Soteriou, Matthew (2005) VII - The subjective view of experience and its objective commitments. In: Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, Senate House, University of London, 24 Jan 2005. Published in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), Vol.105 (No.1). pp. 177-190.

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Abstract

In the first part of the paper I try to explain why the disjunctive theory of perception can seem so counterintuitive by focusing on two of the standard arguments against the view—the argument from subjective indiscriminability and the causal argument. I suggest that by focusing on these arguments, and in particular the intuitions that lie behind them, we gain a clearer view of what the disjunctive theory is committed to and why. In light of this understanding, I then present an argument for the disjunctive theory based on the claim that the content of experience is particular and not general.

Item Type:	Conference Item (Paper)
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Subjectivity, Experience, Knowledge, Theory of, Objectivity
Journal or Publication Title:	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Publisher:	Aristotelian Society
ISSN:	0066-7374
Date:	June 2005
Volume:	Vol.105
Number:	No.1
Page Range:	pp. 177-190
Identification Number:	10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00110.x
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Conference Paper Type:	Paper
Title of Event:	Meeting of the Aristotelian Society
Type of Event:	Other
Location of Event:	Senate House, University of London
Date(s) of Event:	24 Jan 2005
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/41038

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