False consensus in economic agents
Proto, Eugenio and Sgroi, Daniel (2011) False consensus in economic agents. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick. Dept. of Economics. Warwick economics research paper series (TWERPS), Vol.2011 (No.968).
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In an incentivized experiment we identify a powerful and ubiquitous bias: individuals regard their own characteristics and choices as more common than is the case. We establish this "false consensus" bias in terms of happiness, political stance, mobile phone brand and on the attitude to deference in a hypothetical restaurant choice, and show that it is not limited to the distribution of hard to observe characteristics and choices but also to weight and height. We also show that the bias is not driven by the fact that the tallest, happiest, most left/right-wing, etc. are more salient.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Self-evaluation, Test bias|
|Series Name:||Warwick economics research paper series (TWERPS)|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick. Dept. of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Leverhulme Trust (LT)|
|Version or Related Resource:||Also in the Cage working papers series. Department of Economics, University of Warwick, number 54.|
 Banerjee, A. V. (1992). \A Simple Model of Herd Behavior", Quarterly Journal of
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