Bernhardt, Dan, Duggan, John and Squintani, Francesco (2009) Private polling in elections and voter welfare. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.144 (No.5). pp. 2021-2056. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.013 ISSN 0022-0531.

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Abstract

We study elections in which two candidates poll voters about their preferred policies before taking policy positions. In the essentially unique equilibrium, candidates who receive moderate signals adopt more extreme platforms than their information suggests, but candidates with more extreme signals may moderate their platforms. Policy convergence does not maximize voters' welfare. Although candidates' platforms diverge in equilibrium, they do not do so as much as voters would like. We find that the electorate always prefers less correlation in candidate signals, and thus private over public polling. Some noise in the polling technology raises voters' welfare.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Economic Theory
Publisher:	Academic Press
ISSN:	0022-0531
Official Date:	2009
Dates:	Date Event 2009 Published
Volume:	Vol.144
Number:	No.5
Page Range:	pp. 2021-2056
DOI:	10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.013
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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