Iyer, Lakshmi and Mani, Anandi (2012) Traveling agents : political change and bureaucratic turnover in India. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.94 (No.3). pp. 723-739. doi:10.1162/REST_a_00183 ISSN 0034-6535.

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Abstract

We develop a framework to empirically examine how politicians with electoral pressures control bureaucrats with career concerns, and the consequent implications for bureaucrats' career investments. Unique micro-level data on Indian bureaucrats support our key predictions. Politicians use frequent reassignments (transfers) across posts of
varying importance to control bureaucrats. High-skilled bureaucrats face less frequent political transfers and lower variability in the importance of their posts. We find ev-
idence of two alternative paths to career success: officers of higher initial ability are more likely to invest in skill, but caste affinity to the politician's party base also helps secure important positions.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Journal or Publication Title:	Review of Economics and Statistics
Publisher:	MIT Press
ISSN:	0034-6535
Official Date:	August 2012
Dates:	Date Event August 2012 Published
Volume:	Vol.94
Number:	No.3
Page Range:	pp. 723-739
DOI:	10.1162/REST_a_00183
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Related URLs:	Related item in WRAP

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