Roessler, Johannes. (2001) Understanding delusions of alien control. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, Vol.8 (No.2). pp. 177-187. ISSN 1071-6076

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Abstract

According to Jaspers, claims to the effect that one's thoughts, impulses, or actions are controlled by others belong to those schizophrenic symptoms that are not susceptible to any psychological explanation. In opposition to Jaspers, it has recently been suggested that such claims can be made intelligible by distinguishing two ingredients in our common sense notion of ownership of a thought: It is one thing for a thought to occur in my stream of consciousness; it is another for it to be interpretable in terms of my propositional attitudes. I argue that this distinction cannot be sustained and pursue an alternative suggestion, drawing on Louis Sass's "solipsist interpretation" of schizophrenia.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology R Medicine > RC Internal medicine > RC0321 Neuroscience. Biological psychiatry. Neuropsychiatry
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Delusions, Passivity (Psychology), Schizophrenia, Solipsism, Self-consciousness (Awareness)
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology
Publisher:	Johns Hopkins University Press
ISSN:	1071-6076
Date:	2001
Volume:	Vol.8
Number:	No.2
Page Range:	pp. 177-187
Identification Number:	10.1353/ppp.2001.0015
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/40980

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