The epistemological role of episodic recollection
Soteriou, Matthew. (2008) The epistemological role of episodic recollection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.77 (No.2). pp. 472-492. ISSN 0031-8205Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00199.x
In what respects is episodic recollection active, and subject to the will, like perceptual imagination, and in what respects is it passive, like perception, and how do these matters relate to its epistemological role? I present an account of the ontology of episodic recollection that provides answers to these questions. According the account I recommend, an act of episodic recollection is not subject to epistemic evaluation—it is neither justified nor unjustified—but it can provide one with a distinctive source of warrant for judgements about the past when it is accompanied by knowledge that one is recollecting, as well as knowledge of what one is recollecting. While the account concedes that when one recollects one’s attitude to what is recollected cannot be one of observation, it nevertheless accommodates the notion that episodic recollection involves a form of mental time-travel—a case of re-visiting, or re-acquaintance with, some past episode.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Knowledge, Theory of, Recollection (Psychology)|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Philosophy and Phenomenological Research|
|Publisher:||Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.|
|Official Date:||September 2008|
|Page Range:||pp. 472-492|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
Budd, M. (1989). Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
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