Smith, A. D. (Arthur David). (2008) Translucent experiences. Philosophical Studies, Vol.140 (No.2). pp. 197-212. ISSN 0031-8116Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9137-5
This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Perception (Philosophy), Representation (Philosophy)|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Philosophical Studies|
|Official Date:||August 2008|
|Page Range:||pp. 197-212|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
Bach, K. (1997). Engineering the mind. Review of Naturalizing the Mind by Fred Dretske. Philosophy
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