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The epistemological role of episodic recollection

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Soteriou, Matthew. (2008) The epistemological role of episodic recollection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.77 (No.2). pp. 472-492. ISSN 0031-8205

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00199.x

Abstract

In what respects is episodic recollection active, and subject to the will, like perceptual imagination, and in what respects is it passive, like perception, and how do these matters relate to its epistemological role? I present an account of the ontology of episodic recollection that provides answers to these questions. According the account I recommend, an act of episodic recollection is not subject to epistemic evaluation—it is neither justified nor unjustified—but it can provide one with a distinctive source of warrant for judgements about the past when it is accompanied by knowledge that one is recollecting, as well as knowledge of what one is recollecting. While the account concedes that when one recollects one’s attitude to what is recollected cannot be one of observation, it nevertheless accommodates the notion that episodic recollection involves a form of mental time-travel—a case of re-visiting, or re-acquaintance with, some past episode.

Item Type:

Journal Article

Subjects:

B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)

Divisions:

Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy

Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):

Knowledge, Theory of, Recollection (Psychology)

Journal or Publication Title:

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Publisher:

Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.

ISSN:

0031-8205

Official Date:

September 2008

Dates:

Date	Event
September 2008	Published

Volume:

Vol.77

Number:

No.2

Page Range:

pp. 472-492

Identification Number:

10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00199.x

Status:

Peer Reviewed

Publication Status:

Published

Access rights to Published version:

Restricted or Subscription Access

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