Review of Perception, by Robinson, H.
Soteriou, Matthew (2011) Review of Perception, by Robinson, H. Mind, Vol.120 (No.479). pp. 901-906. ISSN 0026-4423Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzr063
Howard Robinson's Perception is now rightly regarded as essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the sense-datum theory of perception and its motivations. It should also be regarded as essential reading for those with a more general philosophical interest in perception and sensory consciousness. As well as discussing the history of the sense-datum theory, and the nature of sense-data and their relation to the physical world, Robinson offers critiques of physicalist theories of perception, intentional/representational theories, adverbial theories, and naive realist/disjunctivist theories. Along the way he also discusses Wittgenstein's private language argument and the nature of secondary qualities. Over the course of the book we are presented with a sustained, and forthright, defence of a sense-datum theory in its traditional form. The arguments are clear, briskly delivered, and challenging. Here I highlight two key elements in Robinson's case for a sense-datum theory, which I think pose an especially serious challenge for his opponents. These are his articulation and defence of the ‘phenomenal principle’ and his ‘revised’ causal argument for sense-data.
|Item Type:||Book Review|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Mind|
|Publisher:||Oxford University Press|
|Official Date:||July 2011|
|Page Range:||pp. 901-906|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
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