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After Derrida, Before Husserl

The spacing between phenomenology and deconstruction

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Some of the principal themes of this Ph.D. thesis can be traced back to an early article that I presented at an international conference in philosophy held at Warwick University in 1989, entitled: “Différance Beyond Phenomenological Reduction (Époché)?” – published in The Warwick Journal of Philosophy, Vol.2, Issue 2, 1989. This paper explores the development of the various phases of the movement of époché in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and its relevance for Jacques Derrida’s project of deconstruction. The analyses not only attend to the need for an effective propaedeutic to an understanding of phenomenology as method, they also serve to demystify the logics of Derridian non-teleological strategy by explaining the sense of such a manoeuvre – as a kind of maieutic response to the Husserlian project – which operates within the horizon of a radical époché. According to this orientation, Derrida’s deconstruction of phenomenology is permitted to open itself up to a phenomenology of deconstruction.

The present book develops these analyses and utilizes a form of critique that points the way to the possibility of a phenomenological-deconstruction of the limits of Derrida’s project of deconstruction through the themes of époché, play, dialogue, spacing and temporalization. In order to trace the resources from which he draws throughout the early development of deconstruction, this study confines itself to a discussion on the texts published between 1962 and 1968. This subjection of deconstruction to a historical de-sedimentation of its motivational, methodological, theoretical, and strategic moments, involves a certain kind of transformational return to the spacing between phenomenology and deconstruction, which urgently puts into question the alleged supercession of phenomenology by deconstruction.

The expression of such a ‘beyond’ is already deeply sedimented in contemporary deconstructive writing to the point at which it is now rarely even noticed, let alone thematized and brought into question. This conviction (regarding the transgression of phenomenology by deconstruction) traces itself out in the form of an attitude to reading which is, in fact and in principle, counter to Derrida’s own call for care. The meaning and limits of the very terms, transgression, beyond, supercession, etc., must be continually subjected to deconstruction.

The notions of play, dissemination and supplementarity – with the concomitant sense of transformational repetition that defines them – do not function as a mere excuse for lack of scholarly rigour. Deconstruction is a movement of critical return, which must insert itself (with a sense of irony) within the margins and intersections of that which gives itself up to this practice of textual unbuilding. The strategy of play encourages the structural matrix of that with which it is engaged to turn in upon itself, exposing its limits and fissures in a kind of textual analogue to a psychoanalysis. To be sure, this does involve a certain kind of violence – a violation of the ‘system’s’ own sense of propriety (what is proper [propre] and closest to itself) – but in no sense is this an anarchical celebration of pure destruction. We speak rather of irony, parody, satire, metaphor, double-reading and other tactical devices, which permit a reorganization of the deconstructed’s (textual analysand’s) self-relation and the possibility of playful speculation. Such play demands care and vigilance in regard to the appropriation of the logics of the system with which it is in a relation of negotiation. In order to play well, one must learn the game-rules.
i. Ekstatic Interchangeability – the Intra-Communality of Time in its Spacing

The title of this text contains the words 'before,' 'after' and the 'spacing between,' thereby expressing the three ekstases of time. However, it is meant to indicate more than mere 'differentiation' between the temporal horizons of past, present and future (as the presence of the word 'spacing' would ordinarily suggest). What unfolds throughout the text is a phenomenological-deconstructive account of the ways in which they are interchangeable with one another. This interchangeability is a mark of their 'essential' interpenetration. By adumbrating the structures of this interpenetration, the following discourse stands in stark contrast to the view in which the three ekstases are principally held to be distinct (e.g., as in the case of formal grammar, which rigidly distinguishes between different tenses and which forbids their intermixture). For instance, the before of 'Before Husserl' in the title is not only an index to what is 'prior' to his philosophy, it also indicates that which lies 'ahead' – a project whose initiation awaits fulfilment: a task that lies before phenomenology. The first and more traditional 'past' sense could trace itself out in an examination of the historical background (context) which motivated Husserl's project of phenomenology as a radical critique of this history. This perspective on the 'before' would be to focus on the historico-contextual milieu
(and its outstanding moments of aporia) out of which Husserl's critical investigations on the question of lived-time grow and announce their urgency.

One example is the uneasy relation between Husserl and his mentor Brentano. To ask about the degree to which Husserl's discourse on intentionality actually surpasses that of his teacher is to pose a number of considerable problems. Oscar Kraus and David Wood have noted that Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* establishes the radicality of its orientation on the question of the temporality of lived-experience by distancing itself from Brentano's theses purely on the basis of its thematization of the latter's 'early' views. Husserl does this without really acknowledging that Brentano's ideas had undergone a significant alteration before the date of his lectures (1904/5 and the supplements of 1910) – an alteration that was even more marked before the actual publication of *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* in 1928.¹

The orientation that is required by such a difficult question weaves itself in a number of different ways throughout the thesis, but not in the specific form of an examination of the differences between the texts of Brentano and those of Husserl. The reason for the preceding opening is purely one of strategy in that it repeats a fascinating analogue to how Derrida, in *Speech and Phenomena* (1967), strategically reduces Husserl's phenomenological project in general to the early 'static' analyses of the *Logical Investigations* (1901). This reduction obscures, at a thematic level, the theoretical and methodological significance of some of the most radical research projects undertaken by Husserl in his later development of a 'genetic' phenomenology (e.g., *Experience and Judgement, Formal and Transcendental Logic, Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology [Crisis]*). Such obfuscation is not only unjust with respect to the self-critical-understanding of phenomenology, but also, somewhat ironically, to that of deconstruction. However, it is important to constantly distinguish between what is explicitly thematic in
Derrida's writing and that which is methodologically operative. One cannot say that he is unaware of the important radical changes in Husserl's thinking for the later developments actually form the theoretical basis of Derrida's own critique of phenomenology. In many ways Derrida, for reasons of strategy, is merely the mediator of a critical return inquiry (Rückfrage) by Husserl to Husserl – a re-reading and re-writing in which it is phenomenology itself (in line with the radical methodological necessity of self-critique through which it defines itself as 'a perpetual return to beginnings') that subjects its 'own' horizons to a form of Abbau or de-construction.

All of this brings us to another vital meaning of the phrase 'Before Husserl.' The problematics of phenomenology brought to light by Derrida's deconstruction or de-sedimentation of Husserl's programme leaves us with the task of presenting a possible Husserlian 'response.' Thus, 'before' (as indicated above) is also understood in terms of a task that lies ahead. What lies before Husserl is the future as the opening of the possibility of a phenomenology of deconstruction. Like the intertwining of Abbau and Aufbau, such a movement would be de-con-structive and re-con-structive – unravelling and concatenating – hence the play on the con of de-con-struction as a weaving-together-within-disruption. The dual function of the hyphenation in the preceding sentence is now a familiar device that indicates both 'distanciation' and 'concatenation.' The epoché, as the methodological expression of a movement of rupture and return, withdrawal and reappropriation, announces itself as the opening of phenomenology to itself. It is the unfolding of the horizon of the possibility of phenomenology as self-critical / reflective interrogation (once again, it is the gesture of a certain Rückfrage). When understood as 'a perpetual return to beginnings' – which is to say, an ethical call to methodological rigour that is conscious of itself as an 'infinite task' – we see how phenomenology operates in a manner that is fundamentally deconstructive in spirit.

Husserl once wrote,
In order to attain its total horizon, the phenomenological reduction would require a 'phenomenology of the phenomenological reduction.' (Crisis. Part 111 B, sec.71, p.247).

In other words, a truly rigorous phenomenology needs to continually confront itself (as method) critically. Such a phenomenology would be another name for deconstruction. Derrida's deconstructions of some of Husserl's key theses on intentionality, signification, temporality, historicity (to name but a few), provide a profound and often exciting response to this challenge – a response that raises, re-situates and critically re-evaluates the question of the limits of phenomenology itself. This brings us to yet another possible sense of 'before' that confounds the 'chronology' of phenomenological and deconstructive thought. Since Derrida has provided new ways of reading the Husserlian project, in certain cases the re-reading of Derrida, in the following critique of the relations between phenomenology and deconstruction, comes before the reading of Husserl. The sense of this strategy lies in the need to take into account the ways in which Derrida's readings influence 'how' Husserl is re-read today. In other words, we take into account how the chronology of reading is an issue that, in a sense, comes before the question of the chronology of the written (without, that is, invoking a paradoxical denial that the written must precede the reading).

These re-readings provisionally guide us while they themselves are simultaneously subjected to critical scrutiny. This double movement is vital in order to open a space of 'dialogical exchange' that restores the Husserlian text in an 'interlocutionary' capacity – as opposed to one that is consigned to the silence of a past horizon (as a mere historical curiosity) apparently delimited by deconstruction and robbed of the possibility of an effective response.
Therefore, if such a dialogical opening is to be secured, a deconstruction of phenomenology has to coincide with a phenomenology of deconstruction.

But, what of the *after* of 'After Derrida'? Is there an *after* Derrida or is this question limited to the perhaps of *that which is yet to happen*? Is there not yet a time for the copula 'is'? But, is not this 'after' precisely what we are already faced with 'now' – a now, present, current horizon in which deconstructive strategies for reading are already sedimented, already motivating and defining the scope of future possible *styles* of interrogation? Are we limited to an understanding of this now-horizon purely within the confines of a milieu of post-structuralist writing that has emerged since Derrida – a milieu which has, in many significant respects, forgotten its methodological indebtedness to phenomenology? In this sense, 'After Derrida' designates the 'critical movement of return' by which deconstruction must seek to unearth, through a process of de-sedimentation, the *tracing* of its own history. Therefore, the 'after' is a *return to the before*, but a re-turn that is a radicalized *re*-orientation on the 'spacing between' deconstruction and deconstruction. Since 'After Derrida' also names a task that lies before Husserl, in this case, Husserlian phenomenology can perform as a mediator between Derrida and Derrida.

There is also an 'after' that traces itself out in the sense of what it is to 'pursue' – the futural orientation of the chase. But, we must be careful here. If this is merely thought in terms of the desire for mastery (which speaks of an objectivating / idealizing / totalizing intention), then the true profundity of Derridian thought will, perhaps, perpetually elude us. The question of style, for example, does not give itself up easily to the imposition of a structural grid with its demands for objective classification (mastery). The reader should bear this in mind when considering the various analytical orientations outlined above. These perspectives are in no way to be taken as exhaustive. We wish, instead, to begin to illuminate the 'open multiplicity' of *possible* fields and strategies of deconstructive 'encounter' that have not, as yet, been
rigorously explored, but which have, to some degree, already been anticipated by Husserlian phenomenology and Derridian deconstruction. Thus, our overall orientation is one that could be said to concern itself with the politics of reading.

But, what of the 'spacing between'? In truth, it has already been articulated through the play of the foregoing. It is the open horizon of the interchangeability of the before and after: the tracing of their play (as a lack of fixedness). Each ekstasis (including the present\(^2\)) slides due to the essential 'play' in its structure. This play is not something that happens merely in terms of an inter-play between originally 'heterogeneous' zones. Their play is not simply a question of inter-connectivity, but of intra-communality. The relations between different ekstases are not only of a horizontal order. There is a vertical dimension that needs to be taken into account. Each ekstasis is already the embodiment of an intra-communal play at the heart of itself: the outside of its inside. The 'between' is the opening of inter- and intra- relationship – the fabric of that which stands-out from itself to itself as Other. It is the depth horizon of an original intertwining, where difference and identity are of the same flesh in the unfolding of their time.

In the specific context of the subtitle, the 'spacing between' – which is also to say, the history or 'duration'-between' the Husserlian texts and those of Derrida – is the opening site for the radicalization of the thematic of time within philosophical discourse: extending as spatializing and temporalizing, spaced-out-time.

The copulation of between and spacing also expresses the emergence of a form of spatializing that is not simply 'in' time, but is 'of' time – for both terms have spatial \textit{and} temporal aspects. In this sense we could say, but with some caution, that the 'spacing between' refers to the tracing of the movement from Husserlian phenomenology to Derridian deconstruction between the years 1901 to 1968. But, it is in no way restricted to this. There is a
deeper non-linear sense to the 'Spacing between' for which we could equally have spoken of the
_time-space_ between or _chiasm_.

Consider Heidegger's discourse on time-space in his analysis of the fourth dimension of
time – which is not to be understood as an increment to the other three ekstases, but is the
opening of their essential interplay – when he writes...

...the unity of time's three dimensions consists in the interplay of each towards each.
This interplay proves to be the true extending, playing in the very heart of time, the
fourth dimension, so to speak – not only so to speak, but in the nature of the matter
("Time and Being." _On Time and Being_. P15).

Compare this structure of ekstatic interplay to the following comments by Merleau-
Ponty. Taken from the working notes of his last and unfinished book, _The Visible and the
Invisible_, they express the same form of interplay. They also anticipate Heidegger's shift in
perspective on the question of time and its articulation in the lecture entitled "Time and Being"
– which was published just over one year later (31st. January, 1962).

_Time and Chiasm_

November, 1960

The _Stiftung [founding / establishment]_ of a point of time can be transmitted to the
others without "continuity" without "conservation," without fictitious "support" in the
psyche the moment that one understands time as chiasm.

Then past and present are _Ineinander_, each enveloping-enveloped – and that
itself is the flesh (p.267-8. Translation modified).
What Merleau-Ponty says about the enveloping-enveloped structural intertwining of the present and the past is also true of their relation to the future. Chiasm expresses the vertical intertwining (Ineinander) of the three ekstases of time. Time is understood as invaginated flesh, where past, present and future are offered up to one another as folds in the same flesh (which has certain spatializing resonances). The flesh as fold – in its folding-in upon itself – is the un-folding of differentiation within a horizon of belonging.

Time-space is Heidegger's name for that interweaving of the three temporal ekstases – the giving that determines all – which expresses a horizon that first articulates their unity and difference, and which is irreducible to the limits of the common bifurcation between time and space. The opening of this extending as an original intertwining (in both cases) precedes space as an order of coexistences and time as an order of successions.\(^3\)

What is crucial here is the way in which both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger have appropriated and developed Husserl's thought on time as Absolute Flux: the play of the longitudinal and transversal intentionalities of primordial temporalization – a play which Derrida comes to express in terms of temporizing and / is spacing.

This thesis explores the extraordinary contribution made by Husserl's phenomenology to the radicalization of discourse on time and how it traces itself out in Derrida's early writing.

As opposed to a systematic coverage of a far broader range of writers throughout the investigation of the methodological and theoretical trace-structures at work in the movement from phenomenology to deconstruction, this thesis specifically restricts itself to an engagement between Husserl and Derrida. Other philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, essentially provide various different orientations on the central relations between Husserl and Derrida, but their work is not actually subjected to a critique in any detailed form. Three other writers also make themselves felt here, but only one of them acts as a kind of pivot for the encounter between phenomenology and deconstruction. In every
case, however, their function is primarily one of mediation, their differences producing a kind of *epoché* that encourages dialogue. This multi-textual or pluri-vocal *epoché* brings out some further orientations and possible spaces for dialogue between Husserl and Derrida.

From a certain point of view, the addition of works by other writers would really be quite a superfluous gesture here because Husserl and Derrida already have the capacity to multiply themselves endlessly within the spacing of their return to one another. The movement 'from' phenomenology 'to' deconstruction is not a simple progression or surpassing. The foregoing discussion on the interchangeability of the 'before, after and between,' which structure (and *re*-structure) the fabric or spacing of their ongoing encounter, has already problematized such thought. It is really a case of the 'play' between phenomenology and deconstruction.

Consequently, we return to one of the fundamental meanings of 'After Derrida – which coincides with the futural sense of that which is 'Before Husserl' – history is the name of a task that lies ahead. A dialogue between phenomenology and deconstruction obviously does not consist in Derrida encountering Husserl as the mere signature of a dead text. It is a living dialogue in which the relationship goes both ways. Husserl's texts resonate with a life of their own and ask questions of the questioner.

It is in these terms that history does not merely lie behind us, it also lies before us.
ii. **Note: textual dialogue**

The endnotes to this text, which serve as the outside-inside of the thesis as a whole, are important in their capacity to flesh out the inter- and intra-dialogical moments of the following engagements. Their principal function is not merely one of qualification, as addenda that substantiate the critical direction of this thesis but, in many cases, they also serve as critical 'interruptions' to any tendency toward slipping into the comfortable rhythm of a monologue. (Such a tendency is somewhat encouraged by the presentational demands placed on academic philosophical texts – which generally prescribe a linear format / style regardless of the non-linearity of the content). This 'other' text – which situates itself within the same text to which it is other – inscribes and re-iterates a certain movement of dehiscence that is fundamental to the unfolding of the text as a whole. It is the signature of an *epoché* within the monologue that reminds us of the dialogical opening that already precedes and constitutes it. Such a 'dialogical *epoché*’ should be understood in reference to the comments above about the *before, between* and *after* of the relations between phenomenology and deconstruction. It is the dual sense of the movement of *epoché* as 'cutting' and 'reappropriation' that provides the main thread for the thesis. It is a withdrawal that produces an opening from which new life pours forth; a breaching of attitude, which permits a transformational return (e.g., to alternative orientations, spaces, narratives, contexts, positions, etc. [consider the pivotal role of strategic displacement for Derrida which opens up philosophy to its Other, which is to say, opens it up to *dialogue* and negotiation]). The importance of this theme demands a careful examination of the development of the thought of *epoché* in Husserl's work.

This involves adumbrating a number of different strands of phenomenological research that weave their way through the Introduction. Their forms of presentation are not to be taken as independent and self-sufficient; neither do they indicate a particular pattern of linear
consecutivity despite the fact that they delineate a certain kind of history. They are moments of a whole that are, in a peculiar sense, coextensive with one another like intercalated leaves or folds in the same flesh: they announce one another simultaneously.
INTRODUCTION

1. Re-Reading the Deconstruction of History

Deconstruction, as a project of critique, of re-situation, has a history – a history whose own origins cannot be clearly distinguished from that which is deconstructed by its movement, except through the theme of a kind of supplementation (supplementarity) which, in effect, already undermines the issue of origins. The very question of re-situation itself is that which gets closest to the matter of what distinguishes the history of deconstruction from the history that it deconstructs. It marks out the time in which the reorganization of our questioning – with respect to its forms and sites / methods and orientation – is announced as the central task of this history. If deconstruction represents another epoch, then this is only because it has been inaugurated by a movement of dehiscence that is already at work in the history that it re-traces. Such an epoch can only structure itself on the basis of an *epoché* through which history is always already re-writing itself. To reduce the history of Western philosophical thinking to one principal form of desire, limited by a particular concept of presence (as defined by Derrida), speaks of a project of idealization about which we should be suspicious. It is only one narrative, one story. It must be worked *through*.

The time of this history is not only constitutive of such an ideal orientation; it is also that which undermines it. The traces of this thought and the means by which such idealization can be subjected to further critique are to be found throughout the history that is, somewhat ironically, shut out by this motif in deconstruction. There are so many moments in this history
that scream out to be heard – which do not fit into the overarching grid that is supposed to delimit them. We cannot enter into a protracted discourse on the entire history of Occidental thought so we shall confine ourselves to what we might call, with some caution, a more immediate epoch in this history as a whole – the spacing between phenomenology and deconstruction. This is a paradigm: an exemplary instance of the exhibition of the violence of the deconstructive delimitation.

On the other hand...

Derrida's project of deconstruction should not be limited to this purely violent characterization, for it only makes reference to the effect of what we should call a 'strong' reading. Derrida's writing is labyrinthine in structure, articulating itself in different tones, operating on many different levels, and along multiple pathways. It cannot be reduced to its sensational forms of sloganizing. Derrida's own writing offers clues as to how it must be deconstructed in order to flesh out its depths.

We need to strategically put into operation a breach – a doubled Derrida, with the 'strong' thesis, on the one hand and the rigorous critical practice of unbuilding (Abbau) on the other, which, if taken to its limits, already undermines the whole concept of a 'strong' thesis in deconstruction. The point here is also to express another Derrida who has contributed to phenomenological thought. One must unravel the 'strong' thesis in order to reach the subtle, and at times profound, insights that structure his writing. The former remains within brackets. It is not to be ignored, but it is to be viewed with a careful degree of irony. Therefore, we shall not entirely restrict ourselves to a critique of Derrida's sensational claims – for they often
obfuscate what is really significant in the exchange between phenomenology and
deconstruction.

Several influential texts have been written about the relations between the Husserlian
and Derridian projects, but arguably, there are only three books that contribute significantly
original perspectives to this exchange. These texts are: J. Claude Evans's *Strategies of
Deconstruction*, David Wood's *The Deconstruction of Time*, and Rodolphe Gasché's *The Tain
of the Mirror*.¹ The three writers offer a broad spectrum in their various approaches to Derrida
and Husserl. At first glance, if we restricted ourselves to the narrow margins of the Husserl
contra Derrida arena, their differences might be characterized in the following terms: Evans, as
the outraged Husserlian who displays a rather anti-Derridian posture; Wood, as the
phenomenological-deconstructionist, who subjects the theoretical, methodological and
strategic relations between Husserl and Derrida to a form of critique that puts both writers
through their paces; and Gasché, as the pro-Derridian, for whom Derrida can do no wrong. In
actuality, their respective orientations are not so clear-cut. These texts actually explode the
narrow spectrum limited by such stereotypes.

The most important point to bear in mind here is that this study refuses to take sides in
the so-called Husserl / Derrida debate (I am somewhat fatigued by this limited form of
approach to their relations). If there are significant differences that truly divide Husserl and
Derrida, they are far more subtle and difficult to pinpoint than anything that has been presented
by commentaries that set themselves up in either of the opposing camps.² The only texts that
seem to realize this (and which explore the issue thoroughly) are the three titles cited above.
These books cannot be situated comfortably within the familiar disputational space between
opposing forces. They are also very different to one another – but, in ways that lead to a more
open space of dialogue between phenomenology and deconstruction rather than a closed arena
of contradiction.
The Husserl contra Derrida 'debate' must be subjected to a form of *epoché* (suspension) in order to explore the dialogue between them via a different route. Such a movement of re-reading may be viewed as highly speculative, with respect to its examination of the route[s] that must be examined, but it need not sacrifice rigour or balance in regard to its treatment of the two principal interlocutors – not opponents.

2. The Point of the Metaphysics of Presence

Evans's *Strategies of Deconstruction* is a penetrating study of the limits of Derrida's stronger claims in *Speech and Phenomena* regarding the limits of Husserlian phenomenology. Although the former text is quite specific in its style of approach to the critique of Derrida – which takes the form of a highly detailed comparative analysis in the service of a critique of the coherence of deconstruction – when making reference to Derrida's comments on 'protocols of reading,' Evans leaves open the possibility that "...we are using the wrong protocol" *Strategies of Deconstruction* [SD], Conclusion, p.168). However, he remains clear that deconstruction can and must give itself up to a critique which tests it against its own standards of rigour. It is for this very reason that *Strategies of Deconstruction* almost writes itself (it certainly needed to be written).

On the positive side, it marks the point at which deconstruction comes of age in the realization of its responsibility to continuously return to the question of care through unremitting self-critique. The book also gives, by example, the limits of the kinds of critique
that may be employed in any approach to Derrida's writing. There are other protocols of reading, but they do not come ready-made.

One of the main claims of Evans’s text builds upon a careful demonstration that Derrida's 'strong thesis' (in his reading of Husserl) is, in many ways, untenable. Although Evans does express how Derrida's project must ultimately be put at risk by the strategic misappropriations and misreadings of Husserl in *Speech and Phenomena*, he does acknowledge that deconstruction resists being pinned down in this way. *Strategies of Deconstruction* explores a number of different suggestions regarding the motivations and strategies of the Derridian text: such as fiction, misreading, parody, satire, comedy, careless distortion, and performance, etc. On the negative side, however – if one keeps to the specifics of Evans's orientation – when Derrida's texts are "...measured in terms of their own standards of rigour...they fail to live up to those standards" (*Ibid.* p.169). Even if Derrida's writing is geared toward reinscribing the notion of truth in and by the text under deconstruction, Evans maintains that it is difficult to find suitable justification for the degree of distortion at work in his reading of Husserl.

In the Conclusion of *Strategies of Deconstruction* (subsection: "Deconstruction and Rigour"), Evans raises the question of textual plausibility in reference to Derrida's treatment of Husserl's phenomenology in *Speech and Phenomena*.

The entire deconstructive strategy of the book is to allow the argument to develop strictly and only from the reading of Husserl. One may well leave aside the question of the adequacy of the reading of Husserl, but if 'Derrida's Husserl' is not independently plausible, the overall argument lacks plausibility. I would venture to suggest that a Husserl who argued like Derrida's Husserl would never have been taken seriously (*Ibid.* pp.174-5).
There is much to be said for the suggestion that 'Derrida's Husserl' of *Speech and Phenomena* "would never have been taken seriously" – and this points to an unjust attitude to Husserl's phenomenology that must be rectified. However, it is quite a different matter when one considers 'Derrida's Husserl' in his earlier seminal *Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry."* There are problems associated with any approach to *Speech and Phenomena* that treats it in isolation. We do not undertake the task of rigorously comparing the two texts here, but the spirit of the ongoing dialogue between them (as the reverse and obverse of one another) is evident in the various readings that follow.5

In a particularly intriguing passage, Evans carefully shows that "...in spite of their unclarities, Derrida's claims all admit of a Husserlian reading; indeed, only that reading seems to make sense of them" (*SD*. p.82).

This theme is at the focus of the following study; which places specific emphasis on what is probably the most important misreading in *Speech and Phenomena* – that which concerns Derrida's occasional misrepresentation of Husserl's concept of the Living Present (*lebendige Gegenwart*) as a point-like presence. Evans is right to speak of this issue when he lends stress to his argument concerning the lack of rigour in Derrida's engagement with Husserl...

To take a specific example...Derrida's attempt to show that Husserl is committed to the instantaneousness of the present fails to respect the demands of rigour in reading (*SD*. p.175).

This theme of the “instantaneousness of the present” is 'the' fundamental issue that extends itself throughout a range of Derrida's texts – for its logic is bound up with his
characterization of the 'metaphysics of presence.' The seeds of this determination are to be found in Heidegger's *Being and Time*. The following quotation exemplifies what is, perhaps, the principal inspiration for Derrida's particular orientation on the question of presence.

Heidegger writes...

...in our process of destruction we find ourselves faced with the task of Interpreting the basis of the ancient ontology in the light of the problematic of Temporality (*Temporalität*). When this is done, it will be manifest that the ancient way of interpreting the Being of beings is oriented towards the 'world' or 'Nature' in the widest sense, and that it is indeed in terms of 'time' that its understanding of Being is obtained.

The outward evidence for this (though of course it is merely outward evidence) is the treatment of the meaning of Being as *parousia* or *ousia*, which signifies, in ontologico-Temporal terms, 'presence' [*Anwesenheit*]. Beings are grasped in their Being as 'presence'; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time – the 'Present' [*Gegenwart*]. (*Being and Time* [BT]. p.47 / H.25. Translation modified).

However, Derrida's appropriation of this insight does not authorize the leap by which he then relates the present and presence to the metaphysics of the instant: the now as a point. In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* [BPP], Heidegger's examination of Aristotle's treatment of the question of time culminates in a characterization of the now that is very different indeed.

In singularly Eleatic terms, Heidegger claims,

Every now and every time-determination is *spanned* within itself, has a range that varies and does not first grow by means of a summation of individual nows as
dimensionless points. The now does not acquire breadth and range by my collecting together a number of nows, but just the reverse: each now has this spannedness within itself in a primary way. Even if I were to reduce the now to a millionth of a second it would still have breadth, because it already has it by its very nature and neither gains it by a summation nor loses it by diminution. The now and every time-determination has a spannedness intrinsically. And this, too, has its basis in the fact that the now is nothing but the 'expression,' the 'speaking out' of original temporality itself in its ekstatic character (BPP. p.269-70).

This orientation in Heidegger’s discourse on temporality does rather upset Derrida's reading of the now as a point and his attribution of this conceptual trace to Western metaphysics as one of its fundamental characteristics. It is significant that Derrida’s essay, entitled "Ousia and Grammé – a note on a note from Being and Time" (Margins of Philosophy [Margins]), takes up the project originally announced by Heidegger, concerning an analysis of Aristotle's discourse on time, but which Derrida maintains was unfulfilled. Although this analysis was meant to be presented in the Second Half of Being and Time, which never materialized, it did in fact emerge in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (from which the passage above has been taken). However, this text was not available to Derrida at the time that he wrote "Ousia and Grammé" – since Heidegger's text (based on a lecture course given in 1927) was not published until 1975. Derrida's essay was published in 1968. It is worthy of note that the latter article begins with an epigram from Heidegger's essay "Time and Being." This should be taken into account for a number of reasons that will soon become apparent.6

The thought of the now or present as a source point of unmediated presence is subjected to an extended critique by Derrida. The project has a certain value in its own right, since it questions the traditional logic of immanence / immediacy (which traces itself
throughout the history of Occidental discourse on presence) as the criterion by which presence, Being and existence are measured. However, to associate this concept of the corpuscular or atomic now with Husserl's lectures on time is a complete mistake and, in particular, it undermines the basis of Derrida’s *strong* thesis. Since this represents one of the principal orientations at work in *Speech and Phenomena*, if one does not grasp the full irony of Derrida’s double-reading it is very difficult to assess the value of this text as a whole given that it is supposed to be a critique of Husserl's phenomenology. This is the case if the *strong* thesis is taken as anything more than a playful strategy.

Our task here is to restore the historical context and methodological scope of Husserl’s writing on temporality and the manifold phenomenon of presence.

Evans finds it hard to understand what was actually so compelling about Derrida’s *Speech and Phenomena*. However, that it had a certain seductive appeal cannot be ignored. The reasons why tantalize. Evans quotes Wood's *The Deconstruction of Time* in this regard.

Wood notes that "Husserl scholars have not reacted too favourably to it, but it has had an enormous impact on the wider perception of the limits and indeed the very possibility of phenomenology" (Wood, 1989, 111). There can be no doubt about the impact of Derrida's work on many contemporary attitudes toward Husserlian phenomenology (*SD*. p.179).

However, 'contemporary attitudes toward Husserlian phenomenology' seem to be caught up in a rather linear perspective. Their 'singular' orientation appears to say – ask not what phenomenology has done for deconstruction, ask what deconstruction has done for phenomenology. Actually, why not ask both questions – and without restriction to past-tense?
3. Transcendence, Things, and Signs

It would be a worthwhile task to take up Wood's call in *The Deconstruction of Time*, where he expresses the hope that his remarks...

…will one day find their proper place in a positive revaluation of Derrida's relation to phenomenology (p.126).  

Wood's scholarly analyses on Husserl's lectures on time and their impact on Derrida's thought do indeed present fascinating opportunities for re-evaluating the theoretical and methodological relations between phenomenology and deconstruction. One can appreciate the sense of balance that Wood's text is trying to promote but, unfortunately, Derrida's writing often exhibits a form of carelessness in his reading of Husserl that cannot be ignored. We are left unsure about the degree to which the present study can (or ought to) be 'positive.' From a methodological point of view, a form of suspension is required.

The following passage from *Of Grammatology* is an exemplary instance of the way in which Derrida casually underplays the radicality of Husserl's phenomenological project (and its meaning) when he adumbrates what he sees as the fundamental difference between the philosophies of Husserl and Peirce. This acts as a pivot for his ‘strong’ reduction of phenomenology to the mere "...restoration of the metaphysics of presence."

Peirce goes very far in the direction that I have called the de-construction of the transcendental signified, which, at one time or another, would place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign. I have identified logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence as the exigent, powerful, systematic, and irrepressible desire for such a
signified. Now Peirce considers the indefiniteness of reference as the criterion that allows us to recognize that we are indeed dealing with a system of signs. *What broaches the movement of signification is what makes its interruption impossible. The thing itself is a sign.* An unacceptable proposition for Husserl, whose phenomenology remains therefore – in its 'principle of principles' – the most radical and most critical restoration of the metaphysics of presence (p.49).8

This is a paradigmatic example of what one can call Derrida's *strong-reading* of the limits of Husserl's phenomenology. However, it is somewhat disingenuous. For example, Husserl’s ironic reference ‘to the things themselves’ does not participate in the Kantian metaphysical disjunction between appearances and things-in-themselves. From a ‘methodological’ point of view, one could say that phenomenological interrogation proceeds *as though* that which is given to experience is precisely the Thing in itself rather than a mere representation. The orientation is such that it refuses to take up a position on the actuality or non-actuality of the signified in any Kantian terms that would put it beyond the bounds of experience. It is experience itself that is the source of all *judgements* about actuality.

Derrida’s approach to signification employs a radicalized notion of the sign, which takes a path that is in advance of the limits of mere phenomenal reproductions, objective images, appearances, etc. This is a pathway that was actually opened up by Husserl’s phenomenology.

Derrida's early orientation (especially in *Speech and Phenomena*) is engaged primarily in a phenomenology of the sign *as sign* (a sphere that he appears to treat as a rather exclusive horizon). He simultaneously criticizes the logics of such a project through a rather loaded deconstruction of Husserl’s phenomenology while ostensibly performing an eidetic analysis of signification.
One can argue that the dimension of the phenomenological-deconstruction of that which structures experience in the *giving* of meaning is the result of bracketing anything that could be construed as an original extra-significational referent. This is then followed by subjecting the 'presence' of meaning to an eidetic reduction – which unravels the structures of such a presence (presencing) to a play of different signs. We shall conduct a brief analysis of some of Derrida's principal themes (in his critique of Husserl's phenomenology) in these terms.

Husserl's critique of re-presentation is aimed at the presuppositional foundations of 'imagistic' thinking. Therefore, his critique of representation must be considered in its proper context: as a radical overturning of the thesis in which experience is said to be of a merely representational order – where representation is thought purely in terms of reproduction and substitution. Certain kinds of experience can indeed be imaginal or pictorial but, for Husserl, this dimension is not the principal form of consciousness as it encounters phenomena. His position on the *intentionality* of consciousness does not do away with the question of re-presentation (or relegate it to a minor role), but re-situates it.

Husserl's phenomenology presents us with a powerful critique of a deeply sedimented and limited historical conception of the meaning of representation – that is rooted in a *weltanschauung* enmeshed in the logic of a Cartesian metaphysical divide (which, in turn, is the echo of a platonic schism). Contrary to the tone of Derrida's *Speech and Phenomena*, Husserl’s polemic against the substitutive / opaque theory of the sign as a model of consciousness actually restores the complexity and variety of different forms of representation as they function in experience.

At the level at which Derrida raises the issue of the sign, Husserl might, from a structural (and functional) point of view, agree with the claim that we are "dealing with a system of signs," but with a certain reservation and warning. Discourse on signs often carries metaphysical baggage of its own.
Firstly, the source of Husserl's reservation can be found in his descriptions of the retentional and protentional intertwining of time-consciousness – an interplay of transversal and longitudinal intentionalities which, as the unfolding of temporal flux (a continuum which is both dispersive and recuperative), originally constitutes the horizons of what we would call 'intuition' and 'presence.' The consciousness of duration, and thus continuity (which is always married to consciousness of change), is the primordial condition of any possible experience (understood in the most general sense). The consciousness of duration (whose extension and inherent unity is only possible due to the interplay of retention and protention) does not involve the experience of the passing away of actual times or mere temporal signs by somehow collecting them together and comparing them in the 'present' consciousness re-productively. This would not give duration – in much the same way in which collecting together different spatial locations would not give 'motion.' Since there is consciousness of duration / successivity, as opposed to a communalization of all past moments within the same consciousness, presencing as now, there must be a form of return whose very possibility precedes that of mere 'reproductive' repetition, i.e., a passive living of the past as distinct from remembering as a 'picturing' of the past through an act of evocation.9

One can say that different times are not actually concrete moments / existences strung together representatively, but in a way, signs in themselves. However, the double aspect of the word sign must be considered with great care. We shall see that these moments are rather intentional correlates to changing modes of consciousness – that is, changing modes of temporal orientation, which find themselves continually modified in their manners of presencing. Such modification should also be understood not as something that befalls a temporal object after its original presentation, but as that which internally constitutes it as a temporal object in its givenness as something that is 'extended (this includes a certain positionality with respect to other temporal moments).
Consider, for a moment, what is involved in a judgement about the actuality-status of something. In a way, 'indefiniteness of reference' does point to a system of signs but, for Husserl, this is an indication of the limitlessness of the different orientations (spatial and temporal), which give the sense of the excess of the Thing that is experienced. For instance, the spatiality of the Thing announces itself in the fact that it cannot 'fully' present itself in its totality within any particular perspective. If it is truly 'extended' then it requires a multiplicity of orientations to deliver it up. In these terms, 'indefiniteness of reference' points to the unfolding of a mobile matrix of intertwining orientations, whose very structurality is precisely openness / indefiniteness. This speaks of time and repetition in a way that is irreducible to classical discourse on representation. While Derrida places emphasis on 'indefiniteness' of reference, in many cases this actually translates as 'incompleteness' of reference or givenness.

If we turn to the phenomenological concept of the noema, there is another way of examining the question of 'indefiniteness of reference.' Consider the following classic example (which Derrida himself uses [see SP. p.91]).

To say that Napoleon is the identical object of the two statements 'the victor at Jena' and 'the vanquished at Waterloo' is a trivial truth. What is important is that we have two 'different' noematic configurations of meaning. However, they still point to the same object (even though the meant appears very differently in each case) and do not cancel each other out or cause the referent to vanish in a puff of Aristotelian logic (according to the law of non-contradiction). Napoleon is the pole through which each noema is vertically related, but it exceeds its various aspects. Indefiniteness of reference, in this instance, has to do with the essential potential for a multiplicity of different styles in which that which is meant may stand-out. The noema does not substitute or stand-in for something else, it is the meaning of the meant precisely as it is meant. In these terms, indefiniteness of reference does not cancel out
the thing in favour of its substitution by signs. The X of the play of its signs is, to use a common Thai expression: "same, same, but different."

The transcendence and invisibility of the Thing is, in an almost paradoxical sense, evidence of its actuality. Evidence, here, involves a certain kind of recession of presence. In contradistinction to Derrida's reduction of the phenomenological sense of evidence – as that which merely repeats the limits of what he calls the 'metaphysics of presence' – evidence also refers to the speaking-out of an 'essential absence.' The evidence of transcendence as transcendence has its own peculiar kind of phenomenal meaning. It is the givenness of a certain lack of givenness: a lack that must necessarily accompany the presence of any Thing. That which is 'spatio-temporal' must, in an important sense, recede before any 'particular perspective' if it is to give evidence of its spatio-temporality. That is, although the object as a whole must be capable of presenting other faces according to different perspectives (its sides, inside, back, top, etc.), if it is truly extended, then 'all' these profiles cannot be 'present' in any one moment. The exhibition of something always involves relations of presence and absence within the horizon of its givenness. The Thing is a nexus of latent or potentially actualizable perspectives or modes of exhibition, which announce themselves despite their non-presence. We shall return to this issue in Part One.
4. The Play of Presence and Absence

For Husserl, the givenness of the 'actual' is not the 'primary' basis of all other types of perception, it is just one phenomenal value among others, e.g., the imaginary, the remembered, the anticipated, etc. These modes of signification do not merely float upon a more originary perception of 'actuality' – in the sense in which they did for the early empiricists; in particular, John Locke. For example, he thought that the imagination played a secondary or higher level role of merely abstracting that which had already been given (by means of those senses which were affected by certain powers inherent in bodies / entities / Things). There is no metaphysical distinction in terms of such levels for Husserl. The initiation of the phenomenological reduction reduces the signification 'actuality' to actuality-phenomenon. Therefore, what is really at issue is the careful description of various different kinds of phenomena in their giving of themselves without presupposing, and thus merely reiterating, any underlying metaphysical substratum – which effectively remains in [brackets].

The givenness of the past, for instance, is certainly due to a movement of signification, if we turn to the Derridian meta-general viewpoint, but this must be understood in the correct context. For Husserl, the originary givenness of the past as Other than, and yet intertwined with the present (which, when thought in conjunction with protention, is the extending or stretching-out of duration) is not the 'product' of a 'reproductive' consciousness. 'Retentional' consciousness may be said to have the character of the movement of signification (representation) and yet that which is given by means of retention is immanent. This does not mean the mere immanence of a reproductive image / substitute / proxy / sign over and above that which is reproduced. It is an originary presencing, not a presentification.

It is the question of such immanence that rules out the simple continuation of the 'traditional' terminology of representation for Husserl. This is why he is careful to warn us in
Ideas 1 that the inside / outside dyad is an inappropriate model for discussing perception.\textsuperscript{11} It is rather the intentional play of immanence and transcendence that must be studied and described. To fall back into the language of inner and outer dimensions would bring with it the danger of the possibility of imagistic-thinking returning through the back door. One must tread most carefully here. Derrida himself is clear when he writes, "...the property of the sign is not to be an image" (\textit{OG}. p.45). Of course, Derrida does not restrict the meaning of representation to 'reproduction,' since the latter definition falls back on an antiquated model of originals and copies of which he is highly critical. Husserl does not restrict representation to this definition either. However, he found himself having to dispute a community of thinking in which consciousness was specifically reduced to discourse on representation in precisely these terms.

It is Husserl's careful working-through of an alternative terminology that provides deconstruction with the means of re-evaluating the meaning and function of the sign. It is difficult to understand why Derrida appears to go out of his way to obfuscate this.\textsuperscript{12}

Unfortunately, although Derrida establishes a more general horizon in which to situate his discussion on the sign – which is designed to be free of imagistic presuppositions – his writing obscures a certain contextual difference when drawing material from Husserl. What Husserl's phenomenology aims to disclose is that intentionality (which defines consciousness as \textit{consciousness of} something) is precisely the \textit{movement of articulation} itself – where the giving of phenomena ('for' consciousness) is irreducible to the mere language of appearances, reproductions, signs, or images. The sense of the phenomenon equally embraces the language of ‘presencing’ or ‘appearing’ – a language which, as in the case of ‘horizon,’ brings out the \textit{essential functioning of absence} without simply inverting such absence into the mere secondary negation of appearance. There is a paradox of the phenomenon in that its presence simultaneously involves a certain kind of occultation (once again, this can be thought in terms of 'indefiniteness of reference') which is constitutive of any form of appearance.
This phenomenological theme of the double movement of immanence and transcendence is in play in Derrida’s discourse on the sign. Signs are irreducible to 'objects,' since they primarily efface themselves in order to function as signs. Signs surpass themselves toward other signs in an open referential matrix where 'there is nothing but signs.' However, without rigorous qualification, there is a significant danger here of a return to a 'doctrinal' form of anti-realism.

Derrida has often fallen victim to this interpretation of his meaning (which is somewhat irritating). That there is nothing outside the text (the famous claim in Of Grammatology) is not the pronouncement of a new 'textual idealism,' but points to the play of signification that produces the con-textual unfolding of any form of presence – the contexture of the ways in which meaning, sense, truth, the real, etc., are 'articulated.' Derrida's discussion on the Latin con-texere – particularly in the essay "Form and Meaning" (Margins) – brings out the vital significance of 'the bringing-together,' as the weaving of a text or fabric – a con-textual matrix of interwoven significations.

In order to fully appreciate Derrida's discourse on signification / representation it is impossible to bypass phenomenology, or to simply dismiss its importance on the basis of his 'strong' theses. These orientations tend to place excessive stress on the reduction of the essence of the sign to the pure structure of substitution – although this must not be confused with the thought of the sign as a substitute for something extra-significational.

For Derrida, there are aspects of the sign that must be understood in terms of a certain withdrawal of presence, a self-surpassing or self-erasure. Signs are not principally opaque, and they are certainly not merely objective replacements / phenomenal substitutes for things. As we have seen, the thought of the sign is not to be reduced to that of the 'image.' The movement or tracing of signification is primarily one of self-effacement – a transcendence that, in a certain sense, gives presence. What is at stake for Derrida in his early texts, in regard to the
question of the possibility of any kind of presence, is the play of transgression and recuperation
that articulates it, repeatability, and the delay or detour that is implied in the movement of a
repetition that transforms. These are important issues, but it is far from being clear that the
pathways of Derrida's analyses somehow contradict or problematize Husserl's form of
approach.

Derrida, in concordance with Husserl, does not begin with the traditional logic of
duality that purportedly divides consciousness and world or signifier and signified in classic
philosophical discourse. Articulation is not a secondary process that occurs only after there is
consciousness and things. Neither Husserl nor Derrida explicitly reject both poles of the dyad
in any metaphysical sense – they consign the bi-polarity to parenthetical suspension. Instead,
they concern themselves with the 'between,' the play that permits such polarization. The
insistence that there is 'nothing outside the text' is consistent with a methodological or strategic
necessity only. For Husserl, it is a question of epoché. For Derrida, it is similarly a matter of a
certain kind of displacement and the suspension of a particular thesis: the perpetual deferment
of metaphysical decision. The kind of 'betweenness' disclosed by, on the one hand, Husserl's
intentional analyses and, on the other, Derrida's writing on the theme of différance – trace,
iterability, archi-writing, etc. – is not actually 'situated' as such. It is certainly not restricted-to
or positioned-within the traditional space which divides the bi-polarity, but is u-topic (no-
place, non-lieu). This speaks of the originary opening-up of presence, structure, meaning,
temporality, spatiality, etc. We shall see that this radical displacement in deconstruction should
be understood, as it is for Husserl, in terms of a certain kind of epoché. Derrida's early writing
moves within its spacing.

The danger alluded to above, regarding the meta-generality of the level at which
Derrida discusses representation, concerns the possibility of the appropriation of his writing on
the sign from an image-theorist's perspective, which would be to remain situated within the old
bi-polarity. Derrida's theory of supplementarity – which presents us with the notion of a supplement without origin, a movement that has no starting-point or final resting-place – does resemble the 'structure' of the old model of re-presentational consciousness that Husserl rejects, but the resemblance is purely superficial. The classical image-theory still bases itself on an ontological divide in which the principal problem is how to get beyond that which is played out on a mere mental imaging screen to that which is purported to originally subsist outside of its representation. Although this model radically upsets the possibility of the continuation of discourse on an 'outside' in any coherent and consistent form (since it cannot support the basic criterion that would make such a distinction possible), it still maintains itself within the presuppositional limits of the classical ontological duality.

According to Derrida's orientation, however, there is nothing outside representation. This is not to say that his analyses merely shift to one side of the familiar schizoid world-view. In a move that echoes Nietzsche's claim that with the loss of the real world, we have also lost the apparent, the old model is lifted into quite a different dimension.  

It is also certainly the case that when Derrida re-situates discourse on what actually presents itself to experience, at no time does this suggest that presence is merely the product of an engagement between consciousness and signs. Clearly, this would be to fall back on the canon that both he and Husserl strongly criticize – a tradition of thought that simultaneously displaces the ontological status generally assigned to the Thing, or the object of a pure intuition, in favour of purely mental phenomena. In this kind of tradition these ‘objects’ implicitly retain a residual connection to a more originary source – when such phenomena are called appearances, representations, images, or signs (thus assuming the standpoint of a profoundly problematic ontology in epistemological clothing that conceals a massive paradox within itself). While it allows the possibility of a clandestine attempt to reinstate the Thing at another level (e.g., the noumenal for Kant, for whom this was surely much more than a mere
limiting concept "…to curb the pretensions of sensibility" [Critique of Pure Reason, A255-B311, p.272]), we find that this would be to maintain a presupposition that cannot be qualified within the parameters of its own logic.

Similarly, one of the most important issues for Husserl's thesis on intentionality is that we are not principally conscious of signs – which should read as 'sign-objects' – but relations of significance, meanings, things, states of affairs (Sachverhalte). This kind of consciousness is not to be confused with the consciousness of signs – which, on its own, would actually problematize the possibility of the consciousness of signs as signs.

Merleau-Ponty suggests that signs only stand-out as signs once meaning has already been 'given.' He spoke of this as being the consequence of a certain kind of 'return' – a Rückgestaltung (back-formation or reverse-structuration): a recursive movement by which a sign can come to exhibit its value as a sign. It is like the difference between looking toward the finger that points as distinct from that towards which it is pointing. In a certain sense, the sign's value or meaning as a sign stands out only in that its function originally involves a form of self-effacement by directing attention away from itself. To be sure, from another point of view, one can still make the rejoinder that the sign in pointing away from itself comes before that which it points out, but this does not necessarily involve recognizing its function as a sign. If one did not recognize the function of the finger that points it would merely become an ‘empty’ sign of itself (an object-in-itself). This emptiness does not necessarily mean the complete annihilation of its significational capacity, but it does mean that its value as a sign for something Other is not, itself, signified. A sign is pure reference – it transcends itself towards that which gives itself through the signification (as Other). If it merely terminated in itself, such termination would literally mean the destruction of the horizon of the lived experience of difference.
It is vital that the sense of erasure or self-transcendence that is intrinsic to the sign be thought simultaneously with any reference to the sign in its 'substitutive' capacity.

What has to be taken into account is a subtle change in discourse on the sign that transforms the theme into a more 'dynamic' sense of signification. The move is analogous to the phenomenological shift from being as noun to its verbal form – a move that embraces time with all its dispersive and recuperative connotations. In German, verbs are known as zeitworte (time-words). For Husserl, consciousness is a self-transcending (ekstatic) intentional directedness. It is the outside-itself movement of signification. If we were to say that the consciousness of a Thing is really the consciousness of a sign (or, more accurately, a matrix of signs) this would be to disregard an absolutely vital phenomenological distinction that can have the effect of plunging us into a mere phenomenalism. There is not consciousness and signs, but 'signification,' itself – of which these terms are intertwined moments. It is this interwoven tension and movement of surpassing that Husserl describes in terms of the language of intentionality.

This brings us to the form of the possible warning by Husserl – a warning that revolves around the problem of privileging discourse on the sign without due regard to the question of its 'phenomenological-intentional' meaning. It is through the latter that it already announces the unfolding of a distanciating and recuperative relation between appearance and appearing (in which absence or non-appearing is a constitutive moment). This can be translated as the 'opening' through which the sign announces itself as the unity of signifier and signified. When the term ‘sign’ is discussed in a purely 'substitutive' sense, this tends to conceal the double-aspect to its function. This generally restricts it to a purely objective determination caught up within the limits of the language of the appearance or the image – some-thing that points. Husserl would insist that we are not first conscious of signs or reproductive images, by means of which we then infer the existence, meaning, or truth of that which is indicated. This is not to
say that signs, when understood according to Husserl's phenomenological standpoint, are extrinsic to perception, since the preposition of of intentional consciousness implicitly announces the movement of signification within itself as the very possibility of its being as a meaningful-comportment-towards something (which is a movement built upon the capability of repetition – the again and again). Husserl's theory of intentionality does not concern the relationship between 'consciousness and an extra-phenomenal reality,' but describes the relational (which is to say, intentional) structure of consciousness itself in its various forms of encounter: the 'field' of experience. It is the horizon of the encounter – the of – that defines the meaning of consciousness. That things are only given (articulated) through the movement of signification – the Latin particle re- of representation referring to the 'again' of return – is a mundane truth. However, this is a completely different proposition to Husserl's contention (arrived at through a meticulous series of phenomenological [intentional] descriptions) that consciousness, understood on the basis of its prepositional / transitive sense (as consciousness of something), is primarily engaged with meanings / things and not images or signs – in the sense of objective symbols.

Husserl maintains that,

The spatial thing which we see is, despite all its transcendence, perceived, we are consciously aware of it as given in its embodied form. We are not given an image or a sign in its place. We must not substitute the consciousness of a sign or an image for a perception (Ideas I. §.43, p.123).

Derrida places too great an emphasis on the substitutional function of the sign in perception – the detour through the sign as indication (Anzeichen). We must endeavour to pay more attention to that aspect of the sign which should be understood as its pure self-
erasure or transparency – for without such invisibility before that which it [re]presents (whatever that may be) it would cease to function 'as a sign.' It could do nothing but turn in upon itself; its own density causing it to collapse like a dying star. Such density would, in the end, merely resituate the question of presence, not deconstruct it. Such substitution would be to replace the presence of the Thing with the mere presence of a sign – which Derrida himself clearly means to avoid.¹⁶

The reduction of signification to a play between signifiers (where the signified is not dependent on an extra-significational substratum) is a powerful model for grasping those functions at work in the constitution of meaning. There are independent reasons for the production of such a model (for one thing, it is the legitimate result of an eidetic reduction), but these have little to do with simply reversing an old hierarchy. Derrida himself is only too well aware of this. There are important phenomenological differences that get effaced. One does not simply substitute the presence of a sign for the presence of something extra-significational. The question of what originally comes to presence is re-situated only on the basis of a purely 'provisional' move. What is really at issue is that the 'substitutional' aspect of the sign is founded upon a certain performance of 'erasure.' What is 'essential' to the functioning of signs is their ability for self-effacement. The meaning or the standing-out of the sign as substitution is contingent on the original transparency of the sign.

The problem is that Derrida utilizes the theme of substitution against Husserl's discourse on what actually gives itself in perception. This is completely inappropriate. The indicative sign or representation, as 'substitute' or 'proxy,' only represents one of Husserl's definitions of Vorstellung (according to Evans, the 8th).¹⁷ There is a deeper aspect to the performance of the sign (its self-effacement) that is better suited to Derrida's form of engagement with Husserl. Not that it would actually help Derrida overturn Husserl's theses, but it would at least address Husserl on the level at which he himself actually conducts his
inquiries on the difference between expression (Ausdruck) and indication (Anzeichen). Their differences are not to be thought in terms of a distinction between non-signs and sign, but a difference between two types or functions of signification.

5. The How of the Articulation of the Question

Historicity, for Derrida, is another name for writing – and the movement of historicity should be understood, in the most primordial sense, as archi-writing / tracing. The working-out of this thought can be found in the movement of Derrida's Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry" – which is one of the appendices of Husserl's last (and unfinished) text: The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology [Crisis]).

In the Crisis, Husserl investigates the possibility of a transcendental phenomenology of history. By working through some of the key differences between description and explanation (the life of the plane and the life of depth) in his discussion on the historical movement of the Idea, Husserl proceeds to uncover the horizon of historicity (Geschichtlichkeit). The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness is a vital resource for this work (as Derrida himself claims). But then again, so are the Cartesian Meditations and Experience and Judgement since these texts primarily concern themselves with the possibility of a genetic or constitutional phenomenology according to a transcendental orientation. The paths taken by Husserl are long and convoluted, and the movement is far from linear. The continuous working-out of the thought of epoché throughout the movement of Husserl's phenomenology demanded this.
With the *Logical Investigations* (1901), Husserl outlined the basis of an early (static) dimension of phenomenology through the development of a certain style and method. The rest of his career was taken up exploring the 'possibilities' of phenomenology – in terms of both a *pure* phenomenology and a phenomenological *philosophy* (a double-aspected 'self-critical' movement announced in the title of Husserl's three-volume work: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* [1st Volume: *General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, 1913]). The working through of the critical method of *epoché* was a task to which Husserl returned again and again. It was a constant return to beginnings: the question of the 'how' of the articulation of the question.

The young Heidegger, on the other hand, appropriated the 'practical method' of phenomenology (ready-made – as developed in the *Logical Investigations*, which was prior to the thematization of the phenomenological reduction) without Husserl's obsessive drive for an ongoing critical examination of its limits.\(^1\) This is not to say that Heidegger was in any way careless, but it does suggest an over-confidence regarding the degree to which the methods of phenomenology had been grounded. Yet, he was unable to 'complete' the project of pursuing and *authentically* determining the meaning of Being as it was ‘initially’ raised in *Being and Time*. During this phase, Heidegger seems to have had little interest in Husserl's later discourse on the *epoché* and his constant return to the question of its scope. This is intriguing since the radical orientation of the analyses of *Being and Time* can be said to take place against the background of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. It is not surprising that the text of *Being and Time* constantly tends toward a return to the critical question regarding the 'how' of the 'articulation' of the 'question of the meaning of Being.' There is no closure, only a further deepening. Husserl's obsession clearly caught up with Heidegger. The reason for this has to do with the non-linear manner in which phenomenological interrogation actually unfolds itself.
In the lecture entitled, "Time and Being" (1962) we see a reversal of sorts – although it is not simply a reversal of names or the undermining of an old hierarchy, since its revolutionary movement was already anticipated, to a certain extent, in *Being and Time*. The moment that Heidegger brought to light the question of the transcendental attitude of *Temporalität* in 1927 he actually undermined the limits of his initial task. The question of Being owes its very possibility to time. The task of 'formulating the question of the meaning of Being' has to proceed by way of a detour. This detour initially involves an analysis of that being for whom Being is in question [Dasein]. With the examination of Dasein as care – *Sorge*, the structurality of which is fundamentally 'temporal' – the detour is not a mere delay in the passage of the guiding question of *Being and Time*. The interruption is not simply surmounted, and what is unearthed is not merely incorporated into the limits of the initial project. It becomes 'interminably' postponed. The delay of a certain *epoché* defines the whole direction of *Being and Time*.

With the deepening of the thought of the 'question' of the meaning of Being with respect to time, from the standpoint of the transcendental horizon of *Temporalität*, the very task becomes transfigured. At this point Heidegger's research is not strictly existential in orientation unless one falls back on the phenomenological relations between existence and ekstasis – including their shared etymological root *ek / ex*: out-of. The word existence is derived from the Latin expression *exsister* which, as the combination of 'ek / ex' and 'sistere,' means 'to stand out' or 'to appear.' This correlates with ekstasis as the 'outside-itself' or 'outside-oneself' of displacement, distanciation, non-location, movement (other-than-static) and thus the temporalization of presence. The interplay of the three temporal ekstases no-longer, now and not-yet is the horizon in which the difference between Being and beings first stands-out. Being always has to be thought in terms of time – but one can argue that the question of time is the
principal problem, not Being. The terms Being and time are not tied together in a symmetrical relationship. Time cannot necessarily be thought in terms of Being.\textsuperscript{21}

It is for these reasons that Heidegger could not continue to ask the Augustinian question "What, then, is time?" (\textit{Confessions}. Book 11, §14, p.263). Although Heidegger’s orientation by way of the question “what 'is' time?” is to ask about its Being, rather than to ask about time \textit{as a being}, his analyses demonstrate that one first has to ask about Being before one can ask about the Being of time. And, has he not shown us that one first has to ask about the being that asks the question of the meaning of Being? This detour, by determining the actual scope of what may be asked, articulates a double withdrawal – methodologically, on the one hand, and ontologically on the other. It also marks a return in the form of a Moebius strip or loop through Sorge (care) as the temporalizing horizon in which Being first comes into question. However, since Being always already has to be thought in terms of time, both of which withdraw in the coming to presence of being, this project must defer its own fulfilment – indefinitely.\textsuperscript{22}

Regardless of whether or not this question was implicitly at work in Heidegger's thinking – as a continuation of the opening question in the lecture “The Concept of Time” 1924, where he writes, “The following reflections are concerned with time. What is time?” – one could argue that he is inevitably drawn back to a more Husserlian type of problematic with respect to the \textit{how} of the articulation of the question.

Existentialism was borne out of phenomenology. In the case of \textit{Being and Time}, the young Heidegger's predispositions informed the manner and direction of his utilization of phenomenological methods. One should not overlook the theological background to the reading of Husserl in Heidegger's development of phenomenological-ontological inquiry – which restores the questions of Being, death, and anxiety. To be sure, Heidegger’s project is not a restatement of an old onto-theology, given that he is deeply critical of its history, but it
does take his own research in a different direction to that of Husserl's phenomenology. One might even suggest that Heidegger's work is not strictly 'phenomenological' (as Husserl himself understood this expression). However, this would be to confuse the aim with the language. Heidegger can rightly be considered as the father of existentialism precisely because it is his rigorous application of the language of phenomenology that unearths the existential horizon. The falling-away from the Husserlian project is a kind of falling-upwards, but there are always problems associated with any kind of fall.

With the lecture "Time and Being," we find a fundamental example of Heidegger's turn (kehre), which he could never have foreseen since the method of phenomenology itself only gradually informed him about the scope of what he could 'authentically' articulate. This makes itself felt with particular force in the fascinating closing remarks of his address where he expresses the 'problem' of having conducted the lecture by means of propositional statements.\(^{23}\)

In effect, the question “what is time?” has to give way to another type of question: how is it with time?

Derrida, in certain fundamental ways, returns the method of phenomenology to itself stripped of the existential character of any particular ontological orientation. It is very much a case of the later Heidegger providing the resources through which Derrida discourses with the earlier incarnation. There is some indication that this also involves a detour through Husserl. Conversely, we have seen – with reference to the intimacy of Anwesenheit and Gegenwart, as the lynch pin of the deconstruction of phenomenology – that Derrida reads Husserl through Heidegger. Derrida's analyses are already based in a plurivocal (dialogical) dimension.\(^{24}\)

Derrida appropriates Heidegger while displacing the questions of Being, temporality and historicity by re-situating them according to a modified perspective: the quasi-transcendental field of writing / archi-writing. There is a sense in which Derrida reads Heidegger with the more 'formal' eye of the Husserlian. The re-reading begins in existential-
phenomenology and goes beyond only by 'returning' to phenomenology in a manner that radicalizes / re-organizes its orientation. Such a 'beyond' requires examination for it has very definite limits.

There is nothing outside the text, which is to say that everything that is is by virtue of the opening up of structure and the structurality of the opening through which it is articulated (con-textualization: co-founding, con-founding, etc.). As a deeply sedimented and yet mobile matrix, the theme of ‘textuality’ performs a similar role for Derrida as the discourse on the Lebenswelt – opened up by the implementation of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction or epoché – does for Husserl in the Crisis.

To return to the Heideggerian trace in Derrida's thought, that there is nothing outside the text is not a reduction of Being. It is the opening up of the sense or horizon of the possibility of its articulation, which is, in a sense, prior to the question of Being. However, it is only through the working out of the 'question' of the meaning of Being that this deeper horizon is announced as a task for thinking. The urgency of the question announces itself only after a careful phenomenological investigation of the problematics of the question of Being in terms of the problem of 'method' itself: the how of the articulation of the question. This is a task that Heidegger took up which, quite ironically, ultimately undermined the limits of the original aims of Being and Time. The promise of a second part to this project, as announced and anticipated in Being and Time, was never fulfilled – nor could it be, as Heidegger himself remarks in his author's preface to the seventh German edition of this text.

While the previous editions have borne the designation ‘First Half,’ this has now been deleted. After a quarter of a century, the second half could no longer be added unless the first were to be presented anew. Yet the road it has taken remains even today a
necessary one, if our Dasein is to be stirred by the question of Being (Being and Time, p.17).

The "road," path, or way "remains a necessary one." The question of method itself is perhaps 'the' phenomenological task. And, it is the methodical care with which Heidegger's magnum opus unfolds itself in these terms that justifies its greatness. With the addition of his later views, however, should there not also be some reference to the necessity of Dasein being "stirred by the question of time?"

Regardless of any specific hierarchical value that may be attached to one side or the other, Heidegger’s writing is a stirring demonstration that time and Being must be thought together.

Much of Derrida's writing may be seen as a vigorous response to these issues – particularly in view of his re-readings of Husserl’s phenomenology, which can, unfortunately, often confuse as much as they illuminate. However, his re-writing of Husserlian themes presents a fascinating spectrum of ideas – all of which are ripe for critical re-reading. However, this is not to suggest that this critique should be primarily concerned with the task of returning to Husserl (as a return to the same) by undoing the Heideggerian traces that weave themselves throughout Derrida’s re-readings. We shall attend to that aspect of deconstruction which (through a Heideggerian lens-piece) has the capacity to further refine Husserl's self-professed drive to leave no philosophical stone unturned in the exploration of the question of method (hodos – way, road).

The epoché remains as the linchpin, but not only as a methodological consideration, since it also resonates with an even more profound sense, of which the later Heidegger is also very much aware. Derrida also reflects this understanding in his comment at the end of his Introduction to Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry” (p.153) about the reduction or epoché having
been thought in the mere “…lacklustre guise of a technique…” and celebrates its deeper sense as a pure movement of delay. The *epoché* [is] temporization. It is the very movement of the methodological *epoché* that inevitably raises this to the level of a theme – where bracketing is none other than the signification of a certain kind of postponement. Heidegger’s discourse on Being by way of the being that asks the question of the meaning of Being is the mark of such a delay; a deferral and a detour that effectively places the question of 1924 – “What is time?” – in brackets.

6. Task or Play?

Husserl's enterprise laid open the 'pathway' to an understanding of essence (eidos and Idea – which are by no means identical) that does not restrict it to a mere 'static' phenomenology. His studies take into account the diversity of the meanings of essence *in terms of time*; meanings that are often in diametrical opposition to the unworldly Platonic essence or form (a conceptual matrix which has, on occasion, been incorrectly attributed to his philosophy).

Derrida's reading of Husserl's "Origin of Geometry" recognizes the 'dynamic' sense of essence in the concept of *Geschichtlichkeit* – the tension (one might even suggest, ‘dialogue’) between eidos and Idea. Tradition is the articulation of the movement of the Idea, the unfolding of its inscription. The recursive movement by which the Idea announces itself again and again (*immer wieder*) is that which constitutes any form of *Weltanschauung* since it originally traces out an inscription capable of transmission: a significational matrix that is
extended and available for re-iteration. Such 'historicalness' (or its possibility) is thematized in Husserl’s writing by the concept of historicity. For Derrida, it becomes archi-writing. Although this 'writing' indicates a transcendental dimension of the unfolding of history and language, the word ‘writing’ itself is retained by Derrida because of its connection to the worldly, mundane or empirical sphere. The 'actual' graphic performance of writing goes hand in hand with the Idea. The latter is nothing without its articulated transmission in the constitution and maintenance of a tradition / community of thinking (which is just one of the reasons why any reference to the transcendental in Derrida's writing will be preceded by the prefix 'quasi-'). This is of course in direct contradistinction to the Socratic / Platonic assignment of writing (in the Phaedrus) to a merely secondary role.

Essence could be said to be a certain kind of organizational formation announced through the movement of writing. It is fruitful to think this in terms of the tracing of primordial temporalization and Geschichtlichkeit. In this regard, Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, Crisis, and Derrida's Introduction to Husserl's 'Origin of Geometry' are the most significant texts to take into account. What Derrida takes up is the question of the structuralization at work in the historical passage of the Idea – where the Idea is an 'absence,' which is, nonetheless, affective throughout the movement that seeks to realize it. The Idea is not self-subsistent and non-temporal because the historical movement that strives toward its realization actually constitutes it. Therefore, in contradistinction to the Platonic assignment of the ideal to a timeless realm, the Idea – understood (as Husserl says) in the Kantian sense – is precisely nothing without the moments (in flux) that reach out toward it. The expression of the Idea relies on such 'movement.' Therefore, it is far from being outside time. The asymptotic tension between eidos and Idea is precisely the unfolding of historicity. This is the 'inscription' and 'transmission' of tradition and thus the ‘possibility of the Idea: a dialectic between finitization and infinitization.26
The convoluted twists and turns of Husserl's investigations, throughout his development of phenomenological method, announce a rigorous response to the problem of how we can be apodictically certain of anything, and as such they operate on the very cutting edge of philosophical heuristics. At the same time, the articulation of the fundamental sense and role of the epoché – as both breach and transformational return – informs us of the ‘infinite’ horizon of such a task. The question of some kind of totalizing authority at a higher (or lower) level is not something about which we are permitted to speculate. It is rather a question of what is at stake in the movement itself that should be of fundamental concern – the how in contrast to the what. Derrida parenthesizes, by means of a more radical epoché, the 'teleological' sense of such a ‘task’ and speaks of the importance of ‘play.’ However, this does not undermine the value of Husserlian methodology because play, dissemination, fictionalizing, etc., from a functional point of view, are other names for phenomenological eidetics and the movement of 'imaginary variation.'

Husserl, himself, writes that,

…if anyone loves a paradox, he can really say, and say with strict truth if he will allow for the ambiguity, that the element which makes up the life of phenomenology as of all eidetical science is 'fiction;' that fiction is the source whence the knowledge of 'eternal truths' draws its sustenance (Ideas I, § 70,).

The movement of 'fictionalizing' in Husserl's writing is known as the procedure of 'eidetic reduction.' Economically, eide are those moments or aspects of an Ideal (the latter being what Husserl calls an Idea in the Kantian sense) that extend toward a terminus without ever 'actually' attaining or encapsulating it – the ideal / whole sense of which they are articulations or adumbrations. This asymptotic relation between eide and Ideas is remarkable
in that it expresses time and the movement of interrogation beyond the bounds of a merely linear and irreversible movement. Disclosure is the meeting-point between multiple perspectives. The Idea is constituted through this inter-play / negotiation – a movement 'to-and-fro.' Such plurality in play is also the key to the value of Derrida's relation to phenomenology. It is because of such fundamental plurality that there is the possibility of what we would ordinarily call discourse – which includes any 'internal' dialogue by means of which any particular tradition of thought is permitted to thematize its own character and motivation through a process of self-critique. Such a form of critique involves a form of self-distanciation – the space that is constitutive of irony. This pluri-dimensional movement at the heart of any tradition (whose essence cannot be divorced from 'temporal' considerations) is that which permits both renewal and transformation through a play of contrasting orientations / perspectives. Tradition is a mobile matrix. It is not static.

In a more straightforward phenomenologically descriptive sense, eide are those aspects or characteristics of an object (the word ‘object’ being understood in the broadest sense) without which it would cease to be what it is. The general idea is that the practicing phenomenologist, in the attempt to disclose the 'essence' of that which is subjected to eidetic reduction, imaginatively varies the object only up to the point at which its structural integrity, form and meaning would otherwise dissolve. Such play, both in terms of the movement of variation and in terms of the play in the object itself – its lack of 'absolute' fixedness, since its 'essential' elements cannot be divorced from the manner in which it is interrogated, i.e., what the interrogator is interested in – announces that an element of fiction is already at work in an appeal to a regulating principle, essence, concept or Idea, (once again, these are not identical). What is really intriguing is the multiplicity of ways in which this movement implicates time. The dispersive effects of time are also those which permit the possibility of synthesis and
appropriation. Both intertwining movements are at work in the possibility of repetition at the very heart of the Idea – a claim that is fundamental in both Husserl's work and that of Derrida.

The essence of the Ideal lies in its repeat-ability. However, this notion of essence cannot be heterogeneous to that which it articulates. Essence is not a 'static' principle that resides outside time, but is of it. Regulative principles, essences, or grounds have the constitutive function of permitting organization in flux, but they are constituted as well as constituting. Husserl often paraphrases Heraclitus in this respect, and the following comments are probably the most characteristic of Husserl's own position regarding the transcendence, mobility and, in a certain sense, the non-totalizability of essences, regulative principles and 'grounds.'

...every 'ground' [grund] that is reached points to further grounds, every horizon opened up awakens new horizons, and yet the endless whole, in its infinity of flowing movement, is oriented toward the unity of one meaning; not, of course, in such a way that we could ever simply grasp and understand the whole; rather, as soon as one has fairly well mastered the universal form of meaning-formation, the breadths and depths of this total meaning, in its infinite totality, take on valuative [axiotische] dimensions: there arise problems of the totality as that of a universal reason (Crisis, Part III A, §50, p.170).

The movement of phenomenology is an unfolding of ‘depth’ through the articulation of the One and the many and the many and the One – an ongoing negotiation between Parmenides and Heraclitus. It aims at fleshing out the whole, which is an ‘infinite task’ – thus, it is irreducible to a foundationalism. Husserl's implementation of the epoché, in its many different phases – which invariably involve an eidetic aspect – expresses the fundamental
importance of a form of recuperation through distanciation (for distanciation, also read delay and duration) and the open-endedness of possible modifications in orientation that free the 'depth' of the 'whole' from the 'shallow' limits of any non-reflexive and totalizing grasp. The movement is that of 'opening' rather than that of 'closure,' or rather; closure is an operative moment in the movement of opening. Here, the expression closure is not equal to the thought of terminus (e.g., when closing a door on a space behind, has not another space already opened up ahead?). The epoché is a movement of dehiscence, a rip in the fabric of lived experience from which pours forth the structure of its own possibility. In these terms, it is the methodological analogue to the retentional and protentional interwovenness of time in its spacing, where closing is coextensive with opening and distanciation is the other face of a transformational return.

Therefore, the unfolding of the One takes time, since it requires a 'multiplicity' of adumbrations to articulate it, but the very movement of articulation itself is also that which defers adequate fulfilment in that it continually modifies the scope of that towards which it directs itself. Such modification of the meaning of the desired is coextensive with the continuous modification of the sense of the desiring itself. Each alteration grows out of prior reflections in a transgressive movement that always already has the capacity to fold in on itself – but, it is a return that transforms. The methodological epoché is the philosophical gesture that raises this to the level of a theme in its own right as part of its prohibition against metaphysical speculation. Thus, Husserl claims that...

...the phenomenological reduction itself – and this is part of its essence – could reveal its sense, its inner, necessary requirements, and its scope only in steps. Each step required new reflections, new considerations, which in turn were possible only through
the self-understanding and the practiced accomplishment of the other steps (Ibid, Part III B, §71, p. 247).

What emerges out of these ‘steps’ is a non-linear movement consisting of delays and constant detours that trace out a perpetual return to beginnings in an endless process of transformation / transvaluation – an unfolding of deeper levels of understanding whose possible forms are always in excess of what may be anticipated at the moment of inauguration. Furthermore, we may not disdainfully kick away the ladder that has raised awareness to such heady transcendental heights for it is the very same ladder that connects us to all the steps – and thus the depths – of the movement of self-understanding that necessarily led up to them.

The historicity of this movement expresses time both as opening and closure, where continuity and fragmentation must always be thought together and where the meaning of extension is irreducible to the stretching out of any kind of monolithic unity – a monologue. The sense of extension here is also a reference to the stretching out of temporality by means of a ‘delay’ (a holding back) – thus ‘giving’ difference in unity and unity in difference in the constitution of ‘continuity’ / continuous alteration – where the unfolding of a passage (duration) of return (recuperation) is structured upon a kind of ‘detour’ / ‘postponement.’ The unity of any kind of history (including that of the legendary Self / personal identity) is actually inscribed through the extending of a dialogue.

The final pages of the main chapters of The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (the text which had such a profound impact on Merleau-Ponty's thought, e.g., his discourse on the Lebenswelt and Ineinander / chiasm, etc.), give an account of the unity of oneself as a reflexive continuum that is dialogical in form. To reflect is to adopt a position and thus to enter into dialogue with one's past. In a peculiar sense, it is to interact within the community of oneself.
Husserl makes this clear in the *Crisis* when, after establishing the life-world [Lebenswelt] as a 'first intentional heading', by means of the strict implementation of *epoché*, he suggests a shift to a 'second level of reflection,' which...

...leads to the ego-pole and what is peculiar to its identity. Let us here point out only what is most important, the most general aspect of the ego's form, namely, the peculiar temporalization by which it becomes an enduring ego, constituting itself in its time-modalities: the same ego, now actually present, is in a sense, in every past that belongs to it, another – i.e., as that which was and thus is not now – and yet, in the continuity of its time it is one and the same, which is and was and has its future before it.

The ego which is present now, thus temporalized, has contact with its past ego, even though the latter is no longer present: it can have a dialogue with it and criticize it, as it can others (*Crisis*. Part III A, §50, p.172).

This speaks of the original-communality [*Urgemeinschaftung*] of the temporal unfolding of the 'life' of consciousness – a transgressive and recuperative passage through which consciousness has its unity (is simultaneous with itself) precisely by being 'in communication' with itself as Other (its unity is also a spacing). These changes in orientation (distanciating shifts) articulate the pure movement (historicity [*Geschichtlichkeit*]) of each individual history. In other words, the ego is constituted within an *intra*-subjective intentional horizon; whose temporal form unfolds in a way that is structurally analogous to that of *inter*-subjectivity. It is a dialogical temporal-spacing through which it both establishes its continuity and marks itself off from that which it is no longer.²⁷ Time gives the spacing through which there can be dialogue and negotiation – the condition of the possibility of re-evaluation and the fleshing-out of structure and meaning. When speaking about the ‘continuity’ of a life history, it
is easy to lapse into monolithic thinking. What must equally be taken into account is that one’s life as a whole is riddled through and through with discontinuities, which mark out the process of maturation. The continuity of a life is the unfolding of a community of differences stretched out and evolving through time.

The movement of phenomenology (the time of its unfolding / development) as a whole, is one of self-critique, which does not, for instance, detach itself from its past, but through its intrinsic futural thrust permits a change in orientation on the meaning of its past. The same is true of the way in which the past (revisited) gives the future its various contours as an incalculably open field of uncertainties, hopes, fears and expectations. As Merleau-Ponty writes in the preface to the *Phenomenology of Perception*,

Phenomenology...must...put to itself the question which it puts to all branches of knowledge, and so duplicate itself infinitely, being, as Husserl says, a dialogue or infinite meditation, and in so far as it remains faithful to its intention, never knowing where it is going (p.XXI).

The movement of phenomenology is the speaking-out of the absence of any fundamental point of termination. This is not the speech of mourning in the presence of mere lack – an absence made visible – but one that celebrates the thrill of an incalculable mystery precisely as such. It expresses an attitude of philosophical humility that restores a sense of wonder in the face of the infinite.

Since the *epoché* plays such a fundamental role in the realization of the significance of the question of openings and openness throughout the constitution of alternative perspectives (which expresses the 'interminability' of the scope of their interplay), this must surely make us pause when we consider what Derrida’s project is actually doing – e.g., his employment of the
strategy of sous rature, his ironic approach to 'reading' (textual maieutic technique), his project of dissemination, etc.

Deconstruction is a kind of 'philosophy of suspicion' – a strategically non-teleological manoeuvre, which has thematically crystallized a primary operational element in Husserlian method announced by the *epoché* and its various movements of unravelling, bracketing and suspension. In these terms, Derrida continues (in a 'stylistically' more radical way), the task of phenomenology's own critical dialogue with itself as method. Derrida has often been accused of de-contextualizing mere 'moments' of texts – which is an over-simplification of the sense of what he is doing when he ‘displaces’ or ‘re-situates’ them. Deconstruction is a movement of de-sedimentation – a dis-entangling, breaking-up or unravelling (as in the sense of the German word *Auflösen*, which means 'to unravel a mystery'). It is not the kind of disentangling that merely 'renders unintelligibility.' It is the demand for *dialogue with* – in contrast to passive *assimilation of* – traditional theoretical axioms, the motivations that they rationalize, and the milieu of thought that they characterize. Deconstruction, in many ways, can be seen as a healthy poke in the arm of philosophical writing as critique.

What we are faced with is a movement of play / variation that brings out the temporal-spacing of the unfolding of *con-textuality*. If sedimentation indicates 'stratification' or 'reification, on the one hand,' it also expresses evolution, the material inscription of change (which is married to continuity), and the clue to possible futures (expectational horizons) on the other. Although there is a certain kind of 'invariability' about the structural unfolding of history (any *possible* history) – a tracing that both Husserl and Derrida attempt, in their own distinctive styles, to uncover – this does not mean that we are reduced to one meta-context that effectively delimits all others. We are not freed from difference, uncertainty and variability. Variability or the *possibility of variation* is also the condition of the possibility of contextualization – the writing out of differential narratives of the One. In a Husserlian sense,
the unfolding of the interplay between *eide* and their vertical relation to Ideas (which is analogous to a *dialogue*) constitutes the 'depth' and formation (contexture) of the meaning of the Ideal.

To reiterate, it is precisely along these lines that the theme of play in Derrida's deconstruction has much in common with Husserl's discourse on imaginary variation and eidetic reduction as *fictionalizing*. Play is 'differing and deferring' – play disseminates – it is fictionalizing. As such, the non-teleological strategies permitted by the movement of play are non-teleological precisely by virtue of the fact that play or dissemination is a 'de-centering.' It cannot help but displace the intimately related questions of origins and ends through the very process of unravelling that it traces – which is to say that there is a certain kind of freedom in the movement of return. This is a freedom that deconstruction expresses by thematizing the form of its own passage as one that embraces both "chance and necessity" ("Différance," *Margins*. p.7).

There is no 'pure origin,' primordial 'centre,' ideal simplicity, or synthesis that draws deconstruction (or in the most general sense, any form of interrogation) inexorably towards itself. From the point of view of the language of presence, such a centre can only ever be an idealization – a fiction constituted by *work*. Derrida's essay "Ellipsis" (*Writing and Difference [WD]*) perfectly illustrates the breach in the concept of the centre as both origin and telos of Western metaphysics (in terms of the space opened by the examination of the open differential / deferring spacing between the 'book' and the 'text'). What is intimated in the structure of such a breach is an absolute lacuna – a sort of purified Sartrean nothingness "...an unnameable bottomless well" ("Ellipsis," *WD*. p.297). As the ‘opening’ of all possible articulation, it necessarily effaces itself. It is pure effacement. This lack is the motivation to write, to speak-out.28
Unlike the hermeneutical gaze (as Derrida sees it), deconstruction does not give itself up to a drive that seeks to passively unearth a pure plenitude of meaning, but instead, it recognizes its responsibility to thematize that which 'actively,' although invisibly, traces itself out in the drive itself. The space opened here permits an interrogation of characters/styles of interrogation and the constitutive impact they have on that which they bring to light. The clues to the strategic and theoretical relevance of this perspective, as already indicated, are to be found in the Derridian concept of 'play' and the Husserlian method of 'fictionalizing.' Such play or fictionalizing is possible because of the pure absence / non-presence of a centre or primordial substrate of meaning. Like an Idea 'in the Kantian sense,' it recedes infinitely: it is a finite infinity (an ideal finitude, but empirically non-totalizable, non-realizable). The passage to the 'limit' is infinite. This is an asymptotic relation of Eleatic proportions – Achilles cannot catch up with the tortoise.

Therefore, deconstruction, in contradistinction to the anxiety or dread in the face of the future about which such luminaries as Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre speak, joyfully celebrates the openness and uncertainty of its futural horizons. Nietzsche's influence here is clearly apparent. Husserl's own comments on the sense of fictionalizing in the 'imaginary variation' at work (or in play) in the movement of eidetic reduction (Ideas 1. Sec 70, p.184 – which Derrida himself remarks upon in his Introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry, p.45 as the "vital element of phenomenology") is one of the principal sources of the logic that is intrinsic to the dynamic, constitutive and disruptive play of Derridian dissemination. This thematization of the element of fiction in eidetic reduction is the methodical announcement of the phenomenological opening through which deconstruction emerges as the expression of both rigour and play. The originality of Derridian thought and hyper-textual manoeuvrability partly lies in the fact that although he is a master of hermeneutic technique he does not restrict his writing to that of a hermeneutical teleology.²⁹ It is not a question of rigour or play. In the
context of Derrida's writing, there is no either / or. Is this then also the case for the and / or of task and / or play?

Deconstructive play is passive and active, responsive and provocative – which returns us to the fundamental sense of deconstructive 'adventure' as indicated above, a joyful embrace of both chance and necessity; a project that is both playful and rigorous. However, with this thought, do we find Derrida transgressing the horizon that Husserl repeatedly expressed as an 'infinite task'? Have we burst through some kind of phenomenological membrane where the last echoes of the call "to the things / matters themselves!" fade into a past now only delivered up to the 'ironic' gaze of deconstruction? Such motifs of deconstructive practice as the attitudes of sous rature, dissemination, de-sedimentation and irony (which always announce themselves through play) express an openness beyond specific tasks, no matter how inexhaustible in scope, in that they speak rather of infinite play. Is this the point at which play is freed from the 'teleology' of the task? As Derrida writes in *Of Grammatology*,

One could call play the absence of the transcendental signified as limitlessness of play, that is to say as the destruction of onto-theology and the metaphysics of presence (p.50).

But, is this to free play from the teleology of the task or to turn to play in such a way as to transfigure the sense of the task? Did Husserl reduce play or fictionalizing to the limits of predelineated tasks – thus indicating that his project was still absorbed within an agenda rooted in the dimension of presuppositional thinking that he called the 'natural attitude'? Has play always been subsumed in this way? Does Derrida effectively deconstruct the notion of the 'task' to the point at which 'play' shows itself to extend beyond its limitations in such a way as to express the open field through which the sense of a task can first be explored? Is it the case
that in Husserl's work we find the method of play initiated under the guiding influence and thus 'limiting parameters' of a specific teleological drive, i.e., a *task* which aims toward totalization, absolute disclosure, full and immediate presence? But, does not Husserl repeatedly deny such a possibility? Does Derrida's deconstruction, then, announce a significant difference to phenomenology by freeing play from teleology in general – or is the question of 'teleology' itself, perhaps, subtly subjected to a new style of interrogation? The anticipation of this can actually be found in Husserl's examination of the possibility of a transcendental-phenomenology of history and the development of the concept of *Geschichtlichkeit* in the *Crisis*.

The primary concern for Husserl (especially in the latter stages of the *Crisis*) is to further undertake a careful examination of the methodological role and limits of transcendental-phenomenological reduction (*epoché*) – a movement that continuously displaces the question of origins and defers the question of ends. How could a 'perpetual return to beginnings' do otherwise?
7. The Epochal Play of Time as Task

In *Of Grammatology*, Derrida writes...

To think play radically the ontological and transcendental problematics must first be seriously *exhausted*; the question of the meaning of being, the being of the entity and of the transcendental origin of the world – must be patiently and rigorously worked through, the critical movement of the Husserlian and Heideggerian questions must be effectively followed to the very end, and their effectiveness and legibility must be conserved. Even if it were crossed out, without it the concepts of play and writing to which I shall have recourse will remain caught within regional limits and an empiricist, positivist, or metaphysical discourse. The counter-move that the holders of such a discourse would oppose to the precritical tradition and to metaphysical speculation would be nothing but the worldly representation of their own operation. It is therefore *the game of the world* that must be first thought; before attempting to understand all the forms of play in the world (p.50).

In its very aim, does not the generality of a project that seeks to uncover "*the game of the world*," as opposed to "attempting to understand all the forms of play in the world," indicate, from the very beginning, a danger of conflation? Does this not implicate a form of violence that forces disparate elements into some overarching unity that is superimposed upon them? In general terms, would this not undermine Derrida's own call to 'rigour' – that the texts under examination be allowed to deconstruct themselves according to their own logics? Is there not also the possibility of interpreting this project as one that is 'essentialist' in
orientation? Is there not the suggestion that "all the forms of play in the world" should be tackled on the basis of "the game of the world"?

It is also a question of whether the central questions raised by Husserl and Heidegger have actually been 'followed to the very end' but, even more importantly, we need to continue to ask: what is meant by 'end'? There is no 'beyond' to philosophy, as Derrida himself makes quite clear. The end-limit recedes infinitely. 'Closure,' then? But, what would closure actually mean in regard to the limits of transcendental phenomenology?

Perhaps Derrida is primarily 'playing' with the issues of origin and telos – subjecting them to a subtle form of problematization, and thus submitting the course of his own project to a certain ironic orientation or self-*epoché*. The sense of play, 'as the absence of a goal,' finds its origins in Derrida's readings of both Husserl and Saussure on the questions of intentionality on the one hand, and the sign on the other. Derrida's notion of the ‘trace’ emerges out of a model of signification in which we are to speak of a 'play of signifiers without an original extra-significational referent.'

This mirrors one of Husserl's earliest moves – the phenomenological reduction. The manoeuvre, through which phenomenology initiates a radical yet responsible critical gesture, 'suspends' any position-taking with regard to the horizon of presuppositional being that is referred to as the 'natural attitude' – which is, in principle, the name of a non-reflexive and habituated orientation. It is not the phenomenon of being that is bracketed (and even less is it doubted), but a certain way of being: a Weltanshauung, a noesis, a thesis. The Welthesis of the natural attitude is suspended. It is not lost, but parenthesized. This radical displacement, this lateralization of orientation, constitutes an opening that restores a certain wonder. The methodological withdrawal from any continued participation, of a merely passive order, within its limits is motivated by a call to focus on the world as phenomenon (as the unity of the out-
standing – ekstatic – logics of appearing and appearance). No metaphysical decision is made about the actuality or inactuality of any extra-phenomenal substratum.

The familiar becomes strange and thus begins to stand-out. Familiarity is the site of a kind of recession of presence; it is undemanding, it asks nothing of us and so it shrouds itself in invisibility. The comfortable withdraws itself within the homeliness of habit (habitation / habituation – habitat / habitus) and only finds its voice when its strangeness is restored. That which is the most familiar, the closest in proximity, is for this very reason that which is farthest from us. The familiar is not at the focus of vision; it recedes into a bland undifferentiated horizon. Like the stand-point of vision, the place from which sight extends itself, it is a blind-spot.  

Within the brackets of the phenomenological reduction, the noetic-noematic correlation or intentional intertwining is the phenomenological-eidetic correlate to Saussure's radicalization of the signifier / signified relation as one which has no 'natural attachment' to an extra-linguistic reality – a 'naturalness' that is thereby permitted to open itself up to interrogation.

When it is a question of the appearing of meaning or sense, the so-called thing-in-itself does not do any of the real work. The logics at play here owe a great deal to Husserl's reading of Berkeley and Hume – both of whom subjected Locke's theoretical disjunction between primary and secondary qualities to the most critical of examinations. The distinction crumbles under their sceptical gaze. However, their sceptical orientation allowed the re-emergence of idealism through the backdoor. As far as Husserl was concerned, their attitudes were indicative of a drive that merely assumed the standpoint of a diametrical opposition – and thus trapped them within presuppositional limits that they had failed to recognize. If Husserl's procedure of reduction is 'sceptical' in character, it is only so in a methodological sense. Here it is a question
of style, critical vigilance, or strategy rather than doctrine in the form of a mere counter-
thought.

Husserl's project is concerned with the phenomenality of meaning – the unfolding of
sense as 'intentional relation.' Intentionality does not refer to a relation that holds between
appearances and things-in-themselves, but to the structurality of appearing itself – the
articulation of significance. This is the difference that sets phenomenology apart from a mere
phenomenalism, naturalism, or psychologism. Similarly, Husserl escapes the naïveté of
scepticism. It is the 'method' of phenomenology itself that prohibits the assumption of a
standpoint on any type of referentiality or connectedness other than that of intentionality. The
phenomenological reduction is not so much an exercise in 'systematic doubt' as one of
'systematic suspension.' That which is bracketed is still, in a certain sense, retained – but in
parentheses. The noetic-noematic correlation (whose structure stands out by means of an
eidetic reduction) is an 'intentional unity' of signifer and signified – but, within the dimension
of this phenomenological orientation this is a matrix that has no necessary relation to any
absolute or substantive signified outside itself.

What we have here is a referential interplay that has no need of absolute referents. This
is not so much representative of a reduction that 'closes-off' as one which 'opens-up' its field –
motivated by a concern that addresses itself to the structurality of intentional play rather than
that of relations of cause and effect. The latter is parenthesized along with what Husserl calls
the 'natural attitude.' The world as world-thesis is retained, but the very sense of the
'naturalness' of this thesis is itself put into question. In other words, it is subjected to a form of
play. This procedure thematizes itself through the very movement of epoché – a movement
that discloses sense precisely at the moment at which it is breached. It thematizes at the level
of method that which is already operative in perception, language or the movement of
signification; a trace of postponement, a detour that disrupts in order to disclose. For Derrida,
also, play is openness without specific spatial and causal limitation (thing-in-itself, absolute referent, centeredness, etc.), and without determinate temporal limitation (the present, origin, telos, etc.). Play is the opening through which he discourses on different kinds of trace structure – where trace is not a trace of any thing.

Derrida’s deconstructive play on the phenomenological \textit{epoché} announces that…

The instituted trace...has no 'natural attachment' to the signified within reality. For us, the rupture of that 'natural attachment' puts in question the idea of naturalness rather than that of attachment. That is why the word 'institution' should not be too quickly interpreted within the classical system of oppositions.

The instituted trace cannot be thought without thinking the retention of difference within a structure of reference where difference appears \textit{as such} and thus permits a certain liberty of variations among the full terms (\textit{OG}. p.46-47).

Firstly, the phrase "...where difference appears as such" shows how even the functioning of difference with respect to the “instituted trace” cannot do without presence to some extent. However, such difference, here, is constituted (as we shall see) by means of a certain delay at work in retention – which is not present except as a trace of itself in the difference that appears. Of the two moments of \textit{différance}, it is only really deferral that resists the language of presence. We say 'resist' – it is not 'beyond' it as that which is alien to presence. Their relation is in fact intimate – so intimate that it can no longer be 'seen.' Secondly, the all-too-casual use of the expression 'the retention of difference' reafirms Derrida's indebtedness to Husserl's theory of intentionality and his studies on time-consciousness. This should not go unnoticed. Furthermore, it implicitly replays the 'structure' of Husserl's noetic-noematic correlation (\textit{intentional} relation), which can be understood as a synthesis of the language of
appearances and the language of appearing without presupposing a 'connection' or 'natural attachment' to things-in-themselves. The call "to the things / matters themselves" announces a project that entirely re-situates itself with respect to the old ontological divide.

This brings us to a third and most vital point. As we have already seen, the opening-up of the noetic-noematic intentional space is facilitated by the procedure of epoché. In this case, it is a double movement of phenomenological reduction, which is a reorientation that concerns itself with the world as phenomenon, coupled with an eidetic reduction, which focuses on the essential structures of the experience of phenomena. In these terms, the epoché permits a turn to the essential configurations of experience in its pure generality while, at the same time, it allows us to concentrate on the 'phenomenality of meaning' by suspending any position-taking in regard to the question of an extra-phenomenal reality. We are left with an intentional synthesis of meaning and meant, where the noema of the noesis is the meaning of its meant. It is a shift that puts the questions of 'naturalness' and 'attachment' into question. Derrida may only be concerned with the former, but, for Husserl, it is also a question of re-considering the sense of 'attachment' or 'connectedness.' The peculiar form of epochal return to this question is that which literally opens up the horizon of intentionality – and thus the space of phenomenology itself. This is the opening that traces the tortuous paths of the many different moments of the epoché (phenomenological reduction, eidetic reduction, transcendental-phenomenological reduction, Abbau and Aufbau, etc.).

Derrida, himself, shows us that one of the most fundamental themes of the philosophies of Husserl and Saussure is that the signifer / signified relation (or sense and reference) does not depend on any substantive, extra-linguistic reality outside itself. However, he also seeks to go further. What he is interested in bringing to light is the very 'structurality' of signification as trace. Derrida maintains that…
…the trace affects the totality of the sign in both its faces. That the signified is originarily and essentially (and not only for a finite and created spirit) trace, that it is always already in the position of the signifier (Ibid, p.73).

Derrida arrives at this thought only after having worked through the logic of the Husserlian intentional correlation between 'appearance' and 'appearing.'

The unheard difference between the appearing and the appearance [l'apparaissant et l'apparaître] (between the 'world' and 'lived experience') is the condition of all other differences, of all other traces, and it is already trace. This last concept is thus absolutely and by rights 'anterior' to all physiological problematics concerning the nature of the engramme [the unit of engraving], or metaphysical problematics concerning the meaning of absolute presence whose trace is thus opened to deciphering. The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general. The trace is the différance which opens appearance [l'apparaître] and signification (Ibid, p.65).

What we have here is a radicalization of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, which is fully cognizant of the profundity of the development of the theme of epoché in Husserl's work. It is a radicalization that brings together the epochal moves that lead to the transcendental orientation of Husserl's Crisis by taking them to their limits.32 The movement of primordial temporalization, as the unfolding of historicity for Husserl, is precisely archi-writing for Derrida – and archi-writing is another name for the structure of the trace. However, Derrida goes on to say that,
The concepts of present, past, and future, everything in the concepts of time and history which implies evidence of them – the metaphysical concept of time in general – cannot adequately describe the structure of the trace (Ibid, p.67).

Firstly, with what notion of 'evidence' is Derrida working? Secondly, can he really speak of a 'metaphysical concept of time in general'? And thirdly, is it legitimate of him to argue that the 'structure of the trace' cannot be adequately described in temporal terms? Is not 'delay' one of the principal aspects of différance? The neologism actually makes reference to both 'spatializing and temporalizing' in their intertwining, where temporizing is spacing and spacing is temporizing.

The phenomenological discourse on the interplay of retention and protention is vital to Derrida's thesis that there is no 'pure origin' – see Speech and Phenomena, for instance, with the (only apparently) startling claim that..."there never was any 'perception'" (The section entitled, "The Supplement of Origin," p.103). One of course, one has to ask about which sense of perception he is actually discussing. Husserl gives two definitions in The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness [PITC] – and Derrida refers to both in Speech and Phenomena.

At first, Husserl defines perception as an 'originary presentation,' but with a bias toward that which is given 'now' (see §16, PITC) – which means that provisionally, perception is contrasted with primary remembrance (retention). However, in continuing the thought of perception in terms of originary giving, Husserl later claims that retention, too, is an 'originary presentation' since it is that through which the past or no-longer-now is 'originally' given (see §17, Ibid) – and which is always already a background to the now.

Derrida plays with the movement here. His arguments revolve around seeing the former characterization of perception as the one that provides the foundation of the latter. In
fact, Husserl's movement unearths a deeper dimension to the former – digging beneath the foundation. Since the now can be nothing for itself, as far as Husserl is concerned, any now-presentation must necessarily have a past-horizon from which that which is given in the present moment can stand out in relief as that which is now. And, since the present moment is the fulfilment of a past protention, it necessarily contains reference to a futural horizon of further possible fulfilments in ever-flowing future present-perceptions.

Although Derrida, on many occasions, subjects Husserl's phenomenology to an a chronological and non-linear critique, his reading still treats the phenomenological enterprise as something that is linear in itself. However, Husserl's movement from perception as 'now-presentation' to perception in the broader sense as 'originary-presentation' – which includes retention and protention – does not follow a linear architecture. The former determination does not provide the foundation for the later. It is effectively superseded through a form of sublation. The latter is an overturning of the former – digging deeper rather than forging ahead.

The principal logic at work in Derrida's claim that "there never was any 'perception'" is founded upon Husserl's own discourse on the temporalizing structures of return, which are produced by the interplay of retention and protention. This is a primordial intertwining, which constitutes presence, the present, present perception, remembrance and expectation – the Living Present (lebendige Gegenwart) of experience in general. Consciousness is always already extended. In other words, there never was any 'original' or 'non-extended' perception that started the sequence. Consciousness lives in the effect of its own repetition – and this is the necessary 'horizon' of all experience. However, from Husserl's point of view, this can also mean that 'there has always been perception' – in that perception is another name for what is essentially an extended / extending horizon. Extendedness is part of its essence – which is to say that the structure of the 'always already' is the constitutive horizon of that which he calls
perception: its timeliness. For Derrida, the horizon of the 'always already' is named by the expression: *trace*.

With Derrida's announcement that "there never was any perception," perception is being defined in the first sense – which is why he does not qualify the statement with the addition of 'original' or 'non-extended.' However, it is insufficient to characterize Husserl's meaning of perception in these terms as it denies his profound insights on the temporalization of consciousness – that which constitutes its horizons. His discourse on temporalization cannot be limited to Derrida's reduction of the themes of time and presence.

This reduction of all discourse on time to a mundane language of presence (an apparently naïve or unreflective metaphysic) is subjected to a careful critique in David Wood's *Deconstruction of Time*. He points out that the language of temporality is still operative in Derridian deconstruction – and for very good reasons (from a theoretical point of view, I am in sympathy with Wood's position when he criticizes Derrida on this point). However, at the same time, Derrida attempts to avoid adhering to the metaphysical foundations upon which his language is based. The question is: does he merely use the vocabulary of time (according to a transcendental-phenomenological perspective) under erasure (*sous rature*) and if so, why is he not explicit about this in a consistent manner? For example, in *Of Grammatology* (and this is by no means the only text), there are numerous examples of Derrida's utilization of the terms retention and protention. These expressions have been appropriated from Husserl’s writing, but without explicit reference to their functional and theoretical origin in *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* (despite the fact that these terms play a crucial role in Derrida's delineation of the various senses of *différance* – as the opening-up of differences, as archi-writing, trace, iterability, supplementarity, etc). We shall see how the form of the interplay between retention and protention, as originally described by Husserl in his lectures on temporality, is integral to the movement / tracing designated by Derrida's quasi-concept
différence. This casts doubt on the validity of Derrida's general characterizations of philosophical discourse on time and puts into question the degree to which he imagines that its substitution by such terms as archi-writing, trace, supplementarity, etc., exceeds the limits of the language of temporality as explored by phenomenology.

As Wood writes in *The Deconstruction of Time*,

...the belief that a postmetaphysical account of temporality can rise again after Derrida must surely be encouraged by his inability to keep temporally loaded terms out of his analysis (p.113).

Derrida has no option but to utilize the language of temporality, but he does so 'under erasure' [sous rature]. This is precisely a 'strategic suspension' or 'displacement,' which permits play, or rather, is the *articulation* of play itself. The very possibility of such play is expressive of the *pure movement of epoché* – the tracing of an altering return through a detour or delay.

It is this sense of *epoché* that guides the present thesis toward an exploration of the theme of temporality as it emerges in Husserl's work and that of Derrida. This horizon of temporality *gives* spatiality through a giving of itself to itself, a temporalizing / spatializing writing, which recovers (returns upon) itself only by originally displacing / deferring itself.

Accordingly, this study resonates with the theme of *time as epoché*, for such movement signifies in itself all the elements of postponement, delay, reserve, detour, etc., that are pivotal for Derrida's delineation of the structurality of the trace. The 'ends' of the following inquiry exemplify a form of *return that transforms* and puts into question the limits of the Derridian project in which “ontological and transcendental problematics must first be seriously exhausted," and where "the critical movement of the Husserlian and Heideggerian questions must be effectively followed to the very end." There is no 'end.' It is rather a question of
whether such a following-through represents a transfigurative continuation on the basis of a certain critical vigilance or whether such a task is undertaken in the hope of a radical break. How could there ever be such a breach, where the 'end' would be a complete distanciation from roots, tradition, teleology, phenomenality, Oedipality and habits of thinking?

When we consider that these questions make reference to the movement of transformative return that originally defines the unfolding of phenomenological method – that this tradition of interrogation is always already in process of radically re-situating (or re-reading / writing) itself – then in what sense can we speak of its 'exhaustion?' Husserl's phenomenology dances at the very edge of an envelope that pushes ever outward by folding in on itself – critically.

At the 'end' of philosophy, one actually has to be aware that this is not a realizable point of termination. The end of philosophy is a horizon that constantly recedes into the distance, not a termination point or a springboard for some quantum leap into a beyond of philosophy. See Derrida's own remarks on the problematic idea of the 'death of philosophy' in the interview "Implications" (Positions, p.6). The distance to some mythical moment of absolute closure can be crossed no more than Achilles, to repeat a favourite paradigm, can catch up with the tortoise. Of course, Derrida's utilization of the term 'closure' steers clear of any notions of absolute termination. It is rather related to the idea of a working-through of philosophical problems to the point of their own 'exhaustion.'

However, there is a great difference between the establishment of such a task, as a regulative principle of critical comportment, and the actual fulfilment of the project. One cannot help feeling that Derrida exhausted himself first.

His writing between the years of 1962-68 presents an agenda that is not necessarily in place after this phase. What does bind the different time frames in Derrida's writing is a continued working-through of the methods of deconstruction. The working theoretical models
with which Derrida plays are still in performance, but the themes to which his writing directs itself – and the style of the writing itself – have obviously changed (although the publication of his MA dissertation has marked a kind of return). Does this suggest, perhaps, that Derrida just got bored with the task in which to "...think play radically the ontological and transcendental problematics must first be seriously exhausted..." (OG. p.50) or that this is a task that has already been completed? Does Derrida really leave us with so little left to say? Surely not! The above sentence is misleading in the rather inappropriate italicization of the word exhausted (with all its eschatological resonances).

The emphasis, given the larger context of the passage, should rest with "seriously." This makes reference to 'attitude' – the 'how' rather than the 'what.' Derrida is expressing the complementary relationship between play and rigour.

The phenomenological discourse on time and the structure of play, when understood according to the logic of epoché, announces urgent questions about the actual scope of Derrida’s project of deconstruction. It raises serious objections concerning its reduction of the history of Western philosophy – by means of its engagement with phenomenology – to a single continuous strand that apparently cannot be divorced from the limits of what Derrida describes in terms of a desire for pure unmediated presence. Here, presence really translates as evidence – but what kind? This question echoes, in a slightly different way, the issue concerning which type of perception Derrida is talking about when he writes "...there never was any perception."

Husserl is concerned with the rigorous description of many different kinds of evidence that have their own forms of registration or signature. For instance, there is an important distinction between what Husserl calls apodictic evidence and that which would be classed as adequate. Apodicticity is sheer obviousness; it refers to a horizon that must be presupposed by any mediate form of evidence, which our language already requires in order to function. Yet, that which is apodictic does not 'present' itself adequately. Like an Idea in the Kantian sense, it
recedes, leaving only traces of itself. It lies open as a possible field of work that aims at its disclosure. To do this 'adequately' makes reference to the regulative principle of the conduct of interrogation. However, adequacy itself, as an actual attainment, is merely an Ideal goal. Full, unmediated disclosure – presence – is impossible. There can be no actual point of termination. There is only an endless return in which phenomenology is in dialogue with itself. The movement is not linear and homogenous. It is a mobile matrix of differing and deferring orientations, re-directing itself along many different paths, where the thought of detour / postponement is raised to the level of a methodological gesture.

Phenomenology is motivated by a drive toward clarity of meaning on the basis of that which 'gives' itself: evidence. However, such evidence can also be a kind of withdrawal of presence. The phenomenological striving for 'adequate' evidence – as a regulative principle of comportment – is a movement which already understands that fulfilment is constantly deferred by the very methods put to use in the name of such interrogation. Once again, it is a question of the asymptotic tension between eidos and Idea (the Idea in the Kantian sense). Derrida discovers the logics of the deconstruction of presence within phenomenology itself – and this is the primary theme of his very first published text, *Husserl's "Origin of Geometry": An Introduction*.

However, it is Derrida's later strategic misrepresentations of Husserl – a trend that started with *Speech and Phenomena* (as a kind of maieutic or even 'cat and mouse' form of play) – that creates the illusion that phenomenology is no more than the last stronghold of a naïve metaphysic. The true radicality of Derrida's orientation is something that, in fact, needs to be interrogated and assessed on the basis of its participation in the history of what is already a radical tradition of thinking.

The theme of 'return' shall be our guide and pivot for what follows.
PART ONE: RE-READING THE DECONSTRUCTION OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Because we are beginning to write, to write differently, we must reread differently.¹

Jacques Derrida

8. The Theatre of Dialogical Play

A phenomenological-deconstructive turn toward the significance of the issue of 'return / repetition' in Husserl's treatment of the question of the temporality of lived-experience demands care in its own movement of re-turn. Certainly if it is to open up the possibility of 'critically' re-reading Derrida's texts on the basis of the limits of his own readings and re-readings of Husserl.

Our task is to open up an inter-dialogical field in which we can begin to deconstruct the intra-dialogical matrix of Derrida's criticisms of Husserlian phenomenology in his early work. The possibility of such an inter-dialogical opening rests on restoring Husserl's voice, so to speak – not the inner phenomenological voice that Derrida thematizes and criticizes, but the voice of Husserl, the radical philosopher and perpetual beginner: Husserl, the Other. Which is
to say that we must restore Husserl as textual interlocutor to the Derridian text in order that the latter may, once again, open itself up to the possibility of inter-dialogical engagement – that is, open itself up to a certain outside: a deconstruction of deconstruction. This would be the point at which a deconstruction of phenomenology would coincide with a phenomenology of deconstruction. Our aim must extend beyond the parameters of Derrida's specific characterizations of phenomenology – characterizations that, strategically, leave little actual room for 'dialogical exchange.'

There can be no 'absolutely' neutral position for us at the inauguration of this opening. Neither can we hope to attain such an 'ideal' neutrality at a later stage as this horizon of dialogical possibilities unfolds itself. The vertiginous pluri-dimensionality of this space (or spacing) constantly forces us to take up positions. Could a dialogical analysis, if it is to show fidelity to its task, ever do otherwise? This is equally true for Husserl and Derrida as interlocutors. There can be no closure here. Both can and must speak – with new and vital resonances that cannot be anticipated or contained by any re-reading or series of re-readings.

Our task, then, does not consist in an attempt to unearth a 'royal road' to some kind of totalizing view of the field. The aim is oriented in a critical manner toward certain questions concerning the politics of reading. Moreover, if the dialogical dimensions announced by these questions are to be rigorously explored, such a 'politics of reading' must be interrogated in terms of the politics of re-reading. We shall see that the latter, rather than being contingent upon the former (in the way of a relation between before and after, if / then, or genus and species), is that which first opens what we would normally designate as a politics of reading.

What is required in the manner of our insertion into this dialogical opening / spacing between Husserl and Derrida is a concernful sense of irony. We should take care not to simply plunge in without due regard to the character and bias of our attitude toward each interlocutor, since it is within the fold of our reading (not simply my reading – note the scarcity of first
person singular personal pronouns in this writing – given that the reader is already involved in
some degree of dialogical negotiation with this text) that Husserl and Derrida enter into
discourse with one another. The trick is to endeavour, with the utmost care and vigilance, to
monitor our tendencies toward merely limiting our reading through the eyes of either one or
the other. To help facilitate this strategic aim, we need the addition of a further frame of
reference that will help us to maintain some kind of balance. For reasons that will shortly
become apparent, Rodolphe Gasché's text, *The Tain of the Mirror*, performs this role very
neatly.

To be sure, the suspension of any bias on our part is an *ideal goal* that even the most
rigorous style of investigation can only ever approximate. At the same time, 'excessive' rigour,
in the form of obsessive self-critique, can lead to a kind of slippage that would undermine the
possibility of such a project from the very start. Let us take our cue from Derrida and say that
we must give ourselves up to both 'chance and necessity.' By introducing Gasché's *Tain of the
Mirror* in the role of textual third-person – as a kind of 'provisional' middle-voice, but not one
that is immune to critique – it becomes necessary to articulate some general differences
between the Derridian text and the milieu or tradition of reading to which it has given rise.
This milieu is responsible for the 'dissemination' of Derrida's work in both senses of 'spreading'
the word and 'fragmenting' it. There has been a certain degree of carelessness in the
appropriation of the logics, styles and claims of Derrida's early writing by some of his
contemporary acolytes – and yet it is through this milieu that we return to the Derridian text.
Indeed, for those who seek 'introductions' to Derrida, which promise to demystify his often,
difficult style, this is doubly true. We may even inquire as to what extent his work is
influenced by the writings of his acolytes, commentators and avatars. Derrida does not give us
the last word on deconstruction. And, from another point of view, when we consider some of
the work of his commentators, which continue to re-situate the logics of the origins of
deconstruction, neither is he the first. These considerations must be raised in order to indicate the extreme difficulties involved in any attempt to pinpoint the differences between the Derridian text and the larger deconstructive text or tradition that has grown in its wake. The evolution of this tradition has brought with it an evolution and a revolution in the way in which Derrida is re-read. This milieu of deconstruction or deconstruction[s] (the latter requiring that we also substitute evolution and revolution with their plural form[s]), as a matrix of interwoven texts, is in dialogue with itself – but often in such a way as to exclude the possibility of an open dialogical exchange with an outside since one of its key critical approaches in its engagement with texts involves a strategic suspension of the ‘values’ of its textual Other. It proceeds by way of a kind of methodical irony that continually displaces the Other's opportunity and means for an 'effective' rejoinder. Although Derrida's deconstructive 'strategy' is, in many ways, a contemporary parallel to Socrates’ maieutic technique of disputation, in that he insists on the analysis taking place within the margins of that which it subjects to deconstruction (by utilizing the same language), this is not always the case in practice. Wood has coined an appropriate expression for what is a rather irritating and, at times, a disingenuous, attitude in deconstruction, which often considers itself immune from criticism by its victims. Critical responses are often dismissed on the basis that they are said to remain caught up in the limits of a logocentric discourse, whose very canons of epistemic accountability are already under erasure (through the method of deconstructive critique). As Wood writes in *The Deconstruction of Time*, "The structure of this defense mechanism is classic. It could be called rebuttal by preemptive engulfment" (p.268).

The deconstruction of the Derridian text must, to a certain extent, simultaneously involve the deconstruction of what has become a tradition of deconstructive readings – readings that have collectively produced a new kind of canon for writing. This in itself indicates a uniquely ironic state of affairs that appears to run counter to the strategic thrust of
Derrida's utilization of deconstructive techniques: – as critical devices whose 'play' cannot be that of a comfortable self-regulating science or tradition. Deconstruction undermines the possibility of itself as a tradition since it is a critical movement which must, in principle, always remain *unsettling* in relation to itself: to win is to lose and to lose is to win.

It is required that we turn to certain themes in Derrida's writing that have remained unquestioned. We cannot engage in a critique of every writer in the milieu, but we can turn to those issues presented in Derrida's own writing that operate invisibly and without question in this sphere – like a general mood. Gasché's book is valuable in this context because it is one of the most philosophically rigorous examples of deconstructive writing on deconstruction. However, at the same time, it is not sufficiently critical of Derrida's 'strong' claims, which still persist in colouring the reader's perception of the actual limits of phenomenology – and, in turn, the limits of deconstruction, itself.

This is one of a number of strategic reasons why *The Tain of the Mirror* acts as a kind of pivot for the following inquiries. One cannot ignore the impact that Gasché's book has had as an original piece of writing in its own right. This text is not merely a commentary on deconstruction; it presents a clearly worked out thesis that makes a significant contribution to the self-understanding of deconstructive thought. Gasché's book has had a massive impact on the contemporary philosophy and non-philosophy arena (a distinction that is rapidly becoming more difficult to grasp). Readers who are not remotely interested in the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and Derridian deconstruction, constantly refer to it, quote from it and praise it – and with very good reason. However, is there not also a danger in this that has to do with the possibility of confusing Derrida with Gasché's Derrida? The book is extremely well informed, and the arguments are often seductive. The overall programme unfolds at a careful pace and, most of all, Gasché's text presents a powerful study of deconstruction's roots in the most rigorous methods of what one might call 'respectable' philosophy. All in all, it is a
landmark text for arguing against the iconoclastic excesses of certain proponents of
deconstruction and a compelling apologia that aims toward the recruitment of the
philosophically unconvinced. Given the widescale dissemination of *The Tain of the Mirror*
amongst Derridian scholarship it is interesting (and perhaps also a cause for anxiety) that there
are very few writers that have engaged with this text on a 'critical' level. And, it is precisely
those issues in Gasché's book, which go without question, that point to something rather like a
general tone or mood in the contemporary milieu of deconstruction – a contextual backdrop
that needs to be unravelled and subjected to critique.

The only text (which in my opinion is worth citing), that does engage in serious critique
is a short article by Claude Evans entitled "Phenomenological Deconstruction: Husserl's
Method of Abbau" (*The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol.21, No.1,
1990). The essay examines Gasché's determination of the origins of the method of Abbau
(unbuilding / deconstruction) and its relation to the question of reflection and shows how he is
mistaken in assigning the introduction of this technique to Heidegger instead of Husserl.

*The Tain of the Mirror* is generally treated as if it was some kind of 'manual' on
deconstruction and, more specifically, 'the' exemplary examination of the relations between
phenomenology and deconstruction. However, Gasché's book still treats this relationship as a
movement of surpassing from one to the other. It is more a genealogical study of the
movement from phenomenonology to deconstruction. In other words, it is principally linear in its
approach. Issues of chronology are important, and we shall explore many references of an
historico-logical order, but they can never be sufficient. This is particularly the case in view of
the ways in which phenomenology and deconstruction have already problematized the
traditional assignment of a certain privilege to this limited dimension of history and historical
analysis.
It must be stressed, at this point, that Gasché's book is introduced here not as an archetypal expression of the contemporary face of deconstruction, but as one moment or perspective that is situated within it. It is one orientation, one voice at work in a deconstructive milieu of *intra*-dialogical exchange that simultaneously 'positions' itself, in a critical manner, in relation-to this horizon. However, this is not to say that Gasché presents a sufficient critique of Derrida.

The critical orientation of *The Tain of the Mirror* presents us with a powerful and eloquent attack on a pervasive tendency in deconstruction to see itself as a basically 'anarchic' enterprise: a non-structural, non-systematic, a-logical game. However, despite the clear value and effectiveness of his project to undermine this tendency, Gasché's 'structurally oriented' language (though scholarly) has certain ill-effects that also obscure the logics of Derrida's post-structural leap throughout his discourse on *différance*. Derrida’s writing radically re-situates the question of structure by embracing questions on temporality – the temporal unfolding of the depth / sedimentation of any structure.

The following analyses direct their attention to that aspect of Gasché's writing which obscures the vertical – temporizing – horizon of *différance* as 'deferring' and 'differing' return.' Certain absences make themselves felt, which are treated as clues, as indications of a number of further possible fields of dialogical exchange between Husserl and Derrida. This is not merely 'idle play.' As we shall see, the very 'glare' of these absences, for they shall indeed illuminate our path, also informs us of the 'philosophical urgency' of our 'task.'

This is a suitable point at which to refer back to the epigram above. To 're-read' differently is to re-read with regard to difference – to take difference into account. Such an accounting must also turn to itself in these terms. Specifically, this means taking account of the forces of both rupture and return at work in the 're' of such a reading – a return that does not erase the breach that already inhabits it, since it is a return with a certain critical 'reserve,'
which registers a difference. Its passage of recuperation involves a detour. It is an appropriation that, in a crucial sense, also withdraws. Such reserve signs the point at which the return is not merely a movement of [re]acquisition, which seals a breach, but one that raises the breach to the level of a theme. It is retained as an integral character or style of both the recuperating and the recuperated. As such, this tracing of differing/deferring return is the very opening of dialogical 'play.'

The neologism, \textit{différance} (as both quasi-transcendental concept and 'strategy') functions as the locus through which the thematic of difference is permitted to open itself up to rich and diverse analyses. To take account of difference along these lines is to re-situate it with due regard to its participation in time – to think difference temporally. Here is the opportunity to begin to articulate further (and perhaps more profound) ways in which to explore the re- of return as an index to the trace of a 'repetition that transforms.'

In these terms, a careful re-reading of the epigram above suggests that the radical thrust of Derrida's meaning would be grasped more adequately if we were to re-write it as follows...'Because we are beginning to write, to write differently, we must reread différant.'

This call to a profound reorientation is our operative guide throughout the course of the following readings and re-readings. Through a critique of Gasché's reading of Derrida's reading of Husserl, we shall explore the theoretical, historical and methodological relations between a number of dimensions and dynamics expressed by the neologism \textit{différance} and the movement and structure of primordial temporalization as articulated in Husserl's phenomenology.

In these terms, the investigation is directed toward a phenomenological-deconstruction of the early development of the Derridian logic of supplementarity. This is a non-linear logic that radicalizes the sense of representation (by problematizing the language of the originary
and the derivative / beginnings and ends), taking it beyond the traditional order of secondariness, as the originary unfolding of presence: the tracing out of the intertwining of appearance and absence.

The key strategy at work here involves a de-sedimentation of the theoretical substrata in play in Derrida's articulation of this theme in relation to the pivotal (the hinge, la Brisure) concept of iterability – as explored in *Of Grammatology*. In turn, the unfolding of this orientation also traces out a path for the deconstruction of Gasché's development of a general theory of duplicity, which is based on Derrida's varied forms of discourse on the double and doubling. Gasché's appropriation of this theme – as presented in *The Tain of the Mirror* – is primarily locked into an orientation that explores it in purely 'structural' terms, without giving due consideration to the temporal thematics in Derrida's early writing that underpin such a structural matrix. We shall see that Gasché fails to grasp certain fundamental aspects of the originality and profundity of the Derridian quasi-concept of *différance* precisely because his text limits itself (through a particular emphasis on 'difference' and 'duplicity') to a pre-phenomenological understanding of the relations between space and time. As such, this limitation underplays the significance of Derrida's [re]readings of Husserl's phenomenology and the genealogy of his thought on *différance as deferral*.

It is vitally important to bring out the 'temporal' aspects of difference here: temporization, deferral, detour – difference as articulated in durational terms. Differentiation between past, present and future is the horizon or fissure through which successivity is given. The possibility of consecutivity – as the unfolding of the no-longer, now and not-yet as opposed to an eternal present in which all is given 'at once' – rests not on absolutely distinct and concrete differences of a purely linear order, but on an interplay of mutual 'delay.' Such deferral is intimately tied up with returnability – the possibility of return through which differences can stand-out against each other and find themselves stretched-out / extended.
The significance of this stretching-out makes itself felt when we consider that difference / alterity / Otherness stands-out as Other through a recursive movement where the return is a recuperation that transforms. This complicity of return and reserve always already functions as an indicator of temporal shift / duration. The no-longer and not-yet as Other must be announced as such. They can no longer simply be treated as negations of the present for this would both efface their fundamental differences in relation to one another and obscure the constitutive nature of their intertwining within the horizon of the present itself. Derrida suggests that "...only differences can be 'historical' from the outset and in each of their aspects" (Margins, p.11) – but then again, without the structurality of the unfolding of the 'historical as such,' such differences would not stand-out. The structurality or historicality of such an unfolding is not so much a question of difference as of a certain constitutive movement of delay. This is the primary consideration throughout our strategic insertion into this dialogical opening.

From a theoretical point of view, Gasché's discourse on 'doubling' – which proceeds by way of a discussion on the logics of the non-Platonic simulacrum – is caught up, for structural reasons, in a one-sided approach to the Latin word differre. This appears to reduce its meaning to a translation of the Greek diapherein (difference of a principally spatial order). However, in the essay "Différance," Derrida writes that...

...the verb differer (Latin verb differre) has two meanings which seem quite distinct....the distribution of meaning in the Greek diapherein does not comport one of the two motifs of the Latin differre, to wit, the action of putting off until later, of taking into account, of taking account of time and of the forces of an operation that implies an economical calculation, a detour, a delay, a relay, a reserve, a representation – concepts
that I would summarise here in a word I have never used but that could be inscribed in this chain: temporization (Margins, p.7-8).

Gasché's 'heterological' study of difference, and ultimately différance, does take temporizing / deferral into account to a certain extent, but only, it would seem, as one infrastructural moment of a non-unitary matrix of syntheses in which temporization / temporalization and spacing are equi-primordially related while at the same time being irreducibly different. However, as we have seen, the temporization of which Derrida speaks finds its root in the Latin differre (the French verb différer also has a dual spatial and temporal meaning) that indicates a region in which the differences between temporalizing and spacing are less originary than their intertwining. We should remember, in accordance with the logics of supplementarity, that the 'and' of difference and deferral does not function merely as a sign of 'addition' (a supplement in the mundane sense), but shares a peculiar affinity with the copula 'is,' in such a way that it is intimately tied up with delay.'

According to Derrida,

...this temporization is also temporalization and spacing, the becoming-time of space and the becoming-space of time, the 'originary constitution' of time and space, as metaphysics or transcendental phenomenology would say, to use the language that here is criticized and displaced (Ibid).

Derrida's reference to the language that is 'criticized and displaced' indicates an adherence to a radical reorientation that must be embraced – an attitudinal epoché – whose sense is to be found throughout Husserl's writing and that of Heidegger. In the later stages of Heidegger's thinking, in particular, the orientation and tone of the writing is geared toward
causing the form of propositional statements to slide (see the lecture, entitled: "Time and Being").

Derrida's strategic utilization of the dual (but not bi-polar) character of differre functions as the primary locus of the following analyses concerning the structuralist limitations of Gasché's formulation of a 'general theory of duplicity.' A careful study of Derrida's key theoretical incorporation of phenomenologically rooted temporal significations (throughout his discourse on difference) shows that one of the most powerful aspects of the post-structural character of deconstruction and the theme of différance (as that which produces differences) lies precisely in the radicality of its return to the question of time. This is a question that structuralism could not adequately grasp (or formulate) due to the theoretical limits of its language and orientation. Derrida's shift to a more temporal perspective in regard to the themes of language and difference owes its radicality, on the one hand, to his somewhat idiosyncratic critique of Husserl's phenomenology (which often seems to convey the character of a polemic) and, on the other, to his own active, but not necessarily always thematized, appropriation of Husserl's theories on time-consciousness. This dual tension is to be found, in particular, in the theoretical orientation, thrust and style of Derrida's Speech and Phenomena.

A certain Husserlian character, of a specifically temporal orientation, also inhabits the theoretical matrix articulated in the early part of Derrida's Of Grammatology, which, in fact, sets the scope for that text as a whole. Gasché's underestimation of Derrida's indebtedness to Husserl's phenomenology in this respect indicates a weakness in The Tain of the Mirror's approach to the question of différance. Indeed, by underplaying the crucial role played by the question of temporality in Derrida's writing on spacing, supplementarity, trace, iterability, etc., Gasché's 'general theory of doubling' continually falls short of its target.

For Derrida, différance is the archi-synthesis of difference and deferral, and yet Gasché's analyses overemphasize (give privilege to) the function of difference. However,
'deferring as temporizing / temporalizing,' necessarily eludes reduction to what, in Gasché's theoretical architecture, is merely expressed in terms of one moment or infrastructure of a matrix of equi-primordial, but "...incommensurable and heterogeneous kinds of differences" (TM, p.204). This general theory of duplicity gives us little more than a flattened plane of simultaneous differentiability under which Gasché attempts to subsume all the moments of the trace. Is not this orientation already anticipated in the very title of his text? Although the applications of the words 'tain' and 'mirror' are meant to extend beyond the thought of play as a mere game of mirroring without depth, these terms still function as 'spatial' metaphors for a play between different surfaces / planes. As we shall see, any considerations of 'verticality' or 'depth' actually lie outside their province. Such themes remain irrecoverable within the bounds of an orientation governed by the thought of difference and duplicity – which forgets the question of the ‘opening’ (which must always implicate depth) of any possible difference: its temporalization.4

As indicated above, our aim is to restore a balance by turning to the issue of différance as deferral, detour, relay – that which produces / articulates space and duration (spatializing-temporalizing); that diffracts / refracts / deflects: a bending (rather than mere differentiation through a divisive movement of 'doubling) – a bending-back-of-a-return, which permits differences or doubles to stand-out: that is, stand-outside-themselves ekstatically / temporally. Of course, any move toward a restoration of balance involves a certain degree of violence – but is this not essential to a critique that must proceed by way of a movement of deconstruction / Abbau / de-sedimentation / dissemination? The violence in question here, though, is not indicative of a negative theology (as Derrida would say), which would subject its field of interrogation to annihilation or destruction. Rather, we speak of a 'playful textual critique' – an unbalancing and unearthing that aims toward the recovery of an operative absence within the text as the trace of a violence that has already been perpetrated and concealed by the text.
Here, 'text' also refers to the structurality of the reading-of-the-text: the horizon of the 'encounter' between text and text.

In order to facilitate a non-violent deconstruction of Gasché's reading of Derrida (avoiding any tendency to re-draw his investigations out of context), we shall attend to the theoretical movement that constitutes one of the key Derridian texts from which Gasché himself has drawn as a source for his 'general theory of duplicity.' This brings us back to *Of Grammatology*. Clearly, we must aim to engage with Gasché on his own ground.\(^5\)

In accordance with this aim, some of the main quotations that are drawn from *The Tain of the Mirror*, in the following analyses, are unabridged and, at times, quite lengthy – the first of which includes his own quotations of Derrida. The full impact and context of these passages would be lost if they were shortened or broken up into bite-sized chunks. And, perhaps even more importantly, their display in this form – particularly in regard to the first quotation – permits us to reflect on the ways in which Gasché incorporates Derrida's writing into his own narrative. The smooth transposition traced out in Gasché's narrative must come under scrutiny. Therefore, we must remain vigilant in regard to certain differences that risk effacement in the casual continuity with which Gasché slips in and out of the Derridian text. For us then, a certain critical distance is required. These passages must remain, in a fully thematic way, quotations of quotations if we are to unravel a space in which to articulate a range of differences between Gasché's text, Gasché's Derrida, and Derrida's text.

*Of Grammatology* presents us with a rigorously formulated and decisive theoretical framework for an understanding of some of the many different senses of the deconstructive theme of 'supplementarity,' which is the main logic to which Gasché's development of a general theory of doubling is tied. Supplementarity needs to be considered in the light of such themes as play, opening (which is always married to a certain movement of closure), tracing, archi-writing, temporization, etc. All these aspects extend the boundaries of the thematic of
temporality beyond the limits of a merely *successive* or *linear* time and confound the logic of beginnings and ends.

Linearity is a key term here, for Derrida's project also extends beyond the limitations of a structural / synchronic linguistics with which the term grammar is usually associated. One of the most significant meanings of the word grammar that must be taken into account is to be found in its etymological relation to the Greek word grammē, which signifies 'line' or 'trace' (as distinguished from gramma, which means mark or letter). For Derrida, this functions (in the context of a gramma-tology) as a crucial sign for how structural considerations traditionally articulate themselves: that is, in 'linear' terms. As a project of deconstruction, the discourse pertaining to the possibility of a gramma-tology concerns itself with more than a syntactical plane of linear contemporaneity and is thus not reducible to structural or linguistic concerns in the usual sense. It rather announces the inauguration of a critique of the history of the *grammē* of grammar – a deconstruction of linear thinking. The most exemplary essay in this regard after *Of Grammatology* is "Ousia and grammē" (*Margins*), which explores a number of linear models of time.6 The concept of supplementarity provides a way in which to turn to non-linear forms of temporality. For Derrida, it also disrupts, in one stroke, the traditional metaphysical idea of the primacy of presence – the possibility of an unmediated exhibition of fullness, plenitude and absolute truth – since there is no truth before the *opening* up of the possibility of its articulation, and thus it is nothing outside the *play* [supplementarity] of signification.

Supplementarity, according to Derrida, "...is precisely the play of presence and absence, the opening of this play..." (*OG*, p.244). The quasi-transcendental thematization of supplementarity, in *Of Grammatology*, organizes Derrida's movement beyond the mere discussion of regional or instituted forms of language *as writing* to the meta-general and pluri-dimensional field of *archi-writing*. This leads to the claim that..."Writing will appear to us
more and more as another name for this structure of supplementarity." (Ibid. p.245). Here, structure is thought in terms of the intimacy it always already shares with time.

The focus of this study, then, is to show how Derrida's discourse on the structure of supplementarity as archi-writing is also, in a vital theoretical sense, an expression of a radical return to the question of temporality / temporalizing / temporizing: temporal-spacing as deferring / differing return. The three main sections of Of Grammatology to which we refer (which guide the critical direction of our investigation concerning possible dialogical openings), are to be found in chapter two: Linguistics and Grammatology. They are entitled: "The Outside and the Inside," "The Outside is the Inside," and "The Hinge [La Brisure]." These three interconnected themes express a hinged movement that articulates the intertwining of the supplement 'and' and the copula 'is.' This brings us to another side of the strategy at work in this particular choice of text, which concerns the development of the theoretical trace that guides Derrida's discussion on the logic of the supplement – an investigation that facilitates his arrival and subsequent delineation of the quasi-transcendental concept of archi-writing. What is unearthed is an 'operative absence' that both indicates and effaces a massive theoretical indebtedness to Husserlian phenomenology: specifically, Husserl's text of The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. This is a resource that Derrida, within the context of Of Grammatology, simply cannot do without.

The fact that Of Grammatology does not critically engage with Husserl and yet it displays (though unthematically) a certain Husserlian phenomenological character, is our point of entry to a horizon in which we can recover the possibility of an 'open' dialogue between phenomenology and deconstruction.

The aim is to continually put into question the popular claim that deconstruction goes 'beyond' phenomenology – a claim whose own deconstruction can no longer be deferred.
9. Presence: a question of appearance?

In *The Tain of the Mirror*, Gasché's discourse on Derrida's deconstruction is organized according to the framework of a general 'critique of reflexivity' – a critique which, he maintains, fundamentally characterizes Derrida's project. However, Gasché's form of argumentation underplays a number of Derrida's theoretical sources and, in particular, does not give sufficient attention to the Husserlian phenomenological treatment of the question of reflexivity under the heading of 'intentional analysis' (which has far more than a passing significance for Derrida). The general 'tone' of *The Tain of the Mirror* is one which suggests that no major advance had been made regarding the problem of reflection since Hegel or, more precisely, the Hegelian phenomenological tradition – until Derrida, of course. However, the general dynamics of signification, reflexivity, and the possibility of any kind of presence, which play themselves out in Derrida's writing on *différance*, point to a combination of static and genetic *intentional analyses* originally undertaken by Husserl (whose phenomenology must be distinguished from that of Hegel).

Husserl's phenomenological-intentional (as opposed to dialectical) analyses provide a rich resource for Derrida's development of some of the primary motifs of deconstruction in his own first major texts. Despite Gasché's acknowledgement of the influence of the method of *Abbau* for Derrida's project (a movement of unbuilding or de-construction that initiates a phenomenological-genetic turn: a movement of Abbau and Aufbau), he commences with an inadequate understanding of the specific reflexivities brought to light at a transcendental level in Husserl's theory of intentionality. He underplays the originality (and continuing relevance) of the Husserlian phenomenological-intentional treatment of the questions of reflexivity and temporality and the theoretical impact of these studies on Derrida. We shall see that this insufficient approach by Gasché, throughout his discourse on 'doubling,' ultimately leads to a
fundamental misrepresentation concerning the context and true radicality of the thought of the 
*trace* in Derridian deconstruction.

In the quotation below, Gasché’s claim concerning the *generality* of the ‘theory of
duplication’ exhibits a profound misunderstanding about the scope of phenomenology – which
is due, in part, to his rather casual acceptance of Derrida's critical position regarding Husserl's
'principle of principles.'

The general theory of duplication not only undercuts speculative dialectics but reaches
beyond phenomenology as well, in particular in its Husserlian form. Derrida's critique
of Husserlian phenomenology does not focus only on the privilege Husserl attributes to
the instance of the *living presence*, nor is it limited to Husserl's bending of the form of
all experience to this essentially metaphysical motif, whether it concerns experience in
general or, more particularly, transcendental experience. In addition to this criticism,
and to his questioning of transcendental phenomenology's unadmitted complicity with
the mundane, Derrida asks the more fundamental question whether 'the
phenomenological model [is] itself constituted, as a warp of language, logic, evidence,
fundamental security, upon a woof that is not its own? And which – such is the most
difficult problem – is no longer at all mundane' (*OG* p.67). As Derrida insists, such a
question is undoubtedly provoked by certain developments in Husserl's
phenomenology itself. Yet phenomenology cannot entirely certify this question, which
refers phenomenology 'to a zone in which its 'principle of principles' (as we see it, its
*metaphysical* principle: the *original self-*evidence and *presence* of the thing itself in
person) is radically put into question' (*WD*, p.164). As a matter of fact, the theory of
originary duplication dislocates and displaces this principle of principles. If it is true
that the principle of principles of phenomenology hinges on the possibility of the self-
presentation of the thing itself, originary duplication puts the very possibility of that which is called a *phenomenon* radically into question (*The Tain of the Mirror* [TM], p.228-29).

These claims are based on readings which are misleading in a number of crucial ways and they express an unquestioned bias in favour of the now 'traditional' view that deconstruction, in some way, transgresses (goes 'beyond') the limits of phenomenology. With the suggestion that if "...the principle of principles of phenomenology hinges on the possibility of the self-presentation of the thing itself, originary duplication puts the very possibility of that which is called a phenomenon radically into question" (*Ibid*), Gasché is working with a number of different and incommensurable senses of Thinghood and appearance – under which the question of the 'phenomenon' becomes subsumed in his discourse. The phenomenon of phenomenology is reduced to the same kind of aporia that befalls discourse on the 'thing itself' on the one hand, and its 'appearance' on the other, which ultimately distorts Husserl's meaning. Perhaps Derrida has forgotten something that Gasché simply does not know – that Husserl brought these issues into question, by means of an 'intentional analysis' (analysis of intentionality) with a radical originality that has transformed, and is still continuing to transform, the ways in which they are articulated in the current philosophical forum.

Husserl's critique began in the form of a powerful phenomenological-deconstructive engagement with psychologism, objectivism, phenomenalism, etc. – rigorously articulating the inherent paradoxes of the 'imagistic' thinking upon which they base themselves and unravelling the logic responsible for their 'objectivist' conflation of the fleeting contents of experience with lived-experience itself. It must be stressed here that the phenomenological motivation of this critique resists falling back into any particular form of realism. In the opening of *The
Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness (section two: The Question of the "Origin of Time"), Husserl writes,

We do not classify lived experiences according to any particular form of reality. We are concerned with reality only insofar as it is intended, represented, intuited, or conceptually thought (p.26).

Gasché's reading of Derrida's suggestion that phenomenology is referred "to a zone in which the original self-evidence and presence of the thing itself in person is radically put into question" (TM, p.228-29 [WD, p.164]) confuses a vital phenomenological difference of which Derrida (through his various readings of Husserl) is already aware – that is, between the phenomenology of appearing and that which appears.⁹ We not only find a misreading of Husserl's meaning by Gasché, but a misreading based on a misreading of Derrida's reading. Accordingly, to cite a fundamental Derridian aim, "We must learn to re-read what has been thus confused for us" (Of Grammatology, p.75).

Firstly, for Husserl the articulation of the phenomenon embodies a fundamental difference within itself by comprising both the language of appearances and the language of appearing in their intertwining (the noetic-noematic intentional correlation), and is thus not to be confined to mere 'objective' discourse. Husserl's theory of intentionality does not present us with an 'object-theory' or 'image-theory' of perception, caught up in a 'container-type' conception of consciousness, but one which considers object-perception in terms of the contextual-unfolding-of a certain 'phenomenal content.' Consciousness is characterized as a self-surpassing, sense-directed – transitive/intentional – relation between meaning and meant. For Husserl, the giving or standing-out of phenomena is irreducible to the appearance of mere 'objective' simulacra that stand-in for extra-phenomenal existents (as images or 'doubles' of the
world (doubles in the more mundane sense). The call to the 'things themselves' does not base itself on a naive / presuppositional metaphysics, but is a call to methodological vigilance, which ultimately re-situates discourse on the question of the Thing. In the context of this turn, which is also a critical re-turn to questions of method, it must be understood that this is in no way tied to a mere 'call to idealism' – certainly not in any doctrinal sense.

Husserl's concern in “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (one of the main texts along with Ideas I that is so often quoted in regard to the call 'to the things themselves') is with 'phenomenal evidence.' For methodological reasons, the Husserlian directive is not limited to existential matters in classical objective terms, since it only addresses questions of existence in terms of their 'phenomenological sense.' The existential character of the appearing of a phenomenon (its phenomenal givenness as an 'actuality') is simply one possible mode among many. For phenomenology, questions concerning the givenness of the 'pastness' of the remembered or the 'imaginality' of the imagined are just as significant as any interrogation of the 'real' and are not merely consigned to a 'secondary' or 'representational' field as has traditionally been their fate.

Husserl is not an 'image-theorist' – for whom the question of extra-phenomenal existents and the veracity of their givenness through images would be 'the' fundamental question (the perennial issue for Cartesian metaphysicians). Phenomenology does not begin as a system that is built upon a metaphysical divide between a world of appearances or mental-images and that which appears (things-in-themselves). This would suppose a covert act of hypostatization that is characteristic of a phenomenalism and not phenomenology. The call 'to the things themselves' is a kind of attitudinal categorical imperative that seeks evidence as it gives itself. It does this without confining such interrogation to the reductive limits of, on the one hand, a naturalistic objectivity, which seeks to rid itself of any residual subjectivity (representation) in its interrogation of 'Things' or, on the other hand, a further re-presentative
notion of consciousness, of a *psychologistic* orientation, that reduces all experiences and objects of experience to subjective states articulated as successive mental events and facts. Each view, in its own way, completely undermines the possibility of discourse on questions concerning our *lived* access to what we might call truth – or more specifically, the truth of the world of *lived-experience*. Here, we speak of both *Erlebnis* and *Lebenswelt*.

The inadmissibility of these questions within the bounds of these viewpoints is inscribed at the outset. As in the case of the image-theory / phenomenalism, they cannot, for reasons of principle, extend themselves beyond a closed dimension of 'mental objects' ('representational' images) without due access to an independent and external criterion by means of which their veracity, regarding that which they represent, can be tested. We find nothing more than a kind of mimetic doubling – echoes of echoes – words which, in this context, must be re-situated with regard to their traditional lexical significations. This is because they attach themselves to a movement that originally problematizes the question of sources, beginnings: the original point that would inaugurate a sequence of doubles or echoes. Here, they no longer automatically imply the echo of something other than, and more originary than, an echo. We are left with nothing more than echoes that are caught up in the reflective (yet another word whose semantic horizon has been caused to slide) vortex of an infinite regress. In this realm, signs or images ultimately, and inadequately, substitute for the consciousness of things / objects (understood in the broadest sense) and the world itself.

Husserl insists that..."On no account should we fall into the fundamentally perverse copy and sign theories..." (*Ideas I*, §52). If the world resists 'adequate' exhibition it is not, for Husserl, due to any inadequacy in our perceptual apparatus (as the representational / image / sign doctrine of consciousness suggests). When we speak of transcendence, this expression does not designate something that subsists beyond some impermeable membrane behind which consciousness is forever trapped within a matrix of immanent mental-objects or images – cut
off from all that is transcendent. The 'transcendence' of the world has a 'sense,' or rather, an infinite diversity of senses that articulate themselves 'within' or 'through' lived-experience. From an important phenomenological viewpoint, they are actually bestowed (as horizontal characters of that which appears) by the transcending consciousness as it 'encounters' the world\textsuperscript{11} – that is to say, to extend a Heideggerian twist, \textit{through} its situational engagement in the world.

Consciousness does not name a dimension that is closed within itself. It is already familiar with transcendence for this constitutes part of its own essence. Consciousness is always already outside-itself-in-the-world – out amongst the things. As such, the question of transcendence is eminently susceptible of phenomenological analysis.\textsuperscript{12} At the same time, it must be stressed that this is not simply a subjectively oriented claim.

Husserl writes,

Whatever is transcendent, in so far as it comes to be consciously presented, is an object of phenomenological study not only on the side of the \textit{consciousness of} it, of the various conscious ways, for instance, in which it comes to be given as transcendent, but also, although essentially bound up with the viewpoint just noted, as the given and that which is experienced in it (\textit{Ideas I, §76, p.195}).

What appears are horizons of different constellations of meaning, which are not to be set against the Thing of experience in the same way that subjectivity is traditionally contrasted with objectivity or immanence is distinguished from transcendence. For Husserl, the \textit{giving} of meaning \textit{qua} phenomenon is also transcendent to the consciousness that perceives it. Such appearing is non-situated, in a certain sense, in that it is 'intentionally immanent' without being really inherent (or contained in) consciousness itself. It is not a case of different realities that
somehow stand side by side – where it may be said, in a way that has become firmly habituated, that what is experienced is the mere subjective duplication of the objective other. The 'given' is not 'in' consciousness, neither is it necessarily 'of' consciousness (although this can also be a dimension of phenomenological inquiry), but for consciousness.

In these terms, the sense of giving or appearing signifies more than a mere horizon of 'subjective' and immanent images. The world as it is given participates in both subjectivity and objectivity – and is both immanent and transcendent. Since appearances (a word that we must treat with the utmost care) are not treated, according to the phenomenological perspective, in the way of subjective hyposstatizations that 'immanently' duplicate a transcendent reality, but are designated as 'transcendent' in themselves, the phenomenality of the phenomenon (the giving of its givenness) must be grasped in a way that no longer sets it in opposition to transcendence. The phenomenon always already participates in transcendence and is that through which transcendence is articulated.

This, of itself, must re-invoke questions concerning the meaning of evidence as it gives itself – without postulating any particular form of transcendence that would force us to think in terms of an extra-phenomenal horizon of sense / truth / reality to which we would need 'direct' access in order to assess the validity or truth-value of such evidence. An external 'source' or 'measure' of this kind is not required. The question of the 'meaning of evidence' in terms of 'its-giving-of-itself' is phenomenological. The preposition 'of' (which defines both consciousness and world) is decisive in a number of vital ways. The dimension of transitivity it indicates is one of the most fundamental of phenomenological themes.

In objective terms, to stand-out is not merely a question of a dual relation between appearance and that which appears, but involves a certain structure and character or tone of such a standing-out. The phenomenon expresses these in terms of the 'ways' or 'modalities of giving' in which something stands-out. Phenomenality cannot be reduced to either the language
of appearances or that which appears for it first constitutes the space of such a distinction. In addition, this space, though it is the necessary horizon of presence, is not present itself (in any sense of being a present 'object').

There is not one principal definition of the phenomenon. It has constantly been confused (and, in some quarters, is still being confused) with appearance, appearing, presence, representation, etc. The term appearance alone is just as problematical. Although there are intimate associations, it must be distinguished from the meaning of the phenomenon. To say that the phenomenon is simply that-which-is-manifest (which, on one level is not incorrect) allows anything – including an appearance – to be called a phenomenon. The 'showing' or 'making-manifest' as distinguished from the 'shown' or 'that-which-is-made-manifest' are expressions that can be applied indiscriminately in the word 'presence.' However, appearance, or better here, visibility is only one moment of the phenomenon. It is to be granted that there are many different forms of visibility, ranging from that which gives itself in itself to different kinds of substitutional forms of appearing in which that which gives itself can, in certain instances, actually conceal that which it indicates (that for which it is the proxy). And, it is not only in regard to the latter moment of this vast spectrum that we must understand that there is equally a zone of invisibility associated with the phenomenon, which is constitutive of anything that stands-out. The phenomenon is the site of the opening of the giving-of-the-given, and is presupposed by any 'form' of appearance.

There is an aspect of principal importance here that always plays at the heart of any discourse on the phenomenon (above all, in line with Heidegger, discourse on the phenomenon as a kind of speaking-out)\textsuperscript{13} as that-which-gives-itself-in-itself or from-itself. The very possibility of discriminating between different kinds of appearing (which is the descriptive task of phenomenology) lies in a certain modal announcement in the phenomenon – which rounds out the definition as follows: the phenomenon as that which gives itself from itself as it gives
It is in the ‘as-it-gives-itself’ that we find the 'meaning,' 'modality,' 'truth-value,' etc., of that which appears. This is the vital phenomeno-logical sense that announces itself in the structure of the appearing of something as distinct from mere appearance. Evidence has to do with a certain 'style' of appearing. It announces itself as the meeting point of an intentional structure of negotiation (that is stretched temporally) and is not to be limited to either the appearance in itself or that which is said to give itself (inadequately) 'in' the appearance.

The pre-phenomenological problematization of the question of the veracity of phenomenal evidence, as-it-gives-itself through the various kinds of directedness of consciousness toward the world, disregards the fact that it is on the basis of such evidence that questions regarding actuality, transcendence, truth, meaning and evidence first find themselves articulated. The question of evidence points to the intentional structures of experience itself (the structural nexus of experiencing and the experienced, which is irreducible to a psychologism) and does not indicate another more original source from which it is bestowed.\textsuperscript{14}

This does not, it must be said, rule out questions of 'exteriority,' but resituates them. The thought of the standing-out of the phenomenon in terms of evidential-giving rediscovers, in more Derridian terms now, the outside that already inhabits its inside.

The phenomenon, as the appearing of that which appears, is not an object that duplicates / doubles / stands-in for the world as something 'extrinsic' to it, but is the appearing of the world itself. However, we must be careful here, since the thesis 'actual world' must be understood within the context of the phenomenological reduction. With this procedure, which disconnects the 'thesis' actual world by means of a kind of methodological detour, we do not lose the world as such, but regain it qua the world of lived-experience. As Husserl writes...

...whatever is phenomenologically disconnected remains still, with a certain change of signature, within the framework of phenomenology (Ideas I, §135, p.346).
The parenthesizing of the actual world through the implementation of the phenomenological *epoché* does not annul the evidence of its appearing as such, i.e., the world is thematized 'in its appearing' as an *intentional* nexus of 'actuality phenomena.' What is at issue here is a particular kind of 'change in signature.'

Evidence cannot be thought without the logics of *appearing*. Here, we speak of the *style* or *mode of the appearing* of that which gives itself through the appearance. This is to be distinguished from a merely opaque or substitutive *appearance*. It is a question of what shapes the character of that which appears in its *appearing*, e.g., the appearance of something as perceived, as remembered, as imagined, etc. (Note: the careful reader should, by now, be less confident about the meaning of the phrase *'mere appearance'*. The appearing of the appearance can also express non-appearance, e.g., the specific moment of an apprehension that speaks of the non-fulfilment of an expectation: in other words, non-appearing as a kind of evidence.

From a phenomenological point of view, the various meanings of the term appearance are tied, for essential reasons, to the thought of 'perspective variation' (*Abschattung*). Although we often speak of the 'appearance' of something as a kind of 'singular' occurrence, as that which stands-out as the self-identical exhibition of a self-same object, there is an important sense in which such an appearance is continually changing. It is enmeshed in a manifold of different patterns of appearing which pass-over into one another. The appearance, in connection to this, is also to be grasped as an adumbration, perspective, or profile of that which gives itself *through* the appearance. An appearance, in these terms, is not the terminus of a perception (for part of its essence lies in a certain 'transparency' in that it essentially *refers*), but is that through which perception is focused in its directedness towards something. The 'something' is always in excess of the appearance, in the same manner as a three-dimensional spatial object with determinate extension and shape resists, for essential reasons, *adequate*
presentation in the exhibition of just one of it sides. The appearance indicates the transcendence of that towards which consciousness is directed, not by standing-in for it as the terminus of an intention (although this is possible through a higher order performance of reflection) as a mere representative replacement or 'image,' which would conceal as much as it disclosed, but by expressing a certain 'orientation' of that which appears: an orientation that runs off into other orientations of the one object as-a-whole.

The object is an X-pole of a multiplicity of adumbrations. The structure of this intentional movement is analogous to the form of ideation about which Husserl speaks when distinguishing between eidos and Idea. There is an asymptotic tension that holds between eide and Ideas in the Kantian sense. The latter can never be given adequately, although this is not the same as saying that it does not give itself at all. Its realization is a passage toward an infinite limit – a play between the many and the One and the One and the many. In this sense, we do not so much speak of the seeing of 'objects' but the unfolding of the 'horizons' of objectivity. The concept of Abschattung (perspective-variation), which expresses the constitutive role of appearing (in the unfolding of appearances), resituates the logic of the appearance by taking into account the question of how an object can be continuous with itself throughout the running-off of the changing profiles that deliver it up over time. Husserl shows that the 'flux' of Abschattungen – which are experiences and nothing spatial in themselves\(^{16}\) – is that which originarily unfolds the 'spatiality' of the object. It is of the essence of something spatial that it can only express its 'spatiality' by withholding itself in a certain way. It appears as a nexus of potential perspectives (e.g., near or far, from above or from the side, etc.), which cannot all be given in any one orientation. They can fulfil themselves only through further modes of exhibition that coalesce within the unity of their running-off within the flux of varying orientations through which the object is filled (or fleshed) out. This flux literally spatializes the object.
With the addition of the pivotal thought of *Ablaufsphänomene* ('running-off-phenomena,' 'modes of temporal orientation'), which is intrinsically enmeshed with the concept of *Abschattungen* in that they are both understood in terms of the *unity of the unfolding of difference in flux* – this flux is also that which temporalizes the object.\(^{17}\) Any thing that is spatial must also be temporal – that is, if it can be said to be coincidental with itself throughout the duration of its 'changing' orientations (or *modes* of appearance).\(^{18}\)

Husserl speaks of an 'analogous' relationship between the ways in which the spatial and the temporal unfold.

If in reflection we immerse ourselves in the unity of a structured process, we observe that an articulated part of the process 'draws together' as it sinks into the past – a kind of temporal perspective (within the originary temporal appearance) analogous to spatial perspective (*PITC*. §9, p.47).

And in an adjoining footnote, Husserl writes,

It is tempting to draw a parallel between these modes of the consciousness and appearance of temporal Objects and the modes in which a spatial thing appears and is known with changing orientation, to pursue further the 'temporal orientations' in which spatial things (which are also temporal Objects) appear (*Ibid*. §9, footnote 7, pp.46-7).

Although questions concerning the consciousness of spatiality and temporality generally indicate different phenomenological dimensions, when viewed eidetically, each sphere actually exhibits similar intentional structures in play.\(^{19}\) It should be pointed out that the eidetic reduction (like the phenomenological reduction) was not presented in a thematic form.
(for publication) until 1913 in Ideas I, but the germinal orientation was still clearly at work in Husserl's early lectures on temporal experience (1904-5).

The essential complicity of spatiality and temporality, when considered from the point of view of the transcendental concept of 'flux' ([Fluß] – which is not of an 'objective' order of temporality), is made explicit by Husserl in the lectures that make up The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. In the following passage Husserl shows why the 'intentional' intertwining of appearances and the structures of different modes of appearing (of that which appears) must be grasped if we are to take into account the myriad differences that await us at the gateway to the phenomenological horizon.

Every temporal being 'appears' in one or another continually changing mode of running-off, and the 'Object in the mode of running-off' is in this change always something other, even though we still say that the Object and every point of its time and this time itself are one and the same. The 'Object in the mode of running-off' we cannot term a form of consciousness (any more than we can call a spatial phenomenon, a body in its appearance from one side or the other, from far or near, a form of consciousness). 'Consciousness,' 'lived experience,' refers to an Object by means of an appearance in which 'the Object in its modal setting' subsists. Obviously, we must recognize talk of 'intentionality' as ambiguous, depending on whether we have in mind the relation of the appearance to what appears or the relation of consciousness on the one hand to 'what appears in its modal setting' and on the other to what merely appears (PITC. §9, p.47-8).^20

We shall explore the phenomenological theme of intentionality in a way that does not so much reduce its ambiguities, according to some overarching thesis called the 'metaphysics
of presence,' as bring them into the foreground. They are indices of fundamental dimensions of intentionality itself (that originally problematize the schema 'metaphysics of presence,' when applied to phenomenology), which must be permitted to articulate themselves in their own right. It is in connection to this that we must retain the thought of flux as that which spatializes and temporalizes. This concept of 'continuous alteration' – where continuity and change, structure and genesis, simultaneity and succession, etc., are not treated as heterogeneous dimensions (within the bounds of the classic bi-polarities) – re-surfaces again and again throughout the following analyses as its significance is examined in relation to the Derridian logic of différance.

When we speak of spatio-temporal objects, that which gives itself through the appearance is necessarily given inadequately and, in a certain sense, incompletely. However, the perception of one side of a house is not limited to that which is literally seen, but extends itself into the unseen – for the wall intrinsically refers to the house as-a-whole. Once again, the term appearance expresses 'aspect / perspective.' With this thought, the sense of the 'appearing of' something in its intertwining with appearance becomes clearer. The question of the appearing of that which appears in the appearance refers us to the modal organizations and perspective variations that inscribe the ways in which something stands-out – the characters or modalities of illumination (Erscheinung) and sense (Sinn) through which that which presents itself is given. This is not restricted to the positional orientation of the house as it gives itself, it can also include its appearance as an object of desire, or as something that is forbidding.21 The latter characters of appearing are not of a merely subjective order, they are intrinsic to the object itself as it stands-out. For every desiring there is a desired, for every recollection there is something that presents itself as remembered – that is, with the modal character of the remembered as opposed, let us say, to the perceived or imagined. Such characters are forms of
illumination that play about the object itself in its appearing, giving the as meant of that which appears as the correlate of the meaning-intention that is directed toward it.

In *Ideas I*, the 'principle of principles' is presented by Husserl as an interrogative norm which prescribes that "...whatever presents itself in 'intuition' in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself" (§24, p.83). In other words, the study of whatever presents itself to the phenomenological gaze must take into account the participation of the noetic contextual ray through which it is illuminated in its appearing (the intertwining of the noesis and the noema). This nexus is the fold / unfolding of the attitude / orientation / noesis that inscribes the 'style' of the appearing of that which appears / noema. There are many different possible attitudes (regional ontologies) through which that which appears can be filled-out – that, in fact, constitute its meaning[s]. It is in terms of the preposition 'of' (e.g., the judging of the judged, the perceiving of the perceived, etc.) that both consciousness and world find themselves articulated and defined. There is very little that speaks of the linear logic of closure or totalization here. One would be very much mistaken to think of the 'principle of principles' in this way. It is actually a call to self-critique.22

Phenomena, for reasons of essence, speak of transitivity and encounter (regardless of whether our orientation is concerned with the horizon of phantasy or that of the real). It is the question of the 'structurality of the opening' of phenomenality (its articulation as encountered) that refers us to one of the most fundamental meanings of intentionality.

On the basis of a somewhat confused reading of Derrida's remarks (cited above), Gasché discusses the issue of 'presence' in purely objective terms, which is why his treatment of the meaning of the phenomenon in Husserl's phenomenology is somewhat inadequate. As we have already argued, the question of evidence, for Husserl, is not simply a matter of objective appearance, in any traditional sense. It does not make an appeal to any metaphysical
thing-in-itself that is extraneous to the world of phenomena, as the source of the truth of the appearance. Likewise, this is also the case for any consideration of certainty.

Recall the distinction between apodicticity and adequacy. These terms name two types of evidence or modes of certainty. The expression 'adequate evidence' concerns 'fulfilment in presence,' whereas the term 'apodicticity' refers to what cannot be doubted without self-contradiction, but which does not make itself present as such. For example, I can be in the dark about my own motivations and reasons for doubting, but I cannot say the same about the fact and the meaning of the doubting itself. The latter is given adequately whereas the former refers us to that which should be classed as apodictic. We can be apodictically certain that doubt has its motivation, but this is not to say that it gives itself adequately – which happens to be one of the principal areas in which Descartes fell into error (an area which eventually provided Freud with such a remarkable career). Living-in the doubting, much of the deeply sedimented significance of its character and motivation may remain a mystery to the one who doubts. Here, we speak of an affective absence that may be unconscious, but certainly not unconsciousness. It makes itself felt like a mood rather than as a presence in any objective sense. There is a fascinating ambiguity here, which calls for attention. Clearly, we can still speak of a certain presence – the living-presence of a mood, as the lived tone of a phase of comportment – but this must be strictly distinguished from what we would call an appearance. Moods are more feeling than felt. They are the colouration of the given. Only through reflection – through a certain kind of self-distanciation / deferment of the prior lived-mode, can one begin to unravel what is in play and subject it to thematization: that is, bring it to presence / make it 'appear' as an object for consciousness. Husserl would be the first to argue that suchthetic presence (especially if this signification is also meant to extend over the range of that which we would call 'apodictic') is not simply given, but is constituted by work – a kind of excavation of layers of sedimented structure.
We are, once again referred to the thought of an intertwining of presence and absence in the structuration of a history. Like the Idea in the Kantian sense, its presence is also that of a withdrawal of presence. The Idea traces itself out through a multiplicity of adumbrations that never quite reach it (e.g., it is the difference between pure red / redness in its ideality and particular instances of the colour red), but then this is true of the very expression 'presence' with respect to the multifarious ways in which we try to grasp its meaning[s]. This is why we must be careful about the general deconstructive delimitation of the language of presence as applied to the history of Western philosophy. The question of presence signs itself here as an open horizon of possible work – an infinite task.

In these terms, this 'work,' this phenomenological 'task,' is turned toward itself as the articulation of a kind of play that always involves an intentional play between absence and presence. Within its spectrum, we find giving and non-giving, appearing and appearance (which structurally includes non-appearing), no-longer and not-yet, etc. We shall see that this inter- and intra-play, as the opening of the phenomenological horizon, is not originarily 'constituted' by what Gasché would identify in terms of a general structure of 'duplicity.' It actually makes reference to a flux of continuous alteration, a self-reflexive continuum that involves a recuperative movement of surpassing that is generated by a play of deferral, detour and displacement.

Suffice it to say, at this point, Husserl's project does not indicate the trace of a residual investment in ultimately unknowable regions expressed in the diverse forms of Cartesian matter (res extensa), Lockean 'bodies' or the Kantian 'thing-in-itself' (Ding an sich / noumenon). For Husserl, evidence is a certain structurality of the phenomenon itself as experienced – and it is this intentional structurality of experience (viewed eidetically) that constitutes the field of his descriptive phenomenology, ultimately opening up the pathway to a genetic phenomenology.
10. The Constitution of the Living Present (*lebendige Gegenwart*): *an immanently transcending opening in flux*

Phenomenology is primarily and preliminarily *descriptive*. It is a method whose language and orientation focus on the multiplicity of various forms or essential *structures* of phenomena *as experienced*. The phenomenological orientations gained through the various methods of reduction radically re-situate questions concerning existence or actuality. However, descriptive (static / structural) phenomenology as the *science of appearing* or giving (phenomeno-logos) does not terminate merely in the constituted. On the contrary, there is a vertical and explanatory dimension which comments upon the ‘grace’ of consciousness as a meaningful directedness toward something: that which constitutes the horizon of the encounter with phenomena without being present as such. The phenomenological approach to the question of presence and its many different forms of articulation, which already demonstrates a radicalized language of *presencing* that takes into account the question of absence (and its phenomenologically constitutive role) in terms of its own kind of evidence, is such that presence is a starting-point and not an end-limit. It is a route of entry that ultimately involves a 'turning-back' (*Rückgang*) upon the question of the *possibility of presence / phenomena* and the constitution of Objectivity in general. The transcendental issue of the conditions of possibility of the *unfolding* of presence is the 'genetic' *response* to a 'static' phenomenology. It is the moment at which phenomenology takes on responsibility for putting to itself the question of how it can account for both the *structurality of the opening and the opening up of structure* through which any possible evidence or presence can extend itself. From a structural-genetic point of view, this orientation is concerned with the temporal 'constitution' of *lived experience* (which includes the constitution of the noeses and the unfolding of characters of *appearing* in
the noema rather than a merely constituted appearance\textsuperscript{27} without which discourse on the phenomenon of presence would have no meaning.

Husserl's intentional investigations into the tracing out of primordial temporalization, as it articulates itself within the 'openness' of the Living Present (\textit{lebendige Gegenwart} as awaiting-towards), is precisely this turn from the constituted to the \textit{constituting}: the \textit{temporalizing of} the temporal. This turn is a \textit{re-turn} which, as a \textit{transversal} and \textit{longitudinal} oscillation from the one to the many and the many to the one, expresses duration in terms of an originary interplay of differentiation in flux. Such differentiated moments are not \textit{discrete}, but are intrinsically intertwined, thus giving time as opposed to \textit{times}.\textsuperscript{28}

There are some contemporary philosophical circles that share a common difficulty in understanding this intertwining (\textit{Ineinander}) or original communality (\textit{Urgemeinschaftung}) of the Living Present as expressed by Husserl in his discourse on time consciousness. The misunderstanding has generated a certain degree of confusion over the relations between intentionality, acts, signs, meaning, and the distinction between appearing and appearance in phenomenology. The confusion has been partly generated and perpetuated by Derrida's \textit{Speech and Phenomena} and its own confusion and systematic conflation of the present (temporal present / \textit{Gegenwart}) and presence (\textit{Anwesenheit}) throughout its treatment of Husserl's \textit{Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness} (1928). This compression clearly finds its motivation in Heidegger's claim that \textit{ousia} and \textit{parousia} have always been thought on the basis of the present (as a specific mode of temporality). Ultimately, this is the hinge of Derrida's programme in the text of \textit{Speech and Phenomena} throughout its criticism of Husserl's distinction between indication (\textit{Anzeichen}) and expression (\textit{Ausdruck}) as presented in the \textit{Logical Investigations} (1901).\textsuperscript{29} Although Derrida's actual knowledge of \textit{The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness} is not to be limited to what stands out as a rather odd reading of this text (since it is more a question of a strategic misreading that is quite different to that
which surfaces in his earlier and more rigorous *Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry"*\(^{30}\), the upshot of this move is that a number of vital phenomenological differences are effaced. These erasures are almost too numerous to mention, but the differences that demand to be restored, in the context of the present discussion, are the distinctions between appearance and appearing, in relation to the giving of the phenomenon; significational distinctions between primal impression and the Living Present; immanence and transcendence; retentions and secondary remembrances and adequacy and apodicticity. All these differences are subsumed (condensed / conflated) by Derrida within a certain *logic of presence*. The constellation of issues to which it is applied is severely and, one might argue, unjustly limited by the meta-generality of his orientation on the theme of presence throughout his labyrinthine discussions on the horizon of *différance*. It is somewhat ironic that Derrida’s critique of Western philosophy and his project to articulate those differences, which have been forgotten by this history, takes the form of a de-differentiation of the many horizons of phenomenology.

Derrida actually deconstructs its language to the point at which its key dimensional differences cease to have any phenomenological value. Such a levelling procedure is, in an important sense, a de-differentiation: a movement toward 'indifference.' This definitely has a negative impact on his reading and representation of Husserl in *Speech and Phenomena* (and it has, rather unfortunately, had a negative influence on some readers who follow Derrida in style without necessarily responding to the spirit of his own call for vigilance; who play, but without due regard for rigour).\(^{31}\) Within certain limits, there is also a positive side to what we may call Derrida’s strategy of de-differentiation or in-difference to certain differences – particularly in relation to the motif of *différance* and the erasure of the substantive difference between spatiality and temporality in the significational play between difference and deferral – which we shall have occasion to explore later on.
To return to the principal citation from *The Tain of the Mirror* above (*TM*, p.228-29), it is significant that Gasché speaks of the Living Present in terms of the 'instance of the living presence.' This suggests that Husserl is working with the notion of a discrete and unmediated intuition of the thing-itself in person within a corpuscular or point-like present – an instance or instant of a spatialized present – presence). There is a movement of conflation at work here that is clearly inspired by *Speech and Phenomena* and Derrida's inappropriate assignment of the view to Husserlian phenomenology that "...the concept of punctuality, of the now as stigme, still plays a major role in *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*" (*SP*, p.61).

Although Derrida acknowledges in the following sentences that Husserl rejects the thought of the now as a point, he still goes on to read the lectures on time in these terms, where the "...irreducible spreading-out of lived experience...is nonetheless thought and described on the basis of the self-identity of the now as point, as a 'source-point'" (*Ibid*). Exactly why Derrida's text distorts Husserl’s meaning to this extent, by making such an extraordinary claim, is rather mysterious since he clearly displays a more sophisticated and appropriate grasp of the actual phenomenological meaning and structure of the now or the present in his *Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry."* It is significant that this earlier text already demonstrates how such a determination of the present 'as a point' is a fundamentally incorrect reading of Husserl.

The principal problem with Derrida’s account of Husserl’s concept of the Living Present lies in the manner in which he approaches the concept of primary impression.

For Husserl, primary impression is a now-consciousness whose distinction from retention and protention – which are, respectively, primary remembrance and primary anticipation – is intentional and not substantial. All three intentionalities are intrinsically intertwined in the present, but they name different orientations. The present [*Gegenwart*] is always already a tri-horizontal matrix. However, Derrida warps Husserl's meaning to such a degree that primary impression becomes reduced to a now-point (a *discrete* moment) in itself,
as if phenomenology has not escaped the limits of the Humean impression of an empirical-psychological succession.

Derrida's reading of Husserl is quite surreal in the assignment of a corpuscular or point-like present / now to the central position of The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. What emerges is a complete distortion of Husserl's discourse on the temporalization of consciousness, intuition, and the issue of continuity with respect to the question of evidence.

The constellation of issues raised by the lectures on internal time consciousness is, in fact, a set of problems handed down from Hume. His 'introspective' inquiry into that which we call the Self (in the study, "Of Personal Identity" – A Treatise of Human Nature [Treatise]) leads to the claim that there is no impression of the Self that is "constant and invariable" (p.251). Hume maintains that the mind is "…nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." (Ibid, p.252). At no time, however, does he ask the question about how there is consciousness of such movement, change, succession, etc. In other words, he does not inquire into the possibility of 'introspection' itself as an 'extended' consciousness or project that is somehow coextensive with itself. Hume’s investigations start out as a quest for the legendary Self and it is a limitation that blinds him to a deeper dimension. He does have the key, but the original question obscures the door that is to be unlocked.

Husserl, in his preface to Boyce-Gibson's English translation of Ideen I, suggests that Hume's Treatise of Human Nature "...gives the first systematic sketch of a pure phenomenology" (p.16). This is clearly true, but when Hume maintains that "...all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences" (Treatise, p.636, Appendix), his analyses get stuck in the sphere of empirical phenomenalism. The principally psychologistic orientation of his studies only
gestures toward a more profound phenomenological field that his language and orientation
cannot actually penetrate. Hume is unable to explain continuity or consciousness of change
within what is fundamentally a 'diachronic' flux of discrete existences. It is significant that this
viewpoint, which is caught up in the thought of time as mere linear successivity, cannot
actually account for Hume’s determination of mind as a ‘bundle of impressions.’ It disregards
the question of the meaning and possibility of the kind of co-existence or simultaneity that
must always already be implicated in the capacity to juxtapose and concatenate various
different sequential / successive moments within a single grasp. Despite the fact that it can be
said that these past 'impressions' no longer exist as such, they are, in an extremely important
sense, still retained. This must be so as a matter of principle if there is to be the consciousness
of a flux of differences in the first place. It is in response to this issue that Husserl’s discourse
on retention (and protention) addresses the question of the possibility of the unfolding of
continuity that produces the registration of difference.

What Derrida’s Speech and Phenomena 'strategically' omits (or perhaps merely fails to
recognize – but I doubt that this is simply the case) is that Husserl's theory of intuition is
explained 'by means of' his analyses on the multiple intentionalities of time-consciousness.
These temporal orientations describe a more primordial flux (Fluß) in and through which the
now is already spanned within itself as the locus of an inter / intra-play of retentions and
protentions. This horizon of intertwined intentionalities originally permits consciousness of
unity and difference as the condition of any possible intuition – where intuition is the product
of the sedimentation that is constituted by the retentional and protentional flux of time
consciousness. Retention gives the passing-over of the present into that which is no longer
(pastness), while protention fills the present with the anticipation of that which is not-yet (the
pre-expectational horizon of open futurity). Retention is a double intentionality that constitutes
the extendedness / duration of temporal objects on the one hand and, on the other, it constitutes
the extendedness / duration of the ‘flow’ of experience itself. It is this second intentionality
(Längsintentionalität – longitudinal intentionality) of retention that is the most significant for
our purposes, since it gives the flow itself (where pastness is always already a constant
background to the flow). Therefore, what is given is a ‘continuum’ of lived / living experience.

Husserl’s Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness is, in large part, an effective
response to Hume's problem regarding the issue of continuity.

Derrida maintains that Husserl's philosophy is centred on the language of 'presence.'
However, as we have seen, the meaning of presence, as it functions in Derrida's critical
analyses of the phenomenological concept of intuition and primal impression, is thought on the
basis of a conflation of Gegenwart and Anwesenheit (temporal present and presence as that
which is manifest / visible). Although Derrida's logic is based on Heidegger's claim concerning
how ousia and parousia have always been thought in terms of a particular temporal
determination – the present – it is an illegitimate move to reduce this history to the thought of
the present as a point. This further compression leads to a very strange and incoherent reading
of The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, which distorts what Husserl is really
doing by actually warping Heidegger’s meaning.

Husserl's inquiry does not 'terminate' in presence or in an extensionless (point-like)
present but, as has already been indicated, in flux (Fluß). However, this is not a Humean
'objective' flux of a merely successive order. It marks the difference between (to borrow from
Derrida’s writing on différance) the written and the writing of the written – (in Of
Grammatology, Derrida speaks of différance as "the formation of form" and the "being-
imprinted of the imprint" [p.63]). In both Husserlian terms and from the Derridian standpoint,
this is the outermost frontier of phenomenology. It announces itself in response to the question
of the possibility of intuition, presence, evidence, etc.
The absolute Ur-horizon of *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* – a field for which, as Husserl says, “names are lacking” (*PITC*. §36, p.100) – does not explain itself by means of the language of presence (certainly not in terms of the way in which Derrida defines such logic), but is that which permits the functioning of such a language. This dimension does not extend itself beyond transcendental phenomenology, but only the distorted sense of an 'intuitional foundation' that Derrida incorrectly attributes to it through an inverted and illegitimate reading of Husserl’s reflections on the Living Present of temporal experience. Husserl's analyses are already attuned to the question of the possibility of continuity and presence in terms of a pure movement of *return* involving deferral and differentiation. Is this just a vague anticipation of Derrida's own discourse on *différance* that has been projected retroactively onto phenomenology or is Husserl's writing actually one of the original sites of its germination?

The answer depends on whether one adheres to that which Derrida unearths in his *Introduction to Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry”* or to that which is expressed in the later text of *Speech and Phenomena*. Each text is the inverse of the other.

To reiterate one of the main points of our discussion, it is vital to understand that the concept of primary impression, as adumbrated in Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, is not be confused with a 'Humean impression.' For Husserl, Hume's discrete impressions can be nothing more than abstractions / idealizing *fictions*, which are constituted through a form of narrative return that forgets its own conditions of possibility. There must be *extendedness* – in the sense of the *consciousness* of extension.

In order for perception to occur – here, we speak of the *appearing of sense* – that which is given up through primary impression must first *be able to return upon itself* (Husserl was not by any means the first to recognize that cognition was primarily a matter of *re*-cognition). The structural possibility of return – which permits the 'I can do so again' – precedes the issue
of personal identity as the condition of its possibility. As we have seen, Husserl describes this recursive structuration in terms of a Primordial Flux: an interplay or intra-play of transversal and longitudinal intentionalities (which must necessarily precede and condition a flux of a Humean order). According to his phenomenological position, the meaning of Primordial Flux is not to be understood on the basis of primary impression as its actual starting-point. The discourse on flux is that which originally explains the opening-up of the Living Present in which primary impression serves in the form of a specific intentional index within a tri-horizontal interplay. It is this folding-unfolding of the ‘horizon’ of the present that produces unity and distanciation / continuity and surpassing.

The Living Present (lebendige Gegenwart), as an intertwining of intentional relations, is an open / extended / extending matrix 'constituted' through a retentional and protentional flux in which primal impression is the spacing of their negotiation. From the standpoint of the Living Present, this inter-play is actually an intra-play. It is not a question of external relations between individual nows strung out side by side, but of an intra-relational matrix at work within the present. For Husserl, the 'now' is grasped on the basis of the original possibility of such an inter / intra-play within the heart of itself. This means that the possibility of the present and the continuity of presence rest on the possibility of return / repetition. It is the structuralizing possibility of return – returnability– that produces a continuum.

As Wood writes in The Deconstruction of Time,

Husserl's real achievement is to have supplied an answer to the problem of continuity through time (p.72).

In sum, Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness is a rigorous response to (and an effective resolution of) the problem of 'association' that plays such a
crucial role in *The Treatise of Human Nature*. Hume was the first to acknowledge that the problem of association could not be addressed with any sort of adequacy (let alone explained) on the basis of his description of the mind as a stream of discrete impressions. This latter view makes it impossible to take into account the structuralization of the unfolding of a continuum. Consciousness (or mind), when thought in terms of a 'bundle of impressions' – a succession of fleeting and distinct present perceptions – does not give us *continuity*. The *life* of consciousness cannot be made up of discrete packets of perception or time as if they popped in and out of existence from moment to moment. The consciousness of sameness and difference must, in some sense, *extend* itself beyond the limits of such a model of the mind (as a running-off of discrete impressions and point-like 'nows') if there is to be the possibility of 'association.' Here, we speak of a form of *bringing-together* whose meaning is not to be reduced to a movement of homogenization, since it also includes, in an original manner, the bringing-together-of-differences *as differences* – a weaving of temporally disparate moments within a quasi-simultaneous web of juxtaposition. This cannot be taken into account within the logical bounds of a mere 'order of corpuscular successions.'
11. The Problem of Association and the Continuity of Consciousness as Consciousness of Continuity: the play of unity in difference and difference in unity.

Hume's empirical-psychologistic standpoint barred him from access to a transcendental plane of orientation on the question of 'unity,' and thus the possibility of 'association.' This is ironic, in view of the weight of significance that this concept has for the theoretical structure and methodology of *The Treatise of Human Nature* – which is one of the reasons why Hume’s writing is so admirable. He develops the theory of association only to see the grounding ripped out from beneath it when he conscientiously reviews the issue of continuity upon which it depends. Hume not only climbs a ladder and kicks it away; he is also prepared to fall back down and to begin anew. Perhaps it is this conscientious rigour of Hume’s analyses of experience that Husserl most admires – given that his own philosophical enterprise is continually defined as ‘a perpetual return to beginnings.’

It was the development of the theory of intentionality by Brentano and Husserl that allowed a new orientation on the problem of continuity. As we have seen, in phenomenology, consciousness is defined in terms of a transitive movement. It is literally nothing without such transitivity: its directedness-toward something. The concept of the ‘outside-itself’ ekstatic movement of consciousness is the principal theoretical basis on which existentialism depends. This is the core of Heidegger’s meaning in the expression Dasein (Being-there) and Sartre’s ‘for’ in Être pour soi (Being-for-itself). The ‘towards,’ indicated by the preposition ‘of,’ is the essential determination of the meaning of consciousness.

In these terms, the consciousness of similarity and difference necessarily implies a stretched-out consciousness that is irreducible to a flux of 'atomic' impressions. Impressions
cannot be discrete consciousnesses or point-like presents since this would imply something like perception without perceiving, meaning without reference, foreground without background, presence without horizon, situation without relation, etc. The life of consciousness cannot be a mere aggregate either – the sum of a collection of impressions, which are said to pass-away with 'inconceivable rapidity.' Without continuity – a continuum that has past and futural horizons – how could we speak of the mind as a 'collection' or a 'bundle'? In the case of the mind as a whole, these expressions have to be applied to a form of non-linear / hologrammatic co-extension or quasi-simultaneous structurality (the latter can be thought in a 'virtual' sense without necessarily invoking the language of presence), which not only retains the impressions that pass-away, but is also already at work anticipating their arrival. Both of these performances constitute the consciousness of transition itself. Without the structurality that is constituted by such performances, it is not even enough to say that we would be unable to grasp the same impression twice. We would not be able to grasp it even once.

Hume's introspective narrative gives us a purely linear order of successions that cannot actually account for the consciousness of 'duration' – a consciousness that must, in some way, be coextensive with itself through change as consciousness of change. Consciousness has to exceed its various moments if there is to be the registration of difference. Running-off impressions must somehow be able to ‘express’ the duration of their running-off.

Therefore, to speak in terms of a flux of impressions that successively flash in and out of existence (remember that for Hume, perceptions are ‘distinct existences’) already presupposes a ‘stretched’ consciousness, which, in some sense, precedes and outlives the impressions that pass-away. What must be taken into account is the ‘continuing-through’ or ‘living-through’ of temporal movement. Discrete consciousnesses could never register ‘transition.’ Therein lies the paradox; such a form of successivity as that expressed by Hume would literally never give succession.
The thematization of motion / change in terms of ‘phases,’ 'passing-over,' 'passing-away,' 'running-off,' etc., speaks of the consciousness of duration, change, modal variations, etc. These transitions cannot be given in a point-like impression or a mere collection (in the case of the latter we would still need to inquire into that which permits such a synthesis). Therefore, we find that the collecting together of a series of different temporal points would not give time in much the same sense that a collection of spatial points would not give motion.

This is where Husserl’s expression running-off-phenomena (Ablaufphänomene) comes into play since it does not so much name impressions that are shading off as the consciousness of the shading off itself.

The lectures on time-consciousness explore the question of the primordial possibility of an extending consciousness which, when understood in intentional terms as a transitive consciousness of something, gives duration. Without duration there cannot be change, without an enduring (temporalized / temporalizing) consciousness there cannot be consciousness of change. Hume's narrative forgets its own condition of possibility, beyond the 'corpuscular' schema that it thematizes. Narratives report duration precisely because they have duration or, rather, they are forms of duration. Association is a kind of narrative return – an unfolding of structure, the writing of con-texture which, in a peculiar sense, combines instantaneity and duration, differentiation and concatenation. Such structuration emerges out of the possibility of comparison, as a kind of compression of 'lived-time.' This compression is structurally identical to the process of idealization – which, once again, rests on returnability.

The opening-up of structure, then, points to a general structurality that first permits such an opening. It prescribes the possibility of association. One can still respect Hume's observation that we do not perceive any “real connexion among distinct existences,” when it comes to questions of causality, but the issue of ‘relatedness’ is irreducible to these terms.
Husserl's theory of intentionality emerged out of a manoeuvre of suspension that bracketed questions of causation. His source of inspiration, as Husserl's introduction to Boyce-Gibson's English translation of *Ideas I* (1931) appears to show, can be found in his encounter with Hume as a rigorous response to the aporetic moments that announce themselves at the limits of his investigations. For Hume, our notion of causality is not derived from the perception of real connections among distinct existences, but from 'habitual association' – which, as we have already seen, cannot actually be explained by his schema concerning the corpuscular temporalization of experience[s]. His dissatisfaction with this state of affairs is well known. It is in the Appendix to the *Treatise* that Hume confesses...

...all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head (p.635).

The theory of intentionality, when considered from the point of view of the temporalization of consciousness, explains continuity in terms of the possibility of return: returnability. It is the retentional and protentional extending of 'return' that gives the 'possibility' of habituation and association – which, in turn, permits the idea of causality. This brings us back to a fundamental question that Hume has overlooked. Is he correct in his assumption that perceptions are actually 'distinct' existences? Is there not a certain degree of hypostatization going on here? For Husserl, "...no concrete experience can pass as independent in the full sense of the term" (*Ideas I*, §83, p.221). Consciousness, or experience (in the most general sense), when understood according to the logic of intentionality, is a transitive upsurge, a unity of a projection, a comportment-towards – which is precisely a 'stretched' consciousness: the extended / extending of a history.
Is not Hume taking rather a great deal for granted? Existence, when thought in terms of its phenomenological affinity with the Greek word *ekstaticon*, expresses emergence: to-stand-outside-itself. However, that which stands-outside-itself already implies a whole matrix of referential differences (that must in some sense *register* themselves as such) from which no ekstatic node can be absolutely distinct. Distinctness arises out of the possibility of the *consciousness of difference*. Therefore, consciousness is essentially *spaced-out*. We should say, in consonance with Husserl, that these moments are not 'distinct existences,' but rather phases, modes or streams of *one* 'unity of lived-experience.'

In the section entitled, "Intentionality as the Main Phenomenological Theme" of *Ideas 1*, Husserl writes,

> It is intentionality which characterizes *consciousness* in the pregnant sense of the term, and justifies us in describing the whole stream of experience as at once a stream of consciousness and unity of *one* consciousness (§84, p.222).

It is important to remember that in Husserl's phenomenology the question concerning the unity of the consciousness of time – as consciousness through time – is not restricted to (understood on the basis of) a mere expression of Self or personal identity, as it seems to be for Hume. The unity about which Husserl speaks indicates something earlier: temporalized / temporalizing consciousness (the a priori condition of possibility of what we would normally name as the Self); a retentional and protentional tracing of a projection – a reflexive unity of a history.

The *life* of consciousness (as a whole) is another name for the *intentionality* of consciousness. This is in stark contrast to the sense of intentionality with which we are left after reading Derrida's engagement with Husserl in *Speech and Phenomena*. As we have seen,
Husserl has, in fact, already tackled the paradoxes that arise through the classic 'discretist' doctrine that the primary components of perception are 'corpuscular' impressions or appearances. Far from being a mere resumption of the Humean view, the theory of intentionality is an effective response and overturning of this thesis.

The somewhat notorious (from a strict phenomenological point of view), but ever-readable *Speech and Phenomena* presents us with a re-reading of Husserl that is a kind of flip-side (or dark-side) to the earlier *Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry."* One has to admire Derrida's cheek when he specifically rejects the thought of the now as a point by drawing on Husserl's own studies on temporal consciousness while, at the same time, actually attributing this corpuscular viewpoint to phenomenology as a whole. Continuing in this attitude, Gasché's claim regarding "the privilege Husserl attributes to the instance of the living presence" ([*TM*], p.228), is one in which the meaning of 'instance' clearly doubles as 'instant. But, for Husserl, such a present / now / instant could never be more than an abstraction from a flux (a Primordial Flux, the *Ur-region* that precedes and constitutes the purely successive flux in Hume's account).

There is an important difference that must be taken into account: any consideration of the meaning of living presence must attend to the question of its unfolding or constitution as a unity of duration. The internal dynamics – which trace out both dispersion and recuperation in flux – are also those that open up the 'Living Present.' In its very principle, the now cannot be a point-like moment or presence. As we have seen, an atomic or corpuscular now, within the context of Husserl's phenomenological orientation, could never be anything more than an idealization, a fiction. A now-point can be nothing for itself. Husserl's 4th law of temporal experience tells us that the now is intrinsically transitive. Every time has a before and after. As the lectures on time-consciousness unfold, it becomes clear that this is no external relation, but that the past and future are necessarily embodied 'within' the present.
There is a certain 'virtuality' expressed by the Living Present in that it is not a presence in the sense of an objective appearance, but is the opening and the depth of any possible mode of 'appearing.' As a horizon, it recedes before that which stands out or comes to presence. In this sense, it is pure transcendence. Deferring and surpassing trace out the structure of its performance as opening.

There is also another sense in which it expresses a fundamental form of immanence. For Husserl, the structurality of the opening-up of the Living Present is precisely flux – through which the giving of temporal objects is lived. The thought of the Living Present is irreducible to the boundaries of what has become (by courtesy of deconstruction) a meta-general form of discourse on presence, since it is the opening of presencing itself. However – and here is the paradox that Derrida cannot disentangle because of the limits of his own orientation concerning the question of presence – although the Living Present does not actually appear it is not a pure absence, for it is, in an important phenomenological sense, immanent in its transcendence. Like the Earth as ground-horizon (the from-which) which is immanent and yet unseen in that it is not principally an object, that which is closest to us recedes from our noticing grasp. In other words, the lebendige Gegenwart is not present to consciousness in any 'objective' sense, but is the present form of consciousness in its directedness toward something.

It must be noted that we are indifferent as to whether such 'directedness' is an orientation toward the now, past or future. Both the horizon of pastness and that of futurity already inhabit the Living Present (as interplaying fringes of the now) in that retention and protention are present modes of consciousness, e.g., retention is not a past moment as such, but a present consciousness (a retaining) of the past – giving pastness within the present. Retentions retain retentions within themselves – they are continua of continua.
In sum, the Living Present is a tri-horizontal nexus of interplaying orientations: retention, primal impression and protention. Each orientation is a 'present' form of consciousness with a unique intentional index.32

Primal impression is the boundary to retention and protention. It marks the point at which they pass over into one another. Such a point is ideal of course. Another way of looking at primary impression is in terms of a boundary that has no thickness. The sense of this is to be found in Husserl's agreement with the radicalization of the concept of the 'boundary' (Grenze) in Brentano's philosophy – which specifically rejects the notion that it is composed of two adjacent points. In the same terms, retention and protention are not adjacent to one another in the sense in which they could be said to either lie alongside one another (touching without blending) or that they are separated by an unspecified gap. Boundary is pure transition. There is not a strict divide between retention and protention, for that division to which the concept of primal impression refers is more a kind of zone of transitional smudging – a blending and a bleeding of one into the other. Boundary, here, signifies a nexus of 'play' where the Living present is precisely a spacing of negotiation between the three intentional ekstases.

What is given through this movement is the unfolding of a horizon, not discrete things. The thought of the boundary as a dividing line without thickness or as a point is, once again, merely an ideal limit – an idealizing fiction.33

There are numbers of ways in which we might understand this play or interplay. Firstly, in the sense in which there is an absence of rigidity – unfixedness. This kind of play occurs through erosion; a loosening that comes with the passage of time. Secondly, the now is always protentionally ahead of itself while being the cutting edge of a train of retentions. This brings us to the following sense: it is a perfect metaphor for the open-endedness of the present – the retentional and protentional interplay that gives the play of the now, its unfolding and its unfixedness. It is a kind of blurring of edges. The Living Present is a horizon with fringes (as
opposed to the common notion of boundaries), which extend on both sides of itself. These fringes (or overlapping zones) are not merely external supports to the present, but constitute its extendedness from within itself. Therefore, the interplay, once again, is in a very fundamental sense, also an *intra*-play.

The idea of primal impression brings with it the all-important phenomenological concepts concerning apodicticity and adequacy and the play between fulfilment, non-fulfilment and degrees of fulfilment. Primal impression is the fulfilment of what *was* a protention. The movement gives, to paraphrase Merleau-Ponty, the germination of what will have already been given. Primal impression is the present actualization of what *was* futural.

This is the fold of a structure of negotiation which originarily permits us to distinguish between phantasy and the real.

At a 'higher' level, an example of this would be when a figure, perhaps shrouded in darkness, may seem familiar, but when it is approached (on the basis of the apprehension of familiarity), it turns out to be someone (or even something) quite different in actuality. What signs itself here is the moment at which a determinate expectation, whose material is delivered up from the past (through memory), is forced to undergo adjustment on the basis of a present consciousness (primal impression) of something with which the expectation does not correspond. As the protention passes over into retention the content of expectation is annulled and retained only as unfulfilled and mistaken. Primal impression marks (to speak metaphorically) the 'point' at which expectations are fulfilled or otherwise. It is the spacing through which existence pours in, disrupting imagination and ideality.

Therefore, it is important to understand that the term primal impression (or now-consciousness) is not synonymous with the meaning of the expression *Living Present*. It refers to only one present form of 'orientation' that articulates the way in which retention and protention (as present modes of orientation of that which is no-longer and that which is not-
yet) pass over into one another in the constitution of the ever-flowing present. The Living Present itself, far from being point-like, is a tri-horizontal 'field.' Along with Merleau-Ponty, we may describe it as a 'bulb' made up of indeterminately extended fringes stretching into the past and the future.

The Living Present (*lebendige Gegenwart*) is a waiting-towards presence. It is not so much the present (in an objective sense) as the *living through of presencing*.

12. The Phenomenology of the *Standing-Out* of that which Stands-Outside-Itself

With these phenomenological issues in mind, which clearly show the constitutive nature of the play between appearance and absence and the originarity of the intertwining (as opposed to heterogeneity) of the now and not-now, we question Gasché's ill-advised tendency to speak of the limits of phenomenology in terms of that which can be 'phenomenologized' – given the limitations of his application of this term. This ignores the theme of the 'horizon' by maintaining the reduction of the phenomenon of phenomenology to an 'objective' presence in which the *language of appearing* is subsumed under the logics of the *appearance* (a mere doubling of content if you wish). That they are inseparably bound together (from the point of view of the performance of phenomenal disclosure in general) is clear, but there is a vital 'difference' that actually defines the space or dimensionality of their intrinsic unity: a unity of content and context, story and narrative, noema and noesis. A phenomenological *noetics* (that is, a phenomenology of a 'noetic' orientation) concerns itself with the logic of *appearing* –
which is irreducible to either the language of the appearance or that which appears (through the appearance). Here, we cannot settle for the standard language of 'presence' – not in terms of the way in which Gasché sets up the expression 'living presence' as a simple and full presence given in coincidence with itself: that is, in a point-like present. This, as we have seen, is far from Husserl's meaning.

The logic(s) of appearing cannot be divorced from a phenomenology of the appearance – given that, the phenomenon, for Husserl, expresses the essential intertwining of both. However, this is not to say that the language of appearing is merely a kind of secondary auxiliary to the appearance or that the former is to be understood on the basis of the latter. This would be a dangerous confusion of different dimensions. The appearing of the appearance is a constitutive movement that plays about that which appears in the manner of an illumination, which permits objects (in the most general phenomenological sense) to 'stand-out.' It is a mood, a contextualizing narrative that is a presencing rather than a presence – the character of the standing-out. Do not narratives efface themselves, in a sense, through their performance? Indeed, is not this self-effacement essential to their performance? A narrative is not the terminus of what is read (leaving the 'object' of a purely textual analysis aside for a moment), it transports the reader beyond its configuration of empirical marks toward that which it expresses (that which announces itself through its noematic component). It is like an arrow. The ability of the narrative to 'transport' the reader beyond itself lies in a movement of 'self-surpassing' which, as the very structure of comportment, signification, [re]presentation, etc., permits the presence of meaning without necessarily being present itself. This structurality of the narrative cannot be grasped sufficiently in the language of 'appearances' since it speaks more of the appearing of that which appears, the giving of the given, the presencing of the present, etc. It traces out a certain invisibility and transcendence as the condition of the visibility of the visible.
The question of the structurality of the unfolding of the narrative, then, can be thought in terms of a phenomenological noetics. The noetics of appearing are *ekstatic*, but the sense of the ekstatic here (*ekstaticon* = to-stand-outside-itself) should not be reduced to the sense in which that which 'stands-out' is an 'objective' presence. Like the sign in its *performance*, it is never 'coincidental' with itself as a presence, but 'surpasses' itself (in the manner described above – e.g., through self-erasure, detour and delay) toward that which it signifies. Signification stands-outside-itself.

This is the logic of intentionality that is applied to consciousness as *directedness-toward something*. Consciousness is *ekstatic*; it 'stands-outside-itself' temporally and can never catch itself except as *performance* in its already *having-beenness* as a constituted unity of duration. The relation of consciousness to itself is essentially one of perpetual surpassing. Self-*coincidence* in a point-like moment is impossible in principle, but (and this would now appear to be in contradistinction to Derrida's actual position) this does not then refer phenomenology 'to a zone in which its principle of principles is radically put into question.' Certainly not if this is meant to sign the absolute limit beyond which phenomenology cannot extend itself.\(^{36}\)

As we have seen, Husserl's 'principle of principles' is also irreducible to a mere metaphysical assertion built upon a divide between appearances and things-in-themselves or originals and copies. It is rather a call to the critical task of interrogating the 'how' of thinking: a turn (an altering *re-turn*) that is facilitated through the movement of *epoché* – a gesture that has a variety of different forms and methodological signatures.

For Husserl, the *phenomenality* (the giving) of the appearance is not contingent (as it would be for a naturalistic objectivism) upon an original objective relation between appearances and extra-phenomenal entities. It rather springs from the intentional / temporal structurality of experience (and the consciousness of temporality), which originarily opens up the space of such a difference. The very postulation of a world existentially transcendent to the
phenomenal horizon is contingent upon the evidential sense of transcendence: that it has meaning / experiential significance. Even if this is usually expressed in terms of a lack, such a 'lack' still signifies.

The first-stage phenomenological reduction (epoché) institutes itself on the basis that to refuse any position-taking with regard to the 'actuality' of a world transcendent to its appearance does not mean that we then lose the 'sense' of transcendence. The sense is conveyed through its manner of appearing (or non-appearing) – the 'appearing of' as distinct from 'mere appearance' or 'that which appears'. Transcendence and absence are structural moments or modes of the appearing of 'things' that constitute them from within: a horizontal unfolding of forms of illumination and patterns of relation through which entities announce / show their existence, when existence is thought in relation to the principal sense of ekstaticon. For any entity to be able to 'stand-out' (in the objective sense), it not only requires illumination (in the terms so far discussed), but also a horizon of differentiated relations through which it can mark out its own identity and position and thus stand-outside-itself. This, let us say, is the 'spatial' moment (with its mundane and objective sense) of ekstasis. The horizontal unfolding of these differences, however, expresses a certain movement and relation of self-surpassing through which that which stands-out stands-outside-itself temporally: it is 'stretched-out' in time. Nothing can stand-out unless it is already extended and extending. Only by standing-outside-itself, by passing over into what it is-not and was-not (in the Heraclitean sense), can an entity stand-out as an objective presence. In other words, it must have 'duration.' The structurality of such an extending, or stretching-out, takes us beyond the language of the visible. However, this does not fall outside the scope of phenomenology's 'principle of principles' – not when it is understood according to a 'genetic' orientation, which concerns the constitution (in flux) of the noeses, which efface themselves through a retentional delay in
their self-surpassing towards that which is illuminated noematically. Correlatively, there is the essential withdrawal of the phenomenon that always already accompanies its giving of itself.

That there is a constitutive function to 'surpassing' that falls outside the language of the appearance does not mean that we can no longer speak of the evidence of a certain form of surpassing – evidence in appearing, which would include non-appearing, rather than evidence of appearance or the mere appearance of absence. If transcendence or surpassing is equated with the name of a problem, this can only be so in that it first 'announces' itself as such. Phenomenology concerns itself with the structures and forms of such an announcement. It will be shown that, without such 'evidence of surpassing' (which, from another point of view, is also a deferring) nothing would appear at all – and that includes difference. One might be tempted to argue that the theme of difference and its constitutive role in the production of individual meaningful appearances is precisely that which is prior to any question of presence. Individuated objects / meanings cannot 'stand-out' unless they are already situated within a matrix of differences against which they can stand-out as distinct entities. However, there are different kinds of differences, and each kind, if it is to function as such must, in some sense, be able to stand-out (to register – be capable of registration).

The meaning of the expression to-stand-out, as indicated above, need not be reduced to the language of appearances in the classical 'objective' sense. Likewise, the evidential logics of which we speak cannot be adequately subsumed under the accepted limits of the language or metaphysics of presence as delineated by both Derrida and Gasché. Ekstaticon, when understood in temporal (and intentional) terms – ekstasis – as a 'standing-outside-itself' and 'other-than-static' refers us to a movement of surpassing brought about by a certain deferment and displacement of itself in relation to itself: giving evidence of a durational difference / interval. Such a deferment or extension produces differences in a very special sense that is prior to the process of, what Gasché calls, 'doubling' and falls outside the apparent 'generality'
of his principal theory. For Husserl (just as much as for Derrida), such significations as delay, postponement, to hold in reserve, etc., speak of a play of presence and absence that does not limit absence to a mere mode of a more original presence. This questions at the deepest level the view that Husserlian phenomenology is limited to the language of presence (which easily translates to the more specific terms of 'appearance' or 'visibility') since, as Derrida himself writes,

In the originary temporalization and the movement of relationship with the outside, as Husserl actually describes them, non-presentation or depresentation is as "originary" as presentation. That is why a thought of the trace can no more break with a transcendental phenomenology than be reduced to it (Of Grammatology, p.62).

So much, at least, for the descriptive and explanatory limits of Husserl's phenomenology. This must surely make us pause for thought when we are faced with the assertion that it is imprisoned in a metaphysic of presence: a metaphysic which is purported to limit its language to that of immediate (non-mediated and point-like) manifestation from the very beginning. And, with the last sentence, we find that the question concerning the sense in which deconstruction allegedly goes 'beyond' phenomenology is getting more complex without actually shedding any light on the actual value of such a claim (note: value, here, should not be limited to matters of 'truth'). Since the 'thought of the trace can no more break with a transcendental phenomenology than be reduced to it,' we find that what Derrida takes away with one hand he restores with the other. His own claims regarding the limits of phenomenology and its supercession by deconstruction (as a radical 'break') are always tempered by the quasi-parasitical nature of deconstruction itself – as a perpetual writing of prefaces, whose own language, for reasons of principle, cannot break with that with which it is
engaged. The self-understanding within which this writing moves is the principal meaning of deconstructive irony. It is the original space in which its many different forms of ironic orientation play, e.g., satire, parody, doubling or substitution, contrariness, maieutic inquisition, etc.).

Gasché's misunderstanding of Husserl concerning the question of 'living presence' is clearly based on Derrida's own undoubtedly 'strategic' (in view of his comments above) misrepresentation of the phenomenological sense of the Living Present in *Speech and Phenomena*. It constitutes an impoverishment of the meaning of Husserl's project, by completely disregarding the actual context and orientation of his analyses on time-consciousness. The phenomenological-temporal analyses set the scene for a radical approach to such issues as difference, deferral, supercession and absence in terms of their constitutive functioning in the movement of presencing without limiting them to the language of appearances or presence in the narrower sense. The impoverished version blinds the 'Derrida of *Speech and Phenomena*' (and consequently also the reader of this text, Gasché) to one of the most profound shifts in Husserlian thought – and not as an implication invisible to Husserl himself, but as one which was fully thematized in his own work. The later stages of phenomenology, as transcendental-genetic phenomenology (post *Logical Investigations*), actually provide the resources for Derrida's critique of the limitations of *static* phenomenology.37 This, in turn, equips Derrida with the means to implement a deconstructive critique of the 'static' limitations of structuralism.

The notion of *différance* as 'differing and deferring' (spatializing and temporalizing) essentially recapitulates and then isolates, in a genuinely creative way, that which Husserl's genetic / temporal analyses have already uncovered and thematized in the concept of the Primordial Flux. Derrida's *Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry"* [1962]) already shows that the lectures on time-consciousness establish (in a *thematic* form) that consciousness
of duration is a matter of consciousness of difference / divergence and that the duration of consciousness itself is constituted through an originary retentional / protentional flux of continuous modification. This flux permits a stretching-out through the recursive temporalizing and spacing of a certain delay: repetition and reserve. It is curious that Derrida forgets this (perhaps, once again, for reasons of strategy) in his later publication: *Speech and Phenomena* [1967]. And again in *Of Grammatology* [1967] which, in the midst of its forgetfulness, nevertheless puts to work a certain Husserlian theoretical matrix that guides the course of Derrida's project to delineate a meta-general concept of writing – archi-writing. This quasi-concept confounds the limits of the language of presence and yet its intrinsic logic essentially re-plays that which he discovers in Husserl's research on time-consciousness – which he correctly determines as the basis for Husserl's discourse on the theme of *Geschichtlichkeit* (historicity).

It is actually extremely difficult to graft the concept of the 'metaphysics of presence' (and its consequent limitations) onto the phenomenological horizon with any real degree of consistency. A careful re-reading of Husserl makes it almost impossible to sustain the view that the intertwined concepts of *différance*, iterability, the *archi-trace*, supplementarity, *archi-writing*, doubling, etc., go beyond the dimension of his phenomenology (particularly Husserl's later work). We cannot accept that Gasché's general theory of duplicity 'reaches beyond phenomenology' in general and "...in particular in its Husserlian form" (*TM*, p.228). Gasché's assumption, that it does, ultimately blinds him to a central dynamic in the thematization of *différance* that is the principal resource for Derrida's discourse on trace structure. In fact, Gasché's general theory of duplicity actually lags behind Husserl.

We shall see that Gasché's critique of phenomenology still sustains some of the common misconceptions that have arisen and found themselves maintained within the milieu of deconstruction regarding the limits of Husserl's project. Despite the careful demonstration of
the intimate relations between phenomenology and deconstruction, Gasché is still primarily influenced by the 'strong' polemical tone of Derrida's texts and its reiteration within the deconstructive milieu. And, here is the irony – this leads, by way of certain 'structural' ambitions, to an insufficient and one-sided understanding of the deep logics in play in Derrida's own writing. This limited perspective underplays (through the failure to re-read both Husserl and Derrida with sufficient critical reserve) the strategic and theoretical significance of Derrida's own treatment of temporal themes and their relevance for the development of the quasi-transcendental concept of the tracing of *différance*.
PART TWO: TEMPORALITY AND THE SPACING OF DELAY

13. History Re-Visited: *iterability, tradition, and pluri-dimensional returnability*

Whether it is intended or not, Gasché’s text reduces Husserl's phenomenology as-a-whole to the *static* phenomenological orientation of the *Logical Investigations*. He works with a very limited perspective of phenomenology, which has been refracted through the lens-piece of Derrida's *Speech and Phenomena*. Ironically, this is one of the principal weaknesses of *The Tain of the Mirror* because it is not at all clear that even *Speech and Phenomena* would authorize such a reduction. Derrida's numerous references to (and quotations from) *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, in particular, clearly show that the resources from which he draws, throughout his critique of Husserl's seminal work (1901), are to be found in the phenomenological study on time-consciousness (1904-5 including the appendices from 1910) and the later genetic research (1917 up to the mid 1930’s [Husserl died in 1938]). Derrida is quite explicit about this, if one looks hard enough.

In many ways, *Speech and Phenomena* can be read not so much as a criticism of the *Logical Investigations*, but as a sophisticated re-reading of *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* – and as an inspired application of Husserl's theses on temporality. The
latter text provides an effective critical language through which Derrida acts as the mediator of a dialogue between the later and earlier Husserl – opening up the spacing between the genetic and the static. Although it may seem somewhat perverse, given the content of Part One of the present study, there is much to be said for a reading of *Speech and Phenomena* in which Derrida's writing can be seen as a vigorous response to – and a radical continuation of – Husserl's own passionate call for ongoing critical vigilance as the hallmark of the phenomenological enterprise. To see this, we must double-back on ourselves and find another route of entry. It is worthy of note that Gasché virtually overlooks the importance of *Derrida's Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry"* (introduction is a misnomer here, since Derrida's essay dwarfs the shorter text that it introduces and translates). One might suggest that it is in relation to this text that Derrida's *Speech and Phenomena* fulfils a broader ambition than that which is generally assigned to it alone. It is significant that this early work by Derrida – which precedes *Speech and Phenomena* by five years – focuses on one of the appendices to the text that develops the theme of *Geschichtlichkeit* (historicity): Husserl's *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* [*Crisis*]. It is only towards the end of *The Tain of the Mirror* that Gasché momentarily considers the roots of the theme of archi-writing and its relation to developments in Husserl's phenomenology. However, he still misses the fundamental importance of Husserl's discourse on historicity (the *unfolding* of tradition) and its theoretical background (especially, the lectures on time-consciousness) for Derrida's development of the quasi-concept *différance* – as archi-tracing or archi-writing.

Gasché writes...

...to contend, as I do here, that Derrida continues Husserl (and this is true of his relation to Heidegger as well) precisely on those issues that foreground the classical ethico-theoretical decisions constitutive of philosophy as philosophy is also to say that such a
continuation is at the same time a decisive break with the idea of tradition, continuity, Oedipality, and so on. Indeed, since the motifs in question are of such a nature that they themselves are radically more fundamental than the possibility of continuity, and since, moreover, they cannot be developed within the philosophical discourse as such, their continuation is possible only from a perspective that is marginal with respect to the history of philosophical development. From this standpoint, the fact that Derrida may have discovered these motifs in Husserl's works is, in a certain way, radically contingent (TM, p.246).

There is another serious misconception here – this time regarding Husserl's own attitude to the question of tradition. His last (and unfinished) text, the Crisis, explores the general structurality of the unfolding of any kind of tradition, while simultaneously exploring the problem of the operative presuppositional (traditional) baggage that such an inquiry can carry with it. This is why the question of the limits of the epoché, once again, announces its urgency for phenomenology as method. Husserl ultimately warns us against complacency and stresses that the reduction is something that must be repeated again and again. In more Derridian terms, this is like saying that deconstruction must continually deconstruct itself – a call that we should actually acknowledge as being vital to the very movement of deconstruction.

In this sense, it is almost impossible to begin to reduce phenomenology (without an unacceptable degree of critical violence) to the articulation of a 'particular tradition' in 'static' terms. Phenomenology, in principle (as the expression of an infinite task), undermines this disastrously reduced (de-temporalized) notion of tradition at its very core. It does this in both the concept of historicity and through the ceaselessly shifting, and re-shifting, motion of critical return (reflexivity) that characterizes phenomenological interrogation itself: a pluri-
dimensional movement of return generated out of a certain kind of epochal suspension or deferral. Husserl's definition of phenomenology as a 'perpetual return to beginnings' embraces non-linearity and non-totalization (the absence of an absolute beginning or end-point). It celebrates at the level of method that which Derrida raises to the level of a thesis (that of supplementarity) in *Of Grammatology*. However, Gasché maintains that, in a certain sense, Derrida's indebtedness to Husserl is merely 'contingent.' The implication is that Derrida could have arrived at the opening onto the same pathway of deconstruction by way of a different route and from quite a different source – regardless of the specific theoretical, contextual and methodological background that constituted the beginnings. In other words, in line with Derrida's essentialist trait in his reduction of Western metaphysics to the articulation of the desire for full unmediated 'presence,' any 'source' can be said to be a mere moment (and thus index) of a more general character of motivation that has traced itself throughout the history of Occidental philosophy.

A number of possible objections announce themselves here, but that which springs most immediately into the foreground (which involves a whole matrix of related difficulties) is that this 'contingency thesis' disregards the complexity of the issue of history. At the same time, it leaves Derrida open to the possible objection that his project is ruled by a hermeneutical teleology and, perhaps, even by a naive commitment to the 'return of the repressed.' These are positions that Derrida himself has forcefully rejected. We must also realize that we cannot ignore the factual / empirical development (history) of Derrida’s writing. To suggest that Derrida's theoretical and methodological rootedness in phenomenology is merely 'contingent' is to forget that his first three significant works (which secured such a unique place for his writing in the contemporary continental philosophical forum) were engaged in a critical dialogue with Husserlian phenomenology. The primary focus
of these texts concerned different aspects of phenomenological discourse on temporality under the headings of genesis, historicity and the sign.

Derrida's MA dissertation is entitled: *The Problem of Genesis in the Philosophy of Husserl*. This text was written during the years 1953-54, but not published until 1990. We have already made many references to his first publication, *Husserl's "Origin of Geometry": An Introduction* (1962) and the strategic parody of this text, *Speech and Phenomena* (1967). There are also a number of shorter essays which dedicate themselves to further examination of Husserl's phenomenology. These include "Genesis and Structure and Phenomenology," which was first given as a lecture in 1959 and published in 1964, and "Form and Meaning: A Note on the Phenomenology of Language" which was originally published in 1967.¹

These texts engage with Husserl by name. Other texts of this period do not – but still Husserl is there like a shadow. The essay "Diffèreance" (first presented as a lecture and published in 1968) is just such a writing.² Derrida’s engagement with Husserl’s philosophy inaugurates a number of radical openings for the working out of the limits of the possibility of deconstruction as a critical praxis. One cannot ignore or underplay the importance of this formative period in Derrida’s thinking. The published texts of 1962-68 exhibit a style of development in their movement from one to the other (which is eminently open to description). However, when we speak of Derrida's development this is hardly reducible to a 'linear' movement because his texts do not start out from the same plane of orientation. It is more a case of the play of an ongoing dialogue. To be sure, if we speak of a progression that we measure in clock time, then there is a linear form to the duration, but this is not to say that the *contextual passage* (and narrative form) of such development is linear.

In the way of an example, let us consider (in purely phenomenological terms) some of the practical possibilities of remembering, given that we concern ourselves with the *articulation* of a history.
Take a slice of the duration of a remembrance. This may be five minutes in length (although it can seem like hours or seconds as it spans the years of accumulated experience), but that which is remembered – the lived experiencing of the remembered – is rarely motivated in a purely linear formation. For instance, a memory of an incident that occurred three years ago may be sparked off by its significance in relation to the situation in which one finds oneself now. This, in turn, may transport one back to an earlier period whose relevance for the future can motivate one into a frenzy of anticipation. Perhaps it evokes the memory of something that happened a week ago in such a way as to transform its significance (like the punch line of a joke, an ironic moment, or the Freudian “Aha!”) and mutate its affects with respect to one’s self-relation and the style of one’s futural comportment in the world. At what point can we demarcate remembering from anticipation when it is generally concern about the future that motivates remembering: that is, as an act of evocation?

There are also many instances in which different times (memories) are given up in a quasi-simultaneous web, where the 'patterns of significance' that bind them become the principal horizon in which they stand-out-together. Their objective and linear temporal positions in relation to one another, e.g., before, after, or at the same time, are not eradicated. The different temporal signatures remain intact, but these indices of uni-directional linear time (chronology) are not the principal temporal forms through which these moments give themselves. Here, the ‘all-at-once’ is not the simultaneity of a non-time and it is an entirely different mode of temporality to that of a sequence of successions. It is a temporality that folds in upon itself in the unfolding of itself.

The passage of remembering is pluri-dimensional and multi-directional in that such a movement reorganizes time (time thought phenomenologically: as a nexus of interplaying relations [not just 'chains'] of significance unfolding through flux), but then this is true of thought and language in general. Even biographical writing rarely confines itself to a linear /
chronological sequence. Derrida has been one of the most outspoken protagonists in the contemporary philosophical theatre regarding the necessity of embracing non-linear orientations on language, writing, experience, etc. The profoundly pluri-dimensional structurality of symbolic thought or, in more general terms, the play / unfolding of meaning tends to be reduced to a point of extreme impoverishment when articulated within the confines of a purely linearist conception of temporality. In these terms, the thought of the development of Derrida's writing (and his interest in Husserl) between the years of 1953 to 1968 is not simply caught up with clock and calendar time. In other words, we are not to confine ourselves to the merely abstract thought of development as an incremental process that is stretched out over a specific duration, measured in the form of a line. There is a linear sequence that must be taken into account, in terms of the chronology of Derrida's early writing, but there are other forms of temporality that we must also acknowledge.

When we speak of Derrida's development of deconstruction as a strategy for re-reading and re-writing, we do not mean a linear 'progression' in the name of episteme, but an unravelling and a deepening (and often a form of side-stepping) whose forms of passage unfold a multiplicity of variant deconstructive readings. These re-readings do not add to themselves in the form of an incremental (linear) growth in a particular body of knowledge, but extend themselves toward one another in the manner of a 'critical' dialogue: a dialogical field that operates on many different levels and in a variety of alternative dimensions. The deepening proceeds by means of a movement of Abbau – an unbuilding, de-sedimentation, dissemination. It is a form of passage that involves a constant transformational excavation of itself that is both intra-dialogical and inter-dialogical. It involves a critical relatedness to itself.

In the radical spirit of the epoché, deconstruction maintains an element of irony in its self-relation and is thus constantly re-positioning itself. This is why it is always difficult to situate and isolate the constructive moments of deconstruction. Its principal form of strategic
play involves a continuously shifting critical relation to itself. Deconstruction openly embraces its own de-construction. The pluri-dimensional passage of deconstructive play, for reasons of principle, tends to put the drive toward re-construction into suspense. Each step forward is also a step back, but, given that the deconstructive character of such a step is one that subjects its field (which includes itself) to a form of critical displacement, it is also a kind of step sideways, which 'cuts' time as line. This cutting or epoché gives us a form of suspension through which the line is subjected to an unravelling in which it is diffracted into multiple strands. We shall get to the meaning and role of the 'con' of this de-con-struction later. It is in this sense of developmental movement as an unfolding of variant readings and narratives that produce a critical deepening (a hollowing out rather than a linear and homogeneous movement of addition) that our reading of key Husserlian methodological and theoretical motifs demonstrates how his phenomenology stands out as a contemporary to deconstruction as well as one of its principal theoretical and methodological resources.

Derrida's development of the logics at play in the thought of différance (e.g., its various key moments such as iterability, trace structure, archi-writing, etc.) and his careful problematizing of such philosophical themes as genesis, the sign, intentionality, perception, presence, the present, teleology, etc., show a methodological and theoretical indebtedness to Husserl's phenomenology that we cannot responsibly ignore – or merely, like Gasché, class as 'contingent'. Derrida's own call for critical vigilance (rigour) announces that the movement of critical return – which is characterized by deconstruction as a kind of 'archaeological' praxis that subjects its field of inquiry to careful de-sedimentation, rather than mere bulldozing – must, in some sense, be an 'ethical return.' Just as Derrida has produced a variety of different strategies for reading, thus simultaneously delineating a radical form of critique, there are operative methodological elements that trace their way throughout deconstruction (as critique).
These happen to be irreducible to Gasché's, or even Derrida's, thematizations of the development of deconstructive strategy and its variety of styles.

Derrida's critique of Husserl’s phenomenology presents us with a number of new styles of re-reading, which, in their more positive sense, illuminate openings for important phenomenological research yet to be undertaken. However, it must also be stressed that the negative aspect of many of Derrida's critical evaluations of the limits of phenomenology are based on readings that are, to put it diplomatically, by no means exhaustive. They certainly do not exclude other orientations or deconstructions, further kinds of re-reading and re-writing, which actually undercut the view that deconstruction transgresses the 'limits' of phenomenology. On most occasions, Derrida’s characterizations of these limits cannot withstand a careful re-reading. Ultimately, Gasché's contention that Derrida’s theoretical roots in phenomenology are 'radically contingent' simply do not stand up to an interrogation of the various senses of différance, which must take into account the historical-contextual background of their thematic development in his writing. Derrida has never really stopped inviting Husserl to dance (the diversity of their mobile forms of embrace range from something like the waltz through to the tango and on to break-dancing).

To extend our examination of the theme of 'return' further, consider the Derridian concept of 'iterability.' Did the logics of iterability abruptly announce themselves out of thin air? One cannot disregard the content and thrust of Derrida's first publication, Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry," in which his analysis of Husserl's concept of historicity is the site of the germination of the concept of 'archi-writing.' It is here that we find the thematization of the crucial function of repetition (this latter thematization leads to the quasi-transcendental concept of 'iterability').

In the fifth Appendix to the Crisis ("Objectivity and the World of Experience" – which immediately precedes "The Origin of Geometry"), Husserl directs his attention to the
possibility of the 'idealizing' activities of the sciences that aim toward 'exact objectivity.' He gestures toward a sense of 'iteration' that must already be in play as the original opening of the expectational horizon that permits the possibility of such a project, when he writes,

What arises first is the idea of continuation which is repeatable with unconditional generality, with its own self-evidence, as a freely thinkable and self-evident infinity...rather than finite iteration, this is iteration within the sphere of the unconditional 'again and again,' of what can be renewed with ideal freedom (p.346).

The importance of return-ability in the "idea of continuation which is repeatable with unconditional generality" and the phrase "again and again" (immer wieder) is made quite explicit as the expression of the essential condition of the possibility of any kind of objectivation and idealization. Here the "idea of continuation" is provided through the retentional reserve of former protentional traces, where the future fulfils itself in its transmutation into the past through the play of the Living Present. It announces the 'anticipatory,' or 'protentional' field of futural openness, which is contrasted with particular (content-laden) expectations. There is a particularly significant passage in Husserl's Experience and Judgement that not only expresses the important difference between protention and expectation, but also further contradicts Derrida's (and Gasché's) delimitation of the phenomenological concept of the temporal present as the maintenance of the model of a point-like now.

Husserl writes...

...the consciousness of a concrete present includes in itself a consciousness of a retentional extension of the past....And the like holds true of what is to come, namely,
that to every new experience in the flow of lived experience there belongs a horizon of original, even if entirely empty, expectation, an expectation at first purely passive (protention). Thus, to the consciousness of a concrete present belongs not only the retentional extension of the past but, just as much, the protentional, although completely empty, extension of the future (§23b, p.111).

Without anticipation as the openness of the present upon futurity there would literally not be any room in which to project possibilities – as determinate expectations. The present as Gegenwart also means a 'waiting-towards.' In this context, waiting-towards means an anticipatory openness and not an expectational fixation. It is the difference between looking toward the open expanse of the horizon in contrast to the objects that stand-out within it. We shall see that a similar contrast is to be found between 'retention' and 'recollection.' Just as before, when we addressed the meaning of the 'phenomenon,' we find that there is a fundamental difference between the meanings of appearance and appearing, which articulates itself within the very structure of retention.

Retention is an originary giving of the past. We do not speak only of particular retained objects that announce themselves as past, but of a retentional movement of giving (that involves a form of holding-back) as an always already pastness, which has never actually been present. This simultaneous movement of giving and withholding originally permits the situation of past-presents (that which has been retained). Retention illuminates the same as Other: as not-now. It is a horisontal determination, a certain kind of significational opening, which situates presence rather than being anything extant in itself. In the retentional deliverance of something, the content is not doubled, but is modified in its appearing. It is the return of the same as Other – the same as given up in changing modes of illumination. However, 'retentional illumination' is not to be reduced to the 'retained,' as such. It is not, as
we shall discover, a mere modification or representation of a more original presence (or present), but is itself originally constitutive of the unity of the retained in the temporal flux. It is the *giving* of pastness as that which always already precedes the present and present-remembering. This movement is examined in finer detail a little later on.

The thematization of repetition or returnability points to the primordial opening of the stretching-out of experience itself – an originary opening in which the past and future are in a reflexive relation of encroachment as well as distanciation (differentiation). Husserl's earlier analyses on time-consciousness (which, as Derrida indicates, form the basis of Husserl's later studies on the question of historicity) show that, more generally, the possibility of repetition underlies any possible form of experience. Our task, then, must consist in unearthing this sense of pure iteration and its importance for Derrida – as *iterability*. But first, in order to prepare for a new orientation regarding the level of Derrida's radicality in his theoretical utilization of this theme, we require a general outline of Gasché's orientation on the sense of *différance* (in his engagement with Derrida's writing) that *understates* it. By means of an examination of the limitations of Gasché's conception of 'doubling' (and the problem of assigning such a principal role to it), it becomes clear how the logics of iterability and supplementarity (as they function in deconstruction) actually draw their sense from Derrida's reading of Husserl's research on time-consciousness. They actually owe much more to the structurality of intentionality (as reflexivity in transcendence) and the phenomenology of 'primordial temporalization' than either Derrida or Gasché seem to be prepared to admit.
14. The Problem of Gasché's Account of Infrastructural Equi-Primordial Heterogeneity

Gasché contends that "a general theory of duplication seems necessarily to underlie all the infrastructures" (expressed by the term *différance*) which, according to his standpoint, includes iterability. To support his argument, he appeals to the root *iter* of iterability (which means Other) as the basis for what, in practice, becomes a claim for the ‘meta-generality’ of his theory of duplicity. However, what Gasché does not consider is the question of how the Other, the different, (alterity in general – Otherness) speaks out as *Other*. He also refers to the particle re- as another example of duplicity, but this time acknowledges its intrinsic sense as 'return / repetition.' In the quotation below, the dual meaning of re- announces itself in the senses of 'again' and 'against,' which are treated (in accordance to Gasché's aim) as *equi-*primordial significations.

The Latin particle *re-*, which corresponds to the English 'again' and 'against,' properly denotes a turning back (upon oneself or itself) or an opposition. Its figurative meaning denotes either a restoration of a thing to its original condition, a transition into an opposite state, or the repetition of an action. Insofar as some of the infrastructures make explicit use of the logic of *re-* by tying all or several of these meanings together, as is the case of the re-mark or the re-trait (but also re-presentation, re-production, *restance*, and so on), and others, such as the infrastructures of iterability and supplementarity, presuppose it, a general theory of duplication seems necessarily to underlie all the infrastructures. Yet duplication is not more original than, say, iteration, although one could show duplication to be a presupposition as easily as an effect of that infrastructure; rather, as I have suggested, they are equiprimordial. This becomes
particularly obvious in those infrastructures, such as iterability, in which duplication and repetition are clearly tied together. Thus, although I am about to concentrate on doubling, I could just as easily focus on iterability, différance, or re-marking (TM, p.225).

In regard to the final sentence, what is telling is that Gasché does not attempt to focus on these alternatives. He stresses that "duplication is not more original than...iteration," but then comfortably settles with the idea that "they are equiprimordial." Perhaps we can take our lead from Gasché (but only ironically), and point out, contrary to his aim, that 'again' is the root of 'again[st].' It can also be argued with some force that the 'again' (return) is the very hinge (brisure), pivot, folding-joint (articulation), which binds doubles as doubles in their differentiation: that is, against themselves in their 'encounter.' The thought of encounter and negotiation is important here for how else could we speak of 'contrast' or 'conflict'? Otherness must always, primarily, speak of returnability – for this traces out the opening through which difference / alterity is first literally 'articulated.'

This recursive structurality is the opening through which the articulation of Otherness can occur. For instance, the remembrance of a past decision that has since been rejected would be the return of the same as Other in the return. Such a difference, if it is to stand-out and function as such, must first be capable of return (this theme is interrogated in more detail when we deepen the examination of Husserl's theory of retention). This is to think return not in terms of the mere recuperation of an original divisive movement or doubling, but as a stretching and twisting of the same: a bending-back. This is still a spacing (in divisive terms), but it is also an extending in the sense of an approach or to reach-out. In these terms, recuper-ability speaks of a recovery that bridges distance without removing it. Extension is a key term here, for it not only speaks of spacing as a stretching-out, but also in the temporizing sense of a
postponement, a deferral. Presence is the gift of an extending: a restoration that gives difference through a certain delay in the presencing of presence.

According to the logics of this orientation then, it would be consistent to argue that the 'against' of difference, opposition, etc., is contingent on the 'again' – or rather, againness / return-ability. For reasons of strategy alone, we shall continue in these terms.

One of the main problems in Gasché's discussion on the manifold senses of différance is that its various moments are thought purely in terms of 'infra-structures' that are tied together in a relation of equi-primordial, but radical heterogeneity. Here, Gasché is concerned to show that although their differences are such that they cannot be reduced to any of the others, through an assimilative process of sublation, they are, nonetheless, involved in an open-ended relation of mutual referral. One of the main points of this argument is that there are irreducible differences between different kinds of differences – differences that cannot be subsumed under straightforward discourse on 'contradiction.' This is the basis of Gasché's over-development of a heterology of différance. This model of différance as a non-unitary matrix (archi-synthesis) of contemporaneous, but radically heterogeneous, infrastructures bears a striking resemblance to that which can be attained through a quasi-transcendental reading of Saussure's concept of langue – as a synchronic matrix of diacritical differences. As we shall discover, this is no coincidence. It is questionable, however, whether such an infrastructural matrix of heterogeneities could ever be more than a grouping of 'instituted traces.' If this is actually the case, their thematization as such would not easily permit us to attend to what is at stake in the opening up of structure. In the same terms, the discourse would not easily adapt itself to the question of what is in play in the structurality of such an opening. These express important and interwoven differences that must be taken into account in any discourse on the trace / différance, but they resist articulation here for largely 'systematic' reasons. The 'play' of différance must, in principle, elude systematization. There is an insoluble problem in any
attempt to impose a structural (even infra-structural) grid on the question of différance – for this neologism must, in principle, always remain the name of a question.

Of course, Gasché would strongly argue against such a reduction of infrastructures to 'instituted' traces, given that one of the starting points of his central thesis concerns the ways in which deconstruction has problematized the question of origins (and thus the distinction between the originary and the instituted). For example, it is the 'open referentiality' of signification (a concept which displaces the traditional relation between original and copy) that provides Gasché with the basis for his development of a general theory of doubling. Following Derrida's theme, the double is not merely secondary to what, in the traditional logic, is said to be an original that it doubles. Iterability is not exactly what one would call an 'instituted' trace – certainly not if 'instituted' is thought to signify a mere 'product,' which presupposes some kind of source that is originally constitutive of (thus prior to) it. To what extent is it an infrastructure? Can iterability really be tied in an 'equi-primordial' relation of difference with other infrastructures in the way that Gasché claims (infrastructures that he has so carefully brought together only to hold them apart)? Are these concepts not already limited by an orientation that de-temporalizes them? And, what about spacing and temporalizing? Are these terms also to be reduced to discourse on irreducibly different, but equi-primordial infrastructures? Is there a truly primordial difference that separates them simultaneously? – or is it rather merely a sign imposed by the divisive hand of history (yet another schematization – another grid)? In which case, would it really be appropriate to continue to speak in terms of their equi-primordiality? Would not their participation in history (their historicality) problematize such a designation? Our aim here is not strictly to polemicize against Gasché's discourse on infrastructures, but, and this is a singularly Derridian strategy, to unbalance the reader in regard to such discourse. This is to unsettle the foundations of the discourse itself in
order to permit what is primary and yet unspoken in Gasché's theoretical adoption of Derrida's language to unearth itself. With this aim in mind, let us ask a few more questions.

Is it really the case, as Gasché suggests, that "a general theory of duplication seems necessarily to underlie all the infrastructures"? Is this a matrix in which the question of iterability can be adequately subsumed and then systematically articulated? Does the expression, 'underlie,' carry the implicit meaning that, from a theoretical point of view, the theme of duplication is 'sufficient' for any discourse on the multiplicity of différance? Alternatively, does it merely suggest that the logic of duplicity is so inescapably caught up with the other logics, which constitute the thematic of différance, that it must always imply the others? Since Gasché rejects any assumption that duplication is any more original than iteration (iteration is his example), it would seem that the second option is closer to his meaning. The former suggests a unique and overarching status for the theory of duplicity, while the latter recapitulates the main tenets of (what I have decided to call) Gasché's 'equi-primordiality thesis.'

There is a sense in which we cannot completely discard the former implication in Gasché's claim. We cannot disregard an underlying and unquestioned 'structuralist orientation' in his writing that privileges a certain language of duplicity at the very start. The claim that such infrastructures as iterability and duplicity are 'equi-primordial' is the mark of a levelling procedure that reduces them, by means of a structural-synchronic-conflation, to a timeless plane.

A double-reading of the general tone and strategy of *The Tain of the Mirror* – in regard to the attempt to uncover a *geo-logy* or *geo-graphé* of the philosophy of reflection through, the eyes of Derridian deconstruction – shows an unspoken and yet operative drive on Gasché's part to unearth a *geo-logy* or *geo-graphé* of différance. His orientation is ineradicably caught up, in a Saussurean manner, within the horizon of synchrony without giving due regard to the
question of how the synchronic can be explained, without implicitly falling back into a primitive spatial (horizontal) horizon: a flattened plane of *equi*-primordiality. Although he avoids the limitations of the language of co-*presence*, his theory still expresses a certain linear simultaneity that does not explain the *verticality* or *depth* of any 'possible' horizon (when 'horizon' is not simply limited to a timeless horizontal abstraction). Should we not extend Gasché's aim beyond the limits of his *a temporal* standpoint by recognizing that geo-*logy* and geo-*graphé* are names which, in speaking and writing of earth as stratification and formation, etc., must equally take into account another aspect of sedimentation that speaks of erosion and disorganization? Is this not precisely the double-edged horizon we call *time*? Duration is the tracing out of disruption and continuity. Each element is reciprocally implicated in *change* – where difference stands-out as *difference* of a 'durational order.' A geo-*logy* or geo-*graphé*, however, are forms of classification that aim toward a certain kind of stasis – to 'fix' within boundaries, to map-out, etc. A cartography or *topography* of time, however, must surely miss its mark. Gasché's treatment of the quasi-concept *différance* as a matrix of heterogeneous infrastructures is indicative of an orientation that is caught up within a purely synchronic horizon of diacritical differences (a field of *equi*-primordialities), which underplays the *temporal* aspects of the trace – i.e., the function of 'delay.' The question of deferral, for both Husserl and Derrida, is irreducible to this language of 'difference.' It cannot be grasped within the boundaries of the concept of duplicity / doubling alone and, for reasons of principle, it cannot be thought in terms of the *equi*-primordial. Deferral cannot be taken into account within any kind of static / synchronous matrix (even if synchrony is expressed on the basis of a heterology). Deferral, in *giving* the 'differences' between appearing, appearances, and that which appears, constitutes the opening of the structural space of doubling. The double polarizes itself in a relation of difference with the doubled through a certain delay – its temporization.
Gasché never subjects his own starting-point to critical scrutiny and thus fails to recognize that such a simultaneous plane of synchrony and equi-primordiality can only be the name of a problem. The spacing about which Derrida speaks always expresses a certain extending / extension / postponement – whose different senses are irreducible to the mere language of the 'spatial' or the 'simultaneous.'

15. Tempor[al]izing and / is Spacing

From a linguistic point of view, spacing is often conceived, in line with Saussure's general notion of language as a structural field of differences, in 'horizontal' terms. However, there is another aspect to this sense of horizon that has undergone a kind of occultation. We shall see that this occultation is not accidental, since this issue refers us to the necessity of such a movement of 'deferring' and 'veiling' at the most primordial level of lived time – which, in the most original sense, gives duration as such. This concerns an undercurrent tendency to assume a metonymic relation of complicity between horizonality and the horizontal, or worse, to treat them as symmetrical terms – a situation that is exacerbated by their lexico-graphic and phonetic ties. These perspectives, which have become deeply sedimented and firmly habituated, trace their way throughout discourse on the synchronic.

The synchronic field of language – as langue (a matrix of diacritical differences, as opposed to 'positive' terms) is generally considered in terms of a horizon that knows no time itself. This is because it is originally supposed to permit, in a purely structural sense, continuity of meaning throughout the tracing of the 'successive' (temporal) unfolding of parole. In these
terms, it is only because this synchronic fold sustains syntactical (and, at a higher level, semantical) relations between differences in duration (provides continuity) that the diachronic movement of parole – the articulation of time and meaning – can occur.

But, what of the 'vertical'? Does not Derrida's utilization of the term spacing take account, according to another, and equally vital orientation on the question of archi-writing, of how, on the other hand, synchrony is possible, or even conceivable, by considering the opening up of such structurality from the point of view of diachrony? Tracing, archi-writing, spacing, etc., also speak of the movement of sedimentation, of the vertical hollow in the horizontal. The depth is irreducible to the common dyadic site of discourse on space as an 'order of co-existences' and time as an 'order of successions.'

This 'depth-movement,' of reciprocal implication must be understood, to borrow from Derrida, in terms of the "formation of form" and the "being imprinted of the imprint" (OG, p.63). It is through the notion of iterability (the possibility of return / repetition) that the synchronic can be understood in terms of the diachronic without merely subordinating all discourse on the latter to the former in an asymmetrical relation.

In these terms, the question of 'repeatability,' when carefully deconstructed, permits us to take account of the question of 'synchrony' without getting caught up in the myth of a pre-temporal structural matrix that occupies an eternal present, a horizon of pure simultaneity, or Parmenidean Plenum. Saussure raises the theme of synchrony to a level of 'ideality' (a 'system' of co-existences that is independent of temporality), which provides the basis upon which time is to be understood as the mere 'evolution' of an already existing system. Diachrony is only ever really treated as the unfolding of a succession of 'empirical facts' and is thus considered 'non-essential.' Is history, then, non-essential? The problem lies in Saussure's rather restricted ideas about time and history, which do not allow the possibility of grasping another, and perhaps more fundamental (and essential), sense of diachrony that is irreducible to a merely
linear and empirical evolution. Whether this is a limitation in Saussure's thinking, or due to the way in which his ideas are represented by the editors of the *Course in General Linguistics*, is (infinitely) open to conjecture.\(^{11}\)

We, however, must re-think the relation between synchrony and diachrony. Husserl and Derrida are our guides. As Derrida writes in his *Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry,*" "Neither pure diachrony nor pure synchrony make a history" (p.61). We shall see how it is the possibility of repetition, or iterability, which permits (in theoretical terms) the thought of synchrony without co-presence, taking it beyond the 'horizontal' limits of a purely simultaneous (*equi-*primordial) plane of juxtaposed differences. An extension of this orientation also unearths how the theme of iterability permits us to think diachrony beyond the restrictions of a purely linear and successive conception of time.

One of Derrida's main aims in the delineation of the logic of supplementarity is the exploration of alternatives to linear models of time, writing, trace-structure and signification. *Of Grammatology* is an exercise in the deconstruction of the linearization of writing. In accordance with this aim Derrida refers to Jacobson's substitution of Saussure's notion of the temporality of the signifier as a 'homogeneous line' with "...the structure of the musical staff, 'the chord in music'" (*OG*, p.72).

Derrida writes,

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\textit{What is in question here is not Saussure's affirmation of the temporal essence of discourse but the concept of time that guides this affirmation and analysis: time conceived as linear successivity, as 'consecutivity.' This model works by itself and all through the Course...(Ibid, p.72).}
\]
In this model, time is thought merely in terms of a linear 'order of succession.' The linear limits of this, according to Derrida, also play themselves out in the concept of simultaneity.

Simultaneity co-ordinates two absolute presents, two points or instants of presence, and it remains a linearist concept (*Ibid*, p.85).¹²

We should bear this last point in mind, for the complicity shared by the concepts of simultaneity and *equi-*primordiality cannot be ignored. Without further elaborating on the question of linearity at this point, however, the one general theoretical disjunction that plays itself out in Saussure is a pre-phenomenological presupposition that maintains strict distinctions between simultaneity and succession, system and becoming, and spatiality and temporality.

The logic of iterability primarily allows us to stand outside the traditional constitutional dyad in which the diachronic is set in opposition to the synchronic. We are referred to 'spaced-out-time' and the 'between-time-of-space' as intertwined moments of an *opening* that precedes the classical distinction between space and time. It is a case of the becoming-time-of-space and the becoming-space-of-time; an unfolding / opening which, in a certain sense, speaks of *chiasm* – the *Ineinander* of the horizontal and the vertical of any possible horizon.

When tied to the thought of infrastructural *equi-*primordiality, the language of doubling expresses a 'horizontal' logic that permits us to speak of a kind of 'contemporaneous' play (of contrast) between multiplicities of doubles. These doubles do not merely spring from an 'earlier' presence. They are said to originarily constitute the possibility of presence.
However, the theory of duplicity cannot immediately account for the 'vertical' dimension of its unfolding – which must already be in play within itself. The general structure of duplicity alone, as delineated by Gasché, could never give 'duration.'

It is in Derrida's thematization of the *tracing* of 'iterability,' that we find the themes of differentiation and doubling re-located according to a temporal (and thus vertical) orientation. This re-situation is a profound expression of the idea that differentiation *as doubling* (a gerund whose verbal aspect, like all verbs, expresses time) can not be grasped sufficiently within the limits of a 'non-temporal' (simultaneous / synchronic / equi-primordial) plane of differences.

The Derridian concept of iterability refers us to the movement of repetition that, for Husserl, permits the possibility of difference *as duration* through which the Living Present is 'stretched' within itself. There is no corpuscular present except that captured in 'spatial' tropes (e.g., simultaneity, co-existence, co-presence, etc.), which have already forgotten the intimacy that is shared, in the most originary sense, by space and time. Iterability speaks of temporal-spacing / spatio-temporizing – and is that which allows any double or difference to do its work.

For Derrida, iterability names that which permits synchrony in a discourse that takes into account the vital question of 'duration' or 'interval': an extending that implicates both simultaneity and succession; the spacing of change, as the playing out of sameness and difference; a tracing of unity and fragmentation. Gasché's account of doubling (duplicity), as indicated above, does not immediately convey anything other than differentiation of a 'contemporaneous' order. But, what about the kind of differentiation that announces itself *through* 'duration' – the temporal unfolding of differences? In the most mundane terms, let us say, I would not consider myself as a 'double of that (myself) which sat here five minutes ago,' but the very same, only now rather than then – extended or spaced-out through time. The difference between now and then is also not a question of doubling, but one of a certain kind of 'delay.' This delay produces a space: a spacing. For Gasché, spacing seems to speak,
principally, of the divisive movement of doubling – the unfolding of difference through which identity and meaning crystallizes – an internal differentiation through which ideality (ideal identity) stands out from what it is not. However, spacing designates more than a 'contemporaneous' differentiality – that is suggested by such logical forms as P is not S, or P is such that it is also not-not P. In order for something to stand out from what it is not, time is always implied – in terms of the duration throughout which something passes over into what it is-not and was-not (this is the temporal horizon of the logical forms above). Duration indicates the vertical hollow in any possible identity as a spacing / extending through which identity has its depth – and is filled out.

It is to be granted that Gasché's re-working of the sense of difference, which re-capitulates the synchronic [horizontal] dimension of differences in Saussurean linguistics, allows him to avoid the allegation that doubling (as he articulates it) is merely the expression of a language of co-presence. However, his analyses fail to gesture toward the more radical significance of its transformation in Derrida's thought with any real degree of adequacy. Although Saussure's characterization of the synchronic dimension of language emphasizes that identity is originarily constituted through differences (that is, such relations, without more original positive terms, are irreducible to discourse on primary units of meaning, or the more mundane sense of presence as the visible) the temporal horizon of language is largely consigned to the mere characterization of the successive movement of parole. We cannot disregard the very recognizable disjunction in play here that re-plays the traditional dyadic opposition between space and time. Saussure formally articulates this bi-polarity in terms of the distinction between static linguistics and evolutionary linguistics.

Saussure writes,
Everything is synchronic which relates to the static aspect of our science, and diachronic everything which concerns evolution. Likewise synchrony and diachrony will designate respectively a linguistic state and a phase of evolution (Course in General Linguistics, [117-118] p.81).

Saussure then goes on to stress that...

The contrast between the two points of view – synchronic and diachronic – is absolute and admits no compromise (Ibid, [119-120] p.83).

The 'absolute' space that constitutes the dyadic relation between synchrony and diachrony in Saussurean linguistics continues a traditional thetic and methodological distinction that interferes with the 'theoretical space' concerning its subject-matter. Such a 'contrast,' that is said to be 'absolute and admits no compromise,' refers us to a strategic decision regarding route of entry which, in a sense, must first disentangle its field of interrogation in order to allow it to express its internal unity (e.g., in the sense in which one might unravel a mystery, or interrogate the essence of something through the application of a form of eidetic reduction). The division between static linguistics and evolutionary linguistics rests, on the one hand, on a desire to disclose how language is in motion within itself (writing itself, as Derrida might say), and on the other, how there is continuity through such change. However, both orientations express 'idealized' points of departure that repeat the classic distinction between the temporal and non-temporal and, in more general terms, the successive and the simultaneous. This translates, according to the inherited logics of Saussure's linguistic schema, as the 'essential' form of the opposition between the temporal and spatial. Here is the unrevised source that seriously limits Saussure's project in that it expresses what Derrida, after
Heidegger, calls a "vulgar concept of time" (*OG*, p.72) – where writing, as an expression of temporality, is thought in terms of mere linear successivity, and situated *outside* language as something that is secondary to it.\(^{13}\)

In Husserl's phenomenology, however, what Saussure would call 'states' cannot be divorced from considerations on temporality, and 'evolutionary phases' always express structurality (or continuity through difference – which, in a certain sense, still speaks of 'states'). Husserl is careful to show that simultaneity is inextricably intertwined with succession and that they do not spring from two different sources.\(^{14}\) The question of succession is never treated as a secondary issue to considerations on simultaneity for this intertwining does not share the 'particular' asymmetry of Saussure's synchronic / diachronic relation.

Husserl's phenomenological orientation, which brackets objective (cosmological) theories on space and time, discloses that the question of the 'unfolding' of spatiality and temporality indicates a dimension in which they are *intertwined* in an originary way. They are not conjoined as two distinct (heterogeneous) horizons that have 'fortuitously' (and equi-primordially) entered into relation. They are articulations of the originary opening up of relation itself. This opening is precisely 'flux.' The relevance of this transition for Derrida's own writing is immense. When questioning the basis of Saussure's assignment of "...writing to the outer darkness of language" (*OG*, p.45), he discloses that his "...quarry is not primarily Ferdinand de Saussure's intention or motivation, but rather the entire uncritical tradition which he inherits" (*Ibid*, p.46). Clearly, this inheritance has still not been fully spent.

In Derrida's development of the theme of archi-writing we find a shift from the dyad 'outside and inside' to a horizon where the 'outside is the inside.' We are introduced to writing as the outside of the inside – the exteriority within the interiority of language. This means that they are not to be thought as two distinct fields, where the former is merely an external 'addition' to the latter – a 'supplement' in the classical sense: as in the outside *and* the inside. It
is important to remember how Derrida likes to play with the French homophonic complicity between the supplement 'and' and the copula 'is' – et and est. It also serves as a rather powerful metaphorical device for overturning the classical hierarchy at work in the conception of 'language as speech' and writing, where speech is the expression of the primary interiority as distinct from the exteriority and secondariness of writing. The difference in meaning (like the 'a' in *différance*) is only apparent in writing. The difference is given more 'originally' through the graphic rather than the phonic sign.¹⁵

The relation of alterity signified by the 'and' is also that which permits the 'is' of identity, unity, individuation, entities, beings, meanings, etc., in that it is the *tracing out* of their structurality and the ways in which they stand out. Derrida's concept of archi-writing designates the structurality of supplementarity through which language writes itself. Language as speech is a kind of writing. The outside is the inside.

In the case of space and time, according to the same logics, the former is not merely an 'external' addition to some kind of hermetically sealed 'internal' time (and vice versa). Addition here speaks only of the 'effect' of return – of returnability – of the originary *Ineinander* of spatiality and temporality. The unlocatable difference between the spatial and the temporal, within the dimension of this orientation, is best expressed through the 'essential' ambivalence of spatial and temporal metaphors. If they are interrogated in terms of the structure of such ambiguity, this prohibits their restriction to the either / or limitations of the principle of contradiction. This original ambivalence and ambiguity is celebrated by Derrida and raised to the level of a theme. Following Husserl (*flux*), Heidegger (time-space), Merleau-Ponty (chiasm), the hyper-transcendental orientation of Derrida’s writing – as expressed by his discourse on *différance* – shows that spacing is temporalizing and temporalizing is spacing.

*Langue*, as the synchronic itself, should not be reduced to a kind of *a temporal* or *non-temporal* plenum. It already implicates its temporality with the theme of *repeatability* (as the
condition of any possible 'contrast'). This points to the possibility of the polarization, and thus extension, of structure and meaning throughout the fleeting moments of articulation (parole) which continually pass away into the past (and which also, in an important sense, extend, in an evolutionary manner, into the 'not-yet'). Which is to say that there is a kind of writing, tracing, temporizing or re-marking that is always already behind and ahead of language as system – and, as such, it is irreducible to the dyadic plane of Saussurean linguistics and its particular hierarchical structure.

Here, the diachronic cannot be reduced to a 'succession' of facts – where phonetic and orthographic changes occur, but without radically affecting the 'system' as a whole. Saussure's "...definition of a language assumes that we disregard everything which does not belong to its structure as a system; in short everything that is designated by the term 'external linguistics'" (Course, p.21 [40]). However, when he goes on to say that..."Everything is internal which alters the system in any degree whatsoever" (Ibid, p.23 [43]), by acknowledging that diachrony does play a role in affecting the system in minor ways over extended periods of time, the diachronic (which, from Saussure's point of view would translate as time in general) still has a hard time fighting off its expulsion into a field that is designated, along with 'writing,' as exterior to language. This is because everything is thought purely in terms of the alteration of a pre-existing system. However, diachrony cannot be a merely secondary and non-essential feature of language (as Saussure already knows and indicates, albeit inadequately) – certainly not if the 'opening-up' of structurality is to be taken into account. Discourse on diachrony should not be a reduction to 'evolutionary linguistics' in such terms that 'evolution' only comes to express an 'empirical' phase in an order of succession. There is also a fundamental pre-empirical sense in which it functions as a condition of the possibility of language (and is important to any consideration of the 'unmotivatedness' of the relation between signal and signification).
We shall see how the spacing-out of the 'depth' of differentiation and continuity that is integral to 'any' system of language (as a matrix of contrasting signs) brings us back to the thought of 'flux.' Not only does it originally problematize the question of synchrony and its related signification in the language of simultaneity, it also actually explains it. Derrida takes into account the possibility of ideality from, what we might call, a diachronic point of view (but this is not diachrony in the mere form of a linear and empirical evolution). By working through an analysis of the function of repetition and arriving at the theme of repeat-ability, his writing displaces the concept of langue as a synchronous field of differences from the privileged position to which it has been assigned by Saussure. By implication, he also anticipates and undermines this operative, though unthematized, prejudice at work in Gasché's approach to différence.

Gasché's delineation of différence as an infrastructural matrix of 'incommensurable' differences (heterogeneities) does not give enough emphasis to the importance of the 'ways' in which the differing moments of this plurality overlap. When he does, such overlapping, as we have seen, is merely discussed in the manner of a matrix of equi-primordial diacritical differences which, in a very crucial sense, refuses time. Is it not vital that we should consider this overlapping from the 'deferring' (temporizing / temporalizing) point of view of différence – the temporalizing dynamics that permit different kinds of differences to stand-out in depth – where depth signifies a certain sedimented / historical interwovenness: 'relations' of a temporal contexture? By further developing the theme of overlapping (according to the demands of a historical analysis of the theoretical movement of the thought of the trace as archi-tracing / writing), we would do well to bear in mind that Derrida has written a great deal about Husserl's own development of this line of thinking (i.e., Husserl's analyses on the primordial movement of temporalization) in the concepts of retention and protention (and their interplay), sedimentation, habitus, and the theme of historicity.
The issue of interwovenness here is vital in establishing the context of the theoretical relations between Husserl and Derrida. We need to remember that the Latin expression *contexere*, from which the word context is derived, literally means to weave a fabric (*con*, together; *texere*, to weave, braid). The *con* also forms the middle part of *de-construction* (which serves to differentiate Derrida's project from that of Heidegger's task of *de-struktion*).

The overlapping or interwovenness of which Husserl and Derrida speak must be understood *in reference to temporality* (flux – temporal unfolding and sedimentation), and not from the standpoint of what, in Gasché's *Tain of the Mirror*, is essentially a simultaneous plane of orientation on the infrastructural plurality of *différance*.

A phenomenological-temporal orientation on Derrida's approach to the question of temporality reveals a radicality that is suppressed by the limits of Gasché's understanding of time and his treatment of the theme of reflexivity in Husserl's phenomenology. Derrida's insights extend and deepen Husserl's thought of reflexivity as *constituted through deferral / a holding-back*. In accordance with this orientation then, we do not so much completely disregard the differences in character of the various moments of *différance*, throughout our examination of the theme of temporality in Derrida's writing, but turn toward the thought of the structure[s] (or infrastructure[s]) of this plurality in terms of intertwining or chiasm. This interweaving and extending is more primordial than the differences between spatiality and temporality (when these terms are understood according to their traditional dyadic significations) *as the opening-up of their play: as temporalizing and spacing*, where the 'and' also functions as an 'is.' This is the logic of supplementarity as it is applied to the pair temporalizing and spacing.

These issues mark out the place where the related questions of overlapping and sedimentation begin to reveal their intimate connection to the question of history, or rather, that which is uncovered at a transcendental-phenomenological level; the horizon of historicity
(Geschichtlichkeit). The first step, however, requires a further examination of the structuralizing dynamics of primordial temporalization (as originally delineated by Husserl in *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*) in order that we may attend to the question of the relatedness of the issues of deferral and return in more detail. It is necessary to work through the various senses of the 'double intentionality' of retention and the intertwining of retention and protention in terms of the unfolding of repetition in order to explore the logics of iterability. The importance of this concept for Derrida's delineation of the structure of the trace must not be underestimated. This is an exemplary route for showing precisely why Gasché's purely 'structural' analyses forget time in the privileging of the issue of duplicity.

16. Iterability, Supplementarity, and the Tracing of the Retentional and Protentional Intentionalities of Primordial Temporalization

It is according to a transcendental-phenomenological attitude, explored so carefully by Husserl, that the questions of duration and the possibility of successivity and contemporaneity find themselves addressed in terms of the possibility of *returnability*. In deconstruction, this theme is taken to its limits with the notion of *iterability*, which serves as the basis for Derrida's radicalization of the concept of the supplement: *supplementarity*. In contradistinction to Gasché, we shall see (with some theoretical corroboration from Derrida), that 'doubling' is not strictly equiprimordial with 'iterability.' Although one can argue that there is, to a certain
extent, a chiasmic relation in which they are interwoven, it is far from being clear that it is of a symmetrical order. From a functional perspective, doubling is a movement that first finds its sense in iterability as one possible way of explaining it, but this, in itself, constitutes a certain movement of return in that doubles, in order to function, must be able to stand-out-against-themselves. This already presupposes returnability as the horizon of their possibility / recognizability.

The essentially structuralist character of Gasché's general analysis of différance tends, as indicated above, to conceal the crucial temporal and vertical dimensions of this matrix. This is of course the danger in any project of generalization, since the movement itself is one that, in principle and by virtue of its operation, de-temporalizes that which it subjects to classification. Gasché is quite clear in his emphasis on the essentially non-totalizable character of the horizon indicated by the neologism différance. However, his account of its key infrastructural moments falls short of an adequate establishment of Derrida's theoretical and methodological resources throughout his 'adumbration' of the various aspects of différance.17 Gasché misses a fundamental transcendental-phenomenological motif – or question – at work, from a theoretical point of view, and in play, from the point of view of the possibility of its motivation and articulation through which the theme of différance finds its philosophical resonances. Gasché is careful to show that différance is not an ultimate resolution of contradiction in the manner of the Hegelian Aufhebung. Equally, différance, as a differing and deferring, synthesizing and dispersing, spatializing and temporalizing, contingent and necessary, passive and active matrix, cannot be situated within the boundaries of the classic dualistic logics of Western metaphysics. Différance (as the originary 'non-origin' of the tracing of any possible kind of presence and the condition of the possibility of the polarization of all the above mentioned dyads) is positioned, in a very 'loose' and 'elusive' sense, between these dualities. However, for Derrida, betweenness in this context is irreducible to an a temporal
spatial model (i.e., the language of *equi*-primordialities), it rather speaks of becoming or the possibility of the becoming of these dualities: the movement of delay / postponement, the hollowing out of a *reserve*, a sedimented *reservoir* of depth. There are differences here that Gasché's form of discourse cannot adequately take into account.

In this 'temporalizing' sense, *différance* – as that opening and closing that 'produces' or 'articulates' presence and absence – names that which is *essentially non-situated* (u-topos). It is no-place precisely because, on the one hand, the very structurality of the trace is one of self-erasure, and on the other, as the pure possibility of repetition, the articulation of any kind of presence indicates that it has always already happened. This signifies the pure *absence of an origin*.

It is the *already-has-beenness* of the tracing of *différance*, without it ever having-been-present, that is the hinge of this critique of Gasché's thesis on the movement of doubling at work in *supplementarity*. By carefully working through this issue, we can see precisely why it is misleading to suggest, as Gasché does, that 'duplicity' is *equi*-primordial with 'iterability.' The pure structurality of repetition – iterability – plays a far more critical role in Derrida's discourse and, from a theoretical point of view, it expresses a more primordial field than that which is delineated within the Gaschéan general theory of doubling.

The logics of iterability (in temporal terms) emerge from Derrida's reading of Husserl's lectures on time-consciousness and the peculiar sense of deferral / delay in play in the form of return that is announced by the 'double intentionality' of retention and the interplay between retention and protention. Neither of these forms can be reduced to a mere relation of doubling in the Gaschéan sense. The temporal dimension that is opened regarding the trace as differing / deferring return propels Derrida away from the Saussurean synchronic / diachronic divide that is still, to some extent, operative in Gasché's theorizing.
For Husserl, the primordial interplay of retention and protention is an originary intertwining, which is precisely the articulation, extending, or unfolding of return. These intentionalities are differentiated within themselves – e.g., retention is a double intentionality because of its intrinsic relation to protention in that it not only retains but, in doing so, it also gives a certain evidence of surpassing. In other words (to recapitulate), retention retains that which is no-longer now precisely as that which is no-longer now.\textsuperscript{18} Surpassing is the other face of a movement of delay.

It is precisely because of the intertwining of retention and protention, which traces out the movement of primordial temporalization, that retention is doubled within itself. However, the very sense of the double is intrinsically defined here in terms of the reflexivity of intentionality itself – which cannot be reduced to the Gaschéan language of 'doubling.' Each intentionality is not strictly a repetition of the other. It is not a case of a double repetition, but two moments of one repetition that in itself is the repetition of a continuum. It is a matter of the unfolding of the relation between the vertical and horizontal – the horizon and that which is spaced-out within it. A unity of duration is not produced through a sequence of doubles or mirrorings, but through a delay in the manner in which the same presences – which is to say, through a deferment that opens up duration and the continuous modification of presence. It gives alteration in the return to the same. Whatever 'the same' may be lies outside our immediate concern. What is important is that it is not 'doubled' as such, but is the same stretched-out. That which is passes over into that which was. What is different is the temporal context in which it appears – which gives the return of the same as Other in the same. The alterity of which we speak is precisely the appearing of duration / extension / interval in which the 'evidence of surpassing' is constituted by a certain delay or holding-back. Retentional and protentional play is an originary unity or intertwining of transgression and recuperation; the
spacing of a transcending movement of return: the tracing of the structure of a repetition that transforms.

It seems, then, that iterability, as the pure structurality of an altering return, refers us to that 'pivotal' condition of possibility that first defines the spacing of supplementarity and doubling. It is above all necessary to understand that, for Husserl, the Primordial Flux is not a continuum of objectivities – retained doubles of doubles. It is rather a continuum of continua – retentions of changing temporal orientations.

17. Duration, the Double Intentionality of Retention, and the Tracing of Deferral

It is significant that although Gasché goes to great pains to articulate the heterogeneity of the matrix différance (as a non-unitary archi-synthesis of radically heterogeneous infrastructures), his structural-linguistic-graphic analysis of this horizon also tends to conceal, at another level, differences between different kinds of differences or differential marks. The meta-general level to which the question of representation is raised as an integral moment of the critique of the 'language of presence' can obscure vital and related differences. This is also true, in many instances, for Derrida. There are times when discourse on the questions of repetition, reflexivity and representation must ultimately suffer through such obscurcation (this is certainly the case with the crucial distinction between apodictic evidence and that which is classed as adequate). Most significantly, we find a fundamental difficulty in disentangling the important differences between retention and secondary remembrance that are disclosed in
Husserl's research on time consciousness. Both forms of remembrance are modes of \textit{representation}, but the former is also to be understood as \textit{presentation}, since it is an \textit{originarily giving of the past}. However, the latter is a form of \textit{presentification} (or secondary presentation / reproduction) permitted by retention, which is able to work upon that which is more originally given up to it.\textsuperscript{19} The \textit{openness} of retention and protention is to be contrasted with the object-related (finite) character of recollection and expectation. The reflexivity of which the first speaks has a pre-objective dimension, whereas the second is a reflexive movement of objectivation.\textsuperscript{20} The first movement is the passivity that operates at the heart of the activity of the second. Husserl gives us a subtle, but powerful distinction between the reflexive intentionalities of temporalizing consciousness as the a priori condition of any possible experience and the objectivating acts of reflection through which consciousness can, secondarily, objectify itself. According to his phenomenological studies on time consciousness, "It is thanks to retention...that consciousness can be made an Object" (\textit{PITC}, Appendix IX, p.161). It is vital to be clear at this point that retention is not a form of intentionality that can be reduced to the level of an 'act.' According to Husserl,

Retention itself is not an 'act' (i.e., an immanent unity of duration constituted in a series of retentional phases) but a momentary consciousness of the phase which has expired and, at the same time, a foundation for the retentional consciousness of the next phase (\textit{Ibid}).

Furthermore, the retentional running-off of consciousness is not to be confused with acts that pass-off into a flow of image-objects or doubles, which are representations of representations of representations, etc. – a movement that would produce a kind of infinite regress. Retentions are not discrete / distinct objects or points that are adjacent to one another
along such a continuum. They embody the continuum of retentional modifications within themselves. This is to be understood in relation to what Husserl refers to as a movement of sinking-down (*Herabsinken* – which is represented as a diagonal line moving downwards from the present to the past). Thus, we have the tracing out of the vertical of experience.

Retentions embody depth in that they bear former retentions within themselves. Retention is indeed retention of retention and so on, but the structurality of this flux is not ultimately reducible to an 'objective' order of successions. This retentional *repetition* (in its intertwining with protention) is that which originally constitutes the 'space' of succession – *it gives* 'duration' through a holding-back (here, the *it gives* expresses a similar sense to Heidegger's use of the term *es gibt* in the essay "Time and Being"). Such an extending (stretching and postponing) movement of return does not actually negate the possibility of the presence of evidence, certainty, continuity (the experience of the marriage of sameness and difference: change), meaning-fulfilment, etc., as if it perpetually deferred every kind of intentional fulfilment – as would be the case with a linear continuum of purely 'objective' repetitions that remained separated (external) to one another. The form of the *directedness* of the interwoven patterns of intentional relations – the *outside-itself* structure of all intentionalities – produces the 'field' in which fulfilment of any kind can originally take place. At the heart of this transitivity, we find certain forces of deferral, which actually constitute the self-fulfilling function of intentional directedness. Here, the terms intentionality and directedness are interchangeable. If different moments are to register *as different times* in relation-to-one- another, then a certain structure of delay must be at work in-the-relation without annihilating the relation itself. Obviously, delay also functions *as relation*. The holding-back constitutes the opening through which the consciousness of succession is possible.
The sense of Husserl's concept of primal apprehension is to be found within this deep transcendental context (which is tied so intimately to the issue of temporalization). It is certainly not to be confused with a higher-order psychological impression of an imagistic character that would require a further act of apprehension of the act itself in order for perception to occur. This would give rise to the necessity of a yet another act, which would need to apprehend the second, and so on, indefinitely.\textsuperscript{21} Certainly, in order that we can speak of consciousness as consciousness of something in the first place, there must be some kind of articulation of the differences between the 'intending' and the 'intended' – otherwise, how could we speak of the preposition of? Each act carries this difference within itself, not as a mirroring or doubling of itself and its content, but as a sense-directed (transitive) relation that is immanent-in-relation to itself as a transcending movement toward something Other. This immanence of consciousness to itself, through the detour of alterity, is the effect of the reflexive unity of duration of the intending itself – which is pre-objective. The difference is announced in primal apprehension through the articulated play / play of articulation between modalities of appearing and that which appears.

Each consciousness, then, does not rely on a further objectivating act in order to function. Intentional consciousness, as a 'flow of becoming,' carries this reflexivity within itself, in principle, by virtue of the flux of primordial temporalization that constitutes each act as a 'unity of duration' – an immanently-transcending bending-back-of-a-return. The diagram below is probably the most famous illustration of this transcending and / is recuperative structural-movement of the intentionality of consciousness.\textsuperscript{22}
At the level at which Derrida and Gasché discuss reflexivity, repetition, and representation it often becomes difficult to account for different modes of the inter-relationship between immanence and transcendence. As already indicated, Derrida's orientation in *Speech and Phenomena* does not adequately distinguish between different senses of presence (appearing / appearance) and the present (in temporal terms) and thus cannot account for how absence can still, in a certain sense, be immanent. Once again, this is a symptom of his application of Heidegger's thesis that Being as presence (ousia and parousia) has always been thought in relation to the temporal sense of the present as now (although Heidegger does not restrict the form of the now to a point). In Derrida’s account, Anwesenheit and Gegenwart become almost indistinguishable semantically.

There are also other significational differences of a subtle kind that are even more elusive and yet which are fundamental to any discussion on the functioning of signs. This brings us to the theme of the *double intentionality* of retention, as adumbrated by Husserl in the lectures on time – a discourse that has clearly (and profoundly) influenced Derrida's thematization of the crucial sense of *différance as deferral*.

The retential *shading-off*, through which lived-experience is stretched out, comprises both the language of *appearances* and the language of *appearing* in the unfolding of experience through the extending / spacing of primordial temporalization. This involves a
transformational movement of return that originarily gives duration. It is their originary intertwining (as opposed to disjunction) that gives the most fundamental differences. The theme of the double-intentionality of retention responds to some extremely compelling questions concerning the conditions of the possibility of lived time consciousness. It may be understood in the following terms:

1. Inscription, carving, marking, writing, tracing = the retention of that which is no-longer → a retaining that is the condition of the possibility of an appearance as a unity of duration. We might, but only very loosely, speak of this aspect of retention as a kind of doubling. However, this movement of inscription is actually auxiliary to that second aspect of retention which originarily constitutes positional differentiation of a temporal order. An inscribed moment must be capable of being delivered up in relation to other temporal positions – and this means that the relations of difference must somehow be able to give themselves within a single grasp. There is a differential 'style' that has to be taken into account that permits the simultaneous interpenetration and standing-out of different moments without removing their temporal differences.

2. The being-inscribed of the inscription → the spacing-out of the mark as re-marking in a specific modal form of appearing → the 'manner' or 'style' in which the mark (retention) articulates itself = the retention of that which is no-longer precisely as that which is no longer. This is the mode of appearing of that which is given in relation to other moments of the past (including the ever fresh now). The retained mark must have the 'character' of a retained mark (and it must also distinguish itself from other retained marks). It is a deferred
presentation – a presence that is Other to the present; a presence in the present that is not of the present, in the sense in which it falls short of the present – otherwise it could do no more than appear 'as-now,' in which case there would not be 'temporal duration / succession,' but only an eternal present in which all was given, as Husserl says, 'Zügleich' (all-at-once). Although, it must be said that there is also another kind of all-at-once that is not equal to the lack of the appearing of succession. The very meaning of temporal horizon involves a kind of vertical and horizontal opening through which different temporal positions can be given simultaneously without eradicating their temporal signatures relative to one another. Any event that gives itself must be more than the sum of a singular temporal modality. The event as-it-gives-itself in the Living Present is always made up of fringes of the before and after. The second intentionality, of which we speak, holds together different moments together within a single grasp (a longitudinal orientation), without nullifying their differences since the other face of this giving is a certain 'holding-back.' What is crucial here is that just like the visual horizon of things stretching into the distance, the temporal continua are framed as a uniform sinking-back of moments into the past without shuffling the order of their consecutivity from the perspective of the ever-fresh Living Present.

In combination, this is precisely the twofold relation necessary for the constitution of any horizon and the process of sedimentation. It is an intertwining of proximity and distance, a fold that is an unfolding of depth. In a way, one could say that a horizon is everywhere (given in a single grasp) and yet it recedes. Like a gestalt, this temporal horizon is the contextualizing structure (or connective tissue) that binds different moments together, while simultaneously
holding them apart. So here we find that the all-at-once does not necessarily mean non-time, but a manner in which time, in its unfolding, folds in on itself (like the instantaneity of all spatial points in a hologram). The second (longitudinal) intentionality of retention is constitutive of the 'unity' of the appearing of that which appears in the flux (an unfolding of changing temporal modalities of the same) in that it gives a certain temporal difference through the giving of the flow itself. It is a stretching-out of duration itself (without restricting the actual appearing to a purely discrete appearance that is given in a sequence of successions). There is a kind of presentative scan (not re-presentation) of that which is no longer present, where the latter can be anything from a particular moment to a sedimented multiplicity.23

Taken together, these forms of intentionality (along with protention as negotiated through primal impression) constitute the consciousness of the 'passing-over' of that which was now into that which is not-now. Retention does not merely present a temporal object as 'give' a certain interval – the spacing, through which it is stretched out. In section 39 of The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness (The Double Intentionality of Retention and the Constitution of the Flux of Consciousness), Husserl shows how the ‘duration’ of a sound is articulated as such, when he writes,

Every shading off of consciousness which is of the 'retentional' kind has a double intentionality: one is auxiliary to the constitution of the immanent Object, of the sound. This is what we term 'primary remembrance' of the sound just sensed, or more plainly just retention of the sound. The other is that which is constitutive of the unity of this primary remembrance in the flux. That is, retention is at one with this, that it is further-consciousness [Noch-Bewusstsein]; it is that which holds back, in short, it is precisely retention, retention of the tonal retention which has passed. In its continuous shading-
off in the flux, it is continuous retention of the continuously preceding phases (§39, p.106-7)

In sum, the twofold intentionality of retention gives us a certain movement of reciprocal implication: retention of that which is no longer present. This refers us to the logic of appearance – and is auxiliary to the deferring / holding-back which constitutes it as one moment of a 'unity of duration.' With this, we also have the retention of the retentional 'orientation' through which that which is no longer present is ‘given’ precisely as that which is no longer present. This speaks of the logic of appearing: the structurality and modality of the given in its givenness, that aspect of presencing that gives duration through a certain kind of deferral of presence, or more precisely, the deferral of a certain 'mode' of presence, e.g., that of nowness. And, in addition to the givenness of not-nowness we find that the relative before and after of the relations between past moments up to the present is preserved.

These forms of intentionality express an essential intertwining of absence and presence. Within this movement of delayed return, we already find a reference to protention as it fulfils itself in an ever fresh now, and where the articulation of 'pastness' implies a certain evidence of surpassing – a "further-consciousness...which holds back." The relation between these two forms of intentionality is that which can be said to obtain between a profile and the constitutive profiling of the profile, the maintained and the maintaining of the maintained, or the imprint and (to borrow from Derrida once again) the ‘being-imprinted of the imprint.’ The unfolding of their relation speaks of the complicity of time and alterity – or more specifically, continuity: as the complicity of alterity and sameness in time. Continuity speaks of a certain difference in similarity, the same as Other, where the same does not equal the identical in terms of the 'modality' of its givenness. Thus, we find the maintenance of the intentional object, content – which is inscribed as Other / not-now and the primary constitutive unfolding of the modalities.
of its maintenance, *context-ualization:* 'depth.' This temporalizing / temporizing (deferring) is that which produces the duration / space in which the first can announce itself *as Other.* The flux is not reducible to a continuum of objective moments that are retained, for it is primarily a retaining of the retaining – continua of continua. The movement of deferral that is in play here gives us a kind of *spacing* in that it is a retentional dynamic that permits various forms of *stretching-out* and *sinking-down.* Retention is the intertwining of the horizontal and the vertical / the transversal and the longitudinal. Retentions retain retentions in a manner that spaces them out – gives depth.

This distanciating interplay *gives* duration through a movement of *sedimentation* (a reserve / reserving, which *pre-serves;* a reservation; a reservoir), which is precisely the opening up of temporality and spatiality: temporal-spacing *as deferring return* – a deferring that *gives* difference by spacing-it-out. According to this orientation, spacing and temporalizing are intertwined in an originary way. They intrinsically implicate repetition as the expression of both the possibility of the announcement of difference, its nullification, and the bringing-together of differences as differences within a horizon of belonging. They do this because they speak, principally, of the more primordial possibility of *return* as the pivot of the originary opening-up of an interplay between changing temporal modes of orientation and that which is given through the flux of *Ablaufsphänomene.* This intertwined parallelism produces the space that is constitutive of the articulated tension between difference and sameness, absence and presence, transcendence and immanence, transgression and recuperation, etc. Such an opening is also a kind of closure. It is the originary opening and closing of difference precisely, because it is the hinge (folding-joint) that permits differences to mark themselves out through their *return upon themselves as differences.*

Retention is a 'pivotal' signification for Derrida in that it speaks of the functioning – spacing – of difference in temporizing terms: *as altering delay and repetition.* The movement
of retention is the manner in which time spaces itself – that is, retention is a *returning*, which gives temporal stretch and depth. It unfolds duration through the continuous retention of the retentional orientation of that which is retained. This effectively produces a deferring of the retained in relation to itself (thus sinking further down) as it extends, by means of protention, into the future. It is a retaining of that which *gives a certain difference* to the character of that which is retained. Such a difference is constituted through some form of 'delay.'

The essence of retention then (in its intertwining with protention), lies in its production of a manifold of different modalities of presencing through a movement of altering return – a temporal continuum of changing orientations, which defers any return of an absolutely coincidental order. Here, repeatability is always intertwined with the function of deferral. Most importantly (in reference to the context of our discussion on Gasché's particular development of the concept of duplicity), this movement is a temporizing 'flow' of 'modal transition' and not the unfolding of a chain of objective contents. The form of this flux is of a completely different order to that which Gasché reads into Husserl's discourse on intentionality and temporalization. This flow cannot be reduced to a Gaschéan order of doublings. It speaks of something earlier.

It is the question of 'returnability' itself (iterability) which goes some way toward expressing the originary structurality of any possible opening. That would also mean any possible functional *opening of difference* and *duplicity.*
PART THREE: WRITING ON TIME AS WRITING

18. **Différance as Iterability and Duplicity: heterogeneity of a simultaneous / synchronous kind?**

The movement toward the thought of *différance* – 'as doubling,' 'as supplementarity,' 'as differing and deferring,' etc. – is a 'critical' response to a teleological thrust that seeks the conditions of the possibility of spatio-temporal differentiation and the constitution of identity and meaning: in a word, presence. Derrida, by working through the question of ideality, in terms of the logics of *repetition*, also uncovers a horizon in which to re-situate the question of difference or duplicity.

Iterability cannot be subsumed under a general theory of duplicity. As we have already seen, there is an important sense in which differentiation and duplication presuppose repet-ability in a manner that is irreducible to the language of doubling. This happens every time we thematically re-incorporate the other integral moment of *différance*: deferral – the component that is underplayed in Gaschê's account of doubling. With the thought of the Latin *differre* and its indifference with regard to any common regional distinction between difference and deferral, we find that Gaschê's stronger claims for the significance and breadth of application of the theory of doubling are susceptible to collapse. Repeatability is the horizon of duration and differentiation in *'depth'*: Through the structurality of delay, it is the opening in which differences can play – a play of identity and difference and presence and absence.
This issue makes reference to the manner in which the Ideal depends for its very \textit{ideality} on the fundamental possibility of repetition within itself through which it becomes individuated, recognizable (re-activatable) and \textit{stretched-out} through time. It speaks of the 'return of the same' – as illuminated within the temporalizing fold of the universal form of the Living Present. The \textit{essence} of ideality lies in its \textit{iterability}. Repeatability certainly speaks of the 'tracing out of alterity,' but only insofar as differentiation, according to the logic of 'doubling,' is announced in \textit{actual} iteration. The 'structurality' of actual or possible iteration, however, expresses far more than the 'divisive' structure of duplicity (and the 'horizontally' bound images of heterogeneity and \textit{equi-primordiality}). The quasi-transcendental concept of iterability itself primarily concerns the \textit{possibility} of return, the horizon of the 'again,' which originally permits ideality, an extending in both senses of giving and postponing (recuperation and deferral). The \textit{divisive} sense of doubling at work in iteration is not its principal or defining characteristic. It should not be confused with that which \textit{iterability} originally unfolds – whose extension is one which folds in upon itself in the opening and closing of the play of identity and difference and presence and absence. This structure is also the condition of possibility of the functioning of difference, division, the double, etc. This speaks of the verticality of an againness, which also makes possible the \textit{suppression} of difference and absence. In the case of the grasping of an \textit{ideal} meaning, for example (that which stands-out as the same), we might say that we have a postponement of any form of durational difference, which would otherwise only permit us to speak of the 'return of the same \textit{as Other} in the same'.

The announcement of the apparent \textit{a temporality} of the 'ideal' emerges out of a movement that is temporal in a very fundamental way. The timelessness of a cherished value, the \textit{a temporality} of a concept or an idea, eternal Being (in a pre-Heideggerian sense) are still announcements / appearances that are borne out of that which Husserl has metaphorically named as ‘flux’ or ‘flow’ (\textit{Fluß}). They may not be temporal in themselves – in that they do
not refer to temporal states of affairs – but their non-temporality still has to be *given* in an immanent unity that always has the form of the ‘flow.’ When we understand that the flux of retentional modifications is not just a simple movement of retaining, but is also a holding-back in order to make manifest the overflowing of the ever fresh present, which is the cutting-edge of the continuum, then we see the temporization / postponement that is always already at work in the constitution of duration and the *articulation* of any state of affairs. Although a mathematical state of affairs does not have duration, since this speaks rather of the unity of the extended act that apprehends it, its timelessness is still a matter of the extension (in both senses of stretching-out and postponement) that originally makes it possible to *articulate* it. Such articulation is borne out of a primordial repeatability. In one sense, the ideal is not non-temporal, but supratemporal or supertemporal [*überzeitlich*]): its 'apparent' non-temporality is still a *mode* of temporality – that of quasi-simultaneity. The theme of returnability expresses a unique peculiarity here. In reference to such a form of simultaneity, it speaks of both difference / duration and the delay or erasure of difference / duration simultaneously. Writing or *archi-writing* is an exemplary name for the structurality of this interplay. It is the paradox of iterability that it can express a movement of 'recovery' which, by deferring the articulation of itself as a differential return, permits the constitution and extension of meaning at the very same moment that it fragments it. Ideal meaning (Ideality), in its very structurality, implicates the play (like that of the relation between eidos and Idea) and, more significantly here, the re-play of deferral and differentiation by which they must necessarily erase themselves in order to perform – *and that they have always already done so*. It is the open againness of iterability that must already be in play in the logic of doubling.

Iterability is the 'structurality of the opening' through which the movement of differentiation (as one aspect of supplementarity) announces itself as the 'opening up of structure.' The absence that occurs through this tracing of self-effacement refers us to the
infrastructural possibility of the *becoming* of sense and structure, which takes into account the pivotal implication of 'becoming' as the *always already unfolding of continuity in difference and difference in continuity*.

In *Speech and Phenomena*, we find a theoretical matrix that is fully cognizant of the *temporalizing of difference*, a matrix that 'repeats' itself – quite literally through its repetition of the theme of *return as transformational repetition* (supplementarity) – in *Of Grammatology*. Derrida's reading of the tracing out of time-consciousness in Husserl's phenomenology allows him to develop an orientation on difference that brings out its spatializing and temporalizing aspects: as both *differing* and *deferring*. This thematic in deconstruction provides, as we have seen, a means with which to explain synchrony, simultaneity, contemporaneity (and their various cognates, such as co-presence, co-existence, etc.) *in terms of a certain kind of temporal-spacing*. This 'temporal-spacing' is more original than time as *succession* and more complex and *pluri*-dimensional than the mere 'diachronic' in Saussure. For Derrida, this movement is precisely the tracing out of *supplementarity*. It is an archi-writing.

The primarily 'structural' attitude of *The Tain of the Mirror* plays itself out in the 'generality' of Gasché's theoretical orientation, which has a tendency to obscure the originality of Derrida's critical reading of Saussure. Gasché's critique of the 'philosophy of reflection' takes us on an excursion through the Hegelian tradition to Saussure without carefully attending to Husserl's distinct contributions to this field. His text exhibits a misunderstanding concerning Husserl's treatment of the question of reflexivity (in intentional terms) in relation to the question of the temporality of lived-experience and it underestimates Derrida's theoretical grounding in Husserl's intentional phenomenology – as distinct from Hegelian dialectical phenomenology. To be sure, Derrida draws from the work of both philosophers and he often refers to the interplay between retention and protention in terms of a dialectical movement. However, he does this without excluding Husserl's unique language of intentionality, his
radical contributions to the theme of reflexivity, or the methodological care of his phenomenology.

Derrida's radicalization of Saussure's concept of language 'as a matrix of differences,' in the related themes of supplementarity, archi-writing and archi-tracing, etc. (which restores its temporal aspect), hinges upon the fact that, from a methodological and attitudinal point of view, he returns to Saussure via Husserl. The route taken is by way of his reading of Husserl's phenomenological analyses on perception, time-consciousness and the method of transcendental-phenomenological reduction. Husserl is a principal player, or better, 'interlocutor' in the dialogue between Derrida and Saussure. Derrida's theoretical appropriation of the concept of retention in its intertwining with protention (whose structurality is integral to the tracing of difference) allows a shift to what he sees as the more primordial condition of the possibility of difference. This possibility is différance.

It is precisely because of the residual Saussurean character in Gasché's analyses, that they do not really grasp the quasi-transcendental designation différance in its truly radical sense. The limitations of his 'horizontal' orientation are such that he falls short of it. The 'general theory of doubling' brings together a number of aspects of différance, by processing them within the limits of a theoretical matrix that knows no time. Gasché's appeal to Derrida's re-reading of Saussure in Of Grammatology misses the radical twist at work in his treatment of the theme of language as differing / deferring play that rediscovers temporality. In order to bring these issues even further into the foreground, we shall examine how Gasché's presentation of the theory of doubling organizes itself on the basis of the concept of the non-Platonic simulacrum.
19. Platonic and Non-Platonic Simulacra

Plato makes numerous references to the problem of the simulacrum in relation to his theory of Forms. Perhaps the most relevant of his varied kinds of discourse on this issue is to be found in the rather ironical approach to art in Book 10 of the Republic. Here, we are presented with a somewhat impoverished theory on art where the work of the artisan is considered to be nobler than that of the artist. According to Plato, the artisan attempts to recreate, in matter, the true Form. The artist, on the other hand, merely reproduces the 'material' object, thus producing a copy of a copy. For Plato, the artist's production (which is seen as a kind of secondary re-production) is less true and somehow ignoble. The divine spark of inspiration is bestowed on the artisan, so to speak, in the form of a passive intuition – pure reception as opposed to creative / active representation. Plato's theory sets itself up on the basis of a rigid disjunction between passivity and activity, which is built upon a theoretical divide between the apparent immanence of intuition and the secondary nature of representational perception. It is the difference between the representation of the real world and the representation of the apparent.

The working of matter, as inspired by the passive intuition of a pure Form, is set over and above the active representation of the worked matter. What is in operation here, as the immediate correlate of the passive / active divide, is a distinction between good and bad representation. The former is meant to express a first-order representation of something given (intuitively) in its original unmediated Form, while the latter indicates a mere representation of a representation. However, the distinction is problematic at the outset because Plato is unable to locate that which would indicate the 'veracity' of the intuition of a pure Form. This is not surprising since such indication would imply a mediating or re-presentative function at work in intuition, which Plato's narrow conception of the distinction between intuition and
representation will not allow. The theory of Forms presents us with an objective horizon – designated as 'real' (a hypostatization of the ideal) – which is not of consciousness or subjectivity. The factor of mediation between what are ostensibly two different realms remains unanswered. Representation, according to Plato's viewpoint, is always bad, but at least a first-order representation is tolerable in that it still retains its reference to something more than a mere image (for Plato, images, like the shadows on the walls of the cave in his famous simile obscure truth more than indicate it). However, if the concept of representation is broadened in order to accommodate intuition then it is far from clear how the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' representation can be formulated. We might call this the problem of mimesis.

Both the artisan and artist work within the sphere of representation. The latter announces itself as essential to the articulation of the Forms. Considered within the limits of Plato's schema, their 'fall' into representation – which is always 'deformation' – means that there must, in principle, be a crisis in regard to the possibility of deciding between good and bad representation (for one cannot get out of representation). Despite this, the distinction is maintained, forming the basis of a problematic ethics that ultimately prescribes the banishment of artists from the Republic.

Plato's schema is one in which the circle of representation does not include the pure Forms themselves. Derrida quite literally turns this model on its head. He does not start with an apodictically self-evident presence of some-thing simple and unitary but, at a more transcendental level, deconstructs the idea of such a presence and examines what is at stake in regard to its possibility. Mimesis, rather than designating a secondary movement – which simply re-produces something originally extant, according to varying degrees of truth and clarity – becomes the vital movement or condition of the possibility of the simple. There is no immediate relation to a pure presentation by means of which the truth of any particular representation can be judged. However, this does not signify the adoption of an extreme form
of scepticism that asserts, in a 'doctrinal' sense, that there is no truth simply because its means of verification is fractured at its core. It is certainly the case that we are sucked into the vortex of an infinite openness of signification, i.e., in terms of the sense, and thus truth, of each representation relying on other re-presentations which, in turn, are themselves intrinsically enmeshed in a matrix of further re-presentations, etc. However, at this level, we are referred to an area which is pre-empirical / without necessarily being pre-epistemological – although it is vital that the latter must be understood according to a transcendental-phenomenological orientation.

This radical horizon still concerns itself with the questions of the possibility of truth and knowledge, but only insofar as it is committed to the deconstruction / Abbau of their deeply sedimented sense. Therefore, such regression is a 'critical return,' which must be understood as de-construction, as opposed to de-struction. It proceeds as a movement of de-sedimentation where the con (as a weaving together) is simultaneously at play with a movement of unravelling and holding-apart.

Since the systematic construction of a new, or the restoration of an old, model of truth is perpetually suspended or deferred (in line with the primary principle that guides both phenomenology and deconstruction), and since it is the question of the possibility of disclosure itself, as the opening up of structure and the structurality of this opening (language as writing and / or time, depending on one's point of orientation or taste in names), our discourse cannot be permitted any epistemic privileges. Truth, according to Derrida's perspective, is not simply uncovered or distorted through representations, but is constituted by such performances.4

It is this logic that serves as the basis for Gasché's appropriation of Derrida's discourse on supplementarity, doubling, and the non-Platonic simulacrum – providing the fundamental background for his own development and promotion of a 'general theory of doubling.'
Gasché writes,

A simulacrum, as defined by Plato, is a copy of a copy, a double of a double, which itself signifies an original. Within philosophy, the simulacrum is indeed dependent on an ontology, since the nontruth of the copy of the copy is linked to the truth of the present referent of which the first copy is the true repetition. Therefore, the subtle excess of truth and ontology that the originary duplication designates cannot be qualified simply as a simulacrum. To call it by this name within philosophy is not only to call it by one of the names of that which is severely condemned by this discourse as spurious, if not bad duplication (and repetition), but also to strip it of its most unsettling implications. To name the originary duplication – that is, a doubling anterior to the metaphysical oppositions of truth and nontruth – a simulacrum is to continue to speak within these comforting oppositions. Yet what this asks us to conceive is a simulacrum without any ultimate referent, in other words, a non-Platonic simulacrum. Indeed, the original duplication, doubling the opposition between copy and original, is neither preceded nor followed by any referent, presence, or unbreached identity. The originary duplication, or non-Platonic simulacrum, initiates but also displaces the metaphysical opposition of original and copy, and of the copy of the copy, into a completely different field (TM, p.226-27).

Ultimately, according to Gasché, Derrida asks us to conceive of a simulacrum without an ultimate referent. This only makes sense after the application of what could be described as a form of epoché: a careful attitudinal and methodological re-orientation that remains suspicious in regard to its subject-matter (copies and originals) and the language (of simulacra) through which it is articulated.
The methodological route to this inversion of the traditional concept of mimesis (where re-presentation was once defined as an imperfect copy of an original presence and was motivated by a purely receptive [non-representational] intuition) involves a strategic withholding of judgement about the actuality or non-actuality of that which is given through appearances. This is in order to focus on the how and the ways in which sense or meaning appears, i.e., in terms of the 'manners' of the appearing of appearances. Attitudinally, this is equivalent to that which is attained through the phenomenological reduction in Husserlian phenomenology. The world is not lost but, as 'world-thesis,' it is retained purely as phenomenon – a meaning-complex comprising both the language of appearances and the language of appearing. In Ideas 1, this space comes to be formally expressed (through eidetic reduction) as the noetic-noematic correlation – an intentional intertwining. A strict analogue to this orientation is at work in Derrida's thesis on the structure of re-marking and re-presentation where, in Derrida's case, it evolves into a question of the writing of any possible meaning or, in more general terms: presence. In both movements, the Husserlian eidetic reduction clearly traces out its signature.

For Derrida, the non-Platonic simulacrum derives its sense from the logic of 'undecidability' (a concept that originated with Gödel [1931]). In other words, it is a simulacrum in an analogous sense. It stands outside the positive / negative dyad of traditional logical discourse on truth and nontruth, original and copy, etc., for it represents a kind of excluded middle. The copula 'is,' as the defining moment of the principle of contradiction, becomes imbued with a supplementary character through which the scope of discourse is no longer determined by the formal limit of either / or. It embraces ambivalence and ambiguity in the play of the 'and' – where such play disrupts the language of propositional statements.

The re- of re-presentation, as Derrida shows in Speech and Phenomena, is not simply (as in traditional ontology and epistemology) a modification of an original presence, but refers
to a fundamental condition of possibility of presence in general. Since the term representation no longer finds itself chained to the foundations of the schema in which its function was limited to a kind of echo of something more original, we find that the whole meaning of representation in general begins to slide. This brings us to the concept of the 're-mark' and the structurality of re-marking.

20. Re-Marking the Re-Marking...

Following the logic of the non-Platonic simulacrum, the relationship between mark and re-mark is not a simple linear progression. The mark is possible only in that it is derived from the structurality of re-marking. The relationship is more complex than the traditional language of 'causal' chains (and successive and irreversible temporal sequences) in which the mark is said to come first. In *Speech and Phenomena*, Derrida's examination of Husserl's utilization of the terms retention and protention brings to light a form of dialectical play that points the way to a general theory on the structure of representation (see also *Of Grammatology* and the essay "Différance" [Margins]). It effectively transgresses the limits of the Platonic notion of mimesis – a notion that carries with it a strict distinction between original and copy and good and bad representation (despite the fact that the possibility of such a distinction is problematized at the very start by the limits of Plato's own language).

There is no clear and direct means of distinguishing between good (true) and bad (false) representation if we rigorously apply the basic principles of Plato's own system. The notion of a pure / non-representational access to the Forms maintains an insoluble tension
within Plato's conception of the true and its articulation since he cannot point out how to get beyond the circle of representation.

By means of a double-reading of that which Derrida calls 'the dialectic of retention and protention,' we can see that the re of re-presentation is not a simple modification of an original presentation. It rather speaks of the tracing out of a repetition that first makes such a presentation possible – a repetition that functions through a movement of delay. The re of representation then, is an index to the condition of the possibility of any kind of presence and not merely a reference to an impoverished simulacrum that 'stands-in' for something originally extant. For Derrida, once again, re-presentation is not preceded by an original, unmediated, or primordial presence.

Gasché does not present a balanced account of Derrida's theoretical appropriation of the 'structure' of primordial temporalization, which was first presented by Husserl in The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. This text plays 'the' pivotal role in Derrida’s construction of the central argument of Speech and Phenomena, even though he comments on not being able to discuss it in depth. If he had actually engaged with this series of lectures in greater detail, it would have been counter-productive to the whole of his 'strong' thesis – but then there is a world of difference between the style of a piece of writing (which says more about that which is demanded by a certain tradition of philosophical presentation, i.e., disputation) and the deep contexture of a writing. One has to excavate Derrida's texts and uproot the often superficial polemical tone, in order to uncover that which is really significant in his thinking – a writing within the written, whose subtle lessons are often concealed by the foreground spur that more immediately inscribes itself in the form of sensational slogans on the imagination of the superficial and inattentive reader. Not that Gasché ever falls into the latter category, but he does have a tendency to merely incorporate the negative sloganizing into his overall account of Derrida's deconstruction without criticism.
The structurality of the interplay between retention and protention, in the opening up of the Living Present, gives us, with very little modification, the *tracing* of re-presentation or re-marking in a theoretical matrix that is far deeper and quite other to the mundane / objectivist thesis of perception that Gasché (perhaps on the basis of a less than critical reading of Derrida's 'strong' thesis in *Speech and Phenomena*) implicitly assigns to Husserl's phenomenological concept of intentionality. It is to be granted that, for Husserl, something must first be given in accordance with the phenomenological concept of evidence / fulfilment (which involves the concept of primary impression – which is not a *self-sufficient* perception), but once again this is built upon the retentional / protentional *flux* of originary temporal articulation. The flux is an extending of continua of continua. This retentional and protentional interplay, when these intentionalities are thought with the addition of their respective parallels in the *presentificational* dimension of secondary remembrance and expectation, is the precise correlate to the structurality of the movement / tracing of re-marking or supplementarity, as described by Derrida: a primordial writing – an *archi-writing*.

In sum, although one ordinarily assumes that a mark is a reference to some extant *thing*, according to the logics of re-marking, if referral takes place it is between mark and mark. Meaning, according to this orientation, is merely like foam on the wave. It emerges through the intrinsic *interplay of a network* of marks – a syntactical matrix that, in re-marking (upon) itself, permits the crystallization of meaning. If we suspend all interest in the ontological status of the mark, or the meaning it delivers up, then we are referred, as Gasché puts it, to an *semic* space. With this, we finally arrive at the point at which we may bring the question of supplementarity into sharp focus.
21. The Historicity of Supplementarity: temporalization as altering return

Supplementarity designates no mere movement of addition – as in the way in which one might speak of an 'incremental' growth in knowledge. But then again, the becoming of knowledge (in that it is not reducible to a linear / successive assimilation of facts) also follows a more complex and dialectical passage. It is an inter- and intra- dialogical movement of negotiation involving shifts, negations, radical deflections – as well as conservations and syntheses – through which the epistemological horizon (which includes self-knowing as a unity of a life-history made thematic) organizes and re-organizes itself. The repetition through which it writes itself is a repetition that transforms. We speak of a matrix that is in motion, changing within itself: a pluri-dimensional shifting from significance to significance whose extending and self-organization is irreducible to the mere linearity of addition.

For Derrida, the history of "linearity...is the repression of pluri-dimensional symbolic thought" (OG, p.87). This is the sense in which we begin to approach the pluri-dimensional-temporal logics of supplementarity. The structurality of this pluri-dimensional play is also the principal working theme that binds Husserl's lectures on temporality. That it is expressed in slightly different terms is almost incidental, for Husserl is clear that the proto-horizon to which the name flux refers is a region for which "names are lacking" (PITC. § 36, p.100). He has no choice but to employ metaphors. Derrida has employed a few metaphors of his own, but the primary logics remain enmeshed in the principal structures of Husserl's tropes. Derrida has radically opened up these metaphors and that which they signify through a kind of supplementary project. Here, the radical tone of the opening cancels out the traditional sense of the supplement. Derrida's contribution to this field is not simply the production of further non-critical addenda following a linear agenda. His writing of supplements to the originary writing-
out of what he names as the structure of supplementarity is an unbuilding and re-building (Abbau and Aufbau) of this Ur-region first 'named' by Husserl. Derrida not only fleshes-out the deepest levels of phenomenology, he also shows that this can only be achieved (to extend the envelope of this chiasmic metaphor) by turning 'its' flesh inside-out – where the outside is the inside.

The occasionally hyper-critical tone of Derrida's treatment of Husserl does not so much rest on any kind of doctrinally motivated polemic as on an adherence to Husserl's own call for a phenomenology (which is to say: phenomenological critique – and thus 'reduction) of the phenomenological reduction. This is actually the space in (or spacing through) which phenomenology first inaugurates itself. However, there are sensational claims (sometimes implicit, often explicit, but always only strategic) that have continued to stick and which still obscure the originality of Husserl's discourse on time. These must be swept away.

As we have seen, Husserl's project, throughout his lectures on temporality, is not, in contradistinction to the 'strong' perspective at work in Derrida's Speech and Phenomena, theoretically bound by the limits of a corpuscular model of time. Neither is it rooted in a purely linear conception. With respect to the question of linearity, Husserl aims at describing those structures that must always already be implicated by such a conception: a proto-structure, which (as it turns out) organizes the conditions of possibility of linear experience without being reducible to the same order or language. What his analyses uncover is a dimension of non-static structurality. It is pure flux (Fluß), it flows, but it is not a process. It is not 'in' time – certainly not as a unity of duration.

This proto-region, in which the usual categories of time do not apply, is pluri-dimensional and non-linear – yet it produces linearity. The Absolute of the expression Absolute Flux, in these terms, is the mark of its resistance to the traditional language of time. Since we primarily wish to bring out particular aspects of the 'structurality' of this flux and its
parallels in Derrida's discourse on archi-writing (where supplementarity is irreducible to a general language of duplicity) we shall not confine ourselves to the now traditional, thanks to Derrida, space of a 'grammatology' in which it is usually articulated. However, we should emphasize that our aim is not simply to displace the theme into another, perhaps contemporaneous, though different, sphere of discourse, but to uncover the structurality of the temporalizing play designated by the term supplementarity. Ironically, this is to aim toward its 'essence,' a word that must be used with caution, since it often suggests a rootedness within the language of the 'static' – cut adrift from time – and is thus to be read, as always, [between brackets]. We need to turn to that temporalizing play of deferral and repetition that traces itself out as a constitutive movement of transformational return – the inscription of duration / change / difference.

One might say that to talk about the structurality of supplementarity, from the Derridian point of view, is to talk about time as writing. What if we were to initiate an inversion of this idea by restoring the full measure and impact of the temporal signification that Derrida cannot do without in his delineation of the sense of archi-writing (as the 'structure of supplementarity,' if structure is to extend its sense beyond a mere static determination)? What if we were to restore such temporal signification in its own right? What might we unearth if we take a little time to write about writing as temporalizing?

The structurality of the play of supplementarity refers us to a horizon that confounds the distinction between genesis and structure. The phenomenological correlate to this, as we have already seen, is that zone for which, as Husserl says, "names are lacking." Derrida has offered us a number of fascinating candidates, which make up the constellation of the quasi-concept designated by the neologism différance. To this extent, Derrida is actually quite faithful to Husserl's phenomenological project. Différance as deferring / differing repetition announces itself as both a quasi-transcendental condition of the possibility of structure,
meaning, presence and the very threat of their dissolution. It further extends and deepens that primary aspect of the Husserlian flux that speaks of both continuity and fragmentation.

In this context, one cannot ignore the main thrust of Husserl's delineation of the structurality of flux as 'continuous alteration,' in which change and continuity are originarily intertwined. For both Husserl and Derrida, at this deep level, repetition is not to be understood as a continuous replay of the same as the same – a mere addition or identical reduplication – but a replay that temporalizes and transforms. Once again, this draws us back to Husserl's discussions on repetition and the intentional structures of temporalization.7

Let us adopt another Husserlian mode of orientation for a moment. As each of us moves on from childhood to maturity, judgements undergo modification through the light of experience (shifts that occur through changing situations, social conditioning, alterations in personal facticities, etc.); even deeply sedimented doxic structures (beliefs) can be subjected to revision. For instance, throughout the process of maturation, every time that one remembers (presentifies as opposed to presents) a past event it marks – through the very movement of re-marking / return – a 'change' in the significance of the reiterated phase according to the narrative structure or manner in which the past is restored to the present. This is not a supplement that merely adds itself to an original meaning, but one that transforms it. Therefore, we cannot simply speak of a 'passive giving' of that which was, but must equally consider the generative or constitutive thrust of remembering that, in an important sense, organizes and articulates its history – re-tells the story of the past (note: we can also consider the movement in the pre-conscious terms of the re-writing of habitus; to tidy up one's house / habitation; the fluid reorganization of the 'ego as substrate of habitualities').8

This 'dialogical' matrix is in excess of the order of linear time and causality. Within the horizon of a rigorously sustained epoché, there never was an original, objectively concrete past- in-itself – a monolithic past that subsists in a real piece of past-time that is rigidly
positioned within a one-dimensional continuum. There never was an originary, unmediated moment that inaugurated a causal sequence of events and which inflexibly 'determines' the pathways of future action. All this can be said because there never was an original, singular and pure event (objective complex of significance) that could be said to lie behind the constituting (or distorting, if one clings to the old world-view) effects of remembering. We do not speak of a substantive plenitude of meaning that escapes the limiting parameters of the narrative form of the movement of return. It is not as if there is a field of original meaning that has the potential for full self-disclosure, if only it could give itself purely – without being mediated by the flux of contingent and fleeting modalities of recollection, whose ever changing manners of illumination equally veil that which they are meant to unveil. This is a 'hermeneutical' problem insofar as it traces the limits of the possibility of hermeneutics and its methods of interpretation / interrogation).

Appropriation or re-appropriation is always an index to a certain character or tone of illuminating that which comes to light. It is never merely passive, but in a crucial phenomenological sense, it creates or constitutes the significance of its field of interrogation – thus giving shape and tone to that which is articulated. This refers us to the fundamentally important theme of Sinngebung (sense-bestowal) in Husserl's theory of intentionality.

In this light, let us return for a moment to the constitutive aspect of 'recollection' (as distinct from primary retention). The presentation in memory of a past event involves an active component in that one often remembers past events in accordance with the character in which one last remembered them. However, this is not to say that a more radical shift of meaning cannot occur. Consider what may happen as a consequence of discovering, in the light of new evidence, that one's judgement about the significance of a past moment was erroneous, e.g., "I thought that he was doing me a favour when he advised me to buy those shares in B.C.C.I."

Furthermore, are there not also moments when it seems as if the past rears up of itself, like a
nightmare flashback? Such moments (the feeling of déjà vu for instance, where past, present, and future appear to coincide) find themselves drawn up, in a peculiar way, by the present in an intimate relation of encroachment. The past surges up into the present, while the present can undergo a startling re-organization as it seemingly finds itself sucked into the past. For instance, consider the effect of returning, after a long absence, to an area in which one lived as a child – or recognizing an odour (stimuli of an olfactory kind has an extraordinary capacity to instantaneously transport one back into the past). This is not the relatively dissociated re-experiencing of something drawn up by an act of evocation, but an immanent re-living of the past. However, once again, this is not to say that there is an absolutely static and monolithic past. Even deep-seated inscriptions or memories, which might ordinarily be considered to be static, undergo alteration in the ways in which they resonate significance through time.

The past is constantly being re-visited, re-organized or re-written on the basis of ever-changing present and futural concerns. At the same time, the meaningful shape of the past can be as much a matter of affect as effect, since it can 'unconsciously' influence present and future acts (taking us into the realm of psychoanalytical concerns). However, despite their changes in resonance, remembered events still retain their relative 'positions' in the past (thanks to primary memory / retention) as 'before' or 'after' other remembered events. There is no shuffling here (although it is sometimes possible to be mistaken). So it is never really possible to bracket the theme of linearity completely. It is always there as a background horizon to other forms of temporality which are, themselves, not reducible to a purely linear form of time. Since Husserl's concept of pure flux is not to be thought in terms of process or any kind of movement in the ordinary linear sense, it expresses a shift to a pluri-dimensional discourse on temporality that looks less and less like time. He is in good company when we also consider Heidegger's writing on time-space and Merleau-Ponty's concept of chiasm. Flux is that which constitutes the linearity we take for granted, but it cannot be adequately expressed by it.
When we turn to the question of the unfolding and development of relations between different kinds of significance across time, we see that this is indeed irreducible to a merely linear formula. In Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, this level designates the constitutive role played by 'secondary remembrance' or 'presentification,' which must be distinguished from 'primary remembrance' or 'retention.' As we have seen, retention, as an originary giving of the no-longer *precisely as that which is no longer*, should be understood as *presentation* (in which deferral and absence play constitutive roles). The mode of the appearing is an originary presentation that *gives* pastness, while that which appears as *retained* in the movement of secondary remembrance is 'presentified.' This is not to be *given*. It is only in retention that it is originally given in its pastness (a 'virtual' presence available for reiteration by secondary remembrance). What is important is that it is in retention (primary remembrance) that that which appears originally announces itself as not-now. Pastness is the mode of its appearing. That which appears to secondary remembrance – as retained – undergoes further modification in the manner of its givenness, which is itself retained and so on.

What we must recognize here, at a higher level, is that we do not merely find ourselves faced with the problem of how, according to the classical epistemological orientation, we can judge the veracity of that which is unearthed through interrogation (which would always remain Plato's problem), when interrogation itself, like any narrative form, plays a constitutive role in establishing the 'character[s]' of that which it delivers up – i.e., what can be unsaid and yet operative within the very passage of the question: the affective though unthematized teleology of the task. Perhaps, with this realization, we find (in line with Gödel’s discourse on undecidability) that a purely objective and naturalistic ideal of truth-verification announces both its limits and its collapse. If one avoids absolute scepticism (Hume's *Treatise* is an excellent example of the way in which a radical / pure empirical method must ultimately
undermine the sense-validity of its own criteria of truth-verification\textsuperscript{10}), there emerges a different kind of question. What is at stake when reason, knowledge or – in more general phenomenological terms – lived-experience (Erlebnis) must return to itself as a becoming?

Hegel’s dialectical phenomenology is a response to this question – by means of which the attempt to restore the thematic of history to philosophy reached a new level of dignity. However, what if we put into question the specific teleological presumption that an Absolute awaits its ultimate disclosure through a linear progression – a synthesis of determinate negations, conservations and moments of sublation? This model implicitly suggests (although this is by no means the only reading) that no historical phase with its own unique character is essential, since all moments are ostensibly accidents along the ideal and universal path of Geist returning to itself as Absolute. This dialectical economy of negotiation says little about deflection, dispersion, delay, and radical incommensurability, but this is not surprising, since these dynamics completely disrupt its teleological presuppositions. From a 'functional' point of view, there is a kind of backward causation at work in the latter. At one level we can grant that no particular moment is necessary in its own right – logically, it is not inconceivable that things could have been otherwise. However, this is not to say that it does not of itself play a constitutive role in affecting historical movement by transforming the meaning of the past and the shape of that which is to come. There is always a tracing of relativity and chance throughout the unfolding of the moments of history. These both differ from and defer the realization of the eschatological ideal that is supposed to prescribe their characters of development. (It is only in the telling that past moments assume a structure of necessity in that they are now past and thus, cannot be undone. Our anxiety about the future arises because this irreversibility, with respect to the specifics of what may occur, is not necessarily in play as a guarantee to prediction).
For Husserl and Derrida, there is no universal or totalizing form of historical significance under which personal, ethnic and cultural differences are ultimately subsumed. We must take into account the very real differences or différends that mark out, and thus remark upon, the plurality of histories that make up humankind as a whole. These are not accidents merely in the sense that they ultimately refer back to a necessary and universal teleological passage through which they find their significance, but whose direction they are unable to affect. It is rather the case that they are accidental in that their significance is always open to revision within an open horizon of possible interpretation / re-interpretation (here we can also speak of both continuity and radical discontinuity as they announce themselves throughout the writing of a single life). However, we do not stop here, for we must not commit ourselves to psychologism, anthropologism or historicism.

The passage of history is not to be reduced to the empirical instances through which historicality or historicalness inscribes itself from moment to moment. The pure movement of Geschichtlichkeit (historicity) – the unfolding or tracing of history (Geschichte in its many lived forms as distinct from Historie) – is both in excess of and less than its constituted moments. Its horizon extends beyond the parameters of any particular regional vocabulary, but at the same time it is nothing more than the structurality of the opening of (or the articulating of) the phases through which any particular tradition, language or cultural horizon evolves.11

The meaning of tradition involves the collective transmission of ideal meanings and norms through which it establishes the character of its own significational horizon. As we have already seen, in reference to the structure of temporalization in Husserlian phenomenology, all ideality is possible only because of the possibility of repetition. This is the case in both quasi-transcendental terms as archi-writing – which provides the structurality of the opening through which there can be the opening up of structure – and in mundane empirical terms as the written transmission of ideas and the organization of tradition. The notion of Geschichtlichkeit and the
logics of the retentional and protentional intertwining of primordial temporalization are thus appropriated by Derrida and put to work in his discourse on the tracing of archi-writing – which announces itself as the pure structurality of the tracing of supplementarity.

Supplementarity combines both elements of constitution and fragmentation. It is the very articulation of the passage of time, the writing of any possible history. Therefore, supplementarity is not an external accident, but the condition of the possibility of the disruption and extendedness – evolution – of meaning. It gives the possibility of excess, while simultaneously marking out finitude. Despite the idea of a movement toward totalization, which it first makes possible, the very tracing of supplementarity undermines the possibility of 'actual' totalization. The movement is like a dialogue, a dialectic between finitization and infinitization through which any telos (as the flip-side of origin) unfolds itself through the play of negotiation that internally constitutes it. The non-totalizable play between eide and 'Ideas in the Kantian sense' is a significant example here, in view of the way in which Derrida plays with this concept in his Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry."

Understood in terms of temporal-spacing, différance, as archi-tracing or archi-writing, expresses 'openness' in both the dimensions of the past and future. It always already speaks of the recursive structurality (the essential possibility of actual repetition and representation) through which, as in Husserl's phenomenology of temporality, the Living Present isoriginarily stretched within itself. This movement of repetition is the essential condition of possibility for the presencing and maintenance of structure and meaning as they evolve toward any number of possible futures. It constitutes and re- organizes the significance of the past from which their shapes are drawn and, in doing so, the form of the passage is a re-organization / re-writing of itself. The openness of the futural horizon is that which permits the possibility of the re-reading and re-writing of the past (to act / work upon it) while the sedimented textuality of the past is that which first delivers up the material (doxa, judgements, and investments, etc.) for a range
of possible projects that give significance / meaning to the future. Passivity and activity are eternally intertwined in the writing out of temporality (even the affective is motivated). This pluri-dimensional reflexivity of altering re-turn (as indicated by the re-) indicates a form of temporalizing play that expresses the true radicality of the concept of supplementarity.

In these terms, we can see that the structure of supplementarity shows that retentions retain signatures of secondary remembrances and that the latter re-organize the significance of the former. They are different moments of the same movement (and it is this intertwining that constitutes the relation of difference between Geschichte and Historie). There is no strict bifurcation here between passivity and activity. Once again, the constellation of movements expressed in the Heideggerian es gibt and ereignis of the lecture entitled "Time and Being" – which announces the it-gives of a primordial and impersonal event of Appropriation – is an excellent analogue to what is in play. The concept of time-space (that introduces them) refers to a fourth dimension that is no mere increment to the other three ekstases of time, but is the originary giving of each to each.

Derrida's discourse on différance as spacing / temporizing / writing / articulation, etc., expresses a pure movement of opening and closing (and a pre-teleological form of becoming). Différance is that which, like Heidegger's conception of time-space, 'makes room' in the most primary sense. It is not simply the announcement of a third term that bisects the common space / time dyad by means of a dialectical motion. This quasi-concept indicates a zone that is always already disrupting the trinitarian horizon of dialectics (the triadic of the trinary) while, at the same time, making it possible. Difference, alone, is insufficient in expressing the 'excess' of différance (hence the introduction of such a neologism – expressing neither passivity nor activity, but at the same time also expressing both) – which is irreducible to the traditional language of mere spatio-temporal differences. The ance of différance indicates its 'active' aspect, but this is also tempered by the fundamental sense of the trace as pure 'non-origin' and
'self-erasure': an opening and closing in repetition that produces only in that it has always already happened. It is always already the trace of an erasure. This speaks of an essential interwovenness of activity and passivity. According to Derrida, "...the ending -ance remains undecided between the active and passive" ("Différance," Margins, p.9). Différance as difference and deferral, announces the intertwining (Ineinander) of spacing and temporalizing – which is not so much 'beyond' as 'earlier' than the classic Leibnizian (and Newtonian) bifurcation between space and time. In contrast to the emphasis generally placed on difference and heterogeneity, différance also expresses an orientation that permits us to speak of such temporal differences as past, present and future in terms of their interpenetration in the movement that traces out their differences. Once again, we find echoes of the thought of flux (Husserl), chiasm (Merleau-Ponty) and time-space (Heidegger).

The issue of the 'always-already-happening' of différance finally brings us to a most fundamental oversight in Gasché's thesis on 'duplicity.'

22. **Différance and the De-Differentiation of Space and Time**

Our project to express the importance of opening up a dialogical space in which to contrast Derrida with Gasché's Derrida never implied that there is, in the end, just one Derrida. His style of philosophizing is a living example of the alterity that already inhabits his (or indeed 'any') writing. Derrida's texts, in particular, make up a community of writing that is in dialogue with itself.
In the foregoing elaboration of some of the key moments of the differential space between Derrida and Gasché's incarnation of Derrida, it has been argued that the originality of the former lies in the fact that his writing strategically avoids limiting itself to the traditional disjunction in kind between temporality and spatiality and the traditional schematics that are based upon it. Derrida places great emphasis on the 'disruptive' elements of the trace / *différance* / archi-writing. Therefore, it is easy to see why his writing announces that temporalizing *is* spacing – in that peculiar sense of suspension in which the *is* is crossed out, put under erasure (*sous rature*). However, we must also remember that the term *spacing* is an index to more than mere distanciation, differentiation and disjunction.

It was suggested, earlier, that the very meta-generality of the operative quasi-concept *différance* in deconstruction gives us a horizon in which, from a certain point of view, differences between differences can be said to break down, e.g., differences between quantity, quality, modality; conflation of the various moments of the sign, such as the distinct, but intertwined, moments of the *style* and *content* of the movement of signification, the *signifying* of the signifier, the *appearing* of the appearance, etc. In other words, with the suspension of a specific framework of values (since the operative language is generally employed under erasure), *différance* can refer us to a horizon of *indifference*. Gasché, on the other hand, makes much of its heterogeneity throughout his attempts to define, systematically, the 'essential' differences that constitute the sense of the plurality of *différance*. But, he only really does so from the point of view of the traditional concepts from which the various infrastructural moments of *différance* (e.g., temporalizing, spacing, etc.) are drawn – that is, from within the boundaries of the synchronic / diachronic duality. However, it is important to recognize that, in fact and in principle, there is no fundamental difference between these particular terms from Derrida's standpoint, throughout his delineation of the horizon of *différance* (especially in the essay of that title), since he does not 'start out' with the traditional distinction between space as
an 'order of coexistence[s]' and time as an 'order of successions.' The consequences of this de-differentiation express quite another side to the negative aspects that were mentioned earlier, concerning the 'conflation' or 'compression' of presence and the present that is at work in Derrida's reading of Husserl's phenomenology.

Since Gasché concentrates on the 'active' and 'divisive' aspects of *différance*, he only ever really speaks of pure 'difference' in similarity (assigning greater emphasis to difference in general). In these terms, he is only half way toward approaching Derrida's actual position. A truly rigorous propaedeutic to the study of *différance* must equally consider its 'passivity' and questions of similarity in difference – which also leads to a form of indifference. It is to be granted that there are irreducible differences between such terms as spacing and temporizing *in relation to their traditional significations* as spatiality / spatializing and temporality / temporalizing. However, there are not any real differences that divide them from the point of view of their 'functioning' *within* the meta-structurality and play of *différance*.

As opposed to Gasché's one-sided tendency toward the articulation of the differences between temporizing / temporalizing and spacing, it is important that we emphasize the common resources from which these terms draw in the announcement of their sense. Not only must this be taken into account from a historical perspective, it must also be acknowledged in terms of the manner of their appropriation and function *within* deconstruction itself. When archi-writing is understood as the movement of inscription and articulation (the textual analogue to the dynamics of primordial temporalization in Husserl's lectures on time) we see that, in the most profound *functional* sense, temporalizing *is* spacing.

It is Husserl's arrival at the concept of *Primordial Flux* that has had the greatest impact on contemporary philosophical thought on temporality, pushing out the limits of the question of time to the point at which it has begun to lack any resemblance to traditional (linear and purely successive) discourse on this theme. When Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger speak of
chiasm and time-space respectively, they focus on a kind of invaginated time, a folding-unfolding temporality. This form is to be understood as giving and encroachment (extending in the sense of extending a gift), while at the same time it also expresses extension in terms of stretching / postponement / distanciation / duration. The word ‘spacing’ encompasses both senses of proximity and distance. In functional terms, there is no strict schematic (or metaphysical) distinction between, on the one hand, Merleau-Ponty's and Heidegger's theses on time as intertwining and giving, and on the other, Derrida's discussion on time as spacing, since they all speak of the structurality of an unfolding of differentiation. These differences are always already intertwined. Husserl's concept of Primordial or Absolute Flux is the archetypal that binds these three writers together in their community of differences.

For Derrida, once again (but this time to quote from Of Grammatology)... 

Spacing...speaks the articulation of space and time, the becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of space (OG, p.68).

It is here that deconstruction and transcendental-phenomenology find themselves theoretically interwoven (and, attitudinally, eye to eye). It is at this point that we should question whether it is appropriate to continue adding the prefix 'quasi' to what is clearly a full-blown transcendental-phenomenological orientation in Derrida's writing.
23. The *Return of the Vertical: recovery, postponement and the unfolding of depth*

If we take the following passage from *The Tain of the Mirror* and compare it with a very pregnant statement (cf., p.224) drawn from *Of Grammatology*, on what is at stake in the opening up of difference, we find that, despite the obvious stylistic similarity to a number of Derrida's discussions on the tracing of difference, a rather interesting absence in the order of content makes itself felt in Gasché's formulation.

Gasché writes,

A general theory of doubling should help account for duplicity in general. In conformity with what infrastructures are supposed to achieve, such a theory will not explain duplicity by way of an undivided whole that would precede it....To explain duplicity and doubling presupposes an originary doubling, which would not be preceded by any unity, and which thus annuls the traditional restriction of doubling to a matter of accidentality and secondariness (*TM*, p.225).

Gasché's discourse on the infrastructural condition of possibility of unity and so-called simplicity places emphasis on the primacy of duplicity and doubling precisely because unity and ideality (identity in general) presupposes difference. Once again, this is not a million miles away from the assertion that P must be such that it is also not-not P – double negation as a positivity – because positive identity or existence 'polarizes' itself through the possibility of its non-being or non-existence (its absolute Other). ‘Polarization’ is meant literally here since positivity is inextricably bound up in a dyad. This is a bi-polar opposition of the type that expresses itself on the same plane as such traditional 'absolute dualities' as truth and non-truth,
essence and existence, light and darkness, etc. Thus, for an identity to crystallize and to stand-out it must already be polarized as a mirror of itself. Alterity is part of its structure. It must be internally differentiated in order to stand-out 'again and against' itself. In other words, when we come to consider the condition of the possibility of 'identity,' we are introduced to the thought of the necessary possibility of division within itself. This emphasizes the 'contingent' nature of the Ideal by bringing into focus the motion of écart (indicated by the logic of duplicity without being reducible to it – since écart also has its temporal meaning as 'interval'). As the condition of the possibility of the Ideal, it is also the very threat of its dissolution.

However, as we have seen, there is an absence in Gasché's account that Derrida has already subjected to phenomenological-deconstruction, which announces the intrinsic importance of the question of temporalization (from a phenomenological-genetic point of view [which takes into account both the opening up of structure and the structurality of this opening]) in regard to the functional sense of 'doubling' – i.e., the pure tracing of iteration, the primary movement of return. Derrida's orientation on the question of the possibility of ideality reveals that its very essence is its repeatability, the 'possibility of its repetition.' Without the possibility of return (returnability / iterability) we would be unable to speak of the constitution and maintenance of structure and meaning through time.12

For Derrida the re- of re-presentation, when thought in just one of its aspects – as an index to a general duplicity within the heart of the possibility of presence – is not to be confused with the level at which Saussure speaks of language as a network of differences. The latter model relies very heavily on 'spatial' tropes of a contemporaneous and linear order. As we have already seen, the manner in which the synchronic can be understood in terms of the movement of the diachronic (and vice-versa) is still a problem. Différance (with an a) designates a field in which synchrony can be thought without co-existence (or in terms of pure simultaneity) and diachrony can be thought beyond a mere order of successions. As 'differing
and deferring,' the question of the functioning of differance refers us to the unfolding of the horizon that is more traditionally considered in terms of the space / time dyad, mentioned above. However, the tracing of differences that Derrida has in mind (figuratively speaking) is more primordial. It extends the Husserlian concept of 'Primordial Flux,' which situates itself in a different and deeper dimension to the 'distinction' (that is often foundational) between space and time. In order for differences to stand-out, and thus perform as the condition of the possibility of individuation, difference must already contain within itself a reference to much more than division or distanciation in spatial or horizontal terms – which is in contrast to the Saussurean schema. Its own functioning must, in principle, presuppose the temporality of returnability.¹³

It cannot have escaped the reader's attention that Gasché would be entitled to respond with the claim that 'returnability' can equally be thought as a function or product of doubling. However, quite paradoxically, this would be to undermine the radical sense of duplicity as it is theoretically rooted in the concept of the non-Platonic simulacrum. This quasi-simulacrum does not have a beginning-point. It has always already been extended toward and away from itself. It is a trace that retains through a delay, whose deep structure is that of an articulation that has always already bent back upon itself, without completely reaching itself. It is this recursive movement through a certain temporal detour that is always already at play in the constitution of the double, for this delay is such that the movement of re-iteration never quite meets itself in coincidence with itself. It never quite reaches back far enough. This is not a defect but the very spacing constitutive of its movement. In a sense, there is an absolute past that already inhabits the movement of doubling, for it is only by means of this horizon that it can return upon itself differantly. There cannot be a process of doubling without a certain returning / retaining, which produces the conditions of possibility for the registration of difference.
The moment of 'deferring' in its intertwining with 'differing' speaks of a certain kind of recovery through delay and distanciation. This is apparent in such instances of deferral as that in which one might forestall a decision in order to consider other possibilities; to hold at bay, in the sense of a movement toward mastery, by reducing the threat of engulfment by the Other; to suspend in order to return anew; to dally awhile; play; foreplay, which, in aiming toward producing a difference in the other, often defers its telos or eschatological fulfilment in orgasm when its focus turns toward its own movement for its own sake, etc. In the case of deconstructive strategy, play is really infinitely extended foreplay. In a certain sense, this constitutes a peculiar kind of suspension of its object without necessarily losing sight of it. It is a shift in orientation that aims toward the illumination of the various characters of the movement of desire itself; to reappropriate itself through a kind of positional suspension – a utopic movement that seeks no 'site,' which is precisely deferral / temporization.

The 'strategic' here is the expression, in style, of a temporizing / temporalizing movement that is always already at work, invisibly tracing out the possibility of sense through the spacing of language in general.

Derrida radicalizes the Saussurean thought of difference and re-presentation by re-storing the full measure of the again of the Latin particle re. This is the fulcrum that permits Derrida to shift into a deeper dimension than that which is presented by the limits of Saussure's (and, by implication, Gasché's) perspective. Derrida's transcendental attitude is such that the 'against' cannot strictly be the correlate to the 'again' in an equi-primordial relation. It is rather a corollary, a derivative of the possibility of againness: the horizon in which differences are crystallized only because of the original spacing of return that produces differential 'registration.' Such registration is produced through the spacing of their encounter. It is this return upon themselves that allows them to stand-out against and toward one another as differences. When we speak of 'possibility,' this meta-structural trace is clearly not to be
confused with 'actual repetitions' that provide the differences through which 'identity' is articulated from one moment to another. Rather, as before, we make reference to a 'horizon' that is presupposed by their ability to function.

With the notion of iterability, an essential temporal dimension to the sign is re-covered. When we speak of a recovery through a certain delay, it is open to question whether this always carries with it a 'privative' sense in which to re-cover also means to cover again (as in to conceal once more). For our purposes, it is enough to clarify Derrida's principal claim when we consider the re- of re-presentation in terms of the structurality of the 'again and again' (Husserl's immer wieder – that which is in play in the possibility of the 'I can do so again'). This is what makes the 'doubling' at work in re-presentation theoretically intelligible.

Iterability speaks of the constitutive tracing of a certain delay and reserve. It is the structural and dynamical parallel to Husserl's movement of retention and protention (and their correlates in secondary remembrance and expectation) as 'altering return' – a re-covering that 'transforms'; an appropriating, which also covers up; 'an unveiling that veils and a veiling that unveils.' The re is an index to a pure tracing of return: returnability.¹⁴

Derrida writes that...

...the appearing and functioning of difference presupposes an originary synthesis not preceded by any absolute simplicity. Such would be the originary trace. Without retention in the minimal unit of temporal experience, without a trace retaining the other as other in the same, no difference would do its work and no meaning would appear. It is not the question of a constituted difference here, but rather, before all determination of the content, of the pure movement which produces difference. The [pure] trace is différance (OG, p.62).
With the thought of 'retention' the truly 'pivotal' function of delay / deferral in repetition begins to make itself felt. The sense of the bending-back-of-a-return is not so much a form of self-differentiation or doubling, as a kind of self-deflection or refraction – a detour, 'which produces difference' in a retention that transforms. Otherness is like the curvature of the same in its delayed return upon itself. In intentional terms, delay is the pivot of a bending that permits difference – temporal difference, duration, interval. Derrida's claim that "without retention...without a trace retaining the other as other in the same, no difference would do its work" amounts to saying that: difference, if it is to function as such, must be able to stand-out as such. Although this is not to say that it requires objectification – as a thing-like 'presence' – difference must, in some sense, still be able to register, and this involves the ability to stand-outside-itself through a structure of repetition. For instance, without such registration the sense of 'substitution' (with all its references to detour and postponement), as one of the key moments associated with the performance of a sign, would be meaningless – it would not 'give' itself. To be out-standing requires a retentional trace that produces such an extension / articulation, inscription / writing.

One of the fundamental differences in standpoint between Gasché and Derrida makes itself clear here. When Gasché speaks of "an originary doubling, which would not be preceded by any unity," he only ever really considers unity in a 'substantive' sense – thus continuing the opposition between syntax and semantics – by claiming that names, identities, simples, units of meaning, states of affairs, etc., are constituted out of the syntactical possibility of differentiation, duplicity, re-presentation, etc. However, this is merely like 'the return of the repressed' – in which the opposite pole is in ascendancy – the syntactical over the semantic. For Derrida, this can only be a preliminary gesture that must surpass the dyad in the form of an inverted sublation. When Derrida writes that..."the appearing and functioning of difference presupposes an originary synthesis not preceded by any absolute simplicity," his analysis is not
situated within such a straightforward constitutional dyad – neither is it operating with the classic bifurcation between identity and difference.

This 'originary synthesis' indicates a different dimension that is situated between the poles of continuity and change. It expresses a thought that borrows from, and further elaborates on, the structure of pure flux in the Husserlian sense: flux is continuous alteration.

24. The Angle of différance and the Repetition of the Always Already

According to Derrida, *différance*, "(is) (simultaneously) spacing (and) temporizing" (*Différance*, *Margins*, p.13). This also applies to the significations, archi-writing and archi-trace. However, this does not mean that *différance* merely functions in a generic sense – as the overarching class or system within which the various infrastructures remain related in an originary state of differentiation (*equi*-primordial and incommensurable). *Différance* signs the point at which their differences are effaced. In this sense, *différance* defers difference.

For Derrida,

*Différance* is to be conceived prior to the separation between deferring as delay and differing as the active work of difference (*SP*, p.88).

Gasché's emphasis on *différance* as a non-unitary matrix appears to set up an opposition to the thought in which it expresses its pure unity as the tracing of both difference
and deferral according to the logic of supplementarity. A non-unitary horizon of equi-
primordialities only expresses the 'and' in its mundane supplemental sense as a
contemporaneous (non-temporal) relation of differentiability, whereas différance, when thought
in its more unitary aspect as the pure deferring / differing unfolding of any possible difference,
expresses the Ineinander of deferral and differentiation in differre where, as we have already
seen, the supplement 'and' also functions as the copula 'is.' The 'is' transforms the 'and' and
vice-versa. Spacing and temporizing are not simply involved in a relation of contemporaneous
differentiality. There is not yet any active difference that divides them when they are thought
according to the standpoint of différance.

It should be remembered that the signification différance does not only function as a
quasi-concept – a radical non-metaphysical replacement for a host of unifying transcendental
principles – since, when it succeeds in these terms, it originally designates an attitude /
strategy, one which remains playful / ironic in relation to itself. As such, it remains, for
precisely 'strategic' reasons, open. When Derrida, in Of Grammatology, writes..."To make
enigmatic what one thinks one understands by the words 'proximity,' 'immediacy,' 'presence'
(the proximate [proche], the own [propre], and the pre- of presence) is my final intention in
this book" (p.70)...he expresses and puts into operation a critical gesture that must repeat itself
indefinitely.

The various critical strategies and orientations that Derrida puts to work (or perhaps we
should say: brings into 'play') are never, at any time, treated as immune to a critical re-reading
in themselves. The effort to "make enigmatic," de-stabilize, render uncertain (and thereby, in a
sense, to restore a certain wonder) also characterizes deconstruction's relation to itself. The
movement 'interrupts' the desire for continuity and upsets the balance of the operative language
that is criticized at the very moment it is put into use. Derrida certainly succeeds in his
"intention" (interesting how this word resists complete neutralization despite the care with
which he subjects it to a kind of parenthetical suspension), but not without also failing, at
certain critical points, to adequately express the subtleties and complexities of Husserl's own
phenomenological critique of these significations.

This absence opened the space of our present discussion, in that it is a lack that is
deeply sedimented within the deconstructive milieu and which continues to operate invisibly /
unreflectively in the reading (as distinct from re-reading as we have defined it) and writing
(practice) of deconstruction. It marks a non-evolving duplication of Derrida's own readings
that treats them as if they were exhaustive and, in some sense, canonical. Perhaps we might
call this 'the problem of the supplement' in that here each further reading of the Derridian text
becomes a supplement to a supplement. But, this is to speak of the supplement in the mundane
sense – which merely continues one kind of reading (adds to it) rather than another. It
represents a continuation of Derrida's 'strong' reading of Husserl that closes itself off from
interruption, i.e., the possibility of a Husserlian re-reading of Derrida's reading of Husserl.
Does not Derrida himself encourage such a re-reading? Deconstruction is a kind of preface-
writing that demands a re-oriented return to the original texts – to re-read these texts, not to
bypass them. Once again, as Derrida tells us "...above all it is necessary to reread those in
whose wake I write" (Positions, p.4).

What we have unearthed here is a further, more radical, supplementary reading /
orientation that has a certain transformative power. We have unfolded a supplementary-
alteration in attitude which, in line with the radical sense of supplementarity in Derridian
thought, has steered between the idea of the supplement in the mundane sense of addition and
the sense in which it is nothing more than a mere distortion – of the type that often creeps in
through a chain of poor readings (e.g., as in a game of Chinese Whispers where after a
protracted sequence of repetitions the original message has changed due to phonetic and
intentional discrepancies that occurred during the moments of exchange). It is not so much a question of a difference in content here as an alteration in style and tone.

In style, Gasché treats *différance* (as we have seen) primarily in terms of a radical non-metaphysical 'replacement' for a metaphysical structural origin. He presupposes, but underplays, the sense of *différance* as a radical critical *strategy*, which institutes itself in the understanding that it must perpetually remain a *problem* to itself. The movement maintains a degree of suspicion in regard to itself for reasons of principle. Its efficacy as a *stratagem* depends on its ability to *unsettle* the relation between reader and text. Gasché's project does have the virtue of de-mystifying many key themes in deconstruction, thus providing a more comfortable basis for a relationship between the Derridian text and the uninitiated (or philosophically unconvinced), but this carries a price. It conceals the intrinsic discomfort that gives the quasi-concept *différance* its power as a critical device.

Gashché's analyses are focused, from a Saussurean structural-linguistic point of view, on how identity emerges through a matrix of differences – that the very structure or essence of a sign lies in its movement of differentiation and duplication – that all signification (and ultimately presence) involves duplicity. Thus, he overemphasizes the functional value of differences, différënds, etc., in the production of individuated meanings. However, this orientation, as we have seen, is still caught up within a rigid 'structural' relation analogous to that which obtains between *langue* and *parole* or synchrony and diachrony in Saussurean linguistics. Unfortunately, it tends to obscure the more profound (meta-structural and meta-genetic) sense of the archi-writing or archi-tracing of *différance*. Iterability 'as the possibility of repetition,' which is the hinge of the *Ineinander* of differing and deferring as *spacing* and *temporalizing*, indicates an 'originary synthesis' (the sense of synthesis being stretched to its utmost limits) that permits differences to do their work. Therefore, unity, in this context, is not a reference to a 'substantive' (homogeneous) primordiality, but a pure tracing of similarity in
difference and difference in similarity. What we have, then, is an extending or spacing that is irreducible to traditional structuralist discourse on doubles, differences, différends, etc. Such tracing is an extending as archi-writing – the writing out of difference and delay (continuity and disruption), spatial and temporal extension; duration, which we may also understand in the form of the intentional (and / is) dialectical 'extending' of the Living Present. This is a horizontal opening of presence; presencing as an unfolding or stretching-out of identity in difference and difference in identity.

The deconstructive turn, or re-turn, to the 'question of reflection,' takes the structure of its own movement of return into account and announces a possibility that is absolutely essential to the performance of reflection itself in general. A 'critical return' is one that gets closest to the matter, so to speak, since it articulates, by the character of its own movement, what is essential to return as return in general: a certain movement of delay, detour, reserve.

The Tain of the Mirror sets itself up as a critique of the language of reflection, but its radicality and effectiveness as critique is diminished by an apparent lack in its appreciation of the profundity and radicality of Husserl's intentional analyses on reflexivity. This is quite apart from missing the descriptive and theoretical power of his phenomenology and its influence on Derrida's development of the thought of the trace. The sophistication of Husserl's treatment of the question of reflection and the sheer multiplicity of different types / modes of reflexivity illuminated in his research on temporality tend to be left out of Gasché's theorizing. They remain shut out from an historical account of the philosophy of reflection whose reductive limits cannot actually accommodate the richness of the language of phenomenology.

Our analyses, which have brought out the crucial importance of the themes of return and delay for such a project, have endeavoured, in a certain sense, to remain more faithful to Gasché's original critical aims. His campaign over the question of duplicity is structurally dependent upon the logic of the non-origin of the re-mark (doubling, supplementarity,
difference, etc., which concerns the 'open' referentiality of the sign, thus problematizing discourse on original and copy). However, the temporal resonances of the meaning of origin (and its absence) get lost somewhere. This is why the level designated by the non-temporal limitation of Gaschê's orientation is only representative of a provisional step for Derrida, for whom this is primarily a strategic detour. His orientation ultimately turns to the non-origin of re-marking itself (the passivity in its activity); the tracing of a reflexive 'bending back of a return,' the articulated / articulating hinge that produces differences or doubles. It is this subtle shift, which (it may be added) is distinctly phenomenological in style, that literally makes all the difference[s].

If we return to the earlier diagram of intentional consciousness, it is easy to see that Derrida – through the concepts of the hinge, iterability, delay, and detour – has focused on the very structurality of the opening and closing of intentional reflexivity. This 'pivot' of intentionality, this condition of its possibility, can be expressed as the angle of deflection that permits differences to play – a play that is irreducible to a mere doubling since it more originally opens its space.

Fig.2. La Brisure / The Hinge

It is misleading to speak of the equi-primordiality of duplicity and iterability since the latter, especially when understood in terms of its theoretical / conceptual links with Husserl's
phenomenological (intentional) investigations on primordial temporalization as flux, is the tracing out of the possibility of all differences. In contradistinction to Gasché's standpoint, it is not at all clear that iterability and duplication (doubling) can be treated as equi-primordial significations. To automatically treat them as such not only indicates a low degree of critical vigilance (and lack of reserve in the face of an admittedly seductive, though ultimately unhelpful, designation of temporally uncomplicated co-implication / contemporaneity), but it can also seriously hamper our understanding of différance as temporizing / temporalizing and precisely why it shakes the basis of the issue of origins and ends.

Gasché writes,

An original division of the reflected must double the dual relation between the double and the original if the original is to lend itself to duplication at all. The originary duplication eliminates the possibility of establishing a last source, origin, and original, installing instead an infinite reference between originals and doubles. The dual relation of the simple, and the secondary, of the original and the double, becomes derivative of this structure of dividing reference, or infinite duplicity (TM, p.226).

This passage speaks of an originary doubling of that which 'appears' (appearance in the widest of its applications, e.g., sign, image, the reflected, etc.), thus re-situating the language of origins as far as traditional discourse on the horizontal relation between originals and copies (doubles) is concerned. It brings out a sense in which any identity or simple "...must inscribe the possibility of being divided within itself" (TM, p.226). For Gasché, this divisive movement, this duplicity "...logically precedes the philosophical opposition of the simple and the derivative double" (Ibid), but we must equally consider what is at stake when Derrida seemingly embraces paradox by speaking of différance as the trace of an originary non-origin
in itself. We may call this the trace or tracing of the verticality of doubling. Here, the very tracing of differentiation and doubling that produces structure and meaning also does not have an origin. The shift in orientation to the thought of an original "structure of dividing reference, or infinite duplicity" that sets up "infinite reference between originals and doubles" (Ibid) is one thing, but the consideration of the vertical infinity of referentiality itself, as the expression of a passivity in relation to an absolute past (pastness) in which it has always-already been in opening and closing, is another.

It is the articulation of the passive aspect of the ance of différance that finds itself interminably delayed in the dynamic orientation of Gascrh's analyses. In those studies, the logic of duplicity is generally founded upon its gerundial form (doubling), which exhibits a bias that can easily lead to the thought of an originary 'activity' that produces the structural conditions for what we might, but only at a higher level, call passivity. However, there is a passivity intrinsic to the trace itself, which is the articulation of the 'absolute pastness' of différance. Such passivity is not an after-effect of its activity. It is not a mere echo, retention, or reverberation of a 'more original activity.' Différance 'produces' only in that its own erasure marks out the passivity of a pastness that always already inhabits its activity.

The central issue is surely not the question of 'doubling' (which is one effect of the spacing-out of an extended / extending or temporalizing-spacing), but the question of temporality itself as both constituted and constituting (temporalized / temporalizing). When thought in terms of the opening up of space through the possibility of its return upon itself, temporality expresses the structurality – articulated / articulating play – of 'iterability.' As the pure structurality of repetition, iterability is literally the hinge that opens and closes difference (permitting it to re-turn and re-mark upon itself) thus originally articulating the space of doubling. In contradistinction to the main thrust of what we have called Gascrh's 'equi-primordiality thesis,' we must not ignore that the logics of a general theory of 'doubling' must,
from the standpoint of \textit{différance}, account for the fact that doubling is such that it already presupposes (in a more primordial way) the possibility of repetition (iterability / repeatability). It must, in principle, have \textit{always already} recurred. This is essential to its structure.

There never was any (\textit{original}) difference or repetition.
25. The Structure of a Double Ruse

It has been indicated that the preceding analyses of the relations between phenomenology and deconstruction and the emergence of the theme of différance have endeavoured to remain faithful to Gasché’s original critical aims. This has involved a rather convoluted and labyrinthine form of re-reading. With respect to the discourse on the in-difference of the infrastructures of différance, it must be stressed that this text does not commit itself to adhering to one position (in-difference) or to its opposite (heterogeneity). The theme of Ineinander or chiasm (the flesh) that has insinuated itself throughout this study refers us to a form of 'infrastructural intertwining' that originally permits such differences to stand-out within a horizon of belonging. This is a kind of middle-ground. It does not, by any means, do away with difference, but it does radically tip the balance away from heterogeneity of a Gaschén order.

The Tain of the Mirror’s thesis on infrastructural 'heterogeneity' is caught up within the specific limits of Derrida's discourse on the polysemic excess of différance. However, these limits only have a provisional function in his writing, since his texts are also concerned with the horizon of différance that is originally constitutive of such semic differences. Although Gasché is concerned to draw out this deeper asemic dimension, he delimits the latter by
retaining the irreducible differences that are only really appropriate at a semantic level. Given
the context of his discourse, he is clearly confusing different dimensions.

When speaking of the 'indifferentiation' between temporalizing and spacing, one must
of course take great care – e.g., from a 'functional' point of view, the constitution of a state of
affairs may involve a number of different functions to occur simultaneously, but this does not
annul their differences. One could say that, in a limited sense, there is no temporalizing
without spacing and vice-versa (e.g., at a more mundane level, there is no thunder without
lightning), but this displaces the thought of radical heterogeneity.

To maintain that temporalizing 'is' spacing, in that sense in which the copula 'is' also
functions as the supplement 'and', must include some sort of difference, but what kind? We
have spoken of indifference with regard to temporalizing and spacing, which is in stark
contrast to Gasché's viewpoint. However, it is also important to readjust the orientation in
order to take difference into account, but without being seduced into using the language of
'heterogeneities.' The point is that we do not simply substitute indifference for heterogeneity.
The emphasis has been placed on a certain movement towards indifference; a 'movement' of
de-differentiation that does not actually 'terminate' in non-difference. Principally, this
represents a 'strategic' aim. One can just as easily show that différance expresses a kind of
indifference with respect to its infrastructural horizon.

It is almost as if Gaschê's conception of the relations between infrastructures is caught
up in an antiquated concept of the 'boundary' (Grenze), which is usually expressed in terms of
an unspecified gap / difference between two distinct horizons or poles – the boundary as
signified by 'two adjacent points.' Husserl, following Brentano's definition of the boundary,
withdraws from this view. The boundary between spacing and temporalizing is not some kind
of magnitude, but the site of pure 'transition.' It is not something to be crossed, for it is,
already, a pure 'crossing-over.' This brings us to the thought of giving, extending, blending, intertwining, etc.

Gasché is quite clear that the heterogeneous infrastructures are 'tied together' (TM. p.225), but his text says little about what actually provides the thread that binds them. It has been shown how we may relate Gasché's particular theme of heterogeneity (designated by the neologism *différance*) to a pluri-dimensionality (a community of differences) that also takes the sense of unity into account – which Gasché's thesis already presupposes, but cannot explain – by taking a detour through the work of Merleau-Ponty and the concept of 'chiasm' or 'Ineinander.' This detour raises the thought of the 'helix.' Derrida makes much of this form in his *Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry."* What is relevant here is that aspect of helical form that is tied to invagination – a folding-unfolding.

In these terms, we need not relate the theme of the 'multiplicity' of *différance* to a matrix of 'heterogeneous' infrastructures, but to an infrastructural intertwining / intra-communality that returns upon itself *différantly*. As Merleau-Ponty would say (in a slightly different context), each moment offers itself up as flesh to flesh. Each moment is not a distinct entity, but only a distinct fold in the same flesh. The flesh is the spacing of the between. This does not radically alter the thought of the movement toward *in*-difference when we speak of temporalizing and spacing because the originary fold of the unfolding of differences is indifferent to them. This thought works with respect to the *intra*-communality of *différance* and disrupts the idea of an *inter*-communality of principally heterogeneous infrastructures.

Therefore, the concept of 'Ineinander' does not nullify difference with respect to – or from the standpoint of – the horizon of *différance* (as the latter names an 'ideal' limit). We merely withdraw from the thought of radical heterogeneity. The question of the differences between the infrastructures is resituated and not eradicated. This is the effect of a vertical analysis rather than that of a horizontal order – but then this is the site of the restoration of a
certain 'balance.' Gasché's text does not necessarily occupy a position that is diametrically opposed to this thesis. These two texts can be bound together according to the logic of a certain complementarity. One of the primary orientations of our analyses can be seen as a careful Derridian response to Gasché – a style of re-reading that takes the form of a deconstruction of the manner in which he has appropriated a number of the central motifs of deconstruction. Gasché's reading had to be re-read with a certain critical reserve and, at the same time, his text had to be invited to dance at the very limits of exhaustion.

Although strategically understated, we do not at any time question the scholarly devotion to Derrida's writing and the inspired development of Derridian themes in Gasché's book. However, it has been necessary to question some of the stronger claims made by The Tain of the Mirror regarding the nature of Derrida's relation to Husserl – especially the degree to which deconstruction is said to transgress the limits of phenomenology through some archetypal orientation expressed in terms of an overarching theory of duplicity. What about a 'general theory of delay? ' It would be difficult to employ the language of equi-primordiality within the horizon of such a theme. The language of doubling itself would also be deferred – interminably. The study of the constitutive logics of such a language would demand this, for the double and the difference reflected still implies the language of visibility to some extent, whereas 'delay' is never actually present. Deferral only leaves traces of itself through the differences that it produces.

Our inquiries have directed themselves to the task of unearthing the temporalizing dynamics and structures that are presupposed by Gasché's discourse on doubling, but which are not rigorously examined or thematized in his study. The principal thesis of The Tain of the Mirror has not so much been turned on its head as shaken at its foundations and turned inside-out in order to redress a balance that is lacking in its account.
Gasché is sincere in his undertaking to articulate a general theory of duplicity according to rigorous principles. However, alongside (doubling) our determination to remain faithful to his original aims, it has also been necessary for the present analysis to institute a certain degree of double-dealing (strategic duplicity) in its engagement with the pivotal concept of *The Tain of the Mirror*.

Phenomenologically, it would be all too easy to apply a sympathetic reading to Gasché's writing on doubling and to bend or twist his expressions to fit almost anything. This has been avoided for purely *strategic* reasons. It is just as easy to twist them out of shape. In this sense, we are guilty of having applied the same methods as Derrida in his 'strong' reading of Husserl. The irony is fascinating and disturbing. In both cases, the deconstructive critique turns toward, and upon, the greatest of allies.

The relevance of this strategic route has to do with the need to unravel the labyrinth of strategies in play in Derrida's own texts.

One could argue that we arrive at a certain impasse when we admit that there is indeed an element of duplicity in the structural performance of retention, i.e., the double intentionality of retention. There are strong elements of doubling involved, but only within certain limits – parameters that we have adumbrated in regard to their formal development in Derrida's studies on Husserl's lectures on temporality. Unearthing this historico-philosophical trace has ultimately served to flesh-out the 'depths' of doubling.

A 'general theory' of doubling has significant value as a tool for understanding the 'linguistic' orientation of certain Derridian texts (which is one of the reasons why Gasché's book is so important), but the generality of its application does not stretch as far as to cover the specific theoretical traces at work in Derrida's engagement with Husserl on the questions of time, intentionality, reflexivity, and the sign. There are other writings by Derrida that 'qualify' his ideas from a temporal point of view and, just as importantly, there are other forms of re-
reading that encourage the subtle resonances of their phenomenological significance to stand out. Our form of re-reading has focused on the 'other' writing. This 'other' writing is also 'other' to the contemporary Derridian text. The 'history' of his writing is the marking out of changes in orientation and strategy. This history (I speak of Geschicht and not just Historie) is like a 'community' of Derridas.

The Derrida (or we might playfully suggest Derrida[s]) of the period 1962-68 who works through the constitutive logics that are at the heart of discourse on doubling is earlier and quite other to the writer who occupies central position in Gasché's book. These two Derridas were invited to enter into discourse with one another. Thus, Gasché's text is presented here on the basis of a ruse (this is one of the duplicitous aspects of our critique of duplicity). The empirical and authorial difference that is represented by the insertion of his writing into this history has a strong metaphorical value. One of its principal functions is to focus the reader's attention on the alterity that already inhabits Derrida's own writing. It is a double-ruse in that our 'strong' reading of Gasché's book mirrors Derrida's 'strong' reading of Husserl – and, as such, it also translates as a 'strong' Derridian reading of Derrida.

...And what is the philosophical value of this 'strong' reading? The reader may spiral back to the Preface and Introduction of this study to re-view the question.

Several references have been made to a distinction between Derrida and Gasché's Derrida. At first sight, this appears to be a legitimate distinction that calls for attention. However, it also proved to be highly problematic from the outset. To ask: “who is the 'true' Derrida?” is rather like asking whether it is possible to step into the same piece of water twice. The only really appropriate response would be to say that, in this case, one can not even step into the same piece of water once. ‘Derrida’ is elusive. Perhaps this creature is nothing more
than a chimera (a ghost in the textual machine) for he always resists capture — as he unbuilds and re-constructs in a multiplicity of changing styles within a textual maze that does not refer back to any centre that can be pinned down. In an important sense, our engagement with Gasché is to actually encounter Derrida. This is why we have strategically bracketed the excesses of ‘our’ Derridian discourse on phenomenology by allowing them to remain in place in Gasché’s Derrida.

To bring out what is highly questionable in Gasché’s text, regarding some of the central claims of deconstruction, is not to set ‘the’ (or ‘my’) Derrida in opposition to his, but to establish a dialogue between Derrida and Derrida and Derrida...

Derrida himself has set the precedent, for this is what he is doing when he engages with Husserl (particularly in *Speech and Phenomena* – remembering the strange tension that exists between this text and the earlier *Introduction to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*). Husserl is invited to enter into discourse with Husserl.

The ‘tone’ of this present study, with respect to its treatment of Gasché, is ‘strong’ purely from a strategic and methodological point of view. The principal value for such a reading has to do with the way in which it mirrors / doubles Derrida's 'strong' reading of Husserl. It thus provides a radical opening for a careful re-reading of the space / spacing between phenomenology and deconstruction. It is this spacing-between – as articulated through the medium of Gasché’s text – that has been at the focus of this critique; a medium, a tone, a contextual grid that needed to be unravelled. Gasché's text has been a necessary detour, an oblique form of return to Derrida.²

It is difficult to express the subtlety of Derrida's treatment of Husserl by just talking 'about' the structures of his analyses, as most commentators have done (including Evans, Gasché and Wood). These structures have to speak-out by a process of a certain 'doing.' By 'strategically' appealing to Derrida's early studies on phenomenology, as the foundation of later
developments in his writing (a kind of genealogy of deconstructive technique), we have put into performance an analogue to one of the provisional working strategies of Derrida's *Speech and Phenomena* in its engagement with Husserl's enterprise. The emphasis here lies with its 'provisional' character because, of course, Derrida's approach is not limited to a linear architecture – but then, neither is Husserl's phenomenology (although Derrida's reading, in *Speech and Phenomena*, sometimes tends toward another view). There are other temporalities that need to be fleshed out.³

It is only in a superficial sense that this thesis appears to be a historiological analysis. If the discourse has travelled the route of *Historie*, it has only been to disentangle a certain linear paradigm – a necessary detour for a reading that is ultimately interested in the pluri-dimensional and non-linear horizons of *Geschichte as Geschichtlichkeit*. However, at the same time, we have also seen that we cannot do away with the language of linearity completely. It is re-situated with respect to the metaphysical primacy that has always been attached to it.

Herein lies the value of Husserl’s research on time-consciousness and its significance for Derrida’s writing. The temporal analyses are inaugurated in order to describe how linearity itself is constituted.

The space of mediation that Gasché's text provides in this study gives us (as indicated above) a kind of refracted view of the way in which Derrida's own texts are always in dialogue with themselves. Our aim has been to bring out the complicity between time and alterity in Derrida's writing by example. Gasché's text facilitates this form of engagement because of the seriousness with which it explores the 'philosophical' (rather than just the literary) tone of Derrida's deconstruction[s]. It is very close to that which courses its way through Derrida's early writing on *différance* (as a quasi-concept and strategy that is aimed at the deconstruction of phenomenological discourse on presence). We say very close, but not coincidental. Once again, it also speaks of a period that is slightly later, for the tone suggests that the delimitation
of the phenomenological project, as the mere restoration of the metaphysics of presence, is an enterprise that has somehow been exhausted. It expresses a confidence in the readings that have preceded and conditioned this confidence. This is a singularly linear orientation that is in need of critique precisely because it fails to address itself critically.

In the publication of Derrida's MA dissertation on Husserl and the problem of genesis (1990, but written 1953-4) we find a recently composed Foreword in which he, once again, expresses the problem of hearing-oneself-speak. After so many years since writing the dissertation, this is hardly surprising. The interval that marks the difference between the writing of the Foreword and the earlier text – to which it attaches itself – represents a massive lacuna at the heart of the book's self-relation. The theme is re-iterated as the announcement of a problem, one which echoes itself with an intensity that must force us to take up this issue in reference to the structure and strategy of Derrida's readings of the philosophy of the West and, in particular, his readings of Husserl's phenomenology. The contemporary Derrida is, perhaps, no more intimate with the Derrida[s] of the fifties and sixties than with the Derrida whose voice resounds through Gasché's book.

26. A Strategy of Indifference

There are some moments in this text that present the reader with a radical departure from certain accepted canons of thought regarding Derrida's writing. Our discourse on the movement of de-differentiation or in-differentiation of différance may seem a little surprising, but this particular point of view (and strategy for re-reading Derrida) has certain advantages
that have become evident throughout the unfolding of the examination. The stratagem does seem somewhat perverse given that Derrida is, in many ways, the champion of difference, but the basic logic has to do with a generally unthematized structural aspect of Derrida's meta-
general orientation in his re-readings of the philosophy of the West. It marks a perspective that tends toward the reduction of this history to the desire for pure, unmediated presence – a history that is said to have forgotten the value of difference and absence. Interestingly enough, Derrida shows this indifference to difference through a de-differentiation or reduction of the complex and richly diverse moments of the history of the Occident to one continuous thread (a reduction to linearity). There is a sense in which these moments or threads are also de-historicized – where one epoch can be exchanged for another, or can be juxtaposed on the basis of the logic in which they can be said to be mere repetitions and systematizations of a more general motivation and orientation of which they are visible traces. This echoes Freudian discourse on the unconscious and the kind of symbolic compression that occurs through repression and the constitution of neuroses – where anything can stand for anything else.4

This is not to suggest that deconstruction is a neurotic enterprise – although one could certainly have fun with such an analogue – but it is worthy of note that there is a similar movement of repression, disavowal and de-differentiation. Actually, the analogue can be further extended by remarking that unlike psychosis, which would involve stepping over the line – into a beyond of philosophy – the deconstructive neurosis tends toward pushing the line outwards. Deconstruction may be a little eccentric (outside the centre of logocentrism) in its re-readings of the philosophy of the Occident, but it is definitely not crazy.

There are other senses of indifferentiation or de-differentiation that have been unearthed – not least of which have to do with the deconstruction of the traditional differences that have always separated time and space in philosophical and scientific discourse. The route to this de-differentiation is to be found in the way in which Derrida has responded to one of the
most profound and disturbing aspects of Husserl's method of reduction (epoché) – namely, the fact that the limits placed on the power of the reduction are not in any way 'essential.' Husserl recognised the essential openness of the epoché and placed strategic limits on its application. However, he also called for a “…phenomenology of the phenomenological reduction” (Crisis, Part III B, §71, p.247) – which means, in practice, a reduction of the reduction – a task that Derrida appears to have taken up. Since there is no limit to what can be bracketed, that which can be consigned to parenthetical suspension is subjected to a certain process of in-differentiation. This is so not only with respect to the other bracketed matter, but also (and perhaps most importantly) with respect to the attitude of the one doing the bracketing. For instance, we are familiar with that aspect of deconstruction where it comports itself on the basis that it is indifferent regarding the 'values' of its textual other. Primarily, this means that it refuses to take up a position. This is an attitude that can best be described as the _u_-topic (non-located / non-lieu) orientation of deconstructive writing. Such in-difference is not simply one strategy among others; it is a strategy for re-reading différantly. It is an epoché of the epoché and, as such, it requires further analysis. This is to respond to what its movement already requires of itself.

Although Derrida's writing has restored certain rights to difference, he has not rid his own discourse and methodology of a certain movement of indifferentiation that has actually helped to facilitate the restoration. In this instance, such indifference has also been the opening up of difference. Derrida's playful use of the compression of meaning that ties difference and deferral together in the French verb différer and the Latin expression _differre_ (from which it is derived) is an outstanding example of a movement toward indifference. It permits a discourse that does not restrict itself to the difference that has classically separated space and time. Consider also, the compression at work in Derrida's association of Anwesenheit and Gegenwart in relation to Being, when he deviates from Heidegger's meaning by reducing these
significations to traces of a history that has always thought of them in terms of immediate presence in a point-like present. This is the conceptual grid that he grafts, most inappropriately, onto Husserl's discourse on temporalization – a discourse whose primary concern is with the question of how differences are constituted as the condition of the possibility of the temporal extension of consciousness and the consciousness of temporal extension. This is the horizon (and not the point) of the Living Present – the stage upon which differences play.

Husserl's analyses on the question of temporal continuity were not in any way conducted at the expense of the issue of difference. Alterity is by no means relegated to a merely secondary role. Temporalizing consciousness is a differentiating and deferring consciousness. It is the consciousness of the differences that constitute the extendedness of experience. The primary theme is the question of how there is consciousness of duration as 'continuous alteration.'

Similarly, Derrida has not shown that Husserl's phenomenology understates the constitutive role of absence in the presencing of presence. Phenomenologically speaking, presence is not synonymous with visibility. According to Derrida's viewpoint, invisibility or absence, when expressed according to the Western metaphysical 'language of presence,' is only thought in a privative sense – as a mere negation of presence. He restores certain rights to absence in their own terms but, contrary to the 'strong' thrust of his writing, he has not shown that these rights were ever at risk in the phenomenological horizon.

Derrida's texts constantly dig up evidence in Husserl's work that tends to undermine his own 'strong' thesis against the limits of phenomenology, e.g., Husserl's discourse on the 'Idea in the Kantian sense,' which always recedes beyond the grasp of any finite articulation; the Thing of experience as an empty pole, a mere X of a play of changing adumbrations; the empty intention or the protention that intends the future as an empty extension; and the epoché, as a
radical movement of delay and transformational return, which undermines positional
totalization or metaphysical grounding.

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology has extended and deepened some of these Husserlian
themes. Their respective forms of phenomenological discourse on absence upset the specific
hierarchical structure of the language of presence that Derrida’s writing wields like the sword
of Damocles (occasionally bashing phenomenology over the head with it). Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology of the invisible names that which is always the horizon of the possibility of
the visible. Invisibility is not merely an after-effect of presence, the negation of presence or the
non-fulfilment of an anticipated presence. A certain occultation is always contemporaneous
with that which comes to presence as the horizon of its possibility, because non-presence is
always already the other face of presence and the betweenness of presencing. Like the spacing-
between things, the invisible flesh through which they are intertwined is that which originally
permits them to stand-out as differentiated folds of the same flesh. In temporal terms,
according to the logic of chiasm, this horizon does not merely lie behind us; it is also that
which constitutes the fabric of the futural field ahead of us. Without this folding-unfolding,
which is not present in itself, but is like the wave of the foam of presence, there would not be a
horizon of presence at all.

Derrida has little to say about Merleau-Ponty, which is odd. This represents a rather
glaring absence in his writing, which is certainly worth pointing out even though we cannot
pursue the issue here.

There are numerous examples of other phenomenological forms of approach to
absence, difference and nothingness that do not treat them as if they were merely secondary to
presence. Sartre's writing stands out in this respect. There are also many examples in
Heidegger’s work, e.g., his definition of that aspect of the phenomenon which involves a
certain withholding of itself (Being and Time), the essential emptiness or nothing that makes
up the receptacle ("The Thing," *Poetry, Language, Thought*), the fourth dimension of time or the 'It' of 'It gives' ([*es gibt*] – “Time and Being”) where the first is a giving that is not a presence but that which makes the extending of presence possible, and the second holds back in favour of that which may come into presence through the grace of its withdrawal.

It has been one of the primary aims of this study to show how Husserl uncovered a language and critical orientation that demonstrate the possibility and urgency of a discourse that takes absence into account in the constitution of presence. It has also been our task to demonstrate that his phenomenology, when understood on the basis of its motivation and the manner in which it unfolds through the method of *epoché*, is a radical critique of the very language of presence that Derrida accuses him of sustaining.

As for the meaning of the present as Gegenwart, we have seen how Husserl's discourse on time consciousness does not treat it as a point-like now (as Derrida's *Speech and Phenomena* likes to claim from time to time – but only according to one type of reading). For Husserl, the present is always a 'field' – *a waiting towards (lebendige Gegenwart)*. It is always stretched – an extended-extending. The movement of primordial temporalization, as explored by phenomenology, names a form of play that is always already at the heart of the present and presence. This 'always-already' is that for which the trace is another name – while archi-writing is another name for the *structure of the trace*.

Derrida has experimented with forms of discourse that express a sense of pastness that is not preceded by an originary present. His texts also consider the theme of futurity in a way that does not restrict it to the thought of a mere future-present. It is maintained that such restriction is the mark of the limitation of the language of time itself, which, as far as Derrida is concerned, can never be more than a metaphysical concept – and that it "...cannot adequately describe the structure of the trace" (*OG*, p.67). It is precisely along these lines that he speaks of an incompatibility between retention and trace. However, retention is not reducible to the
production of a line of modified present-tenses. Although Derrida is quick to criticize retention in these terms, he actually employs the more sophisticated Husserlian meaning of such retaining and repetition, in reference to *différance*, in order to express what is at stake in the heart of the presencing of the present (and thus, any kind of presence). This permits him to raise the theme of the trace as the name of an urgent task, in its own right. It is through the question of the structure of retention that such a task becomes intelligible.

It would only be true to say that retention alone is insufficient in describing the structure of the trace. However, when it is thought in terms of the double intentionality of retention and its intrinsic intertwining with protention, then the alleged incompatibility dissolves: for the trace is also a tracing – and it has always already been so, thus confounding the logic of origins and ends. The trace does not merely lie behind presence and the present, it also lies ahead. It is before in that dual sense in which it is also after.

If we are to speak about what is at issue in the possibility "...that a postmetaphysical account of temporality can rise again after Derrida" (Wood. *The Deconstruction of Time*, p.113 [my emphasis]), then surely we must turn, with care, to that which already lies before Derrida.

Deconstruction is precisely the re-tracing of such non-linear, pluri-dimensional forms of reading / writing – inviting us to re-read those in whose wake Derrida writes.
NOTES

NOTES: Preface


   There is a very accessible collection of Brentano's proto-phenomenological studies, entitled: *Space, Time, and the Continuum*, which brings together a range of transformations in his thought that exceed the limitations placed on his discourse on time in the critical analyses of Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* (see bibliography).

2. Although the now is the 'between' of past and future as the fold of their negotiation, the between about which we speak makes reference to much more than this. There is a deeper sense of betweenness that is the flesh of the three ekstases through which they are originarily intertwined – through which they are always already unfolding into one another.

3. Heidegger writes,

   Time-space...is the name for the openness which opens up in the mutual self-extending of futural approach, past and present. This openness exclusively and primarily provides
the space in which space as we usually know it can unfold. The self-extending, the opening up, of future, past and present (On Time and Being [OTB] p.14).

This 'opening up' is that which also provides time 'as we usually know it.' The sense of extending here, as a 'prespatial' opening which makes room for space, can be traced back to 1927 and Heidegger's account of the meaning of extension and continuity (in terms of their relation to motion) in Aristotle's Physics. Extension is irreducible to spatiality in the usual sense.

Extension and continuity are already implicit in motion. They are earlier than motion in the sense of being apriori conditions of motion itself... Extension here has a broader sense than specifically spatial dimension. Motion follows continuity, and continuity follows extendedness (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. [BPP] p.243).

In Husserlian terms, the threefold is given through retention, primal impression, and protention – whose correlates in the early language of Heidegger are retaining, enpresentation, and expecting. The transcendental sense of Temporalität (as expressed by Heidegger) names the standpoint which focuses on the 'interplay' of the three ekstases; the giving that is constitutive of the horizon of Zeitlichkeit in which things abide in a 'present' which, by being already outside itself (spanned) has its flowing continuity. The 'now' is founded through this flux (and in a peculiar sense the contemporaneity) of the three horizons of Temporality – the 'giving' of each to each in their communality of differentiation.

Heidegger tells us that...
...the unity of time's three dimensions consists in the interplay of each toward each. This interplay proves to be the true extending, playing in the very heart of time, the fourth dimension, so to speak – not only so to speak, but in the nature of the matter (OTB, p.15).

This play or interplay is not an aftereffect. The extending of the ekstases toward one another is that which originally constitutes time as a stretching-out of past, present and future. This is the fourth dimension of time, which Heidegger calls 'true time' – yet it lacks any resemblance to time as we usually know it. It is not 'in' time as some kind of process that has duration. It is not of the order of successivity. This is also the case for Merleau-Ponty's discourse on time as chiasm. As radical as these orientations appear, their ideas constitute a deepening of a dimension uncovered in Husserl's thought on time as 'Primordial or Absolute Flux.' The principal theme is intra-play.

In every case, the traditional disjunction between time and space has been problematized. Temporalizing and spatializing cannot be articulated adequately within the bounds of the classic dyad. This century has distinguished itself in the deconstruction of the differences that have traditionally separated discourse on time from that of a spatial order. For example, the conceptual framework of Einstein's theory of relativity is such that space and time should be treated as one word: spacetime.
NOTES: Introduction

1. Gasché's text plays a significant role in this thesis for a number of ‘strategic’ reasons. See Part One.

2. For a comprehensive list of combatants, see Evans's Introduction and Conclusion to Strategies of Deconstruction: Derrida and the Myth of the Voice [SD].

3. Evans considers this question in the Introduction when he writes,

...it could be argued that the very idea of a critical reading is committed to ideals of truth and epistemic accountability that are deconstructed by the texts under consideration. We seem to be caught in a dilemma: either we move within the medium of Derridian writing, in which case we cannot raise the traditional questions of justification and legitimation, or we don't move within that medium, in which case our traditional questions will a priori receive a negative answer, while the Derridian will reject or deconstruct the very questions themselves. In either case, a critic may well accuse us of being philosophically naive.

But it is less clear that the project of a critical reading of Derrida is not to measure his work against some external, traditional standard that is rejected by the texts under consideration. The task is rather to measure his work against standard that it claims for itself (SD. p.XV).

In the Conclusion of Strategies of Deconstruction, Evans writes that "The present book responds to Derrida's own call for a 'strong' reading of his texts" (p.167). And, he insists that
"The results of this critical reading are discouraging: the texts we have examined overwhelmingly fail to live up to their own standards" (Ibid).

4. In the quotation below, Evans raises an important distinction that must be taken into account.

   I certainly grant that every reading is a performance or transformation (a 'writing,' if you will), but not every performance succeeds in being a reading. What one is left with in Speech and Phenomena...is a performance that, instead of reading the texts ostensibly under discussion, enframes them as raw material for a writing that, for whatever reasons, ultimately exhibits no interest in those texts themselves (Ibid. p.178).


   Note: This latter title will generally appear in the present thesis as Derrida's Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry." For details concerning its publication, please refer to the bibliography.

6. A comparative study of "Ousia and Grammé" (Margins of Philosophy [Margins]) and Heidegger's Basic Problems of Phenomenology – with "Time and Being" (On Time and Being [OTB]) in mind throughout – provides a fertile ground on which to examine some of the fundamental differences between Heidegger's treatment of Aristotle's thesis on time and that of Derrida. We cannot pursue this task here. Although they both reject the idea of the now as a point (and time, in general, as a linear succession of nows), Heidegger discovers the basis for
such a rejection way back in antiquity. This tends to problematize Derrida's specific characterization of the history of Western metaphysics discussed so far. Derrida does acknowledge (on p.59 of "Ousia and Grammé," [Margins]), to a certain extent, that there is evidence in Aristotle's account of the now (nun) which does not restrict it to a point-like moment, but he surely understates its significance given the pivotal role that this theme plays in his earlier critique of Husserl's discourse on time.

7. David Wood's fascinating book, The Deconstruction of Time occupies a kind of middle position that is closest to my own orientation (my association with Professor Wood during the time that he was my personal supervisor of postgraduate study at Warwick University may have more than a little to do with this). Although I do not focus on his book here, at many points my text carefully responds to some of its principal questions.

8. But, does not Husserl say that the Thing is in a certain sense a sign of itself? See Ideas I: §52. Derrida quotes this himself in a footnote to Speech and Phenomena (p.61). He asks the question "Is being a sign of itself (index sui) the same as not being a sign? It is in this sense that, 'in the very instant' it is perceived, experience is a sign of itself, present to itself without the indicative detour."

   Consider the context of Husserl's comment below.

   The thing that appears to sense, which has the sensory properties of shape, colour, smell, and taste, is...far from being a sign for something else, though to a certain extent a sign for itself (Ideas I: §52).
The real issue here concerns the question of 'substitution.' For Husserl, what appears is the Thing in its multiplicity of manners of appearing. These 'moments' of the self-exhibition of something are not 'substitutes' that appear in its place. They are the modes of the Thing's givenness – the *as it gives itself*. They are, in a certain sense, transparent in that they always point beyond themselves to the greater whole of which they are articulations. They do not principally function as substitutive indicators. They are expressions of the Thing *in its giving of itself*. Also, see note 10 (Introduction) below.

All references to *Ideas 1* are to the classic translation by Boyce Gibson – *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*. I developed a particular fondness for this translation after reading extracts from Boyce-Gibson’s journal where he recounted his close association with Husserl during his visit in the late twenties to discuss the issue of translation (see "Excerpts from a 1928 Diary by W. R. Boyce Gibson." Edited by Herbert Spiegelberg in *The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*. 2. (1971), 63-81). For further details on *Ideen 1* (in German), Boyce Gibson’s translation of this text and the more contemporary translation by Fred Kersten, see the bibliography.

9. See *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, §6, p.38-9. All references are to the Churchill translation (see bibliography and note 25 to Part Two below). Unfortunately, Derrida treats representation and repetition as if they were intimately tied up in a 'relation of equivalence.' For reasons of strategy, I endeavour to show that representation itself is dependent upon the *possibility* of repetition; that if there is a *chiasmic* relation then it is 'asymmetrical.' Only by working through the problems of how to read this relation can we arrive at what Derrida is really trying to express through his discourse on re-presentation. And, perhaps then we shall find ourselves in a better position to re-evaluate its meaning in relation to the theme of repetition as explored by phenomenology.
Wood also takes up the issue of whether we can be satisfied with the view that repetition and representation are bound up in a symmetrical relation when he writes,

First, the relationship involved in repetition is neutral with respect to whether the repetition actually occurs (the possibility will do), and second, there is consequently no constitutive, internal relationship between *actual* signs so repeated. Other *actual* signs would just be *proof* of repeatability and not in themselves required...even if one acknowledges the dependence of representation on repetition, that is not a relation of equivalence (p.120).

In Husserl's temporal investigations we find a distinction that Derrida's meta-general level of discourse on representation and repetition has difficulty acknowledging. This is in regard to the difference between retention and recollection and their distinctive styles of temporal self-expression. Both intentionalities are types of 'return,' but the second comes closer to what we might call *re*-presentation (certainly in its more traditional sense). For Husserl, retention (or primary remembrance) is 'presentative' and literally provides the horizon, time, space (or spacing) that permits recollection. Derrida's reduction of the logics of 'return' to the language of representation does not easily grasp such a distinction. It is rather the pure structurality of return that traces itself as the condition of the possibility of both.

10. If we consider these faces or profiles as signs, then their 'value' as *signs* does not present itself until their function has been fulfilled in their pointing away from themselves since, as indicated above, their performance as signs involves their self-effacement before that which they (re)present. The visible, as Merleau-Ponty says, is "centered on a nucleus of absence" (The Visible and the Invisible. [*VI*], p.229). It surpasses itself toward the invisible in
much the same manner in which (to use one of Husserl's favourite examples) one face of a die expresses its position and sense within a matrix of meaning as part of a whole. It is a moment of a certain structural unity – a referential horizon – most of which is unseen at any one time. The perceived 'face' of the die is not the terminus of the perception, but through a certain kind of self-effacement, it is an index (an arrow) to something more beyond the field of vision. It does not present itself as a totality, but as reference-to a totality: as precisely one face of a die. The face or aspect gains its sense (returns upon itself) from the transcendent whole of which it is a part – and thus, it can be said that the invisibility is a necessary condition of visibility, i.e., it is that by means of which the visible is possible as the expression of a unity of sense. We say 'expression' and not 'indication' for these significational moments do not principally substitute for that which they deliver up. In this context, they are the speaking-out of the Thing itself (although this must be understood within the space of the phenomenological reduction) – not some kind of indicative medium that speaks on its behalf. This, of course, is a radically different dimension to the one in which Derrida discourses on the sign. However, neither orientation actually contradicts the other when it comes to the fundamental question concerning the constitutive performance of absence in the presencing of any kind of presence. Derrida does not have the monopoly on this.

11. Ideas 1. §38. p.112. It is in this work (1913) that Husserl breaks with the inside / outside parallelism, preferring the contrast between immanence and transcendence. Despite the title of The Phenomenology of 'Internal' Time Consciousness, this text can also be seen as one that moves within the later set of categories. Even though the latest of the material of the lectures on time-consciousness (edited by Heidegger) pre-dates Ideas 1 by at least three years, the text was not published until 1928 after extensive revision. The extremity of this contrast between the time of conception and that of the publication of Husserl's work is even more
marked in the case of his lecture course of 1907, which was not actually published until 1950. The text, entitled *The Idea of Phenomenology* (given during the period in which he produced the lectures on time consciousness), was the first to really develop the new orientation. This extremely fertile phase in Husserl’s thought provided the seminal basis for the radical direction of thought that is peculiar to his three-volume work, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*.

In *Speech and Phenomena*, much of Derrida's argument against Husserl's discourse on perception exhibits the structure of a polemical attack on the inside / outside dyad, which is why he introduces the thought of spacing as the exteriority that already inhabits the interiority of autoaffection (see *Speech and Phenomena*, p.86). This is understandable in view of the title of Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*. But here, interiority is more the sign of a parenthetical exclusion of the language of objective time (which includes objective space). The question of transcendence is not bracketed alongside this. Neither is it a question of bracketing the horizon of objects in favour of a pure subjectivity. It is rather a turn to the horizon that is constitutive of the extendedness and objectivity of objects. This is to re-situate the question of exteriority (including spatiality as extension) not to exclude it.

Derrida is wrong to reduce Husserlian phenomenology to the attempt to bracket out all exteriority and transcendence. For Husserl, the immanence / transcendence parallelism is not to be confused with the traditional inside / outside dyad. The movement of temporalizing consciousness (internal time consciousness) is constituted by a play of immanence and transcendence – which is the fundamental structurality of intentionality itself.

The whole of *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* is, in a very special sense, an exercise in eidetic reduction – imaginatively varying its subject matter and playing at the limit, beyond which it would begin to lose its inner coherence. The use of auditory examples is a useful way of introducing questions about time – and they do eventually break
out into their spatial moments. Tones run off into other tones as the unfolding of a symphony as-a-whole. From the point of view of the 'whole,' each note shares a certain 'virtual' contemporaneity with respect to the other notes that, together, form a system, a space. Each new tone, as it passes over into the next, always has reference to that which preceded it. Consider how often Husserl refers to the retentional flow as a sinking-down (Herabsinken). Consider, also in these terms, the importance of the thought of 'sedimentation' (a singularly spatial signification) in any reference to the hearing of a melody or symphony (as a quasi-simultaneous whole) when the notes, which make up the whole, are only ever heard successively as they sink into the past. Retention is the unfolding of a certain 'spacing; an extending of difference between the presence of that which is occurring, that which has already occurred, and that which is to come – for the presencing of each note and its retentional train is also protentionally ahead of itself in relation to that which is to follow (thus, we hear a melody and not just a string of notes). See the diagrams in Husserl's *PITC*, which represent the vertical and horizontal dimensions (depth horizon) of the retentional flow. Retention is a twofold intentionality, which both spaces-out experience and permits the giving of past moments all-at-once as – that is, within a single grasp as opposed to running-off successively. Here, though, the all-at-once does not erase the differences in their respective temporal signatures. Rather, it is a product of the way in which the continuum gives itself all-at-once – just as a horizon stretches out into the distance before one’s immediate field of vision. The spatial analogue gives us differences in distance by changing tones, e.g., a distant mountain range is co-present with whatever is immediately in front of the observer, but the considerable difference in distance is marked by its blue hue.

Note: This is a purely stationery analogue, since distance also gives different degrees of change in perspective, e.g., when looking out of the window of a moving train, the trees along
the side of the track flash past one’s field of vision at great speed while the view of, let us say, a mountain range beyond is relatively unchanging.

12. In the passage below, Derrida continues his analysis of the difference between Husserl and Peirce.

The difference between Husserl's and Peirce's phenomenologies is fundamental since it concerns the concept of the sign and of the manifestation of presence, the relationships between the re-presentation and the originary presentation of the thing itself (truth).” On this point Peirce is undoubtedly closer to the inventor of the word phenomenology: Lambert proposed in fact to 'reduce the theory of things to the theory of signs.' According to the 'phaneoroscopy' or phenomenology' of Peirce, manifestation itself does not reveal a presence, it makes a sign. One may read in the Principle of Phenomenology that 'the idea of manifestation is the idea of a sign.' There is thus no phenomenality reducing the sign or the representor so that the thing signified may be allowed to glow finally in the luminosity of its presence. The so-called 'thing-itself' is always already a representamen shielded from the simplicity of intuitive evidence. The representamen functions only by giving rise to an interpretant that itself becomes a sign and so on to infinity. The self-identity of the signified conceals itself unceasingly and is always on the move. The property of the representamen is to be itself and another, to be produced as a structure of reference, to be separated from itself. The property of the representamen is not to be proper [propre], that is to say absolutely proximate to itself (prope, proprius). The represented is always already a representamen...From the moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs (pp.49-50).
What does presence mean in this context? For Derrida here, the function of the word presence appears to be synonymous with that of the actual exhibition of a metaphysical thing-in-itself. Manifestation is a presencing that is not to be restricted to this metaphysical standpoint. Both Peirce and Derrida are right in this respect. However, to say that "manifestation itself does not reveal a presence, it makes a sign" suggests a certain degree of confusion. Signs are forms of presencing. Manifestation, as the making of a sign, is a kind of speaking-out. It is not somehow opposed to – or beyond – the language of presence. It is only at odds with the definition of the logic of presence that Derrida incorrectly attributes to Husserlian phenomenology.

Derrida appeals to the call “to the things / matters themselves” as the justification for his attribution of a residual metaphysic to Husserl’s phenomenology. This is a completely inappropriate reading of what he is really doing. The phenomenological call is actually an ironical rejoinder to Kant’s metaphysical concept of the Thing-in-itself – which is purported to reside beyond that which is actually given to experience. Husserl is concerned only with the phenomenological description of that which is actually given and the structures of its givenness – without making the Kantian metaphysical leap.

13. We have abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparent world perhaps?...But no! with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world!

(Mid-day; moment of the shortest shadow; and of the longest error; zenith of mankind; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA). (Twilight of the Idols. Nietzsche, p. 41.)
14. Consider the 'working note' below (from *The Visible and Invisible*) which was written by Merleau-Ponty in May, 1959.

Perception – unconscious – One* – retrograde movement of the true – sedimentation (of which the retrograde movement of the true is a part) May 2, 1959

The taxi driver at Manchester, saying to me (I understood only a few seconds later, so briskly were the words 'struck off'): I will ask the police where Brixton Avenue is. – Likewise, in the tobacco shop, the woman's phrase: *Shall I wrap them together?* which I understood only after a few seconds – and *all at once* – cf. recognizing someone from a description, or the event from a schematic prevision: once the meaning is given the signs take on the full value of 'signs.' But first the meaning must be given.

But then *how* is it given? Probably a chunk of the verbal chain is identified, projects the meaning which returns upon the signs...The meaning is 'perceived' and the *Rückgestaltung* [back-formation / reverse-structuration] is a 'perception.' This means: there is a *germination* of what will have been understood. (*Insight* and *Aha Erlebnis*) – And that means: the perception (the first one) is of *itself* an openness upon a field of *Gestaltungen* – And that means: perception is unconsciousness. What is the unconscious? What functions as a pivot, an existential, and in this sense, is and is not perceived. For one perceives only figures upon levels – And one perceives them only by relation to the level, which therefore is unperceived. – The perception of the level: always *between* the objects, it is that about which....The occult of psychoanalysis (the unconscious) is of this sort... (p.189. Translation modified).

Note: there is an important translator's comment on this: *On* – the indefinite pronoun "...I ought to say that *one* perceives in me, and not that I perceive. Every sensation
bears within itself the germ of a dream or a depersonalization..." (Phenomenology of Perception. p.215. [French edition – p.249]).

15. Derrida's critique of the distinction between indication (Anzeichen) and expression (Ausdruck) in Husserl's phenomenology leads, by way of a confusion of different dimensions of discourse, to the proposition that there must be an indicative detour in living speech. However, given the context in which Husserl distinguishes between these two types of significational functions, this would involve the paradox of having to first intimate to oneself that which one already wanted to say.

For Husserl, the distinction announces itself in the difference between intersubjective communication as mediated by linguistic signs and the immanence of meaning to the one who is motivated to speak. All signs express something, but in the case of interlocution, they do not immediately 'express' the lived-meaning of the speaker to the auditor, who has to interpret this. Such a movement of interpretation through an 'indicative' medium would be quite superfluous for the speaker. Therefore, Husserl concludes that although all signs express something, not all expressions presuppose an indicative function.

Derrida sees indication as the principal defining characteristic of the sign in general. However, this is only one function of the sign. Indication is that aspect of the sign which, by pointing, stands in for that which is not present. This is an 'essential' component of a symbol. However, the very sense of such a substitutive performance still relies on an original self-erasure, or surpassing – through which the sign's opacity can first be constituted. If it originally terminated in itself, it would not point beyond itself. When someone points, do we look at the finger that points, or that towards which the finger is pointing? We only turn back to the finger if there is an apparent absence of meaning – and we do so only fleetingly in order to re-orient ourselves for another look in the direction toward which it points.
A symbol stands outside itself. It recedes before that toward which it points and is thus, principally, not an object. It can indeed become opaque as an object in itself – *as a proxy* or even the thing itself, but this already presupposes a more original transparency or self-effacement. A religious icon, for instance, is not an object of worship in itself. If it was, then it would be an 'idol' – which would be the dissolution of itself *as a symbol for something Other*. The icon points away from itself – it is an indicator of the sublime, which may not be visible, but need not necessarily be classed as non-present. It is everywhere and nowhere. The sublime is u-topic. One cannot say, "Look, there it is!" One also would not say this of 'roundness' by trying to pinpoint such an anexact morphological type in a specific location in objective space. The indicative or substitutive aspect of the sign is that which can only stand-out by being indicated itself – and this can only be a consequence of an original detour through that towards which it points (e.g., a meaningful state of affairs) in the pointing-away from itself. If that towards which it points is absent, in the sense in which there is a lack of significance or the non-fulfilment of a particular form of expectation, then it turns back upon itself – which makes it stand-out in its substitutive capacity in-the-place of that toward which it points.

If a sign (and expression is one kind of sign) does not fulfil its expressive function, it becomes opaque – as a sign that indicates an absence. It stands-out in-the-place-of something else. If then, we determine the meaning of indication in terms of a certain kind of substitution, we can just as easily argue that this is far from being the most general or primordial of significational functions. One could then say that the indicative and substitutional aspect of the sign is a sign of the non fulfilment of an expressive sign.

16. Words function as signs by pointing away from themselves – and this applies to communication and soliloquy. If a sign principally terminated in itself, rather than effacing
itself through the presentation of something Other, it would cease to 'function' as a sign for something Other.

Imagine driving along a highway, looking to the side of the road for a sign, only to find a signpost that displayed nothing more than the word 'SIGN.' What would its referential function consist in? At most, it would be nothing more than an empty token of a generic type which, in itself, has no value. We would not even be able to speak in terms of signification as a horizon in which signs refer only to other signs, since there is no 'otherness' in play.

17. The theme of Vorstellung (representation) in Husserl's phenomenology, and its treatment by Derrida, is subjected to an exemplary set of analyses in Evans's text (see Strategies of Deconstruction. Chapter 5. "Wanting-to-Say and Representation"). He reminds us that Husserl distinguishes 13 different senses of representation in the Logical Investigations [LI] (See section 44 of the 5th investigation of this text). Evans suggests that the most general meaning of Vorstellung is probably the 4th: Vorstellung as objectivating act. This can be applied to a multiplicity of different acts, such as perception, predication, imagination, etc. Vorstellung as a representative or proxy, however, is Husserl's eighth sense of this term. And this, according to Evans, is Derrida's third sense – like a picture of something. But here, Husserl prefers to use the term Repräsentation for the representation of an object by another object. (See p.79 of Strategies of Deconstruction).

E.g.:
Vergegenwartigung = presentation / presentification
Stellvertreter = proxy / substitute
Repräsentant = representative
18. Although Heidegger maintains that the "...expression 'phenomenology' signifies primarily a methodological conception" (BT, p.50. H.27/28) and that "...it does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that research" (Ibid), it is not so clear that he actually appreciated the full import of this. The real force of the thought of phenomenology 'as possibility' (BT, pp.62/3 H.38/9, and the last paragraphs of "My Way to Phenomenology" [OTB]) only makes itself felt in Heidegger's writing after the analyses of Being and Time are already well underway. The fulfilment of the project as originally outlined in this text finds itself deferred again and again. The movement of withholding / detour / deferral, which Husserl calls the methodological epoché, expresses that which is already operative at the heart of time, history, Being, and presence. This was to become a focal point in Heidegger's later thinking.

Consider the following reference to the expression epoché in Heidegger's lecture "Time and Being" (On Time and Being [OTB]. p.9).

The history of Being means destiny of Being in whose sendings both the sending and the It which sends forth hold back with their self-manifestation. To hold back is, in Greek, epoché. Hence we speak of the epochs of the destiny of Being. Epoch does not mean here a span of time in occurrence, but rather the fundamental characteristic of sending, the actual holding-back of itself in favour of the discernibility of the gift, that is, of Being with regard to the grounding of beings. The sequence of epochs in the destiny of Being is not accidental, nor can it be calculated as necessary. Still, what is appropriate shows itself in the destiny, what is appropriate shows itself in the belonging together of the epochs. The epochs overlap each other in their sequence so that the original sending of Being as presence is more and more obscured in different ways (Ibid).
Fundamentally, one can say that the *epoché* is the temporizing form of temporality. We are justified in this suggestion because the structural form of the *epoché* is a postponement that maintains, a rupture that retains. It holds back in order to make manifest that which is hidden. As spacing, it is simultaneously a holding-together and a holding apart – a closing that opens. The *epoché* is also the signature of the dissolution of the apparent discreteness of spacing and temporizing – just as it announces a suspension that gives, traces meaning without a template and constitutes movement without being reducible to movement in itself.

19. The following passage is the first introduction to the thought of Temporalität in *Being and Time*. Temporalität means timeliness (not, as one might have imagined, Zeitlichkeit).

Heidegger writes,

...the way in which Being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning determined primordially in terms of time, is what we shall call its *Temporal* determinateness (seine *temporale* Bestimmtheit). Thus, the fundamental ontological task of Interpreting Being as such includes working out the Temporality (*Temporalität*) of Being. In the exposition of the problematic of Temporality the question of the meaning of Being will first be concretely answered (*Being and Time*. p.40 / H.19. Translation modified).

Consider this further reference to Temporalität in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. 
What has to be shown is this: temporality is the condition of the possibility of all understanding of being; *being is understood and conceptually apprehended by means of time*. When temporality functions as such a condition we call it Temporality [*Temporalität*] (p.274).

20. According to Heidegger,


And...

> The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality (Ibid. p.375 / H.327).

21. Heidegger writes...

> ...true time appears as the 'It' of which we speak when we say: It gives Being. The destiny in which It gives Being lies in the extending of time. Does this reference show time to be the 'It' that gives Being? By no means. For time itself remains the gift of an 'It gives' whose giving preserves the realm in which presence is extended. Thus the 'It' continues to be undetermined, and we ourselves continue to be puzzled ("Time and Being," *OTB*. p.17).

22. Heidegger echoes St. Augustine's question in the lecture entitled, "Time and Being" [*OTB*, p.10]. Being always has to be understood in terms of time, but the relationship is not necessarily of a symmetrical order. See also the opening sentences to Heidegger’s lecture, “The Concept of Time” (*The Concept of Time*).

24. The question of death that Derrida incorporates into the analyses of *Speech and Phenomena* is another very obvious sign of a Heideggerian orientation in his re-reading of Husserl. See the chapter "Meaning and Representation." And, when Derrida engages in a critical examination of the phenomenological distinction – in the *Logical Investigations* [1901] between expression (*Ausdruck*) and indication (*Anzeichen*) – he does so by working through material drawn from a later period in Husserl's thought [1904/5-10].

25. Genetic and structural analyses (with reference to phenomenological-temporal studies) express themselves in a complementary format under the heading of *historicity* in Husserl's *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. The following quotation from Derrida's *Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry"* is of considerable length. It is presented here in full because it represents a pivotal phase in his account of Husserl's phenomenological approach to the question of historicity.

Derrida writes...

...traditional development, from which every culture acquires totality at each moment (in a mediate or immediate synchrony), does not have a causal style of genesis. In the world of natural reality subject to a causal type of development, sedimentation is not that of an acquired sense that is continually and internally recapitulated. There is no natural history for Husserl any more than for Hegel, and for the same reasons. The analogy will be even greater when we see that, for Husserl as for Hegel, culture itself in its finite empirical units is not sufficient to constitute the pure unity of a history. This
will be the case for all anthropological cultures which do not participate in the European *eidos*. Here the *Origin* repeats Husserl's critique of Dilthey in "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science." While completely accepting Dilthey's criticism of the causalist naturalization of spirit and the principle of an original typo-morphology of cultural totalities, Husserl wishes to extract the idea of science (i.e., above all, philosophy) from the subjective immanence of the *Weltanschauung*.

As cultural form, the idea of science is undoubtedly also part of the *Weltanschauung*, and the content of science and philosophy is undoubtedly transmitted according to the same process as all other forms of culture and tradition in general. The process is analogous, if not identical, to that of internal time-consciousness described from the noematic viewpoint in the 1905-10 lectures. The present appears neither as the rupture nor the effect of a past, but as the retention of a present past, i.e., as the retention of a retention, and so forth. Since the retentional power of living consciousness is finite, this consciousness preserves significations, values, and past acts as habitualities (*habitus*) and sedimentations. Traditional sedimentation in the communal world will have the function of going beyond the retentional finitude of individual consciousness. Of course, sedimentary retention is not only the condition for the possibility of protention: it also belongs essentially to the general form of protention, which is itself conceived under the absolutely unique and universal form of the Living Present. The latter, which is the primordial absolute of temporality, is only maintenance of what indeed must be called the *dialectic* of protention and retention, despite Husserl's repugnance for that word. In the movement of protention, the present is retained and gone beyond as past present, in order to constitute another primordial and original Absolute, another Living Present. Without this extraordinary absolute alteration of what always remains in the concrete and lived form of an absolute Present,
without this always renewed originality of an absolute primordiality, always present and always lived as such, no history would be possible (pp.57-8).

26. These issues permit us to explore a number of different forms of critique on the 'non-reflexivity' of Gasché's language throughout his engagement with Husserlian phenomenology and Derridian deconstruction. We shall see how the criticism brings into question the limits of the central argument of The Tain of the Mirror – a thesis that takes the form of a critique of the theme of reflexivity. Our deconstruction of Derrida's deconstruction of the themes of time and essence involves playing this orientation off against a deconstruction of 'Gasché's Derrida' (so to speak). The latter is still caught up in a synchronic / diachronic dyad that replays the perennial distinction between stasis and becoming. This, in turn, is quite inappropriately grafted onto Husserl's phenomenology.

27. The question of time upsets any idea of instantaneity when it comes to hearing-oneself-speak. This passage (Crisis. Part III A, §50, p.172) is an exemplary instance of how Husserl's own analyses radically upset Derrida's assignment of such a form of simultaneity to the phenomenology of self-discourse. It also clearly shows how the issue of alterity is far from being excluded from Husserl's examinations of the structure of the unity of a life-history.

28. See Derrida's essay "Ellipsis," where he writes of "...the center as the sign of a hole that the book tried to fill. The center was the name of the hole" (WD, p.297).

29. Gadamer's discourse on play problematizes Derrida's reduction of hermeneutical method to a teleological or totalizing orientation when he writes of a "...to-and-fro movement which is not tied to any goal which would bring it to an end.....The movement which is play
has no goal which brings it to an end; rather it remains itself in constant repetition" (*Truth and Method*, p.93).


31. I am reminded of Husserl's phenomenological orientation in the *Crisis* and his discourse on the Earth as the general ground horizon of spatiality without it being a spatial object in the usual sense. It is principally a *from-which* and not a *toward-which* of observation. Derrida, himself, makes reference to this in his *Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry."* See p.85.

32. Once again, consider Derrida’s comment on the reduction having been thought in the mere "lacklustre guise of a technique" (*IHOG*, p.153). This gestures toward a much deeper sense and demonstrates his clear understanding of the implications of the meaning of the *epoché* as the expression of a pure movement of delay.

33. These issues are brought out in the chapter entitled "Signs and the Blink of an Eye" (*Speech and Phenomena*), Derrida plays with Husserl's use of the term Augenblick. His inappropriate assignment of a corpuscular concept of the now to perception – as a point-like moment – in Husserl's phenomenology revolves around this definition.

   In *Strategies of Deconstruction*, Evans focuses on Derrida's translation of the term *Augenblick*. It is shown how he *over*-plays the theme of the now as an "instantaneous moment" without giving due credit to Husserl's discourse on the now as something that is "extended" with past and futural horizons. *Augenblick*, when read as "moment," is suitably ambiguous as to allow it to be translated as "blink." The word "moment" lends itself to the thought of
"instantaneity" – which works its way throughout Derrida's reading of Husserl's discourse on primal impression, the now, perception, and presence in general. Derrida is also quick to point out that even a blink has duration – but somehow he creates the erroneous impression that this shakes the basis of Husserl's discourse.

Derrida's translation of *Augenblick*, as Evans shows, leads to the proposition that... "It is the instantaneous moment of the blink, which closes the eye, not the glance, which opens up a field of vision" (*SD*. p.97). Evans is right to express that this reading, given the actual Husserlian context, is untenable. Derrida appears to go out of his way to conceal that Husserl's phenomenology principally concerns itself with 'horizons' of experience.

The image of instantaneity in the visual metaphor of the blink has its auditory correlate in the expression 'hearing-oneself-speak.' Derrida's writing is deeply critical of the theme of the 'simultaneity' of speaking and hearing-oneself-speak. According to his perspective, there is a 'delay.' The temporizing and spacing of 'autoaffection,' which is constitutive of their interwovenness, carries this within itself. Given Derrida's emphasis on the logics of 'hearing-oneself-speak,' as a means of access to the thought in which phenomenology is set up as the last stronghold of the metaphysics of presence (logocentrism and phonocentrism), it is interesting how Derrida employs the 'visual' simile "blink of an eye" to criticize Husserl's discourse on the now. Has Derrida done this on purpose? The ear does not blink (the oscillations of the inner ear do not really constitute a suitable analogue either because they do not actually close off the auditory field). This is intriguing, given Derrida's underlying critique of phonocentrism and the degree to which his critique of Husserl is determined by it.

Careful reading undermines the 'strong' tone of Derrida's engagement with Husserl in *Speech and Phenomena*. Consequently, much of the technical (or quasi-technical) aspects of this text also fall if determined purely on the basis that they are meant to constitute an effective critique of Husserl's phenomenology. However, the overall direction is rather fascinating.
Much of what holds the discourse together is, in essence, interesting for its own sake in that it questions the traditional distinctions (inside / outside, presence / absence, structure / genesis, etc.) that revolve around the traditional bifurcation between space and time, and how this distinction has traced out a path that has always limited critical reflection on this question.

The worldly, communication, alterity in general, is classically thought in spatial terms. If the voice, the audible, the phoneme, can be thought in purely temporal terms without reference to the spatial then we 'seem' to get closer to the pure form of inner life, the immediate as given within the temporal present. It is this thought that Derrida attempts to deconstruct – although, as already indicated (see note 11 above), he is quite incorrect in his assumption that Husserl is working within the bounds of the inside / outside dyad). As it was for Kant, temporality is the primordial 'form' of inner life for Husserl. His own descriptive analyses show that even here there is a certain participation in spatiality from a structural point of view – and this is not, as Husserl undoubtedly recognized, merely a consequence of an inadequate reserve of temporal tropes. Note: Husserl, of course, was not limited to Kant's Euclidean models of space and time.

In his own way, Derrida has brought this issue into the foreground. It is one that is worth exploring – for he has indeed restored the spatializing theme of difference to the temporalizing theme of deferral (temporization). However, it must be noted that Derrida seems to attribute a 'doctrinal' position to Husserl regarding his utilization of aural examples of temporal experience in *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* – and this is inappropriate. Husserl's choice of examples is motivated by reasons of strategy and method only. It is to be granted that according to the 'classic' distinction between space and time this may be indicative of a strategy that is attempting to rid itself of all references to 'spatiality.' Husserl recognizes, though, that the analogies between the dynamic structures of temporal
articulation (Ablaufsphänomene) and that of a spatial order (Abschattungen) are so close as to be almost indistinguishable (see Part One of this thesis).

There is a vast difference between the employment of what could be called a phonocentric form of description – which is utilized for 'strategic' purposes – and full-blown phonocentrism. Time, as articulated in classic discourse, had to be Husserl's point of entry. Aural examples were the purest form of articulation of time, in a tradition where space and time were rigidly differentiated, in that the unfolding of sounds brings out the phenomenon of 'successivity' in a focused manner that can be distinguished from objective-spatial (coextensive) concerns that are traditionally associated with sight. However, in his approach to the essence of what defined time in classical terms – as a linear order of successions – Husserl found himself tackling the question of what 'constituted' such a linear continuum of successivity. We are introduced to the thought of temporality or, more precisely, a temporalizing horizon which is pluri-dimensional, inexpressible in the language of linearity (yet constitutive of linearity), and not 'in' time. For Husserl, this region (for which "names are lacking" [see *PITC*, §36, p.100]) is a Primordial Flux – but it is not 'in process.' See Husserl's *PITC*, §35, p.99. – or see note 13 to Part Two of this thesis for a quotation of the key passage.

If we reduce the signification 'time' to an order of linear successivity of point-like nows, then Derrida is right to say that time is nothing more than a model, a metaphor, a metaphysical concept. However, the phenomenological orientations of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, which do not express time in this way, show that we still have temporality! It may not resemble the classic *archi-tecture* – and we do need to produce a few more names – but we still have temporality. Derrida deconstructs the history of the signification 'time' and uncovers the impoverishment produced through the imposition of the theme of linearity by exposing the narrowness of its limitations with respect to the pluri-dimensional richness of symbolic (non-linear) experience. Part of this involves turning the thought of the now inside-out. Spacing
does not designate distanciation between moments – like, now-points strung out along a linear continuum. For Derrida, spacing is that which is already at the heart of the now itself. Contrary to the overall tone of Derrida's *Speech and Phenomena*, the logics of this are to be found in Husserl's discourse on the extended / extending structure of the Living Present (*lebendige Gegenwart*) and Heidegger's analyses of Dasein as Being-there or there-being in *Being and Time*. 
NOTES: Part One

1. The main passage from which this epigram has been taken reads as follows.

   The end of linear writing is indeed the end of the book, even if, even today, it is within the form of the book that new writings – literary or theoretical – allow themselves to be, for better or for worse, encased. It is less a question of confiding new writings to the envelope of a book than of finally reading what wrote itself between the lines in the volumes. That is why, beginning to write without the line, one begins also to reread past writing according to a different organization of space. If today the problem of reading occupies the forefront of science, it is because of this suspense between two ages of writing. Because we are beginning to write, to write differently, we must reread differently (OG, p.86-7).

2. The logics of such a suspension are analogous to the way in which Freud, for instance, would often dismiss rejections of his psychoanalytical interpretations of neurotic symptoms, by passing off such rejection (on the part of the analysand) as a sign of 'resistance.' This dismissal is almost like telling a patient to remain uninvolved in the analysis because s/he lacks the 'relevant qualifications.' The exigencies of therapeutic analysis may require this to some extent, but it points to a refusal of dialogue that is still basically an act of violence.

3. Extension plays a crucial role here. Following Derrida's taste for the ambiguities or compression of meanings inherent in Latin, the word 'extensio' means extension in a number of different senses – the most pertinent of which is intimately tied to 'articulation' in the form of a 'hinged' movement which 'stretches-out.'
Extensio = (Latin) a stretching out. Extension / extend / extending

1. Latin: *ex* [out] and *tendere* [to stretch out].

2. Extension, in the sense of a delay / deferment – to extend the date of a task to be completed.

The second definition brings out one of the specific temporal senses of extension (and of course 'extending') that interests Derrida in his discourse on temporization. The first sense refers to the extending of an arm connected to a pivot – to stretch out one of the arms of a hinge – to extend a folding joint. In this instance, temporalizing and spatializing are intrinsically intertwined.

With Derrida's metaphor of the hinge, we find the point at which 'extension' is indissolubly linked to 'articulation.' As Derrida writes, "To articulate is to joint." ("Ellipsis," p.300. *WD*). In a certain sense, extension *is* articulation. Consider the passage below from Derrida's *Of Grammatology*, which is a quotation from Robert's dictionary.

...brisure [*joint, break*] " – broken, cracked part. Cf. breach, crack, fracture, fault, split, fragment, [breche, cassure, fracture, faille, fente, fragment.] – Hinged articulation of two parts of wood- or metal-work. The hinge, the brisure [*folding-joint*] of a shutter. Cf. joint (*OG*. p.65).

The pertinent Greek expression with its root ‘ek’ (out-of) is: *Ekteeno* = stretch, extend, prolong (defer or postpone). *Teeno* = tighten, stretch out, strain, tend-to, lead-to, be inclined.
In these terms, from a Husserlian phenomenological standpoint, articulation, extension and temporization express the fundamental intentional structurality of consciousness in its tendency toward something...

4. The shift to a 'transcendental' orientation – which Gasché's text surely represents (throughout its adumbration of the theme of duplicity) – should not be treated as a levelling procedure for all related (and unrelated) subjects. Differences in 'depth' can be found in abundance. Contrary to the general orientation of Gasché's analyses, that which is designated as transcendental does not automatically reveal itself to be equi-primordial with whatever else happens to share this designation. There is above all, depth – further horizons to be unfolded.

Derrida has focused on one of the deepest levels explored by phenomenology (temporalizing flux) and has taken the project of excavation even further. On the one hand, we have spoken of the quasi-transcendental orientation of Derrida's writing – which means that it is transcendental in a purely analogous sense – but, on the other hand, one must be clear that when deconstruction responds to the phenomenological call for 'a critique of transcendental experience,' its language, focus and style of comportment are nothing other than the expressions of the phenomenological-transcendental orientation itself. The method by which phenomenology approaches this attitude involves a process of deconstruction / Abbau. It is a technique that is initiated within the horizon of the epoché – which means that the form of the approach is one which aims toward the suspension of any metaphysical decision. Phenomenology, in its most radical form as deconstruction, does not aim toward an outside or beyond of transcendental experience. It is the question of a refusal to simply take-part-in or 'live' the philosophical schematics that are woven into the fabric of what we name as transcendental. It is a postponement of a merely passive form of participation, in order to actively reflect. Only in the space constituted by this shift can one 'play.' The similarities
between the phenomenological *epoché* and the procedure of writing under erasure (*sous rature*) are so close in structure and performance as to be almost indistinguishable.

The *meta*-transcendental orientation of much of Derrida's writing still takes place, for reasons of principle and necessity, within the history of the writing out of the transcendental. There is no absolute limit. It represents nothing more than an outer edge to a tradition / a history of radical reorientations whose movements, rather than establishing absolute boundaries, have always pushed out the envelope.

The *meta-* or quasi-transcendental motif of *différance* does not refer us to a plane, but to incalculable depths. The image of *equi*-primordiality, although seductive, can do nothing more than obfuscate this depth. One is reminded of Merleau-Ponty's last working notes (see *The Visible and the Invisible*) in which he expresses the urgency and necessity of shifting from a horizontal form of interrogation to a 'vertical' orientation. This call has clearly been introjected into deconstructive strategy.

The transcendental does not signify a place or site – it is *u-topic* (no-place / *non-lieu*). It speaks rather of horizons of orientation. There are always further depths to uncover since no orientation is wholly transparent to itself. See also notes 12 and 15 (Part One) below.

5. Although *Of Grammatology* is by no means the only text in which Gasché finds his inspiration for the further development of Derrida's logic of doubling, it does, as we shall see, literally provide the hinge that extends itself at the heart of his analyses.

6. The line is the potentiality of the now as point; a point that erases itself as a limit in the tracing of a circle.
7. In an interview with Richard Kearney (Dialogues with contemporary Continental thinkers [DCCT]), Derrida confesses that he studied Husserl in a "studious and painstaking fashion" (p.109). He maintains that Husserl taught him "a certain methodical prudence and reserve, a rigorous technique of unravelling and formulating questions" (Ibid). However, despite this, Derrida maintains that his own deconstructive techniques go beyond the limits of the language and strategies of Husserlian phenomenology.

My discovery of the genealogical and genetic critique of Nietzsche and Freud...helped me to take the step beyond phenomenology towards a more radical, 'non-philosophical' questioning, while never renouncing the discipline and methodological rigour of phenomenology (Ibid).

The question is: does Derrida actually maintain 'the discipline and methodological rigour of phenomenology'? This is a very difficult question to answer. Why is it that he attributes so much value to the 'genealogical and genetic critique of Nietzsche and Freud' without acknowledging his indebtedness to Husserl's genetic phenomenology?

It comes as no surprise that Derrida cites Freud and Nietzsche when he speaks of taking a 'step beyond' phenomenology – for it is undoubtedly on the basis of his readings of their texts that he returns to phenomenology. There is much in the structure and style of Derrida's writing on Husserl's phenomenology that reads like a psychoanalysis. We find that the 'beyond' speaks more of a change in the path of the return to the same – or a change in the site or location of a certain questioning rather than a surpassing of the questioned itself. Of course, the questioned must consequently show itself in a different light, but not necessarily without qualified resistance.
This is not so much a 'step beyond' as an 'altering return.' A discourse that speaks of a 'beyond' should be treated with the utmost care and with a high degree of suspicion. We need to suspend some of Derrida's more sensational claims because there are subtler, and more significant issues to be taken into account that are often obfuscated by his 'strong' theses.

8. There are important differences between Husserl's meaning and that of Heidegger and yet Gasché ostensibly limits his definition of Abbau to its meaning for Heidegger as 'destruction.' Derrida, however, does not restrict it to this. His appropriation and critical implementation of the strategy of Abbau (unbuilding) indicates an important grasp of its Husserlian sense – with its intrinsic relation to Aufbau (re-construction) – by putting the 'con' (bringing-together) back into 'de-struction.'

Claude Evans is also convinced that Gasché limits himself to a Heideggerian reading of Abbau (unbuilding, deconstruction). See The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology (JBSP). Vol.21, No.1, January, 1990. Article, "Phenomenological Deconstruction: Husserl's Method of Abbau." J. Claude Evans. He is correct to point out, in contradistinction to Gasché, that it was Husserl and not Heidegger who first developed the thought of Abbau (which can be traced back to 1921). Even Heidegger clearly acknowledges his indebtedness to Husserl for allowing him access to unpublished manuscripts. See Being and Time, footnote v., of Chapter Two of the Introduction (p.489) and footnote ii., of Chapter One of Division One (Ibid). Heidegger was simply first to publish.

9. The following quotations from Derrida's Of Grammatology are fascinating in the character of their adoption of Husserlian insights for the purpose of contemporizing Saussure. They stress the decisive phenomenological difference between 'appearing' and 'appearances.'
It is well known that Saussure distinguishes between the 'sound-image' and the objective sound (p.98) [p.68]. He thus gives himself the right to 'reduce,' in the phenomenological sense, the sciences of acoustics and physiology at the moment that he institutes the science of language. The sound-image is the structure of the appearing of the sound [\emph{l’apparaître du son}] which is anything but the sound appearing [\emph{le son apparaissant}]. It is the sound-image that he calls \emph{signifier}, reserving the name \emph{signified} not for the thing, to be sure (it is reduced by the act and the very ideality of language), but for the concept,' undoubtedly an unhappy notion here; let us say for the ideality of the sense....The sound-image is what is \emph{heard}; not the \emph{sound} heard but the being-heard of the sound. Being-heard is structurally phenomenal and belongs to an order radically dissimilar to that of the real sound in the world. One can only divide this subtle but absolutely decisive heterogeneity by a phenomenological reduction. The latter is therefore indispensable to all analyses of being-heard, whether they be inspired by linguistic, psychoanalytic, or other preoccupations (\emph{OG}, p.63).

Derrida is right to express the power of the phenomenological reduction in reference to the articulation of the difference between the 'sound-heard' and the 'being-heard of the sound. It not only marks out the space in which phenomenology originally moves, it also points to what is most profound in Saussure's thinking. The orientation of the latter already implicitly involves a form of \emph{epoché}, even though it is never thematized as such. Derrida continues...

Now the 'sound-image,' the structured appearing [\emph{l’apparaître}] of the sound, the 'sensory matter' \emph{lived} and \emph{informed} by \emph{différance}, what Husserl would call the \emph{hyle / morphe} structure, distinct from all mundane reality, is called the 'psychic image' by Saussure.... Although the word 'psychic' is not perhaps convenient,
except for exercising in this matter a phenomenological caution, the originality of a certain place is well marked (Ibid, p.63-4).

Derrida defends this Saussurean schema against a 'mentalist' (and imagist) interpretation by citing Husserl,

The psychic image of which Saussure speaks must not be an internal reality copying an external one. Husserl, who criticizes this concept of 'portrait' in Ideen I shows also in the Krisis (pp.63 f.) how phenomenology should overcome the naturalist opposition – whereby psychology and the other sciences of man survive – between 'internal' and 'external' experience. It is therefore indispensable to preserve the distinction between the appearing sound [le son apparaissant] and the appearing of the sound [l’apparaître du son] in order to escape the worst and most prevalent of confusions (Ibid, p.64).

This defence of Saussure could be said to introduce balance to a more negative orientation in Derrida's own reading in another text when he writes,

Saussure was...careful to distinguish between the real word and its image. He also saw the expressive value of a 'signifier' only in the form of the 'sound-image.' 'Signifier' means 'sound-image.' But, not taking the 'phenomenological' precaution, Saussure makes the sound-image, the signifier a 'mental impression,' into a reality whose sole originality is to be internal, which is only to shift the problem without resolving it (Speech and Phenomena [SP], pp.46-7).
Note: Husserl substituted the inside / outside dyad in *Ideas 1* (§38, p.112 – 1913) with the contrast between immanence and transcendence as the basis for discussing perception. See note 11 of the Introduction above.

Derrida’s re-reading is not simply a case of a ‘double-reading’ of Saussure; it is an exercise in dialogue between Derrida and Derrida.

10. See sections 43 [Light on a Fundamental Error] and 52 of Husserl's *Ideas 1*.

11. Husserl writes,

   The genuine concept of thing-transcendence, which is the standard whereby all rational statements about transcendence are measured, cannot be extracted from any source other than the perception's own essential content, or the definitely *articulated* connexions which we call evidential (*ausweisenden*) experience. The idea of this transcendence is thus the eidetic correlate of the pure idea of this evidential experience (*Ideas 1*, §47, p.134).

12. See sections 38-41 – and especially sections 42, and 44 of *Ideas 1*. Also, see Husserl's short text entitled, *The Idea of Phenomenology* (based on a series of lectures given in 1907, but not published during his lifetime). This book is an important seminal exploration of the question of transcendence. It is no coincidence that this is also the text that first began to develop the method of phenomenological reduction in a fully thematic way. See also notes 4 and 15 (Part One).
13. The section entitled *The Concept of the Logos* (in the second part of the Introduction to *Being and Time*) continues the discussion on the presence of the phenomenon or, rather, the phenomenon of presence, by way of an etymological analysis of the word 'logos.' As the suffix of the expression 'phenomeno-logy,' it is under examination in order to establish the meaning of the enterprise it designates. Heidegger defines logos in terms of 'speech' or 'discourse' [*rede*]. This is definitely one of the sites of Derrida's inspiration for the development of the theme of phonologism and his consequent critique of this field.

See also Heidegger's *History of the Concept of Time* for a discussion on phenomenon and logos.

14. Husserl insists that "a sense-giving consciousness...is absolute and not dependent in its turn on sense bestowed on it from another source." *Ideas I*. §55, p.153. This is a clear departure from Platonism. However, we must also understand that the 'Absolute' character of a 'sense-giving consciousness' is only so from the point of view of an already constituted temporality in which the analyses of *Ideas 1* move. There is a deeper field – that of temporalizing consciousness. This dimension is also implicated in *Ideas 1*, but this is in no way a fall back into Platonism.

15. Husserl writes that "...the bracketed matter is not wiped off the phenomenological slate, but only bracketed, and thereby provided with a sign that indicates the bracketing. Taking its sign with it, the bracketed matter is reintegrated in the main theme of the inquiry" (*Ideas I*. §76, p.194). Moreover, earlier, in section 31, Husserl writes, “...it is still there like the bracketed in the brackets These statements are fascinating in that they appear to outline the logic of what we have come to call the procedure of 'sous rature' (writing under erasure) – a strategy in which the erasure is only partial. The [crossing-out within brackets] gives us a
foreground sign that affects our relation to that which is still visible beneath the cross within parentheses. The crossed-out [or bracketed] is not annihilated, but modified in the manner of its articulation. See also notes 4 and 12 (Part One).

16. Husserl writes,

_The perspective variation (the 'Abschattung'), though verbally similar to the perspected variable (the 'Abgeschattetes'), differs from it generally and in principle. The perspective variation is an experience. But experience is possible only as experience, and not as something spatial. The perspected variable, however, is in principle possible only as spatial (it is indeed spatial in its essence), but not possible as experience (Ideas 1, §41, p.119)._  

17. See Sections 9 & 10 of _The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness_ for Husserl's detailed discussion on 'running-off-phenomena' (_Ablaufsphänomene_). Compare this discourse on temporal orientation to Husserl's discussion on the difference between _Abschattung_ and _Abgeschattetes_ in _Ideas 1_ (see note 16 above). Also, see sections 42-46, 52 of _Ideas 1_ for further discussion on 'spatial perspective.' This issue bears an intrinsic relation to Husserl's discussion on _Ablaufsphänomene_ (running-off-phenomena) since both are understood in terms of the unity of the running-off of the temporal 'flux.'

18. When we consider the appearance of a particular sound we see, according to Husserl, that throughout its duration it "...is the same, but 'in the way that' it appears, the sound is different" (_PITC_. §8, p.45). Husserl is specifically referring here to the retentional running-off of the sound. These 'modes of the appearing of' something are not simply extraneous additions
or supplements to the appearing thing but are essential to its constitution. As Husserl writes, “The thing is constituted in the flowing-off of its appearances, which are themselves constituted as immanent unities in the flux of primordial impressions and necessarily constituted one with the other” (PITC, §43. p.120).

19. As early as section 1 of PITC, Husserl strategically calls on the significance of the parallels between space and time, remarking that "...space and time exhibit so many noted and significant analogies." p.23.

In the immediate quotation below, Husserl further explores the time / space analogue as the horizon of the intertwining of appearing and non-appearing.

The foreground is nothing without the background; the appearing side is nothing without the non-appearing. It is the same with regard to the unity of time-consciousness – the duration reproduced is the foreground; the classifying intentions make us aware of a background, a temporal background. And in certain ways, this is continued in the constitution of the temporality of the enduring thing itself with its now, before, and after. We have the following analogies: for the spatial thing, the ordering into the surrounding space and the spatial world on the one side, and on the other, the spatial thing itself with its foreground and background. For the temporal thing, we have the ordering into the temporal form and the temporal world on the one side, and on the other the temporal thing itself and its changing orientation with regard to the living now (PITC, §25, pp.78-9).

Section 11 continued: Once again – a spatial / temporal analogue.
The originary temporal field is obviously circumscribed exactly like a perceptual one. Indeed, generally speaking, one might well venture the assertion that the temporal field always has the same extension. It is displaced, as it were, with regard to the perceived and freshly remembered motion and its Objective time in a manner similar to the way in which the visual field is displaced with regard to Objective space (p.52).

The originary temporal field displaces itself. There is a kind of recession or self-erasure. As a horizon, it is immanent even though it simultaneously withdraws. Transcendence is already inscribed within and by it.

20. And in the following section, Husserl writes,

We should prefer to avoid talk of 'appearance' when referring to phenomena which constitute temporal Objects, for these phenomena are themselves immanent Objects and are appearances in a wholly different sense. We speak here of 'running-off phenomena' [Ablaufspähnomene], or better yet of 'modes of temporal orientation,' and with reference to the immanent Objects themselves of their 'running-off characters' (e.g., now, past). With regard to the running-off phenomenon, we know that it is a continuity of constant transformations which form an inseparable unit, not severable into parts which could be by themselves nor divisible into phases, points of the continuity, which could be by themselves. The parts which by a process of abstraction we can throw into relief can be only in the entire running-off. This is also true of the phases and points of the continuity of running-off. It is evident that we can also say of this continuity that in certain ways it is unalterable as to form (PITC. §10, p.48).
21. Gasché discusses this sense of illumination (*Erscheinung*) in reference to Kant, but fails to do so in his treatment of Husserl's phenomenology.

22. Evans also makes reference to the theme of evidence in Husserl's 'principle of principles' and focuses on the clause "...but also only within the limits in which it is presented there...." Evans expresses how this is a call to a radical 'critique of evidence.'

All evidence is in need of critique so that we may come to an understanding of the kind of evidence it is and of the limits of that evidence. And the evidence of the reflecting phenomenologist is no exception. Here Husserl recognized the task of a 'critique of transcendental self-experience' [*Hua I*, 67/29, translation altered; cf.178/151-52], a phenomenology of phenomenology, and it was in the course of an attempt to carry out aspects of this phenomenology that he was forced to begin revising his own earlier claims that there is a core of adequate evidence in phenomenological reflection.

Given this background, our response to Derrida's references to the principle of principles can be brief. In the first place, intuition is not the 'source of sense' [*SP*, 60/53] but rather the source of the legitimacy of sense. Second, Husserl's statement that intuition can be undermined by intuition clearly shows that the principle of principles itself does not assert or require "the self-identity of the now as point, as a 'source-point'" [*SP*, 69/61]. Husserl does speak of primordial presence, but nothing in this text from the *Ideas* suggests Derrida's statement that “In phenomenology, the idea of primordial presence and in general of 'beginning,' 'absolute beginning' or *principium,*
always refers back to this 'source-point' [namely, to the self-identity of the now as point]' [SP, 69/61-2] (Evans, Strategies of Deconstruction, pp.109-10).

It is precisely because primal impression is the site of the passing-over of protention into retention in a negotiation of fulfilment, degrees of fulfilment, and non-fulfilment that the now is the source of the legitimacy of sense. Should not this 'core of evidence' be classed as apodictic rather than adequate? From a methodological point of view, the expression adequacy of evidence makes reference to an aim – a regulative principle of interrogation, which in itself is a response to that which is apodictic. The aim is to flesh it out. Husserl does refer to the living-present in terms of 'adequacy' of experience in the Cartesian Meditations (see note 23 directly below), but he probably should have said that this too, was apodictic: a field of possible work. After all, does not the earlier Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness specifically address this field as a problem? The passage quoted above is preceded by a reference to Husserl's account of why one of the "major tasks of phenomenology" involves a "critique of evidence" (Ibíd). This is what leads to the theme of a 'phenomenology of phenomenology.' Also, see p.121 of Strategies of Deconstruction for another reference to this.

The thought of a 'phenomenology of phenomenology' traces itself throughout Husserl's work. See, in particular, the Conclusion to Husserl's Cartesian Meditations (which I quote in my article "Différance Beyond Phenomenological Reduction [Époché]" The Warwick Journal of Philosophy, Vol.2, Issue 2. 1989, p.68). Also, refer to the Preface to the present text for Husserl's call for a "phenomenology of the phenomenological reduction" (Crisis. Part III B, §71, p.247) – which translates as a 'reduction of the reduction.'
23. Given the context of our discussion, see in particular, the first, second, and third meditations of Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*. In the 1st meditation (§9, p.22-23.) of the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl writes,

...adequacy and apodicticity of evidence need not go hand in hand. Perhaps this remark was made precisely with the case of transcendental self-experience in mind. In such experience the ego is accessible to himself originaliter. But at any particular time this experience offers only a core that is experienced 'with strict adequacy,' namely the ego's living present (which the grammatical sense of the sentence, *ego cogito*, expresses); while beyond that, only an indeterminately general presumptive horizon extends, comprising what is strictly non-experienced but necessarily also meant. To it belong not only the ego's past, most of which is completely obscure, but also his transcendental abilities and his habitual peculiarities at the time. External perception too (though not apodictic) is an experiencing of something itself, the physical thing itself: 'it itself is there.' But in being there itself, the physical thing has for the experiencer an open, infinite, indeterminately general horizon, comprising what is itself not strictly perceived – a horizon (this is implicit as a presumption) that can be opened up by possible experience. Something similar is true about the apodictic certainty characterizing transcendental experience of my transcendental I-am, with the indeterminate generality of the latter as having an open horizon.

Apodicticity is a starting-point – this is not the same as an 'adequate' core of evidence. The apodictic needs to be fleshed out. Although apodicticity means sheer obviousness in one sense, it can also mean a withdrawal of the presence of evidence in any adequate sense. On the other hand, 'adequacy' is the 'ideal goal' of interrogation in the form of a critique of evidence.
The call to adequacy names a regulative principle of interrogative comportment, but it is expressed in full realization that adequate determination – 'in fact' – is unattainable. Who is to say that all the possible questions that we may ask of it will eventually be exhausted? Phenomenology, as a perpetual return to beginnings, is antithetical to such a moment of exhaustion.

24. Descartes did not make a clear distinction between adequacy of evidence and that of an apodictic order. In the "Objections and Replies," it is quite obvious that he requires such a distinction and that it is operative to a certain extent (even though it is never thematized). It is difficult to find any hint of this in the Meditations themselves.

25. Consider Freud and the conscious / unconscious disjunction.

    Liminal = (Latin: limen = threshold) relating to the point (or threshold) beyond which a sensation becomes too faint to be experienced. Subliminal (Latin: sub [under] and limen [threshold]. This expression is often treated as being synonymous with subnoetic and anoetic. Residing below the threshold of consciousness; beneath recognition by consciousness. See Peter Angeles's Dictionary of Philosophy. Harper and Row, 1981.

    For Husserl, the subliminal is not equivalent to the anoetic. The noeses bear this horizon within themselves. One must not confuse that which does not appear before consciousness as an object of recognition with that which is not of consciousness and which may well be capable of being made present as a theme for consciousness. Without this, Freud's clinical 'principle of principles' would lack force – i.e., that 'where id was, ego shall be.' Freud first came to the notion of the unconscious through the observation of neurotic symptoms / phenomena – which he took as visible traces / signs of a 'repressive activity' that consigned certain ideas to a region of comparative invisibility. It is a question of only 'comparative'
invisibility, since the repressed material was 'indicated' by many forms of neurotic behaviour, dreams, and slips of the tongue (parapraxes), which provided a starting-point from which to begin to uncover it – to illuminate its significance.

Freud's discourse on the unconscious became more sophisticated and elaborate in the later part of his career (see the various metapsychological papers that are included in the collection entitled: *On Metapsychology: the theory of psychoanalysis*, Penguin) and extended into diverse aspects of this deep-level psychology. His 'economic' model, in particular – which focused on an unconscious play of forces – extended into a more primordial field of energy (*Trieben* – drives) than the form of unconscious that is originally produced through higher level acts of repression. This field required a whole new set of distinctions.

All that is repressed is indeed unconscious, but not all that is unconscious, according to Freud, has been repressed. Part of the ego itself is, and has always been, unconscious. In this sense, there are invisible elements of the psyche that have never been present.

At yet another level, Freud also had to take account of the *pre*-conscious dimension of virtual information that is available for reiteration (because it has not been repressed), but would over-saturate the mind if it were conscious all at once. Imagine what it would be like if the entire history of one's knowledge and experience was present contemporaneously. Rather than ‘pushing away,’ it is more a case of letting go. The latter involves a form of forgetting, while the former involves a forgetting of the forgetting. The expression *un*-conscious points to a field that is profoundly deeper. Nevertheless, despite Freud's more mature views, which culminated in his discourse on the unconscious as *id* (*es* / *it*) – which focused not so much on repressed 'ideas' as on primordial and unconscious 'drives' (*Trieben*, which are not to be confused with instincts, as in the standard translations) – the gateway to the unconscious is still illuminated by signs (chains of symbolic associations) which showed that that which was unconscious was not wholly invisible. It leaves traces of itself.
The Freudian disjunctions between the conscious, pre-conscious and unconscious are not at work in Husserl's phenomenology precisely because consciousness is by no means equivalent to Freud's conception of the 'conscious.' Freud’s writing on consciousness is rather sparse, since his inquiries were generally concerned with the 'unconscious' (especially that which had never been conscious). This also resulted in a rather sketchy model of the conscious field of mental life.

The breadth of Husserl's conception of intentional consciousness stands in better comparison to Freud's notion of the 'psyche,' which embodied the conscious / pre-conscious / unconscious disjunctions within itself. But here, all similarity ends – or can only be maintained rather tenuously through a distortion of their texts.

In Eugen Fink's 'Appendix on the Problem of the Unconscious' in Husserl's *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* it is stressed that...

Only after an explicit analysis of consciousness can the problem of the unconscious be posed at all. But only in the working mastery of this problem will it be revealed whether or not the 'unconscious' can be treated according to the method of intentional analysis (*The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* [Crisis]. p.387).

Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur, and Jacques Derrida have made significant contributions to this area of analysis. In the case of Merleau-Ponty, see note 14 of the Introduction above.

26. See, in particular, the second meditation of Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations.*
27. For even the presence of an appearance, in the mundane pre-phenomenological sense of an image, entails that it must be able to announce itself as image. The appearing of the appearance establishes 'how' the appearance presents itself. It is the modal organization or contextualization of the content of appearance in its appearing.


30. See pp.135/37 of the Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry," for a particularly interesting treatment of Husserl's discourse on temporalization. It is here that Derrida recognizes that "...the Living Present of consciousness holds itself as the primordial Absolute only in an indefinite protention, animated and unified by the Idea (in the Kantian sense) of the total flux of lived experience" (p.136).

31. The complementarity of rigour and play in Derrida's writing often seems to go unnoticed. Take, for example, the perspective of Richard Rorty – which appears to be caught up in an either / or bi-polarity. See "Deconstruction as a Kind of Writing" (Consequences of Pragmatism. University of Nebraska Press, 1982) and especially the essay "Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?" (Derrida: a Critical Reader. Edited by David Wood. Blackwell. 1992).

32. These related issues are partly inspired by Augustine's problem, in section 20 of Book XI of the Confessions, where he ponders over the question of whether we can speak of the
future or the past as actually existing. He decides that we can only do so if we speak of the future as a presently occurring anticipation and the past as a presently occurring act of remembering.

The now is the fulcrum of 'existence' or being for Augustine. However, it is the basis of a 'cosmology,' not a phenomenology. He oscillates between the two orientations (a symptom of Aristotelianism) without realizing that he is doing so – beginning in a cosmology and ending with a singularly phenomenological orientation. "It seems to me," St. Augustine writes, "that time is merely an extension, though of what it is an extension I do not know. I begin to wonder whether it is an extension of the mind itself" (Confessions. Book 11, §26).

The operative schema that determines Augustine's thought on time is one in which the now or present is not extended – even though his later speculation about the possibility of time being an extension of the mind problematizes such a viewpoint. He never actually raised this as a problem and did not really explore the question of the structure of the now itself. Contrary to the 'tone' of Derrida's reading of the lectures on time-consciousness, Husserl does! In The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, the discourse on the now does not determine its being in terms of an extensionless point (which Derrida realizes, but also equivocates over in a rather disingenuous way [see Speech and Phenomena, p.61]), but as a stretched horizon that is protentionally ahead of itself. Likewise, with respect to the constitutive role of retention as the horizon of its before-itself.

In the following passage, quoted below, we find the culmination of Husserl's claim that when we speak of retention it is not as a past-consciousness, but a present consciousness of pastness: it is the giving of having-beenness. The retained is that which is given up by the present retention as that which is no-longer.
Retention constitutes the living horizon of the now; I have in it a consciousness of the 'just-past' (Husserl. *PITC*. §18, p.66).

*The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* can be seen to provide an extraordinarily sophisticated and yet radically clear elaboration of Augustine’s primary themes in his meditations on time. Husserl gives us a phenomenological description of what must necessarily be entailed in the constitution of the past as present-recollection and the future as present-expectation.

However, unlike Augustine's discourse on the non-extension of the now, Husserl shows how it must, necessarily, be a *field*. The former makes the mistake of hypostatizing the mathematical point-system by which duration is measured and confusing it with the structure of time itself.

33. In section 41 of *PITC: Self-Evidence of the Immanent Content – Alteration and Constancy* – Husserl writes,

If one speaks of the self-evident givenness of an immanent content, it is obvious that this self-evidence cannot mean indubitable certainty with regard to the temporal existence of a sound at a point. Self-evidence so grasped...I would hold to be fiction (p.111).

34. See note 14 to the Introduction above.

35. The now is *principally* a horizontal 'form' not an object or some kind of content. It is "...a form that persists through continuous change of content" (*Ideas I*. §81, p.218).
36. But, is this Derrida's 'actual' position? It certainly is according to Gasché's reading. However, let us return for a moment to the textual source from which Gasché appropriated this statement – the essay "Genesis and Structure" (Writing and Difference). Here, we find that Derrida's claim concerning the limits of Husserl's 'principle of principles' is specifically raised in regard to the 'static' (structural) context of its thematization in Ideas 1 – which, he believes, makes it unsuitable for any analysis of 'constitution' that seeks to engage with the related questions of time, alterity and history. Derrida writes,

If, on the level at which Ideas remains, Husserl...keeps to the constituted hyle-morphic correlation, it is that his analyses are still developed (and will they not always be so, in a certain way?) from within a constituted temporality. Now, at its greatest depth and in its pure specificity the hyle is primarily temporal matter. It is the possibility of genesis itself. Thus at these two poles of opening and from within the very transcendental structure of all consciousness there would arise the necessity for the transition to a genetic constitution and for the new 'transcendental aesthetic' which will be announced unceasingly but will be deferred always, and within which the themes of the Other and of time were to have permitted their irreducible complicity to appear. It is that the constitution of the other and of time refers phenomenology to a zone in which its 'principle of principles' (as we see it, its metaphysical principle: the original self-evidence and presence of the thing itself in person) is radically put into question. In any event, as can be seen, the necessity of this transformation from the structural to the genetic is nothing less than the necessity of a break or a conversion (pp.163-64).
Rather than actually reducing the scope of phenomenology to the limits of an objectivist 'principle of principles,' Derrida is primarily raising the problem of its static aspect within the context of Husserl's *Ideas I* (in terms of the language of 'correlations' based upon an already constituted temporality) and giving voice to the necessity of a radical reorientation by questioning its applicability for a genetic phenomenology. This 'break' or 'conversion' is precisely that which is announced by Husserl in regard to the transcendental reduction and the movement of Abbau – which is a specifically genetic turn (*re-turn* inquiry – *Rückfrage*) within its horizon. Derrida's remarks on this radical re-orientation do not indicate a transgression of phenomenology in general, but only mark out the site of a transition that phenomenology, itself, must embrace (and does, as Derrida himself indicates in his essay "Genesis and Structure," [*WD*]). The shift from static to genetic phenomenology must continually re-evaluate its 'principle of principles.' The latter does refer, even at the level of *Ideas I*, to the constitutive role played by the noeses in the unfolding of the appearing of appearances, but it must be adjusted to take account of the genetic structurality of such constitution in flux (the constitution of temporality). This refers phenomenology to a region for which, as Husserl says, "names are lacking" (*PITC*, §36, p.100).

When Derrida points out the "necessity for the transition to a genetic constitution and for the new 'transcendental aesthetic,'" and remarks that this "will be announced unceasingly but will be deferred always," it is strange that he does not acknowledge Husserl's lectures on time consciousness (1905-10) in this regard. Although these lectures were not published until 1928 as *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* (fifteen years after the publication of *Ideas I*), it could hardly be said, with the addition of the *Cartesian Meditations*, *Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, and the lecture notes (edited by Ludwig Landgrebe), which make up the text entitled *Experience and Judgement*, that this transition was 'deferred always.' As for whether Husserl does actually disclose a
horizon "within which the themes of the Other and of time were to have permitted their irreducible complicity to appear", the reader will be able to judge for him/herself during our investigation of the double intentionality of retention (a little later on). I will show how Husserl's concept of the double intentionality of retention expresses a tension and ex-tension that thematically brings out the functional complicity of temporality and alterity through a movement of delayed return.

37. This is apparent to even the most pedestrian readings of Derrida's *Introduction to Husserl's “Origin of Geometry”* and *Speech and Phenomena*. 
1. *Le problème de la genese dans la philosophie de Husserl* is the title of Derrida's MA dissertation – which was written during the years 1953-54, but not published until 1990. His first published text was the “*L'Origine de la Geometrie*” de Husserl (1962 [*IHOG*]). The most significant text that followed – in that it situated itself in an almost diametrical opposition to the orientation of the earlier *IHOG* – was *La Voix et le Phénomène* [*SP*] (1967). There are also some shorter essays that dedicate themselves to the examination of Husserl's phenomenology. With the context of the present discussion in mind, these include “Genese et Structure et la phenomenologie” (which was first given as a lecture in 1959 and first published in 1964 “Genese et structure,” edited by Gandillac, Goldmann and Piaget. The Hague: Mouton) and “La Forme et le vouloir-dire: Note sur la phenomenologie du langage” (published in *Revue internationale de philosophie*, 1967).

2. Derrida is clearly re-iterating the viewpoint of *Speech and Phenomena*’s treatment of Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* when he writes that...

   ...the concept of trace is incompatible with the concept of retention, of the becoming-past of what has been present. One cannot think the trace – and therefore, *différance* – on the basis of the present, or of the presence of the present ("*Différance,*" Margins. p.21).

   Derrida's attempt to re-think a temporality that is not restricted to the thought of the past as a past-present and the future as a future-present is motivated by his inappropriate reading of the present as a point-like now in Husserl's lectures on time. For Derrida,
phenomenology merely maintains the metaphysical perspective in which the "...past and future are always determined as past presents or as future presents ("Ousia and Grammé," *Margins*. p.34). He clearly, but incorrectly, sees 'retention' as a concept that is bound to the thought of the passage of time as the production of a "...line of modified present tenses" ("Ellipsis," *WD*, p.300). The phenomenological discourse on retention 'cannot' be reduced to this model of temporality!

If one takes retention in isolation, then it might be true to say that the trace is not compatible with retention, but not for the reasons mentioned above. However, when protention is restored as a fundamental horizon of retention itself through the thought of their 'essential' interpenetration, then the incompatibility dissolves. This is precisely because the trace as tracing rather than retained trace is the marking out of the crossing-over of protention into retention – which is the tracing of the present.

The trace, as the signature of an 'always-already-in-repetition,' also expresses the protentional dimension of the tracing of the present in which the latter is the fulfilment of the former. The present is the constituted site or stage of the infinite re-iteration of this intertwining of future and past: protention passing-over into retention is the condition of the fulfilment of the present. It is in the concept of protention that we find the gerundial form of the trace: tracing in contrast to merely retained trace. Evans makes a similar point on p.122 of *Strategies of Deconstruction*.

In Derridian terms, this movement (as is also the case for Husserl) has no beginning. It is the originary movement of the trace, of proto-writing. It has always already been in repetition. This movement is both temporalizing and spatializing. It is the site of their intertwining, or rather, since this is prior to a site, a location, or a place, it is the u-topic horizon of their articulation. The transcendental quasi-concept of *différance*, which thematizes their indifference before the pure structurality of repetition – as difference and delay – through
which they unfold as temporalizing and spatializing, is a motif that indicates what one might
call the 'essence' of the Husserlian concept of pure flux.

To think this movement in terms of the tri-dimensional play of the horizon of the
Living Present (lebendige Gegenwart) is to get closest to the meaning of the pluri-
dimensionality that Husserl's concept of Absolute Flux (as the primordial form of temporality)
originally signifies.

Of course, the real problem with Derrida's account of Husserl's discourse on time has to
do with his inappropriate characterization of the present discussed so far. However, when he
speaks of going through Husserl's texts in terms of the kind of "...reading that can be neither
simple commentary nor simple interpretation" (SP. The Supplement of Origin, p.88) Derrida
'does' phenomenology as opposed to merely undertaking a critical 'textual analysis.' His
reading of Husserl's Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness and the appropriation of
its theoretical models (which is not 'limited' to the erroneous perspective on the now as point)
is more crucial than that which he subjects to critical examination in Husserl's Logical
Investigations. Derrida's enterprise (in Speech and Phenomena) is legitimately
'phenomenological' in that the appropriation of Husserl's 'deeper' insights in the lectures on
time-consciousness point to the need for a re-examination of his earlier claims regarding the
respective roles of expression and indication. The Phenomenology of Internal Time
Consciousness (lectures of 1904/5-10 – published in 1928) addresses a far deeper dimension
than that of the Logical Investigations (1901). Although it is a later text, it explores a
dimension of constitution that is 'earlier' than the constituted space of the primarily static
orientation of the text of 1901. In other words, the horizon in which the analyses of the Logical
Investigations move already presupposes the constitutive performance of that which is at the
focus of the later text. Derrida's approach to Husserl's phenomenology is non-linear and non-
chronological, and for a number of legitimate reasons. The conditions of possibility of any
experience – uncovered in Husserl's lectures on time-consciousness – demand a continued 
critique of the meaning of the distinction between expression and indication.

Clearly, this is a response to Husserl's call for a 'phenomenology of phenomenology.'
Derrida writes,

The distinction between indication and expression appears first of all in the necessary 
and provisionally 'objectivist' phase of phenomenology, when empirical subjectivity 
has to be neutralized. Will it retain all its value when transcendental themes deepen the 
analysis? Will it do so when we come back to the constituting subjectivity? Such is the 
question. Husserl never again broached it (SP. p.30).

First of all, one must not confuse this 'objectivist phase' with an object-theory of 
perception. Husserl's phenomenological orientation concerns a 'content-theory' of perception. 
The principal thrust of Derrida's question right here, revolves around his determination of 
Husserl's understanding of expression as pure unmediated disclosure – the instantaneity of 
hearing-oneself-speak; discourse without an indicative detour, without alterity.

It is from the point of view of time and history that Husserl does, in a sense, return to 
this issue. In the Crisis (his last unfinished text) he presents a very different account of 
discourse with oneself – as if to an Other. See note 27 of the Introduction above for another 

It is certainly possible to argue that Derrida is showing a certain fidelity to the basic 
principles of phenomenological interrogation – as a critique that demands a ‘perpetual return to 
beginnings.’ However, caution is advised since there is still a great difference between the 
conscientiousness of Derrida's motivation to write and the actual rigour of his reading. When, 
in Speech and Phenomena, he subjects Husserl's distinction between expression and indication

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to a deconstructive critique, he does so through an appeal to the lectures on time. This later research focuses on the structures and forms of any possible experience that Husserl's earlier text (the *Logical Investigations*) must, as we have already indicated, already presuppose. However, there is a problem with Derrida's push toward discourse on retention and protention as forms of 'indication.' Since retentions (like primal impressions) are 'perceptions' – when perception is defined as an 'originary giving' – they too are 'expressions' and 'not' indications. Indications might, more suitably, be relegated to the sphere of secondary remembrances or expectations – as distinct from retentions as primary remembrances (in which the past is given originarily) or protentions as primary anticipations (in which the future originally 'gives' itself as an open horizon prior to any delimited forms of expectation).

The difference between primal impression and retentions and protentions is not that of a difference between perception and non-perception, but of different modalities of perception. And, despite Derrida's viewpoint, the difference between retention and secondary remembrance is not a question of "a difference between two modifications of non-perception" (*SP* p.65), but precisely between perception and non-perception (presentation and reproductive presentification) – that is, when one is working with the second definition of perception as 'originary presentation' in which retention is also a perception. Derrida would maintain (and has) that perception (which primarily involves the issue of 'expression') is riddled through and through with 'indications,' but he does this by appealing to the retentional and protentional moments of consciousness, which he sees as 'indications.' This is inappropriate given Husserl's general definition of perception as an originary giving. Derrida's argument only works if one applies it to Husserl's narrower reference to perception as an immediate giving of that which is 'now' in contrast to that which is remembered – that is, no-longer-now. However, there is also an open extension of the past, a horizon that gives itself originarily and not merely through an indicative detour. Retention is a primordial orientation
and not to be reduced to that which is retained. With protention – which is the giving (not the indication) of the future as an 'open' horizon – retention is a 'present' performance. In this context it is important not to think of 'performance' as in any way related to ego motivated activity. Retention is not simply a past-consciousness retained, but is a present-consciousness of the past. That this consciousness of the past is a retention of that which was a former present is only one component of the retentional horizon. When retention is thought in its intertwining with protention (the latter being an empty or open extension of the future), we also find an 'open' horizon of the past. This openness is not a question of an empty or vacant past, but of an 'always-already-past': pastness. This is the horizon in which past-presents can first stand-out as such. Retention is 'primary' because it produces that which offers itself up to the reflective performance of secondary remembrance. It is the difference between the horizon (which must always already be available for re-iteration) and that which can be made to stand-out within or from this horizon.

3. The non-linearity of pluri-dimensional symbolic thought: consider multimedia forms – multiple choice applications that have no pre-determined sequential form to the way in which they are organised. The consecutivity of their order occurs through choices. Linearity is something that patterns itself upon a more originary order of significance. This is a purely phenomenological point of view! Thus, linearity does not determine the 'ways' in which states of affairs unfold. It is only a consequence of 'how' they ultimately unfold. We cannot disregard the theme of linearity, but by the same token, it cannot maintain the sense of primacy that has always been attributed to it.

Derrida's comments in the interview "Implications" (Positions) on the labyrinthine structure of his writing is particularly relevant here. He speaks of a 'strange geometry' that makes reference to the pluri-dimensional and non-linear connectivity of his early texts.
Derrida: One can take *Of Grammatology* as a long essay articulated in two parts (whose juncture is not empirical, but theoretical, systematic) into the middle of which one could staple *Writing and Difference*. *Grammatology* often calls upon it. In this case, the interpretation of Rousseau would also be the twelfth 'table' of the collection. Inversely, one could insert *Of Grammatology* into the middle of *Writing and Difference*, since six of the texts in that work preceded – *de facto* and *de jure* – the publication in *Critique* (two years ago) of the articles that announced *Of Grammatology*; the last five texts, beginning with 'Freud and the Scene of Writing,' are engaged in the grammatological opening. But things cannot be reconstituted so easily, as you may well imagine. In any case, that two 'volumes' are to be inscribed one in the middle of the other is due, you will agree, to a strange geometry, of which these texts are doubtless the contemporaries.

Ronse: And *Speech and Phenomena*?

Derrida: I forgot. It is perhaps the essay which I like the most. Doubtless, I could have bound it as a long note to one or the other of the two works. *Of Grammatology* refers to it and economizes its development. But in a classical philosophical architecture, *Speech and Phenomena* would come first: in it is posed, at a point which appears juridically decisive for reasons that I cannot explain here, the question of the privilege of the voice and of phonetic writing in their relationship to the entire history of the West, such as this history can be represented by the history of metaphysics, and metaphysics in its most modern, critical, and vigilant form: Husserl's transcendent phenomenology. What is 'meaning,' what are its historical relationships to what is purportedly identified under the rubric 'voice' as a value of presence, presence of the object, presence of meaning to consciousness, self-presence in so-called living speech and in self-consciousness? The
essay which asks these questions can also be read as the other side (recto or verso, as you wish) of another essay, published in 1962, as the Introduction to Husserl's *The Origin of Geometry*. In this essay the problematic of writing was already in place as such, bound to the irreducible structure of 'deferral' in its relationships to consciousness, presence, science, history and the history of science, the disappearance or delay of the origin, etc. (pp.4-5).

Henri Ronse charges Derrida with having led him into a "labyrinth."

*Derrida:* All these texts, which are doubtless the interminable preface to another text that one day I would like to have the force to write, or still the epigraph to another that I would never have the audacity to write, are only the commentary on the sentence about a labyrinth of ciphers that is the epigraph to *Speech and Phenomena* (p.5).

4. See in particular the interview with Richard Kearney (*Dialogues with contemporary Continental thinkers [DCCT]*) , and "Implications" (*Positions*).

Quite apart from these interviews, virtually every text by Derrida, which engages with Husserl (except perhaps the *Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry"*), has a tendency to impress upon us the idea that deconstruction has taken a step beyond the limits of phenomenology. However, these limits, as adumbrated by Derrida, are often based on readings that are quite inappropriate to the actual context of Husserl's analyses. How are we to assess Derrida's stronger claims about the radicality of deconstruction over, above and beyond the limits that he has either uncovered or projected onto phenomenology? With respect to these two very alternative orientations (alternative, but immensely difficult to unravel), we ourselves, should be open to both points of view.
5. All references are to the appendices as numbered in David Carr's selective translation.

6. The past and future give themselves, to speak metaphorically, from the point of view of the present (which, in itself, is always already stretched), not only as 'objects of remembrances' (past presents) or as determinate 'expectations' (future presents), but also as 'open extensions.' These horizons always recede from the actual point of vision. Derrida has the habit of attributing a hypostatized model of the present to Western philosophy (see note 2 [Part Two] above). From a phenomenological perspective, the present is not an object. It is not even reducible to a noematic counterpart. It is a field, but not one that is principally a 'toward-which.' It is the locus of an orientation – a 'from-which.' The former is indeed one aspect of the present as lived, but it is not primordial. The present as a 'toward-which' is always accompanied by past and futural horizons whose signatures or traces are already constitutive of the present as a 'from-which.' The present as Gegenwart also means a 'waiting-towards.' This is not merely about a waiting towards some thing. This speaks of the 'open horizon' in which there can be such an extending in the first place.

7. Retentions are not simply retentions in an 'objective' sense i.e., specific contents of apprehensions retained. Retentions retain other temporal orientations – 'of' or 'toward' objects. These temporal orientations are not objects 'for' temporalizing consciousness (although they can be made to appear as such at a higher level of reflection), but are orientations of consciousness in its changing 'modes' of directedness-toward temporal objects. Retended orientations retain previously retended orientations within themselves. Each retention bears within itself a history of continuous modification of orientation – where the continuous modification means a certain holding-back / delay which produces a sinking-down of
experience into the past. In other words, retention is the extension of a continuum that is embodied within itself.

Such a retentional tracing of modification or 'continuous alteration' always already precedes the apprehension of any temporal object, for this shifting of orientation is the originary illumination of any content. In a sense, the content is the same, but delayed in its givenness with reference to the present. It is given in different lights (the same, but non-identical) – beacons, signs of the unfolding of its duration.

From this angle, retention cannot be adequately grasped or explained in terms of a process of doubling – unless one really stretches its meaning[s]. It might be possible to say that the continuum itself involves doubling, but again, the temporality of delay gets lost.

8. Gasché writes...

...différance is...an archesynthesis that no longer privileges contradiction as the one outstanding and dominating mode of difference, destined to subjugate all other kinds of difference. Différance, in this sense, is more originary than difference modelled after the law of thought according to which the opposite of a true proposition is necessarily false, or after the dialectical law according to which the negativity of true contradiction makes it the speculative Other, and hence one moment in the becoming of truth." TM, p.204.

9. The reader should refer to Derrida's remarks about 'institution.' Instituted traces are instituting and instituting traces are instituted. Therefore, the sense of 'instituted' here is not easily reducible to the traditional distinction between producer and produced. It is rather a case of production as 'produced-producing.'
Consider Derrida's following remarks on 'retention' and the sense in which 'difference appears.' They are worth bearing in mind when we examine, in closer detail, the question of iterability and the structure of retention as fundamental conditions of temporal constitution. The first part of the following passage can be found in the Introduction to this thesis – in the section entitled "The Epochal Play of Time as Task."

The instituted trace cannot be thought without thinking the retention of difference within a structure of reference where difference appears as such and thus permits a certain liberty of variations among the full terms. The absence of another here-and-now, of another transcendental present, of another origin of the world appearing as such, presenting itself as irreducible absence within the presence of the trace, is not a metaphysical formula substituted for a scientific concept of writing (OG, pp.46-47).

10. See Derrida's comments on this classic Leibnizian formulation of the space / time dyad (which stretches back into antiquity) in the essay "Ousia and Grammé" (Margins, p.54).

11. This has been the subject of a protracted debate between Saussurean scholars. If any kind of criticism is to be directed at Saussure's editors, it should be remembered that they were faced with an almost impossible task. Saussure did not prepare the Course for publication. The text we know today was published three years after his death – the structure of which was the result of a careful, but also 'creative,' synthesis of a number of students’ lecture notes. The devotion and commitment of Saussure's editors to such a difficult project can only be admired.
In the following passage Derrida comments on linearist thinking as the expression of a mundane and vulgar concept of time – a linear model that has become so firmly habituated in our language (even as a model for language) that it tends to resist a critical form of access to it.

The process of linearization, as Leroi-Gourhan describes it on a very vast historical scale, and the Jacobsonian critique of Saussure's linearist concept, must be thought of together. The 'line' represents only a particular model, whatever might be its privilege. This model *has become* a model and, as a model, it remains inaccessible. If one allows that the linearity of language entails this vulgar and mundane concept of temporality (homogeneous, dominated by the form of the now and the ideal of continuous movement, straight or circular) which Heidegger shows to be the intrinsic determining concept of all ontology from Aristotle to Hegel, the meditation upon writing and the deconstruction of the history of philosophy become inseparable. The enigmatic model of the *line* is thus the very thing that philosophy could not see when it had its eyes open on the interior of its own history. This night begins to lighten a little at the moment when linearity – which is not loss or absence but the repression of pluri-dimensional symbolic thought – relaxes its oppression because it begins to sterilize the technical and scientific economy that it has long favoured (*OG*, p.87).

There is an even stronger thesis in Derrida's writing, in the claim that there is no other 'authentic' concept of temporalization beyond the vulgar, which would also suggest that...

...perhaps there is no 'vulgar concept of time.' The concept of time, in all its aspects, belongs to metaphysics, and it names the domination of presence. Therefore we can only conclude that the entire system of metaphysical concepts, throughout its history,
develops the so-called 'vulgarity' of the concept of time (which Heidegger, doubtless, would not contest), but also that an other concept of time cannot be opposed to it, since time in general belongs to metaphysical conceptuality. In attempting to produce this other concept, one rapidly would come to see that it is constructed out of other metaphysical or ontotheological predicates ("Ousia and Grammé," Margins. p.63).

Derrida then goes on to ask...

...is there not at least some Platonism in the verfallen? Why determine as fall the passage from one temporality to another? And why qualify temporality as authentic – or proper (eigentlich) – and as inauthentic – or improper – when every ethical preoccupation has been suspended? (Ibid).

This is a fair question – and one that is certainly applicable to Heidegger's discourse on time. However, Derrida arrives at this thought via a slightly different proposition.

Now, is not the opposition of the primordial to the derivative still metaphysical? Is not the quest for an archia in general, no matter with what precautions one surrounds the concept, still the 'essential' operation of metaphysics? (Ibid).

Derrida suggests that the difference between the originary and secondary exhibits the same kind of value structure. Is this always the case? It is not at all clear that even he has escaped this particular difference.

When he suggests that there is no 'authentic' alternative to the 'vulgar concept of time,' he provides alternatives without attaching any of them to either one side or the other of the
authentic / inauthentic dyad. However, would he be entitled to say that he has shifted beyond the theme of time because he has substituted this expression by writing or trace? What is in a name? Derrida begins with a very narrow conception of the meaning of time as applied to Western metaphysics. Although his own discourse on temporally related themes is extremely sophisticated, he does not revise this viewpoint, but simply re-situates discourse on temporality by employing a constellation of alternative neologisms. However, Derrida's whole discourse exhibits an "inability to keep temporally loaded terms out of his analysis" (Wood, *The Deconstruction of Time*. p.113).

13. It is with respect to this that Derrida asks why the phonetic evolution of language through writing (i.e., the changes it brings by means of the gradual alteration of the phonemes's graphic counterparts) is 'bad.' This question echoes Derrida's discussion on the platonic bias in the *Phaedrus* (see *SP*), which assigns privilege to spoken language, while ostensibly denigrating the role of writing. This division also finds its correlate in the way in which Plato distinguishes between 'good' and 'bad' representation in Book X of *The Republic*. What is the reason for such an 'ethical' distinction? For Derrida, it is borne out of a strict bifurcation between presence and re-presentation – which also translates into the classical disjunctions between passivity and activity and the static and evolutionary.

   There is no such ethical limitation in Husserl's phenomenology of temporal constitution, but there is a distinction between originary giving and that of a secondary order. One could say of the following quotation from Husserl's *PITC* that it expresses the conditions of possibility of both the synchronic (static) and diachronic (evolutionary) dimensions of language as defined by Saussure without formally bifurcating them. In Section 35: *Differences between the Constituted Unities and the Constitutive Flux*, Husserl writes,
In principle, every phase of alteration can broaden into something static, every phase of the static can lead to an alteration. If, in comparison therewith, we now consider the constitutive phenomena, we find a flux, and every phase of this flux is a continuity of shading. However, in principle, no phase of this flux is to be broadened out to a continuous succession; therefore, the flux should not be thought to be so transformed that this phase is extended in identity with itself. Quite to the contrary, we find necessarily and essentially a flux of continuous alteration, and this alteration has the absurd property [das Absurde] that it flows exactly as it flows and can flow neither 'more swiftly' nor 'more slowly.' Consequently, any Object which is altered is lacking here, and inasmuch as in every process 'something' proceeds, it is not a question here of a process. There is nothing here which is altered, and therefore it makes no sense to speak of something that endures. It is also senseless, therefore, to wish to find anything which in a duration is not once altered (§35, p.99).

Of course, with this orientation the usual dyadic categories that delimit discourse on langue and parole (the static and evolutionary) space and time, continuity and alteration, genesis and structure, etc., are quite insufficient. They are inadequate to the task of grasping the structurality of such a dimension. This horizon bears little in resemblance to that which can be adumbrated by any traditional discourse on time. It also upsets the specific form of the primordial / constituted disjunction that Derrida applies to Husserl.

The intertwining of passivity and activity: activity, in its directedness towards the future, establishes its focus by simultaneously being informed [passivity] by the past – while at the same time reorganizing (in other words, acting / working upon) the significance, structural presentation and, thus, the meaning of the past. In Husserl's phenomenology, the reproductive (presentificational rather than presentational) correlates to retention and protention are known
as secondary remembrance and expectation. These are generally active, whereas the former intentionalities are, to a certain extent, passive. It is the difference between an 'act of evocation' and the tracing of a past horizon that extends itself to such an act – a horizon that always already precedes a reflective performance as a remembering. Absolute Flux is that which constitutes this horizon. At this depth though, we have to accept that we cannot rigidly separate passivity from activity. Here, we find that there is always activity in passivity and passivity in activity.

14. In The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness – section 38: Unity of the Flux of Consciousness and the Constitution of Simultaneity and Succession, Husserl writes...

...simultaneity is never without temporal succession and temporal succession is never without simultaneity. Consequently, simultaneity and temporal succession must be correlatively and inseparably constituted (p.104).

See also Appendix VII, The Constitution of Simultaneity, p.155. And in Ideas I, Husserl writes...

...every experience comes not only under the rubric of temporal succession in an essentially self-contained organization of experiences, but also under that of simultaneity. This means that every present moment of experience has about it a fringe of experiences, which also share the primordial now-form, and as such constitute the one primordial fringe of the pure ego, its total primordial now consciousness (§82, p.219).
15. The 'a' in *différance* cannot be discerned phonetically (it is not an 'audible' difference), but only visually (unless of course one is reading in Braille – but then audibility is already a secondary translation of that which is given through a 'tactile' medium). It is in the visual dimension that the 'a' in *différance* 'stands out' with all its spatial (graphic, structural) references. Braille too, has spatial references, for touch requires movement – kinesthesia: the brushing of the fingers across rough surfaces, inscriptions, traces, incisions, which break up the featureless continuity of smooth surfaces. Roughness cannot be determined without movement (which is always tied to spatiality), and what is movement if not a temporal re-organization of space?

In this seeing we perceive a sign of difference – and one which is distinctive in that, like the threefold continuity of sight, it signifies an intertwining of the spatial and the temporal. With the sign of the 'a' we are referred to a certain spatial/temporal indifference – for *différance* signifies a zone that is earlier than the difference between space and time.

16. There are, however, possibilities for re-situating Gasché's structuralist ambitions and reconstituting his model of infrastructures from the point of view of Merleau-Ponty's discourse on chiasm.

17. To speak of 'aspects' of *différance* does not restrict discourse to 'heterogeneous' infrastructures. These different aspects are spread-out by Gasché in a horizontal relation with one another. The verticality of their intertwining is never really brought into account.

18. Retention 'gives' pastness. In other words (to recapitulate), retention retains that which is no-longer now precisely by extending it (by means of retentions within retentions) as that which is no-longer now. Such an 'extending' is simultaneously a 'giving' and a 'delaying.'
However, this is not to limit retention to a past-present. Pastness, as given through retention, is always already a 'horizon' of the present. It is more a question of the Heideggerian 'It-gives' – which is prior to any site.

19. This gives us the practical possibility of the "I can."

20. According to Husserl,

Every experience is in itself a flow of becoming, it is what it is within an original engendering (Erzeugung) of an essential type that never changes: a constant flow of retentions and protentions mediated by a primordial phase which is itself in flux, in which the living now of the experience comes to consciousness contrasting with its 'before' and 'after.' On the other hand, every experience has its parallels in different forms of reproduction which can be regarded as ideal 'operative' transformations of the original experience; each has its 'exactly corresponding' and yet radically modified counterpart in a recollection, as also in a possible anticipation, in a possible fancy, and again in repetitions of such transformations (Ideas I, §78, p.202).

The source of this passage is particularly interesting given that Derrida treats Ideas I as a paradigm for that which is static in Husserl's phenomenology.

21. Husserl writes that...

If one says that every content attains consciousness only through an act of apprehension directed thereon, then the question immediately arises as to the consciousness in which
we are aware of this act, which itself is still a content. Thus, the infinite regress is unavoidable. However, if every 'content' necessarily and in itself is ['urbewusst' – primally conscious]* then the question of an additional dator consciousness becomes senseless.

Furthermore, every act of apprehension is itself a constituted unity of duration. During the time that it is built up, that which it is to make into an Object is long since gone by and would be – if we did not already presuppose the entire play of primal consciousness and retentions – no longer accessible to the act at all. However, because primal consciousness and retentions are on hand, the possibility exists in reflection of looking to the constituted lived experience and the constituting phases, and even becoming aware of the differences which exist, for example, between the primordial flux as we are conscious of it in primal consciousness and its retentional modifications (PITC. Appendix IX. p.163).

* **Important Note:** Translation modified – due to a discrepancy between unbewusst (unconscious) [1928] and urbewusst (primally conscious) Husserliana X, as noted by John Brough. Although the original manuscript has not been located, the context of Husserl’s statements clearly suggests that we go with urbewusst. Derrida quotes this passage in *Speech and Phenomena* (p. 63, Signs and the Blink of an Eye) but goes with unbewusst – which only further distorts his reading of Husserl in an attempt to show how his phenomenology could not accommodate the language of the Freudian unconscious. We cannot enter into this question here. See footnote 25 to Part One.

The paragraph immediately continues with the statement...
All the objections which have been raised against the method of reflection can be explained as arising from ignorance of the essential constitution of consciousness (*Ibid*).

The ‘essential constitution of consciousness’ is a question of intentionality. Given the centrality of Gasché's critique of the philosophy of reflection, and the limits of the language of duplicity that he employs to facilitate this critique, one wonders whether he should have paused here.

22. The reflexivity of intentional consciousness: One can superimpose Husserl's diagrams of the 'sinking-down' [*Herabsinken*] of time-consciousness (through its movement of retention) – the vertical sedimentation of pastness – onto the standard diagram that comprises an outward-directed arrow that simultaneously turns back upon itself in the form of a circle. To express this extension, if the circle is turned onto its side, one finds a spiral (imagine a spring). This 'stretching-out' indicates the temporal duration of the movement. Unlike the movement of the circle, the spiral is not closed. The circular tracing of the helix is such that, in lifting itself, it never quite reaches back upon itself. Although it traces out the same path of the circle from the point of view of the plane, when it is viewed vertically there is a dimensional difference.

23. Längsintentionalität is the German expression for this particular intentionality of (the double intentionality of) retention. John Brough translates it as 'horizontal' intentionality (refer to p.85 of his translation of the very comprehensive collection of Husserl's temporal analyses: *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (based on the Rudolph Boehm edition, *Husserliana* Vol. X [1966]). In the Churchill translation it appears as 'longitudinal intentionality.' On first appearance, there is little to choose between their respective
translations of this expression. However, since this intentionality is that which makes possible the bringing-together of different temporal moments as members of the same flow – “...being-all-at-once” – without erasing their different temporal signatures (e.g., like a moment of recall in which several distinct memories announce themselves simultaneously), this would indeed be constitutive of the 'horizontal' dimension of experience. The horizontal, in this sense, is none other than the flow’s (longitudinal) intending of itself in its flowing. For this reason, it is less confusing to adopt Churchill’s translation of Längsintentionalität as ‘longitudinal’ intentionality.

Querintentionalität (transverse intentionality) is intertwined with this intentionality, but it is directed towards the immanent temporal object, thus cutting across the direction of the flow, so to speak (Brough follows Churchill’s translation in this regard). Both intentionalities always already imply one another since the consciousness of the temporal necessarily coincides with the temporalization of consciousness itself.

My decision to use the J. S. Churchill translation of Edmund Husserl’s lectures on time consciousness, rather than the J. B. Brough version was based on a desire to resist being seduced into utilizing material that was not in the 1928 publication. Brough's excellent (though rather free) translation, based on the Rudolph Boehm edition (Husserliana Vol. X [1966]), includes notes that were not required for the task at hand since Derrida himself refers to the much shorter version of Husserl's temporal analyses as edited by Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger. Although Brough reproduces this version in full, the other notes presented an irresistible temptation to me.

Avoidance was required because the aim of the present study is to engage with Derrida on his own ground.
24. In "Time and Being," Heidegger speaks of a 'holding-back' as a way of giving.

What has-been which, by refusing the present, lets that be present which is no longer present; and the coming toward us of what is to come which, by withholding the present, lets that be present which is not yet present – both made manifest the manner of an extending opening up which gives all presencing into the open (OTB, p.17).
NOTES: Part Three

1. Retention and protention are interwoven through primal impression: the latter is literally the site of their intertwining. There is also a further triadic element in play here, which Derrida is right to thematize: a dialectic that, in "Ousia and Grammè," is said to re-lift [relever) itself through a shifting movement of maintenance [maintenance, maintenent, maintenir – maintain, now, to uphold; main – hand; tenir – to hold, ready-to-hand or presence at hand, etc.]. He is not speaking directly about Husserl's concept of primal impression, for it is clear that he goes out of his way to misrepresent it in the context of Husserl's investigations. However, Derrida's insight regarding the notion of re-lifting is such that it can be incorporated into Husserl's account.

   Primal impression, as the boundary between retention and protention, is the focus of a play of negotiation between fulfilment and non-fulfilment that, like all negotiation, involves 'degrees' of fulfilment. The writing of a life history is the marking out of reorganizations of orientation on the basis of the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of anticipations and expectations. This movement of negotiation and reorganization is built upon a certain constitutive moment of Aufhebung.

   See note 25 to the Introduction above for a quotation of Derrida's thematization of the dialectic of retention and protention.

2. See note 9 to Part One in reference to Derrida's employment of the pivotal phenomenological insight regarding the difference between the logic of appearing and that of appearances.
3. In the case of an instrument-maker, there is a certain question of 'use'. What is also required is advice from a musician – someone who also plays the instrument. However, this falls short of the ‘ideal’ purity that Plato appears to seek. The latter half of book X looks at the problem of poetry in relation to truth. Plato's whole approach is ironic in orientation in that he is really conducting a critique of the universal value attached to Homeric writing.

4. This effectively upsets the canon of thought by which representation is understood in terms of mere reproduction. It is significant that the word canon is derived from the Greek *kanon*, which literally means "a rule such as used by carpenters to set a straight line" (Peter Angeles. *Dictionary of Philosophy*, p.28). Once again, we are drawn back to the apparently more authentic position of the artisan as distinct from the artist. The rule of measure is caused to slide in Derrida's discourse on representation.

   There is a sense in which Derrida plays between the poles of artist and artisan (providing that we contemporize the role of the artist beyond Plato's archaic and impoverished definition) when we consider his comments on embracing both chance and necessity. One might be inclined to say that the deconstructionist requires the imagination of the artist and the conscience of the artisan. This would also be a defining characteristic of the phenomenologist – methodological necessity on the one hand and strategic risk on the other. Of course, any effective form of interrogation must involve both attitudes, but in phenomenology and deconstruction (or phenomenological-deconstruction), this is made thematic.

   \[
   \text{Necessity = rigour / method} \\
   \text{Chance = risk / strategy} \\
   \text{Both moments define the movement of play.}
   \]

5. See *Speech and Phenomena*, p.61.
6. See note 13 to Part Two above for a quotation of Husserl's comments.

7. Also, see Husserl's *Experience and Judgement* and *Cartesian Meditations* for some alternative routes of entry to these intertwined themes.

8. See the fourth meditation of Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* for a thoroughgoing examination of a multiplicity of different forms of ego-functioning. The ego as substrate of habitualities names a matrix of what in *Experience and Judgement* is expressed in terms of 'secondary passivity' – which does not restrict itself to the classic passive / active and structure / genesis disjunctions.

   Habituated activity is an exemplary instance of 'passivity in activity' and 'activity in passivity.' This quasi-mechanical form of activity is one that does not require thought as such – in other words, it is a 'passive-active' performance. Nonetheless, habituated behavioural patterns are not to be deemed as non-volitional – there is still an element of choice to be considered. At the same time, a reflective turn may bring about an alteration in the habituated behaviour and even rob it of its influence – thus rendering it passive by acting upon it. Despite the barely liminal nature of habituated performances – which gives them the right to be designated as passive (certainly from the point of view of 'conscious' experience) – they, themselves, are 'motivated.' Whether we should speak of an even deeper 'level' here is open to conjecture. The metaphorical power of the word level cannot be ignored in its capacity to conjure up the thought of the 'vertical' – for such motivations are certainly (to use another metaphor) more 'deeply sedimented.'

   It is interesting how certain animals (and human animals) when they find themselves in stressful situations, often lapse into ritualistic modes of behaviour that seem to ease their
discomfort. Grooming and nesting behaviours are extremely common in a variety of different symbolic act-forms (e.g., some species of birds, when threatened by a competitor, play out the habituated behaviour of preening themselves). Habit designates a way of being that is 'familiar' and non-threatening. Habituation / habitation is the way in which one lives.

Habit is homely – an active / passive performance or mode of being into which one can relax when the world appears unheimlich (un-homely, uncanny). The key point has to do with the need for a certain kind of 'repetition.' The Freudian concept of the 'pleasure principle' comes to mind here. Similarly, the idea of the 'death-drive,' as the motivated inversion of the 'pleasure principle,' suggests rich possibilities for speculation.

If we look to the Kierkegaardian and Heideggerian concepts of anxiety, we find other ways in which to examine the question of the impulse constitutive of the development of habituated performances. This brings us back to the Latin connection: habitat / habitus – habit is the product of a motivation that takes the form of flight from that which is un-homely / uncanny (*unheimlich*).

9. There is also a form of remembering that is only structurally analogous to the chronological-causal sequence of different times. It is not always the case that a linear causality makes itself *felt*. We do not always re-live the past from the standpoint of the present judgmental ego, which re-traces the order of former steps in its evolution according to present concerns. The question: "how did I come to this?" does not always have an answer. Sometimes it feels as though one-has-always-been-this (e.g., depression or remembering a particularly traumatic moment in the distant past and feeling that one not only *still* feels this way, but that one has *always* felt this way). There is a form of experiential time-travel (cerebral time-tripping) where different times can be experienced immanently without reflective critique of a causal-linear order – like being cut adrift from the present and the psychological-causal chains
that lead up to it. In this kind of experience, the past is the present. This form of time-travel is a common structure of dreams.

The history of Western philosophical thought persistently confuses time with the chronometer that measures rate of motion and change according to a purely linear perspective. This is the temporality about which Freud speaks in his denial that the unconscious knows anything of time. It is fair to ask whether this 'mode' of temporality is 'all' that he understood by the expression time.

10. Whenever I return to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (a child stillborn from the Press) my admiration for the conscientiousness, rigour, and courage of his investigations increases exponentially. The essay "Of Personal Identity" shakes the whole foundation of everything that precedes and works up to it. The Appendix gives us an honest declaration concerning the limits of his investigations. Hume's problem was twofold in that he considered...

...that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflection, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions (A Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix. p.636).
Thus, Hume claims the “‘privilege’ of a sceptic” without committing himself to full blown scepticism. His philosophical writing embodies an extremely rare combination of startling intellectual brilliance, methodological rigour (without doing away with risk), and genuine humility.

But, what legacy remains regarding the issue of the Self? Hume’s introspective analyses, which upset the basis of Cartesian certainty and the primacy of the Ego, have not done away with the Self. Rather, his rigorous investigations have re-situated it within a horizon in which it is no longer the master.

11. Husserl addresses the conditions of the possibility of any kind of history while, at the same time, taking account of real cultural, ethnic, and personal differences. He avoids the absolute incommensurabilities of pure relativism on the one hand, and on the other, avoids the concealment of difference that would be the consequence of a reduction of all sociality and tradition to a 'meta-general,' 'universal' or 'totalizing' language of history.

12. The 'practical I-can' of return is constituted through a kind of maintenance. Derrida makes much of the connection between the now and maintenance: maintenent / now (the maintenance of the now) / to hold in one's hand / the ready-to-hand, and the now as the present / presence in the sense of presence at hand, etc.

13. The Saussurean orientation, as Wood points out in *The Deconstruction of Time*, "...more modestly...gives some insight into the virtuality underlying the idea of repetition. Repetition supplies the numerical difference on the basis of which ideal identity (that is, ideality) can be made to appear. Derrida's reversal of the relationship between ideality and
repetition might be said to have completed in a temporal dimension what Saussure had begun from a synchronic perspective" (p.119).


15. Derrida writes,

The trace is not only the disappearance of origin – within the discourse that we sustain and according to the path that we follow it means that the origin did not even disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a non-origin, the trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin. From then on, to wrench the concept of the trace from the classical scheme, which would derive it from a presence or from an originary nontrace and which would make of it an empirical mark, one must indeed speak of an originary trace or archi-trace. Yet we know that that concept destroys its name and that, if all begins with the trace, there is above all no originary trace (OG, p.61).
NOTES: Afterword

1. Gasché's Derrida is more comfortably situated in the period beginning with *Disseminations* (originally published in 1972 as *La dissémination*. Paris: Seuil) rather than the phase of deconstruction that is examined by this thesis (1962-68).

   By engaging with Gasché's text, we are addressing a slightly different time-frame in Derrida's writing. It is not a case of confusing 'my Derrida' with 'Gasché's Derrida,' but of pointing to a theme in Derrida's own writing that should be brought out: that is, the problem of "hearing-oneself speak." Time / duration is the rupture in such self-coincidence. It is the alterity that already inhabits the space of hearing-oneself speak.

2. My inspiration came from Derrida himself when I met him a few years ago during his visit to Warwick University. After waiting for some time in the inevitable cue, I managed to speak with him. I did not want to take up too much of his time, but I did want to secure his attention. So, I told him that I hated his writing (a half-truth). He was great – the man did not flinch. There was a twinkle in his eye that expressed a subtle humour. Actually, what I meant to say was that I hated and loved his writing. The hate really came from the intense and protracted focus that his texts demand – the endless re-readings, not only of his writing, but also of the original texts that his writing deconstructs. The love expressed itself in the passion with which I continually responded to Derrida's invitation to return to the critical task at hand. Having got his attention I took full advantage of it and managed to find an answer (of a kind) to a question I had wondered about for some time. I ventured the opinion that the central argument of *Speech and Phenomena*, concerning Husserl's distinction between indication and expression in the *Logical Investigations*, was just a ruse. I went on to suggest that despite the principal focus of virtually every other text that has been written 'about' this engagement, his
book is primarily a reading of Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* – an examination of how its radical orientation forces us to re-situate discourse on the sign – and that this is the true agenda and the real significance of *Speech and Phenomena*. Although the inclusion of the *Logical Investigations* serves as a useful strategic device, it is actually a superfluous gesture from a theoretical point of view.

Apart from David Wood and J. Claude Evans, Derrida's reading of Husserl's lectures on time-consciousness is generally treated by most other commentators as a mere auxiliary to what is really going on. Evans also suggests that the tension in Husserl that Derrida brings out is not, perhaps, so much a difference between the lectures on time (1904/5-10) and the *Logical Investigations* (1901), but a tension that exists in the lectures themselves. However, he does not develop this.

When I expressed my viewpoint to Derrida, he raised an eyebrow (an 'indicative' sign), a gesture which, in this instance, did not suggest boredom or displeasure. I decided to take this as a positive sign that I was on a significant track in my re-reading of the relations between Derrida's work and that of Husserl. The principal problem lay in the question of 'how' I was to explore this field. I felt that it would be insufficient to simply write about the complex relations between Derrida's deconstruction and Husserl's phenomenology (a narrative format that is closer to Evans's approach). It was really a question of doubling or duplicating a number of Derrida's different narrative types in order to open a space in which their logics would unfold by the process of a certain doing.

My deconstruction of Gasché's text doubles Derrida's strategic re-reading of Husserl: his *double-reading*. In both cases, it is actually a case of the deconstruction of the closest of allies.
3. Gasché's appeal to deconstruction's roots in rigorous transcendental philosophy only really brings out the linearity of the movement. There are other non-linear temporalities that must be taken into account. Perhaps Gasché imagines that he is doing this when he also suggests that Derrida's discoveries are not contingent with respect to the particular routes that have been taken through Western philosophy. However, these are two extremes.

4. There is an interesting text that focuses on this movement of in / de-differentiation called *The Unconscious as Infinite Sets: an essay in bi-logic* by Ignacio Matte-Blanco. Duckworth. 1975.

5. See the opening paragraph to §32, p.99. of Husserl's *Ideas I*, where he writes...

...on good grounds we *limit* the universality of this *epoché*. For were it as inclusive as it is in general capable of being, then since every thesis and every judgement can be modified freely to any extent, and every objectivity that we can judge or criticize can be bracketed, no field would be left over for unmodified judgements, to say nothing of a science. But our design is just to uncover a new scientific domain, such as can be won precisely *through the method of bracketing*, though only through a definitely limited form of it.

6. One cannot ignore the trace of the *epoché* (phenomenological reduction) in play here. The suspension that occurs through the process of bracketing is not to be confused with any form of systematic doubt, for it signs the intention to withdraw from any position-taking whatsoever. It is the question of a certain kind of disinterestedness or indifference with respect to negativity or positivity and the law of the excluded-middle.
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