Soteriou, Matthew. (2007) Content and the stream of consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives, Vol.21 (No.1). pp. 543-568. ISSN 1520-8583

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Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Content (Psychology), Consciousness
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophical Perspectives
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
ISSN:	1520-8583
Date:	December 2007
Volume:	Vol.21
Number:	No.1
Page Range:	pp. 543-568
Identification Number:	10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00135.x
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/41039

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