Mental agency, conscious thinking, and phenomenal character
Soteriou, Matthew (2009) Mental agency, conscious thinking, and phenomenal character. In: O'Brien, Lucy, 1964- and Soteriou, Matthew, (eds.) Mental Actions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 231-252. ISBN 9780199225989Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225989...
This chapter focuses on the phenomenology of mental agency by addressing the question of the ontological category of the conscious mental acts an agent is aware of when engaged in such directed mental activities as conscious calculation and deliberation. An argument is offered for the claim that the mental acts in question must involve phenomenally conscious mental events that have temporal extension. The problem the chapter goes on to address is how to reconcile this line of thought with Geach's arguments for the claim that mental acts like judging lack temporal extension.
|Item Type:||Book Item|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Act (Philosophy), Agent (Philosophy), Consciousness, Thought and thinking, Phenomenalism, Phenomenology|
|Publisher:||Oxford University Press|
|Place of Publication:||Oxford|
|Book Title:||Mental Actions|
|Editor:||O'Brien, Lucy, 1964- and Soteriou, Matthew|
|Number of Pages:||286|
|Page Range:||pp. 231-252|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
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