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Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict
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Ghosal, Sayantan and Proto, Eugenio (2009) Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict. Journal of Public Economics, Vol.93 (No.9-10). pp. 1078-1089. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.05.003 ISSN 0047-2727.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.05.003
Abstract
We analyze a model where there is uncertainty about the future power of two ex-ante symmetric elites to appropriate surplus, and ex-ante surplus sharing agreements are not binding. We show that in an oligarchy, the stronger elite appropriates the entire available surplus, whereas a democracy results in a more balanced surplus allocation between the two elites. In a democracy, the newly enfranchised non-elite organize to act collectively, so that the weaker elite can credibly threaten to form a coalition with the organized non-elite against the stronger elite. Such a threat ensures that the more balanced surplus sharing proposal chosen by majority voting is renegotiation-proof. Therefore, sufficiently risk-averse elites unanimously choose democracy as a form of insurance against future imbalances in relative power. We emphasize that franchise extension to, and low cost of organizing collective political activity for, the non-elite are both necessary features of a democracy. Our formal analysis can account for the stylized facts that emerge from a comparative analysis of Indian and Western European democracies
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Public Economics | ||||
Publisher: | Elsevier BV, North-Holland | ||||
ISSN: | 0047-2727 | ||||
Official Date: | 2009 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Vol.93 | ||||
Number: | No.9-10 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 1078-1089 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.05.003 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
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