Soteriou, Matthew (2011) Review of Perception, by Robinson, H. Mind, Vol.120 (No.479). pp. 901-906. ISSN 0026-4423

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Abstract

Howard Robinson's Perception is now rightly regarded as essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the sense-datum theory of perception and its motivations. It should also be regarded as essential reading for those with a more general philosophical interest in perception and sensory consciousness. As well as discussing the history of the sense-datum theory, and the nature of sense-data and their relation to the physical world, Robinson offers critiques of physicalist theories of perception, intentional/representational theories, adverbial theories, and naive realist/disjunctivist theories. Along the way he also discusses Wittgenstein's private language argument and the nature of secondary qualities. Over the course of the book we are presented with a sustained, and forthright, defence of a sense-datum theory in its traditional form. The arguments are clear, briskly delivered, and challenging. Here I highlight two key elements in Robinson's case for a sense-datum theory, which I think pose an especially serious challenge for his opponents. These are his articulation and defence of the ‘phenomenal principle’ and his ‘revised’ causal argument for sense-data.

Item Type:	Book Review
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title:	Mind
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
ISSN:	0026-4423
Book Title:	Perception
Date:	July 2011
Volume:	Vol.120
Number:	No.479
Page Range:	pp. 901-906
Identification Number:	10.1093/mind/fzr063
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/42001

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