Smith, A. D. (Arthur David). (2008) Husserl and externalism. Synthese, Vol.160 (No.3). pp. 313-333. ISSN 0039-7857

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Abstract

It is argued that Husserl was an “externalist” in at least one sense. For it is argued that Husserl held that genuinely perceptual experiences—that is to say, experiences that are of some real object in the world—differ intrinsically, essentially and as a kind from any hallucinatory experiences. There is, therefore, no neutral “content” that such perceptual experiences share with hallucinations, differing from them only over whether some additional non-psychological condition holds or not. In short, it is argued that Husserl was a “disjunctivist”. In addition, it is argued that Husserl held that the individual object of any experience, perceptual or hallucinatory, is essential to and partly constitutive of that experience. The argument focuses on three aspects of Husserl’s thought: his account of intentional objects, his notion of horizon, and his account of reality.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938 -- Criticism and interpretation, Externalism (Philosophy of mind), Intentionality (Philosophy)
Journal or Publication Title:	Synthese
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0039-7857
Date:	February 2008
Volume:	Vol.160
Number:	No.3
Page Range:	pp. 313-333
Identification Number:	10.1007/s11229-006-9082-4
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/41005

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