally believed that there was little chance of another armed rising and no hope of a successful one,\(^{104}\) in spite of the avowed ambitions of men like de Rochemore.\(^{105}\) The leadership was well known and closely observed. Thus, when the Gard Carlists gave serious consideration to an armed insurrection to be led by Bourmont in 1837, the authorities were aware of the plot and of its insignificance.\(^ {106}\)

The only occasion that appeared vaguely propitious was the

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103 A.D. Gard 6M 110. Minister of interior to prefect, 11 July, 1833. 6M 118. Sub prefect (Alès) to prefect, 1 April, 1837.


105 In 1837, the sub prefect of Alès observed to the prefect; "However, the leaders of the faction continue to dream of a third restoration à la Charles II, in which M. de Rochemore has promised himself the role of General Monk." (A.D. Gard 6M 118. letter of 1 April, 1837).

106 A.D. Gard 6M 118. Prefect to minister of interior, 17 March, 1837 and an anonymous Police report, 4 March, 1837. According to the prefect, the Marquis d'Assas, charged with assessing the usefulness of an insurrection, said that a rising would not succeed unless Louis-Philippe had angered the people, and unless the duc de Bordeaux came to France to lead it himself.
prolonged ministerial crisis of 1839, but it was exploited by the Left rather than the Right, albeit unsuccessf

premptedly, when Blanqui's Society of the Seasons attempted an insurrection in Paris. Nonetheless, the crisis raised the hopes of the Catholic royalists. One of the largest gatherings of Catholic royalist notables took place in Nîmes in May, but shortly afterwards the authorities in the Vaucluse uncovered an important Carlist conspiracy in Avignon, and preempted any further Carlist action.

Nevertheless, as early as the summer of 1833, the Catholic royalists in the Gard were preparing for such an opportunity. The establishment of a royalist government in the department posed no problems. The Catholic notables would assume control as they had in 1815. But a loyal, determined militia and the good will of the Catholic peuple, always a useful reserve force to appeal to if necessary,

107 A.D. Gard 6M 121. Prefect to minister of interior, April, 1839.

108 A.D. Gard 6M 121. Prefect to minister of interior, 25 May, 1839. The meeting was held in the Hotel du Midi in the first week in May. It was attended by some thirty Carlist notables including Chazelles Lussac, de Surville, de Montcalm, de Bernis père et fils and other notables from the Ardèche, Hérault, Vaucluse and Basses Alpes.

109 A.D. Gard. 6M 121. Prefect of Vaucluse to prefect of Gard, 21 May, 1839. Also A.N. BB18 1377, Dossier 7873A8. In the course of house searches in Nîmes, weapons and cartridges were found in Catholic areas. A.D. Gard 6M 121. Commissaire de Police report, 31 July, 1839.

110 A.D. Gard. 6M 110. Prefect to minister of interior, 10 December, 1833.
were essential, and it was to ensuring these that the leaders devoted much time and energy.

The conspiracy involving the duchesse de Berry had met with failure at Marseille itself. Consequently the royalist militia in the Gard had not been obliged to commit itself and risk defeat and loss of weapons. The task of reorganisation was carried out from the remote country property near the Rhône owned by de Surville's son in law, d'Emery. According to the prefect, the militia existed only on paper in 1833\(^{111}\). Four years later, the authorities were convinced that the militia was numerically strong and well organised across the eastern side of the department. Its weapons were said to be concealed in a number of Catholic villages\(^{112}\). The existence of a Carlist militia was mentioned in reports in 1839 and 1841, although the authorities were unable to obtain first hand evidence of it\(^{113}\).

The good will of the "petit peuple légitimiste"\(^{114}\) was maintained by the traditional forms of paternalism. Militiamen were paid for their service\(^{115}\), and the lower strata of


\(^{112}\) A.D. Gard 6M 122. Prefect to minister of interior, 29 April, 1837.


\(^{114}\) The prefect's expression in a report to the minister of interior, 14 January, 1835 A.D. Gard 6M 115.

\(^{115}\) A.D. Gard 6M 118. Prefect to minister of interior, 10 December, 1833. 6M 125. Minister of interior to prefect, 2 March, 1841.
Catholic society who were excluded from political participation were wooed assiduously: the distribution of busts of Henri V by Chazelles Lussac on his return from Prague took place with a quasi religious solemnity. The notables offered banquets and garden parties to workers' delegations and selected groups of the Catholic working class population. Celebration of the feast of Saint Henry, which fell conveniently on 13 July, was encouraged, and the notables provided funds for food, wine and fireworks.

Probably the most important element in the notables' recruitment of popular support for their aims was economic hardship. Unemployment and poverty were constant threats to the working classes of the Gard in the 1830s and 1840s in both the traditional textile industries and the newer industries assembled around the Alès coalfield.

A fall in demand on the foreign and home markets, due


117 A.D. Gard 6M 114. Prefect to minister of interior, 9 December, 1834. A group of workmen arrived at the end of the olive harvest at Chazelle Lussac's country house bearing olive branches adorned with green and white branches. After a collation, they danced a farandole into the nearby village of Marguerittes.

6M 129. Gendarmerie report to prefect, 3 July, 1835. A garden party was given by Forbin des Essarts at his house near Aramon for thirty Carlists of no particular standing. Seditious songs were plainly heard.

118 A.D. Gard 6M 115. Prefect to minister of interior 17 July, 1835; 6M 125. Commissaire de police of Nimes to prefect, 19 July, 1841; 6M 126. Prefect to minister of interior, 20 December, 1841: "The inhabitants of the Enclos Rey are carefully cultivated by their leaders".
in part to competition from Krefeld and Elberfeld had reduced wages in textile manufacturing. The value of the department's textile production fell from 17,000,000 F in 1834 to 6,000,000 in 1837. In the autumn of 1834, after the second revolt of the Lyon silk workers, 81,000 F were distributed to charitable agencies to alleviate misery in Nîmes alone. Whereas 5,000 looms had been working in the department in 1833, only 2,000 were left at the end of 1835, and 321 visas for Lyon had been given to textile workers in the last quarter of that year alone. Villermé, who described the Nîmes textile workers as virtuous and sober as a general rule, commented that the 3F per day average wage compelled many families to do without necessary food and clothing.

The newer industries were not spared. Iron and coal concessions had resulted in three large concessions, of which the Talabot-Veaute-Abric-Mourier company was the most important. While its assets were worth some three million Francs in 1835, and its total production had increased significantly, its expansion into smelting and, ultimately, railways, was unprofitable. Bad management resulted in laying off 800


120 A.D. Gard 6M 114. Prefect to minister of interior, 7 November, 1834.
In a report to the director of the department of industry and commerce, the director of the Ponts et Chaussées noted in 1837 that the prefect of the Gard had requested 20,000 F to set up ateliers de Charité in the department.

121 A.D. Gard. 6M 115. Mayor of Nîmes to prefect, 28 November, 1845.

122 L.R. Villermé in Rivoire, op. cit., II, pp. 50-52.
workmen in the Autumn of 1835 and kept wages down for two years\textsuperscript{123}.

The constant threat of hardship made the Catholic working classes, particularly in Nîmes, appreciative of the handouts given by the notables. In return, the latter were assured of a pool of men at arms in the event of conflict\textsuperscript{124}. Besides the distribution of money, the notables undertook one most exceptional step to cultivate popular support.

In 1836, a number of Legitimists including Saint Priest, Chazelles Lussac, Forbin Janson and de Bouillé, endeavoured to set up a desalination plant in the Camargue\textsuperscript{125}. According to de Bouillé, designated to sell shares in Paris Legitimist circles, the venture would employ some two thousand men, all of whom would be selected for their devotion to the Legitimist cause\textsuperscript{126}. The project was commenced, but did not attain

\textsuperscript{123} Rivoire, op. cit., II, pp.179-181; A. Pièyre, Histoire de la Ville de Nîmes, I, pp.79-80; 91.

The company had failed to raise enough money to extend the Alès -Beaucaire Line to the mine, a measure that was indispensable to transport coal and iron to the Rhône. A government loan of 6 000 000 F at 4\% saved the company from serious difficulties.

\textsuperscript{124} A. D. Gard 6M 130. Report from sub prefect of Alès, n.d. 6M 122. Prefect to minister of interior, 29 April, 1837. 6M 115. Sub prefect of Alès to prefect, 29 November, 1835.

\textsuperscript{125} A. D. Gard 6M 116. Minister of interior to prefect, 9 May, 1836.

\textsuperscript{126} ibid.
the importance predicted\textsuperscript{127}. The minister of the interior noted, however, that the Legitimist party was "sowing today in the hope of reaping tomorrow"\textsuperscript{128}. Indeed, the interest taken by the Legitimist notables in the disenfranchised Catholic populace would bear fruits in 1848, when the latter obtained the vote\textsuperscript{129}.

The persistence of a strong conspiratorial tradition in the Gard did not impede the emergence, after 1832, of a moderate parliamentary tendency. Initially, this group was composed largely of younger men who believed that it was now essential to attack from within a regime that was already creating far reaching social discontent by its rapacity and neglect. Legitimists of this tendency rallied to the leading Legitimist newspaper, the Gazette de France, which, since 1827, had echoed increasingly the particular brand of royalism professed by its director, the abbé de Genoude\textsuperscript{130}.

A Toulousain, former school master and protégé of Villèle, Genoude endeavoured after 1830 to reconcile the

\textsuperscript{127} A.D. Gard 6M 122. Prefect to minister of interior, 13 July, 1836.

\textsuperscript{128} A.D. Gard 6M 116. Minister of interior to prefect, 9 May, 1836.

\textsuperscript{129} A.J. Tudesq points out that election results in the south failed to show the true strength of the Carlists because they did not take account of the influence of Carlism on the disenfranchised masses. Les Grands notables en France 1840-49 (2 vols., Paris, 1964), I, p.151.

apparently opposed principles of heredity and popular sovereignty. Genoude's doctrine, which he called the Monarchie nationale, incorporated "the double principle of the inviolability of the throne and approval of the budget by the taxpayers".\footnote{Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 10 February, 1833.}

The restoration of the legitimate king could be sanctioned by the people only, and the Legitimists, instead of withdrawing from politics, should be involved and concerned to lead opinion in France to accept a restoration as the most satisfactory solution to the country's ills.\footnote{Tudesq, op. cit., I, pp.205-206. Genoude's views were at odds with those of the exiled Court.}

The Gazette de France had subsidiary newspapers in each of the provinces. In the south, its adjuncts were the Gazette du Midi, published and financed by de Surville and a former prefect of the Gard, d'Arbaud Jouques,\footnote{A.N. F\textsuperscript{1C}I 33. Police report on Midi Carlists, 8 September, 1831.} and the Gazette du Bas Languedoc, published in Nîmes by two Catholic lawyers, Boyer, son of the syndic to the procureur of Nîmes at the outbreak of the Revolution of 1789 and subsequently guillotined,\footnote{A.N. F\textsuperscript{7} 9049. Gendarmerie inspector to director of the police, August, 1814; Boyer's son was Legitimist deputy for the Gard in 1870. R. Locke, French Legitimists and the Politics of Moral Order in the Early Third Republic (Princeton, 1974), pp.22, 59 and n.} and Baragnon, whose son would be minister...
in the early years of the third Republic. The Gazette du Bas Languedoc became the official organ of the Gard Legitimists and, during the 1830s and 1840s, maintained in its columns a relentless critique of Orleanism while arguing for the alternatives offered by Legitimism.

Quite predictably, the newspaper echoed Legitimist views on the "vices of excessive centralisation" and attacked divorce, secular education and the unbridled capitalism of the July Monarchy, an aristocracy that dominates affairs and directs them to its own sole advantage. But the Gazette was not simply the voice of reaction. In contrast to the laisser faire philosophy of Orleanism, it preached the Legitimist doctrine of ordered progress related to human needs, not to human greed. To the individualism that they saw undermining France, the Legitimists opposed the traditional, corporate society based on Gallicanism and emphasising charity and mutual obligations. In these fundamental

135 Locke, op. cit., pp. 90, 22, 254. Baragnon had defended a number of Catholic royalist terrorists of the 1815 period, including Boissin, Roll, Reboul and Aurillon. A.N. F 7 9051. Dargout to Decazes, 12 March and 14 May, 1818.

136 A.D. Gard 6M 119. Prefect to minister of interior, 31 August, 1838. "This is the newspaper in which they launch all their polemics".

137 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 10 February, 1833.

138 ibid., 23 June, 1833.

139 ibid., 2 June, 1833.

140 ibid., 10 February, 1833.
critiques, the Legitimists emphasised the links between Orleansim and Protestantism:

"One can state that all the disastrous systems whose fruits we are now harvesting have their origins in Protestant thought. The very effect of the Reformation is to isolate and to disunite. It has no uniting principle other than hatred of its opponents."  

The legitimists did, however, distinguish clearly between industrialism and the abuses that resulted from its misapplication. They welcomed industrial progress when they considered it to be of use to the community at large. Thus, in 1832, Legitimists of the Nîmes city council urged a considerable improvement in the supply of water to the city because it would help make the declining textile industry more competitive. Nîmes, they felt, might well have become "the Manchester of France". They suggested, too, the creation of departmental credit banks which would be sensitive to local needs, and they urged legal restrictions on speculative investment in order to ensure a stable economy in the department. In 1835, the Gazette put the case for the extensive use of machines, arguing that the long

141 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 21 June, 1837.
142 ibid., 4 June, 1837. "We do not attack industry, but its abuses."
143 ibid., 26 November, 1837.
144 ibid., 7 December, 1837.
145 ibid., 12 December, 1837.
term effects would bring more prosperity and employment, not less. In 1838, Goirand Labaume, departmental councillor for the canton of Uzès, wrote an article emphasising the benefits of farm mechanisation.

When, in 1833, the question of participation in forthcoming elections arose, Legitimist representation on elected bodies was almost nil. The revised Charter of 1830 had made provision for elected municipal and departmental councils, and had extended the franchise enough to give the liberal middle classes a numerical superiority. In the Gard, as in 1789, the measures favoured the Protestants. At the same time, the requirement of an oath of allegiance to Louis Philippe from both electors and candidates made participation impossible for most Legitimists. In January 1831, ten leading Catholics were removed from the department council because they would not take the oath. A month later, more than four hundred Catholic Mayors, adjoints and councillors were dismissed. Then, in the summer, all five parliamentary seats in the department passed into the hands of the

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146 ibid., 19 February, 1837.
147 ibid., 25 September, 1838.
149 A.N. F1b II Gard 5. Decree of 3 February, 1831.
Orleanists, partly because of Legitimist abstentions. When elections were held for the municipal councils in December 1831, Nîmes, with a two thirds Catholic population elected a municipal council with a two thirds Orleanist majority. Within the Orleanist majority, there was a Protestant majority. Once again, a change of regime brought about a transfer of power from the élite of one community to that of the other. Daunant, son of a Protestant mayor who had served Napoleon was appointed chairman of the departmental council and senior councillor at the préfecture. Girard was nominated mayor of Nîmes and held the post until 1838. Pastor Samuel Vincent was appointed president of the Nîmes consistorial, a position denied him in 1824 by an ultra royalist administration.

The absence of Catholic political influence in departmental affairs and the increasing importance of political

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150 A.N. Flc III Gard 5. Elections of 5 July, 1831. Uzès, where the duc de Crussol obtained 69% of the poll in July 1830 (Flc III Gard 5, election of 12, 19 July, 1830), returned Teste twelve months later with the same percentage of the poll. The revised electoral procedure increased the Gard’s constituencies by dividing Nîmes into two constituencies.

151 A. Pieryre, op. cit., I, p. 25. The Legitimists elected to the council were all Catholics, but three Catholic moderates were elected also.

152 D. Roque, "Positions et tendances des Protestants nîmois au 19e siècle" in Droite et Gauche de 1789 à nos jours (Université Paul Valéry, Montpellier, 1975), p. 207. Appropriately, M. Roque calls the period 1830-1848 "Le triomphe de la bourgeoisie protestante".

153 ibid.

decisions taken locally - the Guizot education law for example - made the question of involvement all the more pressing. When, in August 1833, the electoral register for the departmental conseil général elections was being drawn up, the Gazette du Bas Languedoc announced that the Royalists would not take part in the elections, but would present a petition protesting against the oath of allegiance, which prevented many citizens taking an interest in local affairs, and against the tax qualification that gave an unnatural advantage to the Protestant community.\textsuperscript{155} By the autumn, that position had been modified, and the Gazette urged royalists to participate as voters and as candidates "in order to assure an honest and faithful interest in the affairs of our towns".\textsuperscript{156} The editor remarked that the oath of allegiance should not be an obstacle. It had the Pope's approval and the French hierarchy took it. Was there any need to be more scrupulous than one's spiritual leaders?

The views of the Gazette did not obtain the unanimous approval of the department's Legitimists. The marquis Dreux Brézé, one of the leading Legitimists in Paris, came to the south, and received most of the local leaders to discuss the correct strategy.\textsuperscript{157} Nevertheless, eight Legitimists took

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\textsuperscript{155} Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 15 August, 1833. A.N.FlC III Gard 5. Prefect to minister of interior, 25 August, 1833.

\textsuperscript{156} Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 27 October, 1833.

\textsuperscript{157} A.D. Gard 6M 110. Police report, 30 October, 1833. "The Legitimists of Alès, Beaucaire, Saint Gilles and Bagnols came (to Nîmes) to see him. De Larcy, d'Anglas, de Calvière dined with him. De Rochemore, irrepressible as always, didn't miss one such dinner".
\end{flushleft}
their seats on the thirty strong departmental council, to the jubilation of the Gazette. In marked contrast to the landed gentry that dominated the military faction, the new councillors reflected urban professions to a significant degree: Béchard (Nîmes), Ferrand Demissol (Marguerittes), de Larcy (Alès), Goirand Labaume (Uzès) were lawyers. Jalaguier (Saint Gilles) was a négociant. The other three, d'Anglas (Beaucaire), Deveau Robiac (Robiac) and la Fare (Alès) were propriétaires. None of the men had played a prominent part in Catholic royalist politics, but four at least had a counter revolutionary past: de Larcy was the son of an émigré who had been appointed sub prefect of Le Vigan by the provisional government in July 1815; Demissol had been a royalist volunteer with the duc d'Angoulême in 1815; Goirand Labaume was removed from the council in 1830 as a man "devoted to the Congrégation" and the Marquis de la Fare was the son of the 1815 commander of the Uzès National Guard.

Twelve months later, half of the membership of the municipal councils was due for renewal. Once again, the Legitimists made inroads. Eight of the eighteen seats on

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159 ibid., 23 November, 1833. "The future of our educational institutions is assured".
160 A.N. F1b I 687. and A.D. Gard L452.
161 A.D. Gard 4U 5-200.
162 A.N. F1b II Gard 5. Prefect to minister of interior, 9 October, 1830.
163 See p.68, note 106 supra.
the Nîmes council were won by the party, so that its strength was twelve out of thirty-six. Once again, négociants and lawyers made up the majority of their contingent. The prefect, commenting on the sudden growth of Catholic royalism in local affairs, observed:

"The life of the (Legitimist) party over the last four years divides into two distinct phases. During the first, which ended with the expulsion of the duchesse de Berry, the party conspired openly. The second phase, including the present, appears to be more legal, but equally hostile to the government. The view of the party is: the government must fall, and we shall bring it down by occupying the majority of offices opened to us by the laws of 1831."

A survey made early in the spring of 1835 revealed that the Legitimists dominated the cantons of Aramon, Beaucaire, Marguerittes, Somènè, St. Ambroix, Uzès and St. Gilles as well as threatening Nîmes and Alès.

The conquest of local power was continued in 1837, when municipal renewals brought the Legitimists' strength up to 15, nearly half the Nîmes municipal council. Thereafter, there were never fewer than thirteen Legitimists on the council, nine of whom were also on the departmental


165 A.D. Gard 6M 122. Prefect to minister of interior, 5 December, 1834.

166 A.D. Gard 6M 122. Prefect to minister of interior, 25 March, 1835. A maximum of 8 cantons were in the hands of the Legitimists against 30 controlled by the Orleanists. The Legitimist controlled cantons were to the east of the department, where the population was predominantly Catholic.

council\textsuperscript{168}. Among them were the sons of: Vallongues, former ultra royalist mayor of Nîmes; de Surville; de Cabrière; Trinquelague; de Larcy and Goirand Labaume.

The political involvement of these men did not limit itself to local bodies. As early as 1834, a decision was made to contest the elections to the national assembly. The result of the 1834 election proved a failure, partly because of the persisting internal divisions in the Legitimist movement on the question of participation\textsuperscript{169}, and because the Legitimist candidates were not local men. The Gard had put up national figures: Hyde de Neuville and Fitzjames in Nîmes, Dreux Brézé at Uzès. Only in Alès, where the unremarkable Bérard de Montcalm stood against the son of baron Daunant, a former Protestant mayor, did the Legitimists come near to victory. In the \textit{Intra Muros} constituency of Nîmes, the transfer of votes from the "progressive candidate", Lafitte to the Constitutional Chastellier, led to the defeat of Fitzjames\textsuperscript{170}. Nevertheless, the result in the \textit{extra Muros} constituency was contested. In the re-election, the Legitimists put up a candidate who withdrew once the Orleanist, Viger, had failed to obtain a majority, thus leaving the constituency in the hands of the Republican, Teulon\textsuperscript{171}.

\textsuperscript{169} In Uzès alone, 108 Legitimists abstained. \textit{Gazette du Bas Languedoc}, 21 June, 1834.
\textsuperscript{170} A.N. F\textsuperscript{1c} III Gard 5. Election of 21 June, 1834.
\textsuperscript{171} A.N. F\textsuperscript{1c} III Gard 5. Election of 6 September, 1834. \textit{Gazette du Bas Languedoc}, 11 September, 1834.
The next legislative elections were held in November 1837, barely a month before the renewal of the municipal councils. The conflict in the Legitimist party seems to have been largely overcome by then, partly by the effects of local Legitimist councillors and also by the fading prospects of an armed revolt against the July Monarchy. Consequently, an electoral committee was formed, including de Surville, which paid a full time electoral agent to ensure that the prefect did not exclude qualified Legitimist voters from the electoral registers. The committee liaised with the Republican opposition, too. After a very fierce struggle, Béchard, the Legitimist candidate, was elected against the moderate Catholic former mayor, Chastellier. Teulon retained the second Nîmes seat. Shortly afterwards, agreement between the military men and the parliamentarians seemed to be firm. In the summer of 1838, a reception was held in honour of Béchard at the end of the parliamentary session. The reception was attended by the politicians and the soldiers of Catholic royalism, and toasts were proposed to electoral reform, to the royalists, to Béchard and to de Rochemore.

The parliamentary opposition was maintained until the fall of the July monarchy, although Béchard lost his seat in 1846 as a result of government bribery in favour of a Catholic

174 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 8 July, 1838.
constitutional candidate, baron Feuchères. 175 In 1842, his second attempt to win a seat, Félix de la Farelle, a Protestant, won Alès for the Legitimists and retained the seat until 1848.

The Gard Legitimists complained constantly that the electoral Cens reduced unnaturally the party's representation and influence. 176 While this was correct, as the Second Republic would show clearly, the Cens encouraged the Catholic bourgeoisie to assume a type of leadership in local Legitimist politics that distinguished Catholic royalism in the south from the Château based variety that so often obtained elsewhere in France. Throughout the July Monarchy, Legitimist opposition to Orleanism in the Gard remained the opposition of Catholic élites to the Protestant élites who profited then from the July Monarchy as they had previously profited from the Revolution and the Empire. 177

175 Pieyre, op. cit., I, pp.212-3. L. Boyer, a long standing Legitimist supporter, was induced to vote for Feuchères in exchange for a post as Inspecteur des Théâtres de Paris. Also, see the report of the Procureur général of Nîmes to the minister of justice, 9 August, 1846. (A.N. BB 17 A 146).

176 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 22 March, 1838, for example.

177 It would be incorrect to suggest that Catholic royalism merely represented landed wealth and its clientele in opposition to capitalist, industrial modes of production. Deveau Robiac and de Larcy had considerable shares in the mines and foundries of La Grand' Combe and Bessèges (A.D. Gard 6M 104. Anon. report, spring, 1848), and Félix de Surville exploited the Nîmes-Montpellier railway, paying an annual rent of 381 000F to the government (Pierye, op.cit.,I, p. 181). Benoist d'Azy, elected Legitimist deputy for the Gard in 1849, had, of course, extensive industrial interests.
Chapter 6.

News that the July Monarchy had been overthrown brought great rejoicing to the Gard Catholics. The Gazette du Bas Languedoc commented with an air of self righteousness: "Is there not in this sequence of events something that inspires: recollection, that compels one to ponder on God's justice?" The ferociously sectarian Catholics of the Enclos Rey joined with those of the Enclos Mathieu in planting a tree of liberty in the square before the barracks.

The February revolution, which had no violent repercussions in the Gard, threw open the political debate in the department once more. The declaration of a republican form of government and the promise of universal male suffrage which gave the Catholics a numerical superiority were both accepted by the Catholic notables without criticism. The Gazette du Bas Languedoc published a statement by Berryer, a leading Legitimist parliamentarian, pledging his support to the republic and to the principle of universal suffrage.

1 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 2 March 1848. News of the Paris events reached Nîmes on the morning of 25 February by telegraph. The communication from the provisional government stated that Emile Teulon, republican deputy for Nîmes, was appointed Commissioner of the republic in the department. A. Pièyre, op. cit., I, p.241.

2 Pièyre, op. cit., I, p.244.

3 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 29 February, 1848.
and the same newspaper declared:

"The revolution has all our sympathies. It was made by France and for France. It was just, pure and admirable. It has proclaimed its respect for God, for man and for liberty." 4

The Legitimist attitude to the events of February was expressed more clearly by the Marquis de Rivière:

"The whole of France, and soon all Europe must be obliged to rally round the flag that bears the device Liberty! Equality! Fraternity! Well, we desire this flag to be our own, and that the device be applied literally and integrally to everyone.

We are no longer in the age of systematic hatred, of dogmatic opposition. Monopoly power is undesirable for any one group. It is no longer a matter of Catholics and Protestants here; we are all Christian citizens (des citoyens-chrétiens).

Some people seem astonished that we, the party known as Legitimist, the constant opponents of all usurpations, give our support to the provisional government.

Quite simply, in our opinion, the provisional government is Legitimate and will remain so as long as it does not deviate from the presidential mission that circumstances have conferred on it.

Legitimacy does not signify monarchy any more than democracy. The republic is just as legitimate in our eyes as we are. We both believe that all the citizens ought to desire that which the nation desires; that this alone is legitimate, of Divine right.

We have felt, to the present, that the head of state, or of the republic, the title matters little, should be hereditary as at Sparta, not elected as in the United States." 5

4 ibid., 11 March, 1848.
5 ibid., 5 March, 1848.
Thus, the Legitimists were prepared to recognise the republic as the legitimate caretaker until the people gave their assent to a permanent successor to the Orleanist regime. The Legitimists were in a generous mood. The fall of the July monarchy had eliminated the Protestant élite as a credible political force, and the Catholic leaders commanded a numerical majority in the department. Like Legitimists throughout France, they were inclined to see the republic as a stepping stone to a restoration. Indeed, the principal danger appeared to come from the socialists. Not only were the activities of the Parisian left disturbing, at Alès, working class discontent about working conditions and food led to strike action and the threat to burn down the homes of Talabot, Benoît d'Azy and Deveau Robiac. Consequently, as the department prepared for the election of a constituent assembly, there were signs that a coalition of Orleanists and Legitimists was emerging to defend class interests against the threat of socialism.

6 A.D. Gard 6M 145. Police reports (sub commissioner of Alès) to Commissioner of the republic, 5, 7, 10 April, 1848.

7 A.D. Gard 6M 144. Vice president of the electoral committee of Genolhac to minister of interior, 17 April, 1848. "The party of the regency and the Legitimists have raised their audacious aristocratic heads here as in the rest of the department. They will be successful with the aid of certain officials, stupidly left in office, and priests, who shamelessly hawk the reactionary list from house to house."

Similar comments came from the sub commissioner for the arrondissement of Alès concerning St. Ambroix (2 April, 1848), and from a national guard officer of Sauve (22 April, 1848).
When the lists were drawn up, the Legitimists included four Protestants: Emile Toulon, Auguste Démians, Orleanist avocat général, Favand and Paul Bousquet, former Orleanist deputy for Le Vigan from 1831 to 1837. As in 1790, the Catholics were offering the Protestants a proportional representation, but in an electoral system that would almost certainly return a Catholic list. As in 1790, the Protestants would reject a minority share in a Catholic list.

The Catholic list, with the four Protestants, was elected, but the publication of the results on 7 April showed that the Catholic electorate had voted for the Protestant candidates as well as the Catholics, but the Protestant voters had refused their votes to the Catholic candidates, preferring

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8 A decree of 5 March made each department a constituency. A deputy was elected for every 40,000 citizens. The electorate could vote for lists recommended by the parties, or cut across the lists. A minimum of 2,000 votes was required to elect a deputy, irrespective of the size of the electorate. R. Rémond, La Vie politique en France, II, pp. 33-7.

In the Gard four lists were presented: the Legitimist list; a conservative Protestant list that included the Catholics De Larcy and Béchard; a moderate republican list (the Protestant list less De Larcy and Béchard); a republican socialist list. Some candidates - De Larcy, Béchard, Toulon and his brother, Bousquet and Gilly fils appeared on more than one list.

9 Pièyre, op. cit., I, p. 259.
to vote as far to the left as possible\textsuperscript{10}.

The results led to extensive sectarian rioting. At
two p.m., a Catholic crowd thronged the boulevards that
circumscribed the old city chanting:

"Vive Henri V! A bas les Libéraux!
Vive Henri V! A bas les Huguenots!"

The crowd halted outside the cafe Gibelin, meeting place of
the republican and bonapartist opposition. Thereafter,
there are two versions of what occurred, one Catholic, the
other Protestant, both recorded by the police. According

\textsuperscript{10} Indeed, the Protestant electorate had not even
supported the two Orleanist Protestants on the list,
Bousquet and Démians. The results were:

\begin{tabular}{l|c}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teulon (rep)</td>
<td>92,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favand (rep)</td>
<td>88,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Béchard (leg)</td>
<td>55,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Larcy (leg)</td>
<td>53,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Démians (Orl)</td>
<td>52,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roux Carbonnel (leg)</td>
<td>51,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reboul (leg)</td>
<td>51,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>la Bruguère (leg)</td>
<td>51,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bousquet (Orl)</td>
<td>50,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapot (leg)</td>
<td>50,026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\end{tabular}

\textit{Annuaire politique, 1850}

The difference between the votes obtained by Teulon and
Favand, who were on the republican list as well as the
legitimist list and those obtained by the other can-
didates, corresponds quite closely to the votes obtained
by the unsuccessful candidates of the republican list;
Gilly 46,344; Almire Cavalier 45,762; G. Teulon 41,353;
Lichère 39,969.

The point was made in 1852 in a memorandum from Charles
de Calvière on the subject of confessional representation
in the legislative elections of February 1852: "The
Catholics used their majority with moderation in the
1848 election. Their leaders put on their list the names
of four Protestants who were elected unanimously, while
the Catholic candidates were elected by only 52,000 votes".
(i.e. the Catholic electorate). A.N. FlcIIf Gard 5. Etat
actuel des partis Mss. memorandum drawn up for de Calvière
by a colleague, Casimir Murias.
to the Protestants inside the cafe, shots were fired into the cafe, and those inside returned the fire to defend themselves, unfortunately wounding one of the demonstrators. The Catholic version claims that shots were fired from the cafe with no other provocation than singing\textsuperscript{11}.

A full scale confrontation developed. Within an hour, the Catholics of the Bourgades, Enclos Rey and the Bouquerie were in arms. Snipers lurked at street corners, firing into nearby Protestant quarters. The Protestants retaliated, and when the firing stopped at eight in the evening, three Catholics had died. Martial law was imposed at eleven o'clock, but the two camps sealed off their areas and kept patrolling the town through the night to recommence their fighting the next day\textsuperscript{12}.

Any chance of political alliances on lines other than sectarian rivalry had been destroyed. Protestant exclusiveness was matched by Catholic determination to win control of the department. A lull, all too familiar to Niçois, followed the rioting and did little to reassure the authorities for the future\textsuperscript{13}. Signs of antagonism could

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{11} A.D. Gard 6M 144. Police report, 27 April, 1848.
\item \textbf{12} ibid., reports of 28, 29 April, 1848.
\item \textbf{13} A.D. Gard 6M 144. Police report, 7 May, 1848.
\end{itemize}

"I would not advise the authorities to have any faith in the apparent calm. One side hold meetings that exasperate members of other clubs. We shall soon have revenge, some say. We are ready for battle, reply the others".
be seen in many parts of the department as the Catholics began to assert their numerical superiority. In Saint Ambroix, they took over the national guard and clamoured for weapons; in Uzès, they refused to admit proportional Protestant representation on the municipal council that was to be formed. Political attitudes were already being shaped in relation to traditional tensions.

In the summer, two important issues, the composition of the national guard and local elections widened the split that had revealed itself in April.

A decree of 4 March 1848 opened membership of the national guard to all males of 21 years with six months residence in the commune. As a result, the composition of the national guard had undergone a radical modification, Catholics of all classes outnumbering the Protestant middle classes who composed the Orleanist national guard. Conflict and resentment had been widespread in communes where there was a large Protestant population, for the Catholics had endeavoured to exclude Protestants from the service, and had used the guard to intimidate the Protestant population.

But the guard had not been extensively armed. After the April riots in Nîmes, the guard's acting commanders asked for arms so that it might discharge its duties effectively. Realising that such a measure would amount to arming the 


16 A.D. Gard 6M 144. Commander of the St. Ambroix Gendarmerie to commissioner of the republic, 24 May, 1848.
Catholic population, the Protestants, including the deputies Teulon, Bousquet and Favand, opposed the apparently legitimate request\(^17\). The question was brought to a head by three more days of sectarian rioting in June. A brawl between a Catholic and a Protestant led to extensive fighting in which an attempt was made on the life of Farjeon, chairman of the temporary municipal council\(^18\).

The national guard, called out to end the rioting, was of little use against armed adversaries. On 14 June, regular troops were deployed, and took four hours to dislodge marksmen entrenched at the Porte d'Ales and the Moulins à vent, on the north side of the city. The prefect, Salives, decided to arm the national guard, which had been deployed at points where Protestant and Catholic communities met\(^19\).

Immediately, the Protestants reacted to a measure they perceived as a threat. Men of the cafe Gibelin formed up with weapons in front of the cafe and sought to intimidate the national guard\(^20\). At eight o'clock the following morning, a deputation marched to the prefecture to seek the dissolution of the guard. A Catholic counter demonstration assembled, and the crowd had to be dispersed by the army\(^21\). Salives refused to accede to the Protestants' demands.

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17 Pièyre, op. cit., I, pp.260 ff.
18 A.D. Gard 6M 144. Reports of police commissioner, Nîmes, 12, 13, June, 1848. The rioting began on 11 June.
20 Pièyre, loc. cit.
The attitude of the Protestants provoked an immediate outburst of indignation from the Gazette du Bas Languedoc:

"What, then, has become of the skill, so vaunted, of bygone Protestantism in Nîmes? What has become of its elite? of its ascendancy? of its influence?

What! Faced with a government that proclaims through the mouth of its local representative, the rights of all men, you stand as the partisans of narrow privilege, of exclusiveness, of intolerance. You dare to dictate insolently to the magistrate of the Republic, to the representative of the popular principle, your seditious and absurd claims.

For eighteen years, the Protestants kept 1800 guns in Nîmes, under the gaze of the enslaved and unarmed Catholic population. Fewer than 1500 guns have been distributed to the citizens of Nîmes so far, and the privileged class of 1830 raises its voice in despair".

Such were the tensions in Nîmes, that the prefect saw fit to suppress news of the June insurrection in Paris, which, he believed, would have given the Protestant people a pretext to revolt against the authorities. The question of the national guard was ended in August, when the Catholics succeeded in gaining the posts of colonel and lieutenant colonel in elections during which the Protestants tried in vain to win at least one of the key positions.

The elections to the municipal and departmental councils provided the context for another clash between the two

22 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 18 June, 1848.
23 Pièyre, op. cit., I, pp.280-81.
24 ibid., p.300. Protestant resentment was expressed in the Courrier du Gard of 1 September.
communities. In February, Teulon, commissioner of the provisional government until his election to the constituent in April, had nominated a temporary Municipal commission in Nîmes, and the other communes had formed ad hoc councils under the guidance, where possible, of the sub commissioner in each arrondissement. The Nîmes commission reflected all political shades, and no group had a clear majority. The chairman was a Protestant, Emile Causse

Elections to a permanent municipal council were fixed for August, after the divisions between Catholics and Protestants had become acute. For the purposes of the election, Nîmes was considered to be a single constituency. Consequently, the Protestants, who were numerous in the first, second and tenth urban sections of the city, had no guarantee that they would be represented. Shortly before the elections, the Gazette du Bas Languedoc expressed the hope that the elections could bring about a rapprochement if the Catholics chose to ensure proportional representation for the Protestant minority. The results of the first ballot on 10 August showed clearly that rapprochement was far from the minds of the Catholic electorate. Among the twenty five councillors elected that day, there was not a single Protestant. De Surville, de Rochemore, Nourry Tréboulon and de Cabrières, all long standing members of the Catholic royalist secret society, were among those...
elected. The result produced a response from the Prefect, who issued a proclamation to "the majority", declaring they were compromising their material and political interests by their exclusiveness. How could he be expected to endorse a municipal authority that excluded a portion of the city's notables? How could the citizens expect a Republican governemnet to encourage a municipality that was so openly biased against a large part of the republican electorate? Salives ended his statement with an appeal to the citizens of the Bourgades, of the Enclos Rey, to be generous.

On the same day, 15 August, the most successful Protestant candidates, Causse, Granier, Mourier, Roux and Vincens, published their intention to withdraw from the second ballot. The Courrier du Gard, in which they published their intention, lamented. "Only God can see and prevent the public misfortunes which we are destined to witness and suffer." 28

The prefect's appeal went unheeded, and in the absence of strong Protestant contenders, the entire municipal council went to the Catholics. 29 The municipalities

28 Courrier du Gard, 15 August, 1848.
29 A.D. Gard 5M 44. Election of August, 1848.
of Uzès 30 and Alès 31 were won by legitimists, and most of the towns to the south east of Nîmes were dominated by the legitimist party 32.

Success in the municipal elections was followed by a strong legitimist presence on the departmental conseil général 33 and in the conseils d'arrondissement, but in both instances, the constituency was the canton, thus assuring the Protestants of representation in cantons where they were in a majority 34.

The first repercussion of the Catholic victories was the dismissal of the Prefect, Salives. As he left Nîmes, the Courrier du Gard noted:

"The extraordinary administration to which we were subjected could not endure. From the moment of his arrival, Monsieur Salives was the instrument of a particular...

30 A.D. Gard 6M 145. anon. to prefect, 3 September, 1848.
32 They included Beaucaire, Aramon, Marguerittes, Remoulins, Villeneuve les Avignon, Roquemaure and Bagnols. A.D. Gard 6M 154. Prefect to minister of interior, 31 March, 1849. Charles de Calvière stated that "while Protestant majorities expelled Catholics, the Catholic majorities left proportional representation to Protestants, except in Nîmes. The elections were 8 days later there, and Catholics, aware of what had taken place, became extremely angry" (A.N. Flc III Gard S. Notes sur l'état des partis dans le Gard, February, 1852).
33 A.D. Gard 4MI 8. Roughly 2/3 of the thirty eight councillors were legitimists.
34 Nine out of ten cantons in Le Vigan returned Protestants; four in the canton of Alès; and four in the canton of Nîmes. (A.D. Gard 4M 18).
party. He did not cease to speak and work for one exclusive interest" 35

A number of reports of Legitimist intimidation were sent to the Prefect as the resentment felt by the Protestants became more acute36. Within a matter of months, the Gard had become a republic with no republicans. Sectarian suspicions were so strong that the new prefect felt obliged to order an inquiry into the percentage of public offices held by each denomination37, while the Courrier du Gard

35 Courrier du Gard, 5 September, 1848. Salives had certainly offended the Protestants since his arrival in mid June. Besides arming the national guard, he had commented adversely on the Gard's judiciary (unchanged since the July Monarchy): "They (the judges) are always ready to hurl themselves on the Catholics. If a case concerns a Protestant, the most serious offences are deemed to be unimportant." A.D. Gard 6M 145. Report to minister of interior, 17 August, 1848.
The Courrier was owned by the Orleanist Protestant Daunant.

36 Most such reports came from "mixed" areas: Uzès, Sommières, Pont Saint Esprit (where there was a militant republican population), Alès and St. Ambroix, where Protestants and republicans felt they were unfairly denied representation. A.D. Gard 6M 154, last quarter of 1848.

Three deputies, Démiens, Chapot and Bruguière wrote to the republican newspaper La Liberté pour Tous (28 August, 1848) deploring the difficulties that the Catholic monopoly would cause.

The Courrier du Gard (8 September) hypocritically admonished the "Carlists" for taking full advantage of their numerical superiority.

37 A.D. Gard 6M 154. The prefect asked the three sub prefects to send him the numbers of Catholics and Protestants employed by the administration in their arrondissement. The replies were not standardised, but revealed that the proportion of Protestants employed was roughly commensurate with their overall size in the department. The lists were far less detailed than that of the Courrier, which had a point to make.
published a detailed list of paid public posts in Nîmes, concluding that only 36 of the 269 positions were filled by Protestants. 38

For their part, the Catholics were satisfied with their domination in the department. In contrast to the first half of 1848, no rioting occurred between the elections and the end of the year, although there were sporadic manifestations of Catholic royalist triumphalism 39.

In December, the first direct election of the head of state was held. On this occasion, the whole of France formed the constituency. No immediately local issues were at stake, but a marked distinction between Catholic and Protestant choices was evident. In accordance with legitimist policy, the Catholics voted, faute de mieux, for Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, who, in the eyes of the conservative coalition, called after its headquarters the "rue de Poitiers", appeared to be a stronger guarantee against the left and who was prepared to foster Catholic interests as the Falloux law and the Roman expedition had shown. 40

38 Courrier du Gard, 29 August, 1848.

39 A.D. Gard 6M 145. Mayor of Bellegarde to prefect, 3 September, 1848; Mayor of Aujargues to prefect, 7 September, 1848; Commissioner of police, Uzès, to prefect, 12 September 1848; Commissioner of police, Sommières, to prefect, 16 September, 1848.

40 The views of the Gard legitimists, like those of many of their confrères throughout France, were summarised by the sub prefect of Uzès: "Louis Napoleon will have the support of the Legitimists, who desire a policy of reaction, and who see beyond him to a restoration". A.D. Gard 6M 154. letter to prefect, 17 November, 1848.
The Protestant vote, however, went to the two republican candidates, giving them both a share of the poll that was considerably higher than their national vote.\textsuperscript{41}

A closer look at the Protestant vote in Nîmes shows that preferences for Ledru Rollin were not necessarily determined by economic factors. In the first urban section which included the residences of the Protestant haute bourgeoisie, around the quai de la fontaine and the lower slopes of the Mont Cavalier (Tour-Magne), and where Protestants made up just over half of the population, the candidate of the left obtained 28\% of the votes cast in the section. In the two other sections with a considerable Protestant population, Ledru Rollin won more votes than Cavaignac.\textsuperscript{42} It would be facile to conclude that the Protestant vote for the "Montagnard" candidate was determined solely by the resurgence of Catholic royalism, and its

\textsuperscript{41} The results of the election of 10 December were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Gard</th>
<th>Nîmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L.N. Bonaparte</td>
<td>74,2</td>
<td>47,6</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gal. Cavaignac</td>
<td>19,5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ledru Rollin</td>
<td>4,9</td>
<td>14,7</td>
<td>16,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{42} The first urban section voted as follows:

L.N. Bonaparte 46\%
Ledru Rollin 28\%
Cavaignac 26\%

attendant threats, but votes for a party that resurrected the slogans of 1793 were uncharacteristic of a bourgeoisie that had paid dearly at the hands of the Jacobins for their federalism. Nevertheless, the dichotomy between the two communities was perceived by the local administration as being very largely the Protestant community's attempt to counter the Catholic threat. 43

Republicans were increasingly concerned after the election of Louis Napoleon. After appointing a cabinet drawn from most shades of opinion in the constituent assembly, he nominated Thiers to lead it and then withdrew to make a tour of the provinces while political opinion polarised around two blocs, Order and Progress. After the promulgation of a constitution and election of the president, the constituent assembly ceased to have a purpose. Consequently, it dissolved itself in January, and the politicians began to prepare for the third national election in a year.

In the Gard, the campaign began against the background of smouldering sectarian tension. Since the autumn of 1848, the Legitimists had been pressing vigorously in the assembly and on the departmental council their perennial demands for greater measures of local autonomy and more power for


departmental councils. In the course of a heated discussion in the Conseil général, the Protestants and the Prefect vetoed a motion on decentralisation proposed by the Letitimists. Reporting the debate, the Courrier du Gard revealed the fears of the Protestants:

"(Centralisation) is a safeguard of individual interests and of local minorities against malicious influences, narrow prejudice, the oppression of coteries and even of majorities in communes and departments...It makes civil war impossible". 44

The antagonism was not limited to debating chambers and newspaper columns. In his quarterly report in the spring of 1849, the prefect reported that Patriots in many towns claimed they were living in daily fear of their lives and property because the Legitimists controlled the local national guard. He urged the minister of the interior to dissolve the national guard in Uzès, Bagnols, Beaucaire and Roquemaure. 45

Aware of the polarisation towards the extremes that was taking place in France, the minister of the interior, Leon Faucher, was committed to obtaining a coalition of conservatives of all shades in order to prevent the emergence of both the left and the Legitimists as an influential

44 Courrier du Gard, 25 January, 1849. The Legitimist policy was stated in the Gazette du Bas Languedoc of 18 October, 1848, when a speech by Béchard in the assembly was reported fully.

political force. Thus, he was concerned that the prefect should encourage the more reasonable Legitimists and Orleanists to agree to a common list of candidates that would win votes from moderates and reflect both communities.

A similar view was expressed in March by a dozen Protestant notables, all closely associated with the July monarchy, and who were anxious that a split Protestant vote like that of December would only serve the cause of Legitimism or else give undue influence to the extreme left, sought an alliance with Catholic moderates by proposing a conservative list in which confessionalism was subordinated to economic interests.

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47 A.D. Gard 6M 154. Minister of interior to prefect, 5 April, 1849. "You seem to believe that the fight to the death that exists between the two cults will result in a complete Legitimist victory. That would be a misfortune for the department and a very poor example to the country. I am inclined to believe that the moderates of the Legitimist party would regard it as disturbing, too". *idem.*, 7 April 1849. "I am trying to persuade the leaders of the Legitimist party to select three moderates from their ranks".

48 A. Pièyre, *op. cit.*, I, p. 329. The notables were Mourier, Cavaillon, Daunant, Coste, Vincens, Amalry, La Farelle (who had been Legitimist deputy for Alès from 1842 to 1848), Sagnier, Valz, Cazeing, Granier and Michel. Their list was Orleanist and commercial in flavour: Daunant, Troupel, Perouze, Mourier, Cavalier, Pelet de la Lozère and two Catholics, Roux Carbonnel, a silk merchant, and Denys Benoît d'Azy, maître de forges. The committee was called the 'rue des Flottes' committee after its location next to the *petit temple*. 
The Legitimists responded by elaborating their own list, composed entirely of Catholics, equally dedicated to defeating the "Reds". This "rue de Séguière" committee accepted nominations from cantonal committees and sought to produce a definitive list that had the assent of Legitimists all over the department. According to the sub prefec of Alès,

"No rapprochement seems possible between the two religious parties (sic), who reproach each other with deceit in the previous elections, and who will in no circumstances accept the candidates of the other party. The Catholics, all Legitimists, are awaiting the instructions of the Nîmes Catholic committees, the Protestant merchants, mainly moderate Republicans, seem to be waiting for guidance, and if the republican committee has the wisdom to make a wise choice, they will almost certainly accept its list."

49 Pièyre, op. cit., I, p. 334.

50 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 3 May, 1849.

"If we divide, the enemy will pass. The enemy, do not forget, is socialism, the common enemy: enemy of the rich whom it ruins; enemy of the poor whose misfortunes it aggravates; enemy of property which it destroys; enemy of the family which it breaks up; enemy of religion which it blasphemes."

51 A.D. Gard 6M 154. Sub prefect of Uzès to prefect, 20 April, 1849; mayor of Beaucaire to prefect, 19 April, 1849; police report to prefect, 24 April, 1849: "According to my information, M. de Surville will replace de Rivière on the final list so as to avoid giving offence to the Côtes du Rhône."

52 A.D. Gard 6M 154. report to prefect, 24 March, 1849. The first sentence is ambiguous in French: "aucun rapprochement ne semble possible entre les deux partis religieux qui se reprochent de s'être trompés mutuellement dans les précédentes elections". Did they deceive each other, or themselves?
The administration's efforts to bridge the sectarian gulf and create a list based on social and economic interests failed. Three days before the election took place, the Gazette repeated the importance of voting only for the Catholic list, which it published in full.

On 13 May, the Catholic list was elected in its entirety. Five of the constituent deputies were returned, and the votes they obtained in 1849 did not vary greatly from those of the previous year.

53 In April, Faucher agreed to the prefect's request to dissolve the national guard in Beaucaire, Bagnols and Roquemaure, but preferred not to authorise the measure in Uzès to avoid the risk of upsetting his attempts to win over the Legitimists. (A.D. Gard 6M 154. letters to prefect, 7 and 14 April, 1849).

54 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 10 May, 1849. The same issue printed statements from Charles de Calvière and Chazelles Lussac that they would not stand as "independents" and would support the Catholic list.

55 The results were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benoist d'Azy</td>
<td>maître de forges</td>
<td>52 514</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roux Carbonnel</td>
<td>President of the Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>52 383</td>
<td>51 546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Larcy</td>
<td>lawyer</td>
<td>50 808</td>
<td>53 491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bechard</td>
<td>lawyer</td>
<td>50 748</td>
<td>55 418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapot</td>
<td>lawyer</td>
<td>50 797</td>
<td>50 026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debeaune</td>
<td>Proprietor at Roquemaure</td>
<td>50 033</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>la Bruguière</td>
<td>Proprietor, member of the conseil général</td>
<td>49 658</td>
<td>51 504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Surville</td>
<td></td>
<td>49 510</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Annuaire politique, 1850; Pièyre, op.cit., I, pp.258-60.

I was unable to find detailed records of the May 1849 election. Consequently these comparisons do not take account of abstentions, which R. Rémond estimates as 31.9%, practically twice as high as in April, 1848. Vie politique, II, p.80.
The average of the votes for the Catholic list, 50,780, corresponded closely to the total Catholic vote in the department, and the list received the greatest support from the eastern part of the department, while in the Protestant north west, preference was given to candidates on the moderate and Montagnard republican lists. Catholic loyalty was strong and very successful. The sub prefect of Le Vigan observed:

"The most disappointing feature is that political opinions are the consequence of religious attitudes. Thus, every Catholic is, or is believed to be, a Legitimist. By the same token, only the Protestants produce liberals and republicans of all hues. This classification is accepted by public opinion, and it corresponds closely to reality. It is all the more annoying that even the most independent and intelligent men are influenced unconsciously by the society they keep.

Would you believe, Monsieur le prefet, that the Protestants, who, in the Gard, are the richest, and so have most to lose, voted as a man for Ledru-Rollin and Joigneux?"

56 See note 10 supra.

57 A.D. Gard 6M 154 contains an incomplete list of cantonal returns for the election. Nonetheless, a pattern can be seen. The Catholic list was elected completely in: Nîmes (three cantons), Uzès, Ales, Remoulins, Roquemaure, Aigues Mortes and Sommières. In contrast, Alzon rejected La Bruguière and Benoist d'Azy for Almir Cavalier and Bergeron; Le Vigan rejected Debeaune for Almir Cavalier; Lasalle, St. Jean du Gard and Sauve rejected the whole list and voted for the montagnard list, which included Ledru Rollin.

The electoral success of May 1849 was a watershed for Catholic royalism in the Gard. Universal suffrage and the reduction of political conflict in a way that emphasised traditional lines of cleavage had enabled the Legitimists to regain control of the department with remarkable ease through the ballot box. But thereafter, there was little that the department's royalists could achieve without national endorsement of Legitimist principles. Such endorsement was unlikely. In the national assembly, the Union libérale dominated with some 450 seats, but it was a makeshift alliance of all shades of conservatives, and was bound together by little more than a common fear of the démocrates who had re emerged with strengthened resolve after the June reaction, and who had gained some 210 seats in the assembly.

The political impasse and the absence of clear directives from Chambord, who was unwilling to become embroiled in the politics of the second Republic, left the Legitimists confused and prone to division. What they had welcomed in 1848 as a revolution based on aspirations was rapidly producing frustration and impatience in some, and provoking revolutionary tendencies that grew from the frustration.

Thus, in the midst of the indecision and growing fear of the "red spectre", Genoude and his allies began a campaign to seek the immediate restoration of the monarchy by popular consent.
The Appel au Peuple had a particular appeal to the Catholic people of the Gard, who had been taught for eighteen years that the advent of Henri V would re-establish Catholic ascendancy in the department, and would consequently put an end to the economic hardship they had been enduring since the early 1830's. In 1849, the effects of the economic recession were severe and widespread. Popular disenchantment at the lack of political initiatives among the parliamentarians was expressed in the growing rate of electoral abstentions, and not surprisingly, the simple, direct politics of the Droit national seemed to have more to commend itself than the excessive caution of the parliamentarians.

The divergence of opinions in the Legitimist party was first evident at the time of the election of the president of the republic. Genoude published a number of articles exhorting Legitimists to abstain because any head of state save Henri would be a usurper. The Gazette du Bas Languedoc responded:

"The Republic is instituted in France. We do not have any traditional sympathy with it, but we are not in conflict with it at the moment. The principle on which it is founded is not ours, but it is honourable, and we shall not seek to inhibit its natural development."


60. Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 5 November, 1848.
Genoudists quickly capitalised on the blatant opportunism of the parliamentarians, and in the spring of 1849, a number of Legitimists in the Beaucaire and Uzès districts sought the inclusion of Genoude in the Catholic electoral list. A brochure supporting his nomination contained elements of a social and economic policy that were designed to appeal to the working class Legitimists rather than the notables. Droit national supporters demanded half the seats on local nominating committees, but were rebutted by the notables. Further, the administration, concerned about the emergence of popular royalism that was clearly diverging from the patronage of its traditional leaders, strove to swing the Legitimist committees behind the moderate candidates, Béchard, Roux-Carbonnel and Chapot.

Genoude was not included in the list, but the Droit national was not deterred. In the summer of 1849, it published a newspaper, the Etoile du Gard. Aiming to outflank the Gazette du Bas Languedoc, which broke with the Gazette de France and remained loyal to the "official" Legitimists of the Gard, the Etoile put forward policies that were simple and comprehensible to the working class Catholics - it rejected politics at the national level and demanded popular

61 Candidature de Monsieur Genoude dans le Gard (Beaucaire, n.d.).

62 A.D. Gard 6M 154. Mayor of Beaucaire to prefect, 19 April, 1849; Sub prefect of Uzès to prefect, 20 April, 1849; Minister of interior to prefect, 7 and 21 April, 1849.
participation in the political system:

"Universal suffrage, the Appel au peuple, there is the whole political gospel of the masses of the Gard, just as it is our own. France, long repressed by revolutions, can be reborn. It was Paris that delivered France into the convulsions of revolution. It is from the provinces that her resurrection must come." 63

Moreover, a number of political societies affiliated to the Droit national were founded. These societies appealed chiefly to Catholic workers, although they drew support from all sections of the Catholic community. The most important societies were the Cercle du Droit national, whose rooms were in the popular Enclos Rey; the Société des Travailleurs, also known as the Comité central des ouvriers of Nîmes, and the Cercle de Saint Patient of Uzès. 64

By the end of 1849, the popular royalism of the Droit national was a disturbing political force in the Gard:

"The majority of municipal and general councillors, all the deputies, face no greater threat than their own moderation which could alienate popular support and threaten their chance of re election.

The Catholic workers have their own societies ostensibly founded as pious confraternities, but whose chief effect is to promote political rivalry." 65

63 Etoile du Gard, 1 July, 1849.

64 The Droit national had over 400 members who included Négociants, avocats and agriculteurs A.D. Gard 4U5/111. Dossier on the Droit national, report of Procureur de la République, 17 January, 1851. The Cercle de Saint Patient had a membership of over 400, and was composed chiefly of "ouvriers et agriculteurs." A.D. Gard 6M 149. Sub prefect of Uzès to prefect, 31 August, 1850.

Thus, the notables found themselves challenged by the emergence of a Montagne blanche. The rise of popular royalism in 1849 was undoubtedly related to the inability of the traditional leadership to cope with the political and economic crisis that crippled France. The popular royalists made their own many of the social and economic policies that Béchard, La Farelle and Goirand Labaume had expounded ten years earlier, and which applied specifically to the "Jacobins enfarinés" of the Droit national: the establishment of local credit banks for small producers, mutual aid societies for workers organised on a departmental basis. They clamoured, too, for cuts in taxation.

The movement was fostered by three dissident landed "frondeurs": Chazelles Lussac, who had constantly displayed a marked preference for conspiracy; the duc de Crussol Uzès, and the marquis de Rivière. These notables revelled in the paternalistic relationship they enjoyed with their clientèle, but there was undoubtedly no small measure of

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66 See R. Huard, "Montagne rouge et Montagne blanche" in Droit et Gauche de 1789 à nos jours, pp.140-60.
67 Etoile du Gard, 8 May, 1850.
68 The Cercle de Saint Patient described the duc d'Uzès as "L'ami des ouvriers" (A.D. Gard 6M 155, "Délibération de la société de Saint Patient"). In the summer of 1850, the society prepared a traditional Sérénade welcome for him, with an arc de triomphe, when he returned from the Conseil général meeting. The sub prefect commented that "Monsieur le duc had been generous to the society on more than one occasion". A.D. Gard 6M 149. Sub prefect of Uzès to prefect, 31 August, 1850.

Chazelles Lussac was the chief sponsor of the ostentatious celebration of the feast of Saint Henry in 1850. A.D. Gard 6M 155. Prefect to minister of interior, 16 July, 1850.
self interest in their flirtation with an essentially working class movement. Both Crussol Uzès and Chazelles Lussac had large estates to protect at a time when the rural populations were hostile to landowners because of the erosion of forest and pasture rights. 69 De Rivière and Crussol Uzès, too, had failed to be nominated as Legitimist candidates in the 1849 legislative elections. 70 Perhaps it was no coincidence that the duc d'Uzès used the support of the Cercle de Saint Patient in an attempt to regain influence on the electoral committee in 1850. 71

In December 1849, one of the deputies, Debeaune, died. A partial election was held in January, and this provoked a head on collision between the Droit national and the "official" Legitimists.

Debeaune was from Roquemaure, so the initial choice of a candidate was left largely to the Legitimist committees along the Rhône. Their choice fell on Edouard du Grail, a wealthy vigneron from the Tavel district, and a man "remarkable by his strict observance of the Catholic faith". 72

69 Remusat, Mémoires de ma vie (4 vols., Paris, 1962), notes that Crussol Uzès had always been swayed by his property interests. He owned 4000 hectares of woodland. vol. IV, p.106 and note. Dr. Gwynn Lewis points out in his forthcoming book The Second Vendée that the duc d'Uzès' father had been the victim of a serious attack by local peasants who burned down much of the estate in 1792.

70 A.D. Gard 6M 154. Sub prefect of Le Vigan to prefect 29 April, 1849.

71 See p.252 infra.

However, the choice was rejected by the Cercle de Saint Patient, whose committee issued a statement demanding a democratic choice of a candidate by the electors, from a list of candidates submitted by the electors. The Cercle said it was proposing the duc d'Uzès, "ami des ouvriers" but it would ultimately accept the wish of the majority. 73

When the demand was refused by the notables, the Cercle called a democratic electoral assembly to discuss the merits of nominees. The meeting was chaired by Péladan, editor of the Etoile du Gard. In the end, the Droit national chose to put up Lourdoueix, the new editor of the Gazette de France and an even more intransigent supporter of the appel au peuple than Genoude, who had retired through ill health. 74

The campaign was bitter, and the sub prefect of Le Vigan commented that the partisans of the Droit national were employing the rhetoric of Jacobinism to discredit the moderates, urging the people to ignore the "aristocrates" and warning of even higher prices if du Grail won. 75 In the words of the prefect, the struggle was bitter beyond all expectations. 76 The Droit national gained enough support to split the Catholic vote and permit, unintentionally, the

73 A.D. Gard 6M 155. Délibération de la société de Saint Patient d'Uzès, 29 December, 1849.

74 A.D. Gard 6M 155. Sub prefect of Uzès to prefect, 6 January, 1850.

75 A.D. Gard 4U5/111. Procureur of Le Vigan to Procureur général, Nîmes, 24 January, 1850.

election of the republican candidate, Favand. 77

After the election, antagonism between the official Legitimists and the Droit national, encouraged by its support, was considerable. Popular Legitimism was clearly a growing threat to stability. Through the spring and summer of 1850, the Droit national dominated politics in the Gard, opposing vociferously the limitation of universal suffrage, which the Gard's Legitimist deputies voted, 78 and worrying the local authorities by the character of its plans to celebrate the feast of Saint Henri. Indeed, the summer of 1850 marked the heyday of the movement. Flying in the face of the local authorities, 79 its leaders invited Lourdoueix to festivities that included fireworks, street banquets and serenades in the popular quarters of Nîmes as


78 The Etoile du Gard (25 May, 1850) declared that universal suffrage was the strongest guarantee of order by giving everyone a share in politics. The Droit national constantly made common cause with republicans in seeking the repeal of the law of 31 May. See R. Huard, "La défense du suffrage universel sous la seconde République: les réactions de la population gardoise et le pétitionnement contre la loi du 31 mai 1850", Annales du Midi, 1971, pp.315-336.

79 In February 1850, the prefect had imposed a ban on public meetings and banquets (A.D. Gard 6M 153, prefectural arrêté, 18 February, 1850). As the "marching season" approached, the Nîmes city council (Legitimist) imposed a ban on fireworks which were an integral part of all popular celebrations. (A.D. Gard 6M 153. Municipal arrêté, 10 July 1850). Even Vidal, son of the 1815 police chief, and adjoint at the Nîmes city hall, could not dissuade the Droit national from proceeding with its plans. Vidal, and other "official" Legitimists were dismissed as collaborators. (A.D. Gard 6M 155. Vidal to prefect, 13 July, 1850.)
well as more formal banquets at the home of Chazelles Lussac. The climax of the festivities was marked by the reproduction in the *Etoile du Gard* of the inflammatory *Déliberation des Catholiques de Nîmes* of 1790. The text was prefaced by the comment:

"We are pleased to place the following document before our readers. They will see what manner of men the Nîmois of 1790 were, and will be able to compare them with those of the present day."

However, in a country that was increasingly concerned for law and order, the very violence of the *Droit national*, regardless of its professed Legitimism, made the movement as dangerous as any of the republican clubs, and both the authorities and the official Legitimists, afraid of full scale rioting, moved to restrain the movement. Thus, police proceedings were begun against the *Cercle du Droit national* for illegal gatherings and displays, while Ferdinand Béchard brought a civil action against the *Etoile du Gard* for defamation. The most devastating blow came from Chambord himself. In September 1850, he disavowed the notion of a plebiscitary monarchy that had been the core of the *Droit national*'s political programme. Chambord's denunciation of

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80 *Etoile du Gard*, 17 July, 1850.

81 A.D. Gard 4U5/300. Procureur of Nîmes to Procureur général, n.d. 1850. Also 4U5/111, dossier on the *Droit national*.

82 A.D. Gard 6M 149. Police report, 22 September, 1850. Péladán, who refused to publish an apology, was imprisoned for 5 days, fined 1 000 Francs and obliged to pay the costs of the case. The case was a source of great amusement to the republicans.
the Droit national weakened the movement considerably, and
drew the bulk of its leaders back into the main stream of
Legitimism, although the popular clubs it had engendered
continued to function, leaderless, under the watchful eye
of the authorities.

In contrast to the radicalism of the Droit national,
the orthodox legitimists, led by the department's deputies,
displayed a cautious attitude to political developments.
Increasingly conscious of the threat of popular disorder, the
parliamentarians reiterated their policies of decentralisation
and paternalism. If more authority was invested in the de-
partmental councils "which, since their creation have not
ceased to give distinguished service", the antagonism between
citizens and a remote, monolithic administration would be
eliminated. "In times of peace, the conseils généraux would
oversee the most rapid expedition of administrative affairs,
and in times of unrest they would provide a daunting bulwark
against anarchy." 

For the working classes, the Legitimists prescribed
religious education and the creation of certain types of
working men's associations as an antidote to "competitive

84 The Cercle du Droit national changed its name to Cercle
de la Concorde, and continued to meet until it and other
political clubs were closed in August, 1851. See pp.259-60
infra.
85 Gazette du Bas Languedoc, 1 July, 1849.
86 ibid., 27 June, 1849.
individualism":

"To refuse the working classes the freedom of seeking in the spirit of Christian association, the antidote to socialism, and to revitalise through a free and spontaneous élan the work of Saint Louis, from which the civilisation of the middle ages sprang almost completely, is a double crime. It is a crime against humanity and against God." 87

The notion of "free and spontaneous élan" did not, however, prevent the lawyer Ferdinand Béchard from proposing that towns should keep a register of workers in order to monitor their movements and to regulate the labour market. 88

Expressing such views, it is not surprising that the deputies voted for the 31 May law, imposing a three year residence qualification on voters in order to diminish the influence of the "nomadic populations of ne'er-do-wells (fainéants) and troublemakers who disturb the peace of our cities." 89

But the élites were incapable of resolving the political and economic crisis. In the summer of 1850, the chance of a monarchic restoration based on a fusion of the two dynasties failed, leaving much mutual recrimination and suspicion. 90

87 ibid., 7 October, 1849.
88 ibid., 20 May, 1849.
89 idem.
90 The orleanist Courrier du Gard commented acrimoniously: "We know of nothing more conservative than the principle of Legitimacy, but we know of nothing more revolutionary than Legitimism. What is the role of the Legitimists? It is always the same. It consists in conspiring against every government, conspiring to undermine its foundations, to weaken the laws, to prepare revolution when it does not exist." Courrier du Gard, 17 September, 1850.
At the same time, the uncovering of a widespread republican plot revealed the determination of the left to bring about its own solution by whatever means it had available.91 Finally, Chambord's rejection of compromise and of the policies of the Droit national left the Legitimists in an impotent attentisme.

After a visit to Chambord, who was sojourning in Wiesbaden,92 the Gard's Legitimist deputies arranged a series of meetings in the department. They urged "true Legitimists" to be patient and united, for the country was on a volcano, and the government lacked unity. According to the police, their words were mild and restrained.93 At the largest of the meetings, held in Nîmes and attended by more than four hundred people, they were challenged on the efficacy of their work by Guillo, a militant of the Droit national. Instead of debating the extent of the president's powers, Guillo told them they should be seeking to revitalise politics by proroging the 31 May law that restricted the suffrage.94 But the challenge had no support, and the

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93 A.D. Gard 6M 149. Letter from Niebel, Sommières, to prefect, 8 October, 1850. Report from sub prefect of Alès to prefect, 15 October, 1850.

Jacobins enfarinés who sought the repeal of the law made common cause with the republican left in a petition campaign in the spring of 1851.95

The Legitimist leadership, unable to pursue a fruitful "Legitimist" policy, slipped into support for Louis Napoleon. In 1851, Chapot, de Larcy, de Surville, Roux Carbonnel and Béchard voted in favour of constitutional revision that would enable the president to stand for a second time.96

The failure of the project to obtain the required two thirds majority increased feelings of uncertainty about the immediate future.97 In the second half of 1851, de Larcy and de Surville travelled to Fröhsdorf to explain their provisional support for Louis Napoleon:

"It is generally acknowledged that instructions given to the legitimist party hitherto were to impede every political act that could endow Prince Louis Napoleon with strength and permanence that exceed the limits traced by the constitution. Doubtless, the honourable representatives of which I speak, having consulted the populations of the department, will have judged that a restoration of the elder branch is the event for which France is least prepared; that, waiting for more propitious circumstances, the maintenance of order should be the single great concern of les honnêtes gens. If this

95 See Huard, "Défense du suffrage universel", pp.335-6.


97 According to the prefect, political uncertainty was the single major cause of the slow recovery of industry in the department. (A.N. Fl2 4776 c. prefect to minister of agriculture and commerce, 13 August, 1851).
is the case, I can understand that the deputies of the Gard should want to explain to the comte de Chambord their reasons and obtain from him some approval for their new attitude in the assembly, approval that will justify them in the eyes of the blinder, more violent men of the party".  

Indeed, the Legitimist population of the Gard had never understood their deputies' support for the one man who stood between them and their ambition. The prefect reported:

"Their clubs meet all the time. Every night, walking along the boulevards and opposite the barracks, one hears their shouts of Vive Henri V and songs in his honour."

Popular celebration of the feast of Saint Henry in 1851 again defied bans on public gatherings, carrying weapons and letting off fireworks. Moreover, the celebrations almost led to a sectarian riot. A police enforced closure of four legitimist clubs revealed the sentimental bric a brac that had always characterised popular Catholic royalism: pictures and busts of Chambord as Henri V, as le jeune Ecossais; pictures of Louis XVI; scenes from the tribulations of the royal family during the Revolution; portraits of leading Legitimists - Kergorlay and Saint Priest. The prefect gauged the character of popular

98 A.D. Gard 6M 155. Prefect to minister of interior, 26 October, 1851.


101 A.D. Gard 6M 153. Police report, 26 July, 1851, relating to items seized in the rooms of the Cercle de la Concorde; Cercle de la Redoute; Cercle de la Violette; Cercle dit de l'Hôpital.
Catholic royalism in the Gard very well:

"The Legitimists, twice as numerous as their adversaries, are celebrating the feast of Saint Henri with even more enthusiasm, noise and unity. But their exaltation is matched by their sincerity. For over twenty years they have awaited with imperturbable candour and good faith the return of Henri V.

They are so certain of the coming of their pretender that they believe every excess they commit in his honour will not only go unpunished, but will guarantee a future reward." 102

The action of the authorities against the clubs and the hostility of the rank and file Catholic royalists to the notables indicated plainly that almost twelve months after the collapse of the Droit national, the rift and antipathy between the notables and the peuple of the Catholic community had not been overcome.103

When the coup d'etat was carried out, the Legitimists of the Gard were remarkable by their passiveness. Unlike the Protestants, who constituted the core of the republican opposition to the coup, the Catholics were politically and socially divided to such and extent that opposition was inconceivable even though it was undoubtedly desired by extremists who had been hostile to Louis Napoleon and his increasing hold on conservatives.


103 A.D. Gard 6M 155. Prefect to minister of interior, 21 July, 1851. The measures taken against the Legitimist clubs caused acute embarrassment to certain Legitimists on the municipal council, and these considered resigning in the face of the abuse heaped on them by the sociétaires. Vidal, acting in lieu of the indisposed mayor, and "who was in 1815 one of the most unbridled royalists of that sad epoch, and whose great age does not prevent from being one of the most outspoken Legitimists now" implemented the closure. He was reviled as a traitor and a collaborator.
The absence of clear and coherent directives from Chambord and his representatives had left Legitimists without a rudder. The lack of orientation was then exaggerated by the social and political rift that weakened the traditional cohesion of the Catholic community. Faced with the increasing probability of social disorder, the Catholic notables had made it plain in 1851 that support for Louis Napoleon, whose policies were favourable to the Catholics, was essential.

As far as the peuple légitimiste was concerned, it had not acted independently of its masters since the Revolution, save for the embryonic organisation it began to evolve under the tutelage of the Dröit national. Traditionally armed and trained to respond to the call of the Catholic landed notables, it was not equipped to react on its own. Moreover, the Protestant character of the militant opposition would have alienated Catholic royalist support for it.

In Paris, the department's deputies made a gesture of protest against the coup. They took part in the meeting headed by Benoist d'Azy and Falloux in the Mairie of the Xe arrondissement, and were arrested as they made their way to the Elysee to protest formally to the president. 104

104 The results of the plebiscite of 20 December were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>70 283 (78%)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>18 919 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>475 spoilt votes</td>
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The total number of votes cast corresponds closely to the number cast in the presidential election of 1848 (82 690).
Support for Louis Napoleon was lower than the national average of 92% YES. R. Rémond, Vie politique, II, p.136.
The coup d'état was sanctioned by a large majority of the Gard's population. Charles de Calvière stated that the Catholics voted "Yes" while the Protestants voted "No". The Legitimist party, however, greeted the new regime with sullen, impotent silence, having no clear policy, and reluctant to make common cause with the Socialist, and essentially Protestant, opposition.

The consolidation of the Prince President's power and the promulgation of a new constitution which required an oath of allegiance to Louis Napoleon from elected officials split the Legitimists seriously. De Larcy, Barbut and Pontmartin refused the oath, as did de Surville and Chapot who were appointed to the new Bureau du Roi, the central Legitimist body that replaced the old and ineffectual royalist committee. But the Legitimists remained without a clear directive until the belated instruction Chambord gave in April, 1852, barely two months before the first elections to the new Corps législatif. Then, however, many minds had been made up, and the order to abstain from political participation

106. A.N.F 1cIII Gard S. Notes sur l'état des partis, February, 1852.
107. Pieyre, loc. cit.
received a mixed response. While de Surville, Chapot, de Larcy and Benoît d'Azy persisted in their abstentionism, two of the prominent landed aristocrats of the department, Charles de Calvière and the duc d'Uzès were elected to the Corps législatif. It was clear from the support these long standing royalists received that local issues counted for more than dynastic fidelity did. Indeed, the victory of the duc d'Uzès over the government candidate, General Teste, was a clear rejection of the government's policy of having one Protestant elected in the department and of adjusting electoral boundaries to achieve the desired result.

In the local elections, too, sectarian rivalry continued to play a significant part. An overwhelming Catholic majority on the Nîmes municipal council led to the resignation of the three Protestants elected in the first urban section and of the single Protestant adjoint, Mourier.


111. Under the revised electoral law, the Gard was allocated three seats. The constituency boundaries were redrawn in order to reduce the chances of a Catholic monopoly. See A.N.F1c III Gard 5: Letters of the prefect to the minister of the interior, 21 and 23 January, 1852; Calvière's memorandum on L'état des partis and his accompanying letter to the minister of the Interior, 6 February, 1852.

112. The authorities had intended the Protestants to have twelve seats from the 1st, 2nd, 10th and 12th sections. The complete failure of the plan was due to internal Protestant divisions and to the unwillingness of moderate Catholics to vote for a Protestant candidate. A.D. Gard SM 57. Municipal election of 1852; Pieyre, op. cit., II, pp.180-3.
The Second Republic, far from serving as a prelude to the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy, had plunged the Legitimist party into a profound crisis, tearing its adherents between loyalty to the dynasty and the pressing need to find a solution to the apparently inevitable social and economic conflagration that loomed over the country. In the absence of clear and realistic leadership from Chambord, the party had stumbled and dithered, gradually merging more and more with the broad mass of conservatives as fear of revolution took precedence over ideological squabbles. The coup d'état, by removing the threat of revolution, brought principles to the foreground once more, and revealed the considerable divergence of opinions in Legitimist circles.

The Gard did not escape this crisis, as the elections of 1852 showed. Whilst some Legitimists gave priority to their allegiance to the Pretender, others, conscious of the need for order and security, preferred to retain their influence in politics and ranged themselves, however reluctantly, behind the President who had been careful to offer guarantees that satisfied the religious convictions of the royalists as well as their temporal requirements. Catholic ascendancy in the department seemed to be assured by the influence the Church had acquired since 1850 even if the authorities had tried to ensure a modicum of representation for the Protestant community.
Among the factors that led so many Catholic royalists to place practical considerations before matters of doctrinal purity, one must certainly single out the evolution that had taken place among the Catholic workers, the petit peuple légitimiste that had constantly accepted the leadership of the Catholic notables. By 1850, social and economic change, universal suffrage had given the Catholic working class some sense of an independent identity, and it began to articulate its own grievances and demands to the astonishment and horror of its traditional leaders. Popular Catholic royalism did not develop beyond the embryonic stage, principally because it could not merge with the Republican Left. Its self awareness remained tinged with a substantial residue of anti-Protestantism and devotion to an ideal vision of a benign monarch. Nevertheless, it was clear in 1850 that the peuple catholique was no longer a force at the beck and call of the notables, but that it was capable of independent action reminiscent of Jacobinism - a term that one observer had applied to it as early as 1815.113

113. A.N. F79049. General Lagarde to minister of police, 7 December, 1815.
Conclusion.

During the period with which this thesis is concerned, the political fortunes of the Catholic royalists in the Gard coincided considerably, as one might expect, with the fortunes of the Ultra royalist party in France. Thus, the last ten years of the Restoration marked the zenith of Catholic royalist triumph, while the "liberal phase" of the Restoration, and the July Monarchy stripped them of their power and forced them into a bitter and relentless opposition. They experienced, as well, the internal dissensions that beset Ultra royalism in 1827, and Legitimism in 1833 and 1850.

Yet Catholic royalism in the Gard retained a separate identity, one that reflected the very particular and local character of politics in the department, and which distinguished Catholic royalism there from the main stream of Ultra royalism and Legitimism in France. The difference was most striking in the period from 1815 to early 1817, and later, during the Second Republic, when the Gard royalists gained control of their local administration, only to find that they were significantly out of step with their allies in most of the other French departments.

The singularity of Catholic royalism derived from the unchanging nature of political and social conflict in the Gard after the Revolution. Throughout the
period that concerns us, the conflict between Catholic and Protestant élites, each with its own clientèle, continued to dominate politics, and political allegiances continued to be defined in socio-religious terms instead of developing around the issues that divided French political society of the day.

However, each party looked to national political events for the support it needed in order to ensure its ascendancy over the other, and political change in Paris had far reaching consequences in the Gard. The political upheavals and changes of regime that occurred led inevitably to a transfer of power in the Gard from one party to the other. Compromise, whether that attempted by Dargout in 1817, or that sought by a number of notables in the face of social unrest in 1849, failed because there was no viable middle ground or centre group, and compromise was unacceptable to each party, which had its own patronage to distribute, its own enragés to appease.

The primitive and very emotive sectarian cleavage that subsumed local political, social and economic issues gave Catholic royalism its strength and cohesion for more than half a century, and enabled the Catholic notables who were in competition with their Protestant counterparts for positions of local influence to mobilise all sections of the Catholic community behind them.
Originally, the conflict had been between Catholic landed and Patrician interests and the Protestant, capitalist interests that had benefited considerably from the Revolution and Empire. Understandably, then, Catholic royalism was dominated for some time by an oligarchy of landed notables, related often by marriage as well as by their economic and social interests, and most of whom had emigrated during the Revolution. Men like baron Jules de Calvière; his cousin, Jacques-Alexis de Calvière-Vézénobre; the vicomte de Rochemore; count René de Bernis, married to a sister of Calvière-Vézénobre's wife; the marquis de Montcalm; the marquis de Valfons; the duke de Crussol-Uzès; vicomte de Saint Priest, brother in law of Calvière-Vézénobre and de Bernis; vicomte de Vogüé, were intimately involved in planning and directing the White Terror of 1815 to restore the pre-revolutionary balance of power in the Gard, Hérault, Lozère, Ardèche and Vaucluse, where they owned property and enjoyed a traditional influence. These were the men, too, who were most deeply involved in the unsuccessful attempt in the summer of 1815 to secure a considerable measure of autonomy for the Midi under the tutelage of the duc d'Angoulême. During the Restoration, they were the respectable representatives of Catholic royalism, and they frequented, in many cases, court and Parisian Ultra royalist circles. They were well rewarded for their zeal, most of them becoming prefects or deputies.
The presence of these seigneurs diminished significantly after 1830, when many of them retired from public life. De Rochemore, Crussol-Uzès and de Calvière-Vézénobre were notable exceptions, devoting themselves to Legitimist conspiracies, then standing for public office as Legitimist candidates.

However, Catholic royalism was not a narrow, chateau based movement. In 1790, the violent reaction to the Revolution had come from urban and semi-rural sections of the Catholic population in the first place, and Catholic royalism continued to reflect the legal and administrative middle classes in its leadership. Froment, Trinquelague, de Surville, Baron, Boyer, Vidal, du Roure, Vallongues and de Larcy, all men with a counter-revolutionary past and all denounced by comités révolutionnaires as aristocrates, and most of them forced to flee the department during the Terror, served the Catholic royalist cause with zeal well into their old age and sometimes to their death. In the way the landed notables influenced the Catholic rural populations, these men, and their commercial counterparts - like Bernavon, Nourry Tréboulon and the Clergé brothers, had access to the Catholic tradesmen and working classes.

After the Revolution of 1830, the importance of the Catholic bourgeoisie in the Catholic royalist party was considerably enhanced. Many of the older nobles retired from politics, but the Catholic bourgeoisie, competing with the Protestants for trade, employment and public office, was anxious to ensure representation on local bodies such as the municipal and departmental councils, which began to
acquire greater importance in local decision making during the July Monarchy.

Among the aristocracy and the urban notables, the continuity of counter-revolutionary zeal is striking. Jacques-Alexis de Calvière-Vézénobre emigrated in 1792 and joined the Armée des Princes. He returned to France in 1803, and married one of the daughters of Emmanuel de Saint Priest, a former minister of Louis XVI, whose other daughter married René de Bernis. In 1814, Calvière was commissioned in the Mousquetaires du Roi, and went to Spain with de Bernis and Angoulême at the end of the unsuccessful attempt these men made to cut off the advance of Bonaparte in March 1815. In June 1815, Calvière was responsible for organising the royalists of Aigues-Mortes, and later, during the White Terror, he commanded a royalist cavalry troop in the department. During the period of Decazes' domination, Calvière lost his commission because of his political opinions and his involvement with the royalist committees in the Midi. After the July revolution, he was a fervent Legitimist, allowing his château at Vézénobre to be used as a meeting place for conspirators. He and his son Charles participated with their Saint Priest relations in landing of the duchesse de Berry in 1832. After his death in 1844, Charles de Calvière took his father's place in Legitimist politics, and became mayor of Vézénobre, departmental councillor and, in 1852, deputy for the Gard.

Jean Louis de Surville, styled "Bourgeois, propriétaire, 10 000 F de revenus" in the 1811 tax register, was a nephew of the strident abbé Lapierre, a leader of the counter-revolution in the Gard. In 1793, de Surville was forced to flee the department after the comité révolutionnaire of Nîmes brought accusations of hoarding flour and of holding aristocratic principles. In 1811, he was appointed Receveur général of the department, a position he held, with the exception of the Hundred Days, until 1830. After exaggerated displays of royalism in 1814, de Surville served as an aide de camp to Angoulême in the brief campaign of 1815, and was later described as one of the cruellest agents of the White Terror. He was ennobled the same year, and became commander of the fiercely sectarian national guard of Nîmes. After the dissolution of the guard in 1818, de Surville commanded the clandestine Catholic royalist militia that was maintained, and in 1830 he offered two thousand armed men to the last Bourbon prefect of the Gard when news of the revolution reached the department.

Until his death in 1847, de Surville worked incessantly for the Bourbon cause in his capacity as secretary and assistant to the count Narbonne Pelet, who directed the royalists of the Midi from Nice. He and his children were involved in the landing of the duchesse de Berry, and his son Charles became a leading Legitimist politician in the south, deputy for the Gard in 1849 and member of the Bureau du Roi in 1852.
De Larcy, sub prefect of Le Vigan during the White Terror, emigrated in 1792 from a predominantly Protestant part of the Gard where he owned considerable property. His appointment to the sub prefecture by the provisional prefect, Jules de Calvière, was terminated by Dargout in 1818 because of de Larcy's unbridled royalism. His son, Roger, trained as a barrister, became notorious during the July Monarchy for his defence of the most infamous royalist agitators, and was deputy for the Gard in 1848 and 1849. After the coup d'état in 1851, Roger de Larcy refused to take the oath of allegiance to Louis Napoleon, and continued to work for Chambord into the 1870's.

There are other examples of such long lasting allegiance to the Catholic royalist cause in the department, notably those of the Vidal and Goirand Labaume families. Ironically, there is no reference after 1816 to François Froment, the instigator of the Bagarre de Nîmes of 1790, and indefatigable counter-revolutionary. Had he not become disillusioned by the bad faith of those he had served so well, no doubt he and his family would have continued to figure prominently in the Catholic royalist movement after the Revolution.

The most striking feature of Catholic royalism was the massive popular support it enjoyed through the period with which this thesis is concerned. Boulangers,
portefaix, tafetassiers, faiseurs de bas, tailleurs de pierre, décrotteurs, cabarétiers, travailleurs de terre and fénassiers did the dirty work of the notables, and figure prominently in riots and on membership lists of the various royalist clubs that flourished from 1814.

The support, generally in the form of muscle, given by the Catholic working classes and peasants was crucial to the success of the movement, and was carefully exploited by the notables. Popular anti-Protestant prejudices had been magnified since the 1780's by economic grievances. As the traditional textile industries of the department went into a decline that lasted throughout the period that concerns us, Protestant merchants, who controlled most of these industries, were accused of exploiting the shortage of work to depress wages, and of giving available work to their coreligionists in the north and west of the department, so bypassing the formal structures that regulated wages and work in the towns, as well as undercutting urban wages. As the population of the towns grew after the Revolutionary period, unemployment became a constant source of concern, and one that was easily translated into sectarian terms. Food prices were unstable, too, causing concern and hardship to producers and consumers. The serious crop failures from 1815 to 1818, then from 1827 to 1831 had very serious consequences in the Gard, as the requests for relief and the rise in the incidence of theft and brigandage showed.

In such conditions, the Catholic poor were easy prey to the notables who realised very clearly the value of
of a dissatisfied populace that could be used to keep the Protestants, many of them employers who had laid off workers, in a state of fear. By providing money and food to the Catholic workers, and by giving them preference over Protestant workers when they controlled the distribution of patronage, the Catholic notables ensured that sectarian loyalty prevailed over working class solidarity. In 1834, the Legitimist leaders in the Gard took great care not to exploit the troubles in Lyon because of the class antagonism inherent in them.

However, much of the popular support for Catholic royalism could be traced to the beginning of the Revolution or to subsequent Protestant abuses of power. In 1794, Alexis Lavondès was accused of counter-revolutionary attitudes and forced into hiding with his father. The family business was ruined, and in 1814 Lavondès was a bitter man, ridden with debts; Souchon had served with the Armée des Princes for three years; Vampère was one of Froment's lieutenants in 1789. All three were sent from the Gard into internment during the Hundred Days. Dupont, alias Trestaillons, described as a simple travailleur de terre, lost his father in the Bagarre de Nîmes. At the beginning of the Hundred Days, his olive trees and vines were destroyed by Protestant neighbours while he was away with Angoulême's volunteers.

Besides money and plunder, when available, these men enjoyed immunity from the law as far as the notables could guarantee it. Trestaillons was never convicted of
the crimes he committed in the name of Catholic royalism, and, in 1819, when the government appeared to be intent on pursuing untried terrorists, the prefect of the Gard, Haussez, made arrangements to spirit Trestaillons out of the department. Graffand, alias Quatretaillons, was permitted to live in tranquility in his native Pougna-doressse, barely eleven kilometers from Uzès, the town in which he had committed several brutal murders in 1815. In 1830, Quatretaillons was brought out of his retirement when the Catholic notables were organizing resistance to the Orleanist authorities. When some of the terrorists were put on trial, the royalist organisation provided them with a defence. Boissin, Aurillon, Servent, Reboul, Trufémy and Pocheville were defended by maitre Baragnon, an officer in the Nîmes national guard, to which they had belonged before it was established in a regular manner. Police officer Gibrat lost his job because he stole documents from Dargout's office, and leaked confidential information to the royalist leaders. He was immediately provided for by the Calvière family, and was then given a job as secretary to the vicomte de Vogüé, inspector of the department's national guard.

But popular royalism proved to be a double edged sword. Already, in 1815, after unleashing the people on the Protestant population, the notables were embarrassed by some of the excesses committed, and which drew unwanted attention to the department. They found that it was extremely difficult to impose some kind of discipline on their Miguelets, too. Moreover, the rank and file royalists were profoundly suspicious of their leaders'
motivation. There were frequent complaints that some of the notables were pursuing policies that were dictated by self interest, and accusations that the wealthy were not contributing as much to the cause (and the cash box) as they might. Men like Trinquelaque and Jules de Calvière, in spite of the touching receptions they received from their clientèle, were constantly looking over their shoulders.

Until 1848, the royalist people had no means of expressing its opinions independently of the notables. Universal suffrage gave the rank and file royalists this means, and revealed a current of opinion in the Catholic working class that rejected the previously unchallenged authority of the notables. The unexpected emergence of a Catholic Montagne that made economic and political demands with a distinctly Jacobin flavour shocked the Catholic notables who had always sought universal suffrage believing that the Catholic majority in the department would consolidate their supremacy without questioning it. The style of the Droit national was undoubtedly a factor in the decision of many Catholic bourgeois to support law and order and to welcome the coup d'État in 1851.

The upheavals of the Second Republic revealed the various shades of royalism in the Gard. Besides the Droit national episode, defections from the path of pure legitimism, admittedly a meandering and apparently unrewarding path, illustrated an essential characteristic of Catholic royalism - the desire for local ascendancy without any interference from outside. This aspect of
Catholic royalism was remarked by Eymard in 1814, by Lagarde in 1815, and by Ferdinand de Bertier in 1831, and it revealed itself in opposition to any government, including Bourbon governments, that sought to prevent a Catholic monopoly of power. In 1814, when the government of Louis XVIII did not meet their expectations, the Catholic royalists transferred their loyalty to Artois, and did not hesitate to try to thwart the plans of Louis' favourite. Henri V was the ideal monarch until he began to lay down Legitimist policy. He provided a symbol, an object of veneration, a source of fervour, but made no demands on the Catholic royalists who were free to legitimize their deeds and demands by invoking his name.

In such attitudes, it is possible to detect an element of the particularism that characterized southern traditions. The proximity of borders with foreign states - Spain, Piedmont, Nice and, until 1790, the Papal possessions just across the Rhône - combined with the importance of Mediterranean trade to forge economic and cultural ties that took precedence over those with Paris and other northern French towns until the railway and the telegraph opened the southern departments to the influences and scrutiny of the capital. Mérimée, arriving in Avignon from Lyon in the 1830's, felt he was in a Spanish town, so different were the customs, language and physical traits of the people. The Royaume du Midi of Angoulême and the "frondeur" aristocrats of the south, and, to some extent, southern federalism, should be placed
in the context of this awareness of a separate identity that was common in the south, and which was by no means exclusive to conservative traditions; the southern Republicans' *Ligue du Midi* in 1871, with its capital at Lyon, is in the same tradition.

The Catholic royalism of the Gard was but one manifestation of a royalism that extended across the Midi. Moreover, it must be said that the recent and largely artificial boundaries of the Gard did not delimit sphere of activity or influence of Catholic royalism. The southern Ardèche and the north eastern Gard were, in terms of support and terrorist activities, a single region with a royalist tradition that established itself in 1790 at Jalès, Uzès, Pont Saint Esprit and Bagnols; White Terrorists sought refuge in the Bouches du Rhône and Vaucluse until the hunt died down; Avignonais and Marseillais contributed to the murders and pillage undertaken in the Gard in the name of Catholic royalism. The royalist network spread so far that the Gard authorities were obliged to hold the trials of important White Terrorists in towns as far away as Grenoble and Riom to avoid rioting and to reduce the intimidation of judges and witnesses - when these could be persuaded to testify. Nîmes itself occupied an important position on the roads from Lyon, Marseille and Piedmont to Toulouse and Spain. It was a convenient town for Ultras and Legitimists from the south east and the south west to meet in, and certain pro-royalist hotels were popular meeting places. In 1833, a large gathering of Legitimists from the Ardèche, Drôme, Isère, Basses Alpes, Vaucluse,
and Bouches du Rhône took place in the Hôtel du Midi in order to review tactics after the collapse of the duchesse de Berry's plot.

The small town of Aigues Mortes, and its adjacent port, Le Grau du Roi, were excellent points for bringing arms and agents discreetly into the south east, and for bypassing the stringent surveillance of the main roads to Spain. Beyond the Camargue, the country residences of men like de Surville, Valfons and Fontarèche were convenient overnight halts on the back roads to Arles and Marseille or Avignon.

Notwithstanding this involvement in wider royalist enterprises, it was no secret to the agents of the Bourbons, from Froment to Ferdinand de Bertier, that royalism in the Gard drew its strength and persistence from peculiar local circumstances that made the movement's usefulness and dedication to the Bourbon cause questionable. It generally received unfavourable comparisons with the idealism of the western royalists. Indeed, the aims of the Catholic royalist movement identified it as a local counter-revolutionary movement, whose royalism was a necessary characteristic in the particular circumstances of the Gard, but was not the fundamental one, nor a disinterested one. The Catholic

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2 See, for example, the comments of Ferdinand de Bertier and baron de Bordigné on the relative merits of southern and western royalists, and on the value of Catholic royalism in 1831, when the Gard Catholics were particularly militant. Bertier de Sauvigny, "La Conspiration des Légitimistes", pp. 13-14; 32-34.
population in the Gard needed a Catholic monarchy, aristocratic privilege and a special position for the Catholic church in order to ensure its political ascendancy over the Protestants. Through the period with which this thesis has been concerned, Catholic royalists strove with whatever means were at their disposal to reverse the effects of 1789 in their area. A prefect who had been given the unenviable task of administering the department in the months that followed the July Revolution captured the vendetta spirit that fired Catholic royalists and their Protestant rivals in the Gard when he commented in 1842:

"Outside the department, these men are tolerant and reasonable; when they return home, they put on the livery of the region once again, and give in to hate filled prejudices which they justify completely in conversations with strangers to the area."

3 A.D. Loire Atlantique 3J 201. Achille Chaper to D'Arcy, 18 November, 1842 (Cited in Tudesq, Les Grands Notables, I, p.154) D'Arcy was about to move to the prefecture at Nîmes.
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Fla. General correspondence of the ministry, 553 to 559. 1814 - 1851.

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157/3. Jules de Calvière
162/3. d'Haussez
158/3 & 176/2. Darnand Vallabrix
166/11 & 168/11. Narbonne Lara

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234. Mayors, adjoints appointed in 1816.
236. idem. 1816-20
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246, 247, 248. Mayors and adjoints of large towns, 1814-46.

FlbII. Personnel (by department)

Gard 3, 4, 5, 15. Administrative personnel 1826-55.
Gard 7. Alès.
" 13. Le Vigan.
" 15. Nîmes.
" 21. Uzès.
F^1cIII. Elections, public opinion.

Gard 5. Elections 1820-77.

" 13. Public opinion (particularly 1813-18).

F^1cV. Departmental Councils

Gard 4 - 7. (1828-1843)

F^7. General Police

4349. Election 1816, 1817.


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6769. Gard 1822-1830.

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6780. Gendarmerie 1830-32.

7077, 7078. Extracts from newspapers, 1821-27.

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124 AP. Eymard papers. Claude Eymard, a native of Valence
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missions in the south, in 1814 and 1817
at the behest of Decazes. His reports
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those of 1817, are extremely valuable.
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2D5. 5 to 29 Administrative matters, 1815-52. Useful for police officials dismissed because of their politics.

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2I. 6, 7. General police.

1K. 3. Electoral register.

Very little of the Beaucaire archives had been classified when I was in Nîmes.

Chartrier de Clausonne

The correspondence of the Fornier family. General Fornier d'Albe was a retired Napoleonic general who was in Paris for the period of the correspondence. His nephews, Gustave and Horace Fornier de Clausonne were magistrates, Horace in Uzes for a time. The correspondence offers an extremely interesting picture of the views and attitudes of the Protestant bourgeoisie during the Restoration.

dossiers 123 to 127. Letters received by Gustave, 1808-1836.

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Fonds Légal

FL 341. François Froment, Recueil de divers écrits relatifs à la Révolution et à la Restauration à Nismes.

Four Mss. notebooks dated October 1817. Particularly interesting for Catholic royalist blueprint for the White Terror.

D HAUTE GARONNE

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E LOZERE

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F PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON


146. Correspondence of the Paris embassy.

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Monsieur le Comte de Bernis kindly gave me access to three Mss. notebooks that belonged to the wife of Jacques-Alexis de Calvière-Vézénobre. The notebooks contain interesting observations on the revolution (childhood of the authoress, Pulchérie-Cécile Gugnard, née Saint Priest), and on the involvement of the Marquis de Calvière in the events of 1815, and those that followed the landing of the Duchesse de Berry in 1832.

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Le Courrier du Gard. Founded by Baron Daunant and Girard, it was the pro-government paper from 1831 to 1848. It continued to appear during the Second Republic as the voice of Orleanist Protestants. Copies for 1831-1852 are held in the Bibliothèque municipale of Nîmes.

L'Etoile du Gard. This paper first appeared in July 1849. It was the local mouthpiece of the Lourdoueix royalists who expounded Genoude's Droit national, the monarchy founded on popular consent. Its editor, Adrien de Pelardon, broke with the Gazette du Bas Languedoc as Lourdoueix, successor to Genoude, broke with the Gazette de France. Copies are held in the Bibliothèque nationale (ref: JO 486) for 1849-50.

Gazette du Bas Languedoc. The "official" organ of the Gard Legitimists from 1833 to 1849, when it broke with L'Etoile and continued to support the Gard's deputies, and, consequently, the notables. The Gazette was the paper in which Legitimist policy, national and local, was publicised. It is of great value in tracing the recovery of Legitimism in the Gard after 1833. Copies are held in the Bibliothèque municipale of Nîmes (to 1842), and in the Bibliothèque nationale (ref J0129) from 1848-52.

Journal du Gard. The government newspaper from 1814 to March 1815, and from 1816 to 1831. At the beginning of the second Restoration, the Journal was Catholic royalist in sympathies. Gaude, the publisher, was an active Catholic royalist and member of the secret society. In an attempt to reduce the influence of the secret society on the paper, Dargout gave the printing concession to Guibert, and arranged to have the editorial comments written by his own agents. The newspaper is useful as a general record of the period of the restoration in the Gard. Copies are kept in the Departmental Archives, Nîmes.
La Minerve française. A Liberal newspaper that appeared from February 1818 until March 1820, when the reaction after the murder of the duc de Berry obliged it to close down. From autumn 1818 until February 1819, a number of articles on events in the Gard were printed under the title L'Hermite, the name used by Jouy. While these articles were clearly sympathetic to the Gard Protestants, they offer, nonetheless, an interesting impression of Nîmes at the time. See:

Volume IV, pp. 64-75; 267-75.
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