Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Statistics
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login

The disjunctive theory of perception

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

Soteriou, Matthew (2010) The disjunctive theory of perception. In: Zalta, Edward N., 1952-, (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, Conn.: Stanford University, Metaphysics Research Lab..

Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries...

Abstract

Perceptual experiences are often divided into the following three broad categories: veridical perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations. For example, when one has a visual experience as of a red object, it may be that one is really seeing an object and its red colour (veridical perception), that one is seeing a green object (illusion), or that one is not seeing an object at all (hallucination). Many maintain that the same account should be given of the nature of the conscious experience that occurs in each of these three cases. Those who hold a disjunctive theory of perception deny this. Disjunctivists typically reject the claim that the same kind of experience is common to all three cases because they hold views about the nature of veridical perception that are inconsistent with it. Disjunctivists are often naïve realists, who hold that when one perceives the world, the mind-independent objects of perception, such as tables and trees, are constituents of one's experience. In other cases, such as hallucinations, it seems out of the question that such objects are constituents of one's experience. It follows that on a naïve realist view, the veridical perceptions and hallucinations in question have a different nature: the former have mind-independent objects as constituents, and the latter do not.

Item Type: Book Item
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Perception (Philosophy), Knowledge, Theory of
Publisher: Stanford University, Metaphysics Research Lab.
Place of Publication: Stanford, Conn.
Book Title: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Editor: Zalta, Edward N., 1952-
Date: December 2010
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Description: Encyclopedia entry
URI: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/41045

Request changes to a record

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item
twitter

Email us: publications@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us