Soteriou, Matthew (2009) Mental agency, conscious thinking, and phenomenal character. In: O'Brien, Lucy and Soteriou, Matthew, (eds.) Mental Actions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 231-252. ISBN 9780199225989

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Abstract

This chapter focuses on the phenomenology of mental agency by addressing the question of the ontological category of the conscious mental acts an agent is aware of when engaged in such directed mental activities as conscious calculation and deliberation. An argument is offered for the claim that the mental acts in question must involve phenomenally conscious mental events that have temporal extension. The problem the chapter goes on to address is how to reconcile this line of thought with Geach's arguments for the claim that mental acts like judging lack temporal extension.

Item Type:	Book Item
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Act (Philosophy), Agent (Philosophy), Consciousness, Thought and thinking, Phenomenalism, Phenomenology
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Place of Publication:	Oxford
ISBN:	9780199225989
Book Title:	Mental Actions
Editor:	O'Brien, Lucy and Soteriou, Matthew
Official Date:	2009
Dates:	Date Event 2009 Published
Number of Pages:	286
Page Range:	pp. 231-252
DOI:	10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225989.003.0012
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Related URLs:	http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b2290...

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