Credibility and strategic learning in networks
Chatterjee, Kalyan and Dutta, Bhaskar (2011) Credibility and strategic learning in networks. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick. Dept. of Economics. Warwick economics research paper series (TWERPS), Vol.2011 (No.972).
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This paper studies a model of diffusion in a fixed, finite connected network. There is an interested party that knows the quality of the product or idea being propagated and chooses an implant in the network to influence other agents to buy or adopt. Agents are either "innovators", who adopt immediately, or rational. Rational consumers buy if buying rather than waiting maximizes expected utility. We consider the conditions on the network under which efficient diffusion of the good product with probability one is a perfect Bayes equilibrium. Centrality measures and the structure of the entire network are both important. We also discuss various inefficient equilibria.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||System analysis, Social learning, Diffusion of innovations|
|Series Name:||Warwick economics research paper series (TWERPS)|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick. Dept. of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Institution:||University of Warwick|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Human Capital Foundation|
 Bala, V. and S. Goyal, (1998) “Learning from Neighbours”, Review of Economic Studies,
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