MICHEL FOUCAULT

TOPOLOGIES OF THOUGHT:
THINKING-OTHERWISE
BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND SELF

BY

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"Original forms of thought are their own introduction: their history is the only form of exegesis they tolerate, and their fate the only form of criticism."1

Spatial images are the dreams of society. Wherever the hieroglyphics of any spatial image is deciphered, there the basis of social reality presents itself.2

Thought is no longer theoretical. As soon as it functions it offends or reconciles, attracts or repels, breaks, dissociates, unites or reunites; it cannot help but liberate and enslave. Even before prescribing, suggesting a future, saying what must be done, even before exhorting or merely sounding an alarm, thought, at the level of its existence, in its very dawning, is in itself an action - a perilous act.3

If something new has appeared in philosophy and that "this work is as beautiful as those it challenges"4 we shall see that it all takes place in a new dimension, "which we might call a diagonal dimension, a sort of distribution of points, groups or figures that no longer simply act as an abstract framework but actually exist in space".5 The spaces that constitute this immanent dimension are topological or as Foucault says - "heterotopological".6 We shall designate these heterotopologies: Knowledge, Power and Self. Although these sites are irreducible to each other they seep into and 'capture' each other through a series of multiple and complex relations in such a way as to suspect, neutralise or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror or reflect. If within these sites subjects, objects and concepts disappear it is only in order to 'disperse' or 'distribute' them according to their variable functions and make them reappear again, released of their 'self-evidence', in a new space of immanence. Each heterotopology is capable of juxtaposing within itself and outside of itself, or rather across its folded surfaces, several formed spaces that are not isomorphic or even compatible but are heterogeneous and communicate with or 'encounter' each other through a pure transmission of elements.
In order to map the formation, displacement and transformation of Knowledge, Power and Self, it will be necessary to analyse these surfaces constituting a series of topologies of thought. Ultimately Knowledge, Power and Self are the recursive spaces of a problematisation of thought, a series of irreducible yet interconnected maps of immanence and Foucault gives us a new history and conception of philosophical thought, an endless questioning of what is at stake in living and thinking without foundation.

That Foucault is a philosopher of space, spacing, spatiality and spatialisation in the most complex and difficult way should be clear to those inspired by Deleuze's attempt to read Foucault topologically. The advantage of this reading is that it allows us to emphasize, at once, a rigourous topo-logic of immanent conditions of existence and not transcendental conditions of possibility; the subordination of abstract first principle (cogito, subject, consciousness, etc,) to the spaces of its historical actualization; a concentration on the material spaces of force and not the ideality of form; an affirmation of the difference of thought (and the thought of difference) and not the dialectical negation of the same; a focus upon processes of individuation and not the individual produced. In short, it allows us to read Foucault's mobile and constantly changing analytic frameworks as driven by an impulse to mix, connect, reassemble and fold the conditions of thought (the possibilities of knowledge, power and self) in a prodigious 'encounter' with the Outside.
Reading Foucault topologically we will discover how concepts of space are problematised as they inform the questions of thought that are raised. The question of thought, ("the arrow first fired by Heidegger and then again by Foucault" ⁷) in its 'perilous' action, cuts across the primary dimensions of knowledge, power and subjectivity that constitute Foucault's texts. By problematising and rethinking the concepts of space these domains are profoundly disturbed since, in Foucault's 'diagnosis' of thought, space is the unthought: "the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile. Time on the contrary was richness, fecundity, life, dialectic". ⁸ Effaced in consciousness and dissolved in time, space is 'neglected' and 'devalued' particularly in the 'time-consciousness' of the philosophers:

Among all the reasons which led to spaces suffering for so long a certain neglect, I will mention just one, which has to do with the discourse of the philosophers. At the moment when a considered politics of spaces was starting to develop, at the end of the eighteenth century, the new achievements in theoretical and experimental physics dislodged philosophy from its ancient right to speak of the world, the cosmos, finite or infinite space. This double investment of space by political technology and scientific practice reduced philosophy to the problematic of time. Since Kant, what is to be thought by the philosopher is time. Hegel, Bergson, Heidegger. Along with this is a correlative devaluation of space, which stands on the side of the understanding, the analytical, the conceptual, the dead, the fixed, the inert.

It will not be a question of reversing the polarities, of attributing to space the properties here assigned to time, but of constructing space-time multiplicities of and for knowledge, power and self; a problematic, immanent map of the interrelation of space and time as a constitutive
fold of the action of thought. The idea/problem of space-time relations that 'insist' and through which the question of thought 'ceaselessly stirs':

Far from being the still incomplete and blurred image of an idea that eternally retains our answers in some upper region, the problem lies in the idea itself, or rather, the idea exists only in the form of a problem: a distinctive plurality whose obscurity is nevertheless insistent and in which the question ceaselessly stirs. What is the answer to the question? The problem. How is the problem resolved? By displacing the question.

The question of thought is displaced and transformed by an idea/problem in topological proximity. Foucault's topological idea/problems are not so much concerned with the category, form, structure or code of spatial configurations as with their differentiating, serializing system of relation and the mode of their 'connectivity' to the Outside, the immanent relations between points, lines and surfaces in a moving, configurational network. Paraphrasing Deleuze on Donzelot we might say that:

Foucault's method consists in isolating pure little lines of mutation which, acting successively or simultaneously, go to form a contour or surface, a characteristic feature of the new domain. Thought is located at the intersection of all these little lines.

It is through the practical relations of knowledge, the strategic relations of power and the techniques of the relation to self (rapport a soi) that the idea/problem of space-time relations, with all their little moving lines of mutation and passages to the Outside are insistentely enveloped and displaced in the question of thought. Space and time are constructed through these relations just as the relations of knowledge, power and self are constructed through space and time. If
Foucault gives a certain 'privilege' to space ("the anxiety of our era has to do fundamentally with space, no doubt a great deal more than with time" 12) it will not be to 'spatialise time' but to show that their relation is an everchanging 'non-relation', a series of indefinite and reversible relations organised and conditioned by the tacit forms of thought that underlie them. "It is not possible to disregard the fatal intersection of time with space." 13

If space is dominant in the non-relation of the 'present' it is because "our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein". 14 It is a question of the ways in which the 'history of the present', the relation between 'history' and the 'actual', the 'fibrillation' between the 'not yet' and the 'no longer', appears as an immanent "distributive operation" for a space of a becoming 'in-between', a folding in between the threads of our 'skein' that opens a space of difference, a 'thinking otherwise', a space that can be developed into a 'smooth space' of thought, a space teeming with force, resistance, chance and becoming, a space that affirms the throw of the dice, that affirms difference differentially, a space outside of the stratifications of metaphysical and anthropological thinking, a space of unpredictability that opens up new thought and new mixtures.

Foucault's topological system of thought-spaces is organised by an endless desire to escape itself, to reconnect elsewhere, to escape the territorialities of identity, representation and the same which imprison thought through a 'force of flight' in which "an exchange starts and the
within, despite itself, begins to open onto the birth of a space". The whole system of thought-spaces in Foucault are shaped by the oscillation of the interior onto the exterior, the birth of an inside space from an outside space, the birth of an outside space from an inside space across an immanent plane of thought:

*The inside as an operation of the outside: in all his work Foucault seems haunted by this theme of an inside which is merely the fold of the outside.*

And these spaces are always born from something other than themselves, from something elsewhere, a transmission of unique relations and forces. We will see how Foucault's topologies of thought introduce this 'something other', this Outside, into the image of thought, reinjecting space into thought and space-time relations into knowledge, power and self making thought a becoming-other, a thinking-otherwise and resistance to knowledge, power and self in the present, in favour of the 'actuality' of a 'heterotopia' of a different thought to come:

*The object was to learn to what extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently.*

**PREFACE**

**Knowledge**

1. It will first of all be necessary to analyse knowledge through several formed spaces that correspond to a formal and experiential impulse that Foucault's 'early' work generates. These are the surfaces of literature and madness. "What interested and guided him was a certain form of the presence of madness in literature". That certain form of presence is
paradoxically an absence, an "absence d'oeuvre" that is not 'in' literature but the absent opening 'outside'. In these absential, split and drifting spaces "strange bonds are knit". Through their mutual intrusions and "destructive invasions" an avalanche of 'mad' images penetrates to the core and 'communicates' with a language that can only "turn back on itself in an endless reflexivity". A blind word and a mute image 'unworking' and transgressing the limits of reason from a "fund beyond control". The effect is a space of transgression that places word and image together disjunctively, articulates them on the basis of their difference producing new thought, a new way of reading the productions of knowledge. Already an exploratory topology of thought, a 'diagnosis' of the spaces that trap thought and an experiment with going beyond them - already a map of immanence and a "thinking otherwise".

It begins, then, in the "interior of the exterior and inversely" or the doubling of madness and literature. A mute vision and a blind word: this is not madness. The 'encounter' between madness and literature takes place in a zone where the author has disappeared, the death of god has been 'announced' and the transgression of limits becomes possible. If the 'being of language' shines through this zone it is because it reposes on a voided image, on a groundless space hollowed out through its own passage to the Outside. We need, then, to map the relations between madness and literature as exterior surfaces superimposed upon one another, silent yet 'communicating' to each other, 'dispersed' across a space turned inside-out. This is the immanent space of transgressive thought, a thought of difference that articulates the 'enclosure' of thought within a knowledge of the same, diagnoses its
conditions of confinement, and thereby "opens onto a scintillating and constantly affirmed world."  ^25

2. Within this space a new experience and action of thought is made possible that Foucault will call archaeology. ("And one wonders whether 'topology' would not have been more apt than archaeology".  ^26 The great George Steiner concurs with us!). Archaeological thought will redistribute the experiential and affective elements of transgressive space by locating literature and madness as one transgressive series in an expanded space of immanence that Foucault will map as 'positivity', a space "whose necessity has its roots in a vast configuration in which the whole structure of our thought and our knowledge is traced."  ^27 Archaeological work will map the 'positive exteriority' of this configuration by seeking to formalise the relations or 'non-relation' between statements and visibilities as the exteriorities of knowledge or 'forms' of the outside. These forms or vectors are operative in archaeological analysis through a stratification that locks them into a set of historical conditions ('concrete apriori', 'historical apriori'. "The a priori of positivities is not only the system of a temporal dispersion; it is itself a transformable group"  ^28) whose local and regional discontinuities can be juxtaposed like a series of interlocking surfaces which constitute an 'episteme' and an 'archive'.

Archaeological space relays transgressive space though a "positive unconscious of knowledge",  ^29 a material, anonymous, transmission network, a network of practices: practices of saying and seeing that constitute an audio-visual archive. The enunciable and the visible ( the
being of language and the being of light) are spaces of emergence and becoming that are intimately bound up with historically given forms of the discursive /non-discursive with their deposits of strata and the unique sets of relations they organise. They are exterior spaces of multiplicity that condition what can be said and what can be seen. The archaeological space of multiplicities, of plural and diverging series, that cross, bifurcate and overlap in their 'non-relation', throw up a unique double function which "cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities and which reveals them, with concrete contents in space and time". 30 Everything is on 'display' in the space of enonces even as (and because) the topologist defines this functional space as "neither visible nor hidden." 31 Archaelogical space is 'sectioned' and segmented in triplicate in order to map and connect the immanent bifurcations and divergences, the curves and features of a specific series enabling the examination of relations within and across its corpus of enonces. Archaeological thought invents a new immanent 'architectonic' space from which the topo-archivist will construct an immanent relational 'plinth' or 'stand' in order to read anew the productions of knowledge.

We need only know how to read, however difficult that may prove to be. The secret exists only to be betrayed, or to betray itself. Each age articulates perfectly the most cynical elements of its politics, or the rawest elements of its sexuality to the point where transgression has little merit. Each age says(ence) everything it can according to the conditions laid down for its statements. (enonce). 32

Power

3. The 'dispersion' or transmission of elements throughout the spaces of enonces, the 'encounter' between them forced through the archaeological method, enables the discovery (or rather 'eventalisation') of a new fold
or dimension investing the topological structure of knowledge. This new
dimension is immanent to and constitutive of the spaces of knowledge which
are 'conducted' and shaped by its movement. This is the dimension of
power-relations, a dimension 'outside' topologically folded 'inside', the
fold of their relation ensuring that "there is no exteriority, even if
they have specific roles and are linked together on the basis of their
difference". 33 A regime of power-knowledge.

Foucault explicitly develops the 'thought from outside' as a strategy for
'eventalising' the immanent fold of power-knowledge relations, exposing
the unseen and unsaid 'self-evidences', upon which the relation is
built, to criticism. Foucault will demonstrate that the possibilities of
knowledge distributed throughout the enunciable and the visible, as
potential spaces of emergence, are defined and articulated through the
events of power. Power is exercised through relations of force (non-
relation) that "come from everywhere", 34 a "non-place" 35 (outside). In
eventalising these relational spaces Foucault will show that there is
always 'something else', 'somewhere else', an unthought, an 'Outside' of
thought that eludes power even as it makes it possible.

Power is born out of a plurality of relationships which are grafted
onto something else, born from something else, and permit the
development of something else. 36

From this point on the episteme and the archive are entirely worked
through and doubled by the 'event', the 'diagram' and the 'dispositif'
following a "general line of force...in any relationship from one point
to another." 37 Lines of force don't just make up the surfaces of
thought but run through them pulling at them and this implies a whole
series of driftings, transformations and mutations, breaking through thresholds that might have been seen as aesthetic, philosophic, political or scientific, that might be seen as theoretical or practical etc. The events of outside thought traverse audio-visual mediums, a reassemblage that moves toward the Outside, ceaselessly connecting and bifurcating. The cartographer will emphasise the possibilities of resistance in this multi-relational force-field by concentrating on 'lines of fracture' and 'breakage' and will multiply the "points, knots and focuses" of resistance by characterising and making visible the historical image of the events, transformations and resistances of power as a diagrammatics.

4. The diagram expresses an open and fluid cartography of the strategies of power that create space and time in their own image ensuring the replication of those strategies, and the creation of forms of resistance that thwart those strategies, folding them back onto themselves and opening them to transformation. Diagrams function as 'informal' maps, virtual multiplicities of force relations actualised or 'swallowed up' in the differential concrete assemblages of the enunciable and the visible.

Foucault will concentrate, develop and make visible those diagrams of force in continuous variation that trip across the surfaces of knowledge in order to produce so many disciplinary mechanisms. The variations from one point of power to another, from one form of visibility and enunciation to another will be seen to depend upon the strategies of power that organise 'bodies' and 'individuals' in space and time through normalisation. Normalising space: flexible, interchangeable,
indefinitely reversible and without exterior. It is across this supple, extensive surface that disciplinary instruments (hierarchic surveillance, examinations etc) 'manufacture' bodies and individuals according to an economy of force ("it was a question of constituting a productive force whose effect had to be superior to the sum of elementary forces that composed it". 39) stratified into visible and enunciable multiplicities. The 'logic' of individualisation along with its visibility makes every-body and individual into a 'case' and the norm appeals to nothing other than that which it works on and makes visible. It is "an art of light and the visible" 40 working in 'conjunction' with the great mechanisms of the articulable: hierarchical observation and normalizing judgement, technologies of 'seeing' and procedures of 'expression'.

The spaces of the norm generate a 'politics' that ranges from the intensification of an "anatomo-politics" of the body into a "bio-politics" of the life of populations. And here Foucault traces other lines and diagrams of force from 'biopower' and 'pastoral power' to 'governmentalisation'. Foucault’s texts on power culminate in a 'triangulated' diagram of forces that 'individualises and totalises' human multiplicities in space and time. If sex is one of the primary axes through which the life of bodies and populations are governed then we must 'invent' new modalities of (de)sexualisation in "a different economy of bodies and pleasures", 41 a new modality of thinking as a resistance to the government of the self and the government of life.
Self

5. Foucault does, in fact, discover a new economy of bodies and pleasures, and in another deployment of power and knowledge, but which will offer the possibility of practices of 'liberation' in a new dimension derived from power and knowledge but not dependent on them. Perhaps a topological shift was necessary in order to access this new dimension but, in any case, it was always a question of knowing "how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently instead of legitimating what is already known". The final fold in Foucault's topology of thought is, then, the effort to think differently the application of the Outside to oneself, to think the immanent conditions of a new economy of bodies and pleasures through a 'problematization' of the internalization of power. This is the dimension of 'self', a relational and folded 'inside-space' co-extensive with the outside, folding the forces of the outside through processes and practices of "subjectivation". Foucault's final fold of the question of thought inserts itself into the problematic space of a self-relation and a process of subjectivation. And "perhaps he even had to go back to the greeks".

If you want an image, think of a network of scaffolding that functions as a point of relay between a project being completed and a new one.

There is no rupture, 'return to the subject', but a continued questioning of its identity, origin and unity. "The subject does not disappear; rather its excessively determined unity is put in question". Foucault had always placed the unity of the subject in question but he now found "the impasse to be where power itself places us, in both our lives and our thoughts, as we run up against it in our smallest truths." The rigid
striation, fixing and segmentation of lines of force making it impossible to "cross the line" \(^{47}\) and making the search for and invention of a space of radical questioning all the more intense and necessary. Foucault's "problematization of the self" accesses a new dimension of immanence, expressing a new diagrammatic map of the interiority of thought where the Outside affects itself, where power over the other is doubled by power over the self. Foucault does not return to any "sovereign, founding subject, a universal form of subject to be found everywhere."

He insists:

\[\text{I am very sceptical of this view of the subject and very hostile to it. I believe, on the contrary, that the subject is constituted through practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through practices of liberation, of liberty, as in Antiquity, on the basis, of course, of a number of rules, styles, inventions to be found in the cultural environment.}\]

Foucault's work on the practices or technologies of the self presuppose an undifferentiated matter (inside of the outside) and self-organising processes of becoming (subjectivation) that fold the chaos, force and chance of the outside into a new relation (self) with the inside. Self as relation (rapport a soi), subjectivation as process (the 'four-fold'). Foucault's interiority of thought is the development of a self-organizing form connecting and bifurcating, diverging and folding with the chaotic matter of the Outside: it is the becoming of a Nietzschean "dancing star". This new relation to self (as the interiorisation of the other - both the other 'outside' the self and the other within the self) is a locus of resistance, flight and transformation, an ever changing pool of potentia that has the power to affect and be affected depending on the processes of subjectivation and the existing relation to self.
The production of selves and the process of individuation are separate from yet conditioned through the productions of Knowledge and Power. They are 'lines of flight' or escape and it will be necessary to assess each form of subjectivation according to the blockages, supports or resistances it offers. This is Foucault's attempt to "refuse what we are", 49 to "get free of oneself" 50 and invent, not discover, "new forms of subjectivity". 51 If Foucault embraced the Kantian 'Ausgang' it was because it corresponded to that "permanent provocation" or "agonism" 52 of the self found in his last books. And if 'aesthetic' criteria provide a model for this exit or line of flight toward the creation of "new subject formations" it was only to replace transcendental judgements with immanent evaluations. To search, invent, create and experiment with the "trace of that which escapes", 53 this is the Foucauldian acategorical imperative, an imperative guided by a "thinking otherwise" about Knowledge, Power and Self which leads ultimately to new thought, a new image of thinking, an imageless, foundationless freedom of immanent thought in space-time.

We will attempt, then, to develop a reading of Foucault's thought as a philosophy of immanent freedom, a thought that Deleuze's work has generated and that Foucault always practised - particularly with Nietzsche:

The only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche's is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest. And if commentators then say that I am being unfaithful to Nietzsche that is of absolutely no interest.
1. LITERATURE, MADNESS AND THE SPACE OF TRANSGRESSIVE THOUGHT

From Writing to Cartography

We are all agreed that your theory is crazy - the question which divides us is whether it is crazy enough.

By the madness which interrupts it, a work of art opens a void, a moment of silence, a question without answer, provokes a breach without reconciliation where the world is forced to question itself.  

Intensity is silent. It's image is not (I love everything that dazzles me and then accentuates the darkness within me).

And if seeing was fire, I required the plenitude of fire, and if seeing would infect me with madness, I would madly want that madness.

Tragic consciousness never ceases to be vigilant. It communicates with the 'lost' cosmic time of madness and the cries yet to come. Michel Foucault will not just play witness to this 'verticality', closing his eyes and plugging up his ears but he will write, he says, the archeology of its silence. The impossibility of this task, to say madness itself, to have a language speak that "sticks in the throat, collapses before having attained formulation and returns without incident to the silence from which it had never been freed," is by a paradoxical twist the very possibility of the enterprise. If Foucauldian discourse can twist into and out of the void without identifying or equating with it (which would be negative transcendence or theology) and thus maintain a "relativity without recourse" then the problem of elocution or articulation can be displaced. Out of the void emerges the possibility of 'thinking otherwise', a critical / transgressive thought that begins in non-recognition.
1. Madness.

Partage/memory. The decision or gesture of division that organises the spaces of the book (Madness and civilisation) does not attempt to say madness 'itself' but to discover the "perpetual exchange, the obscure common root..the confrontation." that constitutes and reconstitutes the figure of madness. Partage is the topological structure of the 'history' of madness:

but only insofar as division is not understood as a cutting gesture, or the establishment of a separation or the measuring of a distance, only retaining that in it which may designate the existence of difference.

The division is not outside history but is the Outside of history at the limit of historicity: the difference of history. Madness is always already "a not yet divided experience of division itself". From the distance of the partage established Outside, the variable divisions and limits are constituted inside. Or rather, the limit insists and subsists in the fold or 'edge' between inside and outside, same and other, reason and non-reason.

Madness and non-madness, reason and non-reason are inextricably involved: inseparable at the moment when they do not yet exist, and existing for each other in relation to each other in the exchange which separates them.

The 'caesura' that separates and joins madness to the 'not yet' of the outside is an original feature: "What is originative is the caesura that establishes the distance between reason and non-reason". The 'caesura' is a topological figure of the limit because it is simultaneously inside and outside. "Limitations are not historical because they are constitutive of all possible history." If the distance between reason and its other
becomes 'absolute' and their relation is formally broken in the classical age, the partage of this 'broken dialogue' or 'non-relation' is not forgotten but retained in an asignifying Outside, an invisible fold or condition for madness to signify as deraison. The asylum is the architectural figure of a memory that must be forgotten. The Outside is retained in forgetfulness - the Eternal Return of madness.

*Madness and Civilisation* offers a history of the 'return' of the tragic memory of madness that bursts into a transgressive 'present', a historical 'noumenalism' of its silent image that conditions the entire network of its phenomenal appearance and disappearance. Its phantoms and menace, its secret tragic destiny are obscurely preserved in Bosch, Brueghel, Thiery bouts and Durer. At the birth of the classical when literary, scientific and philosophical discourse are engaged in capturing madness (General hospital, birth of the asylum, Cartesian philosophy, etc) Foucault returns to the moment of the classical partage. If "with Erasmus, with the whole humanist tradition, madness is caught in the universe of discourse", in painting something else occurs:

on one side Bosch, Brueghel, Thiery bouts, Durer... madness possesses there a primitive force of revelation: the revelation that the dream state is real, that the fragile surface opens onto an undeniable profundity, and the reverse but equally painful revelation that the entire reality of the world will some day be reabsorbed in the fantastic image, in this moment between being and nothingness which is the delirium of pure destruction.

A moment between being and nothingness, a transgressive immanent revelation of an experience of madness: a 'pure', fantastic, ecstatic destiny. The 'pureness' of the experience of madness constantly risks, in order only to be 'itself', being nothing, a non-experience.
The world is already no more, but silence and the night are not yet entirely closed in on it... This entire network of appearance and the secretive, of the immediate image and the hidden enigma, is depicted in the painting of the fifteenth century as the tragic madness of the world. 14

Reserve/Distance. This 'experience' does not exist but 'subsists' in the outside of tragic revelation. This subsistence is not confined to the visible. The potency of tragic madness made into an immediate experience in the field of discourse, drained of its powers and prestige, is nevertheless not exhausted by it. Certain texts retain the primitive vivacity of the tragic, they capture the "lost time" of madness but also communicate with a future time. They constitute a transhistorical fund or reserve bringing together past and future in an invisible present. Shakespeare and Cervantes both testify more to a tragic experience of madness appearing in the fifteenth century, than to a critical and moral experience of unreason developing in their own epoch. Outside of time, they establish a link with a meaning about to be lost and whose continuity will no longer survive except in darkness. 15

The forgetting of this reserve, of its pathos, is the history of madness, its lyricism "ceaselessly snuffed out." 16 Classical (tragic) madness is silenced by the cartesian gesture which in the very movement of proceeding towards truth "renders impossible the lyricism of unreason." 17 The 'critical and moral experience' of madness is an already tamed and reflexive a posteriori experience of decision:

The division (partage) has already been made: between these two forms of experience of madness, the distance will not cease to increase. The figures of the cosmic vision and the movements of moral reflection, the tragic element and the critical element, will go their own way from this moment on, separating themselves from each other to an ever increasing extent, and opening in the profound unity of madness a void that will never more be closed. 18
The ever increasing distance between the two forms of madness does not place tragic madness 'at a distance' since the void is inscribed so completely 'within' unreason:

It will not be said that we were at a distance from madness but within distance of it. The Greeks, similarly, were not distanced from 'hubris' because they condemned it; they were rather within reach of this excess located at the heart of the distance where they kept it.

The Fold. The lyricism of unreason re-emerges within the distance of the discourse of Rameau's nephew, a space that remains invisible to the eighteenth century but which is visible to us. This space enables Foucault to make visible the vast structures of unreason which lay dormant in western culture which in a flash sketches the contours of the great unbroken topological line from the ship of fools to the last words of Nietzsche and beyond. The space created by Rameau's discourse is a hinged heterotopic space, 'insisting' in a fold at the limit of the classical, topologically linking inside and out, a virtual space actualised through differentiation; it is the non-space into which Foucault's discourse disappears and reemerges tracing out the limits of epistemological space.

What is the significance of this unreasonable existence which Rameau's nephew figures in a manner that remains a secret for his contemporaries but which is decisive for our retrospective perspective? It is an existence which is rooted very far back in time...and announcing also the most modern forms of unreason, those which are contemporaneous with Nerval, Nietzsche, and Antonin Artaud. To interrogate the paradox of the existence of Rameau's nephew, which is so visible to us and yet which remained invisible to the eighteenth century, is to place oneself slightly in retreat from the chronicle of evolution. But it is at the same time to allow oneself to perceive in their general form, the vast structures of unreason-those which lay dormant in Western Culture, a little underneath the time of historians...it is necessary to investigate it [Le neveu] as a condensed paradigm of history. Because for the flash of an instant, it sketches the great broken line that goes from the ship of fools to the last words of Nietzsche and perhaps
even up to the cries of Artaud...The history that we will have to write in this last part installs itself in the space opened by the discourse of the Nephew."  

Foucault's discourse inserts itself into that space of lyrical excess, of "torn presence," out of a necessity which would otherwise make of his discourse a treatment excluding the "lyric glow of illness."  

Foucauldian discourse must of necessity move into this space but must do so temporarily, testing its limits, reversing any orders that it accepts and finally moving beyond them. Foucauldian discourse thus 'participates' in madness, in pathos, yet simultaneously in logos. This critical space or non space provides Foucault with a perspective on the limits of epistemic order, where orders dissolve and are reborn and where transgression becomes possible. This space is the 'exteriority' of discourse, it subsists in the 'in-between', in those gaps within and across discourses where they are separated from themselves, from their own disappearance, or merging with other discourses or a return to silence.  

2. Literature.  

The great unbroken line of madness made visible in a flash of lightning before fading back into the invisible is a recurrent image in Foucault's book. Certain texts, by virtue of their (non) expression, are marked by a rent, cut or fold that (momentarily) opens their limit to an Other, an Outside, a transgressive space that involutes the ordered transparent spaces of reason. The transparent spaces of classical representation are profoundly disturbed when 'literature' is born, in a lightning flash,
opening up a transgressive space of dispersion and difference that will fold into the 'void' of madness. Literature begins where rhetoric ends at a "moment...when a language appeared that appropriates all other languages (religion and classical discourses) in its lightning flash, giving birth to an obscure but dominant figure where death, the mirror and the wavelike succession of words to infinity enact their roles." 23

If religious discourse occupied that space poised against death then for literature to be born atheistic discourse will not be enough; language must murder God and take the place of the word. Sade and Holderlin are the midwives of this birth. Tragic consciousness has been awoken, then, with the last words of Nietzsche and the last visions of Van Gogh and it is this consciousness that is expressed in a certain experience of madness:

"it is these extreme discoveries and these alone that permit us today to determine therefore, that the experience of madness which extends from the sixteenth century up to the present owes its particular figure and origin of itself, to this absence to this night and to everything that constitutes it." 24

The tragic structure of madness from which history proceeds is the refusal and silent fall of madness through history. The 'memory' of this structure is reawakened in the division, distance and reserve of the aleatory relation between madness and literature.

Absenting language. Madness, Foucault says, is doubtless the absence of work: "where there is a work there is no madness." 25 The paintings and texts of the tragic are not works but transgressions of the limits of works, in an absence or recess of discourse, which cannot be mastered. If Foucauldian discourse situates itself in relation to this absence it is
only to question itself, transgress and (de)position itself. Foucault finds this strategy at work in Raymond Roussel:

It is Roussel’s linguistic space, the void from which he speaks, the absence which binds and mutually excludes his work and his madness. This void is not to be understood as a metaphor. It is the insolvency of words which are fewer in number than the things they designate, and due to this principle of economy must take on meaning. Roussel’s language wanders on a tightrope over the void, constantly doubling and dividing itself. Foucault’s Roussel is a rebus which shows what it shows but not what in it is shown. "Language is that space by which a being and its duplicate are united and separated: it’s a relation of that hidden shadow which shows things by hiding their being." Roussel’s language doesn’t want to conceal anything or set up a fundamental division between the visible and the invisible so much as show that the visible and the invisible repeat each other infinitely. Foucault finds machines that "enclose the procedures in which they are enclosed", systems which repeat and reverse themselves, a whole panoply of tropes and figures, fantastic machines and bizarre stories which all cover the void:

He does not want to duplicate the reality of another world, but, in the spontaneous doubling of language discover an unsuspected space and cover it with things never before said.

The ‘being’ of language that Foucault finds in Roussel and Modern literature exemplifies the space of transgressive thought because it both ‘binds’ and ‘mutually excludes’ its relation to madness. It does not gather itself into a unity or totality of the same but ‘disperses’ its statements into a space of exteriority, an absence and impossibility hollowed out through its own redoublings:
it is time to realise that the language of literature is neither defined by what it says, no more than it is by the structures that make it meaningful. It has a being and it is in terms of this being that it is necessary to question it. This being, what is it actually? Something without a doubt that has something to do with auto-implication, with the double, and with the emptiness that is hollowed out in it.

In all of Foucault's writings on 'literature' the movement of language to its own disappearance, the instability and disorder within language, the limits of language and the place where it splits apart are teased out.

No doubt it is like a dark machine for creating repetition and thus the hollowing out of a void where being is swallowed up, where words hurl themselves on pursuit of objects and where language endlessly crashes down into this central void.

In fact, language is teased out not to be interiorised (to state nothing but itself) but to show itself 'outside' of itself, to escape the mode of being of discourse - the great dynasty of identity and representation - in order to affirm "its own precipitous existence."  

This precipitous existence is precisely its hollowness to infinity "its uncontrollable flight to a hearth which is without light"  which no culture can immediately accept. The language of literature is transgressive not in its meaning or its verbal matter but in its playful movement to the outside. From its play of double designation and endless reduplication, follows the proliferating emptiness of language, its capacity to say "all things, to lead them to their luminous being, to place in the sun their 'mute' truth, to 'unmask' them."  

Transgressive literature speaks "in a language stripped of dialectics."  It is located "at the centre of the subjects disappearance" where it
proceeds to the limit and to that opening onto the Outside " where its being surges forth, but where it is already completely lost, completely overflowing itself, emptied of itself to the point where it becomes an absolute void."  

3. Literature and Madness. (The transgressive fold).

The poet and the madman, work and madness, communicate with each other and exclude each other through a fundamental absence which opens out onto an exterior, an outside that nevertheless responds to its own internal and differential articulation. Madness is not found 'in' literature if it poses a challenge and limit to discourse this is because literature links up with the absent opening Outside separating discourse and madness.

"Hence also this strange intimacy between madness and literature to which one should not lend the meaning of a psychological relation finally revealed. Uncovered like a language silencing itself and superimposing itself on itself madness doesn't manifest or recount the birth of an oeuvre, it designates the empty form whence the oeuvre derives, that is to say the place from which it never ceases to be absent, where one will never find it because it was never there. In this pale region this essential hiding, the common incompatibility of the oeuvre and madness reveals itself. It is the blind spot of their possibilities and their mutual exclusion."

The highest transgression, which is the blindspot of their possibilities and their mutual exclusions (work, madness) exposes in its performance the code of its utterance: language silencing itself by folding into its outside, carving itself from within to infinity. Indeed, The Order of Things tells us that there is no language more transgressive than literature; a non-discursive language "folded back upon the enigma of its own origin and existing wholly in reference to the pure act of
writing." 39 A language which "curves back in a perpetual return upon itself", 40 as if its discourse could have no other content than the expression of its own formative process. The ultimate transgression is "a silent, cautious deposition of the word upon the whiteness of a piece of paper." 41

Sex/Death. Transgressive language carves out its own immanent space outside in the absence of god and simultaneously produces and assimilates a prodigious sexuality:

on the day that sexuality began to speak and be spoken language no longer served as a veil for the infinite; and in the thickness it acquired on that day, we now experience finitude and being. In its dark domain, we now encounter the absence of god, our death, limits, and their transgression. 42

Sexuality is "the limit of language, since it traces the line of foam showing just how far speech may advance upon the sands of silence." 43 Transgression is the very language of sexuality. "Since Sade and the death of God, the universe of language has absorbed our sexuality." 44 It speaks from where it falls, from precisely where words escape. Sexuality is not a 'theme' of transgression since it is inscribed completely in the fold of the outside (the structure of the outside within) as the transgressive structure. Bataille's language "describes a circle; it refers to itself and is folded back on a questioning of its limits"; 45 In questioning its limits, Bataille's language opens violently onto the outside, cleaving a sexuality that designates us: "sexuality is a fissure - not one which surrounds us as the basis of our isolation or individuality, but one which marks the limit within us and designates us as a limit." 46
Transgression means not only to 'communicate' through sex but it is also its impossible root, it is the "excessive distance which it opens at the heart of the limit." 47 Sex in transgression is violation at the limit of being, the shattering of unity and the approach of death. But this movement does not exhaust it. Opening "violently onto the limitless" 48 serves as a "glorification" of that which is violated: transgression carries the violated away with it - an affirmation of annihilation. Transgressive sex is not the transcendence of loss but its transvaluation. It is a profanation of the 'sacred' and the mark of a new sacred which attempts to "overcome the limits to the death of God;" 49 in excess of God's death it is not God or religion that are transgressed but the "limited and positivistic world," 50 a world of discourse.

Literature is posthumous speech. It is a non-discursive absential language that "transgresses the limit of death through its reduplication in a mirror." 51 Languages' affinity with death functions through its movement to the outside (through "a tear in the fabric of language" 52) in which it is "fulfilled by this alien plenitude which invades it to the core of its being" 53, the opening up of a virtual space on the limit of death and its pursuit to infinity. "Death is undoubtedly the most essential of the accidents of language." 54 Bataille's death, Foucault wrote, was an event encountered by his language. Foucault wanted to speak "from where Bataille's death has recently placed his language." 55 The language of literature is organized by its immanence to the singulizing and enabling space of death:

It is quite likely that the approach of death - its sovereign gesture, its prominence within human memory - hollows out in the present and in existence the void toward which and from which we speak. 56
We live death as it organizes our relation to sex and language, in our madness and our literature; we live death as it organizes our relation to the outside:

Perhaps their exists in speech an essential affinity between death, endless striving, and the self-representation of language...from the day that men began to speak toward death and against it, in order to grasp and imprison it, something was born, a murmering which repeats, recounts, and redoubles itself endlessly, which has undergone an uncanny process of amplification and thickening, in which our language is today lodged and hidden.

4. The transgressive double.

Language is lodged and hidden, then, in the 'communication' between literature and madness, at the absential, erotic and cadaverous site of transgression where the 'mute' consciousness of tragic madness links up in a complex relation with the blind streaming of anegoic 'literature'. Within this relation an immanent, transgressive space of the outside is produced for thought and History:

The dissolution of a work in madness, this void to which poetic speech is drawn as to its self-destruction, is what authorises the text of a language common to both (work and madness). These are not abstractions, but historical relationships which our culture must eventually examine if it hopes to find itself.

If our culture is starting to examine itself in literature, or to examine its madness in literature, in the writings of the Marquis de Sade Foucault proclaims that "the western world gathered the possibility of overcoming its reason in violence and of reviving the tragic experience beyond the promises of the dialectic." Dialectic and discourse, or the traditional referential language of philosophy are being transgressed in the revival of tragic experience. This revival promises the possibility of transgressing the boundaries of the modern
episteme. Foucault discovers this possibility in those artists whose madness is indicative of a new form of art in which "language and delirium are interlaced." Language and delirium are tied together through the site of the tragic. Madness functions as something like a silent transhistorical fund or reserve, whose structural 'exclusion' or limit is isomorphic with the non-existence of 'literature' before the dissolution of representation. Language functions in this double-space: the space of the language of a work that constitutes what the work says and the groundless space of a 'blind' delirium "through which it speaks." This language says what it says but it adds a blind and mute outside, a surplus that "enunciates what it says and according to which code it says what it says". This transgressive space is like "an essential fold of the utterance. A fold that hollows it out from within and perhaps to infinity". The doubling of transgression is blind and mute even as it lets 'see' and 'say' in a new way simultaneously transforming the limits of its 'own' space and the limits of the space it transgresses. Madness and work are articulated onto each other through a doubly enigmatic space of the same that gives birth through its limit to a space of difference.

These two forms of discourse obviously manifest a profound incompatibility, even though an identical content is put to profitable use in either discourse; the simultaneous unravelling of poetic and psychological structures will never succeed in reducing the distance which separates them. Nevertheless, they are extremely close, perhaps as close as a possibility is to its realisation. This is because the continuity of meaning between a work and madness can only be realised if it is based on the enigma of similarity, an enigma which gives rise to the absolute nature of the breaking point.

Profoundly incompatible, yet as close as possibility is to its realisation, the double relation between madness and literature fluctuates between discursive continuity and ecstatic fragmentation, between infinite possibility and the precision of meaning.
Madness is the absolute break with the work of art; it forms the constitutive moment of abolition, which dissolves in time the truth of the work of art; it draws the exterior edge, the line of dissolution, the contour against the void. Artaud's oeuvre experiences its own absence in madness, but that experience, the fresh courage of that ordeal, all those words hurled against a fundamental absence of language, all that space of physical suffering and terror which surrounds or rather coincides with the void - that is the work of art itself: the sheer cliff over the abyss of the work's absence.

5. The absence of work. (writing/reading otherwise).

Madness and work inhabit this vertiginous and shattering space, the double and voided space of a transgressive outside that (modernist) language finds in itself. The host / parasite structure that conditions the relation of madness and work opens onto an enigmatic space where one cannot tell them apart or hold them together: such is the 'enigma of their similarity'. In this neuter (neither positive or negative) yet reversible space madness and work 'give rise to the absolute nature of the breaking point'. It is a transgressive space that does not confirm madness in its interdiction but produces it as a moment of its own impossibility. It designates the outside as out of reach: accessing the inaccessible, crossing the uncrossable. Poetic language particularly 'performs' and enacts the 'essential hiding' of literature and madness at the limit of a transgressive outside:

But a discourse (similar to Blanchot's) which places itself within the grammatical posture of the "and" that joins madness and an artistic work, a discourse which investigates this indivisible unity and which concerns itself with the space created when these two are joined, is necessarily an interrogation of the Limit, understood as the line where madness becomes, in a precise sense, a perpetual rupture.

'Desoeuvrement' names the 'work' or process that enables the production of this ruptured space. Desoeuvrement is the immanent spatial logic of the outside that articulates madness and literature as a disjunctive
word-image; it is the unsayable invisible source from which the work and madness emerge and into which it would disappear. Desoeuvrement is both the division or 'partage' that articulates the modern relation between madness and literature but also the functional 'Limit' or unworking of this 'partage' relation. This Limit that Foucault's writing interrogates and is orientated and directed beyond is designated as a 'hollowed void', a 'white space':

it creates the partage which gives it the face of its positivity: there one can find the originary thickness where it is formed. 

Foucault interrogates the ruptured space of desoeuvrement, "which is like the birth itself of its history" by making visible the divisions, folds and interlacings of its 'originary thickness' and attempting to see beyond them. Desoeuvrement is both the condition and occasion for the madness / literature relation but also the condition and occasion of Foucault's archaeology of silence as an experiment in both 'writing' and 'reading' otherwise that dissolves itself, a new way of reading and writing history as desoeuvrement that necessarily seeps into the folds of aesthetics, epistemology, politics etc. Desoeuvrement is a feverish and shattering effort at thinking 'impossibility' or 'absence' as the unthought thought of thought. It is the 'passion of the outside'. There is an unthought (madness) from which thought tries constantly to free itself and Foucault's practice of desoeuvrement aims to transform the spaces through which the 'madness' of history is made (in)visible through its unthought, its absence of work, its unworkness. Foucault's great book (Madness & Civilisation) is a writing that absents itself, a work that transgresses itself by disappearing into the space of the outside that it both summons and produces. Foucault's book is a vehicle for a writing that transgresses itself through its own worklessness.
The writing passes through the book, accomplishing itself there even as it disappears there; yet we do not write for the book.

The writing exceeds or transgresses the book in a complex topological absence that doesn’t just disposess or displace the author so much as suicide his (im)possibility:

I would like that this object-event (madness and civilisation), almost imperceptible among so many others, re-copy, fragment, repeat, simulate and double itself, (and) disappear finally without ever allowing the one who happened to produce it to be able to claim mastery over it, to impose what he meant, to say what he had to say.

The writer has no tenure, no legible space from which the work could be lead into the light, despite making himself ‘extravagantly seen’ in the process of writing. The book, in fact, functions as a peculiarly dense transfer point or attractor of the outside through which the work collapses under its own weight like a dying star. The work absents the ‘author’ and involutes its own force relations into the impossible space of its ‘production’. The work ‘can not yet say’ and ‘no longer represent’ and in this we should hear the echo of Blanchot who offers a trajectory of the writer:

From the ‘not yet’ to the ‘no longer’ - this is the path of what we call the writer, not only his time, which is always suspended, but what brings him to life through an interrupted becoming.

Foucault’s early path of ‘writing’ doubles Blanchot’s to the extent that the ‘doubly impossible’ task of Madness and Civilisation simulates the rigourous logic of Blanchot’s literary production. From the ‘not yet’ to the ‘no longer’ in a ‘single layer of language’, Foucault’s book functions as the ‘object-event’ through which the writing moves towards its absent opening outside, a transition from the personal je to the impersonal il. Before the writing the writer is not there and after the
writing the writer is no longer, dissolved in the impersonality of a 'one writes,' 'one dies.' The 'he', 'it', or 'one' does not occupy the place taken by the subject but fragments and disperses its space, pluralising and repeating its absence; a space from which 'it' is missing, remaining empty, but producing and forcing open a surplus of space, a multiplicity of hypertopic spaces out of which emerges a new transgressive relation between madness and work, between writing and reading, between thought and the outside.

What remains or dwells in the hypertopic absence of the book is a cadaverising madness or a madness cadaverised. The 'absolute memory' of madness retained in the grave of *Madness and Civilization*. The 'project' of *Madness and Civilisation* seals the grave of madness:

since it would enjoin us to reconstitute the dust of those concrete sufferings, of those insensate words which nothing moors to time, and especially since these sufferings and words only exist and are only given in themselves and to others in the gesture of division which already denounces and masters them ... the perception that seeks to grasp them in their pure form necessarily belongs to a world that has already separated them.

The materiality of language seeks to recover that which it had to destroy in order to come into existence. The 'object-event' that is *Madness and Civilisation* attempts to replace the object proper that was previously eliminated recognising all along the impossible, double impossible nature of the task. The materiality of language reinforces the restraints covering what has been lost. Writing does not resurrect madness 'itself'. Madness 'itself' is lost in the space of its 'literary' production, and language, in attempting to 'revive' madness loses 'itself' in a 'deafening night'. If madness 'itself' is always already captured in a gesture, a historically variable gesture of division that gives it its
figure, the simulacrum of madness that Foucault’s text releases in its
desoeuvrement - as a simulacrum of a simulacrum - unworks any gesture of
division in directing its ‘expression’ into the contaminated space of
transgression that carries the gesture away with it. Foucault’s text
functions as a transgressive simulacrum of madness by contesting decision
or division through loss, disempowerment, and forgetting.

Yet the cadaver addressed by the ‘reader’ opens the grave of the book.
"Such is the nature of that ‘opening’ that reading is." 73 The
call or silent appeal of the text opens a space for reading to dwell, a
space of "participation in that open violence, the work."74 Reading the
absence of the book, erasing all its names including its own, delivers a
freedom that "says yes, can only say yes" 75 to the work. Reading 'makes'
the book 'become' a work, not a production since it makes 'nothing' but
through a pure affirmation that clears a space for its 'interrupted
becoming'. There is no content only a pure affirmation:

    the affirmation that it is - nothing more. 76

Reading Madness and Civilisation, listening to the silent call of
madness, opens the grave of this book, "lifts the book to the work which
it is" 77 and the cadaverous text projects itself. Reading enters into a
properly Nietzschean becoming: "a helplessly joyful dance with the
'tomb'" 78 of madness.

The freedom of readings yes, its 'helplessly joyful dance' is a response
to the call that turns the reader "away from ordinary relations and
toward the space in whose proximity the reading, by abiding there,
becomes the approach to the work..." 79 Reading and writing are bound
together in a fragmentary, indefinite and reversible topological relation that opens the absence of the work into a productive becoming. In approaching the space of the work, the absence which is outside it, by abiding there, reading confronts the great witnesses of madness in their 'absence d'oeuvre.' Reading's affirmation is compelled 'helplessly' to reinscribe the names, to pursue them to the outside, because it is before what they name. This 'family' of names is by now familiar enough: Artaud and Van Gogh, sometimes Holderlin, Roussel, Diderot, Nerval and, above all, Nietzsche. Their excess, "the madness in which the work of art is engulfed," is the 'gulf', 'abyss', 'void', 'nothing' or 'outside' (all of Foucault's words) which opens, as Foucault says, "the space of our enterprise." 

The space of Foucault's enterprise carves out a 'becoming-other' for thought between madness and literature that is transgression. Madness is lost, reading can not make it 'appear', but it will take us to a threshold before which 'We' or 'the world' are summoned. Reading is not authorised beyond this limit space and begins to flounder in its own impossibility. noli me legere, 'you will not read me.' It does not interrogate, examine, objectify, open a conversation or demand an explanation.

The moment when, together, the work of art and madness are born and fulfilled is the beginning of the time when the world finds itself arraigned by that work of art and responsible before it for what it is.

Constituted 'outside' by the non-discursive discourses of Nietzsche, Artaud, et al, 'reading' "a work opens a void, a moment of silence, a question without answer, provokes a breach without reconciliation, where the world is forced to question itself." The history of madness (and
the mobile, fragmented, divided 'we' of reading) assumes
'responsibility' for that which is named by Nietzsche, Artaud etc. 'We'
are arraigned by madness, "the enigmatic 'we' for whom a history of
madness opens today, for whom the door of today is cracked open so that
its possibility may be glimpsed." The cracked open door of today is the
fault-line, through which we are arraigned by madness, through which we
are measured by the immeasurable but without measuring and limiting the
immeasurable:

The world that thought to measure and justify madness through
psychology must justify itself before madness, since in its
struggles and debates it measures itself by the excess of works like
those of Nietzsche, of Van Gogh, or Artaud. And nothing in it,
especially not what it can know of madness, assures the world that
it is justified by such works of madness.

6. Cartographies of immanence.

Foucault images a new 'plane of immanence' whose contours are folded
into a 'no longer' and a 'not yet', a 'lost time' of madness and a
future not yet 'in time,' past and future conjoined in an invisible and
unsayable 'present'. It is a fractured present, a 'time out of joint'
that no longer confirms the teleological passage from past to future but
opens onto an Outside, a virtual temporality that bursts into an
affirmation of becoming. There is a 'pure empty form of time' that
relates madness to its relative pasts, presents and futures, and
Foucault spatialises (topologises) the 'time' of madness, replaces a
history of madness with a 'stratigraphic' time of madness that
superimposes the various layers and curvatures of space-time strata in
an infinite, or as Blanchot would say, an 'interrupted becoming.' The
history of the 'devinir-autre', of the becoming-other of the 'event' of
madness 'insists' and 'subsists' in its 'present' as what we are no longer and in its 'actuality', as what we are not yet, the future of an 'infinite now.' The actuality of madness as 'the now of our becoming:'

Perhaps someday we will no longer know what madness could have been. Its figure will have so closed in on itself as no longer to allow the traces that it will have left behind to be deciphered. At best they will be among the configurations that we today would not be able to draw, but which in the future will be indispensable grills for interpreting us and our culture. Artaud will then belong to the grounds of our culture and no longer to the break with it; neurotics, to the constitutive forms (and not the deviations) of our society. Everything that we experience today in the form of a limit or as foreign or insupportable, will have taken on the serene characteristics of what is positive. And what for us today designates this exterior risks one day designating us.

The 'today' of our becoming-mad, Nietzsche and Artaud as the 'ground' of 'our' culture in a fold of its exteriority in which 'we' are no longer but always becoming, the history of madness drawn on the plane of immanence, that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought. The unthought within thought. The extremity of madness 'within' thought, "intimacy as the outside, the exterior become the intrusion that stifles, and the reversal of both the one and the other." 87 The Passion of madness outside, simultaneously a displacement and an intensification, a constantly repeated (Nietzschean) 'going-under' of history "in the interior of the exterior and inversely" as Madness and Civilisation puts it. Foucault elsewhere calls this an "autochthonous transformation," 88 the 'configurations that we today would not be able to draw' function as the autochthon of 'our' becoming mad, madness in our actuality, whilst 'today' in our present it is that which is our 'stranger':

What was Autochthonous becomes strange; what was strange becomes Autochthonous.
Foucault maps out 'in the future' a plane of immanence that would
deterritorialise our autochthon, our plane of today, by reterritorialising
our stranger in a new plane of immanent madness that would designate us.
And 'we' as a 'transitory postulate' are already 'no longer':

a denouement is already in process: madness and mental illness are
undoing their affiliation to the same anthropological unit. This
unity itself is disappearing along with the human as a transitory
postulate. Madness, the lyrical halo of illness, continues to
extinguish itself. And at a distance from pathology, from the
vicinity where language folds in upon itself still saying nothing,
an experience is about to be born where our thought is headed. This
imminence, already visible but absolutely empty, remains to be
named. 90

This is not a utopic space of the future, but the ectopic space of our
becoming, the heterotopic space of the 'now.' And Foucault's great book
represents his first 'diagnosis' of our becoming, a first effort as
'physician of civilisation,' a diagnostics of Madness and Civilisation
as a topology of thought, a thinking-otherwise about the spaces that
confine thought in order to contest them and transform them.

Foucault's immanent cartography of madness and work traces the
deterritorialised /reterritorialised system of spaces that constitute
their 'encounter' or 'relation.' It maps the absence through which work
and madness communicate with and exclude each other. The writing of the
work is an exercise in mapping and deterritorialisation.
Deterritorialising the writing of the work through a space of
impersonality, inscribed in the alea of its production, leading to the
dissolution of its authority in an 'absence d'oeuvre.' The writing of
the book folds and refolds into the 'torn intimacy' of madness, into the
space of its simulated 'object'.
all those words deprived of language whose muffled rumbling, for an
attentive ear rises up from the depths of history, the obstinate
murmur of a language which speaks by itself, uttered by no one and
answered by no one, a language which stifles itself, sticks in the
throat, collapses before having attained formulation and returns
without incident, to the silence from which it had never been freed.
The charred root of meaning.

How to map the absence of the book? How to map the "obstinate murmur of
a language which speaks by itself, uttered by no one and answered by no
one"? Derrida, who is otherwise unable to map the absence of this book,
suggests that madness is articulated through pathos:

What I mean is that the silence of madness is not said, cannot be
said in the logos of this book, but is indirectly made present,
metaphorically, if I may say so, in the pathos - I take the word in
its best sense - of this book.

A madness consumed by its own fiction, blind to itself in its own loss
of mastery and meaning, suffering in silence the tragic loss of its
'lyrical presence' in an excess of pathos. A pathos that cannot be
formulated only mapped and 'practised', and can only be made
(indirectly) present through a complex topological 'absence': yet also
a pathos that is "the most elemental fact from which a becoming and
effecting first emerge". 93

The Greeks thought differently from us about the tragic effect; it
was brought about by way of the great pathos scenes...where action
meant little but lyricism everything. 94

Foucault's text articulates madness, "under the sun of the great
Nietzschean search," 95 through a cartographic scenography of pathos and
great bursts of 'lyrical explosion' in order to insert itself into the
'torn presence' of a pathetic resonance. Madness and Civilisation
denounces "the modern worlds effort to speak of madness only in the
serene, objective terms of mental illness and to obliterate its pathos." 96

The text constantly attempts to elevate or make visible, through its lyricism, scenes of pathos that activate an 'unthought' of thought - "the lyric glow of illness." 97 The 'history' of madness is the dissolution of this fiction: "Madness, the lyric glow of illness, is ceaselessly snuffed out." 98 Foucault's pathos scenes are lines of light whose paths make particular features visible in a relation between forces. In these 'description-scenes' the text gives us a vision of the other, a scenographic map of the other whose glow or luminosity is ceaselessly extinguished in the course of its recuperation by reflection: "embraced by lyrical experience, this recognition is still rejected by philosophical reflection." 99 In the absence of this book there is a diagram of forces realised "both in description-scenes and statement-curves." 100 The relations between the scenes and curves is asignifying and we must consider Foucault's map-book as a "small asignifying machine: the only problem is - Does it work and how does it work?" 101 It works by continually absenting itself, producing itself through its own impossibility, breaking down and re-connecting with other lines of force, other lines of intensity and it presents these new 'regimes' as an asignifying relation between curves and scenes of historically varying intensity. Foucault's book demands a new way of reading the asignifying relations between discursive and figural intensities. As a Nietzschean book of madness it is written for all and no one simultaneously:

Simultaneously battle and arms, strategy and shock, struggle and trophy (or wound), conjunction and vestige, irregular encounter and repeatable scene. 102
The question of reading here is determined precisely by how one plugs into this book-machine, making its intensities function to produce other lines of flight: "There is nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. It can be compared to an electrical connection. A body without organs." Rather than make intense, electrifying connections with the pathos of *Madness and Civilisation* Derrida is content to read its thematics into a philosophical body, infect it with organs, to 'organise' the book, block its affective-machines and intense becomings by reterritorialising it on the signifier and the form of the concept:

The concept of madness is never submitted to a thematic examination on the part of Foucault, but isn't this concept - outside of everyday popular language which always drags on longer than it should after being put in question by science and philosophy - isn't this concept today a false concept, a concept so disintegrated that Foucault, by refusing psychiatric or philosophic tools, which have done nothing but imprison madmen, ends up making use - and he has no alternative - of a common, equivocal notion, borrowed from a fund beyond control.

Madness is indeed 'a false concept' but one which corrosively unworks conceptuality down to its 'charred root', unbinding it from any thematic examination, losing itself in a 'fund beyond control'. "What then is madness? Nothing, doubtless, but l'absence d'oeuvre." An absence of work, mastery, meaning and control. An(archy). Dissolution in arrival and arrival in dissolution. A chiasmic paradox of movement - equivocal and common - 'borrowed from a fund beyond control'. The fund cannot be thematised - rendered into an equalibrium of stable points - because its movement in speed, its 'metastable', vortical or swirling connections forge intense, rhizomatic lines of becoming that are endlessly transformable, imploding into a permanent trans-fusion across its
surfaces: the fund can only be mapped. The 'principle' or dynamic of the fund, the source of its transgressive force, is its spatialised and spatialising movement: a destabilised and displaced energetics beyond control.

Foucault attempts precisely to 'put in question' the 'control' that philosophy and science claim to exert over this fund; and Derrida wants to arrest Foucault's questions, stake out his 'positions' with respect to the concept of madness, fortify control over the fund through a 'thematic examination', maximising its meanings. Foucault's 'schizo stroll' with madness, however, unworks philosophy's interrogations in its affinity with athleticism and nomadism wandering off, changing places, connecting and reconnecting elsewhere in a becoming other. It is a question of mapping madness onto:

fields of intensity on the body without organs, identifying personages with states that will fill these fields and with effects that fulgurate within and traverse these fields.

The 'fund beyond control' is precisely a wave of 'fields of intensity' on the body without organs of madness traversed by the personages of Artaud, Nietzsche and Foucault, perhaps also Freud, the tragic Freud of the metapsychology papers, the Freud who 'talks' it out with madness and death. All of these proper names designate an effect that ramifies and 'fulgurates' within these fields superimposing states in an infinite process of becoming - tragic states, intense states, states of new consciousness:

Beneath the critical consciousness of madness and its philosophical, scientific or moral and medical forms, a mute tragic consciousness did not cease its vigil. It is this latter consciousness that Nietzsche's last words and Van Gogh's last visions have revealed.
The mute tragic consciousness of madness is lodged in a fund beyond control, retained in a field or patterning of intensity across its body, nested in the fold of its (non)expression. Foucault designates this space "structurally esoteric." The structurally esoteric space of madness is positioned within a "fold that hollows it out from within and perhaps to infinity." It is the violent and violating play (and not its meaning a’la Derrida) of this fold, its ‘uncontrollable flight’ that transforms the field of intensity into a transgressive space.

Madness and Civilisation and the early texts on ‘literature’ forge ‘head-on’ into this transgressive fold, consenting to come undone like an incendiary device, "battle and arms, strategy and shock, struggle and trophy" detonating their own form of expression and charring their own roots of meaning in the burn-core of a becoming-intense, stripping them of any possible relation with axiomatics.

Writing only interests me in so far as it can be incorporated into the reality of a combat ... I would like my books to be sorts of scalpels, Molotov cocktails or minefields and that they would explode after use like fireworks.

The ‘after-effect’ or ‘fall-out’ is a Guattariesque ‘a signifying semiotic’: a flow of non-repeatable signs, lines of flight that chaotically traverse a fund beyond control, unilateral differences expressed through the pathos of gesture and cry - a whole theatre of madness, a hieroglyphics of the body. Foucault’s book functions as a ‘war-machine’ by destroying the sovereignty of the signifier-madness, detaching it from the concept of a primary Logos and incorporating those ‘words deprived of a language’ into the actions of Pathos - flows and lines of word-affects penetrating the body and assuming their function
as cry and gesture, "retransforming words into theatre." 112 Foucault's text is a combatant in a 'theatre of war' which is not waged 'on behalf' of madness itself but in the invention and 'occupation' of a smooth transgressive space in order to "make thought a war machine". 113 Foucault's 'scalpels,' instruments or weapons ("all my books are little tool kits" 114) function as a regime of affects, mobile, rapid discharges "carried along by the same speed-vector": "weapons are affects and affects are weapons." 115. Foucault elsewhere calls this single mechanism a 'word/projectile' a 'verbo-ballistic invention' a 'discourse-weapon.' 116 The fund is exacerbated beyond control by an 'arsenal' of word/affect/weapons that exert a pull or attraction triggering relays 'in' or 'out', 'up' or 'down' the fund. This is no doubt a strange ani(mad)version of Zeeman's 'catastrophe machine' and Foucault's book gives us explosive maps of madness, the catastrophic moves in and out of the virtual fund, their denouement, unravelling or unfolding, a recoiling or turning, an undoing or unworking mapped through a differential topology: a morphogenesis of madness.

I am shocked that anyone could call himself a writer. I am a dealer in instruments... a cartographer, a surveyor of plans, a manufacture of arms. 117

Foucault's 'topo-analyse' of madness is, then, generated through a war-machine-book that functions through smooth absential spaces enabling the mapping of systemic but discontinuous states whose operative units (intensities, personae, effects etc) are defined relationally. The great states of strata are layered together 'ply over ply' transparently overlaid. Each pause in time ('the great internment', 'the birth of the asylum') simulates a disjunction in space, an arrest of the line along a bifurcative path: an unforeseen node eluding any dichotomy of structure
and event. Foucault’s analyses map these nodal problematics of history in terms of a spatial economy of control (e.g. the nomadic multiplicity of renaissance madness, ‘ship of fools,’ smooth space of the sea reterritorialised on to the striated space of the asylum/hospital machine through internment). Foucault’s texts are able to map, invent and fiction these nodes because they are immanent to their conditions of existence, an immanence derived from the complex topological and transgressive discursive practice they engage. Each ‘form’ of madness can be mapped to its unthought, the relation of forces that compound it, by tracing its archaeology through the continuously variable spatial relations immanently constructed.

Michel Serres has pointed out the extent to which Foucault’s book presents a ‘geometry’ of madness through a "language ... of negativities," 118 a series of negative images or visions of madness articulated through a geometric/poetic multiplicity and this is Foucault’s first attempt at a ‘thought of the multiple.’ Serres goes on to suggest that the multiple negatives inscribed in Foucault’s geometry of language link up transversally with a history of the other:

it can be used to explain the Greek and the classical meaning of the other, its logical, existential, ontological, moral, epistemological and religious meaning. It can be used to express under one denomination, Platonic otherness, Marxist alienation, medical alienation and existentialist foreignness. 119

Foucault’s war machine attempts to construct and manoeuvre the fund of otherness into a space of confrontation or contestation through a topo-history of limits that will fold the exterior into the same. Transgressive space is a fold, zero, blank or neutered space inscribed
with "those obscure gestures, forgotten as soon as they are accomplished, by means of which a culture rejects something and makes it the Exterior". 120

In Foucault's early work the madness/literature nexus is mapped as that 'zero point' or transgressive space of immanence where history escapes from itself towards the unthought that conditions it, it reveals the "great immobile structure ... the point where history is immobilised in the tragic which both founds and challenges it." 121 The space or site of tragic madness is "that constant verticality which confronts European culture" 122 with the possibility of its transgression.

What, then, is this confrontation beneath the language of reason? Where can an interrogation lead us which does not follow reason in its horizontal course, but seeks to retrace in time that constant verticality which confronts European culture with what it is not, establishes its range by its own derangement? 123

We are led by this interrogation to the transgressive 'hollow,' 'fold,' 'void,' 'double,' 'absence,' and 'emptiness' outside (topologically inside) the language of reason that conditions its interior composition. All of these terms operate in Foucault's first works as mechanisms of relay and trigger that release the apriori into a transgressive space. Dreams and madness, sex and death, language and the figural are the vertical coordinates of a 'cruel and infernal knowledge' that displaces 'reason in its horizontal course' onto its own impossibility. It is only when that "useless and transgressive fold we call literature" 124 opens out onto an absent outside that tragic madness 'returns' in a pure space of transgression. It is in this impossible space or blind-spot that the "possibility of each to become the other and of their mutual exclusion" 125 is articulated. Foucauldian transgressive space is organised almost
entirely around this blind spot. It is "a fold of the spoken that is an absence of work." 126

7. The mapping of transgressive thought.

Foucault’s early texts, then, weave or fold together (and simultaneously hold apart) a space of transgression that violently unworks the self-same interiorities of reason and a space of 'non-positive affirmation' that has nothing to do with negation but inscribes itself within 'contestation.'

Contestation does not imply a generalised negation, but an affirmation that affirms nothing, a radical break of transitivity. Rather than being a process of thought for denying existences or values, contestation is the act which carries them all to their limits and, from there, to the Limit where an ontological decision achieves its end; to contest is to proceed until one reaches the empty core where being achieves its limit and where the limit defines being. There, at the transgressed limit, the 'yes' of contestation reverberates...

Without recourse to any notion of evolution or 'transitivity' irreducible opposites involute each other through an 'empty core,' the capitalised 'Limit' of a silent zero space - Foucauldian sunyata.

The 'yes' of contestation, the 'droit de cite' is the affirmative expression that Foucault’s texts cannot yet represent since it is unrepresentable but communicate through their pathos in drifting silent spaces linking up with the formless night of tragic madness:

And this madness that links and divides time, that twists the world into the ring of a single night, this madness so foreign to the experience of its contemporaries, does it not transmit - to those able to receive it, to Nietzsche and Artaud - those barely audible voices of classical unreason, in which it was always a question of nothingness and night, but amplifying them now to shrieks and
frenzy? But giving them for the first time an expression, a droit de cite, and a hold on Western culture which makes possible all contestations, as well as total contestation?

Perhaps the 'model' par excellence of transgressive space - that holds together all the Foucauldian problematics of an expansionist force of rationality frustrated by an ever contracting vertiginous space of the outside limit - is the model of the Orient:

Within the universality of Occidental ratio there is to be found the dividing line that is the Orient: the Orient that one imagines to be the origin, the vertiginous point at which nostalgia and the promises of return originate; the Orient that is presented to the expansionist rationality of the Occident but that remains eternally inaccessible because it always remains the limit.

The 'geographical' Orient is obliterated in a geometry of diminishing scale, a fractal topology that folds space into a dividing line and limit and then into an ever receding point of origin. The Orient is figured as a space on a path or trajectory to zero, lost in a vertiginous vortex, a space that involutes its own structure. Yet this zero point or voided space still yields a flickering presence in its oscillations between the 'dividing line' and the 'limit.'

It is within this flickering presence, the 'not yet' and the 'no longer' of transgressive space, that lines of flight are emitted, new enonces produced: great volleys of lyrical intensity compounded into scenes of tragic pathos.

We now know ... that language owes its power of transgression to an inverse relationship, that existing between an impure word and a pure silence, and that it is in the indefinitely travelled space of this impurity that the word may address such a silence.

Scenes of pathos always operate in Foucault on the lip of silence.

Utilising the "non-dialectical language of the limit" language of the
'not yet' and the 'no longer' with its "calcinated roots, its promising ashes" 132, Foucault's texts lead us to the paradoxical precipice of the 'language of silence', a strange language that "places us at the limits of all possible languages" 133 and causes us to "lose language in a deafening night." 134 Pathos scenes articulate the silence of madness through an ultimate 'communication', between an impure word and a pure silence, a communication that presupposes the cessation of the speaker and the absence of the listener. In Bataille's beautiful words, which Foucault repeats for us, the 'communion' of the mad is expressed through "an immense alleluia lost in the interminable silence." 135

Foucault endorses a language of silence for every one and no one a "unique Discourse which no one, perhaps, will be able to hear." 136 Foucault's impossible language functions through discursive mechanisms of revocation and suspension in a self-consumptive drive to zero and silence. It is a Saturnian language "that devours all eventual words" 137 that paradoxically we must ceaselessly speak in order to "succeed - if not in silencing and mastering it - in modulating its futility." 138

The language of silence (and the silence of language) in Foucault functions as a 'heterotopic' space, a space of pathos and otherness distributed 'beneath' the language of reason in its horizontal course. It offers the (im)possibility of transgressive 'interpretation'

what is in question at an interpretation's point of rupture, in a interpretations tendency towards a point that renders it impossible, could well be something like the experience of madness. Such an experience of madness would be the sanction for a movement of interpretation which approaches the infinitude of its centre and collapses, turned to ash. 139
Foucault maps the 'archaeology of silence' of madness onto the rupture of transgressive interpretation by collapsing the very possibility of language, (this has nothing to do with any 'gap' or absence that is considered to be constitutive of language) into its own 'finitude' and 'death'.

The futility of a language that merely folds back on itself and consumes itself evades contradiction and dialectics by passing through the passage of paradox, a 'perverse' space constructed through a certain game of philosophical pedagogy through the space of paradox. To approach this space one must "remain motionless to the point of stupefaction in order to approach it successfully and mime it...and to await, in the always unpredictable conclusion to this elaborate preparation, the shock of difference. Once paradoxes have upset the table of representations, catatonia operates within the theater of thought." 140

In this theatrical staging of catatonic thought the space of transgressive paradox with its 'disreputable bias' unworks the spaces of representation with its logic of negation toward an "acategorical thought" beyond crisis: once thought is "freed from its catatonic chrysalis" 141 it will rise renewed and completely transformed. The space of transgressive thought between work and madness is the limit-space induced to catatonia - an opening for thought, a 'thinking otherwise.'

Embracing the space of paradoxical silence though perversity and ill-humour, Foucault hastens the appearance of a new transgressive thought
and language: asignifying, acategorical, incoherent, non-dialectical and discontinuous.

This space of transgressive thought, *in the zone of silence and paradox* in which the communication between madness/literature culminates, transgresses itself by transgressing the Limit.

Transgression is an action which involves the limit, that narrow zone of a line where it displays the flash of its passage, perhaps also its entire trajectory, even its origin; it is likely that transgression has its entire space in the line it crosses.

The space of the limit, as 'pure' limit, gives itself to be seen by being crossed. Transgression is always already a complex relational spatiality that presupposes that which it transgresses. Transgression transgresses a limit, a connective relation of lines, points, sites and enclosures which is bounded by a mode of order, rationality, self, being, or thought. The violence of transgression is directed toward this limit space which it both constitutes and is constituted by, both the necessary and sufficient condition for the possibility of its transgressing.

The limit and transgression depend on each other for whatever density of being they possess: a limit could not exist if it were absolutely uncrossable and, reciprocally, transgression would be pointless if it merely crossed a limit composed of illusions and shadows.

A limit is made visible at the point of its transgression, a moment which forces the limit "to experience its positive truth in its downward fall." The 'lightning flash' of transgression traces the very line that it cancels. In each case transgression unfolds upon and creates the space of the limit which it then transgresses; transgression is wedded
to the limit through its annulment and erasure: transgression gives birth to a space of the limit by its abortion. The limit, in turn, has no meaning, structure or organisation without transgression. The limit contains within itself the possibility of its transgression constitutively, of being unbounded and opened to a space outside of itself which was always already inscribed within itself, an invisible fold or condition of its existence.

Transgression carries the limit right to the limit of its being; transgression forces the limit to face the fact of its immanent disappearance, to find itself in what it excludes (perhaps, to be more exact, to recognize itself for the first time), to experience its positive truth in its downward fall.

Transgression’s immanence to the limit necessarily involves perpetual repetition, its play repeated in an infinitesimal, ‘timeless’ instant, between a ‘not yet’ and a ‘no longer’. Transgression operates within a ‘between-time’ mechanism, a time of chaos and becoming, a time of waiting and passage, of arrival and departure whose spirallloid, fractal structure - a fold within a fold - squeezes out any continuous chronological time in its movement:

Transgression incessantly crosses and recrosses a line which closes up behind it in a wave of extremely short duration.

The between-time of transgression Foucault often figures as a (Nietzschean) lightning flash which cannot be tied to any specific action, activity or movement and it is this that entails the ‘death’ and displacement of any ‘originating’ or grounding function. In fact, this function is an effect of transgressive activity, a shadow in its lightning flash. The ‘content’ of a particular act of transgression is given to it by the limit it transgresses and yet transgression as such
is de-void, not that it contains nothing, but that transgression 'exists' (insists, subsists) in its performance of a relation, the activation of a new zone or space, constituted through its activity, its transgressing. Transgression, for Foucault finally cannot be located within a negative or positive polarity but in the affirmation of a (Blanchotian) neuter:

Transgression contains nothing negative, for it affirms limited being - affirms the limitlessness into which it leaps as it opens this zone to existence for the first time. But, correspondingly, this affirmation contains nothing positive: no content can bind it, since, by definition, no limit can possibly restrict it. Perhaps it is simply an affirmation of division ... of difference.

Transgression is a self-organising space of difference that continually produces itself in its own moment of occasion or event, it takes place in a neuter space that it knits out of itself, a space marked and delimited by the surfaces and lines it crosses. Transgression exposes this limit space in a brilliant flash that simultaneously reveals the limits of the being it circumscribes and also the limitlessness of all that the limit fails to contain. But transgression as such is neither bound nor defined either by this limited being which it transcends nor the unlimited space of existence toward which it leaps. Transgression cannot be "a victory over limits" and neither does it transform the other side of the limit "into a glittering expanse." Transgression is an affirmation of difference, an affirmation that confirms the otherness of the different: transgression is a space of pure difference.

The limit by definition cannot affirm difference but neither is it a simple negation of difference. The limit denies difference, says no to it and opposes it, appropriating it under the identity of the same.
Disowning difference through an appropriation, owning the limited by disowning difference. Nietzsche had already said that concepts originate through equating what is unequal and that truth "is formed through an arbitrary abstraction from ... individual differences, through forgetting the distinctions." 150

Delimitation refuses difference and subordinates it raising its nosaying to the level of taboo and prohibition. Both Foucault and Nietzsche trace back this ordering of being to Plato's "delicate sorting operation" 151 which subordinated appearances to essences. And since then, in each case "difference is transformed into that which must be specified within a concept, without overstepping its bounds." 152 The subjection of difference under the domination of concepts, categories, representations etc. constitutes what Foucault and Nietzsche articulate as Western thought's relentless 'will to truth', as a violence of the limit that abstracts from 'singularities' a structure of identities and similarities and organises differences into systems of resemblance. The limit overcomes difference by apprehending "global resemblances...at the root of what we call diversity." 153

Lying at the centre of this appropriation, subordination and exclusion of the space of difference is 'good sense':

Good sense is the world's most effective agent of division in its recognition, its establishment of equivalences, its sensitivity to gaps, it gauging of distances, as it assimilates and separates. 154

Good sense is a 'metrication' of space, a precise accounting that always leads back to a form of interiority, an identity across its variations constituted through delimitation, categorisation, circumscription,
abstraction and theorisation; this is the basis for 'understanding.'
Good sense is an instrument of exclusion and domination, a way of
encircling, delimiting and 'occupying' the space of 'becoming'.

The absence of good sense (ignoring it or simply lacking it) involves
placing outside, going 'out of bounds', risking scandal, stupidity, rage
and 'uncertain madness' in the face of beauty, knowledge and truth. A
form of moralisation (of limits) always sanctions good sense and also
empowers it, limits always invoke good sense justifying the limit as
such through the apprehension of good sense. In this apprehension "we
encounter the tyranny of good will, the obligation to think in common
with others..." 155 Good will functions along with good sense to sanction
its violence of the limit and its refusal of difference by forcing it
into an obligation. Transgression is always a refusal of complicity
with an ethics. Transgression liberates difference from good will whose
violence it hears 'instinctively.' The limit prohibits such violence
but because it carries the possibility of its transgression
constitutively it can never completely prohibit. Instead the limit
mobilises guilt in order to stave of its own inner possibilities but
this risks increasing the intensity of the violence of transgression
whilst offering an opportunity to reappropriate and re-assimilate
transgressive acts. But it can only do this negatively turning the act
into a limit - the limit of the limit. Yet transgression refuses guilt
in its movement and this refusal is to "begin thinking from it and the
space it denotes." 156 Foucault's delineation of this space dissociates
transgression from the negative; it must be affirmed. This
affirmation, the 'dangerous maybe' of transgression forces thought into
a new space:
Transgression opens onto a scintillating and constantly affirmed world, a world without shadows or twilights without that serpentine 'no' that bites into fruits and lodges their contradictions at their core. It is the solar inversion of satanic denial. 157

The affirmation of transgression means affirming a space of difference, of forcing thought into a new space, a space that unfolds outside of the domination of the limit. "Difference can only be liberated through the invention of an acategorical thought." 158 Acategorical thought plays on the surfaces of events, phantasms and simulacrum, plays on these surfaces and between them without this play being organised or subsumed by any unity. Transgressive play inhabits a space 'outside' of representation organised and conditioned by good sense and good will. "Let us pervert good sense and allow thought to play outside the ordered table of resemblances." 159 To inhabit this space of transgression we must become perverts:

The philosopher must be sufficiently perverse to play the game of truth and error badly; this perversity, which operates in paradoxes, allows him to escape the grasp of categories. 160

In Foucault's 'early' work perversity runs 'head-on' into this acategorical transgressive space whereby raging contradictions are allowed to fester and swell bursting into a difference of thought.

Transgressive thought affirms the affirmation of this space of difference since it was always a doubled thought, a thought that copulates with itself, producing itself out of itself; giving birth to new thought. Yet we must not valorize difference "we must avoid thinking...the form of a content which is difference." 161
Difference must not be thought as a category or a concept that organises a philosophy of difference. The space of transgressive thought is continually being reknitted or refolded carrying within itself its own erasure constitutively thus preempting the possibility that difference might solidify or stagnate into a 'truth.' The affirmation of transgressive space necessarily involves the transgressing of that space itself.
2. THE EXTERIOR LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE

Statements and Visibilities.

It is in vain that we see what we say; what we see never resides in what we say. And it is vain that we attempt to show, by the use of images, metaphors, or similes, what we are saying; the space where they achieve their splendour is not that deployed by our eyes but that defined by the sequential elements of syntax.

For Watt now found himself in the midst of things which, if they consented to be named, did so as it were with reluctance.... Looking at a pot, for example, or thinking of a pot, one of Mr. Knott's pots, it was in vain that Watt said, Pot, pot. Well, perhaps not quite in vain, but very nearly. For it was not a pot, the more he looked, the more he reflected, the more he felt sure of that, that it was not a pot at all. It resembled a pot, it was almost a pot, but it was not a pot of which one could say, Pot, pot, and be comforted.

To speak and to show in a simultaneous motion...a prodigious interweaving.

The space of transgressive thought opens out onto an experience and action of thought that Foucault will call archaeological, a new fold in a topology of thought, a new series of spaces to enable the archaeologist to 'think otherwise'. This new space assimilates and redistributes the coordinates of transgressive space to "the level proper to archaeology". This new fold will continue to "define a particular site by the exteriority of its vicinity" but will concentrate on the exteriority of the enunciable and visible sites themselves, in their 'positivity', as they traverse and constitute the practical assemblages of knowledge. Foucault had already created a transgressive archaeology of the 'present', in this sense, by relaying the 'visibilities' of madness with the 'expressions' of literature emerging out of the archaeological space of silence and this formed one series in the possible permutations of the enunciable and visible 'archive'. And
this space of silence is now inverted and folded, stretched and multiplied into a space that conditions 'things said' and 'things seen' and makes an 'archaeology of knowledge' possible.

Archaeological space is a 'pure' positivity, a "positive unconscious of knowledge" expressed through enonces: the forms of the statable and the visible. These forms are like patches, patternings or collections of stratified space that are juxtaposed, intermingled and overlap forming 'deposits' that accumulate into the enonces of a specific knowledge-formation. Each knowledge-formation (episteme) is composed of particular variations and combinations of technologies of the visible and procedures of the enunciable. These technologies and procedures of space positively produce knowledge in each formation as historical aprioris. They are irreducible, heterogeneous and isomorphic each having their own spaces, rhythms and history and, as exteriorities, they do not derive from ideas, concepts, subjects or 'mentalities' since they make these possible: they are spaces of emergence and becoming. The archaeologist will analyse the relations between these spaces in order to foreground and actualise their potential as zones of otherness, difference and becoming. Ultimately, the aim of archaeological thought is to make it possible to think difference; it attempts to establish that "we are difference, that our reason is the difference of our discourses, our history the difference of our times, our selves the difference of masks." The crisis of thought has enabled it to "avoid the difference of our present".
1.a. The space of the invisible visibility (medicine)

To begin to think the difference of our present the archaeologist will focus on one set of spaces bound up with the "over-all architecture of the human sciences" ⁹, a space of thought that is "fully engaged in the philosophical status of man." ¹⁰ And the archaeological method will segment and section this space in order to maximise the legibility of its sedimentations of the visible and the articulable. It will describe "the common structure that carves up and articulates what is seen and what is said" ¹¹. The Birth of the Clinic will be "an archaeology of medical perception" ¹² or an archaeology of the 'gaze' (regard) only in relation to the statements that are produced disjunctively beside them: a simulacrum or 'aparallel evolution'. The objective of the book is to examine "the silent configuration in which language finds support: the relation of situation and attitude to what is speaking and what is spoken about." ¹³ The organization of the clinic - its invention of techniques of observation, the ways in which it establishes 'knowledge' through a certain disposition of bodies and gazes- all of this is tied to the problematic of 'language', of what can be expressed, and the visibility of the body, of what can be seen.

In Madness and Civilisation Foucault mapped the "not yet divided experience of division itself" ¹⁴- as a space of anteriority conditioning what can be said/seen - through a complex, transgressive space of absence: an "absence d'oeuvre". This absence is transformed in Foucault's archaeology of medicine into a desire to remain "at the level of the fundamental spatialisation and verbalisation of the pathological, where the loquacious gaze with which the doctor observes the poisonous heart of things is born and communes with itself." ¹⁵ This will entail
excavating and making legible a space "where 'things' and 'words' have not yet been separated, and where - at the most fundamental level of language - seeing and saying are still one." 16 If Foucault criticised the notion of an 'experience' of madness and comes to reject the 'gaze' as a "synthesis of the unifying function of a subject" it is only in order to scrupulously maintain the "dispersion that we are" in the relations between words and things, and to insert his discourse into that space of 'non-discursive' language. 17

We should not be surprised that in the period in which Foucault was to write on Brisset, Roussel, Blanchot, Holderlin he should also have been drawn to the heavy, descriptive, qualitative 'being' of language that he finds at the heart of the clinic. Equally, in the same period, Foucault was drawn to Magritte, Manet, Klee and Kandinsky and the question of the 'being' of light or visibility dispersed throughout aesthetic space. The Birth of The Clinic, its 'obviousness', was fundamentally tied to the conditions of possibility of a way of seeing and saying that culminated in a structure of perception that Foucault called 'invisible visibility.' 18 In the structure of invisible visibility or of non-discursive language Foucault extended the 'vertical' space of transgression to bring to light a new 'fold' in our knowledge revealing that clinical medicine has a "fundamental place in the overall architecture of the human sciences." 19 For this place to be established we should not expect the gradual unfolding of the 'gaze' to the point where its power is finally recognised in the clinic, but a "formal reorganisation in depth" 20 of the conditions, hidden to the age in which they operated that structure the domain of clinical experience. It is
in the search for the 'concrete a priori' that Foucault opens out the axes of space, language, and death.

For clinical medicine to have become possible as a form of perception a new modality and organisation of space was necessary from that which operated in eighteenth century classical medicine. The 'geography' of disease in relation to other diseases, to the individual and to the social space of medical institutions and practices undergo a transformation informed by a "spontaneous and deeply rooted convergence between the requirements of political ideology and those of medical technology." 21 Revolving around the revolutionary abandonment of privileged centres, the politicisation of doctoring, the problem of assistance etc, medicine is displaced from specialised institutions and its forms are regrouped through the function of a 'generalised vigilance' across all social spaces:

one began to conceive of a generalised presence of doctors whose intersecting gazes form a network and exercise at every point in space, and at the same moment in time, a constant, mobile differentiated supervision. 22

The doctor as one of the first architects of panoptic space: "Doctors at the time were among other things the specialists of space." They were "along with the military, the first managers of collective space." 23

Answering to a theme of 'medicine in liberty' 24 the clinic could appear in this new collective space and generate a new type of theoretical knowledge in which medicine constructed not so much an "encyclopaedic knowledge" as a form of "constantly revised information, where it is a question, rather, of totalizing events and their determination than of enclosing knowledge in a systematic form." 25 The clinic of 'ideology', or the 'semio-clinic' of
Condillac, relies as much upon language and its relation to enunciation and perception as the anatomo-clinic of Bichat and both are the 'isomorph of ideology'. Both forms of clinic find the conditions to attach themselves to the 'armature of the real' predicated on a model of language. But the semio clinic transforms the relation between speaking subject and the disease spoken about, the site from which this subject spoke, and the way in which speech was relayed to others. In this form of clinic the 'being' of disease is completely coincident with what the doctor is able to state. If, in a previous 'botanical' model the disease revealed its 'essence' through the sign, in the semio clinic the sign becomes the effect of the doctor working upon the symptom: "it is the sovereignty of consciousness that transforms the symptom into a sign." From now on the 'being' of the disease can be understood as coinciding only with its statability by a doctor. The model of a 'complete description' of disease which emerges (although a failure) indicates an alignment of the heterogeneous spaces of the doctor and the disease.

The medical field was no longer to know these silent species, whether given or withdrawn; it was to open on to something which always speaks a language that is at one in its existence and its meaning with the gaze that deciphers it - a language inseparably read and reading.

That disease could obviously become available for new perception and knowledge involved, then, a passage through what Foucault calls 'ideological' philosophy. The practical emphasis that emerges as a result of this passage, at the centre of clinical practice, is that one learns by seeing. The teacher does not have to instruct the pupil in the nature of diseases for the whole of pedagogical space undergoes an inversion which enables the disease to 'speak' to the pupil and teacher simultaneously as they watch: "The genesis of the manifestation of truth is also the genesis of the knowledge of truth."
This new time and space of disease although 'open' becomes more intricate, complicated and uncertain and the notion of an individual 'case' involves an "inversion of complexity" as diseases no longer display essences that are simple combinations but now combine diverse elements into a complex and unique individual form. The assumption that 'the symptom' become a sign places on the "horizon of clinical experience the possibility of an exhaustive, clear and complete reading" of disease. Yet the semio clinic privileged the functions of 'saying' over 'seeing' and it is only when the technical as much as the grammatical notion of disease is abandoned in favour of a proto-gaze - a 'glance'- that medical consciousness and its object are able to enter into more productive relations. In fact, now a "tangible space of the body becomes possible for the gaze."

Contingent transformations and modifications to spatial and linguistic structures in relation to medicine had now furnished a "domain of clear visibility" for the gaze; that is, a space that would be visible for Bichat. Indeed Foucault even refers to clinical experience as a "speaking eye" that "would scan the entire hospital field, taking in and gathering together each of the singular events that occurred within it; and as it saw, as it saw ever more and more clearly, it would be turned into speech that states and teaches." The postulate of the organisation of the clinic is that the visible is expressible and it is visible because it is expressible. This is the 'dream' of the clinic ("more the dream of a thought than a basic conceptual structure"), and as Foucault's analysis of Magritte makes clear, is nothing but a pipe-dream. What The Birth of the Clinic had uncovered then was an 'absolute gaze, a 'virtual visibility,' a 'visibility outside the gaze' which ran
through perceptible experiences summoning up not just sight but also hearing and touch. The glance was unlike the 'gaze' in that it was sensory and direct, touching the surface of the body with an eye and here the gaze takes on clearly its apriori functions as it lays visibilities open not just to sight but to the other senses, each according to certain combinations so that for example, the tangible is a visible that conceals another visible and this is particularly apposite when considering the clinic of laennec: even the stethoscope remains for Foucault under the 'dominant sign of the visible'. Thus: "in its sovereign exercise the gaze took up once again the structures of visibility that it had itself deposited in its field of perception." 

The last of these structures is finally uncovered by Bichat and represents for Foucault "the great break in the history of Western medicine," the opening of the anatomo-clinic to pathological life.

With Bichat, knowledge of life finds its origins in the destruction of life and in its extreme opposite; it is at death that disease and life speak their truth; a specific, immediate truth, protected from all assimilations to the inorganic by the circle of death. that designates them for what they are.

For Bichat death is not just a negation of life, or a refusal of it, but a 'positivity' that invades life with a "teeming presence." Death is not just the condition of visibility of the disease (at post-mortem) but also the ultimate source of disease during life. Life and disease are no longer thought as an oppositional structure but through the addition of that 'third term' as Foucault calls it, of death, the three terms are articulated together. Foucault invents from Bichat a new kind of vitalism that defines life as those set of functions which resist death.
Bichat relativized the concept of death, bringing it down from that absolute in which it appeared as an indivisible, decisive, irrecoverable event: he volatilized it, distributed it throughout life in the form of separate, partial, progressive deaths, deaths that are so slow in occurring that they extend beyond death itself. But from this fact he formed an essential structure of medical thought and perception: that to which life is opposed and to which it is exposed; that in relation to which it is living opposition, and therefore life; that in relation to which it is analytically exposed, and therefore true.

Vitalism appears against the background of this 'mortalism.' \(^{41}\)

Vitalism appears as a modulation of this mortalism since disease is no longer a foreign entity threatening life but a new historical mode of life which the new pathological anatomy of tissues could render visible, from the moment of its insertion until its 'death', with the organism, as the proliferating spread of lesions. The 'space' of disease with its historical character became identical with the body. And this is no doubt Foucault's historicisation of Canguillhem's thesis in relation to the originality of the 'vital order': it is not the eternal confrontation or frustration between Doctor and the sick that makes possible the appearance of the 'vital order' so much as the emergence of the internal space of the organism as corpse. The gaze is silenced, divided from the enunciable, becoming the "non-verbal order of contact". \(^{42}\)

It now requires specific technologies to translate the invisible interior of the body into a recognizable order of signs that will document and classify. Not just Canguillhem and Bichat but also Schopenhauer and perhaps even Freud and Illich are captured here with the question of how such a conception could become possible; how could the specificity of life as a configuration of illness be thought possible except through the articulation of death, the thought of death as an epistemological category?
Clinical medicine, more than just necromancy, makes the 'individual fact' possible. The space of death is not reductive of individuality but constitutive of it and this passage through to the 'reversible surface' of death was necessary for the individual fact to emerge as a problem of knowledge. The significance of the 'invisible visibility' of death in clinical medicine lies in the space that it occupies in the 'overall architecture of the human sciences', indeed it "marked at the empirical level, the first opening up of that fundamental relation that binds man to his original finitude." 43 Finitude is given a positive content and Foucault's archaeology of medicine shows that death is at the limit of those sciences that study the life of man:

it will no doubt remain a decisive fact about our culture that its first scientific discourse concerning the individual had to pass through this stage of death. Western man could constitute himself in his own eyes as an object of science, he grasped himself within his language, and gave himself, in himself and by himself, a discursive existence, only in the opening created by his own elimination: from the experience of Unreason was born psychology, the very possibility of psychology; from the integration of death into medical thought is born a medicine that is given as a science of the individual. 44

Here, no doubt, one could stream together a confluence of spaces of thought that traverse Foucault's texts from Binswanger's Dream and Existence where dreams insert in life a space of death to a madness that occupies that same enclave. Although flowing along opposing vectors (life and death) and emerging out of heterogeneous regimes (sleeping/dreaming, madness/unreason), these forces move to expression through the forms of exteriority, of statements and visibility, the 'being' of language and the being of 'light' that interface all of Foucault's texts.
It is likely, however, that this specific movement of death into the life of the individual culminates in the 'reversal' of visibility that one finds in those pages of Discipline and Punish where the extension of disciplinary machinery, in the context of confession, is forced to maintain the life of the body in order to accede to 'truth'. The individual invented in the Birth of the Clinic is not the individual of 'discipline' (of course this knowledge would be useful for it), but the fact of a particular entity whose very possibility - in medicine, in eroticism, in lyrical poetry - is death:

"Death left its old tragic heaven and became the lyrical core of man; his invisibile truth, his visible secret."  

1.b. The space of the invisible visibility (the literary double)

The invisible visibility as that space in which the invisibility of death is made visible in language ("the anatomo-clinic method" 46) has a precise analogue in Roussel as the set of relations between space, language and death are developed further and inform Foucault's analysis of the work of Raymond Roussel in Death and the Labyrinth. Ultimately, Foucault is less concerned with Roussel's linguistic machines, than with the death that makes them possible.

Roussel invented language machines that have no other secret outside of the process than the visible and profound relationship that all language maintains with, disengages itself from, takes up, and repeats indefinitely with death.

Roussel's death is the key to all of his linguistic procedures: "his first person narrative in the posthumous revelation" 48 The mechanisms of Locus Solus and those of How I wrote certain of my Books are reciprocally opened,
suggests Foucault, by a space of death that is not redeemed or resurrected into life, but conserved and prolonged in death. 'Vitalium' and 'ressurrectine' do not give life and certainty not an afterlife, but a ventriloquised death as Danton's mouth moves in a morgue for agitated corpses. The space of Locus Solus for Foucault is 'empty', "its emptiness is like that of an easter sunday which remains empty." Canterel tells us to look amongst the dead for the 'one' who is there, that is where he is, he has not been resurrected. 49

Though dead, the corpse 'pretends' to be dead just as it did when it was alive:

That which in life which is repeated in death, is death itself. The scene death plays as it imitates life imitates death which is as lifelike as it had been when lived in life. The boundary which resurrectine could not abolish repeats life in death and in life that which was already dead. 50

Foucault's reading of Roussel organised around the space of death is structurally analagous to the spatial logics of Birth of the Clinic. The two books are twins, sharing the doubly 'mute' and 'blind' space of death that nevertheless makes a new vision and a new relation to language possible. In the Birth of the Clinic Bichat finds in the corpse the posthumous text from which he is able to 'read' the secrets of the lesions and discover the 'nerve structure' of the text/corpse. As in Roussel, death is an uncrossable mirror structure which is nevertheless topologically linked to a knowledge of life through a reversible surface:

as if perception, in order to see what there is to see, needed the duplicative presence of death. 51
Foucault tells us further that the medical perception of death, "from the time of Bichat", has transformed its relationship with life, it "is 'staggered' in relation to life and is separated from it by the uncrossable boundary of death in the mirror of what it observes itself." Vision is unable to extinguish itself, caught in the death-mirror of its own impossibility. The 'gaze' is fastened onto that which limits or abolishes it. The 'purity' of sight, or the light that allows us to see, is violently contaminated by a blindness or death-vision that is not merely a deprivation of light but a "visibility separate from being seen". The blindness that infects sight from a space 'exterior' to it and that cannot simply be aligned with any (metaphysical) figures of absence, loss, deprivation or end culminates in the displacement of the identity of vision and thought, and of both with spontaneity (the Cartesian, Kantian or Husserlian constitutive activity of the subject) that Foucault explicitly contests.

The Birth of the Clinic attacks the vision of the eye, the seeing subject as the fundamental site of medical knowledge. Foucault articulates an experience of perception made for "no one." In fact, this perception is made "on the basis of death", "of the corpse" , a perception which invests death with visibility. Medical perception "is no longer that of a living eye but the perception of an eye which has seen death." The eye which has seen death inhabits a space of radical exteriority, a 'blind spot' or unthought of thought.

Foucault had already traced a 'blind spot' in Bataille, the eyes blindness to itself, an eye confronted with its own socket:
the globe of darkness whose sphere is closed by the unsocketed eye which stands before it, depriving it of the ability to see and yet offering to the absence the spectacle of the unshakable core which now imprisons the dead vision.  

The 'spectacle' is without spectators, an empty theatre engaged in an experience that no one experiences, a theatricality with the death of God. The ultimate blindness of sight, the opacity of the transparent, forces language to its limits exploding "in laughter, tears, the overturned eyes of ecstasy, the mute and exorbitated horror of sacrifice."  

And Foucault will sum up these themes in the searing phrase "a sun that rotates and the great eyelid that closes upon the world."  

2. The visible and the Articulable.

Roussel's great eyelid is an "empty lens" which invokes "images visibly invisible, perceptible but not decipherable given in a lightning flash and without possible reading, present in a radiance that repelled the gaze." Light is absorbed into a "mutism of objects" and we are continually confronted with the "interlacing" of the visible and the invisible in "exactly the same tissue, the same indissoluble substance."  

Death and the Labyrinth examines statements and visibilities in order to locate them in both a space in which "the verbal thread is already crossed with the chain of the visible" and their "system of dispersion". This space will later be analysed in terms of discursive relations, discursive practices (the space of enonces as a mixing of expressive forms) and their 'distribution'. At this stage, Foucault's account attempts to circumnavigate a route around Roussel's "small spatial cells" with their "chatty landscapes" and is itself circular and doubled.
The route around things is simultaneously their arrangement - their configuration, mode of connectivity and distribution. The temporal sequence of things Foucault admits is "lost in space" [65], chronological time is eliminated "by the circular nature of space." [66] The strategy that Foucault highlights in Roussel short circuits the possibility that thought, committed to ever deepening or refined layers and levels, can work itself out through linear or 'progressive' time revealing 'essences', 'identities' or 'fundamentals.' The old structure of 'metamorphosis' is 'reversed' in Roussel leaving only "a joining of beings which carries no lesson: the simple collision of things." [67] The space of words/things left in Roussel is still present but folded and doubled over, a commutation that breaks open continuity and any simple inside/outside structure. Foucault lays out the paths:

Thus are constructed and criss-crossed the mechanical figures of the two great mythic spaces so often explored by Western imagination: space that is rigid and forbidden, surrounding the quest, the return and the treasure (that of the geography of the argonauts and of the labyrinth); and the other space - communicating, polymorphous, continuous and irreversible - of the metamorphosis, that is to say, of the visible transformation of instantly crossed distances, of strange affinities, of symbolic replacements. [68]

The path that Foucault shows Roussel is leading us to is a metamorphosis or rather a juxtaposition of forms contesting their own space. Or as Foucault says "the meeting of beings occurring in the broad daylight of a discontinuous nature." [69] These forms or beings "must cross a whole intermediary gamut in order to be joined." [70] That they can be joined without 'hierarchy' renders uncomfortable "the old principle of the continuity of beings." [71] Roussel's language endlessly pursues this conjunction of forms and things, continually making the hazardous journey across the 'intermediary gamut', proliferating and multiplying
itself to the point where it falls back into the "empty labyrinthian space" of silence since silence resides on the edge of the surfaces of words and things.

Roussel's language turns toward things, and the meticulous detail it constantly brings forward is reabsorbed little by little in the silence of objects. It becomes prolix only to move in the direction of their silence.

That there is finally nothing more to be said beyond the surface of things and that "the discourse which describes them in detail is finally the one that explains them" leads to the irreducibility of words and things such that the things encountered and described appear in their insistent, autonomous existence, as if they were endowed with an ontological obstinacy which breaks with the most elementary rules of ... relation. Their presence, like a boulder, is self-sufficient, free of any relation.

Utilising a phrase from Blanchot, Foucault will insist that the relation between words and things is a 'non-relation', and the distance 'in-between' them traverses a 'non-space' - the space of the 'outside.' For both Foucault and Roussel (even Blanchot) one can dream of isomorphism, stacking statements on top of visibilities in order to unlock their 'secrets' and yet with Roussel's How I wrote certain of my Books the holding up of a 'mirror' on his own oeuvre, "the mirror deepens in secrecy." In fact, the archaeologist refuses to stack things on top of one another and order them hierarchically but disperses them across a hypothetical space, across their differences, in order to remove or 'problematis[e] their 'self-evidence' revealing that the rules governing this 'system of dispersion' are nothing but "the ways the statements are actually related." The actual relation of statements concerns their 'geography' - the distances between them an index of their difference:
There is no privileged point around which the landscape will be organised and with distance vanish little by little; rather there’s a whole series of small spatial cells of similar dimensions placed right next to each other without consideration of reciprocal proportion ... Their position is never defined in relation to the whole but according to a system of directions of proximity passing from one to the other as if following the links in a chain: "to the left," "in front of them to the left," "above, higher," "further," "further continuing on the left," "at the end of the beach," "still close enough to them," "a little more on the left on the other side of the arcade." Thus spreads the sand of La Vue, in discontinuous grains, uniformly magnified, evenly illuminated, placed one next to the other in the same noonday sun.

The distance between things their 'to-the-rightness' or 'to-the-leftness', their 'aboveness' or 'belowness' are, apart from the saturation of detail, amongst the few organising devices that Roussel permits himself in order to "eliminate ... the distance of language from things." 78 This dream that statements might directly express the vision of an 'absolute eye' is taken to its limits by Roussel (whose pen emits rays of light that must be confined), whose labyrinthian language 'moves towards infinity' attempting to cover over everything but fails and folds back on its own 'poverty,' 'scarcity' and 'finitude' enabling the visible to appear in its own 'dazzling superficiality.' 79

In Death and the Labyrinth Foucault, then, has already 'archaeologised' the surfaces of the visible and the articulable, analysed their relations and ordered their geography: The 'criss crossing' of the labyrinth and the metamorphosis.

If Roussel had attempted to merge the orders he only demonstrated the distance between them:
It is the structure of the labyrinth which completely upholds Roussels plays, as if it were a matter of eliminating everything that goes into its theatricality, to let appear as visible on stage only the shadow play of the secret. By contrast, never is it more a question of masks, disguises, scenes, actors and spectacles than in the nontheatrical texts: the metamorphoses are only brought forth on stage through a narration, therefore changed and caught in the labyrinth of a discourse given second - or thirdhand.

The system of statements (in Roussel's case the labyrinth) evacuate the visible leaving only a 'light', a 'sparkle' a form of luminosity which is pure surface. The statements themselves create their own forms (the tableness of the table) which are invisible. On the other hand the 'thereness' of the table demonstrates the inability of statements to cover the 'metamorphosis' of the visible with chains of history and explanations (origins, causes etc). These two forms exterior to each other, contest each other through that 'insufficiency of being' and come together in the 'sun of language': the source of light cannot be looked at and the source of sense or non-sense cannot be articulated. In their coming together the visible and the sayable fall away from one another.

In Foucault's text on Brisset the relations between the exterior surfaces of knowledge are developed further and linked in such a way as to set in motion various 'writing machines.' This language before discourse is not read for its value in making visible the discursive constraints of a tradition nor for isolating any factors that may account for Brisset's 'delirium.' The specific linguistic procedures of Roussel and Brisset begin to operate as writing machines when "the relationship of words to things is no longer one of designation, when the relationship of one statement to another is no longer one of signification and when the relationship from one language to another (or from one state of language to another) is no longer one of translation." The procedure in each case
modulates the things intricated in the words and for each case a different organ of the body - the eye in Roussel, the ear for Brisset - constitutes a "machinery of domination and transformation." 83

For Foucault Brisset constructs a language through etymology and homophony, in a state of primitive multiplicity. It is not a language, however, from which another, more modern, language derives but a language that exists in a 'fluid, mobile, indefinitely penetrable state," 84 in which there is "the possibility of circulating in every direction, the field open to all the transformations reversals, cut-outs, the multiplication at each point, in each syllable or sonority, of powers of designation." 85 This language is in a 'state of play' permeated by chance so that each sound or syllable is like a dice whose faces each have a different meaning and are endlessly retossed to form new combinations with other dice.

Brisset manufactures his language by breaking up words into constitutive sounds or syllables and rearranging them in order to release a semantic network, through which enonces or statements are produced. Instead of tracing a multiplicity of words back to a root Brisset proliferates the possible phonetic combinations or 'anterior states' to which they may be linked. Individual words are filtered through this method with different results each time. Further, by breaking words down into micro or elementary combinations Brisset uncovers 'archaic states', which through a "compressive play or settling down, contractions, phonetic modifications proper to each one ... end up converging toward a single and sole expression that regroups and contains them." 86 Brisset's assumption is that a first language contains neither a set of 'word
treasures' or expressive cries but a multiplicity of enonces. With this means of producing phrases he uncovers not a set of "morphological constraints' but a 'stream of spoken things,' of wishes, commands, desires, questions etc. His analysis does not fold around an emerging linguistic system or symbolic order of signifiers but projects itself toward an outside facing violent scenes of battle and struggle. The word possesses neither morphological, semantic or referential unity: words exist to link up with visibilities or rather to cut into them:

to join (literally: to form a body with) a scene in which it surges up as cry, murmur, command, story; and its unity it owes on the one hand to the fact that, from scene to scene, despite the diversity of the decor, the actors, and the upsets, is the same sound that runs throughout, the same sonorous gesture that detaches itself from the melee, and floats an instant above the episode, like its audible sign, on the other hand, to the fact that these scenes form a history, and are connected in a sensible fashion, according to the necessities of our ancestral frogs. A word -its the paradox, the miracle, the miraculous hazard of a same noise that, for different reasons, for different characters, aiming at different things, resounds throughout history. Its the improbable series of the die which seven times in succession turns up the same face. Little matter who speaks, and, when he speaks, why and in employing what vocabulary: the same clattering, unreasonably, resounds.

What interests Foucault is the way that Brisset defines words through a "scenic homophony" and how through a 'phonetic scenography' words are forced to penetrate and become part of the body again and to assume their functions of cry and gesture. Brisset places words back into the mouth and disperses them around the sexual organs. The intrication of words into scenes of struggle with their 'incesscent play of appetites and violence' gives them their body, and through their repetition insures their form. Around every word alliterate cries will swarm linking up with other words in a chain of immemorial scenes evoking war, sexual savagery and devastation.
By "retransforming words into theatre, putting sounds back into croaking throats, mixing them again with all the tatters of torn and devoured flesh, raising them up as a terrible dream, and contraining men to once again bow down." Brisset has restored words to the noises from which they issue and placed them back into the scenes of violence and assault from which they generate. For Foucault's Brisset words have the power of bloody deeds because they are fully immanent to those scenes. Thus what Foucault found in Roussel and in a different way in Magritte and what he could have found in a different sense in film is the audiovisual battle, the double capture, "the noise of words that conquered the visible, the fury of things that conquered the articulable." It is precisely these themes that inform I, Pierre Riviere but placed in such a context whereby historical and psychological dimensions are intermingled to enable a new problematic to emerge. Although I, Pierre Riviere is contemporary with Discipline and Punish it is not the twin of that book in the way the Raymond Roussel doubled Birth of the Clinic. In fact, the whole problematic of I, Pierre Riviere remains contemporary with Roussel and the Clinic since the text arises out of Leiris' 'tauromachic' writing, in the performance of which, the death of the author is integral.

For Foucault Riviere enters into the category of 'the posthumous revelation of the first person' because after writing his memoirs "a newspaper report tells us that in his prison he considered himself already dead." The full title of the work already inscribes within itself the difference that will inform the text: I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister and my brother are the first
words of Pierre Riviere’s account and the subtitle ‘a case of parricide in the 19th Century’ establishes the document as a case-story set in a relationship with other documents that surround and contextualise it, but also with a historical discourse and commentary that will reveal its status and importance. It is the difference between a singular constative enunciation and an institutional, anonymous power.

Foucault’s contribution to the collection focuses on the intricate entwining of the deed and the writing of the deed and on its capacity to silence commentary:

Rivieres own discourse on his act so dominates, or in any case so escapes from every possible handle, that there is nothing to be said about this central point, this crime or act, that is not a step back in relation to it. We see there nevertheless a phenomenon without an equivalent in either the history of crime or discourse: that is to say, a crime accompanied by a discourse so strong and so strange that the crime ends up not existing anymore; it escapes through the very fact of this discourse held about it by the one who committed it.

The effect of Riviere’s discourse can only be explained through a murder/narrative machine as if the "murder and the narrative of the murder were consubstantial." It is through this consubstantial machine-space that "a twenty year old Norman peasant was able to make himself in two different ways but in virtually a single deed an author." Riviere’s discourse is a tangled, doubled and folded tissue that rotates around itself creating a complex ensemble whose mechanism is analagous to Roussel and Brisset: "The text does not relate directly to the deed; a whole web of relations is woven between one and the other; they support one another and carry one another in ever changing relations." When Riviere’s case comes to trial, his written account is used as evidence by both prosecution and defense since it contained ‘signs of madness’ as
well as 'signs of lucidity.' But for both the account is integral to
the crime and forms part of it.

For Foucault this further exemplifies the "verbo-ballistic" nature of
the text because the text and murder move around one another, capturing
one another as functions of a single mechanism:

The murder would rather appear to be a projectile concealed at first
in the engine of a discourse which recoils and becomes unnecessary
in the propulsion discharging it. We might well call this mechanism
the mechanism of the 'calibene' or 'albalester' from the names of
the instruments invented by Riviere, fabricated words, instruments
to discharge arrows, weapons to bring down clouds and birds, wrought
names that brought death and nailed animals to trees, all at the
same time. 96

The equivalence of weapon and discourse is compounded by Riviere's
construction of a bow or 'arbalest' which functioned as a "mute
declaration which became a substitute for the dark discourse engendered
with the crime and intended to make him, by the narrating of it,
glorious." 97 The 'arbalest' is part of the instrument of conversion or
catalyst of transformation on that day when what Riviere:

"called his ideas and thoughts ... were transformed into
discourse/weapon, poem/invectives, verbo-ballistic inventions,
instruments for 'encepharing' (one of Riviere's invented words);
into those engines of death whose names were fabricated and whose
corpse were buried, those words/projectiles which were from now on
never to cease springing from his lips and spurting from his hands." 98

Riviere's verbo-ballistic machines juxtapose and entangle the visible
and the articulable through the production of a murder/memoire that
makes it impossible to tell them apart and yet absolutely necessary to
maintain their difference. This is further complicated by Riviere's
self-proclamation as an 'author' who came to "lodge his deed and his
speech in a defined place in a certain type of discourse and a certain
field of knowledge." Indeed Pierre Riviere’s murder/memoire is made possible by it being bound up with an already constituted historical field of popular knowledge, memoires, broadsheets and narratives which already operate and have effects at a certain level of discursive practice and with the knowledge tied to it. But what is striking for Foucault is that "in the inextricable unity of his parricide and his text he really played the game of law." Riviere plays this game simultaneously on both registers, as author of the crime and author of the text, as subject of the deed and subject of discourse which was not mad or irrational - but monstrous.

Riviere’s writing mechanism became, of course, an object of scrutiny outside the field constituted by the rules and assumptions of popular knowledge and became subject to a different question of truth. Riviere’s "deed/text was subjected to a three fold question of truth: truth of fact, truth of opinion and truth of science. To a discursive act, a discourse in act, profoundly committed to the rules of popular knowledge there was applied a question derived elsewhere and administered by others." This new context of truth disallows the ‘beauty’ of Riviere’s deed/text. Foucault’s intervention authorises the document by dismantling the invention, production and construction of the author. The deed/text is released from its authorical functions and posthumously invented by Foucault by giving it a reader. The ‘beauty’ of the text is allowed to reverberate 150 years later through the ‘internal abstraction’ of its author who considered himself ‘already dead.’ And in this we might perhaps also see a process or movement away from the library, an ‘external abstraction’ bound to the authorial function which treats literature solely as ‘documents through which are
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constituted central categories of individuality in our modern life." 102

*Discipline and Punish* situates literary discourse in relation to a larger configuration of documents which together constitute a specific historical reality.

And if from the early Middle ages to the present day the 'adventure' is an account of individuality, the passage from the epic to the novel, from the noble deed to the secret singularity, from long exiles to the internal search for childhood, from combats to phantasies, it is also inscribed in the formations of a disciplinary society. The adventure of our childhood no longer finds expression in 'le bon petit Henri' but in the misfortunes of 'little Hans'. The romance of the Rose is written today by Mary Barnes; in place of Lancelot, we have Judge Screber. 103

3. The historical and the Actual.

The site or 'tropological space' that disseminates and distributes the articulable and the visible in Roussel, the immanence of language/desire in a space of battle and their composition into a violent 'body' in Brisset and the construction of a word/deed machine in the murderous crime/text of Riviere together constitute variations of the combinatorics of the space of enonces, a historically variable conjunctive /disjunctive relation between forms that constitutes knowledge. This process of spatialising the enunciable and the visible gives onto a certain patterning of their relation and, following their repetition into a second phase, the miniscule difference between the two, the 'snag' between them and the twisting and doubling from one to the other, is one of the conditions for the 'twist, fold, stop' action or spatialising movement between surfaces that for Foucault conditions and produces knowledge (historical, aesthetic, philosophical, etc.).
The snag is no longer the accident of the tissue but the new rule on the basis of which the external tissue is twisted, invaginated and doubled.

And the tissue of history is transformed, dispersed across a space turned inside-out. Each time it is a game of chance ruled by an iron hand. The surfaces and lines that Foucault traces are constantly in variation crossing each other, 'waging battle' and throwing up new combinations. Each time one set of variables is conditioned by the previous combinations and history becomes 'other,' something new. For Foucault (as for Deleuze) the universal, the totality, the abstract explain nothing, it is the universal, the totality and the abstract that need to be explained. If there are constants in Foucault they are lines of enunciable and visible variation that are constantly forking and bifurcating, folding back in on themselves or other lines, or surging across each other connecting up and disconnecting through variable thresholds. In the interview with Raulet, Foucault explains that these lines of variation are constantly composed and decomposed by relations of force creating little lines of mutuation and lines of 'fracture' that are to be mapped as an "endless, multiple bifurcation - a kind of abundant ramification". What Foucault finds in Roussel, Brisset and Pierre Rivierre is precisely this endless bifurcation of forms and relations of force that make and unmake the real. It is within the development and extension of this archaeological 'fieldwork' across all of the human sciences that Foucault will locate an "abundance of branchings, ramifications, breaks and ruptures" that constitute historically determinate forms of rationality and the spatial resources to 'think otherwise' and beyond them.
I think, in fact that reason is self-created, which is why I have tried to analyse forms of rationality: different foundations, different creations, different modifications in which rationalities engender one another oppose and pursue one another.

Epistemes, archives, discourses etc are not universals operating on different levels, they simply name a set of variables (modifications, foundations, creations), forms of rationality in continuous variation. Epistemes, archives, discourses etc, are the co-ordinates of an archaeological system of space-time that make it possible to map 'continuous variables' of difference. Variables, or lines of difference (enunciables/visibles) break into what Foucault has called lines or surfaces of "sedimentation", spaces that accumulate 'deposits' of enonces glued together with lines of time, ("each transformation may have its own particular index of temporal 'viscosity'"), or surfaces that stratify into definite contours and shapes but also open surfaces of creation and difference which belong to the 'present': that which belongs to history and that which belongs to a process that Foucault, along with Deleuze and Nietzsche, will call 'becoming.' A 'becoming' that entangles itself and bifurcates with the 'no longer' and the 'not yet' of history and Foucault will describe this 'untimeliness' or 'unseasonableness' in the Archaeology:

the archive comprises a privileged region which is at the same time close to us, but different from our present; it is the border of the time which surrounds our present, jutting over it and describing it by means of its otherness; it is that which is outside and delimits us. To describe the archive is to set out its possibilities on the basis of forms of discourse which have just recently ceased to be our own; the threshold of its existence is established by the break which separates us from what we can no longer say, and from that which falls outside our discursive practices; it begins with what is outside our own language, its locus being its distance from our own discursive practices. In this sense it becomes valid as a diagnostic for us.
Foucauldian 'diagnostics' and 'analytics' problematise forms of discourse and the non-discurive that 'have just recently ceased to be our own' by opening them to a space of otherness, difference or possibility in the present ("it now bursts open the other and the outside" 112). Diagnosis and analysis cannot map out a future or say 'what must be done'. They "cannot establish the facts of our identity" 113 so much as dissolve and deprive us of such reassurance. The diagnostic and analytic elements of archaeological thought function as tools and instruments for 'making' problems in the present, and one makes a problem by exposing lines of difference in the 'self-evidence' of what we can say and see, producing enonces as a problem in what we have been (history) in order to open up possibilities for what we are in the process of becoming (actuality).

"History is what still separates us from ourselves, while actuality is this other with which we already coincide." 114

The great archaeological descriptions of the archive deploy their possibilities and encounter their thresholds in the space that separates us from what we can no longer say or see: from the space of the 'outside'. Their time is the time in between, the time of the 'no longer' and the 'not yet'. The space-time of the outside is precisely the point where a strategy of archaeological/ archival description can 'begin,' "its site is the gap between our own discursive practices" 115 analysing what we are no longer whilst, simultaneously, providing a diagnosis of becoming something other, something not yet. And thereby an 'archaeology of the present' is made possible and made possible to the extent that "it establishes that we are difference." 116
That Foucault's diagnostic/analytic project can take place resides in the inhabitation of an archaeological exterior, a series of 'empty', 'blank' or 'impossible' spaces or slots within which the archaeological 'gaze' is temporarily sited. Foucault's texts 'fiction' or 'invent' temporary staging posts or 'stands' within particular discourses that have been opened by certain 'limit' texts. These openings or sites can then be defined "by the exteriority of its vicinity."

In The Order of Things this exterior is defined less by the differences that limit the relations between the visible and the enunciable (the estimate Otherness to be shut away) as by those relations of resemblance and identity that yoke them together in the order of the Same. But the whole of the analysis, in any case, is leading to the point of their Fold because "it is... concerned with showing how the Other, the Distant, is also the Near and the Same". And Foucault will demonstrate this through the 'heterotopic' spacing of certain 'limit' texts which mark each episteme. Heterotopic spaces are disturbing:

probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy syntax in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to but also opposite one another) to "hang together".

In fact, the book as a whole, we are told, emerges from a "passage in Borges." This is not just a textual passage but also a heterotopic one, a passage that will "dessicate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very possibility of language at its source", a passage through which Foucault will pass all the organising terms of The Order of Things. The strange taxonomy of animals listed by Borges is an
example of the "exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that." 122

Foucault’s text is concerned with those categories which organise and condition the 'impossibility of thinking that', opening them to heterotopic spaces which fold the system back on itself, which double and repeat it, which turn space inside out:

The central category of animals ‘included in the present classification,’ with its explicit reference to paradoxes we are familiar with, is indication enough that we shall never succeed in defining a stable relation of contained to container between each of these categories and that which includes them all. If all the animals divided up here can be placed without exception in one of the divisions of this list, then aren't all the other divisions to be found in that one division too? And then again in what space would that single, inclusive division have its existence. Absurdity destroys the and of the enumeration by making impossible the in where the things enumerated would be divided. 123

The paradox of self-inclusiveness points to the disorder of order itself, to a chaotic, heteroclitic space 'outside' of itself organising the space of order: "The lawless and uncharted dimension of the heteroclite....should be taken in its most literal etymylogical sense; in such a state, things are 'laid, 'placed', 'arranged' in sites so very different from one another that it is impossible to find a common place beneath them all" 124. This space that the archaeologist will chart has nothing to do with reflexivity, or rather, it makes the appearance of reflexive order possible:

Thus between the already 'encoded' eye and reflexive knowledge there is a middle region which liberates order itself ... this middle region, then in so far as it makes manifest the modes of being of order, can be posited as the most fundamental of all: anterior to words, perceptions, and gestures, which are then taken to be more or less exact, more or less happy, expressions of it (which is why this experience or order in its pure primary state always plays a
critical role); more solid, more archaic, less dubious, always more 'true' than the theories that attempt to give those expressions explicit form, exhaustive application, or philosophical foundation. Thus, in every culture, between the use of what one might call the ordering codes and reflections upon order itself, there is the pure experience of order and of its modes of being. 

Foucault will locate the 'pure' experience of order and its modes of being in the heterotopic space of archaeology by determining those 'historical aprioris' upon which the 'positivities' of seeing and saying are derived. The historically variable apriori combinatorics of visibilities and enunciabilities constitute the space of a 'positive unconscious' of knowledge.

The pure experience of order and its modes of being (light, language) in the classical era are manifested in the instability of representation or the representation of representation. The relations between the 'subject' functions in Las Meninas reveal the void at the heart of the space of representation, its limits and the limits of the entire epistemological space of the classical era.

Las Meninas is a painting about painting. The painter is represented in the paintings at work on a painting that cannot be seen, he looks at the model who happens also to be the viewer. We thus enter into a labyrinth where the outside is brought inside and the inside is projected outside so that representational space is a folded pocket extending to the outside as it does the inside. The painting captures the painter at a moment between the visible and the invisible "caught in a moment of stillness ... halfway between the visible and the invisible." The visibility of the painter in the painting renders his own painting
invisible to him "as though the painter could not at the same time be seen on the picture where he is represented and also see that upon which he is representing something. He rules at the threshold of these two incompatible visibilities." 127

But the 'rule' can only be a 'moment' of the threshold since it in turn will be undermined by an "unstable play of metamorphoses" where "subject and object, spectator and model, infinitely reverse their roles." 128 The mirror in the picture offers Foucault "at last that enchantment of the double" 129 which multiplies the relations between visibility and invisibility. In fact, the mirror reflects the outside, what is not represented inside. The scene of representation is thus a complex involuted folding of (in)visibilities outside in and inside out. And yet at the 'completion' of representation there is "an essential void: the necessary disappearance of that which is its foundation." 130

Foucault's whole analysis of Las Meninas determines the precise distribution of opacity and transparence, of the visible and the invisible in the space of classical representation. Light opens up this distributive network and conditions the permutations of perception or the combinatorics of the visible. "The light that is flooding the pictures from outside" 131 organises a system of opening and closing that structures the space of the "spiral shell" 132 of representation. The light from outside illuminates two "sagittal lines" 133 which traverse the space of representation and converge in an uncertain point: it is the uncertain point at which 'we cannot yet see' and 'no longer represent.' In this "sagittal dimension" 134 the line of the inside (past), the line of the no longer visible, is folded into the line of the outside (future),
the line of the ‘not yet’ visible, "an oscillation between the interior and exterior." The space of the ‘mirror’ at the centre of the painting places us at "the threshold of ... two incompatible visibilities" at the limit of the classical present. That the lines lose their shape at the fold of the limit ("they all lack a segment of their trajectories") attests to the ‘void’, ‘hollow’ and ‘absence’ at the heart of representation and to the presence of that "ambiguous visitor" who "is coming in and going out at the same time, like a pendulum caught at the bottom of its swing." In what we might call Foucault’s pendulum we are given an archaeological snapshot or portrait of classical thought and its transformation through a ‘sagittal dimension’ with its arrows or lines of space-time that are drawn through a ‘bifurcation’ point or space of discontinuity between ‘attractor’ states. (i.e, the spontaneous transition from a point of equilibrium (infinity) to a state of oscillation (finitude)). It is a ‘phase portrait’ of the abstract, heterotopic space of the outside between the not yet and the no longer, a representation that can no longer represent and a finitude not yet visible.

And Foucault’s construction of an archaeological ‘phase-space’ will demonstrate that classical thought is continually driven into and losing itself in the attractor of infinite representation. This is why, in one sense, that "language in the classical era does not exist." Language loses its ‘being’ which is dissolved entirely in its representational function and exists in the ‘hollow’ that it creates for itself. Within this hollow language takes on its function as discourse distributed through a ‘quadrilateral’ table that attempts to represent, ultimately though the name and the picture, the order of beings to infinity. This
was equally the case with the other empirical domains. "As long as these empirical contents were situated within the space of representation, a metaphysics of the infinite was not only possible but necessary." Representation as that historical apriori or archaeological ground of classical thought unfolds the spaces of the enunciable and visible through each other all the better to unfold them through a continuum to infinity. Enunciable space must render all of visible space translucent to it at that infinite point where representation and being, nature and human nature intersect.

What classical thought reveals is the power of discourse. In other words, language in so far as it represents - language that names, patterns, combines, and connects and disconnects things as it makes them visible in the transparency of words. In this role, language transforms the sequence of perceptions into a table, and cuts up the continuum of beings into a pattern of characters. Where there is discourse, representations are laid out and juxtaposed; and things are grouped together and articulated. The profound vocation of classical language has always been to create a table -a 'picture'... it exists, therefore, only in order to be transparent.

The simultaneity and transparency of enunciable and visible spaces to each other runs through the other empirical domains of natural history and wealth. Remarking on the curiosity that the classical age expressed through the establishment of botanical gardens and zoological collections Foucault says that their had, for a long time, been an interest in exotic plants and animals but that "what had changed was the space in which it was possible to see them and from which it was possible to describe them." The conditions for the existence of natural history were thus established through the necessity to name things in accordance with a specific mode of seeing, made possible through a re-organisation of historical space.
What came surreptitiously into being between the age of the theatre and that of the catalogue was not the desire for knowledge, but a new way of connecting things both to the eye and to discourse.

This is why, in one sense, "that life itself did not exist" in the classical age. The space through which it could be named and made visible (biological space) had not been constructed and could not have been. Foucault's archaeology of natural history demonstrates not only that 'life' as an object was not seen, but that it could not be seen. Natural history analyses 'living beings' into their functional variable components through a 'structure' of identities and differences that can be tabulated to the 'character' of genuine species, that brings words and things together in a simultaneous act of seeing and naming. Linnaeus' proposed calligrams, where the actual arrangement of words on the page represent the visual parts of the object ("that the printed text ... should have a vegetable structure") illustrates this structure. (No doubt in the margins of Linnaeus' little epistemological dream we would find the inscription: this is not a plant). This structure is a historically specific "limiting and filtering" of the visible (the invention of the microscope was made possible by this contraction of the visible and its use merely extended this contraction) that makes possible its transcription into language.

In the 'analysis of wealth' labour does not exist, and for the same reasons that language and life do not exist. The exchange value of money is dissolved into its representational function as a sign of the value of other commodities. Money has no intrinsic value other than that "which permits wealth to be represented." The continued use of specific metals (gold, silver) is merely due to their "representative
function as signs." 148 Because of certain material qualities (Foucault lists imperishable, easily divided, density (weight per volume), transportable, easily pierced) they retain a 'peculiar perfection,' a perfection that favours them for infinite representation. From this perspective classical thought could develop a table of identities and differences through which all wealth, as components in a system of exchange, could be represented.

General grammar, natural history and the analysis of wealth are modes of being through which classical thought constructs its order of things.

All wealth is coinable; and it is by this means that it enters into circulation - in the same way that any natural being was characterisable, and could therefore find its place in a taxonomy; that any individual was nameable and could find its place in an articulated language; that any representation was signifiable and could find its place, in order to be known, in a system of identities and differences. 149

In each empirical region the spaces of the enunciable and visible produce a precarious compound form from those forces within (a certain mode of being for language, nature, need) in confrontation with those forces from outside. "Archaeological mutation" consists in "an erosion from the outside" 150 when the attractor state of classical thought (infinite representation) with its three axes or lines converging on a virtual point contract with new forces from the outside - life, labour and language - ("the force of labour, the energy of life, the power of speech" 151) producing through these forces the form of that 'periodic' attractor - man - through the dense points of biology, economics and linguistics as both object of knowledge and subject who knows, as both positive foundation and fundamental limitation.
When these empirical contents were detached from representation and contained the principle of existence within themselves, then the metaphysics of infinity became useless; from that point on, finitude never ceased to refer back to itself (from the positivity of the contents to the limitations of knowledge, and from the limited knowledge of the contents) where upon the entire field of western thought was invented.  

The exterior forms of content and expression no longer unfold adjacent and superimposed on one another and converging on a singular point but are now folded through a 'periodic attractor,' a 'period doubling' or, as Foucault says, "an empirico-transcendental doublet which was called man." 

Hence the interminable to and fro of a double system of reference: if man's knowledge is finite, it is because he is trapped, without possibility of liberation, within the positive contents of language, labour and life; and inversely, if life labour and language may be posited in their positivity, it is because knowledge has finite forms. 

All these contents that his knowledge reveals to him as exterior to himself, and older than his own birth, anticipate him, overhang him with all their solidity, and traverse him as though he were merely an object of nature ... Man's finitude is heralded - and imperiously so - in the positivity of knowledge ... 

Man is now constituted in that space of positivity that Las Meninas had reserved for him. It is the space of the "Fold (in which) the transcendental function is doubled over so that it covers with its dominating network the inert, grey space of empiricity ..." Foucault's whole analysis of modern thought demonstrates that the folded space of finitude constitutes the compound 'man' across its surfaces only after hollowing out the being of representation, through a primary phase, that
breaks its links with infinity. The forces of finitude are already, in some sense 'present,' (insisting, subsisting), held in reserve and floating or hovering in the 'outside' limit of classical thought. Smith, Jussieu and Jones begin to assemble the space within which the outside (finitude) will be folded into the inside creating a new dimension or as Foucault says, a new 'configuration' upon which the 'mode of being' of words, classes and wealth will fold and become articulated. Within this development words and things acquire a historicity (first phase) which is given a foundation by being appropriated by man (second phase).

Thus, behind the history of the positivities, there appears another, more radical, history, that of man himself - a history that now concerns man's very being, since he now realises that he not only 'has history' all around him, but is himself, in his own historicity, that by means of which a history of human life, a history of economics, and a history of languages are given their form. In which case, at a very deep level, there exists a historicity of man which is itself its own history but also the radical dispersion that provides a foundation for all other histories.

This is not a transition from the static tabula of classical order to History so much as a passage from the unified historical schema of the enunciable and the visible with the same space and chronology to a multiplicity of spaces and times each with its own form of historicity. This dispersion of history is only regrouped in its being when the human sciences organise themselves around the figure of man. But, the emphasis of the human sciences on historicity as a 'mode of being' could also be directed back on themselves as forms of knowledge undermining any effort to construct universal laws equivalent to those in natural science. Foucault's infamous provocations about Marxism ('storms in a childrens paddling pool') merely locate it as a child of its time whose
claims to scientific totality conceal its own historicity. Marxism is just one discursive practice amongst others in a broad epistemological arrangement of history which is itself a form of knowledge and a mode of being governed by a historical apriori. 'History' is a historical problematic through which difference and otherness return as a problem.

The whole effort of *The Order of Things* is thus directed toward establishing the 'horizontal axis' through which the differentiated exteriorities of knowledge, the 'play of dependencies', links and redistributions affecting the spaces of the enunciable and the visible, actively produce historical knowledge through the same/other rubric. The apriori of historical knowledges is itself historical:

> the apriori of positivities is not only the system of a temporal dispersion - it is itself a transformable group.  

Foucault's texts renew history by demonstrating the non-arbitrary regulatory network that reconfigures epistemological space. Each mutation in the spaces of history systematically rearticulates the assembled spaces of knowledge, the already said and the already seen. Knowledge is immanent to and coextensive with the actioned spaces of the social/historical field. "Knowledge is a practical assemblage, a 'mechanism' of statements and visibilities. There is nothing behind knowledge (although, as we shall see, there are things outside knowledge.)."  

Knowledge organises the internal space of each regime and the circle of articulations between them. In the modern regime 'man' attempts to close the circle of these articulations:
The question is no longer: How can experience of nature give rise to necessary judgements? But rather: How can man think what he does not think, inhabit as though by a mute occupation something that eludes him, animate with a kind of frozen movement that figure of himself that takes the form of a stubborn exteriority?

Man as that 'figuration of finitude', as a transcendental/empirical doublet is born alongside an 'unthought', an excession of representation, an 'outside' topologically folded inside thought. The unthought outside reverberates across the spaces of knowledge (life, labour, language) as their deep interior, the other that traverses the same.

Man has not been able to describe himself as a configuration in the episteme without thought at the same time discovering, both in itself and outside itself, at its borders yet also in its very warp and woof, an element of darkness, an apparently inert density in which it is embedded, an unthought which it contains entirely, yet in which it is also caught.

Foucault joins the extimacy of the unthought with thought to the "retreat and return of the origin". Thus the transcendental/empirical, thought/unthought, original/originated are the archaeological phases or period doublings of the attractor of modern thought just as they are the aporetic spaces of an 'Anthropology' that ultimately collapses upon itself.

Man is embedded within the interior cavities or strata of an epistemological space which is simultaneously embedded within man. The doubling and repetition of this space within itself is the dogmatic circularity of a bisected Anthropology that experiences itself as 'vigilance', even though it has closed its faculties down for the night.

And so we find philosophy falling asleep once more in the hollow of this Fold; this time not the sleep of Dogmatism, but that of Anthropology.
"From Kant until our own day" Archaeology documents a circular dogmatism distributed across the surfaces of an "anthropological quadrilateral" which can only be displaced by saying farewell to the "face in the sand." Archaeological thought understands the Kantian revolution as an anthropological turn that organises the entire epistemological space of modernity: it is the genesis of an "epistemological consciousness of man as such." 167 The dissolution of representation heralds man as that "figure occurring between two modes of language" 168 that short-circuits and collapses empirical and transcendental spaces into each other. Simultaneously held together and apart it is only when this folded space is erased or dispersed into a new multiplicity that a thinking-otherwise becomes possible:

It is no longer possible to think in our day other than in the void left by man's disappearance. For this void does not create a deficiency; it does not constitute a lacuna that must be filled. It is nothing more, and nothing less than the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think. 169

Archaeological thought unravels and situates itself within a post-anthropological space that frees thought from within man. It is in The Archaeology of Knowledge that this space is drawn out and given its irreducible exterior form, a form "purged of all Anthropologism" 170. 'Man' is a temporary functional space within the modern episteme soon to be declared useless by a contemporary formation displaying a new "cluster of transformations," a new set of force relations.

The archaeological principle that in each age everything is already seen and already said according to their anonymous conditions or apriori is, then, already present in The Order of Things and is taken up in The Archaeology of Knowledge not as a totality describing a period, a
structural key, overarching principle, weltanschauung, integral paradigm etc, but as that set of historical forces that condition the existence of specific forms of the visible and the articulable and their spatial relations of dispersion and displacement. These principles allow us to describe, as the episteme of a period, not the sum of its knowledge, nor the general style of its research, but the deviation, distances, the oppositions, the differences, the relations of its multiple scientific discourses: the epistemic is not a sort of grand underlying theory, it is a space of dispersion, it is an open field of relationships and no doubt indefinitely specifiable. They allow us furthermore to describe not the great history which would carry along all the sciences in a single trajectory, but the types of history - that is to say, of retentivity and transformation - which characterise different discourses ... the episteme is not a slice of history common to all the sciences: it is a simultaneous play of specific remanences. Finally they allow us to situate the different thresholds in their respective place: for nothing proves in advance ... that their chronology is the same for all types of discourse ... the episteme is not a general stage of reason, it is a complex relationship of successive displacements.

The episteme then is a space of multiplicity cut across by other multiplicities - discursive and nondiscursive - in infinitely varied patterns of spatial movement. The episteme is a kaleidoscopic compound of visible and invisible space, the verbal and non-verbal nerve structure of the 'no longer' and the 'not yet.' The archaeology of the 'present' episteme is a map of what we are leaving behind and what we are in the process of becoming, a displacement of the past into the dispersion of the new.

The archaeologist is above all fascinated with the emergence of these 'other spaces' in the time of the 'not yet', fascinated with spaces of becoming, impossible heterotopic spaces that do not yet exist but insist or subsist within the fractures and splinters of the stratum; fascinated, above all, with how both the arbitrary and groundless interaction between contingent processes of spatial flux give rise to
subsequent spatial forms and how other relations and processes emerge between interacting ones. The archaeologist's principle concern is to map, describe and rethink in its logic the endless interweaving and folding of epistemic multiplicities and the processes through which they constitute the pulse of the 'real.' For the archaeologist can also claim "that he has written only what is real, and used what is real, for everything is real in the statement, and all reality in it is openly on display." 172 Foucault's archaeological maps or phase-space diagrams of the real not only show how the possibilities of knowledge are defined by the way in which the enunciable and the visible produce and stratify the space of enonces but they also show (create and select) those points and spaces to destratify, inventing 'smooth spaces' and little lines of flight to the outside. The archaeologist will designate the space of enonces as the location of this contest over knowledge.

4. The space of enonces.

Enonces are the material expression, the collective assemblage of enunciation of the variable epistemic conditions that constitute the real. The archaeologist will map the spatial logics that inform this figure and we will come to see how enonces are shaken loose from their anchoring in any 'discursive unit,' peeled away from any linguistic or 'written' core and inserted into a radically positive exteriority or transversality at the heart of Foucault's 'empiricism' or 'positivism.'

In the books leading up to The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault had explained that he was dealing with neither words or things, but what makes them possible. His work was not concerned with logical or
grammatical analysis, with objects, subjects or predicates and nor was it concerned with any kind of analysis of phrases or propositions. In fact, the Archaeologist attends to a topological dimension in order to apprehend what has not been read before. Moving along a diagonal line that cuts through the spaces of 'interpretation' or 'formalisation' Foucault presents the enonce (statement). An example is immediately forthcoming: "the keyboard of a typewriter is not a statement; but the same series of letters A, Z, E, R, T listed in a typewriting manual, is the statement of the alphabetical order adopted by French typewriters."

Foucault's archaeological instruments invent a new enunciative or expressive function and Dreyfus and Rabinow, for example, will describe this function as a double phenomenological reduction bracketing sense and reference. The statement for them is a serious speech act (a seriousness that is suspended) offered up through the principle of the rarefaction of discourse, a rarefaction produced through some kind of 'institutional test'. The statement is a form of residual materiality left over after the extraction of propositional, grammatical and analytical content making a pure description of discourse possible. This is barely adequate to the reach and originality of this 'concept'. It binds the statement to a 'linguistic' act, ties such acts together as discourse (so that discourse is merely a collection of oral or written statements, a version of speech act theory), deprives it of its complex relation to a 'visible' component and almost entirely suppresses, across the range of its articulations, its development as a complex figure of space, spacing and spatiality. If we accept Dreyfus and Rabinows understanding of the statement "we distort Foucault's conception of
history, but equally we distort his thought and his conception of thought in general. We make it into a variation of contemporary analytical philosophy, with which he has little in common." 175

In fact, the archaeologist will establish the provenance of the space of enonces neither through a transcendental deduction nor through a phenomenological reduction (however radical) but through, playing on words a little, an immanent production. The enonce is a function of a composite, immanent space which yields, with mathematical rigour, a series of horizontal, vertical and diagonal dimensions compacted and stratified, stretched and folded into geomorphic lines and surfaces. These active spaces (correlative, complementary and collateral) that make up the inter, intra and extra dimensions of 'discursivity' require, for archaeological work, a non-linear geometry because of the complexity of their fractional form, their articulation through scalar difference, their proliferation through serial division and their profound affinity with chance.

Associate or collateral space organizes the groupings of enonces, how they emerge and how they are disseminated, distributed and coalesce as historical formations. If Collateral relations define the stratification and layering of the articulable and the visible, then correlative space defines the organizing terms of their relation or how the legibility of subjects, objects and concepts emerge in the structuration of the articulable and the visible. Complementary space defines an institutional base determined by the relations between discourse and the non-discursive, the concrete mode of effectuation or inscription of the
outside. As we will see, these spaces cut across and through another creating complex intermediary and interlocking relations throughout the immanent corpus of enonces. Moreover, their realized state can be articulated like a (non-linear) differential equation mapping the relations between continuous variables. If Foucault offers an 'archive' of any specific equation it is in the sense that archaeological differential equations contain "two different realities." The archive of a discursive formation will extract, exposit and produce an actual/virtual relation which determines the precise 'conditions of existence' of any corpus of enonces. The archive constitutes an audio-visual matrix that generates enonces in a series of tripartite, complex non-linear spaces in between and exterior to the visible and the expressible.

It is here around the pivot of the double reality of enonces and the tripartitional immanent logic of space that produces them that Foucault constructs an exteriority for the archaeological register:

the analysis of statements treats them in the systematic form of exteriority. Usually, the historical description of things said is shot through with the opposition of interior and exterior; and wholly directed by a desire to move from the exterior- which may be no more than contingency or mere material necessity, a visible body or uncertain translation - towards the essential nucleus of interiority.

It is through the insistence of this exterior without interior that the archaeologist can map the spaces of the statement and that they may be organized as the 'structure' of discourse. The relations between the spaces of the statement "are not present in the object; it is not that they are deployed when the object is being analysed...They do not define
its internal constitution, but what enables it to appear...to be placed...
in a field of exteriority." 177 Statements inhabit, create or exist...
within relational spaces of exteriority that aren't buried or concealed...
in a nucleus of interiority in a manner that would require some kind of
hermeneutics to uncover, bringing to light their concealed or repressed
strata. Equally statements are not wholly visible to a phenomenological
gaze or horizon that would restate them in and through a structure of
intentionality. Archaeological thought functions in that paradoxical
space of exteriority in which statements "are neither visible nor
hidden." 178 Whether exteriority, positivity or 'neutrality'179, the
archaeologist demonstrates a technique of mapping that segments and
sections discursive and non-discursive space in order to maximise the
legibility of its sedimentations of the visible and the expressible. And
this practice of archaeological reading will show that the statements of
each historical formation "systematically form the objects of which they
speak" 180

We need only know how to read however difficult that may prove to
be. The secret exists only in order to be betrayed, or to betray
itself. Each age articulates perfectly the most cynical elements of
its politics, or the rawest element of its sexuality, to the point
where transgression has little merit. Each age says everything it
can according to the conditions laid down for its statements. 181

The practice or technique of archaeological reading breaks with the
accepted interiorities of author or book unities to offer a topology of
discourse and the non-discursive based on positivities that "cannot be
constructed from the grammatical features, formal structures and objects
of discourse" 182. Enonces are mobile, rare, configurations of
exteriority and positivity composed of singularities and multiplicities,
empty spaces temporarily inhabited by subjects, objects and concepts as
repeatable regularities. "Each statement is itself a multiplicity, not a structure or a system". 183

Foucault insists on the 'rarity' of the statement-multiplicity and is the condition for the appearance of statements in general. If discourse is analysed so that different texts are organised around or into a single figure, coherent with institutions and practices, there is always a desire to reveal beneath the diversity of things said "a sort of great uninterrupted text," revealing what men "really meant." 184 Because this underlying formulation is arrived at by an individual act of interpretation a single manifest formulation will give rise to an endless number of latent meanings. Between the opposite poles of analysis whereby the many are reduced to the one or the one expanded to the many Foucault will create a new ‘abstract’ or ‘virtual’ space of multiplicity that does not contain any potential or possibility but remains at the level of what is said at a given moment, including any blanks and gaps.

In this sense, discourse ceases to be what it is for the exegetic attitude: an inexhaustible treasure from which one can always draw near and always unpredictable riches ... it appears as an asset - finite, limited, desirable, useful - that has its own rules of appearance, but also its own conditions of appropriation and operation. 185

There is no sense of possibility or potentiality within the space of statements since they are the "pure positivity of the dictum" 186 with their own conditions and rules. Gliding through this space the archaeologist will show that statements of the same set may be compared with others on different levels or with other sets on the same level and that the relations between statements can only be analysed, and their
"points of diffraction" 187 established, according to the precise distance between them. Each time the geometry will vary and the 'diagonality' or transversality must be redrawn. And with this method one realises that "not only are few things said, but few things can be said." 188

Statements exist, then, as functions within a space of rarity which cannot be understood in terms of creation, beginning or foundation and the mapping of their formation and transformation require another logic of space. A statement exists as "a transmission of particular elements distributed in a corresponding space" 189 and Foucault stresses that no originality is needed in order to produce them: "the originality/banality opposition is not relevant: between an initial formulation and the sentence, which years, centuries later, repeats it more or less exactly, (the archaeological description) establishes no hierarchy of value; it makes no radical difference. It tries only to establish the regularity of statements." 190 Regularity cuts through the problem of originality and is an effect of rarity of its space. Statements preserve themselves in their space while the space itself endures or is reconstituted.

The accumulation of statements is like the building up of stock, the layering of deposits or the bedding together of all kinds of bastard 'families' and, on each occasion, their empty spaces, gaps or absences are filled by variable and different subjects so that the statement resolves into a specific object in a particular discursive formation. Such a formation then is not a totality but a "distribution of gaps, voids, absences, limits, divisions". 191 The rules that govern this
distributive process are not found on some other level but on the same
immanent level as the statement itself.

The regularity of statements is defined by the discursive formation
itself. The fact of (a statement) belonging to a discursive
formation and the laws (rules) that govern it are one and the same
thing. 192

This is Foucault's 'positivism' and in substituting the 'there is' of the
Archaeology for the 'Being' of the *Order of Things* Foucault's 'ontology'
is stripped of any vestiges of a "more fundamental opening or
difference" that might be said to characterize other 'archivists' of
Being and Difference. Indeed, substituting the 'positivity of the
dictum' for the 'Being of language' (Order of Things) enables Foucault to
state simply that "there is language", "things have been said" and in
each case 'one speaks' through an anonymous murmur reverberating through
a rift or fold of discourse into which even the archaeologist would like
to lodge himself. Occupying the place of the 'one speaks' and the 'it
is said' statements will be subjected to a systematic dispersion through
which one uncovers "an order in their successive appearance,
correlations in their simultaneity, assignable positions in a common
space, a reciprocal functioning, linked and hierarchised
transformations." 193

The regularity of statements renders their occurrence (whether for the
first time or whether repeated or reproduced) an effect of the whole
topological curve and must be associated with the whole of this curve
and with the rules governing the particular space in which they are
distributed and reproduced. Statements have nothing to do with any
cogito, transcendental subject, ego, or spirit of the age etc, which
could originate, conserve, multiply, or destroy them. Any individual can become the subject of a statement and a statement can be reproduced by many individuals. The statement, because of its variable functions accumulates into an object that can be transmitted, repeated or preserved. The spatial relation to other statements within the same group are formed by rules to be found on the same immanent level and these rules function through dispersion and heterogeneity as the statements within a group cross into other systems, cutting across institutions, observations and descriptions. So each statement is bound up with other members of its group which are conditioned by the inherent rules or lines of variation which define their 'regularity.'

Statements are also linked to other surfaces by the relations that they have with their own subjects, objects and concepts. The statement 'refers' to spaces within itself, or rather expresses a set of derived functions that are extremely variable. The link that the statement holds with a variable subject in itself constitutes a variable that is intrinsic to the statement itself. The various positions offered by the statement depending upon the group and formation are not variants of a unitary subject but are depersonalised categories of subjectivity e.g. one speaks, he speaks, etc and emerge from an anonymous' murmur'. If this goes for the subject as much can be said for objects and concepts. Statements have their 'discursive objects' which don't refer to some extrinsic variable but in fact are defined by the limits to the lines of variation of the statement itself. Equally the concepts that emerge in statements are the "schemata" of the statement in terms of its role as primative function. Thus the statement contains its own functions of
subject, object and concept and these are like places or positions taken up within a family of statements. All of these places taken up within the statement are like moving points or dots joined up by the curve of regularity across an immanent surface. Inherent variation and intrinsic variable. This still leaves a third realm of extrinsic space, the space of non-discursive formations. Institutions imply statements and statements refer back to an institution which is necessary for the formation of the subjects and objects of statements e.g. the doctor in the hospital, the writer in society etc. There is no simple relation of causality or symbolism or parallelism or even isomorphism between the discursive and non-discursive since the non-discursive forms a kind of limit surface neither inside or outside statements but which enables the appearance of objects and their assignation within the statement itself.

Because statements may be repeated, or rather that "only statements can be repeated" is no doubt due to their 'materiality' and therefore occurs only under very strict conditions. This internal materiality of the statement that makes repetition possible must, in each of its conditions, be the same for repetition to take place. 'Species evolve' is not the same statement when first used by an eighteenth century naturalism and then by nineteenth century biology. In fact the same statements belong to different discursive formations depending upon the precise factors associated with their reactivation. This has nothing to do with context since its nature is determined by the group of statements of the discursive formation under consideration.
Foucault's archaeology of the triple spaces of the enonces activates, then, a complex relational expressivity that traverses thresholds and breaks with all the old unities.

A genealogical tree, an accounts book, the calculations of a trade balance are statements. ... an equation of the nth degree, or the algebraic formula of the law of refraction must be regarded as statements ... Lastly, a graph, a growth curve, an age pyramid, a distribution cloud are all statements: any sentences that may accompany them are merely interpretation or commentary.

Historical knowledges are embedded within the spaces of enonces "a function that cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space." 195

The problem is to map the 'how' of this embeddedness, to determine precisely the formation, transformation and deformation of the positive topological spaces that organise the shapes of enonces of thought in an epoch. In effect, with the thought of enonces Foucault invents a new kind of 'abstract expressionism' that does not traverse domains, disciplines, subjects, genres, etc, so much as constitute archaeological territories that extend to "'literary' or 'philosophical' texts as well as scientific ones. Knowledge is to be found not only in demonstrations, it can also be found in fiction, reflection, narrative accounts, institutional regulations, and political decisions". 196

Archaeological territories, historical formations, discursive and non-discursive multiplicities are compounds, "temporal vectors of derivation" 197, made up of deposits of strata that overlap and coexist, passing through varying thresholds and limits which are activated and reactivated according to the formation in question. Equally, other lines fade out or break up, diverge and become
redistributed elsewhere or are left in abeyance. In any case the mobility of the archaeologist will enable historical multiplicites to be surveyed and mapped "with concrete contents, in time an space" so that "thought is once again possible."

Foucault's archaeological thought, as a rethinking of the logic of the space of enonces, serves as the media (audio-visual archive) through which the already said and already seen spaces of enonces (past), are made active to the present (the 'now' of what we can see/say), in a confrontation/resistance that forces thought into a 'thinking-otherwise,' a becoming-other of thought, a release of new enonces (future).

In developing this method to its limit Foucault will lock his 'empiricism' onto specific thresholds that will mobilise the enonces of knowledge in other directions taking them to the point of their own 'impossibility'. By breaking through certain 'aesthetic' thresholds, for example, Foucault will show how the space of enonces can no longer be understood through the exclusive determination of language or through the play of signifier and signified. Archaeological thought will begin to map knowledge onto another dimension, 'outside' yet immanent to its own internal composition. Foucault had already shown how the repetition of a statement entailed its difference, almost always repeating "something else", something paradoxically that "is strangely similar and almost identical to it" 198. The material repeatability of the statement ensures that it is circulated and used, that it "allows or prevents the realisation of a desire, serves or resists various interests, participates in challenge and struggle, and becomes a theme of
appropriation or rivalry." 199 And the spaces of knowledge are always already a battleground and a space of contest and struggle in which questions of power, desire and resistance are of crucial importance. The archaeological exterior is shifting and realigning genealogically as an explicit response to the realisation that the spaces of enonces are produced, stratified and coded through the invisible spaces of power. It is in those pages of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* devoted to the relations between painting and enonces and drawn out by *This is not a Pipe*, that Foucault begins to tease out those unseen and unsaid spaces in which the enunciable and the visible are articulated together and apart as the logic of power/knowledge.

5. The force of painting.

The relation of language to painting is an infinite relation. It is not that words are imperfect or that when confronted by the visible, they prove insuperably inadequate. Neither can be reduced to the other's terms: it is in vain that we say what we see, what we see never resides in what we say.

The spaces of enonces and the system of thought they embody are cleaved open along the crack or fracture of their 'relation' and distributed into an isomorphic and asymmetrical series each penetrated to the core by their differential positivity. Archaeological thought would not set out to show that the painting is a certain way of 'meaning' or 'saying' that is peculiar in that it dispenses with words. It would try to show that, at least in one of its dimensions, it is discursive practice that is embedded in techniques and effects. In this sense, the painting is not a pure vision that must then be transcribed into the materiality of space; nor is it a naked gesture whose silent and eternally empty meanings must be freed from subsequent interpretations. It is shot through - independently of scientific knowledge (connaissance) and philosophical themes - with the positivity of a knowledge (savoir).
Painting can be analysed as a discursive practice not by transcribing the silence of the visible into the 'latent discourse of the painter,' the commentary that would 'recapture the murmur of his intentions' but by mapping the system of practical 'visibilities,' of which the painting would be a part, to its historical conditions of emergence/existence. Thus to analyse painting as a discursive practice would take us to the limit of practical knowledge since it would show not only that painting was more than an expression of aesthetic practice but is also more than the conceptual and institutional foundations of that practice: it would show the historical conditions of possibility/impossibility of painting as an expression of 'thought' in relation to other practices of thought. Foucault concurs with Magritte: painting names the problem of a "thought that sees and can be visibly described."

Painting is reinscribed within a visible series generated through those spaces of positivity that make it historically possible (what could be painted, where, by whom, how? etc) which would connect to other complex spaces of discourse/knowledge. The problem of art or painting is not autonomous, yet painting is a node in a micro-network of practices (savoir) irreducible to 'philosophical themes' and 'scientific knowledge.'

Foucault is worrying away at a central (non-linear) dynamic that pervades his thought from beginning to end. It concerns the oldest oppositions of our alphabetic civilisation: to show and to name; to shape and to say; to reproduce and to articulate; to imitate and to signify; to look and to read.
In both transgressive space and the positive archaeological space of exteriority Foucault's thought constitutes a vigourous assault on the identity, resemblance and self-evidence of these oppositions in order "... to keep the relation of language to vision open to stay as close as possible to both ... to treat their incompatibility as a starting point ..." The incompatible relation between statements and visibilities, word and image, discourse and figure, discursive and non-discursive, language and light is given its most rigourous 'starting point' in Foucault's reading of Magritte in This is not a Pipe where the relation is thought as 'non-relation': "the drawing ... and the text ... cannot find a place to meet ..." because the 'common space' between them is 'hollowed out' and dissolved in "the slender, colourless and netural strip" that links and divides, connects and separates text from figure.

Foucault had already demonstrated how, in The Order of Things, the classical space of representation had placed limits around the productivity of this 'non-relation' by erasing it in the functions of designation and naming. It permitted classical thought the freedom "to pass surrepticiously from the space where one speaks to the space where one looks; in other words, to fold one over the other as though they were equivalents." The space of classical (aesthetic) thought governs a specific ordering of the system of enonces in the form of an equivalence of resemblance and the affirmation of a representative bond. The space of enones could neither 'merge nor intersect' and yet they 'cannot be dissociated.' The instability of this relation is regulated by the
subordination of one space to the other. Visibilities organise a system of resemblance that can only be elevated from their silence and affirmed through the referential power of (linguistic) statements. And this linguistic activity distributes the meaning of 'signs' across their differences.

What is essential is that verbal signs and visual representations are never given at once. An order always hierarchizes them, running from figure to discourse or from discourse to figure.

Resemblance and affirmation require a division between the plastic elements of representation which separate resemblances in the activity of representation and discursive reference which denies things their capacity to resemble by affirming their expression as linguistic signs in a referential network of meaningful differences. Although these orders are mutually exclusive and irreducibly divided, they form together a double articulation.

Let a figure resemble an object (or some other figure) and that alone is enough for there to slip into the pure play of painting a statement (enonce) - obvious, banal, repeated a thousand times yet almost always silent. (It is like an infinite murmur - haunting, enclosing the silence of figures, investing it, mastering it, extricating the silence from itself, and finally reversing it with the domain of things that can be named). "What you see is that."

If philosophy excludes the visible from the expression of thought by continually utilising it as a resource for its propositions, Foucault will mobilise the spatial practices of Klee, Kandinsky and Magritte to profoundly problematise the order of hierarchization that organises the play of discourse/figure.

Between resemblance and affirmation there slips an enonce which cracks open any logic of propositions to the specifically historical visible and articulable conditions that make them possible. It is:
rather a question of the intersection within the same medium, of representation by resemblance and of representation by signs. Which presupposes that they meet in quite another space than that of the painting.

This 'non-place' or absence of space "must be seen as a crevasse - an uncertain, foggy region now dividing the pipe floating in its imagistic heaven from the mundane tramp of words marching in their successive line." The thin strip or faultline that ensures that figure and text will displace each other, transforming the space of enonces, is produced through the calligrammatic 'logic' of Magritte's drawings. It is "an art more committed than any other to the careful and cruel separation of graphic and plastic elements. If they happen to be superimposed within the painting like a legend and its image, it is on condition that the statement contest the obvious identity of the figure, and the name we are prepared to give it." 

If the modern period folds enunciation and affirmation together in the proposition: 'This is a pipe' Foucault will show how Magritte's work explodes the collateral faith in the figure/text designation by streaming the series together and apart as the 'double-logic' of the calligrammatic sign. The calligram "never speaks and represents at the same moment. The very thing that is both seen and read is hushed in the vision, hidden in the reading."

The calligrammatic 'trap' lures language into its object, shapes it into what it says, stripping it of its affirmative function by subjecting it to the force of resemblance. Yet, language parasitises the figure with 'discontinuous letters,' opens the silence of its 'uninterrupted lines' to interrogation and forces it to speak 'in the universe of discourse.' Once read the figure is shattered into affirmation by the name. This is indeed a pipe: "A double trap, unavoidable snare."
Yet, in *This is not a Pipe* Foucault pushes the potential of Magritte's 'unravelled calligram' beyond a suspension of the identities of discourse/figure into a space of becoming: the calligram 'can not yet say' and 'no longer represent' \(^{218}\) and the spaces of enonces are unquestionably transformed in the actualisation of their becoming. *This is not a Pipe* releases the subversive potential trapped in the oscillations of the calligram by returning discourse/figure to their 'proper' spaces and thus making their trap-gates visible:

"Magritte reopened the trap the calligram had sprung on the thing it described. But in the act the object itself escaped." \(^{219}\)

When the two series are returned to their space the negation inscribed in each dissolves the object by collapsing the frame of designation to which the calligram ultimately belongs. Foucault opens out a new problematic relation of becoming between discourse and figure linked by a "subtle and unstable dependency, at once insistent and unsure." \(^{220}\) Whilst remaining absolutely divided discourse/figure nonetheless 'encounter' each other in an agonistic coupling.

Between the figure and the text we must admit a whole series of crisscrossings, or rather between the one and the other attacks are launched and arrows fly against the enemy target, campaigns designed to undermine and destroy, wounds and blows from the lance, a battle ... images falling into the midst of words, verbal flashes crisscrossing drawings ... discourse cutting into the form of things. \(^{221}\)

The relation of 'non-relation' between the regimes is one of mutual exclusion and reciprocal presupposition. Resemblance and affirmation are profoundly disturbed and transformed by "avalanches of images into the midst of word, and verbal flashes that streak and shatter the drawings." \(^{222}\) From the ruins of ressemblance and affirmation springs the space of similitude: the difference and repetition of the visible and the enunciable.
In *This is not a Pipe* the void or difference between the visible and the enunciable that dismantles "all the relations of designation, nomination, description and classification" \(^{223}\) between them is reconfigured as a productive absence or multiplicitous outside that cannot be reconstituted as origin or unity. It is a space of virtuality or becoming between text and figure, between the 'not yet' and the 'no longer' that continually divides and regroups, bifurcates and disseminates meaning. Within the painting the identity of the enonces is split open along the seam of this space and hovers in an unstable relation between text and figure issuing three 'propositions' from their non-coincidence. In *les deux mystères* this same operation produces "seven discourses in a single statement. More than enough to demolish the fortress where similitude was held prisoner to the assertion of resemblance." \(^{224}\)

Foucault (and Magritte's) pipe-becoming ('This is a pipe' becoming 'This is not a pipe') is gauged by the extent to which similitude has replaced resemblance as the organising term or historical apriori within the space of paintings enonces. "Resemblance predicates itself upon a model it must return to and reveal," \(^{225}\) writes Foucault, but "similitude circulates the simulacrum as an indefinite and reversible relation of the similar to the similar." \(^{226}\) Similitude "develops a series which have neither beginning nor end, that can be followed in one direction as easily as in another, that obey no hierarchy, but propagate themselves from small differences among small differences ..." \(^{227}\)
Resemblance presupposes an Original, Ideal, True pipe that hierarchises and orders its copies. Resemblance only has to repeat once for affirmation to capture it in its nets ensuring a 'this' is always securely attached to a 'that.' Similitude, released from the anchor of an Original, a first and last, a beginning and end, an authenticating model that organises its derivatives, forges and multiplies itself through serial vectors in a reversible movement between copy and copy, repeating itself infinitely in a multiplicity of affirmatives. The space of similitude is the difference and repetition within and across the enunciable and the visible.

Enonces can no longer be determined by a single affirmation. The strict separation between the enunciable and the visible, legitimated/regulated through resemblance, has been irreversibly transformed by the double articulation of their non-relation. Deleuze captures the formula thus:

"to speak and to show in a simultaneous motion ... a prodigious interweaving." Speaking and seeing at the same time, although it is not the same thing, although we do not speak of what we see, or see that of which we speak. But the two comprise the stratum, and from one stratum to the next are transformed at the same time (although not according to the same rules). 228

Once opened to similitude the affirmations of speaking and seeing proliferate indeterminately in all directions continually reconstructing the possibilities of knowledge; through their very incommensurability they produce the multiple terms that regulate possible knowledges across varying thresholds and limits. The space of enonces has entered into a becoming with the age of the rhizome:

A day will come when, by means of similitude relayed indefinitely along the length of a series, the image itself, along with the name it bears, will lose its identity. Campbell, Campbell, Campbell, Campbell, Campbell. 229
If the potential of the knowledge-rhizome lies in its capacity to destroy spaces of identity by opening them to difference and repetition, to an outside that conditions their formation, this potential can be reassimilated and invested elsewhere. (The relentless plundering of Magritte's images by a collusive Art/Capital circuit that deploys them as a marketing strategy. The thought of similitude as the rhizomic circulation of global capital. Warhol- the first 'seer' of the capital-rhizome). The spaces of enonces constitute a battlefield, a zone of turbulence and chaos, a 'perpetual war' carried on through the mutability and contingency of its political instruments. The spaces of knowledge undergo constant interference, division, reconstitution and transformation. The struggle over knowledge can no longer be "couched in terms of the symbolic field or the domain of signifying structures" but must be thought in terms of "relations of force, strategic developments, and tactics". 230

The history that bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of language: relations of power, not relations of meaning. 231

Similitude accelerates and exacerbates this dynamic struggle between the enunciable and visible forms of history to the threshold of a new dimension, a new event of space and relation that runs through the forms of knowledge, conditioning them and making them possible and giving one form determinable primacy over another. It is the event of Power, an "event of an entirely different nature, one that hides outside the image, takes place outside" 232. As Foucault says of that other painter-thinker of force, Paul Reybeyrolle, when confronted with the limit-event of the space of enonces: "nothing from the interior hints at it; no longer does anything venture to penetrate. Rather than an exterior, there is a pure outside, neutral, inacessible, without form." 233
3. THOUGHT OF THE OUTSIDE

There are Events of Thought

Thought about thought, an entire tradition wider than philosophy, has taught us that thought leads us to the deepest interiority. Speech about speech leads us, by way of literature as well as perhaps by other paths, to the outside in which the speaking subject disappears. No doubt that is why Western thought took so long to think the being of language: as if it had a premonition of the danger that the naked experience of language poses for the self-evidence of the 'I think.'

A thought that stands outside subjectivity, setting its limits as though from without, articulating its end, making its dispersion shine forth, taking in only its invincible absence; and that at the same time stands at the threshold of all positivity, not in order to grasp its foundation or justification but in order to regain the space of its unfolding, the void serving as its site, the distance in which it is constituted and into which its immediate certainties slip the moment they are glimpsed - a thought that, in relation to the interiority of our philosophical reflection and the positivity of our knowledge, constitutes what in a word we might call "the thought from the outside.

Every word becomes a concept as soon as it is supposed to serve not merely as a reminder of the unique, absolutely individualised original experience ... but at the same time to fit countless, more or less singular cases, which, strictly speaking, are never identical, and hence absolutely dissimilar.

Thought has a historicity which is proper to it. That it should have this historicity does not mean that it is deprived of all universal form, but instead that the putting into play of these universal forms is itself historical. And that this historicity should be proper to it does not mean that it is independent of all the other historical determinations (of an economic, social or political order), but that it has complex relations with them which always leave their specificity to the forms, transformations and events of thought. This is what could be called the principle of singularity of the history of thought: there are events of thought.

Through the effects of the exteriorities of knowledge, the event of the outside appears. The thought of the outside is concerned with the emergence of discursive and non-discursive topologies and their assumption of a position within the 'real'. The name given to this emergence is event, evenement. The thought of the outside is precisely the 'event' of 'there is language' and 'there is light' conceived as...
relations of force, becoming and chance productively and positively folded into material strata in space and time. It is that space ('non-
place') and time (the 'actual') in which relations of force('non-
relations') seep into the formations of knowledge creating the events of
Power/Knowledge. If, in Western thought, this 'event' has appeared in
its relations to the real (in language, desire, the unconscious, etc)
through a structurally constitutive mechanism of 'lack' ( best summed up
in the Heideggarian inspired Lacanian drivel: the 'lack-of-being that
life is'), or simply as the unthinkable, in Foucault it functions
through the complex interrelations, connections and bifurcations between
power/knowledge that actively produce the real. It produces the real
through the interrelations of the articulable and the visible and the
cutting, reshaping and folding of space and time. The relations between
the event and thought presuppose a 'non-place' and a 'non-relation', an
'extimacy' of intimate exteriority, an outside in which thought once
again becomes possible.

1. THE IMMANENCE OF THEORY.
1.1. Singularities/multiplicities: the singularity of events, the
multiplicity of the universal.

The event is the differential composition of the being of light and the
being of language, a dispersive series of 'impossible' or unclassifiable
conditions (singularities, multiplicities) that have made this event,
and no other, into the kind of actuality that it is. The individuated
event is conditioned by the historical aprioris of light and language
and the force relations that run through them thus ensuring that the
event is a very specific form of positivity that is historical and epistemological rather than phenomenological. The positive eventalisation of light and of language are not revealed through a 'clearing' or a shared background of practices. Each event is produced and functions as a coalescence of exterior strata which are derived from a set of conditions or aprioris unique to each stratum. Lines of force run through different levels of each stratum triggering different effects. Displacing talk about rules, codes and laws (which only ever had minor importance) Foucault endorses the thought of 'eventalisation' as the name for a spatialized and spatializing strategy of thought, a new way of continuing to make maps of difference, a strategy for making and intensifying connections with the outside.

It's not a matter of locating everything on one level, that of the event, but of realising that there is actually a whole order of levels of different types of events, differing in amplitude, chronological breadth, and capacity to produce effects. The problem is at once to distinguish among events, to differentiate the networks and levels to which they belong, and to reconstitute the lines along which they are connected and engender one another.

The strategy of eventalisation breaks down the units of explanation which all too often rely on a "historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all" by "making visible a singularity." Making the singular visible involves a "breach of self-evidence", a counter-actualisation of the event that unfolds and individuates the metastability and 'polymorphism' of the outside. Events are constructed through multiple processes, a plurality of causes that offer a "polyhedron" or multiplicity of intelligibility through "a progressive, necessarily incomplete
saturation." The virtual differences of the outside folded into the event are unfolded and individuated by decomposing the process under analysis into micro-physical units which are then expanded into the external relations of intelligibility through a "multiplication of analytical 'salients'". Thus the singular, actual, individuated event subsists or insists in the polymorphism of its virtual differences.

Foucault inserts the strategy of eventalization into a broader practice of history:

History as it is practiced today.... is continually enlarging the field of events, constantly discovering new layers...in order to establish those diverse, converging, and sometimes divergent, but never autonomous series that enable us to describe the 'locus' of an event, the limits of its fluidity and the conditions of its emergence.

In practicing the eventalization of history Foucault will reject any transcendent, structural, psychoanalytic or phenomenological appeal and any reference to intentionality, ideology, or significance is refused as a reduction of the concreteness of the event, an effacement and deeventalization of its specificity and singularity and its immanent relation to the outside in the name of understanding, explanation or theory. For example:

It seems to me that we must insist on the specificity of the Gulag question against all theoretical reductionisms (which make the Gulag an error already to be read in the texts), against all historicist reductionisms (which make the Gulag a conjectural effect which can be isolated in terms of its causes), against all Utopian dissociations (which would set it, with 'pseudo-socialism', in opposition to socialism 'itself'), against all universalising dissolutions into the general form of internment. These operations all serve the same role ... to preserve the currency among us of a leftist discourse...

Archaeological space determined "the law of existence of the statement, that which has rendered them possible - them and none other in their
place: the conditions of their singular emergence: their correlation with other previous or simultaneous events, discursive or not." The 'meaning', 'truth' and 'objectivity' of discourse is displaced by the conditions of its emergence, insertion and functioning through what Foucault refers to as its mode of existence or effectivity. The eventalization of discourse becomes a description of concrete techniques, effects and conditionings. Foucauldian eventalization denies any transcendent or molar term in order to analyse the individuation of practices or events, an individuation defined by the effectivity of the event within and across enonces and by its conditions of existence.

Effectivities are combinations or mixes of heterogeneous yet adjacent strata and (the task of) eventalization is to make their mode of existence and their conditions of existence visible as a product of the a polyvalent yet univocal space or dimension (the outside) which it neither represents, resembles or is analogous. Elements connect and fold through this space (i.e. they assemble and re-assemble their own heterogeneous conditions) each time reconfiguring and modifying the space of effectuation. Depending upon the particular line, point or surface at which the strategy of eventalisation intervenes, the effectivity of events are mapped out as sets of relations which have been produced and function in continuous variation across their differences. The plane of immanence (in Deleuze's idiom: the plane of consistency) is a space of difference-in-itself and Foucault's eventalization of the effectivity of this plane of thought is nothing but its affirmation. Foucault's strategy of eventalization: the historical actualisation of events as effectivities through the immanent
(aconceptual) difference of the outside. Conditioned and condition assemble or machine their parts and matter, connecting and reconnecting them together, squeezing, flattening and redistributing their space of articulation whilst simultaneously increasing their 'dimensionality' or 'valency' through multiplication and proliferation of connection: events of thought are affirmations of differential multiplicities.

The complex 'flattened', immanent, yet multi-dimensional spatiality of eventmental thought requires establishing a whole series of topological connections between the inside and the outside, space and time, knowledge and power across its plane of expression which will disturb, problematise and displace the metaphysical spaces that 'ground' the meaning, unity, creation, and originality of de-eventalised thought. It will open a new 'spacing' of events and a new 'timing' of history and a new way of mapping their relations in order to show not only the extent to which singular events are a "transformable group", but to eventalize a thinking-otherwise in relation to the events of thought.

The strategy of drawing lines of multiplicity or connections between points or singularities in a field and measuring their Immanent intensity, the 'distance' and 'difference' between them, necessarily involves studying how the effects themselves ramify in all directions cutting across a particular regime or domain. A discursive 'object' subsists relative to other discursive objects only in its multifarious effects at other points and their effects at the point of its apparent locus which resonate through "the said as much as the unsaid." 18 This strategy of placing events in relation to a constitutive and immanent outside undermines the desire to produce abstract first principles with
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their hierarchical dualisms, progressivist schemas or teleologies which would regulate and control the 'play' of events, reduce and capture their 'meaning' through origin and totality, cause and effect, and locate centres for particular regimes. These centres or structures can then establish striated boundaries between particular regimes of effects, install transcendental and hierarchical conditioning mechanisms that would restore depth, negativity and interiority and exclude and efface the outside as they produce identity within difference.

Events, then, exist within and between lines, points or surfaces which are situated within multidirectional and multidimensional fields of force. The productive relations between these singularities and multiplicities is synonymous with effect and a particular dynamic point or moving line - a partial object - is defined by its relation to the outside, its connections with other points in a field of effects. The 'event' of the outside is the folded, differential articulation of the enunciable and the visible. The events of the outside name so many impersonal and pre-individual singularities and the outside 'itself' is the 'aleatory point' that triggers and traverses these singularities. The event of the outside, for Foucault, is a "swarm of singularities" that cannot be captured in the unity of the Same: an "eventalisation of thought" is the carving out of a space in which the hierarchy of the Same is irrevocably perverted.

Foucault's eventalization of thought problematises a methodological schema that makes a 'deventalised' thought of the Same a principle of historical / philosophical intelligibility.
The way they work is by ascribing the object they analyse to the most unitary, necessary, inevitable and (ultimately) extrahistorical mechanism or structure available. An economic mechanism, an anthropological structure or a demographic process, which figure as the climactic stage in the investigation - these are the goals of de-eventalised history.

De-eventalised thought locks material strata into an explanatory pattern or grid-form ensuring that any surplus or excess is assimilated and appropriately distributed through its categorial schema. For Foucault this involves a reduction of the event into a 'unitary necessity,' always captured by a law, principle, structure or mechanism that hierachises, gradates, dehistoricises and depoliticises into a comfortable and reassuring image of thought. Foucault's eventalization of the thought of the outside functions as the site of the displacement or dislocation of models of the Same (e.g. Platonic, Kantian, structural or dialectical paradigms) and the elevation of analyses "in terms of the genealogy of relations of force, strategic developments and tactics."

Here I believe one's point of reference should not be to the great model of language (langue) and signs, but to that of war and battle. The history that bears and determines us has the form of war rather than that of language: relations of power, not relations of meaning. History has no 'meaning', though this is not to say that it is absurd or incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible to analysis down to the smallest detail-but this in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics. Neither the dialectic, as logic of contradictions, nor semiotics, as the structure of communication, can account for the intrinsic intelligibility of conflicts. 'Dialectic' is a way of evading the always open and hazardous reality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton and 'semiology' is a way of avoiding its violent, bloody and lethal character by reducing it to the calm Platonic form of language and dialogue.

For Foucault structuralism 'evacuated' the event, drained off its singular content into universal, necessary, ahistorical, binary structures: 'Kantianism without the subject.' Dialectics evades the event by assimilating difference into a unity and totality of the same.
It effaces the open, indefinite and redundant space of the outside by putting it to work: the dialectical labour of law, lack and the negative expressed as the resolution of contradiction in a synthesis of the same beyond difference. Dialectics:

does not liberate the different, on the contrary it guarantees that it is always recuperated. The dialectical supremacy of the same allows it to exist, but only according to the law of negation, as the moment of non-being. You think that you are seeing the subversion of the other declaring itself, but in secret, contradiction is working for the salvation of the identical.

Deeventalised thought mobilises the ‘unitary necessities’ of the Same in the name of a ‘will to truth’ that day by day ‘grows implacably.’ The arrest of the event and the elision of anything in it that might be querelous or discontinuous operates through categorical thinking and its instruments of repetition, gradation and representation (the identity of concepts). The ‘boundless diversity’ or ‘mad flux’ of difference is entrapped within the Same where it is policed, monitored and disciplined. To think against Platonic similarity is to think in the absence of hierarchy and gradation, not to reinstate the rights of appearances "ascribing to them solidity and meaning, and bringing them closer to essential forms by lending them a conceptual backbone" but to think the simulacrum as simulacrum, to think difference differentially: "and what will enter, submerging appearance and breaking its engagement to essence, will be the event."

Thinking the event differentially is to break with the repetition of the same profoundly disturbing the interlocking spaces of ‘common sense’ with its mutual and reciprocal functioning of the faculties enabling the
introduction of 'ill will' into the 'good will' that forces differences to serve as markers of classification.

What if we gave free rein to ill will? What if thought freed itself from common sense and decided to function only in its extreme singularity? What if it adopted the disreputable bias of the paradox, instead of complacently accepting its citizenship in the doxa? What if it conceived of difference differentially, instead of searching out the common elements underlying difference? Then difference would disappear as a general feature that leads to the generality of the concept, and it would become - a different thought, the thought of difference - a pure event.

The 'pure event' thought differentially is the vibration and intensity of the 'being of the sensible' beyond representation, a repetition of repetition itself. It is a non-conceptual, singular difference displaced on each occasion through its repetition in thought as a phantasm: "it makes the event indefinite so that it repeats itself as a singular universal." 29

1.2. The materiality of events

A. The incorporeal space of thought: phantasms and events

As we have seen in The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault framed the material space of discourse and the non-discursive by appeal to the notions of episteme, enonces and archive. The former indicated an open network of relations and successive displacements, a space of multiplicity and dispersion. The latter referred to an anonymous apriori or system of rules accounting for the appearance, formation, and transformation of discursive and non-discursive strata as an (historical) audio-visual regime. The enonces themselves create, produce and stratify this regime. These terms together articulated the exterior spaces of an 'archaeology' of knowledge. In The Order of
Discourse the discursive and non-discursive field is seen as the difference between what could be said correctly and observed appropriately and what is actually stated and seen and thus opens up an outside in which power and force relations are operative, an outside which is drawn out, mapped and remapped in Foucault's eventalisation of thought.

In the Archaeology Foucault had already recognized the evental character of the enonces but they were tied to the exterior dimensions of the forms of knowledge encoded as 'rule' and 'regularity'. The Order of Discourse and Theatrum Philosophicum will develop and elaborate the thought of the event in terms of an incorporeal materiality of force relations or a 'phantasmaphysics' of the outside that will break the primary controlling forms of discourse (summed as the 'world, self, and god') and dissolve them in the force, chance and becoming of a thought of difference, a thinking-otherwise about the events of thought.

In thinking the event as a 'singular universal', Foucault will elaborate the event in its relations with a phantasmatic and incorporeal space which does not converge in a common space of origin or similitude but functions in a disjunctive space of affirmation, a series of colliding, mingling and folded surfaces that positively produce a meaning-effect in its singularity. Each singularity is always folded within a fold as an element in another series, a component of a multiplicitous serial space.

The actualisation of the singular event from the virtual series is activated and reactivated by the phantasmatic incorporeal space that simultaneously folds the series together and holds them apart across one surface:
It (the phantasm) transcends inside and outside, since its topological property is to bring 'its' internal and external sides into contact, in order for them to unfold onto a single side. \(^3\) The incorporeal materiality of the phantasm functions as a simulacrum that articulates the discursive and the non-discursive together at the moment when the surfaces of 'language' and event coincide. This coincidence that "arises between surfaces" is articulated in "the reversal that causes every interior to pass to the outside and every exterior to the inside..." \(^3\) In constructing events as folded singularities, points or intensities on a virtual surface, a plane of multiplicity and immanence ready to be actualised in any form or modality, Foucault eventalizes the limits and conditions of historical thought in order to open that thought to the exteriority of genealogical series, to the thought of the outside. Such series function by the repetition of a (non) event, as an event in thought, by retroactively aligning the series with the disruptive and discontinuous folds of the (non-spaced, non-original) event. The 'original' event is always already a fold or folded space-time, a "temporal oscillation that always makes it precede and follow itself." \(^3\) The repetition of the disruptive event disturbs and displaces the reassuring forms and identities, similarities and chronologies of history so that the past is riven with fissures, bifurcations and folds that open political spaces for radical thought, a thinking-otherwise about the events of thought in the present.

The materiality of the event, then, is problematized. Neither substance nor accident, quality nor process, the event occurs neither at the level of bodies, nor in some immaterial realm. It is a material effect that
"consists in the relation, the co-existence, the dispersion, the
overlapping, the accumulation, and the selection of material
elements. It is not the act or the property of a body; it is
produced as an effect of, and within a dispersion of matter. Let us
say that the philosophy of the event should move in the at first
paradoxical direction of a materialism of the incorporeal."

Incorporeal materiality is not a primary infrastructural domain upon
which discursive events would be an expressive emanation but a
topological dimension which runs throughout the surfaces of the event,
conditioning it and conditioned by it. It is not an inert positivity but
an effect of bodies mingling, colliding and separating. Incorporeal
materiality insists or subsists on the surface of bodies and the surface
of words, it is not a thing or a cause but a space of virtuality, a
topological relation and a verbal infinitive capable of a multiplicity
of actualisations. It is simultaneously the 'meaning' of the event and
the 'event' of meaning, the displacement of the present and the
repetition of the infinitive. Foucault's favoured example is, of course,
death:

Death supplies the best example, being both the event of events and
meaning in its purest state. Its domain is the anonymous flow of
speech; it is that of which we speak as always past or about to
happen and yet it occurs at the extreme point of singularity.

'To die' is never localized in the density of a given moment, but
from its flux it infinitely divides the shortest moment.... the
(multiple) eternity of the (displaced) present.

Foucault's eventalization of thought attempts to think the space of
enonces or the relation of the articulable and the visible as the
disjunctive and double affirmation of the event and the concept, or
rather, the event and the phantasm as the singular, universal,
incorporeal and univocal space of thought. Thought is the universal
repetition of the phantasm in the singularity of the event: "What is
thought itself if not the event that befalls the phantasm and the phantasmatic repetition of the absent event." 39 The phantasm and the event folded together and apart are the disjunctive synthesis of thought, they are:

the object of thought and thought itself; they situate extra-being at the surface of bodies where it can be approached by thought and trace the topological event in which thought itself is formed. 40

b. The subject in space-time

There is no equivalence, isomorphism or identity between the object of thought and thought itself since the formative processes of thought reside in the "uncrossable fissure" 41 of the outside. This implies a double dissociation: "that of a central and founding subject to which events occur while it deploys meaning around itself; and of an object that is a threshold and a point of convergence for recognizable forms and the attributes we affirm." 42 The eventalization of thought will require a practice of history that will break the relation between thought and its object (conceived as a relation between continuous history and consciousness as the centre of its development and action) by opening that relation to a radical practice of space:

For all those who confuse history with the old schemas of evolution, living continuity, organic development, the progress of consciousness or the project of existence the use of spatial terms seems to have the air of an anti-history. If one started to talk in terms of space that meant one was hostile to time,...that one 'denied history'...They didn't understand that to trace the forms of implantation, demarcation and delimitation of objects, the modes of tabulation, the organization of domains meant the throwing into relief of processes - historical ones, needless to say - of power. The spatialising description of discursive realities gives on to the related effects of power. 43
Equally, in *The Order of Discourse* Foucault will eventalize the outside (power) of historical thought through its description in terms of discontinuity and exteriority and its problematization of the subject and of time: "It is a question of caesurae which break up the instant and disperse the subject into a plurality of possible positions and functions." Throughout the range of his texts Foucault continued to think the (linear, unitary, chronological and totalizing) concept of time as necessarily bound to a (metaphysical) model of consciousness ("two sides of the same system of thought") that could only offer a weak, naive and limiting understanding of historical transformation ("in this system, time is conceived in terms of totalization and revolutions are never more than moments of consciousness") that conceals and effaces the operation of the outside. It thus renders the 'effects of power' invisible and can only be prised apart and opened to a thinking otherwise through a strategic practice of space:

metaphorising the transformations of discourse in a vocabulary of time necessarily leads to the utilisation of the model of individual consciousness with its intrinsic temporality. Endeavouring on the other hand to decipher discourse through the use of spatial, strategic metaphors enables one to grasp precisely the points at which discourses are transformed in, through and on the basis of relations of power.

The discontinuous event-series of the outside function independently of these units (‘the subject and the instant’) through relations which are neither successive, simultaneous or of the order of consciousness but must be thought as a complex topology of differential and material relations of force, chance and becoming (in space-time) through which the events of thought are formed. In *The Order of Discourse* Foucault will lay out a number of ‘principles’ through which the event and the series may be
mapped to the outside which will show the extent to which the
eventalization of thought, the process which forms and transforms it and
from which it forms and transforms itself is subject to chance, error
and relations of power.

Through a principle of reversal: the "swarming abundance" of events are
always tied to a continuity expressed through positive sources - author,
discipline, 'will to truth'. Evental thought will reverse this: only
recognize the cutting up, dispersal and rarefaction of events. And this
rarefaction does not function on some vast hidden surface or underside
since a principle of discontinuity does not assume a "great unsaid or
unthought which runs throughout the world and intertwines with all its
forms and all its events." 48 Events are constituted through the
discontinuous practices of the articulable and the visible which cross
each other, pass through one another, presuppose and exclude one another
yet, equally, might remain unaware of one another. A principle of
specificity ensures that the legibility of events has nothing to do with
any 'pre-discursive' domain, so that events can be interpreted or
explained through and already existing set of significations. Discursive
events are a product of the specific practices of the articulable and
the visible and the force relations that run through them, they are "a
violence which we do to things.. a practice we impose on them" 49. Our own
practice must account for the 'regularity' of discursive events, it is
not inherent in the world. Finally, the perspective from the outside
construes the event field as inhabited by a twisting and folding of
regulation, chance and accident. Events of thought occur in a folded
and involuted outside that has nothing to do with intentionality nor is
it the effect of any kind of mechanical causality. Events are irreducible and 'autonomous', independent of the direction, meaning or temporality of consciousness. No order of events is fully organised but establishes itself in relation to a certain disorder. Similarly, there is no primordial randomness of 'language' upon which orders from the outside are projected. These terms are unintelligible in isolation and highly variable. The principle of the external conditions of possibility, then, determines the aleatory series of events out of which it appears and which fix its limits. Foucault's thought of the outside introduces "chance, the discontinuous and materiality"\(^{50}\), which have been effaced through the founding subject (phenomenology), originating experience (hermeneutics) and a mediating totality (dialectics), into the "very roots of thought"\(^ {51}\).

Foucault opposes his own terms to the notions of creation, unity, originality and signification which have rendered events invisible. Foucault's texts have no use for consciousness or continuity with their metaphysical understanding of freedom and causality and no use for structure and sign. Foucault's texts rigourously militate against any notions that could provide a framework of intelligibility for a subject. (especially those (Kant) that 'subjectivize' or 'interiorize' space and time rendering them passive and receptive). Evenements are active and productive singularities, connected as lines of multiplicity, grouped as colliding surfaces and articulated/made visible as an indefinite and reversible series of phantasm/events of variable functions and incorporeal matters. Foucault's eventalization of thought installs a "small (and perhaps) odious piece of machinery" \(^{52}\) in the gap that the
history of ideas sought to keep free. Displacing the great adventure of reason, this machinery locates the difference of events, and the difference of the forces that run through them in "a space of multiple dissensions", a space that neither the "language or the meaning can quite exhaust" \(^{53}\), the space of the outside.

1.3 The effective history of thought.

The Foucauldian strategy of eventalization thus performs a particular operation on the 'body' of thought, opening up a consistent (immanent) space in which events can appear and be conjoined with other events. Each series of events are connected and connectable to each other, mapped along their lines of composition and borne along by (what we might variously name) their incline, resistance or 'line of flight' \(^{54}\) that opens out on to the outside. Deeventalized thought tends to striate this space and immobilize its movement through hierarchical schematisms that represent and reproduce the Same whereas eventalized thought tends to a smooth space of the outside through the repetition of a 'free' syntheses of Difference. The cartographer will measure the extent to which event-assemblages maximize their potential of difference (and minimize the constraints of the same) by mapping their immanent and differential conditions of existence and affirming their reality. There are no constants only forces in continuous variation, there is nothing to recognize or rediscover only connections and differences to be made. Realigning and folding the modes of existence or effectivities of the phantasm/event series in a properly genealogical space, Foucault's eventalization of outside thought becomes what Nietzsche, Genealogy, History will call "effective history".
An entire historical tradition (theological and rationalistic) aims at dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity - as a teleological movement or a natural process. ‘Effective’ history, however, deals with events in terms of their most unique characteristics, their most acute manifestations. An event, consequently, is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, a battle, but the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it, a feeble domination that poisons itself as it grows lax, the entry of a masked ‘other.’ The forces operating in history are not controlled by destiny or regulative mechanisms, but respond to haphazard conflicts. They do not manifest the successive forms of a primordial intention and their attraction is not that of a conclusion, for they always appear through the singular randomness of events.

Foucault’s eventalisation of thought in the folds of history activates another unthought series, another emergent series of the outside, "an unstable assemblage of faults, fissures and heterogeneous layers" that "disturbs what was considered immobile, (it) fragments what was thought unified, it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself." The events of thought are reinscribed in the formation of another series: a Nietzschean series structured by Herkunft and Enstehung, descent and emergence. This reinscription of the displaced origin and telos systematically dismantles the continuity, immutability, identity, objectivity, meaning and truth of traditional ‘monumental’ history:

a history given to reestablishing the high points of historical development and their maintenance in a perpetual presence, given to the recovery of works, actions and creations through the monogram of their personal essence.

This is a further unfolding and refolding (a topological shift) of the "space of dispersion" (plane of immanence) in which the archaeologist had teased out the complex relations between the articulable and the visible as forms of exteriority. Now they are redeployed as the productive site
of phantasmatic, incorporeal yet singular events of thought and their articulation through the Herkunft/Enstehung series as a confrontation between force, body and history - the nobility or baseness inscribed on bodies and their forced and forceful emergence into the spectacular space of history. The space of dispersion is now "precisely this scene where they are displayed superimposed or face to face." 58 The space of the outside is "nothing but the space that divides them, the void through which they exchange their threatening gestures and speeches." 59 Foucault's texts begins to eventalize a properly genealogical space, an incorporeal, virtual, phantasmatic space of force relations outside the body/substance, form/history matrix within which forces mutate yet topologically connected through the event of their articulation.

Emergence. The genealogical space opened up by evental thought is a war-zone through which the outside enables history to appear as an irreducible 'object' in itself, as an event, a power-full event constituted by force, struggle and conflict. Events are constituted through a struggle of forces distributed in a complex spatial scenography: "What Nietzsche calls the Entstehungsherd of the concept of goodness is not specifically the energy of the strong or the reaction of the weak, but precisely this scene where they are displayed superimposed or face to face. It is nothing but the space that divides them, the void through which they exchange their threatening gestures and speeches." 60 The emergence of the event:

"designates a place of confrontation, but not as a closed field offering the spectacle of a struggle among equals ... it is a 'non-place,' a pure distance, which indicates that the adversaries do not belong to a common space. Consequently, no one is responsible for an emergence; no one can glory in it, since it always occurs in the interstice."
The 'non-place' of the outside is composed of formless forces, topologically in contact with form/strata compositions through an interstitial void that determines their emergence: Foucault's eventalisation of thought is precisely a problem of space (the outside) and relation (non-relation). A great drama of "endlessly repeated ... dominations." 62

This relationship of domination is no more a 'relationship' than the place where it occurs is a place;.

The 'evental' site of domination is a 'non-relation' between a complex series of immanent forms (discursive/non-discursive multiplicities) and the composing forces of the outside. The entstehung or emergence of forces cannot be conceived as a point or segment on a line but must be thought as a matrix of qualitatively heterogeneous dimensions or spaces, a series of relational discontinuities which are not structural or dialectical but topological.

Herkunft. The event cannot be isolated from the conjunctural or operational spaces that produce it, and from the figures of descent (accident, error and randomness) that function through them. The disruptive force of the Herkunft disarticulates or undermines determinate notions of history by making its formative processes visible as a product and an instrument of discontinuity, chance and the 'exteriority of accidents':

to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations - or conversely, the complete reversals - the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave
birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents. 64 Herkunft differentiates singularities outside of any categorial framework and locates them in an "intersecting network" of accidents that permits "the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost events". 65 Herkunft attaches itself to the body, inscribing its surfaces, energies, forces and movements in the events of history: "it is molded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances". 66

The "singularity of events" are inscribed on the body through 'reversal,' 'usurpation' and 'appropriation', through 'accident', 'error' and 'chance' in "a scene where forces are risked in the chance of confrontation." 67 Foucault's text dramatises the eventalisation of thought ("only a single drama is ever staged in this 'non-place'" 68.) through the repetition of struggle and domination, the agonism of forces. If the herkunft traces the back-stage directions "that give birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us" 69 then enstehung is the violence of the double, a redoubling of the outside and its composing forces as they "leap from the wings to center stage, each in its youthful strength" 70, the 'cruel theatre' of the body's obliteration by history and its resignification through force "made to appear as events on the stage of historical process." 71
Foucault eventalizes the thought of the outside, then, as an open struggle or spectacular engagement of forces in the 'non-place', 'pure distance', 'interstice' or 'void' through which the organizing terms of the articulable and the visible (the exchange of threatening speeches and gestures) are forced to pass, displacing any transcendental or metaphysical 'interiority' (I, cogito, synthesizing subject, etc.) that could then re-centre thought, and any continuity, teleology or totality that would give history direction, meaning, end or purpose ensuring that the events of thought are articulated in the constitutive exteriority of the (Nietzschean) play of force, chance and chaos. "It is at once the chance within the game and the game itself as chance; in the same stroke, both the dice and the rules are thrown" 72. All the predicates and perspectives of Foucault's eventalization of thought must be related to this game of chance and the chance of the game- ("the iron hand of necessity shaking ther dice-box of chance" 73) - to the hazardous space of the outside.

Ever since the Sophists' tricks and influences were excluded and since their paradoxes have been more or less safely muzzled, it seems that Western thought has taken care to ensure that discourse should occupy the smallest possible space between thought and speech. Western thought seems to have made sure that the act of discoursing should appear to be no more than a certain bridging (apport) between thinking and speaking, a thought dressed in its signs and made visible by means of words, or conversely the structures of language put into action and producing a meaning effect. 74

Deeventalized thought dehistoricises (and depoliticises) the evental character of its realisations effacing the hazards of the outside in its exclusive movement between thinking and speaking. The 'reality' of the event, the univocal and polyvalent 'Being' of its differential expression is elided by reducing it to either autonomous thought or
autonomous speech. The descent/emergence series opens and disperses the space between 'thought and words', aligning them with an outside teeming with force, chance, accident and error in order to refocus 'historical mutation' as a problem of genealogical conditions open to becoming and transformation. Descent/emergence reinscribe the events of the outside in terms of a critical ontology of history, a Nietzschean ontology of difference where there is no 'Being' behind the effecting and becoming of history but a vast immanence of interconnected and enfolded force-fields which are not anchored in the same but unfolded through difference, which are not regulated through any unitary principle but constituted through will to power.

Foucault's dramatisation of the events of thought on the stage of history enable the construction of an historical ontology of difference through "clothed or masked repetition," a 'dress rehearsal' for 'thinking otherwise' in a new theatre of thought. Beyond the repetition of identities and resemblances, Foucault connects events to the real by dismantling their conditions (as possibility of representation or totality of the same) and reassembles them (as actual existence in the outside) in the theatre of Force and Difference. This dress rehearsal conditions the 'fabric' of thought for new folds, new creations, a new 'fabrication' of thought. "Knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting". And genealogical cutting operates on itself by cutting the eventalization of thought into a folded ontology of history, a historical-genealogical ontology of difference. (This will later become the historical or critical ontology of ourselves). Through the events of effective history 'Being' is said and seen, effected and
effective as the difference of the outside. The genealogical events of outside thought are the mechanisms that affirm Being as that which is said, seen and felt to be unfolded in one world through an infinite difference and variation in space-time. The immanence of theory is folded into a pragmatic or practical ontology of thought, a political ontology of difference thought through (as we will see) in terms of a politics of truth, the specific practice of intellectuals and the critical events of thought in order to open spaces of resistance in the 'present' to the powers that run through the events of thought.

2. THE FOLD OF PRACTICE.

The 'something else' that we had earlier seen as the doubling of distributed points on a discursive surface or as that limit which discourse and the non-discursive confront as their difference is now formulated through the event/phantasm, body/history, enstehung/herkunft, series as the singularity of the Event of the outside itself: it envelopes and folds, through the relation of its outer and inner surfaces, the entire series of events into an infinity making the inside pass to the outside and visa versa through discontinuous finite events.

From the moment discourse ceases to follow the slope of self-interiorising thought and, addressing the very being of language, returns thought to the outside - from that moment, in a single stroke, it becomes a meticulous narration of experiences, encounters and improbable signs - language about the outside of all language, speech about the invisible side of words. And it becomes attentiveness to what in language already exists, has already been said, imprinted, manifested - a listening less to what is articulated in language than to the void circulating between its words, to the murmur that is forever taking it apart, a discourse on the non-discourse of all language; the fiction of the invisible space in which it appears.
The 'void' that circulates between the series is not of the series but that point of difference between them, the point where they converge communicate and are articulated onto each other. The 'murmur' that 'is forever taking them apart' is an equally original feature or singularity of the outside that disjoins the series, displaces them, making them begin again, redistributing the series into other sets. These figures are empty places, absent 'differentiators' or singularities that trigger the venting of particular series all of which "communicate in one and the same event which endlessly redistributes them, while their transformations form a history". The Event of the Outside redistributes them from the "fiction of the invisible space in which it appears" and gives them a history or genealogy "of experiences, encounters and improbable signs." Events of the outside take place in an 'ideal' space, a phantasmic, fictional (in)vented and invisible space which is never the space which realises them or makes them exist. Rather events of the outside insist or subsist as an infinitive before they exist. Events of the outside insist or subsist as the aleatory point, the mobile empty question of thought in its relation with the singular points of problematic space: thought of outside - there are practical events of thought.

2.1 Eventing Blanchot.

It is with the singular series of Blanchot's fictions, the 'events' of Blanchot, that Foucault explicitly encounters and practices the "thought from outside." It is precisely in the relation between 'fiction' and visible 'space' that Foucault pursues and develops the singular
'objectives' of the question of thought and the practice of space.

Foucault demonstrates with Blanchot's 'fiction' how the thought of the outside is given to be seen:

Blanchot's fictions are, rather than the images themselves, their transformation, displacement and neutral interstices. They are precise; the only figures they outline are in the gray tones of everyday life and the anonymous. And when wonder overtakes them, it is never in themselves but in the void surrounding them, in the space in which they are set, rootless and without foundation. The fictitious is never in things or in people, but in the impossible verisimilitude of what lies between them: encounters, the proximity of what is most distant, the absolute dissimulation in our very midst. Therefore, fiction consists not in showing the invisible, but in showing the extent to which the invisibility of the visible is invisible.

Through the impossible space of fiction, a topological space in between events converting near and far into irreducible pure distances, the emission of singularities/events are 'shown' or made visible in relation to the invisible outside. Foucault/Blanchot's 'fiction' shows the extent to which the invisibility of the visible outside is 'invisible but not hidden.' The outside is invisible to the extent that it is the unseen light that makes visible, it is the "sparkle of the outside." The forms or events of luminosity that the outside in fiction makes visible (Blanchot's texts, Foucault's genealogies), are bound up with a material space that doubles, multiplies, cuts into and contests the materiality of events.

(Fiction) bears a profound relation to space; understood in this way, space is to fiction what the negative is to reflection (whereas dialectical negation is tied to the fable of time). No doubt this is the role that houses, hallways, doors, and rooms play in almost all of Blanchot's narratives: placeless places, beckoning thresholds, closed, forbidden spaces that are nevertheless exposed to the winds, hallways fanned by doors that open rooms for unbearable encounters and create gulfs between them across which voices cannot carry and that even muffle cries...
Voices cannot carry in this space because the conditions for their existence are absent or rather the battle begins, the forms contest each others space and the Event of the Outside eternally returns, each time displaced, as a thought of difference, multiplicity, 'an opening on to the future.' The doubled space of Blanchot's fiction is cleaved by an outside that gives these spaces a different history, form, materiality and function. The event of fiction makes these differences visible, it opens thought to the outside, the unseen spaces of thought.

2.2 The events of truth

A. Fictioning the outside. Foucault's genealogical fictions practice this effort of making visible a historical unthought from which history constantly tries to free itself. The Events of history are not inside it, but in the absent opening outside. Foucault's genealogical fictions take historical forms/events outside of what they have been in order to open them to transformation. Transformation can come about through thinking the absent or impossible spaces of history as limits, conditions and constraints on what is no longer or not yet possible for thought, "that is by making the past active and present to the outside so that something new will finally come about, so that thinking, always, may reach thought. Thought thinks its own history (the past), but in order to free itself from what it thinks (the present) and be able finally to 'think otherwise' (the future)."

Foucault's fictions unwork historical thought and make it possible to think otherwise by eventing other possibilities 'within the true':
I am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions. I do not mean to say, however, that truth is therefore absent. It seems to me that the possibility exists for fiction to function in truth, for a fictional discourse to induce effects of truth, and for bringing it about that a true discourse engenders or 'manufactures' something that does not as yet exist, that is, 'fictions' it. One 'fictions' history on the basis of a political reality that makes it true, one 'fictions' a politics not yet in existence on the basis of a historical truth. 83

B. Distance. One fictions the events of truth on the basis of a thought that makes it true, one fictions thought not yet in existence on the basis of events of truth. Foucault's fictions do not plug up the gap or distance between events, or between saying and seeing, but connect and reconnect with the "pure distance" of the outside itself.

A distance which belongs neither to the world, nor to the unconscious, nor to perception, nor to inwardness, a distance which, in its barest form, offers a crisscrossing of lines of ink as well as an entanglement of thoroughfares ... And if at last anyone were to ask me to define the fictive, I should say, albeit rather tactlessly, that it was the verbal nerve structure of that which does not exist, such as it is. 84

Foucault eventalizes the outside as the invisible nerve structure of that which does not yet exist- but must be fictioned through the irreducible distances of an 'impossible' relation with the outside. Fiction inhabits those distances "which cannot be broken down" of the thought from outside. It does not yet exist but subsists in the distancing of the relation between 'a crisscrossing of lines of ink' and 'an entanglement of thoroughfares.' The outside resides in thought as the unthought distancing of that which is no longer or not yet. Thought:

cannot discover the unthought without immediately bringing the unthought nearer to itself - or even, perhaps, without pushing it further away, and in any case without causing man's own being to undergo a change by that very fact, since it is deployed in the distance between them. 85
C. Truth of the outside. Fiction and distance are elements or instruments of outside thought that eventalise truth, "'I have never written anything but fictions...’ but never has fiction produced such truth and reality." 86 Foucault’s fictioning of the outside is concerned with the existence or non-existence of the composite event within the ‘true,’ that is with the fact that events produce ‘truth effects.’ This production itself is conditioned and therefore the particular effects of such events cannot be accounted for purely within ‘discursive’ or ‘non-discursive’ terms. Truth effects describe the inclusion and exclusion of concrete historical ‘facts’ from exerting particular effects. Thus the importance of the question of power, but not just the power of certain ‘discourses’ or ‘language’ but also the whole field of non-discursive visible practices and the powers that circulate through them as, for example, in a ‘regime of truth’ which organises bodies and materials as well as discourse in order to produce truth 87. Foucault’s ‘political history of the production of truth’ establishes that truth is no longer a property attached to discourse but the concrete effect of particular practices that traverse the non-discursive as well as the discursive, the visible as well as the articulable. Truth is evented and produced as a problem space through the disjunctive practices and programmes of saying and seeing each with its own ‘regime’ and a specific set of techniques and procedures for producing truth - whose procedures and methods, techniques and strategies can be opened to an outside that would constitute a ‘history of truth.’
Outside thought would constitute a 'history of truth' not by uncovering "'the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted,' but rather "the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the 'true', it being understood also that its not a matter of a battle 'on behalf' of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays." 88

Truth is inseparable from the procedures of its production, inseparable from a "regime of practices" and the conditions which make them acceptable. The eventalisation of thought has nothing to do with 'theories,' 'institutions' or 'ideology' but with practices of seeing and saying and the problematic space of truth they make possible. Practices are to be "understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect." 89

D. Jurisdiction and veridiction. This construction of practical series ('jurisdiction,' 'veridiction' 90) is both a 'coding' of behaviours, (a system of regulating, ordering, grading, examining, classifying, training etc, in short, 'governing') interwoven with the production of true discourses "which serve to found, justify and provide reasons and principles for these ways of doing things." 91 Jurisdiction and veridiction are interlocking and overlapping zones of events, events of the articulable and the visible with effects which are "mutually opposed, composed and superposed." 92
Eventalising singular ensembles of practices, so as to make them graspable as different regimes of ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘veridiction.’ That ... is what I would like to do.

Eventalisation directly takes up the problematic of strategy in enabling the articulation of truth and power together. This "monism of practices" enables the two regimes to develop together and mutually condition one another, the former prescribing a set of procedures and strategies the latter providing reasons and principles for the procedures and strategies through a production of 'true' discourses.  

Within the space of these two axes the problem of how particular practices emerged and were accepted within a particular historical moment can be addressed along with their relation to the whole field of practices. The 'dispositif' or 'apparatus' describes such a field of practices as an ensemble of "discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in short the said as much as the unsaid."  

A regimes of practices which define particular technologies or "programmings of behaviour" coexist and interact with all these other regimes. Eventalisation brings together the discursive as well as non-discursive events all of which modify each others functions and effects.

2.3. Polymorphism (singularity/multiplicity) of the Outside.

Jurisdiction and veridiction as lines or parcels of the enunciable and the visible are splintered and multiplied in Foucault's eventalisation of thought into an 'increasing polymorphism as the analysis progresses' so that each line or series becomes a heterogeneous multiplicity - a machinic arrangement or compositive space made up of molecular particles
or points functioning together and apart as a dynamic 'structure.' Thus the event of 'carceralisation' is mapped as an expanding, capillary network, a fractal scaling of 'elements,' 'relations' and 'domains of reference' proliferating rhizomatically across polymorphic surfaces:

- A polymorphism of the elements which are brought into relation: starting from the prison, one introduces the history of pedagogical practices, the formation of professional armies, British empirical philosophy, techniques of use of firearms, new methods of division of labour.

- A polymorphism of relations described: these may concern the transposition of technical models (such as architectures of surveillance), tactics calculated in response to a particular situation (such as the growth of banditry, the disorder provoked by public tortures and executions, the defects of the practice of penal banishment), or the application of theoretical schemas (such as those representing the genesis of ideas and the formation of signs, the Utilitarian conception of behaviour, etc).

- A polymorphism of domains of reference (varying in their nature, generality, etc.), ranging from technical mutations in matters of detail to the attempted emplacement in a capitalist economy of new techniques of power designed in response to the exigencies of that economy.

The events of 'carceralisation', are mapped as heterotopic spaces, "heterotopias of deviation" that collide, overlap, and intermingle.

"They are explicit programmes: we are dealing with sets of calculated, reasoned prescriptions in terms of which institutions are meant to be reorganised, spaces arranged, behaviours regulated." Foucault's analysis of the spaces of jurisdiction and veridiction demonstrates that the programmes of seeing and saying "don't take effect in the institutions in an integral manner; they are simplified, or some are chosen and not others; and things never work out as planned." Particular techniques and apparatuses emerge in response to a particular need and are therefore always strategic. The existence of these techniques is never completely conditioned by this 'origin' since they
continue to exist through "functional overdetermination" and "strategic elaboration." Techniques enter into relations with other techniques in which they condition and are conditioned by each other, the effects of these relations enforce the modification and adjustment of the apparatus itself. A particular technique may have effects that demand the elaboration of that technique itself extending it well beyond the original need whilst completing its effectiveness. In other words, the effectivity of techniques, because of the complexity and mutual conditioning of the relations they enter into, extend beyond their intended or imagined possibilities: they become engulfed into larger apparatuses operating with different strategies which are, in turn, conditioned by other techniques with different aims and objectives.

Particular techniques, then, are connected with nothing necessary, natural or arbitrary but with a "multiplicity of historical forces." Eventalisation begins with a "breach of self-evidence" through which the singularity, concreteness and positivity of the event are made visible. Through a process of 'causal multiplication' the archeologist/cartographer constructs a new space of intelligibility which is shaped like a 'polyhedron' or 'polygon' the number of faces of which are never given in advance. With no constants, essences or universals Foucault's nominalism of the outside enables the construction or invention of a series of surfaces that are 'rhizomatic', connecting events with events, drawing maps of lines of effectivity. Given the singular event, one must "rediscover the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of force, strategies, and so on which at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary."
This reconstruction, rewriting and reassembling of the historical record finds that thought is the inscription of lines of power upon its surfaces, but the lines do not correspond to pre-established categories and relations but redefine them each time according to the shape and contours of the relations of force that are operative. Horkheimer and Adorno only adduce part of the problem when they demonstrate the link between Kantian Schematism and 'what Hollywood consciously put into practice.' Concepts of the understanding programme appearances through a schematizing power (jurisdiction/veridiction) conditioned by historically contingent strategies which regulate their production. The conditions for the possibility of an event are the conditions for its existence. The Duality of Kantian reason is sustained in Horkheimer and Adorno's account but in Foucault it is broken and disseminated through an Outside. If jurisdiction and veridiction are effects of fragments of what is possible, taken together as co-mingling series of groupings of strategic events they actively produce the real.

They are fragments of reality which induce such particular effects in the real as the distinction between true and false implicit in the ways men 'direct,' 'govern' and 'conduct' themselves and others. To grasp these effects as historical events - with what this implies for the question of truth (which is the question of philosophy itself) - this is more or less my theme. 105

2.4. Practising the Outside.

Foucault's eventalisation of thought is produced through an outside (the gap/void or difference between strategies), the non-correspondence or anisormorphism between practices and programmes of seeing and saying. Programmatic knowledges attempt to elide or efface the disjunction between
practices, erasing the function of the outside, in order to make their object/event programmable. This programming of events schematises their difference and heterogeneity by deploying an 'internal' mechanism that regulates their construction and production. Eventalisation de-programs events from any Kantian schema or neo-Kantian history of ideas which utilize the idea as a regulative 'focus imaginarius', the unconditioned which conditions every structure through its form of unity (totality) and necessity (universal objectivity).

For me this is precisely the point at issue, both in historical analysis and in political critique. We aren't, nor do we have to put ourselves under the sign of a unitary necessity. 106

The 'idea' in its 'undoubted reality' is precisely the kind of 'self-evidence' which 'imposes itself uniformly on all' that Foucault's eventalisation is attempting to 'breach' and 'counter-program':

A breach of self-evidence, of those self-evidences on which our knowledge, acquiescences and practices rest. This is the first theoretico-political function of 'eventalisation'.

And this function is bound up with a second which would demonstrate how any internal mechanism is the fold of an exterior or outside. It means "rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of force, strategies and so on which at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary." 108

Foucault eventalises any 'idea in the Kantian sense' and its transposition in historical schemas through a 'breach' space that is then mapped to its outside. Thus, eventalisation asks how such 'evidences' arose (herkunft) and took form (enstehung). The (evental) question of evidence is bound up with the form of its acceptability and the functions it serves. It is therefore a component in a 'strategy of power.'
2.5. Diagnosing the Outside.

History is continually reborn in Foucault's eventalisation of thought as a 'breach birth' aided by genealogical 'midwifery'. Eventalisation makes history 'effective' to the extent that it can practically turn it against itself.

Effective history studies what is closest, but in an abrupt dispossession, so as to seize it at a distance (an approach similar to that of a doctor who looks closely, who plunges to make a diagnosis and to state its difference). Historical sense has more in common with medicine than philosophy ... its task is to become a curative science.

The eventalisation of thought would take certain features of 'physiological' thought (techniques and practices of effective history which are "similar to that of a doctor who looks closely, who plunges to make a diagnosis and to state its difference," \textsuperscript{110}) to open up a body of evidence to those invisible and unseen events from outside. As a 'curative science' \textsuperscript{111} it would constitute a 'seeing' outside as well as a 'saying' ('to state its difference'); it would be a 'diagnosis,' a critical diagnosis made on the basis of a certain self-evidence (what is closest) abruptly dispossessed and ruptured, rendered unacceptable through the 'distance' of a seeing/saying outside.

Diagnosis is a primary strategy of eventalised/eventalizing thought. It deprives us of our continuity; it dissipates that temporal identity in which we are pleased to look at ourselves when we wish to exercise the ruptures of history ... It causes the other and the outside to burst forth. Understood in this manner the diagnostic does not establish the fact of our identity by the play of distinctions, it establishes that we are difference.

Foucault practices this art of diagnostic eventalisation throughout his work but it is most prevalent in the 'birth' books. In the 'event' of
the clinic "the exact superposition of the 'body' of disease and the body of the sick man ... is self-evident only for us." In 'eventing' the 'practice of imprisonment' Foucault refers to 'the self-evident character that the prison form assumed.' In both cases Foucault's analyses/diagnosis insert themselves within the differential or ruptured space of self-evidence and open it to an outside within thought. In this opening practices and programmes of seeing and saying are mapped to strategies of power and their relations to forms of knowledge and modes of living; a critical opening in thought that would enable a 'thinking-otherwise' about the events of thought.

Foucault eventalises thought in the difference between what we are no longer (the archive) and what we are becoming (diagnosis) what we are not yet. It is the difference between history and actuality, past and present, a diagnosis of the 'history of the present:'

To diagnose the present is to say what the present is, and how our present is absolutely different from all that it is not, that is to say, from our past. Perhaps this is the task of philosophy now.

Foucault's thought functions in that constructed outside between an 'analytic' and a 'diagnostic,' it folds these spaces together and bursts any continuity or identity between them. Diagnosis would trace and agitate along the line of their fold 'lines of fragility' of 'breakage' and 'fracture' that would open a new space within the fold:

I want to say about the task of diagnosis today that it does not consist only of a description of who we are, rather a line of fragility of today to follow and understand, if and how what is, can no longer be what it is. In this sense, the description must be formulated as a kind of virtual break, which opens room, understood as a room of concrete freedom, that is possible transformation.
The thought from outside, in diagnostic mode, is formulated as a virtual/actual circuit through which points of 'break' and 'caesurae' are diagnosed and eventalised in the present. The analytic consists in reattaching the virtual to actualised events in order to make visible those weak points around which diagnosis would construct 'lines of flight' in the present. From what practices of knowledge, strategies of power and forms of subjectivisation are we departing? In short, from what events of thought are we becoming other? These questions feed back into the event of Foucault's thought through specific zones, spaces and events of archaeological/genealogical enquiry: madness, sex, punishment etc. Each zone requires a separate analytic/diagnostic which nevertheless connects with and resonates with the others.

Diagnostic space opens up a "space of concrete freedom" of 'becoming-other' such that resistance to what we have been saying and doing to ourselves and one another is both possible and necessary. The eventalisation of thought is an analysis and diagnosis of the "contemporary limits of the necessary, a critique of what we are saying, thinking and doing" conceived as events that expose the outside in self-evidence and open it to other possibilities. 118

2.6. Eventing the intellectual

It is the function of the 'intellectual' to invent and pursue these spaces and Foucault eventalises the function of the specific intellectual:

What the intellectual can do is provide instruments of analysis, and at present this is the historians essential role. What's effectively needed is a ramified, penetrative perception of the present, one that makes it possible to locate lines of weakness, strong points, positions where the instances of power have secured
and implanted themselves by a system of organisation dating back over 150 years. In other words, a topological and geographical survey of the battlefield - that is the intellectual's role. The 'court of reason' with its 'jurists' and 'notables' no longer adjudicates events and has become a 'battlefield' that must be 'surveyed', a contested battlefield directed by disciplinary armies each with a specific agenda. Has Foucault simply taken the metapanoptical function away from the Kantian philosopher and arrogated it to the genealogist? In fact, Foucault’s texts militate against any metapanoptical structure by eventualising it as a set of distinct, singular and specific ‘small scale, regional, dispersed ‘Panoptisms’ that intersect and overlap operating as auxillaries or supports in a kind of ‘viral spread’ or generalised abstract function. Each micro-panoptism, with its veridicative and juridicative machinery produces its own objects and ‘strains’ of truth "linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it." 

A. Resistance of the outside. Foucault’s ‘dream’ intellectual would be a mobile and constantly mutating line of flight that the system of power itself produces but can never quite contain:

I dream of the intellectual destroyer of evidence and universalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of power, who incessantly displaces himself, doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he’ll think tomorrow because he is too attentive to the present.

The "specific intellectual" can provide instruments of analysis, little 'tool kits' to locate lines of weakness in the present, exacerbate and amplify them. This is not to suggest the appropriate tool be utilized in solving the correct problem so much as a tool/concept be used to create
a problem, to invent a problem and to make a difference, to "pack a potential in the way a crowbar in a willing hand envelops an energy of prying". Foucault's texts begin to eventalize a new relation between theory and practice, between intellectuals and struggle/resistance; a relation of 'transversality' between points in a network of strategies / stratifications enabling specific intellectuals to function as 'exchangers' through the overlapping "points of intersection" within this network. Thus local and regional struggles can develop lateral connections "across different forms of knowledge and from one focus of politicisation to another." What prevents these struggles from becoming too localised or sectoral, what enables these resistances to remain in touch with the forces that enable them to grow is that they "attack not so much 'such or such' an institution of power, or group, or elite, or class, but rather a technique, a form of power." And here Foucault would situate his own specific contribution by "using this resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, find out their point of application and the methods used. Rather than analysing power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists of analysing power relations through the antagonism of strategies".

Resistances directly express an outside distributed through an 'antagonism of strategies.' Applying the 'chemical catalyst' of eventalisation to the forces of resistance that 'always already' exist "means that a social field offers more resistance than strategies, and the thought of the outside is a thought of resistance."
The eventalised thought of the outside as a thought of resistance in Foucault no longer concerns any 'universality' of 'man' or 'revolution' but the transversality of forces that pass through man, making change possible; there is a 'plenitude of the possible.' Foucault's eventalisation of the outside is an effort within that plenitude:

To give some assistance in wearing away certain self-evidentnesses and commonplaces about madness, normality, illness, crime and punishment; to bring it about, together with many others, that certain phrases can no longer be spoken so lightly, certain acts no longer, or at least no longer so unhesitatingly performed, to contribute to changing certain things in people's way of perceiving and doing things...

Foucault's eventalisation of thought opens up a space of resistance and change by connecting together maps of events and making visible their relation to the outside and thus allowing us to 'see' power differently, by making, for example, the practices of imprisonment 'difficult', 'problematic' and 'dangerous' through a presentation of their invisible conditions of possibility. "My project is precisely to bring it about that they 'no longer know what to do'". The moment of pause or space of difficulty in the evidence of self-experience can be used to construct a line of flight, a passage to the outside. When Foucault says that his work of eventalisation "takes place between unfinished abutments and anticipatory strings of dots" he is referring to this problematised space of self-experience that we are leaving behind and a new space, not yet sketched out, of unforeseen possibilities for being other than we are, a space of 'thinking-otherwise' in relation to the events of thought. This 'thinking-otherwise' is "seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom."
2.7. Critical events

The eventalisation of thought activates a new spatial relation to critique, criticism and the critical as a thought from the outside. It is "genealogical in its design and archaealogical in its method." When Deleuze remarks, in relation to Foucauldian power, it is as if something new were emerging in the wake of Marx, we would add, in relation to critique, it is as if something new were emerging in the wake of Kant - an eventalisation of critique. The entire juridical edifice of transcendental critique sited in the universal, ahistorical, 'common' space of the court of reason gives way to a mobile, strategic space of immanent 'critique' eventalised in an outside always already adjacent and conjoined to a space of difference. The juridical space of critique elides the extent to which its judgements and their conditions of possibility, are penetrated and traversed by exogenous and extra-territorial mechanisms that actively produce the conditions for the existence of juridical space with its borders, frontiers, territories, limits etc. These mechanisms remain invisible not just because juridical space cannot provide a deduction of itself (which would be an infinite regress or spiralling of the quid juris upon itself) but because this space is produced and made to function as a reterritorialised instrument that masks its own conditions of existence. This is not a problem of ideology or repression but of a power whose "success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms".

The stakes of Foucault's eventalisation of critique consist in inhabiting the outside to 'produce,' 'actualise,' 'fiction,' and 'invent' a critique not yet in existence, a space of critical thought
that insists or subsists within the juridical space of critique. The point is to 'rupture' the juridical because it continues to occlude the extra-juridical forces that condition it. Transcendental critique is juridical because it legitimates its judgements on the basis of apriori conditions of possibility which have been deduced in terms of our 'legal entitlement.' That reason is inherently juridical is a basic premise of transcendental critique. Foucault continually returns to transcendental thought as that axial point of difference or disengagement for eventalising thought. "In all of my work I strive ... to avoid any reference to this transcendental as condition for the possibility for any knowledge ... I try to historicise to the utmost to leave as little space as possible to the transcendental." 137 the space of eventalised critique is a singularly unclassifiable or 'heterotopic' space of the outside that squeezes out the transcendental in its movement, to event the transcendental is to invent spaces of possibility within the impossible.

A. The impossible within. The eventalisation of critique produces the impossible within or invents a possibility for which we have no legal entitlement. It actualises an impossible multiplicity, lines of difference from the outside which we cannot yet see or say, an impossible thought that cannot yet be thought. And this is not a juridical negation, a (formal) apriori, an obstacle, censor, repression or prohibition so much as an historically productive impossibility of what is not yet or no longer possible. The eventalisation of critique uproots juridical space, separates it out, and disperses it in the invention of an impossible outside. This critique:

will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events ... that will not
deduce from the form of what we know what is impossible for us to do and to know, but ... will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are, do or think.

Eventalised critique opens a 'plenitude of the possible' in the events of thought, new spaces for the invention of saying, being, doing and seeing otherwise. It is an experience of thought that is "indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it, not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is." 139

B. The possible without. To imagine a thinking otherwise than it is, a critical thought of the events of thought is not a desire to 'smash' the juridical or step outside 'of the law' it is a "long work of comings and goings, of exchanges, reflections, trials, different analyses." 140

It is an experimentation in connecting and reconnecting with the real. It is not a desire to replace law with a 'new legality' disguised 'as beyond politics,' 141 so much as a displacement of legal negativity, ('penser ... le pouvoir sans le roi' 142) a fold into the with-out of evental critique that poses problems to politics.'

The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of a necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression 143

The possible without of evental critique is not the invention of a possible form to be realised but surprise of what is no longer or not yet possible in the invented spaces of critique: eternal return of the outside or virtual multiplicity without law and concept. This is critique that will not be realised in the utopic space of historical possibility but a critique actualised through the hetertopic space of 'lines of differentiation' flowing from outside 'actualised by
inventing.' Critical actualisation does not programme thought but frees it for invention. It cannot project a new order but imagines the present one differently:

Critique doesn't have to be the premise of a deduction which concludes: this then is what needs to be done. It should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse what it. Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn't have to lay down the law for law. It isn't a stage in programming. It is a challenge directed to what is. The resistance or refusal of what is is a resistance or refusal of what we are no longer in order to initiate that step into the space of a becoming other, the transformative actualisation of the not yet.

Above all, I don't think that one can oppose criticism and transformation, "ideal" criticism and "real" transformation. Criticism and transformation are bound together in the space of a becoming other of thought eventalising those 'monumental' spaces of critique (pure, practical, aesthetic) that are kept separate. The problematic holding together of criticism and transformation modifies the structure of the very context of thought and its relation to the 'real.'

We've got to avoid the sacralisation of the social as the sole instance of the real, and stop treating thought - this essential thing in human life and human relations - lightly. Thought exists, well beyond and well within system and edifices of discourse. It is something which often hides itself, but it always animates everyday behaviour. There is always a little bit of thought even in the silliest institutions, always some thought even in mute habits. Criticism consists in driving this thought out of hiding and trying to change it: showing that things are not as obvious as we might believe, doing it in such a way that what we accept as going without saying no longer goes without saying. To criticize is to render the too easy gestures difficult. In these conditions, criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for all transformation. Because a transformation which would remain within the same mode of thought, which would only be a certain manner of better adjusting the same thought to the reality of things, would only be a superficial transformation.
On the other hand, from the moment one begins to be unable, any longer, to think things as one usually thinks them, transformation becomes simultaneously very urgent, very difficult, and altogether possible.  

The eventalisation of critique is simultaneously the eventalisation of the outside: the invisible visibility of power.

2.8. The Event of Power.

The outside is the placeless space through which every relation of power and resistance, thought and criticism is inscribed. "Rootless and without foundation" 147, the outside can be eventalised as a specific logic of power and resistance that presupposes the anarchic proliferation of forces that undermine them. The double movement or double conditioning of the outside is such that power arises out of resistance and not the reverse. The embodiment of power in institutions or technologies functions to regulate and control those forces that invest them, but there will always remain an irreducible outside, an inaccessible pocket or zone at the centre of the cyclone. The zone of the events of the outside at once generates, limits, and subverts relations of power. "Power is everywhere" not because it embraces everything but precisely because it is neither here nor there, because it is continually eventalising: "it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another" 148. If power is diffuse, multiple and continually proliferating it is never totalising or completely all encompassing since it cannot thoroughly saturate, immobilise, regulate, invest or parasitise its own arbitrary and chaotic movement, its own evental structure. Power seeks and fails to subdue the event of its own self organisation and production. The alea of its evental character is
completely inscribed within it. The event of power is that fold of infinitely extended space (outside) through which power fails to accomplish itself and through which thought may think-otherwise. To fold the event of power into the immanent plane of Foucault's thought it will be necessary to map the theory/practice of events as topological co-functions of a diagrammaticism of thought.
4. THE SPACES OF POWER: DIAGRAMMATIC THOUGHT

A whole history remains to be written of spaces - which would at the same time be the history of powers. ¹

People have often reproached me for these spatial obsessions, which have indeed been obsessions for me. But I think that through them I did come to what I had basically been looking for: the relations that are possible between power and knowledge.

The spatial systems of knowledge established in the *Order of Things*/Archeology as the relation between discursive and non-discursive formations and later broken down and reconstituted as 'events' or singularities of the Outside are opened to a properly serial, 'micro-physical', machinic and strategic space-time in *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*. The micro-series of the books are ordered by a historical space-time image of power that links strata together as multiplicities in a relation of immanence to strategic lines of force. The 'conduction' of strata by lines of force together compose strategies: "strategies of relations of force supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge". ² This 'analytic' of power "takes whatever is still pyramidal in the Marxist image and replaces it with a strict immanence where centres of power and disciplinary techniques form multiple segments". ³ Multiple segments or 'human multiplicities' are constantly mutating and being transformed through the effects of strategies of power and the diagram is a map, replete with the precise spatial logic, of the everchanging formations within this network that control human collectivities in space and time. Thus Foucault's 'diagrammaticism' demonstrates that it is through the 'schemata' of power that the exteriorities of knowledge are articulated and the events of thought are conditioned.
The abstract or 'incompossible' diagram expresses a space-time image of thought for each formation, a dimension of thought irreducible to the exteriorities of knowledge yet relayed through particular points as events of the outside. Genealogical diagrams are archaeological archives teeming with force and chaos, or rather, diagrams are relations of force in action. Foucault only speaks of power/knowledge relations and power relations and the definitions correlate with these terms. ("There is no Power, but power relationships which are being born incessantly, as both effect and condition of other processes." ⁵ The diagram, which "must be detached from any specific use" ⁶, offers a blueprint or virtual map of how these relations of force are actualised and how they condition the practices of knowledge, the events of power and the possibilities of thought in a given epoch. The diagram does not 'represent' anything - it makes and unmakes the real; and in this it is like a specific fold or rift of the outside itself; it is a precise, abstract, historical figure of the plane of consistency, an imageless, anonymous, spatial image of the possibilities of power, resistance and thought in a given formation. The diagram is 'expressed' through a mobile, metastable space of 'becoming' that cuts into the audio-visual archive, conditions it, and is in turn conditioned by it. It is the unfolding of a pure space of chaos and order, a 'local' and unstable map of the 'not yet' and the 'no longer' wrought into "confrontation at the limit of the living present". ⁷

1. The spaces of Power/knowledge.

For diagrammatic thought power and knowledge inhabit each other, parasitise each other. Each is the others 'inside', a double inside
stretched and folded across each others surfaces without any 'exterior' in-between, such is "the question of their relation." 8 This multiply folded (and multiply tensed) relation expresses the 'complicated' spatiality or space-time of power-knowledge, enables their co-incidence into "local centers" and strategic blocks, and tightly links them in their "incessant comings and goings." 9

"Relations of power (with the struggles that traverse them and the institutions that maintain them) do not merely facilitate or obstruct knowledge; they are content neither to favour or stimulate it, nor to falsify or limit it ... the problem is thus not solely to determine how power subordinates knowledge and makes it serve its ends nor to determine how it superimposes itself on it and imposes on it ideological contents and limitations. No knowledge can be formed without a system of communication, of recording, of accumulation, of displacement - which is itself a form of power ... No power, on the other hand, can be exercised without the extraction, appropriate distribution, or retention of knowledge. At this level, there is not learning on one side and society on the other, or science and the state, but rather the fundamental forms of "pouvoir-savoir." 10

The familiar schemas of subordination, superimposition, essence or attribution are already problematised in this formulation and when, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault treats the relation in terms of 'micro-physics', Foucault writes, "to analyse..the micro-physics of power presupposes..that one abandons..the violence-ideology opposition, the metaphor of property, the model of the contract or of conquest; that - where knowledge is concerned - one abandons the opposition between what is 'interested' and what is 'disinterested', the model of knowledge and the primacy of the subject." 11 Moreover, diagrammatics reveals power as positive and productive: "We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it "excludes," it "represses," it "censors," it "abstracts," it "masks," it "conceals." In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth." 12 These qualifications are gathered together in a hesitant but imperative mode:
"Perhaps ... we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests ... We should admit rather that power produces knowledge ... that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. These are "power-knowledge" relations." 13

Power and knowledge are articulated onto heterogeneous spaces so different that we cannot fail to tell them apart and yet so entangled, entwined and topologically interlaced that we cannot take for granted the possibility of telling them apart. Foucault’s text insists absolutely on maintaining both versions of the relation simultaneously. It is a "relation of non-relation". 14 They are heterogeneous to the extent that, on the one hand, the enunciable and visible that constitute the forms of knowledge have their own irreducible spaces, rhythms, history, functions and materiality and, yet, on the other hand, these are affects of actualisation and capture which already presuppose the transference or transmission and redistribution of force relations. The relation of incommensurability that regulates the forms of knowledge is doubled and conditioned by relations of power that determine what is made visible by technologies of observation and eloquent by processes of expression. Foucault’s texts on power produce this double relation simultaneously erasing the space of difference insisted upon and erasing that insistence in reiterating the difference. The power/knowledge relation remains indefinite and reversible as the folded and double space that holds them together and apart divides and then closes up the division across the asymmetrical surfaces of their ‘articulation’.
This thing called power is characterised by immanence of field without transcendent unification, continuity of line without global centralisation, and contiguity of parts without distinct totalisation: it is a social space.

2. Panopticism.

It is in Discipline and Punish that Foucault diagrams the panoptic features of this social space and is bound up with disciplinary technologies. Indeed the mechanism of panopticism expresses and embodies the diagram of this social space through its relations between articulable and visible forces in disciplinary technologies:

This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest moments are supervised, in which all events are recorded, in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and the periphery, in which power is exercised without division, according to a continuous hierarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly located, examined and distributed among the living beings, the sick and the dead - all this constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism.

Panopticism is the abstract mechanism of the disciplinary formation. It is the exposition of a heterogeneous convergence through which relations of force, compacted into strategies, are actualised in the differentiation between articulable and visible series, between technologies of observation and procedures of expression. Its articulable elements (penal law discourse and its reformisms) condition the emergence of new figures (e.g. delinquency), across a plane of immanence, traversed by visible elements (e.g prison) that control and regulate these figures. The Panoptic mechanism expressed as a function of diagrammatic space:

is not simply a hinge, a point of exchange between a mechanism of power and a function; it is a way of making power relations functions in a function, and of making a function through these power relations.
The mechanism is fractured or split along the fold or cleft of the power relation that binds and separates visible and articulable functions. There is no totality, unity, "conformity or bi-univocal correspondance" between the diagram of panoptic spaces, only "a relation of forces which acts transversally and finds in the duality of forms the conditions for its own action and realisation". Panopticism is not only an architecture of space that distributes visibilities throughout the prison (or schools or hospitals or factories etc) but is equally a distribution of articulable functions linking them up through their 'encounter' and is coextensive with the whole force-field. The panoptic function tranverses all the forms (care, education, punishment) and all those formed and fabricated (prisoners, sick, madmen etc) within a specific enclosure. If the formula for panopticism considered as a machine or technology of visibility is 'to see without being seen' as an articulable-visible diagram or abstract machine of power it is to control and govern the 'life' and conduct of human multiplicities in space and time.

3. Bodies and Discipline

The diagram of the panoptic mechanism articulates discipline as that relation of power that automatically extracts, increases, combines, composes and reconstitutes the forces at its disposal, "in every relation from one point to another". Discipline is a flexible and indefinitely transferable technology that effects an increase in the relations of utile force at its disposal, simultaneously increasing its domination and diminishing resistance at minimum cost. Discipline augments force over and above the summed parts of its 'object', "it was a question of constituting a productive force whose effect had to be superior to the sum of
elementary forces that composed it". Discipline divides forces in space, orders them in time and recomposes them in space-time; it transposes them into 'fixed' forms ("discipline is anti-nomadic") and organises visible matter and enunciable functions into a continuous hierarchical network. The primary object and target of disciplinary technology - in terms of an 'anatomo-politics' - is the body: machinic processes construct and integrate through their 'mechanisms' a group of formed 'substances' (soldier, prisoner, schoolboy, etc,) whose forces of utility are increased at the expense of a strict subjection: "an art of the human body was born...at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely". Foucault reveals his indebtedness to a Nietzschean 'materialism' by stressing that it is upon the body's surfaces that the forces of power and history are inscribed. Body names that surface or set of surfaces traced by lines of multidirectional force destroyed and preserved by entstehung creating a "volume in perpetual disintegration."

This 'emergence' is always a "particular stage of forces" and, as we have seen, these events of power are therefore to be analysed according to a diagrammatic and genealogical logic of strategy, contest and struggle, and not that of contradiction.

It was Nietzsche who emphasised the enculteration of subjects through "blood and cruelty" and Deleuze and Guattari who conceptualised the body as a set of undifferentiated surfaces teeming with particles and affects, marked by patterns of intensity in a relation of immanence to a 'body without organs', continually reinserted, organized and overcoded in an oedipal/capital circuit. Similarly, body in Foucault is a pure
materiality, a multiplicity of forces and sensations "directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it, they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs." Disciplinary punishments construct an entire "political technology of the body."  

Foucault's texts refuse the unitary coherence and intentionality of any phenomenological 'lived body' linked to the world through a "network of primal significations, which arise from the perception of things..."  

Joining up with a Deleuzo-Guattarian 'schizo-analysis' with their bodies without organs, Foucault's cartography of the body shows how its forces, desires and materiality are topologised (the striation of the smooth space of the body) into a series of multiple surfaces, broken into sections and regions, layers and strata, lines and points, breaking open bodies, cutting into them and the functionings between them "according to the laws of proximity, torsion and variable distance - laws of which they remain ignorant."  

These measurements are carried out according to the degree of capture, with all its mixtures that the diagram presents between the discursive and non-discursive variables, between the articulable and the visible and the force relations that traverse them. The diagram or abstract machine of disciplinary power is swallowed up and distributed in a mechanism of coeffectiveness, geared through the ratios of particular machines - the school, hospital or prison-machine - governing the degree of integration, effectuation and control "for that multiplicity of bodies and forces that constitutes a population."
The disciplines with their refinement, development and elaboration of a whole family of techniques for the control of individuals virtually discover and certainly 'create' the body as an object and target of power. Of course, the body has always been caught in a web of power relations which impose regulations and constraints upon it, but the scale of control of disciplines is unique, treating the body not as an undifferentiated unit but breaking it down into smaller zones, analysing in detail its movements and gestures, slowness and rapidity, like a military drill where complex movements are reduced to their simple component acts. Discipline seeks an "infinitesimal power over the active body." 32 The object of control is no longer the body as 'signifier': power no longer concerns itself with signs imposed upon or extracted from bodies, but with the efficiency of the bodily movements themselves, the precise distribution and composition of forces considered in their internal organisation and with respect to the functional processes into which they are inserted. This modality of control develops a constant, uninterrupted coercion applied during the functional activity itself.

The human body was entering a machiery of power that exposes it breaks it down and rearranges it.

Space

This political investment of the body, a "political anatomy", 34 operates within a set of spaces and spacial techniques that mark out the body and its forces and the functional social institutions in which it operates and is operated upon. Disciplinary power constructs these spaces and techniques but is irreducible to them; discipline is:

A type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a 'physics' or an anatomy of power, a technology.
The 'physics' of disciplinary power distribute and divide the forces of the body through the construction of a set of spaces that still function through enclosure but in terms of the developing 'machinery' of disciplinary technology this principle is "neither constant, nor indispensable, nor sufficient."

Discipline divides space into compact segments through partitioning in order to isolate bodies, extract and 'train' their forces, making them more efficient at least expense. There is a whole 'physics' of space through which the forces of the body are circulated, that power machines into 'images' and 'discourses' and through which bodies are recognised or excluded, positioned and displaced. Disciplinary power effects on bodies a decomposition and redistribution of their forces so that they "may be subjected, used, transformed and improved".

Disciplinary space is that set of techniques par excellence for dismantling body/multiplicities, reassembling them and redirecting their forces, effectively dissolving 'communities' of resistance of all kinds (the mad, the sad and the bad etc.,). Disciplinary space must "avoid distributions in groups; break up collective dispositions; analyse confused, massive or transient pluralities".

Discipline breaks down complex multiplicities into smaller simple units; it breaks down populations and crowds in hospitals, workshops, schools, placing 'docile bodies' and 'fabricated' individuals into units carefully divided into a basically cellular space. "Each individual has a place, and each place has its individual".

Disciplinary space is cellular, isolatable, hierarchical, emplaced and relatively immobile, moving only from point to point in closed intervals and assigned breaks.
In discipline the elementary units of space are relational "since each is defined by the space it occupies in a series, and by the gap that separates it from the others". The units of space do not so much arrange, distribute and relate territory or precise location as rank: the place one occupies in a classification, the point at which a line and a column intersect, the interval in a series of intervals that one may traverse one after the other. Discipline is an art of rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangements. It individualises bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations.

The 'serialisation' of disciplinary space through the relations of 'cell', 'place' and 'rank' marks it as "real without being actual, ideal without being abstract"; these mixed spaces are "real because they govern the disposition of buildings, rooms, furniture, but also ideal, because they are projected over this arrangement of characterizations, assessments, hierarchies." The great space of the table, as "both a technique of power and a procedure of knowledge", aligns these spacial relations across the disciplinary register in order to treat "multiplicity itself, distributing it and deriving as many effects as possible." Disciplinary power distributes relations of space in the form of the table to achieve "ordered multiplicities".

Disciplinary power controls and increases the forces of body-multiplicities through a precise spatial tabulation of their energies, movements and relations; it codes its institutional spaces as multifunctional control sites that fix, monitor and regulate the flows that pass through it. For example, Foucault's analysis of the naval hospital shows its development as a "filter" mechanism that "pins down
and partitions" and controls the circulation not just of contagions and
diseases but, through an adaptation, extension and overlaying of its
control mechanisms, also the circulation of goods and commodities,
effecting control over "remedies, rations, disappearances, cures,
deaths, simulations." In the factories and workshops of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries these functional sites and multiple control
circuits driven by the need to continually increase productive force
through its tabulation of flow (the flow of bodies, movements,
processes, relations) in space would be indispensable for articulating
the distribution of individuals in space onto the machinery of
production. The tabulation of flows in space is doubled and complimented
by the tabulation of flows in time.

The disciplines, which analyse space, break up and rearrange
activities, must also be understood as a machinery for adding up and
capitalising time.

Time.

It was the function of the time-table to ensure that activities and
actions of the body are broken down into simple, measured, components so
that their multiplicity of forces can be ordered and arranged in
duration and their movement and gesture can be subdivided, decomposed
and programmed through regulated repetition, imposed routine and "a
collective and obligatory rhythm". Discipline fashions the time-table
into a positive and productive instrument: "it is a question of
extracting, from time, ever more available moments and, from each
moment, ever more useful forces."
Discipline 'machines' time, intensifies it to its ideal limit, accelerates the functional processes into which it is inserted and designates maximum speed as a virtue in the order of morality. Disciplinary time functions as an accumulating resource, is turned into 'credit-time', by organizing duration into clearly delineated parallel or successive segments, by separating and adjusting the activity-threads of each segment according to a continuum of increasing complexity and by finalising each segment by a clearly defined sequence of temporality that must terminate at precise points in the sequential series. The 'serialisation' of activity through time laid out in tight, hierarchical nets according to rank, level of attainment, seniority.

And at the heart of this machinery for the capitalisation and seriation of time one finds the exercise. Exercise is a means of training and organising the production of useful subjects through a "linear, continuously progressive organisation". It is "that technique by which one imposes on the body tasks that are both repetitive and different but always graduated." Through exercise power positively constitutes and saturates duration offering the possibility of detailed control and regular intervention at every moment. "It thus assures, in the form of continuity and constraint, a growth, an observation, a qualification". In the disciplinary time of exercise the individual progresses not to any apex but to a "subjection that has never reached its limit."

Space-time

The disciplines are a technology for the construction of a machine that positively produces surplus force from body-multiplicities through a
strict striation of space and time, a machine "whose effect will be maximised by the concerted articulation of the elementary parts of which it is composed", 54 a machine "whose principle would no longer be the mobile or immobile mass, but a geometry of divisible segments." 55 increasing its power through the composition and reinvestment of surplus force in space-time. Thus the disciplines install the body as an active, yet automatic and signalized (not signified) component in a mega-machine of power, or, as Foucault says, "as part of a multi-segmentary machine." 56 Thus the disciplines install space and time and combine them as the indispensable transmission device of the machine itself: the multiplication of controllable and useful forces through their recomposition in space-time - the apex of disciplinary power as an arrangement of 'tactics'.

Tactics, the art of constructing, with located bodies, coded activities and trained aptitudes, mechanisms in which the product of the various forces is increased by their calculated combination are no doubt the highest form of disciplinary practice. 57

Discipline constructs a calculating machine of power that seeks pure exponential increase to the nth degree, a will to power that organizes the tactical extraction of force in space-time. Foucault's cartography of discipline is "a profound Nietzscheanism" 58 and, as a diagrammatics of pure reason (and not a Kantian critique), is also a twisted and provocative 'Kantianism' since Foucault completely rewrites, through a radical 'Transcendental empiricism', the whole of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic': space and time as the machined parts of the body, a diagrammatics of power schematized and then actualised through its composition in space-time.
Functions-relations

The techniques and functions of disciplinary power, then, insert bodies into discursive and non-discursive formations and are assigned roles, statuses and positions which carry out objectives governed by the rules of the formation and the composition of the statements in question. This articulation and combination of forces is 'canalised' or channelled through the particular primary function - production, care, education etc. through molar integrators (state, family, etc) occupied by variable "Personages": doctor, teacher, guard etc. which act as supports for techniques like surveillance and hierarchical disposition deployed within the stategic nets of power. The integrators with their Personages are interchangable on each occasion and are merely conduits for a set of functions that ensure the almost imperceptible 'delivery' of force relations through each function so that "prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons." 59

Although individual techniques of discipline had of course existed earlier in the armies and monasteries their function remained negative but when integrated into their central social function they became their condition of existence: "as a unity that derives from this very unity an increase in its forces." 60 In the history of disciplines Taylorism merely refined a set of already known techniques and extended them to new processes.

The historical moment of the disciplines was a moment when an art of the human body was born, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, ....it produces an increased aptitude and an increased domination. 61
The techniques of discipline impose the relation: "utility-docility." Foucault's diagrammatic cartography exposes the body and its materiality as that relay or junction point within the carceral machine where the primary decomposition and division of active forces from themselves takes place; body names the topological site of the becoming-reactive of force traced through the incorporeal relation: utility-docility. 62

At this level, and in terms of the relationship between judicial punishment and the body of the condemned, Foucault is able to describe the transformation in penal style through the mechanism which transcribes the sentence onto the body. In this case, the mechanism that operates on and through the bodies surfaces the 'machine-prison' penalty-machine, is a combination of elements or segments derived from the visible and articulable which remains heteromorphous. "The carceral system combines in a single figure discourses and architectures." 63 By tracing the transformation of this mechanism on the body Foucault makes visible a new technology of power whose mode of punishment passes from "an art of insupportable sensation to an economy of suspended rights." 64

The body is no longer the 'object' of the new dispensation, but it remains an instrument, caught up in intermediary movements: "punishment, if I may so put it, should strike the soul rather than the body." 65 The soul is an invisible element, region or point produced "around, on, within the body." The law is not internalised but incorporated on the soul-surface of the body. The 'interiority' of the soul is constructed and produced on the surfaces of the body enabling the illusion of an ineffable depth. As a surface signification that
contests and displaces inside/outside, the soul is a figure of projected 'interior' psychic space inscribed on the body as a signification that perpetually conceals itself. The soul is a 'phantasm' constructed by force relations transversally cutting across the surfaces of body, it is a real investment by-passing any imaginary or symbolic. "It would be wrong," Foucault writes, "to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality ..." In Foucault's text the soul is not imprisoned by or within the body but undergoes an inversion: "the soul is the prison of the body." The genealogy of this body-soul would be a primary element in the history of micro-physics and would be correlative of a certain "technology of power over the body."

What distinguishes this technology and links it up with the contiguous and topological space-time of the diagram of disciplinary power is that the 'soul' which the prison/law/knowledge system first constructs, and then operates upon, is the same as that which is educated, drilled, corrected and controlled in the schools, barracks, asylums and factories:

"this real, non-corporeal soul is not a substance; it is the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge." These typologies constitute a technology of discipline which operates like a generalised abstract function and cannot be identified with any one institution or apparatus. Foucault's diagrammaticism shows that this technology of power traverses every institution or apparatus, positively producing and reconfiguring their spaces, linking them up, "prolonging them, and making them converge and function in a new way." Even
seemingly obvious segments of the state such as the prison or police are so conditioned:

Although the police as an institution were certainly organised in the form of a state-apparatus, and although this was certainly linked directly to the centre of political sovereignty, the type of power it exercises, the mechanisms it operates and the elements to which it applies them are specific.

The diagram of disciplinary technology is coextensive with the entire social body not just according to the limits it embraces but to the extent in which it penetrates right down to every minute detail thereby revealing its relative independence from juridical and political appbarati. Diagrammatic thought reconfigures the body/soul complex within the workshop, prison, factory, etc, as the realisation of mechanisms of power that are already presupposed by these forms. Foucault's analysis of bodies and discipline diagrams a technology of power that is simultaneously an economy, an economy of power that is characterised by the mixed and distended space of the norm.

With this new economy of power, the carceral system, which is its basic instrument, permitted the emergence of a new form of 'law': a mixture of legality and nature, prescription and constitution, the norm.


Through the disciplines appears the power of the norm. Is this the new law of society? Let us rather say that it is added to to other powers constraining them to new delimitations: the powers of law, of the word, of text, those of traditions.

Disciplinary mechanisms redefine and expand the boundaries of the space of the 'political', constraining them to new delimitations, in a way that undermines "a certain image of power-law, of power-sovereignty, which was traced out by the theoreticians of right and the monarchic institution." Disciplinary mechanisms develop forms of control which do
not operate through threat, deduction, prohibition, levying or death. In fact "our historical gradient carries us further and further away from a reign of law." Foucault explains, "I do not mean to say that the law fades into the background or that the institutions of justice tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a norm, and that the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory." Disciplinary power/knowledge "has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchise." It "does not have to draw the line that separates the enemies of the sovereign from his obedient subjects; it effects distributions around the norm." 77

The norm functions - through a whole series of feedback processes - as a generalised and abstract control of space-time that enables the recognition and correction of tendencies and dispositions that may affect the willingness or capability of 'individuals' to adhere to that norm.

"The perpetual penality that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institution, compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes." 78

The old 'inquisitional' system of investigation based on the reparation of power gives way to an 'examinatorial' system of infra and micro-penalties designed not only to prevent the occurrence of an infraction from happening in the first place but to produce a "penality of the norm" whose power resides in the homogenization and precise classification of space and time: "by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and to render the
differences useful by fitting them one to the other." 80 Through the
great Classical lists and tables, with their systems of notating and
registering individuals at 'all points' and in 'every instant' the
disciplines derive normative scales which had a decisive importance in
"the "epistemological 'thaw'" of the sciences of the individual". 81

Normalization is that mechanism of adjustment which makes possible the
transformation from discipline as 'blockade' to discipline as machine or
mechanism and which in turn facilitates, as a result of this
transformation, its generalisation and abstraction through the sciences
and knowledges of the individual. 82 Disciplinary society, in this sense,
is not a society of confinement or exclusion but a machine of uniform or
homogenous space-time which links up all of its component parts
producing, in an indefinite translation, a whole whose forces are more
than the sum of its parts. This 'surplus value' is then reinvested or
reintegrated since the norm integrates anything that might be external
to it.

If disciplines normalise rather than prohibit or permit, and observe,
surveillance and control the anonymous and abnormal, rather than glorify the
privileged, it is because they transport a new form and objective of
power which increasingly subordinates older ones. Thus Foucault
distinguishes the manufacture and fabrication of individuals from the
insertion of subjects into language, ideology, culture or tradition and
subordinates the latter to the former.

From a law of exclusion through confinement to a norm of indefinitely
expanding inclusion through continuous surveillance, the space or axis
of 'individualisation' is transformed. Foucault's diagram of sovereignty
maps an 'ascending individualisation' 83: the more one held power or
prestige the more likely one was to be historically recorded through
rituals, discourses, commemorations, paintings etc. The disciplines
reverse this. They introduce a 'descending individualisation': the more
anonymous and functional the level of power, the greater the likelihood of
individualisation of those to whom it is applied. An 'historical-ritual'
form of domination is subordinated to a 'disciplinary-scientific' one.
The commemoration of proper name and glorification of heroic exploits and
familial or aristocratic genealogy were subordinated to surveillance and
observation (not ceremony), measure and calculation (not privilege and
status). The objective is no longer to punish those who violate laws, but
to insert individuals into hierarchical groups according to a normative
scale. A juridical objective domination was no longer valid, but
subordinated to a normative one; the knowledge of jurists, chroniclers and
painters was subordinated to the rise of a new form of knowledge and
associated techniques of intervention: the sciences, analyses, and
practices we call 'psychological:'

All the sciences, analyses or practices employing the root 'psycho' -
have their origin in this historical reversal of the procedures of
individualization.

The strategies deployed through normalisation always develop according
to the logic of descending individualisation, a strategy of power that
constructs individuals in space-time. Foucault continually returns to
this point: discipline 'manufactures' individuals; it is a specific
technique of a power which takes individuals at one and the same time as
objects and as the instruments by means of which it is exercised. The norm
links up individualities as object and instrument, becomes that space of
reference through which disciplines construct individuals and operate through them.

The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which powers comes to fasten or against which it strikes ... in fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires come to be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the vis-a-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects. 85

If the individual is an effect, this effect is a measure of the extent to which normalisation is a function of the spatio-temporal logic of power that traverses the articulable and the visible. Each individual becomes a 'case', a 'status', a 'role' and a 'type', "a differentiation that is not one of acts, but of individuals themselves, of their nature, their potentialities, their level of value." 86 Each carrying around a little dossier of judgements, an identity established "in-truth" and fixed in a network of writing. The statements contained in these files and dossiers, which form part of any 'examination' and constitute an 'archive' of "normalising judgement", are established through techniques of comparison and forms of categorization in a space of differentiation in which a quantification and hierarchization of 'nature', level and ability can be assessed in relation to an 'average', 'standard', 'optimum' and increasingly 'normal' value. Normalising judgements are relayed through, and combined with a system of visibility, an apparatus of observation, "in which the techniques that make it possible to see induce effects of power, and in which, conversely, the means of coercion make those on whom they are applied clearly visible". 87 The examination is composed of a system of light and a system of language, procedures of expression and technologies of observation: it combines "the technique of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalising judgement," 88
brought together in a 'single mechanism.' This single mechanism or
'examining machine' is at the "centre of the procedures that constitute
the individual as effect and object of power, as effect and object of
knowledge". 89

Foucault brings together the space-time machinery of docile bodies and
the articulable-visible examining machines of individuals as the
'schema' of the actualisation or realisation of power/knowledge:

It is the examination which, by combining hierarchical surveillance
and normalizing judgement, assures the great disciplinary functions
of distribution and classification, maximum extraction of forces and
time, continuous genetic accumulation, optimum combination of
attitudes and, thereby, the fabrication of cellular, organic,
genetic and combinatory individuality. 90

Normalisation is articulated upon or presupposes a precise and extensive
knowledge of the individuals upon which it is resourced, it is a power
which knows the individuals upon which it is exercised, in order to make
them calculable and programmable, to make them known. This knowledge is
derived from articulable procedures and techniques of the visible
deployed through a controlled space-time. If, in this, the normalising,
synthesizing and combinatory power of the examination bears similarities
to the function that Kant attributes to the concept of the Schema it is
because "it does not answer the question, how are phenomena made subject
to the understanding, but the question, how does the understanding apply
itself to the phenomena which are subject to it." 91 Foucault rethinks
Kantian schematism as the problematic relation between what can be
judged (the articulable) and what can be observed (the visible) through the space-time diagrammaticism of normalising power.
In *Discipline and Punish*, as in all of Foucault's previous books, the Kantian topography of reason is radically disturbed and displaced. If in the space of archaeological thought the 'historical apriori' was "not a condition of validity for judgements, but a condition of reality for statements", in diagrammatic thought the conditions for the reality of statements are given by power and statements are always already functions of the articulable before they are judgements. In effect, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* had discovered a new type of 'judgement' function that Transcendental philosophy could not recognize and certainly not account for and *Discipline and Punish* gives this judgement a certain genealogical 'deduction'. (Obviously not in the sense of 'legal entitlement' but in terms of powers productivity). Foucault displaces the fact/right axis upon which judgements can be given and legitimated onto a power/norm axis upon which statements exist.

Judgement is a mechanism for normalizing and controlling bodies in space and time. In *The History of Sexuality* Foucault will demonstrate the techniques through which the body is trained to judge itself. It is no longer a question of removing any 'metaphysical impediments' to freedom in an act of self-legislation since the heteronomy of the body has nothing to do with laws of nature or causation so much as the microphysical and political impediments of a power that conditions and prepares the body for its own use without recourse to law.

Normalising power does not operate like law excluding, prohibiting, objectifying, coercing and punishing but seeks to enhance the life of bodies, individuals and populations intensifying the penetration of the
entire social body through the production of anomalies which it then attempts to reassimilate. Docile bodies and normalized individuals are created by a power whose forces and aptitudes are continually expanding exponentially, justified by a more economical and efficient power with no other goal than the ever greater welfare of all. The practices and technologies associated with this process Foucault will go on to call biopower. It is a power:

working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimise, and organise the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impending them, making them submit, or destroying them.

5. The juridical. Law and illegalisms.

The norm is not in 'opposition' to law, although bio-power develops within the space of the norm "at the expense of the juridical system of law", and law is not in decline as a result of the development of bio-power since normalisation tends to be accompanied by a massive proliferation of legislation. The norm in fact is opposed to what Foucault calls the 'juridical': the institution of law as the expression of a sovereigns power. (Philosophically: the 'architectonic' of critical reason expressed through the Kantian court as the medium for legitimating and justifying claims to knowledge).

Disciplinary power is opposed. term by term, to a judicial penalty whose essential function is to refer, not to a set of observable phenomena, but to a corpus of laws and texts that must be remembered; that operates not by differentiating individuals, but by specifying acts according to a number of general categories.

If, as Foucault puts it "the law cannot help but be armed," and, if its weapon par excellence is death, this equation of law and death does not derive from the essential character of law. Law, in fact, is traduced
and made to function by the formulation of norms, thus becoming part of a different sort of power that "has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchise rather than display itself in its murderous splendour."  

In the age of bio-power, then, the juridical, which characterised monarchical law, can readily be opposed to the normative, which comes to the foremost typically in constitutions, legal codes, and "the constant and clamourous activity of the legislature." Thus we must distinguish law and its formal expression from the juridical. The juridical functions as that code that enabled monarchical power (and critical reason) to constitute itself. The code may also have been constituted in other ways. Neither the "regression of the juridical", which accompanies the rise of bio-power nor the fact that the most typical mechanisms of juridical power can no longer be represented in legal form, necessarily signals the disappearance of the law.

Law, in fact, functions in Foucault's diagrammaticism as a system of differentials which formalise articulable and visible regimes. The relations between these forms is organised by the 'juridical' in the case of 'sovereign' society and by 'norm,' 'normality' and 'normalisation' in the case of disciplinary society and Foucault's text gives us fragments toward a genealogy of law. Law founded on the 'juridical mode' Foucault shows to be tethered to a concept of power shaped by theories of repression. Law appears as an external reaction to desire whereas repression appears as a condition internal to desire. The formal differentiation of law in sovereign societies operated through binary mechanisms that permitted or forbade certain expressions.
or contents. In the societies of discipline lines of enunciation and lines of visibility tend to be administered, appraised, hierachized and adjusted through the integral space of norms, producing them through a seamless, contiguous mechanism. Here law becomes the integration and introjection of 'illegalisms', a collection of integrations which are initially local but then tend to become global, aligning and homogenising the relations between forces.

The disciplinary model of power also demonstrates the extent to which penal justice manages illegalities producing positive effects to the benefit of a certain class and doesn't eliminate illegalities but administers them 'differentially.' Thus penal reform of the 18th century creates a new system for the distribution of illegalisms not just because offences focused increasingly on property rather than people but because disciplinary mechanisms categorised and formalised infractions in a new way, creating new forms like 'delinquency' which in turn set up new classifications and a different control of illegalisms:

illegalism is not an accident, or a more or less inevitable imperfection ... At a pinch, I'd say that a law is not made in order to forbid any behaviour, but in order to distinguish between the different ways of getting round the law itself.101

Penal law doesn't refer to prison but to its own differential articulations. It is a system of statements that classifies, translates and calculates. It is a machine that relentlessly produces statements and sentences. Prison, on the other hand, comes from somewhere else, has an entirely different 'becoming', since its form is irreducible to penal law. "Prison, that concentrated and austere figure of all the disciplines, is not an endogenous element in the penal system as defined at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries." 102 Prison is
that system of optics whose structuring invisible principle is defined by panopticism: a machine that makes the visible. The optical machine, or as Foucault calls it an 'observation machine', makes lines of light which form variable shapes inseparable from the apparatus in question. It structures light, disperses it, distributing the visible and the invisible, makes possible a seeing without being seen.

Its principle ... is in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up. 103

Equally, prison (Bentham's panopticon) is also a site for la voix acousmatique, a system of 'conversation' tubes through which law is expressed as "commands... that are barked from on high and from below" 104 to prisoners who can hear but cannot see the source of the voice, to prisoners who may be spoken to individually without others knowing who is being addressed so that no one is certain that they are not under surveillance. 105 Two formations: A system of language, sentences, commands and order-words and a system of light, gazes and observations that do not refer to each other but come into contact. Penal law still fills the prisons and prison continues to produce 'delinquents.' But this is so only when we consider the integration or actualisation of power-relationships within the variable layers of strata. The strategic element finds "a whole extra-legal functioning of power..." that was "partly assured by the mass of reserve labour constituted by the delinquents." 106 The gap or fissure that opens up between the stratified forms of law and prison is filled by a "strategic reinvestment" which articulates their difference.
The figure of law, then, is above all the form under which sovereign power since the Middle Ages has presented itself. Its continued domination is evidenced by the extent to which power is still conceived as negation, prohibition, and repression. Such power limits freedom by imposing a will, issuing commands and exacting obedience with threats. As a 'political' architecture it is preoccupied with questions of sovereignty and justifiable coercion setting up its answers in terms of rights, obligations, procedures and juridical persons. The diagram of sovereignty still plays this role in liberal, state or Marxist political theory where the ruling class plays the same uniforming function as princes, sovereigns, legislators, etc played in classical political theory.

Despite the differences in epochs and objectives the representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy. In political thought and analysis we still have not cut off the head of the king. Hence the importance that the theory of power gives to the problem of right and violence, law and illegality, freedom and will, and especially the state and sovereignty.

The price of a continuing juridical representation of power is the gap or discrepancy that opens up between the 'political' and the extension of control through new functions and new forms delivered through new mechanisms, instruments and relations of power that remain occluded or invisible to the political. "We have been engaged for centuries in a type of society in which the juridical is increasingly incapable of coding power, of serving as its system of representation." ¹⁰⁸ Foucault's diagram of disciplinary power provides the means of problematizing this juridico-discursive conception; in so far as disciplinary techniques fabricate useful individuals, turning bodies into labour-power, soldier-power or delinquents, "power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth." ¹⁰⁹ Foucault does not ignore
repression or ideology but they are seen as the dust thrown up by a more fundamental struggle between forces. The expression of a power relation, the relation between forces Foucault describes as "an action upon an action." The power-relation "incites, provokes, combines." In disciplinary societies these functions "allocate, classify, compose and normalise." Modern politics is a dispersed and indefinite struggle of forces that the juridical model congeals and totalises. Diagrammatic thought would "cut off the kings head"; it would attempt "apart from any totalisation - which would be at once abstract and limiting - to open up problems that are as concrete and general as possible, problems that approach politics from behind and cut across societies on the diagonal".

6. The state and its apparatuses.

Foucault does not diminish the importance of the state but demonstrates how the state depends on discipline for its effective domination. "One impoverishes the question of power when one poses it uniquely in terms of legislation or of the constitution, or only in terms of the state or state apparatus. Power is much more complicated, more dense and diffused than a set of laws or an apparatus of the state."

Disciplinary power is diffused not just through 'legitimate' forms but through local forms at the extremities of its existence where power has a "capillary form of existence," where it "reaches into the very grain of individuals," whose analysis in ascent would aim to discover the 'colonisation' of these local forms, their transformation and utilisation in the central apparati and more global forms of domination.
The Marxist pyramid is displaced by points or nodes of power immanent to disciplinary techniques which form great segments of strata linked to one another traversed by human multiplicities. Refusing the principle of subordination through which power relations are reduced to the status of effects of some more global principle, such as the mode of production, power relations in the form of disciplinarity provided the conditions of existence for modes of production.

"At the emergence of large-scale industry, one finds beneath the division of the production process the individualising fragmentation of labour power; the distribution of the disciplinary space often assured both."  117

Disciplinarity is that kind of 'production' that conditions and is conditioned by military, pedagogic and other spaces of production. The two processes - the accumulation of capital and the development of the techniques for the control of increasingly larger and more numerous human multiplicities - cannot be separated.

To the extent that disciplinarity is a precondition for capitalist production and to the extent that disciplinary mechanisms are bound up with techniques across the production apparatus, Foucault points out the economistic illusion in thinking that capital defines the specificity of the forms of material production and reproduction. Moreover, Foucault's analysis refuses to see the forms or the exercise of power as instruments of a class. If the transformation in the exercise of power also coincides with the establishment of a "new class power" this is only a distant "guarantee of intelligibility" of those transformations themselves. 118
Foucault stresses that power could not be a 'property' won by a class. In *History of Sexuality* (Vol 1) Foucault begins to draw out the strategic and abstract conception of diagrammatic power that multiplies, folds and conditions the technico-economic, mechanistic conception of power in *Discipline and Punish*. In *The History of Sexuality* power is a strategy whose effects cannot be attributed to an appropriation "but to dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings." 119 Class or class struggle is not denied but embedded in a broader, more global and simultaneously micro topology where power is "exercised rather than possessed; it is not the 'privilege' acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions." 120 Without their inscription and codification through relations of strategy power relations remain unknown: "Power in the substantive sense, *le pouvoir*, doesn't exist ... power means relations or more-or-less organised, hierarchical coordinated cluster of relations." 121

The state or state-control is one institution along with family, religion, Production even art which are not the sources of power but already presuppose strategic power-relations. If the state has captured so many power relations and arrogated to itself so many diverse functions this is because it has assumed the status of 'global integrator' enabling state-control of so many domains (economic, juridical, familial, sexual etc). The molecular or micro relations of power are organised by a molar function in each of these domains constituting forms of knowledge divided and multiplied across the articulable and the visible.
The molar/molecular 'structure' of power facilitates the emergence not of increased state power but, as we will see, of the "'governmentalisation' of the state." Disciplinary techniques and mechanisms saturate and infiltrate the old machinery of state which was incapable of effectively ordering and distributing new multiplicities. The old systems of deducing and levying, of bestowing life and death (tied to the space of exclusion and death inhabited by the leper) were insufficiently equipped to deal with the developing disciplinary diagram (tied to the model of the plague and administering life).

The establishment of the mechanisms of discipline as means of state-control is for Foucault the outcome of a process that gathered momentum in the societies of the Seventeen and Eighteenth Centuries. Their original function was to "neutralise dangers, to fix useless or disturbed populations to avoid the inconveniences of over-large assemblies; now they were being asked to play a positive role, for they were becoming able to do so, to increase the possible utility of individuals." The negative functions of discipline give way to a positive mechanism which tends toward 'deinstitutionalisation', stepping outside enclosures and confined spaces. The mechanisms circulate in a 'free' state offering opportunities for 'investment' and 'exchange,' transferral and adaption: "massive and compact disciplines are broken down into flexible methods of control which may be transferred and adapted." Disciplinary power, no longer tied to sovereign institutions which were "closed, established within boundaries", became a generalised mechanism at the service of all production: The great "swarming of disciplinary mechanisms."
Discipline and Punish maps the spread and generalisation of these mechanisms of molar and molecular control and the abstract or strategic machine that gives them their direction is properly located and elaborated in The History of Sexuality (Vol 1). Here Foucault demonstrates that this new topology of power evolved through two pure functions linked together through a whole cluster of relations in order to produce, saturate, infiltrate and invest 'life.' An 'anatomo-politics' organised through the mechanisms of panopticism, disciplinary space-time and the techniques of normalization facilitates the development of the body/individual as a machine ensuring "the optimisation of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls"; and a 'bio-politics' ordered through the regulations of a population, its biological processes: propagation, birth, mortality, health and longevity with all of their variable conditions. The co-ordination, super-imposition and articulation of these two functions and their actualisation through a network of interacting strategies together refocus the topology, dynamics and intelligibility of Foucault's diagrammaticism.

7. Diagrammaticism

Diagrammaticisms rule of immanence: each diagram articulates a bundle of potential force relations which function as a plane of immanence: "between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority". No knowledge without power, no power without knowledge. Power-knowledge relations: immanence without exterior in reciprocal presupposition. Yet no identity or isomorphism since they are "articulated with each other on the basis of their difference." Power-knowledge relations: immanence without exterior through mutual
exclusion. In their coming together they fall away from each other since
the point, fold or cut that joins them up also inscribes their
difference, prevents them from collapsing into each other. Non-
identical, non-oppositional- a non-relation.

Diagrammaticisms rule of continual variations: power-knowledge relations
exhibit "a pattern of modifications" in continuous variation as force
relations are continually churned up through realignments,
reinforcements and reversals. "The 'distributions of power' and the
'appropriations of knowledge' never represent only instantaneous slices
taken from processes involving, for example, a cumulative reinforcement
of the strongest factor, or a reversal of relationship, or again, a
simultaneous increase of two terms." Thus diagrams of power-knowledge
are several maps superimposed onto each other, folded, stitched and sewn
together. Diagrams "are not static forms of distribution, they are
'matrices of transformation'." History is continually unmade and
remade as diagrams are drawn from the pool of virtual/potential force,
realised in strategies and transformed in the real.

Foucault's texts offer a cartography of this process as a series of
'open' and connective maps to the Outside, a series of double
reciprocal and reversible movements, of the articulable and the visible,
of forces and forms of positivity broken up by various lines and
trajectories traced out over strategic segments which are integrated and
differentiated into diagrams of power/knowledge: "power as exercise,
knowledge as regulation." Foucault's 'pragmatism' is also a profound
pluralism at the heart of which operates a distribution of
multiplicities in continuous variation, multiplicities of the seen and
the said and the "manifold relationships of force" that activate them. These relations of multiplicity raise the possibility of an infinity of diagrams, of all kinds of intermediary diagrams such as the Napoleonic diagram that Foucault writes of "at the point of junction of the monarchical, ritual exercise of sovereignty and the hierarchical permanent exercise of indefinite discipline." As we will see, Foucault thinks modern power as a specific 'triangulation' and 'tesselation' of diagrams and it is precisely their functioning together that breaks forces of resistance, isolating them, dividing them in space, ordering them in time and composing them in space-time - an individualizing and totalizing power administering and controlling the life of populations.

Diagrams can thus connect up, overlap, or wrap around each other and the topology (of power and resistance) will be different on each occasion. This connection and reconnection of points or superimposition of maps means that all diagrams include points with continuously variable 'degrees of freedom,' determined by the number of dimensions with their "points, knots, and focuses" that remain relatively unbound: diagrams contain "a multiplicity of points of resistance." The diagrams subsist in the very 'warp and woof' of concrete institutions actualising the relations between forces, rendering their own virtual potential into a power relation that passes through every point differentiating statements from visibilities, discourses and architectures, penal law and prison etc. These systems are continually opened by "mobile and transitory points of resistance", producing fractures and cleavages which break up unities and effect regroupings but which also move across individuals themselves "cutting them up and remolding them, marking off irreducible regions in them ..." These bifurcations and fractures, of
power and resistance, these continual variations create the "heterogeneous ensemble" that constitutes a diagram.

Diagrammaticisms rule of double conditioning: power-knowledge relations are not actualised or realised unless they pursue their tendency to progressively integrate from "local centers" of tactics to global, massive and heteromorphous strategies that react or fold back on these tactics as anchor and support. These are not different or discontinuous levels (micro/macro), nor are they homogenous forms acting through scalar difference (projected enlargement or miniaturization) but a complex, multiply folded space (and time) that iterates its own conditions each time through slightly modified coordinates. Thus "one must conceive of the double conditioning of a strategy by the specificity of possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes them work." 139 Strategic forces pass as much through the dominated as the dominant invading the stable forms of the visible and articulable that make up the archive.

one needs to be nominalistic: power is not an institution, a structure, or a certain strength with which people are endowed; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society. 140

It is the anonymity and instability of this 'complex strategic situation' that Foucault will define as "intentional and non-subjective", 141 a programme without a programmer. Strategy exploits the spaces within programmes, between programmes, programmes of 'observation' and 'expression' that the strategy itself creates and conditions. The non-correspondence, anisomorphism or 'non-relation' between programmes is the 'virtual' space for strategy to operate enabling the 'transduction' of force relations into a more or less
concerted effort of synthesis which would remain 'unknown' within the programmes themselves. Thus strategy appears in "the arena of the cynical, promiscuous, the tacit." The double conditioning of the diagram and the archive, strategy and strata.

Diagrammaticisms rule of tactical polyvalence: power-relations can not be differentiated or actualised in their movement "from one point to another" except through the vehicle of 'discourse'. Discourse functions here as a complex switch/relay/connection device in which "a multiplicity of discursive elements...come into play in various strategies." 142 Within these strategies discourses function as both "an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy". 143 The diagram is thus continually modifying and realigning its elements in relation to the everchanging combinations and displacements of the discursive field which, in turn, feed back into the strategic process. There are no 'epicenters' or originating points for this process and neither (or very rarely) are there simple oppositions or dualisms. "There is not, on one side, a discourse of power, and opposite it, another discourse that runs counter to it. Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in a field of force relations; there can exist different and even contradictory discourses within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing their form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy." 144 This applies as much for the 'non-discursive' as the discursive and the problem (the problem of 'truth') will be to map the polyvalence of tactics, as both 'mutually exclusive' and in 'reciprocal presuppositions', as they circulate through enunciable an visible blocks.
Diagrams of power issue from a 'non-place', 'outside' of the forms of exteriority. The Stratosphere. Or rather, the diagram, in so far as it reveals a set of relations between forces, is not a place but a cauldron of mutation that affects those composing forces:

In a sense, only a single drama is ever staged in this 'non-place,' the endlessly repeated play of dominations. 145

The endless repetition of forces incorporating and assimilating other forces which in turn ... a continuous restaging of the theatricality of force. Why one set of relations of force achieves relative stablization over another becomes a throw of the historical dice, but why one production or diagram takes the forms that it possesses (what it makes see or say) is a function of those topological and diagrammatic spaces left 'vacant' by its predecessor. If life, labour and language are dispersed and distributed throughout the spaces left vacant in representation, it is because representation is displaced at the point of its "greatest inadequacy", an inadequacy made visible by a new combinatorics of force that makes possible new 'subject' positions, conceptual architectures and object domains; a new modality of seeing and saying, a new set of relations between power, space and the image of thought that conditions and is conditioned by them. The 'force' of diagrammatic reading lies precisely in accessing this zone which is "neither visible nor hidden"

This power/knowledge complex, then, brings together the diagram and the archive, folds and splices strategy and strata together "on the basis of their difference." The diagram, as it were, 'selects' a particular 'embodiment', instantiation or incarnation according to its own design
thus enabling, for example, the predominance of the prison in 19th Century judicial punishment even though the prison existed long before. Equally, penal law undergoes a development that obliges it to speak of crime and punishment in terms of the defence and security of society rather than in terms of vengeance and the restoration of sovereign power. The diagram divides itself across this fracture between forms, between architectures and discourses, gives them conditions and makes them function whilst remaining virtually outside.

Foucault's diagrammaticism finds that this virtuality or outside is composed of the immanent strategies, sets of force relations that makes the forms and functions possible. Such programmes or strategies are determined by the diagram under analysis and we move from the unstable and transitory domination of one diagram to another. Reasons for such movement cannot be given in advance and it becomes impossible to say why a particular global strategy of power should have arisen when it did. "It is difficult to give reasons, since all the reasons, including economic ones, presuppose the presence of the diagram." In any case, "we give up nothing in abandoning reasons." The diagram is driven by relations of force, chance, mutation, and contingency which does not make it inexplicable, but its intelligibility should not be confused with necessity. If diagrams of power are intelligible "this is not because they are the effect of another instance that 'explains' them, but rather because they are imbued, through and through, with calculation.." The 'calculation' of diagrammatic surfaces renders their 'logic' "perfectly clear, their aims decipherable and yet ..no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them." The "great anonymous, almost unspoken" diagrams are unstable,
fluid, constantly in states of change. Foucault called this dynamic, internal to the diagram and in relation with the 'outside', a 'becoming'. If the diagram is always in a state of becoming it is because it 'subsists' in the 'not yet' and 'no longer' of the 'present'. And Foucault's 'history of the present' is a series of diagrams of the becoming of power in relation to the forms which it creates and destroys. This becoming and subsistence of diagrams of power Foucault would concur is "real without being actual, ideal without being abstract." 149

Diagrammatic thought traces and tracks a line of general force "in any relationship between one point and another" cutting across lines of visibility and lines of enunciation. These are the coordinates of knowledge which, in each case, issue from and condition the diagram: "strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge." 151 It thus appears that the multiplicities of the episteme, as a specific apparatus of knowledge, are opened up by other multiplicities from the outside, multiplicities of force that contest it, force it to do battle and subject it to a drifting outside of what may or may not be characterised as 'knowledge' or 'science'. The episteme and the 'audio-visual archive' are doubled, multiplied and folded in all directions and across all levels and the diagram becomes the skin or membrane attached to a "moving substrate of force relations". 152 The moving substrate perpetually engenders states of power by virtue of a permanent system of asymmetrical and unequal relations in which they are engaged.
There are, then, diagrams of power that are irreducible to knowledge which will not preclude their 'mutual immanence' but will actively offer its conditions. These conditions are always strategic (and therefore double) and are actualised through colliding and interacting spaces that are polyvalent and in continuous variation. These spaces express a (non) relation between forces: "a set of actions upon other actions." In fact, power is not essentially repressive because it "incites, it induces, it seduces." Power is not a form, an attribute or a property that can be held or dispersed, withheld, frustrated or transferred. These are reactive affects presupposing a power that is first of all productive, that is practiced and exercised, and which circulates through a 'non-place' passing through all related points. Power understood in this way is formless, purely operational and functional. Abstracted from the forms it assumes, or the aims and objectives given to it, the space of power is thought as immanent force (non-place) or condition rather than transcendental form, diagrammatic relation (non-relation) rather than structure or code and problematic, differential actualisation (event, emergence) rather than dialectical resolution.

Foucault's diagrammaticism inverts, displaces and problematizes all the old theoretical frameworks of power making possible a new cartography of the 'political':

"It is a question of orienting ourselves to a conception of power which replaces the privilege of the law with the viewpoint of the objective, the privilege of prohibition with the viewpoint of tactical efficacy, the privilege of sovereignty with the analysis of a multiple and mobile field of force relations, wherein far-reaching, but never completely stable, effects of domination are produced. The strategical model, rather than the model based on law. And this, not out of a speculative choice or theoretical preference, but because in fact it is one of the essential traits of Western societies that the force relationships which for a long time had found expression in war, in every form of warfare, gradually became invested in the order of political power."
8. The apparatus of sexuality.

The experience of 'war' and 'politics' as both irreducible strategies and interchangeable mechanisms partially code and integrate the forces of the diagram as a disciplinary power and a 'bio-power', and Foucault begins to draw the diagrammatic map of a 'bio-politics' that administers, monitors, regulates and controls the life and forces of the body and populations through a strategic "deployment of sexuality". If panopticism articulates the diagram of disciplinary power then the apparatus (dispositif) expresses the diagram of forces that traverse sex and control the life of human multiplicities. Power over life runs through sex because it is that point of articulation and intersection between the body and populations and the apparatus is a map of these processes and relations, a map of lines of dispositional force and their variation through division and displacement into the positif curves of the articulable and the visible.

The exercise of biopower on body/populations involves "the entry of phenomena peculiar to the life of the human species into the order of power and knowledge, into the sphere of political techniques." Sex allows "access to the life of the body and the life of the species" and Foucault's apparatus of sexuality will articulate the management, policing and ultimately the governent of life through those procedures of power-knowledge that emplace sex within the articulable ('the incitement to discourse') through the generalisation of techniques of confession, and that distribute sex through the visible as the accomplishment of techniques of observation. A 'scientia sexualis'. The deployment of sexuality through the articulable and the visible effects a power over life that tightly couples together truth and pleasure in
space-time, or rather, truth is given to be seen and told through a fascination ("we have at least invented a different kind of pleasure pleasure in the truth of pleasure, the pleasure of knowing that truth, of discovering and exposing it, the fascination of seeing it and telling it" 159) that is dependent upon the way in which what can be seen and what can be said is derived from the construction and invention of a sexuality through 'incitement' in space and time:

Let Charcots Salpetriere serve as an example in this regard: it was an enormous apparatus for observation, with its examinations, interrogations, and experiments, but it was also a machinery for incitement, with its public presentations, its theater of ritual crises, carefully staged with the help of ether and amyl nitrate, its interplay of dialogues, palpations, laying on of hands, postures which the doctors elicited or obliterated with a gesture or a word, its hierarchy of personnel who kept watch, organized, provoked, monitored and reported, and who accumulated an immense pyramid of observations and dossiers. 160

If Freud establishes from this another space (and time) through which the 'hystericisation' of sex can be connected to a visible and articulable element (what the hysteric shows and says) then Foucault's great diagram of the apparatus of sexuality can also serve "as an archaeology of psychoanalysis" 161

The apparatus of sexuality is that system of deployment that constructs or fictions sex as a 'speculative' element in its functioning. It is a "sexuality without sex", a "unique signifier and a universal signified" 162 that normalizes desire through its hysterical incitement to be seen and said. It is, then, an "especially dense transfer point for relations of power" 163 that breaks up the scientia sexualis (the ars erotica is dependent upon another diagram of forces involving the relation between master and slave or disciple, a quite different cluster of relations between power and knowledge and the transmission of truth and pleasure)
into a great shimmering network of surfaces conditioned by forces that incite and induce a specific mode of seeing as well as saying: a sex that speaks and a sex that reveals, surfaces teeming with words and surfaces traversed by gazes, a sexual body constructed and enfolded by power.

The power that thus took charge of sexuality set about contacting bodies, caressing them with its eyes, intensifying areas, electrifying surfaces, dramatizing troubled moments. It wrapped the sexual body in its embrace.

Scientia sexualis produces the sexual body through the techniques of confession and incitement as a specific site for the inscription of desire and truth. 'Law' is eroticized as that mechanism (distributed across medicine, criminology, psychiatry, etc.,) that constitutes and produces, multiplies and proliferates the desire and truth (the desire for truth and the truth of desire) of the sexual body.

One should not think that desire is repressed, for the simple reason that the law is what constitutes desire and the lack on which it is predicated. Where there is desire, the power-relation is already present: an illusion, then, to denounce this relation for a repression exerted after the event; but vanity as well, to questing after a desire that is beyond the reach of power.

And desire is produced around the body through the confession of its truth: "The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement." It is "a technique for producing truth" that "unfolds within a power relationship." Truth is inseparable from the procedures that establish it and Foucault grafted confessional procedures onto the history that he established in Discipline and Punish that moved from 'inquisitional enquiry' to the 'disciplinary examination' model. In all cases the procedure is made up of statements and visibilities and the forces that run through them and a different 'desire' is extracted and made to
function as true through variable techniques. Foucault historicizes the apparatus for the production of desire as an invention of recent date "we have had sexuality since the 18th Century, and sex since the 19th. What we had before that was no doubt the flesh." ¹⁶⁸ But from one formation to the next the apparatus produces a different set of relations between power and knowledge, truth and pleasure, bodies and desires and each case involves different variables and subject positions, different methods and processes, techniques and practices.

Foucault concentrates on the specific practices and technologies of sex that produce truth as 'problematic', a 'problematisation' of truth: the 'non-relation' between truths of light and language. Foucault's diagram of the apparatus of sexuality with its demolition of the 'repressive hypothesis' and its mapping of the deployment of scientia sexualis reveals the teeming discourses of sex, the technologies for its observation and "an entire machinery for producing true discourses concerning it" ¹⁶⁹:

Between each of us and our sex the west has placed a never ending demand for truth: it is up to us to extract the truth of sex ... it is up to sex to tell us our truth.

The truth of sex became something fundamental, useful or dangerous, precious or formidable: in short ... sex was constituted as the problem of truth. ¹⁷¹

The 'question' of sex is constituted within a fold of truth: sex must speak and show the truth as we demand that it say and make us see the truth. The truth of ourselves, of others, and of the other within the self, "all this found an opportunity to deploy itself in the discourse of sex." ¹⁷²

The truth of sexual reason is one element in the functioning of a government of truth that traverses every segment of the social apparatus as a government of affective life. If power redirects its energies to the prolongation, administration and management of life, takes life as its aim and object, resistance turns life against power: "life as a political object was in a sense taken at face value and turned back against the system that was bent on controlling it." 173 The task of Foucault’s diagrammaticism lies in locating, activating and amplifying these lines of resistance, lines that can be connected in what we might risk calling a discipline of resistance or bio-resistance, the multiplication and intensification of lines of flight, endogenous to regimes of power, by connecting them to an Outside. For diagrammatic thought life resists power through a direct ‘feed’ to the Outside and ‘reverse’ resistance can only be a temporary and incomplete stage in this process. There is always a moment of disengagement in power relations, a multiplicity of resistant points that are always unstable and reversible. Foucault’s diagrams always search out and ‘make’ these ‘lines of fracture.’ It is no longer sufficient to ‘diagnose’ or ‘release’ resistances of the Outside, it has to be made from the Outside. The lines can be opened up to other forces, reactive forces twisted into active forces, agitated to the extent of making change possible and necessary. Powers’ counterstroke uses the resources that power formerly deployed against oppositions:

what was understood and what seemed as an objective was life ... which became the issue of political struggles, even if the latter were formulated through affirmations concerning rights. The ‘right’ to life, to ones body, to health and happiness, to the satisfaction of needs ... this ‘right’ which the classical juridical system was utterly incapable of comprehending... 174
Life rather than the law, productive power rather than juridical power characterises "political struggle" and in the struggle of government life itself is the issue.

"Since the last century, the great struggles that have challenged the general system of power were not guided by the belief in a return to former rights, or by the age-old dream of a cycle of time or a Golden Age. One no longer aspired toward the coming of the emperor of the poor, or the kingdom of the latter days, or even the restoration of our imagined ancestral rights; what was demanded and what served as an objective was life, understood as the basic needs, man's concrete essence, the realization of his potential, a plenitude of the possible. Whether or not it was Utopia that was wanted is of little importance; what we have seen has been a very real process of struggle; life as a political object was in a sense taken at face value and turned back against the system that was bent on controlling it. It was life more than the law that became the issue of political struggles ..." 175

Power over life involves maintaining the forces of life, "making them grow and ordering them" 176 to the point where their relation either fosters life or disallows it to the point of death, the moment that escapes it. Forces must be cultivated, optimized, managed, administered and sustained in life, normalizing their differences, increasing their potential and governing their actualisation. The difference between points of force in a relation amounts to a quantitative inequality which is not prior to any sequence or modality of action nor prior even to the body for, as we have seen, the body is already a complex arrangement of forces distributed throughout its surfaces. The forces of government in question here have nothing to do with violence or ideology which are merely forces at their extremities. The differential relations of force refer to a capacity to act or be acted upon, a capacity to affect or be affected; as Foucault says "an action upon an action:"

In effect, what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action that does not act directly or immediately upon others. Instead it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, or existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future ... The exercise of power ... is a total structure of actions
brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions.

Here Foucault demonstrates the extent to which "the exercise of power consists in guiding the possibilities of conduct and putting in order the possible outcomes" 178 which means that power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government. The governmental motor generates and controls the flow of space-time through which forces can act. 'Government' is the power to affect, whether it is children, families, souls, the sick or the mad.

This word must be allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth century. "Government" did not refer only to political structures or the management of states rather it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals of states might be directed: the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick. It did not cover only the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection, but also modes of action, more or less considered and calculated, which were designed to act upon the possibilities of action, more or less considered and calculated, which were designed to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others. The relationship proper to power would not therefore by sought on the side of violence, or of struggle, nor on that of voluntary linking (all of which can, at best, be the instruments of power), but rather in the area of the singular mode of action, neither warlike nor juridical, which is government. 179

This power to affect is obviously not an appearance or an illusion. It is a factored product that distends itself over the multiple surfaces of the social to which it is co-extensive. An 'immanent cause', a machine that produces its own cause which is inseparable from its effects even though it is 'outside' the effects themselves not the outside of the effect. The governmental 'effect' traverses all of those institutions of molarity which seek to capture or organise its 'microphysical relations'; the state is only one example of this.
'Omnes et singulatim' is the great characteristic property of the governmental machine whose concerns are simultaneously to 'totalise' and to 'individualise.' 180 It produces this differentiation from the reservoir of forces to which it is in contact enabling maximum efficiency in the control of conduct. Foucault traces this governmentalisation of power relations to the 'daemonic' folding of 'city-game' onto the 'shepherd-game': the Greek game of citizens and laws annexed to the pastoral model of a shepherd who cares for each individual in his flock. Foucault analyses how the state diagram 'invests' the pastoral-diagram through an "individualising 'tactic' which characterised a series of powers: those of the family, medicine, psychiatry, education and employers." 181 This investment leads to both a 'government of individuality' and a form of government by 'individualisation' operating as a continuum through all of those agencies which delimit and striate space and time, fixing boundaries and determining positions. The governmental machine regulates and distributes space-time according to the force relations that it 'conducts' through enunciable and visible segments.

Foucault has shown in his diagrams of power that it is less a question of a space of sovereignty replaced by discipline in turn replaced by government but a 'triangulation' of these three planes of exercising power in a network of reciprocal relations, a particularly dense interweaving or interpenetration of power relations that constitutes governmentality. It is less to do with the imposition of laws than of a certain disposition of statements and visibilities, of 'men and things' in space and time. This disposition may also employ the law as a tactic in order for its ends to be achieved. In any case if the sovereign with
his laws right through until the liquidation of the themes of 'mercantilism' were able to frustrate or immobilise the 'art of government' its processes emerged full-scale with the demographic expansion of the eighteenth century. The notion of 'population' becomes the object of government and in doing so utilises and colonises sovereignty and disciplines. Government uses the instruments of sovereignty (laws) refines and extends them as generalised tactics in order to 'legalise' populations. Government simultaneously takes over disciplinary techniques, reorients and redistributes them in order to gain access and control over bodies and individuals in order to 'normalize' them. Power is everywhere, it comes from everywhere, in every action and passion, "in every relation from one point to another", controlling multiplicities in space and time: a government of life.

The burden of diagrammatic thought is to produce maps of this 'government of life' which can be connected to the Outside and used to produce 'other' truths, other 'parrhesiastic' acts in the battle 'around' truth.

"If power is constitutive of truth, how can one conceive of a 'power of truth' which would no longer be the truth of power, a truth that would release transversal lines of resistance and not integral lines of power?" How can we 'cross the line?' One of the 'other' truths- the power of truth - that Foucault's maps produce is that we can't 'see' or 'say' the truth of power. Power is never 'here and now': power hides in the Outside, in a 'non-place'; power is never 'present' but hides in the repetition of its difference. Power is never a function of logical or syllogistic relation but functions through invisible 'non-relations'.
tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself." 184 Its success is entirely "proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms." 185 Power is anonymous and unspoken, blind and mute even as it makes us 'see' it and talk about it in ways that ensure its indefinite reproduction, as it coordinates "loquacious tactics' and constructs great machines of visibility. The guard in the tower of the panopticon cannot 'see' power and the speech of the confessing subject is always already the 'subject' of power. Power hides its mechanisms by ordering, dividing, distributing, composing, inducing, seducing and inciting, in short, in relentlessly producing and governing articulable and visible functions (through asymmetrical relations of force) by meticulously constructing and arranging space-time. Diagrammatic thought releases this process from any essence, ground, being, intention, subject, etc, that might give it foundations and displaces it onto the Outside, makes it visible as a process of the Outside, a problem of immanent conditions of existence, a politics of space and time as a politics of truth. Diagrammatic thought can 'see' and articulate power differently or make it visible because of its rigorous affinity with space, its ability to think the Outside as a map of power and consequently a map of resistance; its affinity with time as a way of thinking the 'no longer' against the 'present' in favour of a 'not yet'- an aconceptual difference- of seeing and saying otherwise and in a new way, of thinking-otherwise. Diagrammatic thought is a thought of resistance and freedom, an indefinitely renewed effort to 'cross the line.'

Diagrammatic thought shows the instability of the spaces of power relations, the fragility of the apparatus that circulates them and the possibility of their 'reversal' through a "multiplicity of points of
resistance", 186 "often in the same vocabulary and using the same categories". 187 And from this we might imagine "another economy of bodies and pleasures." 188

It is the agency of sex that we must break away from if we aim - through a tactical reversal of the various mechanisms of sexuality - to counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures and knowledges in their multiplicity and their possibility of resistance. The rallying point for the counter-attack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be not sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures. 189

Foucault will go on to call the internal dynamic of this spiralling process between power and resistance a relation of 'freedom' or 'agonism' in the sense that every exercise of power presupposes a subject who is free to act: "power is exercised only over free subjects and only insofar as they are free." 190 At the heart of relations of power lies "the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom", 191 an agonistic relation of "reciprocal incitation and struggle", a "permanent provocation". 192 The relations between the apparatuses of sex, subject and government must be thought through a space of constitutive freedom, a fold of forces through which power and resistance are articulated. And this space involves a whole series of differential relations between technologies which aren't just technologies of domination but complex interactions upon other interactions "where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself." 193 If Foucault had overemphasized the technologies of domination as the only form of government, a topological shift was necessary in order to access another dimension, dependent upon the others (knowledge, power), yet irreducible with its own space and time, history, rhythm, form, etc. A government or technology of the self as Foucault conceives it (care of the self) would be the culmination and final flowering of diagrammatic thought as a resistance to the government of life, a step into the outside as an operation of the art of living.
5. THE INTERIORITIES OF THOUGHT: SELVES AND SUBJECTIVATION
Subjectivating the Outside

It is enough to create new names, new estimations and probabilities in order to create in the long run new things.

The double is never a projection of the interior; on the contrary, it is an interiorisation of the Outside. It is not a doubling of the One but a redoubling of the Other. It is not a reproduction of the Same, but a repetition of the Different. It is not the emanation of an 'I', but something that places in immanence and always other or Non-self. It is never the other who is double in the doubling process, it is a self that lives me as the double of the other: I do not encounter myself on the outside, I find the other in me. It resembles exactly the invagination of a tissue in embryology, or the act of doubling in sewing: twist, fold, stop, and so on.

The breakdown of philosophical subjectivity and its dispersion in a language that disposesses it while multiplying it within the space created by its absence is probably one of the fundamental structures of contemporary thought.

What must be produced is not man himself such as nature designed him, or such as his essence prescribes. What must be produced is something that absolutely does not exist, about which we know nothing... the creation of something totally different, an innovation.

Oh, those Greeks! They knew how to live. What is required for that is to stop courageously at the surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance, to believe in forms, tones, words, in the whole Olymps of appearance. Those Greeks were superficial - out of profundity.

The events of thought are mapped as actualities through the invention /articulation of points or intensities on the immanent surfaces of words and things. If these points come from the outside it is only as a doubling, a hollowing out of the outside which is "always concerned with showing how the Other, the Distant, is also the Near and the Same." The Order of Things had already demonstrated the extent to which the unthought resides as a double at the heart of thought and we had to wait for Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality for a conception of the immanent strategies that produced these variable configurations. The 'abstract machine' produces a synthesis of these configurations and a history of the problematics of thought becomes possible.
Foucault puts before us, in his last books, a realignment and reconnection of these configurations through the possibility of thinking the constitution of the self as the unthought subject of desire, the unthought inside as an affective, immanent practice of the outside. The problematic unthought gives way to a thinking being that problematises itself in the immanence of the outside. The "historical ontology of ourselves" or "the genealogy of the subject" projected through sexual experience will "take into account the interaction" of the technologies of domination and of the self "where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself. And conversely, he has to take into account the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion or domination." It is in this double articulation or fold of the outside that Foucault will construct an interiority of thought, "an inside deeper than any interior", the mobile and everchanging site for the application of the outside to oneself, the wager (dangerous and joyful) of 'inventing' oneself through an experience that is 'not yet' or 'no longer' possible. As the final figure in Foucault's topological being of thought it is an attempt to invent an immanent freedom of thinking-otherwise in the inside of the outside.

1. Interior surfaces of the self

In all cases, and perhaps from the beginning, an inside is created that has nothing to do with traditional 'philosophical' interiority, an inside that is an infolding of the outside. The aleatory outside, a 'virtuality' or immanence adjacent to an inside composition is formed from the enunciable and the visible and the powers that traverse them. Equally, the
enunciable and the visible and the powers that embody them are informed by a virtual outside in a reciprocal relation producing endlessly continuous variations; "it resembles exactly the invagination of a tissue in embryology." Functions abstracted from form and substance are differentiated and actualized through the surfaces of visibilities and statements ensuring that the contact between surfaces has properties that the surfaces do not contain in essentia. The materials and strata constituting the surfaces are differentiated not only from each other but also from the Fold of the outside which in turn enables the articulation between the surfaces to take place on the basis of their difference.

The 'self' in Foucault appears as a series of nodes or lines articulated across these impersonal or neutral surfaces within the action of the fold of the outside, a series of relational vectors of virtual force and matter upon which the process of subjectivation inscribes itself.

I will call subjectivization the procedure by which one obtains the constitution of a subject, or more precisely, of a subjectivity which is of course only one of the given possibilities of organization of self-consciousness.

Subjectivation here names the process or operation of active folding, folding the material of the self into new forms of individuation, another possible organization of self-consciousness. This technology of the self- folding operations of force actually produces thought and makes subjectivity possible. Subjectivity and thought are born as a heterogeneous and co-functioning matrix produced out its own self-iterative processes. The surfaces of the self are composed of immanent, moving relational lines, lines of enoncés and visibilities, lines of force and lines of subjectivation. All these lines are entangled in
differential patterns of movement, diverging and pullulating, determined by the immanent topological conditions of each historical Diagram. On each occasion, the Foucauldian topologist maps the immanent conditioned and conditioning effects of these relational lines and the complex iterational paths and trajectories they pursue. Each path contains folds that create complex anisotopic spaces where orbits become discontinuous and unpredictable. Universal and 'apodictic' conditions become displaced and 'problematic', bound to specific historical dispositifs and the forms of self they make possible.

Foucault’s interiority of thought links up with the archival and cartographic research into the repetition and iteration of enonces and visibilities and the events of power/knowledge they embody. Unfolding the multiplicitous lines of power and subjectivation in order to map their 'regulated exchanges' with the apparatuses of knowledge. Foucault's analyses of the self elaborate an epistemological and ontological interior folded across an immanent dimension of thought; "the archaeological dimension of the analysis made it possible to examine the forms themselves; its genealogical dimension, enabled me to analyze their formation out of the practices and the modifications undergone by the latter." 12 These analyses form a series in a line of analyses that places the spaces of the epistemological (strata) and the ontological (fold) into an immanent topological relation. For Foucault it is "the operation of the art of living". 13 Lines of power from the outside are placed in conjunction with the line of the inside. Techniques of objectification are pleated, folded and doubled-up with processes of subjectivation. The line of the outside is folded onto itself in order to constitute the inside/outside - modes of subjectivation, self.
Foucault discovers in the Greeks a problematic moment when "it is not sufficient that force is exercised against other forces, or that it takes on the effect of other forces, it also has to be exercised on the self, itself." 14 The outside is folded against the inside along a series of 'optional' practices involved in the relation of self to self. Subjectivation: "to bend the line so that it comes back upon oneself." 15 The historical analysis of the production of subjectivation allows the possibility of envisaging different ways of living, of constructing a space to reevaluate ('problematize') the self constructions that are given and open new lines to the outside, creating a proliferation and profusion of becomings, the actualization of virtual multiplicities of the self. For Foucault and Deleuze this is both the practical and theoretical question of thought/philosophy:

up to what point can we unfold the line without falling into an unbreakable void, into death, and how to fold it without nonetheless losing contact with it, in order to constitute it as an inside co-present with an outside, applicable to the outside? 16

Subjectivation is a process (joyful and dangerous) of moving, bifurcating lines maintained in the immanence of the outside, it is a 'tool kit' for an encounter with what it is not yet and no longer possible for us to be. (It is in the problem of maintenance, ie, care in folding, and the efficacy of the tool kit, ie, will it access 'our' problems in a new way, that the whole of Foucault's politics of the self resides.) Subjectivation enables a reconfigured relation to self (what can we know? What can we be? etc.) through the endless application of the outside to oneself; it is a "refusal of what we are", an effort to "get free from oneself" and 'think otherwise.' 17
The self is "not a substance; it is a form and this form is not above all or always identical to itself." 18 The forms of the self are continually entering into differing relations, overlapping, folding and cutting through one another: "In each case, we play, we establish with one's self some different form of relationship". 19 The self can be stretched, bent, folded, refolded and unfolded. The self is multiply layered and multiply levelled, embedded within accumulated 'deposits' of strata or 'sedimentary beds'. The historical specificity of the formations of the self is derived from how the visible and the expressible produce and stratify these sedimentations but also how some 'particles' (energies, forces, sensations) or lines ("points, knots, focuses") repulse or resist singular stratifications, attempt to destratify or become attached to different lines of attraction. The self is connective (a line), conjunctive (parallel surfaces) and disjunctive (a bundle of trajectories bifurcating in all directions). The point is to carefully fold the self in order to move toward the outside, in order to better intervene in the processes of subjectivation.

The processes and actions of interweaving and involution, inflection and doubling best describe the relations through which the lines and surfaces of the self can be reconstituted in another form of subjectivation. These processes condition the possibility of escaping fixed subject positions constituting a model of individuation without an individual: "subjectification as process is personal or collective individuation, in relation to one or to many." 20 Subjectivation produces individuated subjectivities that do not coalesce into any fixed subject.
The folding of lines is an individuated construction of the inside and the outside, lines which are also articulated onto other dimensions, 'political', 'ethical' and epistemological, etc, but which are reconfigured in the process. Folding the self absolutely scrambles any dichotomy of interior self and exterior social. The practices of the self are bound up with and knotted into the political: "being occupied with one self and political activities are linked." 21 "Taking care of the self" (subjectivation), as opposed to "knowing thyself" (subjection), involves practices which construct a relation to oneself by detaching forces from their inscription in any collective political network (conceived as the just regulation of the state) and turning or folding them against themselves, and reinscribing them within a transfigured politics. Within this folding lies the possibility of a thousand new selves.

what we have to think are qualities or quantities rather than intentions; longitude or latitude rather than depth; rather moments of individuation than species and kinds; and thousand masked subjects, thousand I's dissolved, thousand passivities and chaos where yesterday there used to rule the sovereign subject. 22

2. Greek Foldings

Foucault's work on the self leaves no privileged space for the 'ethical.' The ethics of the self ("The genealogy of the subject as a subject of ethnical actions" 23) as a series of moving relational lines that are continually displaced in a form of 'problematisation', a problematisation of ethical space itself which opens up the space of a problem, and gives it a history, a "history of thought." The self as a node or fold of force links up a "historical ontology of ourselves" at a profound level, with Foucault's topologies of forms of knowledge and relations of power making the production of a history of thought an action of resistance to the knowledge, power and selves sedimented in
the present. Ethical space is one axis of a problematisation of thought within the "history of systems of thought" which emerges with the Greeks.

For the Greeks it is the invention of a "relation to oneself" (rapport a soi) as a unique dimension, derived from power and knowledge but irreducible to them. There is a 'self-constitution' that is derived from codes that give the rule to knowledge and a form of 'enkrateia', a relation to oneself that "is a power that one brought to bear on oneself in the power that one exercised over others." 24 This principle of "internal regulation," a domination of oneself is a hinge, a fold or a doubling of the domination of others. Selves are constituted through a differentiation and folding from the code and are no longer dependent upon it.

This relation of 'enkrateia' between 'free agents' operating through an 'aestheticised' sexuality places a form of subjectivisation in Greek man. For Foucault, the Greeks invert the outside into a new inside space of a relation to oneself that must be sewn through sexuality. Knowledge/power relations continue to bubble away on the surface permanently communicating with forms of subjectivity through struggle and composition but subjectivisation is continually being redrawn elsewhere even as it unfolds and merges with the 'codes and rules' of knowledge/power.

In Foucault's diagram of the interiority of Greek thought, the Greeks were able to bend force, double it back on itself through a set of practices or exercises "that enabled one to govern oneself." These
exercises become detached from relations of power and the strata of knowledge when "free agents" enter into 'agonistic relations'. The 'agonism' of freedom that Foucault constantly alludes to results in the Greek invention of an 'aesthetics of existence' which is always determined and composed within a sexuality that folds it and doubles it back into an "institutional and social system." But subjectivation as the constantly changing process of the relation to oneself never simply becomes a product of systems of power and knowledge. Subjectivation is always reborn and takes off elsewhere, always "beneath the codes and rules" of knowledge and power. The self is created and recreated on each occasion on the basis of the folds that subjectivise knowledge and bend power relations.

Foucault reconstructs a problematic interiority of Greek ethical thought, a rapport a soi, that emerges in the breaks, fractures and folds of power/knowledge relations. The interiorisation of the outside would constitute an "affective and relational virtuality" through the "diagonal line" it would trace in "the social fabric." Foucault "encloses the outside", envelopes and enfolds it in an interiority of thought that is irreducible to knowledge/power relations and yet remains historically variable, a constitutive dynamic in continuous variation. Subjectivation continually folds and refolds its own topological structures, twisting 'somewhere else' through its involvements with power/knowledge surfaces. New surfaces continue to sediment, stratify and bifurcate according to each level of strata and the 'internal organisation' they exhibit. The 'dissipation' of internal structure or subjectification continues as if all on its own, or rather according to
the roll of the dice, or the set of power/knowledge relations
reconstructed from chance/necessity. ("The dice-throw does in fact
express the the simplest possible force relation, the one established
between particular features arrived at by chance" 26). The forces of
subjectivation are "concerned less with a form than an energy; less with
a presence than an intensity, less with a movement and an attitude that
with an agitation, of a trembling that is contained only with
difficulty." 27 'Energy,' 'intensity', 'agitation' and 'trembling'
"contained only with difficulty" are, first of all, forces of the
outside that are actualised through a differentiation and
internalization into the orders of subjectivation; it is "when the
outside collapses and attracts interiority" 28 that the forces of
subjectivation are shuffled about into new combinations. They are
doubled and knotted into an interior, an interior whose 'difficulty'
constantly threatens its own displacement. This displacement begins
"with an erosion from outside, from that space which is, for thought, on
the other side." 29 It is the "interior of the exterior and
inversely" 30 that we had already discovered in the madness book. The
'difficulty' or 'problematic' as Foucault comes to call it of this space
is a differentiation or division along a four-fold axis or relation that
is rapport a soi.

The fourfold knot

Foucault's last books pursue the immanent topology or non-linear
dynamics of the forces of the outside and their actualization through
the process of subjectivation offering an archaeology/genealogy
/problematization of lines and chains with their 'partial linkages' and their formation and transformation into knots of the self. For Foucault there are four great knots or foldings in the lines of the self.

The first knot is directly related to the folds of materiality - "it topologises the materiality of the body." 31 The variable entanglements of the materiality of the self amount for the Greeks to a relation between the body and its pleasures: the 'aphrodisia.' For the Christians it will be 'flesh' and 'desire' and their relation, a completely different modality of subjectivation. For modernity the 'substance' or materiality which is 'problematically' different from flesh and aphrodisia would be 'sexuality.' Sexuality is the problematic ethical substance of modern societies linked to the liberation of desire, the devaluation of acts and the elision of pleasure. For the Greeks it is precisely the regulation and management of the forces of desire, acts and pleasure as the singular experience of aphrodisia (eating and sex present the same problems!). For Foucault the issue of these material folds or lines of substance lies precisely in the extent to which they continue to inform and subject "who we are" (Greek, Christian, etc), when our problems are no longer the same, closing off new processes of subjectivation and restricting different relations to self.

The second knot in the 'being of the chain' of subjectivation is the "mode d'assujettissement", the fold of the relation between forces according to a particular rule. The fold of the relation involves particular categories of power, depending on the diagram one is dealing with, which bend back the forces in question into a relation to oneself. The categories of force or power relation will be different on each
occassion and the infolded rule (aesthetic, natural, divine, rational, etc) will determine how it gets "a hold on our selves." The mode of subjection "provides the linkage between the moral code and self." The "linkage", then, is constituted and reconstituted thorough variable lines of force which are folded through variable lines of coding creating a 'knotted interior'- a form of subjection. Foucault indicates that for the Greeks the politico-aesthetic mode was an existential choice, not to choose to truly be ones true self (Sartrian authenticity) but to choose "to build our existence as a beautiful existence", to choose an "aesthetics of existence".

The third knot of the fold concerns "the means by which we can change ourselves in order to become ethical subjects." This asceticism or self-formation involves the fold of knowledge and truth in that through a specific working over of the strings of problematic ethical material a relation between truth or knowledge and being is constituted. This is the condition for any knowledge, a subjectivation of knowledge and truth that is in continuous variation. The practices of self-formation offer possibilities of reconstituting the self as a "transformable singularity", of freeing ourselves from ourselves through practices that challenge (problematize) "the evidence on which our knowledge, our consent and our practices are based."

The fourth knot concerns the fold of the outside itself "what might be called the telos of the ethical subject" where the subject hopes for death or detachment, salvation or immortality, "which is the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way." It is here, as Blanchot says, that Foucault encloses the outside in an "interiority of
expectation." If the Greeks folded the outside into a telos of self mastery in order to obtain power over the other Foucault demonstrates how this knot is retied through the introjection of a telos of rationality (one masters oneself because one is rational) and, later, of immortality (no longer tied to mastery but renunciation). A genealogy of the interior expectations of thought as a fold of the outside.

We have to maintain all at once the complex relations between the pleats, their circular and looping mechanisms through the immanent space of the self that they create on each occasion and a "certain kind of independence" that gives each fold its temporality, rhythm and structure. Foucault's last books map the folds of the self through their "succession of partial relinkings" and their formation and transformation into knots of 'self evidence.' It is through these epistemological knots with their lines of power and resistance that "being offers itself to be thought." 40

The Use of Pleasure, then, does not discover or rediscover the subject but extends its derivation from an assignable position within the statement to an immanent derivation from the outside, which was always contemporary and adjacent to it in The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge as the 'something else', something like it but not on the level of the statement. This 'something else' that is like the statement and enables its articulation are the forces of the outside, forces which are captured by relations of power and forms of knowledge but equally forces which actualise themselves in a fold of subjectivation which differentiates itself from these systems creating a relation to oneself as a source of resistance.
Foucault's version of the Greek doubling is, then, the development of an independent ascetics, a double differentiation "distinct from the ethical conduct that was its objective" \(^{41}\) that is a folding and mastery of the self in relation to others. And this relation of self-mastery does not presuppose that there has to be something originary to be mastered. What masters and what is mastered are differential effects of the relation of self-mastery. The self relation is produced or constructed on each occasion through its folds and positions within the relational field of subjectivation. An 'aesthetic' relation to the outside constitutes the self through the folds of subjectivation that place the relation of self-mastery as the constitutive form of Greek self-invention.

In the Greek diagram that Foucault invents in The Use of Pleasure the forces of attraction and repulsion that constitute the field through which subjectivation takes place are aesthetic forces: Beauty and ugliness, contemptibility and ignominity in relation to moderation and excess, activity and passivity (rather than docility and utility through normalisation, the law etc). The line of the self is bent or folded through practices which give style to ones existence through an aestheticization of the outside rather than a disciplinary model which produces the self through the internalisation of a normative and prescriptive power that controls individuals in space and time based on binary disjunction (good and bad, healthy and pathological, normal and abnormal, mad and sane etc). This folding of the lines of the self traverse the Greeks use of pleasures and the problem will be to determine precisely how sexuality becomes the site for the enactment of the relation to oneself that is detached and differentiated from alimentary conditions. (This is dealt with as a problem of 'dietetics,' 'economics' and 'erotics.' \(^{42}\)
Foucault will articulate the differing relations to the self, their continuously variable foldings and the historical possibilities of thinking otherwise within these folds through a strategy of problematization, an immanent practice of thought that will demonstrate the conditions that enable a specific, historical and transformable interior fold to develop in relation to the forces of the outside. It is through the extension of the problematization of the non-originary and historical relation to self constructed through the fold of the outside that Foucault will utilize the Greek diagram "not for but in terms of a contemporary situation" 43, and it is in the extension of the analysis made in terms of problematization that Foucault will link the relation of self and sexuality to a history of thought whose task is "to define the conditions in which human beings 'problematize' what they are, what they do and the world in which they live." 44

3. The space-time of problematic thought.

Problematization makes a history of thought possible: how did the problems of the self become an object of forms of knowledge and strategies and techniques of power? and how have these problems been transformed and modified in relation to different forms of knowledge and different strategies of power? (how has self relation, problematized through aesthetic practice become a problem of normalization "subject to someone else through control and dependence"? 45). On each occasion the outside is folded according to particular practices that gives problematization its specific historical form. It is not a question of problematizing the given so much as problematizing how it is possible
for something to be given. The history of thought as rapport a soi is thus a conception of how self-experience enters and exits thought, of how the inside is transformed through the fold of the outside, of how certain forms of experience (madness, crime, sex, etc.) are made possible, problematized and transformed on the basis of forms of knowledge, strategies of power and techniques of self.

The history of thought as a history of problematizations is an open field of becoming that is seeking to give "a new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the still undefined work of freedom". The undefined work of freedom is the becoming and thinking otherwise of thought in the present, the problematization of "who we are today" since we are no longer greek or christian. The history of problematic thought thus serves as a way "of thinking the past as it is condensed in the inside, in the relation to oneself, ..(and to) ..then think the past against the present, and resist the latter, not in favour of a return, but 'in favour, I hope, of a time to come'. (Nietzsche)". 

Problematisation is, then, an "affirmative thought whose instrument is disjunction". An affirmative thought of the present would be a thought of multiple difference, "of the nomadic and dispersed multiplicity that is not limited or confined by the constraints of similarity". Foucault opens up the space of different subjectivities, of new and intensive subjectivities by operating the disjunctive instrument that separates the lines and folds of the self, multiplies their possibilities through problematization and then disperses them nomadically along differential trajectories; it is thought "as intensive irregularity, disintegration of the subject".
The thought of problematisation is a disjunctive practice that addresses a "multiplicity of exceptional points, which are displaced as we distinguish their conditions, and which insist and subsist in the play of repetitions". We must not think the possibilities of subjectivization in the present by questioning and answering dialectically; by thinking the history of the self problematically the processes of subjectivation can be made visible as a specific and diverse practice of the outside, a response or set of temporary solutions that do not "assume a unique form that is the direct result or the necessary expression of these difficulties" but show how a specific set of relations may become a singularly transformable object of thought.

The disentangling of the lines and knots of the apparatus of subjectivisation frees up spaces for a new relation to self, a thinking otherwise about the processes of subjectivation. Problematisation functions as that component part that directly activates the mechanism of the fold, constructing a line to the outside that does not yet exist, making "something other" enter the real. Problematisation denotes:

the set of discursive and non-discursive practices that makes something enter into the play of the true and the false and constitutes it into an object of thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analyses.

Difference.

Problematic space is traversed by lines of difference that the cartographer/specific intellectual maps as they enter into the play of the true and the false, constituting a new object for thought. In
mapping the lines of difference in processes of subjectivation (greek, christian) Foucault produces maps of the self that bifurcate with history and relay analysis with other roads. These maps offer the possibility of thinking otherwise about modes of subjectivation in the present, of problematizing our folds since they are always the temporary and variable effect of resistance before they are integrated into systems of knowledge and codes of power. Each time the subject is produced through differential lines that constitute a matrix of relations of power/knowledge. Lines of subectification and lines of power/knowledge are non-linear and differentiated, they are not originary but function within a field or topology of relations. The emergence of lines of subjectification and lines of power/knowledge within this space of a relational field is itself a product of those relations which are constantly switching connections, investing and redeploying elsewhere.

The differential space of problematization in Foucault’s interiority of thought is the last form of the ‘space of dispersion’ that runs through all of Foucault’s work. It is another device of immanence that opens little spaces of freedom to the outside, that connects and reconnects with the archaeological and genealogical planes of Foucault’s thought. It is an imageless thought that makes something enter truth, resist it and change it.

Foucault’s texts produce the possibility of new subjectivations, new ways of producing the self by intensifying the need for transformation in the present through the problematisation of the existing space of subjectivisations. Problematisation displaces those practices
(confession, discipline, normality) that constitute a given 'rapport a
soi' in the present (what we are ceasing to be) by opening up their
'self-evidences' (which tie self relation to "identity by conscience or
self-knowledge) and attaching them to their problematized and differential
'conditions of emergence.' The problematic space that Foucault fashions
for the practices of saying and seeing and the power-strategies that run
through them that construct the apparatus of subjectivation "makes
something enter into the play of the true and false," it makes difference
by opening a space to think otherwise about the self in the time of the
not yet, of thinking new possibilities of subjectivation through new games
of truth. Problematic space is a space of freedom and difference that
actualises the possibility of thinking otherwise. It is within this space
of possibility (the not yet of the outside) and within these new games of
truth that the self may transform itself and attain a different "mode of
being", a mode of being in which the practices of the self would allow
"these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination". 54

Equally, it makes the "future formation of a 'we' possible" not by placing
oneself in any "of the 'we's' whose consensus, whose values, whose
traditions constitute the framework for a thought and define the
conditions in which it can be validated" 55, but by problematizing whether
"it is actually suitable to place oneself within a 'we' in order to assert
the principles and the values one accepts... Because it seems to me that
the 'we' must not be previous to the question; it can only be the result-
and the necessarily temporary result- of the question as it is posed in
the new terms in which one formulates it". 56 Problematization constructs a
relation to a 'we' we are no longer in order to open the question of who
we are today to the actual possibility of what we are becoming, of what we
are not yet, of what difference we are in the process of becoming.
The space of problematisation intensifies the 'need' for displacement, difference and transformation within the apparatus of subjectivisation but it does not propose solutions. "I am not looking for an alternative," he says, "rather I would like to do a genealogy of problems, of problematics." 57 The genealogy of problems would analyse those "techniques which permit individuals to affect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, their own souls, their own thought, their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves." 58

Distance.

Problematisation presupposes a 'distancing' from the sedimentation of axiomatic practices and procedures that determine who we are by creating the conditions for transformations, modifications and displacements in who we are becoming. The problematization of the self then, finds that it is traversed by lines of difference (singularities, multiplicities, active forces, the fold, segments etc) that are subjected to unifying principles and transcendent structures. The activity of problematization springs lines of difference from any 'illusion of transcendence' and folds 'height' and 'depth' into a 'positive' distance:

The idea of positive distance belongs to topology and to the surface. It excludes all depth and all elevation, which would restore the negative and identity. 59

Positive distancing is neither opposition to or negation of existing self-relation but the production of immanent thought without foundation or identity. The practice of problematisation offers a history of thought and the possibility of thinking otherwise. Thought is freedom in the immanent distance of the outside:
Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem.⁶⁰

To think is to problematise, to displace, to transform, to experiment. 'Thought is Freedom' in the activity of problematising, displacing and distancing. Foucault's thought does not offer any 'ethics of liberation,' it practices a distancing and detachment opening up a 'non-place', a heterotopic space, a theatre of multiplicities, 'any space whatever' that can be used and inhabited to produce a genealogy of thought and new forms of subjectivation, a thinking otherwise about the relation of self and thought. The problematization of ethical thought (of the self in thought) finds that processes of subjectivation are always dangerous. "My point", he says, "is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous there is always something we can do."⁶¹

Problematization is a hyperactive exposee of the dangers of subjectivation and in exposing these dangers opens little "spaces of freedom" to the outside, spaces of "care" in folding and for thinking otherwise. Knowledge, power and subjectivation are the triple root of the dangers of problematic thought through which being is given:

It was a matter of analyzing...the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought- and the practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed.⁶²

The apparatus of thought in Foucault, as a problematization of the practices of knowledge, power and self is an attempt to ascertain "to what extent the effort to think ones own history can free thought from
what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently,"\textsuperscript{63} in order to invent new practices of individuation and collective subjectivation, new practices of thought.

In the problematization and thinking otherwise of thought, through the difference and distance of problematic space, force is folded into the active creation of the new. For Foucault/Deleuze the new is the tension between the historical and the actual, the movement between what we are (no longer) and what we are becoming, between the not yet and the no longer. It is what Nietzsche called:

\begin{quote}
the unseasonable, the uncontemporary, the becoming which bifurcates with history, the diagnostic which relays analysis with other roads.
\end{quote}

The new is the becoming-other of thought, its problematic resides in the need to locate for each system or apparatus, each map or diagram lines of breakage or fracture, lines of light and lines of enunciation, lines of force and lines of subjectivation. Problematization:

\begin{quote}
does not establish the fact of our identity by the play of distinctions. It establishes that we are difference, that our reason is the difference of discourses, our history the difference of times, our selves the difference of masks.\textsuperscript{63}
\end{quote}

Problematic space establishes that we are difference through the affirmation of surfaces which are always in the process of becoming, practices that are purely relational and constituted in connectable, open and transformable series. The constitution of topological series dissipates negativity and identity by bestowing on surfaces (the practices of knowledge, power and self) an immanent differential ontology which is irreducible and not derivative or determined from something.
secondary or lying outside them. The problematic space of interwoven
distances and folded differences produces connections between its
constituent parts allowing a line of subjectivation to develop which
supports the archaeological/genealogical effort of making visible lines of
fracture and breakage.

Rapport a soi (the body of thought)

This problematic and problematizing thought of the inside of the
outside, then, first of all concerns forces and their differential
relations: with what forces of the outside will thought come into
contact with, what forms will be produced and synthesised as a result of
this 'power relation' which is 'introjected' through practices creating
a rapport a soi. With what other forces will the rapport a soi come
into contact with forcing a 'problematisation' of those practices. On
each occasion thought is 'complicated' by force, made to depart from an
established path and a 'self-evident' image, forced 'outside' into a
whole new series of impure mixtures.

The fold of the outside makes thinking otherwise possible. The outside
is the condition for the existence of the interiority of thought. There
is nothing necessary or universal about the outside, it does not create
the conditions for the possibility of thought but produces the real
conditions of its existence through a historical and therfore
transformable problematic. In a passage from the Use of Pleasure
Foucault states that the rapport a soi explains thought and philosophy;
thought is constituted through a fold in the outside actualising an
interior life of the concept through various historical practices. The
rapport a soi is:
the living body of philosophy, at least if this latter is still now what it was in the past, that is an ascesis, an exercise of oneself, in thought. 68

The rapport a soi rather than a form of self-reflection is a permanently activated mechanism of inflection such that the forces that produce it are acts, original actions of the fold. These actions are "not behaviours, nor ideas, nor societies, or their 'ideologies', but the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought and the practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed." 67

The problematisation of thought, the 'clinamen' that swerves thought away from the 'self- evident' is always an affect of a bending of forces according to the practices in question. The folding of the forces of the outside creates a relation to oneself, an "ascesis", an activity of thought homologous to the relation with the outside. The rapport a soi is the anorganic life of thought, the abstract line of force (the inside of the outside) that keeps the living body of philosophy alive through an infinite becoming. The rapport a soi is not the progressive maturation of the body of thought (the model of the living organism) but the non-organic life of thought in between, the exercise or "working of thought upon itself" 68 that is continually begun again, that "always grows up from the midst", bifurcating and diverging. The rapport a soi is the immanent freedom of thought, the becoming other of thought that keeps it alive.

"it was a philosophical exercise. The object was to learn to what extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently." 69

Thought presents its own history, problematises its past through lines of 'breakage and fracture' in the present separating us from what we can
no longer say or see. The past is made actively present to the outside and accession, the possibility of 'thinking otherwise', of thinking the impossible not yet recurs: "it is the straight line of the future that repeatedly cuts the smallest width of the present, that indefinitely recuts it starting from itself." 70 Foucault will go on to say that it is less like a cut than a "constant fibrillation." These are the means by which "being can and must be thought." 71 The rapport a soi returns in thought as a repetition of difference, a history of thought as "a difference of times" continually dividing the present:

and the present- split by this arrow of the future that carries it forward by always causing its swerving on both sides - endlessly recurs.

The rapport a soi is the endless recurrence of the question of thought, each time displaced, the swerve of the being of thought- the eternal present forgotten yet retained in the outside, the doubling of the present as the memory of the past: the impossibility of return, the necessity of recommencement au milieu. This between time, a gap of dead time is the 'history of the present' "where one sees time as still to come and already arrived". 73 The space-time of problematic thought is the folding of the outside, and, as such, forces every present into forgetting, but conserves every past in memory, forgetting as the impossibility of return, and memory as the necessity of renewal.

The eternal return of the rapport a soi as a fold in the memory of the outside "is the real name of the relation to self, or the affect on self by self". 75 It is the question of thought in an eternally displaced present. The question of our thought today, for Foucault, is the question of what it is possible for us to know, with what powers must we
struggle and through what folds must we resist: what is our rapport a
soi today? What subjectivations are possible for us today? These are the
questions of our actuality, of what is actual in our thought:

This question is very different from what we call the traditional
philosophical questions: what is the world? what is man? how can we
know something? and so on. The question, I think, which arises at
the end of the eighteenth century is: what are we in our actuality? 76

The Greek image of thought, with its complementarity between the city and
Euclidean geometry is now a 'distant memory.' If Euclidean knowledge
functioned as the abstract machine for the relations between power, space
and time in the Greek city (perhaps until our recent past?), then Foucault
will show the extent to which we are no longer Greek, but becoming
something else, and there can be no return. This something else (our
actuality) is governed by an image of thought dependent upon a non-linear
geometry, an abstract machine that organises power, space and time as
simultaneously individualising and totalising (Deleuze's 'societies of
control'), increasingly microscopic and macroscopic. But there are also
movements of change and transformation:

do we not perhaps above all bear witness to and even participate in
the 'production of a new subjectivity'? Do not the changes in
capitalism find an unexpected 'encounter' in the slow emergence of a
new self as a centre of resistance? Each time there is social change,
is there not a movement of subjective reconversion, with its
ambiguities but also its potential?

4. Non-linear geometries of the self

Foucault's interiority of thought as the immanent topology of the actual,
then, maps the processes of the self in the lines, points, intersections
and overlaps that appear in the practical exteriorities of statements
and visibilities and the forces that traverse them. Problematization
accesses our current problem (what are we today?) by demonstrating its genealogical conditions of possibility (the past in the inside) and opens that problem to transformation (the advent of the future in the outside) and brings them together in a struggle "at the limit of the living present", at the threshold of our actuality.

Foucault's 'torus' of thought - where inside and outside define two folded voids, internal and external - points to something actual in thought itself: an ab-sens, becoming or difference at the heart of thought, asymptotic lines meeting and intertwining in the folded space-time of an "indefinite knot." Rather than knowledge (strata) filling an immobile subject container with itself as content, one finds the 'Borromean chain' operating the self as linkages, co-joinings, relations of separate orderings of different kinds of material in their "relation of non-relation." The radical function of the fold, void or difference at the heart of this structure - a palpable density, a cutting, an involution, a compacity between unities - is that it prevents the totalisation, recognition or representation of any stable form, destroying all fixed, foundational identitarian positions. There is no return, only the continual re-activation of certain linkages in the chain, a memory of their forgetting. In the field of genealogy an activity of force or a power relation appears at the edges of cuts and folds made by separations that created knowledge in the first place, in cuts that constitute the distinction between statements and visibilities and the forces running through them. What Lacan said about his own work is even more apposite of Foucault:
I am trying to constitute another geometry, which would deal with the being of a chain. It has never, never been done. This geometry is not imaginary; contrary to the one of triangles, it is real; it is knots of string.

Foucault’s 'historical ontologies' of the self presuppose practices and strategies for refolding or retying the knots of the self in an outside element that will not permanently unravel or unfold the self (the forgetting of forgetting, death) but attach it to features of becoming and chance through lines of power and resistance that recreate, reknot and refold the self allowing a relation to oneself to emerge that is homologous to the relation with the outside. The knots of the self are topologically linked with the outside through the epistemic or stratic dimension (statements/visibilities) which function on each occasion as an intermediary, a go-between, an integrative mechanism continually producing new subjectivites. Some subjectivities will drift and fade, their power to act extracted and returned to them in the form of docility and subjection. Others will flourish in their capacity to attach themselves to other knots and lines developing their ability to resist and refuse capture, utilising resources from other spaces, reconstituting themselves in the "centre of cyclone." Foucault’s analysis offers the possibility of a moving, fluid, immanent typology of self-formations: The nobles, slaves, madmen, hermits, the bad, sinners, heretics, monastic communities, etc all invented and actualized through forms of subjectivisation that at one point offered potential resistance only to be assimilated and produced at other points elsewhere as part of powers deployment. What must be reconstructed on each occasion is the relation between the codes of behaviour and forms of subjectivation. Thus, for example, christian moralities must not be reduced simply to a 'pastoral' coding of behaviour. One must also take
into consideration the "many spiritual movements" that reacted against this coding. Between the code and practices of the self there are always "juxtapositions, rivalries and conflicts, and compromises." There is a history of individual and collective subjectivations.

Thus, the self as synthetic matrix is assembled simultaneously in the register of the larger matrices (multiplicities) of power/knowledge but also irreducibly within the topological spaces left vacant by those forms (singularities), i.e. in the subjectivations affect of force on force, a power to affect itself and not just in the relation that forces have in affecting other forces or being affected by them (codifications). Thus, the basic force to act necessarily involves an action upon oneself, 'an action upon an action' which is self-action. Self-action is an attempted synthesis with the outside, a disjunctive synthesis with the outside in the self. The self, then, emerges in Foucault's texts as a fluctuating meta-stable entity whose contours change as discrete components are shuffled through different combinations and into different configurations. We have already seen that knowledge/power regimes encode a folding and refolding of striated and strategic elements which traverse, connect and reconnect with a radical exteriority and an immanent outside. The final figure or dimension that Foucault offers for thought revolves around the possibilities of subjectivating the outside, an operation of subjectivity that interiorises the outside, makes it proliferate and multiply into a potentially unlimited set of combinations. Subjectivating the outside discloses "not so much what gives beings their foundation as what bears them for an instant towards a precarious form".
The relations between knowledge and power and self open up a constantly folding interior of space-time, an involution of the curves and lines between these entities since the boundaries are fractal and interpenetrate and fold through one another in complex ways unrepresentable in conventional (Euclidean) spatial terms. Thus the interactions between statements and visibilities, forces and forms that constitute knowledge/power regimes enable the production of a remainder, a difference that differs only from itself which permanently reconfigures the interiorisation of space. Borne along for an instant towards a precarious form, the differential relation to oneself is "continually reborn, elsewhere and otherwise." 82

Surface-folds (intensive/extensive)

Force affects itself, differs from itself and this self-activity functions through space, flowing across scales from genetic mapping at a microbiological level where self-organising processes refold DNA coding mechanisms to the tracking of the large-scale flow of galaxies at a cosmological level, from the endocolonisation of the body to the exocolonisation of the cosmos: the world as the immanence of the fold. Foucault takes us on a journey to the interior where the self is assimilated to a complex and everchanging space of subjectivation and any distinction between an interior organism or system and an external environment breaks down as it changes in nature, is invaded and perforated by a singular form that folds its possibilities into itself. And this is not a static or immobile determination but a constantly folding and interconnected immanent 'matrix of transformation.'
Surface-incursions.

This differentiated and differentiating matrix of interiority, the inside of the outside as "the differentiator of the differends", an infinite ('endlessly reflexive') series of passages, caverns, labyrinths or surfaces plunged into the undifferentiated outside are indeed 'univocal' (non-individual singularity) but also multivalent, self-embedded and discontinuous (a multiplicity), an agglomeration of fold upon fold of self-similar surfaces produced by 'bundles of trajectories.' These trajectories are the abstract dynamics of the outside that move around self-other positions reconfiguring their space, melting the scaling mechanisms that fix the interiority of selves.

The vertiginous or dizzying effect of these transversal movements is, then, locked into an immanent topology, a topology of knowledge and power, of selves and subjectivation that essentially differs from itself in its incursions in or on this space. The linkage between words/things, subjectivity and space constantly changes in accordance with the emergency of new topologies of force: their 'semiotic' structure is above all a topological function. Lines of light and lines of the enunciable, lines of force and lines of subjectivisation function together as oscillators, effectors, tensors and nodes in a signifying or semiotic regime: a moving dispositif of subjectification. The dynamic of the regime is structured by stretching, squeezing and folding actions that interweave all the lines together in a composite space that realigns its own constitutive points in a 'simulation' or 'memory' of its own initial conditions. Statements become folded and foldable matter, etched to a point within visible strata.
It is through memory that Foucault thinks the self as a topological structure of time. And this structure is thought as a non-linear, discontinuous iteration, an orbit traced by the discrete value of constitutive points, and the movement across scales. Each surface, with its own complex entanglements of scaled lines, knots, 'accumulations' and 'remanences' has "it's own particular index of temporal 'viscosity'" that functions as a distribution network for the folds of the self. The final figure of Foucauldian space as an interiorisation of the outside reissues time as the dynamic immanent to the folding of spatial trajectories. There is thus in Foucault an oscillation, alternation or flickering through the spatialisation of time to the temporalisation of space: the endless folding of the no longer (the time of the past inside) into the not yet (the time of the future outside) in the struggle over the 'now', what we are in our actuality, a history of the present as the folding of thought in space-time.

The topological texture of time incorporates an interior and an exterior aspect (intensive/extensive time) that merge and interpenetrate. Time is both an iterative process that generates shifting parameters and movements across scales (past) through the interior of the actual, (the patternings of subjectivation in an enunciable/visible series), yet, 'internal time' is expressed as an 'outside' (future) in an immanence of the virtual as a bundle of criss-crossing trajectories. Time now
carries with it a three-fold relation involving the incursions of words/things, subjectivation and space (as practices of thought) on each iteration and also the folding of these iterations through recursion. Incursion marks the relation between words/things, subjectivation and space and recursion produces the time that traces the pathways of self-relation across the ‘living’. Individuation then becomes provisional or processual; a differential located at the seam dividing the stratified from the smooth space of the outside.

**Absolute memory**

When Deleuze names ‘absolute memory’ as the dimension that differentiates itself from and is irreducible to the dimensions of force relations and the forms of knowledge, he is referring to the function of folding and circling back which re-routes experiences or impressions into recursively connected loops. Memory operates through a system analogous to a recursive function in mathematics: a movement both forward and wrapping around itself where at the moment when looping back through reconnects with itself we arrive not at a coincidence of paths, or the full presence of consciousness but an internal, differential displacement against a system of meanings which could not be reconfigured as a dialectical move toward synthesis. Absolute memory mechanisms produce self-generating temporal loops that involute their own generative structure and the self becomes a forgetting retained in the fold of space-time - the memory of the outside, folded and displaced in the inside, the asignifying, non-presence of the outside paradoxically retained as a forgotten memory, the unthought self of thought that insists through a ‘non-relation’ in the present opening it to a thinking-otherwise.
Counter Memory.

Absolute memory is the space-time where 'counter memories' can be invented and actualised. The space of difference between absolute memory and counter-memory requires that the process of actualisation is a creation, a fiction. Absolute memory is the fold or splicing together of the archive and the diagram. It is the zone of the collision or 'battle', the 'atmospheric element' or 'non-stratified substance' that strategically articulates the practices of knowledge, power and self together. If absolute memory retains this outside, it is like a retention of forgetting, a fold of the past that is activated and reactivated by counter-memory: it "is the true name of the relation to self, or the affect of self by self". 86 'Counter-memory 'compels thinking to start again.' It traces out and fictions other lines of visibility and enunciation, other lines of force and lines of subjectivation. In its folding with absolute memory, counter-memory produces forms of subjectivation which escape from the powers and forms of knowledge only in order to be reinserted into another dispositif of subjectivation and self-relation which has yet to come into being. Counter-memory links and relinks with absolute memory by reinscribing the virtual back into a materiality, force and becoming of the self. Only counter-memory as a memory of forgetting, as the unfolding or unravelling of the memory of the outside "recovers what is folded in memory (and in the fold itself)". 87

The non-linear geometries of the self emerge as a fluctuating, metastable fold or relation of lines of force in space-time whose contours are constantly reworked as discrete components are shuffled about in different
combinations and configurations. Subjectivating self is, then, neither active or passive (neither determining the real through ideation nor receiving it through sensation) but a historically variable combination of relations of force that produce the real; it is an incursion of force in space-time that recursively folds into a machine capable of using this incursion, a practical and constantly problematising self that constitutes itself on a plane of consistency, an immanent, rhizomatic multiplicity without foundation, origin or end.

Fractal subjects

A number of recent discourses have deployed the metaphor of fractals. Fractals provide an appropriate metaphor for Foucault's idea of the self as subjectivating relation because they are structures without a centre; they are decentred forms immanent to and bound up with their own formative processes. Lyotard utilises this notion in characterising thought: "thoughts are clouds. The periphery of thoughts is as immeasurable as the fractal lines of Benoit Mandelbrot." The 'immeasurable periphery' captures some of the qualitative aspects of Foucauldian thought and subjectivation: boundaries are jagged yet edgeless and discontinuous within a single scale in a given series but also continuous in the self-activity of form across the scale of immanence. Thought is ruptured and fissured at one level yet takes on a distinctive shape of its own on a larger scale: the relation of singularities and multiplicities in the immanent plane of thought. Lyotard goes on to extend fractal thought to the element of time:
As postponement itself, time does not allow the full synthesis of the moments or positions the mind crossed through in approaching a cloud of thoughts, time is what blows a cloud away after we believed it was correctly known and compels thinking to start again on a new inquiry, which includes the anamnesis of former elucidations.

Lyotard's notion of (anti) anamnesis presents time as an indefinite yet irreversible process, a bank of clouds carried by the wind, forming through chaotic convections. This is an analogous description of Foucauldian/Deleuzian 'absolute memory/counter memory.' With the development of a memory of the outside in Foucault/Deleuze we can see the emergence of an encompassing topological ecology between knowledge, power and subjectivity: a series of symbiotic relationships which process the dynamic immanence and practical/functional ontology of Foucault's thought within the knowledge/power/subject matrix. They are continually interpenetrating and folding through one another in complex ways unrepresentable in conventional (euclidian) spatial terms because these entities (the relations between them) are fractal.

Foucault's knowledge, power, self matrix profoundly resonates with Guattari's "three ecologies" (socius, psyche, 'nature'). Guattari's 'new aesthetic paradigm' links knowledge, power and self together in its "individual, collective and institutional instances" as the conditions for the possibility of chaosmosis, the development of existential territories as an intensive repetition of difference, an immanent 'encounter' with the outside, a collective assemblage of thought.

Ultimately, the non-linear geometries of the self are articulated through the outside as the abstract line of thought, the line without contour, or shape - non-geometries - the imageless plane of life.
5. Self-Resistance: making the multiple

Forms of self-relation and processes of subjectivation are mapped each time in their continuous variations in relation to all the other variable lines that make up an apparatus, lines of strata (knowledge), lines of force (power), lines of flight (resistance): a moving, bifurcating dispositif of thought. Foucault shows that the thought of resistance to this apparatus is a problem of "transformable singularities" and heterotopic multiplicities. What exactly do we struggle against, in each situation, in order to "get free of oneself." This is the essential political dimension to subjectivation.

Subjectivation in its continuous variation and folding with the outside endorses the primacy of resistance:

there will always be a relation to oneself which resists codes and powers; the relation to oneself is even one of the origins of their points of resistance.

The self bends forces, make them relate to one another through practice and discipline, the site of resistance: the folded inside of an outside, an inside "that lies deeper than any interior world."

'Crossing the line' in Foucault involves constituting and sustaining the multiple as a force of resistance, lines of flight the force of which is found "in those sorts of particles endowed with an energy that is all the greater for their being small and difficult to spot." Foucault's vitalism or force of life is that 'point of departure' that leaves a microagitation, a micro-politics of life that is constantly on the move attempting to escape the great 'machines of capture.' The machines that make visible and enunciable always contain gaps and holes through which,
for a time, the micro may move triggering off other lines to form a concerted network. Yet each time the variable mixes have to be decomposed, broken down and then recomposed perhaps even according to 'aesthetic' criteria. Even at the macro level a few great binaries have managed to 'cleave the social fabric' opening up channels and nodes through which resistance might flow. Foucault admits that these have been few and that greater success may well be obtained at a more local or regional level since these levels can be attacked strategically in order to agitate the global, inflect it, and make it change its course. The point is not to complete a journey, arrive home, but to open new lines, allow them to proliferate, or at a certain points arrest their development, squeeze out their materiality, etch them to a spot. This would only be a necessarily temporary activity, certainly not 'free' of power, but a redistribution of its possibilities into the space of a 'permanent provocation,' the space of an immanent freedom of thought.

Foucault, then, has never said that geopolitical lines of power simply subsume and dictate the internal lives of people. Lines of power structure individual selves, but selves do not remain dependent upon these lines but develop their own action and movement refolding and 'hollowing out' these lines within the 'field of possible actions.' Foucault fictions out of the network a multi-dimensional space of resistance, a topology of possibilities through which new forces of subjectivation might emerge. The problem for Foucault right from the beginning has always been "one for the subject who acts - the subject of action through which the real is transformed." 95 The subject on each occasion is not 'given to us' but presupposes a basic force to act.
This force of action is relayed though points, lines, receptors, tensors and connectors which make up a matrix of power/knowledge regimes in continuous variation: subjectivating the outside.

In all of Foucault's books selves are mapped as a permanently contested set of coordinates, plastic, modulated forces channelled through singular points that function as ideal or abstract forces, informal and infinite metastable states which may be actualised and counter-actualised in various ways. The singular points of the practices of subjectivation relayed through the multiplicities of the outside. This immanent 'metaphysical surface' places statements and visibilities together, presents their relations of force and articulates them "on the basis of their difference." Thus two heterogeneous series of terms are produced and set in relation or resonance through a mobile and polyvalent outside. These supple mechanisms enable the mapping of the possible discursive and non-discursive spaces/sites where selves may emerge to be recognised or excluded.

The disjunctive multiplicities of the self are articulated, then, as the splitting between the virtual idea multiplicity and the actual individual multiplicity and their fusion, splicing or folding together. The self is suspended over the void, a virtual reservoir of matter/energy, the caesura of space-time, filled with oneself. The space between preindividual singularities and the full-fledged self filled with forces from the outside is actively inhabited by the mechanism of the fold which creates an interior. Folding through practical exercises or technologies of the self thus opens up a unique topological formation, an interior that has its own historical apriori's and conditions of emergence, its own possibilities of liberation and domination.
Foucauldian subjectivation thus functions as an irreducible assemblage articulated onto the other assemblages of power and knowledge. Subject-assemblages are formed and deformed through an unformed element dissipated through an arrangement of bodies and visibilities and an organisation of signs and enunciables. The unformed element or abstract machine registers only affects on bodies and words and the process through which they are reciprocally affected. On the one hand the subject assemblage faces the strata of knowledge and power which gives it the form of an organism, a signifying system locked into a striated space of interiority and on the other the subject assemblage faces a 'body without organs', flows of asignifying particles flooding the smooth space of the outside. Different subject assemblages are constituted on each occasion through 'capture' and the reciprocal interfacing with the outside. These articulations function together to produce the mechanism of the fold as subject: the outside as the 'membrane' of the inside, the molar as the 'torsion' of the molecular.

In all of Foucault's work 'subjectivation' is a process that links segments together, segments made up of energies, movements and capacities. The segments are assembled and 'produced' constituting together a temporary alignment of multiplicites. Foucault's cartography studies the activity of 'conduct,' 'conduction' in this process. Conduction does not produce permanent multiplicities, the stable, the self-same, the one. Conduct does not orchestrate the real through representation but constitutes it. Nietzsche's hypothesis ('my hypothesis: the subject as multiplicity') opposes the subject to ones or twos linking up the process of subject formation with dimensions in-between speeding up their proliferation. Above all "multiplicities are
defined by the outside," the conduction of multiplicities through an outside that ensures that their transformable potential is always actualised through their connections with other multiplicities. Foucauldian/Deleuzian subjectification is a process of becoming and multiplicity that can be disassembled into parts and segments and reassembled; unfolded and refolded into other immanent spaces that strategically offer more leverage in prizing open boundaries, problematizing them and distributing difference across their surfaces. Subjectivation, as a process of multiplicity never presupposes fixed states or finalised static points; it always refers to tendencies and trajectories that can be realigned, redistributed and related across the topological network.

Dispositif

The lines, knots and folds of self-multiplicity run through the apparatus of subjectivity, each time dividing in nature. The multiple is knotted into an apparatus even as it resists it, changes it and is assimilated by it. The apparatus itself is "the system of relations that can be established between these elements." Power functions as the 'empty centre' of the apparatus, blind and mute, operating through strategies that make the heterogeneous and multiple elements of subjectivation articulate together.

In short, between these elements, whether discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and modifications of function which can also vary very widely.

Processes of subjectivation take place across the surfaces of knowledge/power at varying speeds and modalities according to their distribution throughout the 'heterogeneous ensemble,' 'the said as much
as the unsaid' effecting an alignment and disalignment (a dispositif) of their form with the forces through which they were produced. These (dis)alignments are an effect of force relations captured in strategies responding to an 'urgent need.'

The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function. This may have been, for example, the assimilation of a floating population found to be burdensome for an essentially mercantilist economy: there was a strategic imperative acting here as the matrix for an apparatus which gradually undertook the control or subjection of madness, mental illness and neurosis.

The 'urgent need' surrounding the space of subjectivisation is always bound up with the historical strategies, expressed through force relations, that constitute each apparatus. The apparatus is a moving heterotopic space made up of more or less co-ordinated lines and knots of which Foucault gives us multiply layered maps, lines disentangled and knots undone. It is, he says, 'working in the field'.

In Foucault's last works on the apparatus of subjectivation he concentrated on those lines of a continuous variation that actualise truth. If, in all of Foucault's previous works he had analysed the apparatuses of madness, punishment and sexuality in order to produce a cartography of the truth of knowledge and the truth of power (not, for all that, without having produced the truth of subjectivity in those apparatuses). Foucault in his last work elevates the search for a cartography of the apparatus of subjectivity in its relation to truth out of an 'urgent need' in the present. Foucault had mapped the truths of light and the visible making up knowledge and the truths of power and force that compose strategies whose lines all actualise together producing the truth of the apparatus. In previous analyses the lines of
subjectivity were not sufficiently disentangled from all the others in order to present them in their irreducibility as a separate, but interlinked, apparatus or ontology.

At stake, then, in Foucault’s apparatus of subjectivity or interiority of thought particularly in the last books and interviews, is how the possibilities (multiplicities) of self and subjectivation (for inhabiting a smooth space of thought) are defined (stratified and striated) in relation to apparatuses of knowledge, power and truth in given historical formations, and how these possibilities can be developed as resistance in the present through the formation of ‘historical ontologies’ of the self, a unique and irreducible apparatus of interiority, a history of resistance that is ‘derived’ from the apparatuses of knowledge and power, overlaps with them but is ‘not dependent upon them.’

For Foucault the lines of the present that constitute the apparatus of subjectivity merge together in a knot of individuality that "categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise. It is these lines of force that makes individuals subjects." 103 The present modes of subjectivation have passed into the Code, have been emptied out and reinscribed to the profit of the Code. This type of power, derived from Christian technologies of the self which link ‘sexuality, subjectivity and truth’ together as the terrain for self-discovery, assumes the function of individualising and penetrating the interior: first the pastoral powers of church, then their takeover by the state.
Tearing the subject

If this 'individualising and modulating power' makes individuals subjects then Foucault will propose the task of 'tearing' the subject and folding it into 'new forms of subjectivity.' Foucault attempts:

the task of "tearing" the subject from itself in such a way that it is no longer the subject as such, or that it is completely "other" than itself so that it may arrive at its annihilation, its dissociation. 104

Tearing the self is a 'dissubjectifying undertaking', a practice of dissociating the existing lines of relation to self, decomposing and refolding processes of subjectivation by taking them to their limit. The fundamental lesson of 'tearing' the self along the line of the fold, of tearing the self from itself so that it may fold and become other enables Foucault to open a space for a new 'experience' of subjectivity, a 'limit-experience in the outside.'

in which the subject reaches decomposition, leaves itself, at the limits of its own impossibility. 105

The decomposition of the subject on the line of the outside and its recomposition on the plane of immanence is what Deleuze and Guattari have named a "body without organs." The body without organs is the annihilation of subjectivity 'at the limits of its own impossibility,' the 'degree-zero' of being in the immanence of the outside.

Tearing the self is a constantly re-experienced struggle or agon to destratify oneself in the assemblages of the present and reconstruct them in the 'not yet' or 'actuality' of the outside. We must "go further still, we haven't found our BWO yet, we haven't sufficiently dismantled
our self." 106 In fact, "you never reach the body without organs, you can't reach it, you are forever attaining it. It is a limit." 107

Foucault will designate this experience as a Nietzschean 'eternal return':

Can it be said that the subject is the only form of existence possible? Can't there be experiences in which the subject, in its constitutive relations, in its self-identity, isn't given any more? And thus wouldn't experiences be given in which the subject could dissociate itself, break its relationship with itself, lose its identity? Wasn't this perhaps the experience of Nietzsche, with the metaphor of the external return? 108

Eternal return = terminal identity.

Terminal identity is the fusion with multiplicity itself, the ever-renewed effort to reconnect one's assemblages in an exchange with the outside. Foucault/Deleuze think the contemporaneity of terminal identity through the dissolution of the apparatus of subjectivity and its insertion into the spaces of the machinic: 109

the points of disjunction on the body without organs form circles that converge on the desiring-machines; then the subject - produced as a residuum alongside the machine, as an appendix, or as a spare part adjacent to the machine - passes through all the degrees of the circle, and passes from one circle to another. This subject itself is not at the center, which is occupied by the machine, but on the periphery, with no fixed identity, forever decentered, defined by the states through which it passes. 110

Terminal identity names the 'double-articulation' of the end of the apparatus of subjectivity and the construction of the new relations of subjectivation. All of Foucault's efforts regarding the apparatus of subjectivity are an attempt to intervene in the space of this 'double articulation.' To bend, fold and tear at the lines of the self in order "to move towards something radically other", 111 continual exchange with the outside to loosen the grip of the no longer and accelerate the becoming of the not yet:
it is a question rather of the destruction of what we are, of the creation of something entirely different, of a total innovation.

For Foucault it is the 'eternal return' of processes of destruction/creation that supplies the apparatuses of subjectivity with their historical dynamic. Foucault marks his reformulation of the 'death of man' with this problematic:

in the course of their history men had never ceased constructing themselves, that is, to shift continuously the level of their subjectivity, to constitute themselves in an infinite and multiple series of different subjectivities that would never reach an end and would never place us in the presence of something that would be 'man.' Man is an animal of experience, he is involved ad infinitum within a process that, by defining a field of objects at the same time changes him, deforms him, transforms him and transfigures him as a subject.

Foucault thinks the history of the apparatuses of subjectivation as interminable terminal identity, a thousand tiny 'deaths'. The analyses of the deaths of man show that man is just one stratification of the living, just one form of organizing processes of subjectivation in relation to an experience that 'changes him, deforms him, transforms him and transfigures him', a process of contact ad infinitum (eternal return) with the immanent plane of the outside, the constant questioning and transforming of the role of the self in thought that is freedom.

6. The freedom of thought.

We have seen then that the fold itself organises the relation between thought, subjectivisation and freedom in Foucault's apparatuses. The problematic unthought gives way to a thinking being that problematises itself in the freedom of the fold of the outside. This problematic freedom, agonism or struggle in relation to oneself is given by the
operations of the fold. The immanent plane of outside thought 'encounters' the line of the fold and bends producing a relation with oneself homologous with the outside:

it is not a doubling of the one, but a redoubling of the other. It is not a reproduction of the same, but a repetition of the different. It is not the emanation of an 'I', but something that places in immanence an always other or a Non-self. It is never the other who is a double in the doubling process, it is a self that lives me as the double of the other: I do not encounter myself on the outside, I find the other in me ('it is always concerned with showing how the Other, the Distant, is also the Near and the Same'). It resembles exactly the invagination of a tissue in embryology, or the act of doubling in sewing: twist, fold, stop and so on.

The freedom of the self in thought is thus a problem of folding and detaching to the greatest degree possible, the stratified forms of power/knowledge from the subjectivating plane of the outside; it is the problem not of getting out of power but of folding the forces of the outside in order to resist organising techniques of the self. The dimension of the outside and the mechanism of the fold transport subjectivisation and any 'savage' experience from the domain of power into the strategic 'other' or stratosphere enabling the invention of new relations between forces which place subjectivisations within 'man,' or 'beyond' man.

It is always a question of the extent to which selves are bound to the stratifications of the organism, of significance and of subjectification: the organisation of bodies in space-time; an allocation of significance or meaning linked to the semiotic system; the construction and fabrication of individuality (preferably as isolatable, 'private' and always in 'competition'). It is always a question of resistance to this "white wall-black hole 'system'", continually constructing lines and relays to the outside to think-otherwise and differently.
The freedom of thought (of the self in thought) is thus a problem of interlocking assemblages (lines, spaces, points, modes of individuation etc) and the extent to which they may be unfolded from the plane of organisation and refolded in the immanence of the outside.

The 'self evidences' of the plane of organisation, of the forms of knowledge and the powers that traverse them require a 'freezing' of subject positions, their 'emplacement' within molar unities in order to ensure that spaces are stabilised, and striated according to the 'great binary aggregates.' Thus the space of the system functions homeostatically, hermetically sealing in energies and intensities, asphyxiating processes of subjectivation, damming up forces in the form of 'subjection.' The disciplinary mechanisms that actualise this process are complimented by 'governmentalities,' the dispersion of biopowers and the technologies of the self. All of these techniques and operations involute one another and overlap but equally allow points of leakage through which other lines might run and become entangled with others setting off other more fluid lines.

The 'freezing' that enables subjection can be liquified through these lines affording the creation of passages, cracks and fissures that bifurcate to destinations unknown. The liquidation, or better still, the liquefaction of the subject does not vilify of empty it forcing it into 'a line of death and abolition.' Liquefaction conducts that ration of subjectivity or strata, force or resistance that is the effect or difference of powers fold into new creative lines, molecular combinations or assemblages of the outside.
Attraction

The problematic object of thought (freedom) that Foucault constructs, in relation to the apparatus of subjectivisation, is presented in its relation to the fundamental 'forces of attraction' through which specific practices are actualised and a specific 'rapport a soi' is created. Foucault thinks attraction as utterly impersonal, inaccessible and without form. It is the virtual unseen and unsaid that subsists in processes of observation and procedures of expression - in 'technologies of the self.' Attraction is "the pure, most naked experience of the outside." It dissolves interior identity by "infinitely unfolding outside any enclosure." In its folding with the outside attraction functions as a probability or tendency that invites both a 'hollowing out' and a 'doubling', as Foucault constantly says. It is an "amorphous anonymity" - that divests iteriority of its identity, hollows it out, and divides it into non-coincident twin figures."  

If, in Foucault's earlier books he had shown the doubling of knowledge and power, the doubling of an exterior and an outside, in the last books he invents a doubling of the outside itself, the forces of attraction interiorising the outside creating "an inside that is deeper than any interior." Foucault models the apparatus of subjectivation as a 'continuous transformation' whose geometry is multi-dimensional, fractal (with relative, intermediary insides/outsides) and 'determined' within variable 'attractors/attractions' of force relations. It is when 'the outside collapses and attracts interiorities" that the possibilities for new modes of subjectivation are opened. How can one attract the outside? How can we place ourselves within existing forces of
attraction in order to decelerate them, or speed them up? How can one construct new forces of attraction? On each occasion the questions will differ depending upon the relative danger of each arrangement of force.

Dangers.

The questions will be different on each occasion determined by the relative danger of each arrangements of forces. That "everything is dangerous" is a basic premise of Foucault's thought. The genealogist of problems cannot look to alternatives to answer these questions but must, in each instance, "determine which is the main danger." The dangers inherent in this enterprise can only be displaced if Foucault's own apparatus of thought distances and detaches itself from itself; in its analysis of the dangers of thought, Foucault's apparatus of thought must free itself from 'what it silently thinks' in order to 'think otherwise,' 'think differently;' Foucault's immanent spatialised and spatialising logics and strategies generate this movement in his thought; 'dangers' in Foucault's apparatus of thought are displaced in the outside through the problematisation of their conditions of possibility.

The knowledge/power/subjectivisation system that runs through the apparatus of thought in Foucault is subject to a "sort of open strategic game, where things can be reversed." The possibility of reversal is a form of resistance that Foucault endorses in the dangers that he analyses and in the dangers of his own discourse. Reversibility is one move in a 'game with oneself.' It is also a move within a 'game of truth.' The radical discontinuity of Foucault's apparatus of thought with itself is a 'permanent task' of displacement and transformation in order to provoke
the constant elaboration of 'games of truth' in his thought. The attempt to constantly distance and detach thought from itself in order to avoid becoming complicit and entrenched within the space of sedimented thought is one of the primary strategies and moves within Foucault's game with oneself. It is the game of freedom in the immanent thought of the outside. The space of thought is stretched, folded, doubled-up and reversed in Foucault's apparatus of thought, dissolving intentionality and exteriorising synthesis into a topological relation with the outside. The 'interiority' of Foucault's apparatus of thought emerges as a hollowing out or involution of the outside which develops through its own proliferating self relations.

Self-action or self-relation, subjectivation or inside of an outside is, then, the final figure of heterotopic space in Foucault's topology of thought. The introjection of force carves out an interior vertiginous space that expands or contracts on a scale that gauges the degree to which the diagram or apparatus is fulfilled. Like a Cartesian diver subjectivation rises or falls according to the powers that invest it, the resistances it creates and the knowledges that condition it. These are all original figures and spaces of the action of thought. The action of thought is purely relational 'an action upon an action' and in affecting itself it reveals the outside to be its own unthought element. For Foucault thought is flux, a constant movement and an action of flow, connection and distribution that traverses striated spaces, loosens and fissures them and carries off the released sediments to other folded spaces along its curvature. The curvature of thought is the fold of material (non-discursive) and discursive spaces. Subjectivation is the expression of these folded spaces and these folded spaces are the expression of subjectivation.
Autopoetic spaces

Foucault's 'aesthetics of existence' names the sites or spaces for "a new art of living in society." It names an 'autopoetic' space a space of self-creation, self-organisation and self production whose topology and dynamics constantly escape the codes and rules of knowledge/power apparatuses. Autopoiesis names the process, though which forms of subjectivation are produced. It constitutes a system of relations that condition and are conditioned by an opening onto the outside and by the production of immanent components through these relations. Autopoiesis is a practice, a practice that is the 'ontological condition' of subjectivation.

The autopoetic machinery of subjectivation defines it's relation to the outside as "an intensive relation of immanence" that redefines the self through non-discursive asignifying and machinic components and their relations. Foucault theorises in 'aesthetics of existence' a heterogenesis of subjectivation, an ontological pluralism and an epistemological multiplicity: human subjectivity is an "autopoetic snowball."

Foucault's texts utterly refuse any notion of subjectivity as given, already there, already formed, waiting for us to change it, understand it, or react against it. Foucault refuses "the idea that there does exist a nature or foundation which, as a result of a certain number of historical, social or economic processes, found itself concealed, alienated or imprisoned in and by some repressive mechanism." In fact
he says "I had to reject a certain apriori theory of the subject in order to make this analysis of the relationships which can exist between the constitution of the subject or different forms of the subject and games of truth, practices of power and so forth." Autopoetic space opens the possibility for subjectivation to create and produce itself through its relations with this space-time. It opens new possibilities of agency, agencement or assemblage. Autopoetic space is generated through the fold of the outside. It develops along the line of the fold itself. 

Auto-poetic space is a space of mutation and transformation, it is not a historically given 'form' but rather a space of becoming or a 'probability of emergence' that is immanent to a historically given form of discourse and the power-knowledge relations they organise. Autopoetic space is the final figure of space that emerges out of Foucault's texts. It is a composite of archaeological space (correlative, complimentary and collateral) and genealogical space (diagrammatic) that creates and produces out of itself an 'exposition' of the relation or self-relation of forces as they act on themselves producing so many subjectifications. It operates a mechanism of the fold that produces 'minor' subjects within a majoritarian subject. Foucault's spatialising logics aim to make possible "a reappropriation, an autopoiesis, of the means of production of subjectivity." 

In the last volumes of the History of Sexuality Foucault attempts to give a response to the present mutable conditions under which subjectivity is produced. It attempts to offer the conditions to enable the construction of a full body, a heterogeneous subjectivity. The constitution of autopoetic space requires a destratification of 'extreme
caution' a 'care of the self' that does not devolve into 'techniques' of
the self that 'may be suicidal, or turn cancerous,' plunging into a
'blackhole.' But the development of a resistance to the
'blackhole/white wall' system through a care of the self that produces
itself in the matrix through a specific strategy of folding in specific
heterogeneous spaces. Not counter-attack or reaction but the double and
the fold. Not striated space that captures strata in its grids, but the
smooth space of autopoesis in the becoming of the outside. This is only
possible "precisely on the condition of assuming the multiplicity within
oneself." 131 Foucault's interiority of thought sustains a "profound
Nietzscheanism" from beginning to end and in the folding of the force,
becoming and chaos of the outside there is no telling what a "living
being" might achieve:

I tell you: one must have chaos in one, to give birth to a dancing
star. I tell you: you still have chaos in you. 132
THINKING-OTHERWISE:
Freedom between life and thought

"To form concepts is a way of living..." ¹ Foucault

"Life - that means, for us constantly transforming all that we are into light and flame." ² Nietzsche

It all ends, then, "in the interior of the exterior and inversely,"

Foucault’s topologies of thought offering a series of interstitial and recursive maps for thinking-otherwise between knowledge, power and self: maps of space that fold between the inside and the outside and maps of time that fold between the not yet and the no longer "where one sees time as still to come and as having already happened"³, constituting a partial and fragmentary spatio- temporal "history of the systems of thought". Transgressive maps, archaeological maps, event-maps, diagrammatic maps and maps of the self are indefinite and reversible imageless images of the space-time of thought, lines of flight to the outside consisting of lines, points and surfaces in a relation of non-relation constantly moving and intersecting, cutting across and folding through one another, producing relays, connections and multiple points of entry and exit. They produce ‘an experimentation in contact with the real’, a potential, capacity or freedom actualised as the transformed and reconfigured space-time of thought.

Foucault’s mobile and constantly changing analytic frameworks are composite maps of immanence and multiplicity in an experimentation with thought, a strategy for connecting with the Outside and transforming the real. Knowledge, Power and Self comprise a dynamic, ‘open’, and rhizomorphous system of relational spaces of thought that reconfigure
time as a topological multiplicity, a multi-valent durational space that distributes its elements throughout the coexisting 'lacuncary layers' of simultaneous, heterogeneous and juxtaposed series. Foucault thinks time as a distributive mechanism for a space in between and outside thought.

The spaces of knowledge, power and self are no longer 'fixed,' 'immobile' and 'undialectical' but irreducible sites that condition and are conditioned by each other. Thus, we are to imagine a series of complex reciprocally interlaced spaces that inhere in a 'relation of non-relation.' Knowledge, power and self-formations are 'complicated' topological spaces operating as a constitutive, mobile network whose metastability ensures its permanent transformation. These topological formations are in 'continual variation' across each other and through their own dimensions. They are 'matrices of transformation.'

Time is no longer thought as 'richness,' 'fecundity,' 'life' and 'dialectic' since to release the topological potentials of space automatically short-circuits the linear, continuous and progressivist time lines of chronology. The space-time multiplicities of knowledge, power and self are always 'not yet,' always of the 'outside,' always in a process of becoming set loose from the identity and representation of a container-contained model of space formed by a continuist, linear chronos. Released from this model space 'informs' time offering thought a new image of space-time becoming, a topology of thought that opens onto a 'thinking - otherwise' about the relations of knowledge, power and self.
The Euclidean conception of an axiomatic spatial system is shattered into a non-euclidean space-time topology offering the possibility of a new image of thought an imageless image - a new philosophical thought of space-time.

Euclidean and perspective space have disappeared as systems of reference, along with other former 'commonplaces' such as the town, history, paternity, the tonal system in music, traditional morality and so forth.

Foucault's system of spatial thinking attempts to speed up the recognition of this new category of 'space-time' relations so that "thought may become possible again." Thought is erased in the fixed, static, closed and binary images of space kept in circulation by transcendental, dialectical, phenomenological and structural modes of thinking. For none of those permit a move away from taxanomic, categorical or totalising spaces in order to find 'other' spaces, heterotopic spaces for which no concept, form or abstract model is given. The heterotopic spaces of knowledge, power and self are both 'larger' than the other systems allow (heterotopologies both precede and escape their abstractions e.g. forms, conditions, totalities e.t.c. heterotopologies are 'multiplicities') and 'smaller' than the 'types,' 'kinds,' 'particulars' which are said to 'exemplify' or 'participate' in generalised forms (heterotopologies are 'singularities' i.e. events or 'haecceities' of thought). In short, these other modes or systems of thinking space are too metaphysical, 'arboreal' and bound to the tree, root and branch that sanctifies and legitimates Western thought.

The 'history of systems of thought' diagnoses the abstractions of space by showing that there is much more 'regularity' in the practices of
space than other modes of thought will allow but that this regularity
conditions the existence for 'other' spaces outside thought that open
space and thought to change and transformation. There is much more
freedom in the practices of space which other systems of thought cannot
see, cannot accept.

I think it is somewhat arbitrary to try to disassociate the effective
practice of freedom by people, the practice of social relations, and
the spatial distributions in which they find themselves. If they
are separated, they become impossible to understand. Each can only
be understood through the other.

Ultimately, Foucault's strategies of spatial thinking are aimed at
producing new thought by showing that the 'effective practice of freedom
by people' can only be understood in the present by pushing beyond the
old Euclidean universe with its oppositions between subject and object,
power and knowledge, space and time and the image of thought that
authorises and conditions these oppositions. Foucault's spatial
strategies allow a thought of difference from these oppositions (freed
from making opposition, distinction, categorisation) by constructing a
complex 'complicated' space that reconfigures the abstract spaces of
knowledge, power and self in terms of the 'unthought' difference that
precedes them, makes them possible and yet escapes them. The knowledge,
power and self-organising system of spaces is reconfigured in terms of
the (nomadic) chance, becoming and forces of thought that traverse them.

Foucault's topologies aim at inducing a panic and crisis, a
problematisation and a collapse in the present: thought must shock
itself into something new, shock itself into the space of difference
outside. Thought must become a problem for itself and not a solution
for something 'interior' or internal to it. Thought must create a whole
new theatre:
A theatre of multiplicites opposed in every respect to the theatre of representation, which leaves in tact neither the identity of the thing represented, nor author, nor spectator, nor character, nor representation which, through the vicissitudes of the play, can become the object of a production of knowledge or final recognition. Instead a theatre of problems and always open questions.

In Foucault thought becomes a theatre of problematic multiplicities in topological proximity stretched and folded across the knowledge, power, self system. Within this system thought is problematised as rare, diffuse, acategorical yet selective (creative), operating on the principle of a central breakdown, a kind of atrophy or collapse in its action, so that something new may come about, so that thought may 'think otherwise.'

Thought should not be directed toward establishing a central certitude, but should be directed towards the limits, the exterior - towards the emptiness, the negation of what it says.

And this because thought is the positive creation of a problem, not the recognition or agreement of a solution. And in the creation of a problem thought escapes the fixed images of identity and representation, anchored by the models of ideology and repression, into 'something else', something other and 'not yet'. Knowledge, power and self in Foucault escape the fixed, immobile, passive and receptive spatial images that imprison them by breaking open the foundational and universal forms which depend on them and taking them to their limit and displacing them. Thought is at once constitutive of and inimical to the spatial limits of knowledge, power and self and as an atotalising and acentred system releases itself as a positive, productive and creative force in order to enter into the formation of new social processes.
Thought derives and 'invents' its 'freedom' within this positive movement by problematising its own constitutive activity within the space-time multiplicities of knowledge power and self. Thought is a relation of immanent freedom:

it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought, and question it as to its meaning, its conditions and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem.

The space of freedom enables the immanent thought of the outside to both precede and escape representation. Thought "does not go from one point to another, but passes between the points, ceaselessly bifurcating and diverging." Thus in Foucault, thought does not explain the formation of the spaces of knowledge, power and self and ask how these spaces are realised but asks under what conditions can something other be produced 'outside' or alongside them. Thought in Foucault is not known, a virtual 'thinking-otherwise' within thought that takes singular elements from knowledge, power and self and mixes and reassembles them into a new 'abstract machine' or multiplicity of thought that churns up and redistributes space and time as abstract virtualities.

Thinking-otherwise in Foucault depends upon the abstract 'virtualities' of space, space and time and the 'image' they produce. The image of thought is determined by how space is composed and held together and how it is decomposed and comes apart. There are thus different topological figures of thought determined by the relations of forces that run through the compositional/decompositional system. And for Foucault prior to and subsisting within these differing figures lies the tendency for these spaces to leak, become indistinct, imperceptible, and
formless, crossing and folding through each other, losing their limits 'in-between' creating the possibility of a multiplity of exits and entrances. Foucault discovers a sort of 'catastrophe' in thought, a force or potential inherent in its relations with space. Thought passes through a collapse of its enunciable and visual co-ordinates, as a condition for it to see and say otherwise - for it to think otherwise. Foucault is the proper name for a blind and mute machine of thought that shows the unseen and describes the unsaid.

What matters in Foucault's abstract spacing of thought are the lines, series, folds and doubles which are unlimited, have no inside or outside and abandon geometric shape in an active, productive, expressive decomposition and recomposition of thought. The contourless, shapeless infinite space of thought reposes on a surface from which it constantly flees and attempts to escape as though bombarded by the violence of invisible forces which undo its identity and expose its monstrous uniform. Foucault thinks the otherwise unseeable and unsayable abstract forces of space that condition thought, showing that the contours and forms of knowledge, power and self are merely limitations of an infinite potential in thought, of an acentered, shapeless, boundless, formless space of 'thinking-otherwise.'

Thought in Foucault is a process of saying and seeing otherwise - "that does not legitimate what is already known, but attempts to think differently," thinking differently outside of the knowledge, power and self that is given. Thought is irreducible to the forms of the given, since it is (topologically) in immanent contact with the forces of the
'outside' which gives them their conditions of possibility. Foucault's reconfiguration of the spaces of knowledge, power and self shows them as volumes that perpetually process these forces and conditions reinscribing them into the chance and becoming of history. Thought is this action and process, one of freedom and resistance to those spaces that imprison it.

Foucault's thought is ultimately devoted to life. It is a thought "that discloses not so much what gives beings their foundation as what bears them for an instant towards a precarious form." Thought as Foucault conceives it is an action and practice directed toward the transvaluation of life, "an introduction to the non-fascist life", the ethos of a Nietzchesan philosophical life lived in the force, chaos and becoming of the outside, the only philosophical life that is worth living:

is not the force that comes from the outside a certain idea of Life, a certain vitalism in which Foucault's thought culminates.

The key to the personal poetic attitude of a philosopher is not to be sought in his ideas, as if it could be deduced from them, but rather in his philosophy-as-life, in his philosophical life, his ethos.

The immanent freedom of thought in Foucault emerges through a topology of enclosures, making visible those spatial images of thought (bound to the knowledge/power/self system) that imprison life by opening them to other spaces, the heterotopic spaces of thinking-otherwise. "It was a philosophical exercise. The object was to learn to what extent the effort to think ones own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently". For Foucault, the
immanent freedom of thought is "the living substance of philosophy", reconnecting life and thought through an "exercise of oneself in thought".  

Man imprisons thought and confines freedom in his own self images of life and so life must be freed from within man - "to the benefit of another form" - by constructing a life 'outside' of man, life within the folds, a space that "absolutely does not yet exist", a space otherwise and beyond, yet folded and co-present in an immanent extimacy. Man is only one stratification of the living and Foucault's topology of thought accelerates his departure.

Foucault gives us a theoretico-practical framework for an opening onto the life and thought of the post-human, a way of thinking through the possibilities of liberation and domination in an experience that we do not yet have a name or a concept for. A thought of relation with a non-organic life without origin, essence or foundation. Foucault constructs a 'force of flight' for the spaces of life that maximizes, to the greatest degree possible, the loosening of its fixations in the confinements of knowledge, power and self in order to connect and assemble them in the abstract, immanent space of thought outside: the mutant, chaotic line of thought that passes between knowledge, power and self triggering a thinking otherwise about what we are, say and do.

Foucault's 'force of flight' is not any simple stepping outside or flight from life, but a "twist, fold, stop" into the outside within, again and again, not a pure destruction but a positive production of the real: "to flee is to produce the real, create life, to find a weapon." 

Thought produces the real and creates life by collapsing its interior
foundations and certitudes and inserting itself into the reconfigured exterior relations of knowledge, power and self, into those spaces between and outside that condition their emergence. When thought reaches the outside, immerses itself in the 'non-place' of force-relations, goes beyond experience in an immanent connection and folding with the conditions of real experience, only then does thought attain an irreducibility, an independence from the knowledge, power, self system since it can grasp them in terms of their functions of existence and forms of relation. And thought is thereby "flung into the categories of life." 17 Foucault's thought is an abstract relay/connection-device plunged into the immanent, multiple, formless and chaotic spaces of the outside within, and it is in the inside of the outside that we must nourish little 'thoughtlets,' little open rhizomes of thought that will branch out, bifurcate, and diversify into the 'not yet' thought of our becoming. And at the very heart of that becoming, in the eye of power there lies "the centre of the cyclone where one can live and where life exists par excellence." 18

Paraphrasing Deleuze on Spinoza we might say that:

In his whole way of living and thinking, Foucault posits the image of a positive, affirmative life, against the simulacra with which men content themselves...Life is not an idea, a matter of theory for Foucault. It is a manner of being, one and the same eternal mode in all its attributes. And only from this viewpoint does the topological method assume its full meaning. 19
POSTSCRIPT

There is no doubt that all of Foucault’s major preoccupations (madness and death, language and visibility, crime and punishment, sex and subjectivity, history and truth, power and resistance) are radically transformed by, or are on the threshold of being transformed by, cybernetic or technological discourse. A ‘history of the present’ in Foucault’s sense (as a strategy of refusing, creating and inventing who we are), a post-humanist topology of thought, is of inestimable value in coming to grips with the abolition of real or material space and time in the frenzy of the ‘informatics of domination,’ of coming to grips with the cybernetic ‘stranger’ knocking at the door of our present.
ABBRévIATIONS


DL Death and the Labyrinth - The World of Raymond Roussel, (Doubleday, 1986).,


F EFFECT The Foucault Effect - Studies in Governmentality (Harvester, 1991)

F LIVE Foucault Live - Interviews 1966-84 (trans) J Johnston (ed) S Lotringer (Semiotext(e), 1989)

F READER The Foucault Reader (Penguin, 1984)


IPR I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister and my brother ... a Case of Parricide in the 19th Century, trans. F Jellinek (New York, 1975),

LCMP Language, Counter-Memory, Practice - Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77 (ed) D F Bouchard (Cornell University Press, 1977)

LIM "Life of Infamous Men" in Foucault, M: Power, Truth, Strategy (Feral Publications, 1979)


OD The Order of Discourse, in R Young (ed) Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, (Routledge, 1981)

OT The Order of Things. An archaeology of the human sciences (Tavistock 1970)


TNP This is Not a Pipe, translated and edited by James Harkness, (Univ. of California Press, 1982)

PPC Politics, Philosophy, Culture and Other Writings 1977-1984, ed L U Kritzman, (Routledge, 1988),

UP The Use of Pleasure - The History of Sexuality, Vol 2. (Penguin books 1985),
NOTES

PROLOGUE

4. G. Deleuze, *Foucault*. p.1. (Athlone 1988). We might as well say here and now that Deleuze' book represents the most profound and provocative engagement with Foucault's thought. It is neither a theoretical reflection on Foucault nor an exposition of his philosophy so much as an immanent map of a common rhizome. Deleuze reconstructs Foucault's life/thought as an 'aparallel evolution,' an ever renewed 'encounter' with the outside.
5. Ibid, p.22.
6. M. Foucault, *Of Other Spaces*. Diacritics, vol 16, p.24. Here Foucault offers heterotopology as the name for both a reading and a contestation of "the space in which we live."
13. Ibid, p.22
19. See the important text translated as: *Madness, the absence of work*. Critical Inquiry 21 (Winter 1995) pgs. 290-98.
20. M. Foucault, *This is Not a Pipe*, translated and edited by James Harkness, (Univ. of California Press, 1982) p.36, (hereafter referred to as *TNP*).
21. Ibid, p.36
22. G Deleuze, *Foucault*, p.131
CHAPTER 1

1. N Bohr cited in Pamela Major-Poetzl, Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Western Culture (Harvester Press, 1983) p.71

6. Ibid, p.214
8. LCMP, p.36
9. M&C, Preface ix
10. M&C, Preface x
11. Ibid, p.18
13. M Foucault cited in David Carroll, *Paraesthetics - Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida*, (Routledge, 1987) p 112. We take this division (discourse, figure) as absolutely fundamental to Foucault’s understanding of madness and literature and as crucial to the entire range of his work. In the first few pages of what Foucault calls his ‘first book’ he says: "Between word and image, between what is depicted by language and what is uttered by plastic form, the unity begins to dissolve; a single and identical meaning is not immediately common to them. And if it is true that the image still has the function of speaking, of transmitting something consubstantial with language, we must recognize that it already no longer says the same thing; and that by its own plastic values painting engages in an experiment that will take it farther and farther from language, whatever the superficial identity of the theme. Figure and speech still illustrate the same fable of folly in the same moral world, but already they take two different directions, indicating, in a still barely perceptible scission, what will be the great line of cleavage in the Western experience of madness." (M&C, p.18)
14. Ibid, p.112
15. M&C,p.31
16. M Foucault cited in Felman, op cit, p.224
17. Ibid, p.223
18. M Foucault cited in David Carroll, op cit, p.114
19. M Foucault, *Madness, the Absence of Work*, p.292
20. M Foucault cited in David Carroll, op cit, p.114
21. M Foucault, *Madness, the Absence of Work*, p.298
22. Insistence and subsistence are used throughout and are drawn from Deleuze’s idiom (especially *The Logic of Sense*, Columbia University Press, 1990) to designate a heterogeneous mode of existence on the plane of immanence. The advantage of these terms is their emphasis on differential and multiple connection - an ontological pluralism 'in-between'.
23. LCMP, p.66
24. M Foucault from original preface, cited in D Carroll, op cit, p.113
27. Ibid, p.119
28. Ibid, p.65
29. Ibid, p.16
30. M Foucault, *Madness, the Absence of Work*, p.297
31. DL, p. 138
32. OT, p. 300
33. M Foucault, *Madness, the Absence of Work*, p. 294
34. DL, p. 165
35. LCMP, p. 41
36. Ibid, p. 43
37. Ibid, p. 43
38. M Foucault, *Madness, the Absence of Work*, pgs. 296-97
39. OT, p. 300
40. Ibid
41. Ibid
42. LCMP, p. 51
43. Ibid, p. 30
44. Ibid, p. 50
45. Ibid, p. 44
46. Ibid, p. 30
47. LCMP, p. 35
48. Ibid, p. 34
49. Ibid, p. 35
50. Ibid, p. 32
51. Ibid, p. 58
52. Ibid, p. 34
53. Ibid, p. 58
54. Ibid, p. 55
55. Ibid, p. 40
56. Ibid, p. 53
57. Ibid, p. 55
58. Ibid, p. 85
60. Ibid, p. 285
61. M Foucault, *Madness, the Absence of Work*, p. 294
62. LCMP, p. 85
63. M&C, p. 287
64. LCMP, pgs. 84-5
65. 'Desoeuvrement' is a complex term, difficult to translate and recurs constantly throughout Blanchot's work. It has been variously translated as 'idleness,' 'redundant,' 'worklessness' (L Davis, *The Gaze of Orpheus*, Station Hill Press, 1981). It is here being used as a figure of 'unworking' or 'unworkness' that relays with Foucault's use of 'absence d'oeuvre'. Ann Smock, in her translation of *L'Espace Litteraire* comes closest to expressing this when she translates desoeuvrement as "the absence of work, l'absence de l'oeuvre." "The work excludes him, sets him outside it." (The Space of Literature, University of Nebraska, 1982, p.13)
67. Ibid
68. Blanchot's passion of the outside is used here as a figure of neutral desire, an asignifying non-relation through which madness stubbornly continues to inhabit thought through transgressive experiences like literature, eroticism, death, etc. See also *M&C* pgs 85-117, especially 88-89 where Foucault says: "The possibility of madness is therefore implicit in the very phenomenon of passion."

71. M Blanchot, *Vicious Circles*, translated by P Auster, (Station Hill, 1985) p.60

72. M Foucault cited in D Cook, op cit, p.10

73. M Blanchot, *The Space of Literature*, (University of Nebraska Press, 1982) p.195

74. Ibid, p.195

75. Ibid, p.194

76. Ibid, p.194

77. Ibid, p.196

78. Ibid, p.197

79. Ibid, p.196

80. *M&C*, p.288

81. Ibid, p.288

82. *M&C*, p.289

83. *M&C*, p.288


85. *M&C*, p.289

86. M Foucault, *Madness, the Absence of Work*, p.290


88. AK, p.15

89. Deleuze and Guattari, op cit, p.102

90. *Madness, the Absence of Work*, p.298

91. M Foucault cited in S Felman, op cit, p.212

92. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, p.37


96. Ibid, p.224

97. M Foucault, *Madness, the Absence of Work*, p.298


99. Ibid, p.224

100. Deleuze, Foucault, p.81


103. G Deleuze, "I Have Nothing to Admit," op cit

104. M Foucault cited in S Felman, op cit, pgs. 225-26

105. Ibid, p.227

106. In *Madness, the Absence of Work* Foucault uses 'Reserve' to designate the 'fund beyond control.' "We still have to grasp how fitting this word reserve is ... it is a figure that retains and suspends meaning, laying out an emptiness where nothing is proposed but the yet-incomplete possibility that some meaning or another may come to lodge there, or still a third, and this may perhaps continue to infinity. Madness opens up a lacunar reserve that designates and exposes that chasm where linguistic code and utterance become entangled, shaping each other and speaking of nothing but their still silent rapport." The reserve of madness is "a fold of the spoken that is an absence of work." *p.295
'Body without organs' and 'Rhizome' are, of course, taken from Deleuze and Guattari's monumental two volume *Anti-Oedipus - Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (Athlone Press, 1983), and *A Thousand Plateaus* (Athlone Press, 1988). Madness as 'reserve' or fund beyond control is aligned with Deleuze and Guattari's "body without organs" in several respects:

1) It is a limit, tendency or becoming in all strata, an unformed zero before its gradation by reason
2) It is a topological surface of intensities with a history of relatively 'free' or 'bound' circulation that Foucault maps
3) It is a becoming that resists organised, hierarchized and stratified structure through passage, connection and multiplicity
4) It is a dissolution of identity that emerge with the extension of the organism, splits the subject and displaces meaning.

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108. M Foucault, from original edition, cited in D Carroll, op cit, p.113
109. M Foucault, *Madness, the Absence of Work*, p.294
110. Ibid, p.294
111. M Foucault cited in O'Farrell, op cit, p.93
112. M Foucault cited in J Johnston, op cit, p.812
113. G Deleuze and F Guattari, *Nomadology: The War Machine*, (Semiotext(e))
114. *LCMP*, p.208
115. G Deleuze and F Guattari, *Nomadology*, op cit. p.84
118. M Foucault cited in O'Farrell, op cit., pgs.141-42
119. Ibid
120. Ibid, p.70
121. Ibid, p.71
122. Ibid, p.70
124. M Foucault, *Madness, the Absence of Work*, p.297
125. Ibid, p.297
126. Ibid, p.295
127. *LCMP*, p.36
131. *LCMP*, p.44
132. Ibid, p.33
133. Ibid, p.33
134. Ibid, p.32
135. Ibid, p.32
136. Ibid, p.61
137. Ibid, p.61
138. Ibid, p.60
140. *LCMP*, p.190
141. Ibid, p.190
142. Ibid, pgs.33-4
143. Ibid, p.34
CHAPTER 2

1. OT, p.9
3. DL, p.114
4. AK, p.16
5. Ibid, p.17
6. OT, Foreword to English Edition, p. XI
7. AK, p.131
8. Ibid, p.131
10. Ibid, p.198
11. BC, Preface, p.xi
12. Ibid, p.xi
13. Ibid, p.xi
14. Michel Foucault, Madness & Civilisation - A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, (Random House, 1965), Preface (hereafter referred to as M&C)
15. BC, Preface, pgs. xi-xii
16. BC, Preface, p.xi
17. Foucault always read his previous books in terms of his (then) current concerns, in terms of the 'present,' (especially in the interviews). It is the difference between what we are and what we are in the process of becoming, "the historical part and the current part." The interviews, then, would serve to 'correct' and double the books by mapping lines of force in the present, the drift or flow of the current:
   "If Foucault interviews form an integral part of his work, it is because they extend the historical problematization of each of his books into the construction of the present problem, be it madness, punishment or sexuality." (Deleuze, Foucault, p.115)
18. BC, p.165
19. BC, p.198
This network sprawls across Foucault's 'literary' and aesthetic texts and one notes the lack of a literary archive in Discipline and Punish. In that text Foucault announces, in fact, the "disqualification of death" in modern political space. And, in the History of Sexuality, power controls and administers life and life is taken as the object of power and, simultaneously, resistance to power comes from life. Later we shall try to analyse how this new set of concerns emerges out of the abandonment, collapse or assimilation of 'literary' or aesthetic space to a much broader and extensive spatial network where a certain 'post-humous' enunciation/vision opens up the limits of knowledge to a new dimension: a topology of power.

It is this blind spot that 'establishes' the 'posthumous' exteriority of the archaeologist "I am abolishing all interiority in that exterior that is so indifferent to my life, and so neutral that it makes no distinction between my life and my death." It is only when the structure of the invisible visibility is realigned genealogically, in Discipline and Punish, that Foucault will map this whole configuration in terms of a panoptical fiction of power. Foucault's ontology of power: power does not exist, but fictions for itself a marvelous and chimerical body that has all too real effects.
The 'artificial body' of the panopticon is sustained in life by an invisible eye (whose blind spot indicates not a real presence but an apparent omnipresence) and a voice that cannot be seen (if the voice could be attached to a body with real presence its power could be more easily contested). The voice and the gaze of power brought together "all by a simple idea in architecture".

57. LCMP, pgs. 45-6
58. Ibid, p. 48
59. Ibid, p. 49
60. DL, p. 57
61. Ibid, pgs. 102-3
62. Ibid, p. 114
63. Ibid, p. 107
64. Ibid, p. 107
65. Ibid, p. 110
66. Ibid, p. 78
67. Ibid, p. 84
68. Ibid, p. 80
69. Ibid, p. 82
70. Ibid, p. 81
71. Ibid, p. 81
72. Ibid, p. 103
73. Ibid, p. 111
74. Ibid, p. 106
75. Ibid, p. 2
76. Ibid, p. 106
77. Ibid, p. 107
78. DL, p. 104
79. See DL pgs. 108-109 where Foucault distinguishes forms of light: a 'first' light "whose ultimate sweep delivers the being of things" and a dazzling 'second light' that exists only momentarily as a contraction, distribution and dispersion of the first.
80. DL, p. 96
81. Both Roussel and Brisset construct writing machines to engage the cleavage between 'words and things.' Foucault will bring out the differences between their 'process' and 'method' and refocus this difference in terms of a historical dynamic, machines that make one see and say according to a specific combination of historical conditions.
82. Ibid, p. 812
83. Ibid, p. 812
84. Ibid, p. 809
85. Ibid, p. 809
86. Ibid, p. 810
87. Ibid, p. 811
88. Ibid, p. 811
89. Ibid, p. 812
90. Ibid, p. 812
91. I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister and my brother ... a Case of Parricide in the 19th Century, trans. F Jellinek (New York, 1975) (hereafter referred to as IPR) p. 212
92. M Foucault, Foucault Live, Semiotext(e), 1989, p. 132
93. IPR, p. 200
94. Ibid, p. 201
95. Ibid, p. 201
96. Ibid, pgs. 202-3
97. Ibid, p.203
98. Ibid, p.203
99. Ibid, p.208
100. Ibid, p.209
103. DP, p.193
106. Ibid, p.28
107. Ibid
108. Ibid, pgs. 28-9
109. Foucault often (in AK) refers to enunciative deposits as sediment that combine and act together to create a specific historical 'reality.' The archaeologist would attempt to make these sedimentary beds visible by disturbing them and thereby transforming them. See also G Deleuze, "What is a Dispositif?" in M Foucault, Philosopher, trans. T Armstrong, (Harvester Press, 1992), pgs. 139-169.
110. Ibid, p.175
111. Ibid, pgs 103-31
112. Ibid, p.131
113. Ibid, p.131
114. G Deleuze cited in J Rajchman, 'Crisis,' Representations 28, Fall 1989, p.91
115. AK, p.130
116. Ibid, p.131
117. AK, p.17
118. OT, p.339
119. Ibid, Preface, p.xviii
120. Ibid, Preface, p.xv
121. Ibid, Preface, p.xviii
122. Ibid, Preface, p.xv
123. Ibid, Preface, p.xvii
124. Ibid, Preface, pgs. xvii-xviii
125. Ibid, Preface, p.xx
126. Ibid, p.3
127. Ibid, p.4
128. Ibid, p.5
129. Ibid, p.7
130. Ibid, p.16
131. Ibid, p.11
132. Ibid, p.11
133. Ibid, p.13
134. Ibid, p.11
135. Ibid, p.11
136. Ibid, p.4
137. Ibid, p.15
138. Ibid, p.11
139. Ibid, p.79
140. Ibid, p.317
141. Ibid, pgs.310-11
142. Ibid, p.131
143. Ibid, p.131
144. Ibid, pgs. 127-28
145. Ibid, p. 133
146. See OT, p. 133
147. OT, p. 177
148. Ibid, p. 176
149. Ibid, p. 175
150. Ibid, p. 312
151. Ibid, p. 244
152. Ibid, p. 317
153. Ibid, p. 319
154. Ibid, p. 316
155. Ibid, p. 313
156. Ibid, p. 341
157. Ibid, p. 221. Chapter 7 deals in detail with this First Phase and Chapter 8 deals with the second
158. Ibid, p. 370
160. AK, p. 127
161. Deleuze, Foucault, p. 51
162. OT, p. 323
163. Ibid, p. 326
164. Ibid, p. 328
165. Ibid, p. 341
166. Ibid, p. 341
167. Ibid, p. 309
168. Ibid, p. 386
169. Ibid, p. 342
170. See the introduction to the Archaeology where Foucault states the "aim is to define a method of historical analysis freed from the anthropological theme" and its twin figure humanism.
171. AK, pgs. 191-92
172. Deleuze, Foucault, p. 18
173. AK, p. 86
174. H Dreyfuss and P Rabinow, M Foucault - Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, (Harvester, 1986)
175. Deleuze, Foucault, p. 50
176. AK, p. 120
177. Ibid, p. 45
178. Ibid, p. 109
179. Ibid, p. 121
180. Ibid, p. 49
181. Deleuze, Foucault, p. 54
182. AK, p. 157
183. Deleuze, Foucault, p. 3
184. AK, p. 37
185. AK, p. 120
186. Deleuze, Foucault, p. 15
187. AK, p. 65
188. AK, p. 119
189. Deleuze, Foucault, p. 3
190. AK, p. 144
191. Ibid, p. 144
192. Ibid, p. 116
193. Ibid, p. 37
194. Ibid, p. 82
195. Ibid, p. 87  
196. Ibid, pgs. 183-84  
197. Ibid, p. 169  
198. Deleuze, Foucault, p. 12  
199. AK, p. 105  
200. OT, p. 9  
201. AK, p. 194  
202. Ibid, p. 193  
203. Ibid, p. 193  
204. TNP, p. 57  
205. Ibid, p. 21  
206. OT, p. 9  
207. TNP, pgs. 30-1  
208. Ibid, p. 28  
209. OT, p. 9  
210. TNP, pgs. 32-3  
211. Ibid, p. 34  
212. Ibid, pgs. 33-4  
213. Ibid, p. 28  
214. Ibid, p. 35  
215. Ibid, p. 25  
216. Ibid, p. 21  
217. Ibid, p. 22  
218. Ibid, pgs. 24-5  
219. Ibid, p. 28  
220. Ibid, p. 26  
221. Ibid, p. 26  
222. Ibid, p. 36  
223. Ibid, p. 28  
224. Ibid, p. 49  
225. Ibid, p. 44  
226. Ibid, p. 44  
227. Ibid, p. 44  
228. Deleuze, Foucault, p. 67  
229. TNP, p. 54  
230. F Reader, p. 56  
231. Ibid, p. 56  
232. Deleuze, Nomadology  
233. M Foucault cited in Bernauer, op cit, p. 2

CHAPTER 3

1. Foucault/Blanchot, Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from Outside, (Urzone, 1987), p. 13, (hereafter referred to as TFO)
2. TFO, p. 16
4. F Reader, p. 335
5. M Foucault in The Foucault Effect - Studies in Governmentality, p. 76 (Harvester, 1991), (hereafter referred to as F. Effect)
6. F Reader, p. 56
7. F Effect p. 76
8. Ibid, p. 76
9. Ibid, p. 76
10. Ibid, p.77
11. Ibid, p.77
12. Ibid, p.77
13. Ibid, p.77
14. M Foucault cited in Pamela Major-Poetzl, op cit, p.18
15. PK, p.137
17. Mode of existence no longer designates the 'law' or 'principle' of statements as discursive formation but power as the immanent condition for the functioning of the visible and the articulable as a single event-mechanism.
18. PK, p.194
19. LCMP, p.182, translated as "the swarming of individualities"
20. F. Effect, p.78
21. F Reader, pgs. 56-7
22. Ibid, pgs. 56-7
23. LCMP, pgs. 184-85
25. LCMP, p.182
26. LCMP, p.168
27. Ibid, p.168
28. Ibid, p.182
29. Ibid, p.178
30. Ibid, p.172
31. These are, of course, Kantian regulative ideas whose role and function (as supra-conditioning figures of the understanding) both Foucault and Deleuze are displacing in relation to the constitution of events.
32. LCMP, p.177
34. LCMP, p.169
35. Ibid, p.169
36. OD, p.69
37. LCMP, p.173
38. Ibid, p.174
39. Ibid, p.178
40. Ibid, p.178
41. Foucault also describes the 'uncrossable fissure' of the outside on an immanent "width-less crack" (LCMP, p.175) straddled by a differential 'grammar' of time: the infinite displacement of the 'moment.'
42. LCMP, p.178
43. PK, p.20
44. OD, p.69
45. AK, p.12
46. Ibid, p.12
47. PK, pgs. 69-70
48. OD, p.67
49. Ibid, p.67
50. Ibid, p.69
51. Ibid, p.69
52. Ibid, p.69
53. AK, p.28
54. We believe that the archaeological/genealogical effort (as an eventalisation of thought) consists in pushing the mixed lines of stratification to the plane where 'immanent' variation is no longer dependent upon structure or development but on the mutation, combination and fusion (effectivity) of lines of flight. Foucault always recognised the instability of lines of force and the immanent existence of lines of resistance inherent within power.

55. F Reader, p.88
56. Ibid, p.82
57. Ibid, p.94
58. Ibid, p.84
59. Ibid, p.84
60. Ibid, p.84
61. Ibid, pgs. 84-5
62. Ibid, p.85
63. Ibid, p.85
64. Ibid, p.81
65. Ibid, p.81
66. Ibid, p.87
67. Ibid, p.93
68. Ibid, p.85
69. Ibid, p.81
70. Ibid, p.84
71. Ibid, p.86
72. LCMP, pgs. 194-95
73. F Reader, p.89
74. OD, p.65
75. TFO, pgs. 25-6
76. Logic of Sense, Deleuze, op cit, p.53
77. TFO, pgs. 25-6
78. LCMP, pgs. 185-86
79. TFO, pgs. 23-4
80. Ibid, p.18
81. Ibid, p.24
82. G. Deleuze, Foucault. p.119
83. PK, p.193
84. M Foucault cited in M Foucault Philosopher, ed. T Armstrong, op cit, p.149
85. OT, p.329 and 325
86. Deleuze, Foucault, p.120
87. See PK, pgs. 131-33 for the conception of regime of truth.
88. PK, p.132
89. F. Effect, p.75
90. Ibid, p.75
91. Ibid, p.79
92. Ibid, p.50
93. Ibid, p.79
94. Ibid, p.79
95. PK, p.194
96. F Effect, p.80
97. Ibid, p. 32
98. Ibid, p.37
99. M Foucault, Of Other Spaces, op cit., p.25
100. F Effect, p.80
101. Ibid, p.80
102. Ibid, p.76
103. Ibid, p.76
104. T Adorno & M Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (Verso, 1979) p.84
105. F Effect, p.82
106. Ibid, p.78
107. F Effect, p.76
108. Ibid, p.76
109. F Reader, p.95
110. Ibid, pgs. 89-90
111. Ibid, p.90
112. AK, pgs. 130-31
113. BC, p.3
114. F Effect, p.75
115. DP, p.232
116. Foucault Live, p.112
117. Ibid, p.252
118. F Reader, pgs. 43 and 45
119. PK, p.62
120. Ibid, p.72
121. Ibid, p.133
122. Foucault Live, p.155
124. PK, p.127
125. Ibid, p.127
126. M Foucault, "The Subject & Power", in Dreyfuss & Rabinow, op cit, p.212
127. Ibid, p.212
128. Deleuze, Foucault, p.90
129. F Effect, p.83
130. Ibid, p.84
131. Ibid, p.84
132. M Foucault, Questions of Method, Ideology and Consciousness, No. 6 p.84. See also F Effect pgs. 73-4 which reads "anticipatory strings of dots"
133. F Reader, p.46
134. Ibid, p.46
135. Thus Habermas proposes 'radicalizing' the metacritical project by demanding a new trial and a new charge without for all that questioning the juridical itself.
136. HS, 86
137. Foucault Live, p.79
138. F Reader, p.14
139. Ibid, p.41
140. F Effect, p.84
142. PK, p.121, "we need to cut off the kings head"
143. F Reader, p.45
144. F Effect, p.84
145. M Foucault, "is it really important to think", Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol 9 Part 1, Spring, 1982, p.33, pgs. 29-40. See also 'Practicing Criticism' in PPC, pgs. 152-159
146. Ibid, pgs. 33-4
147. TFO, p.23
148. HS, p.93
CHAPTER 4

1. PK, p.149
2. Ibid, p.69
3. PK, p.196
4. Deleuze, Foucault, p.27
5. Foucault Live, p.187
6. DP, p.205
7. Deleuze, Foucault, p.119
8. PPC, p.43
9. HS, p.98
11. DP, p.28
12. Ibid, p.194
13. Ibid, p.27
14. The source text is M Blanchot's The Infinite Conversation especially "speaking is not seeing." This is a theme present in all of Foucault’s work, internal to each topological zone (knowledge, power, self) and linking them together. Foucault’s most emphatic texts in this regard are: "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in F Reader or LCMP, This is Not a Pipe and The Thought From Outside which should be read together. See also the (brilliant) analysis by Deleuze in Foucault especially 'strata or historical formations' where Foucault’s thought is developed outside of any Kantian, phenomenological, structural or semiotic framework into a thought that "is uniquely akin to contemporary film", both a mixing and a separation of audio-visual regimes.
15. Deleuze, Foucault, p.27
16. DP, p.197
17. Ibid, p.39
18. DP, pgs. 206-07
19. Deleuze, Foucault, p.39
20. HS, p.93
21. DP, p.163
22. Ibid, pgs. 137-38
23. F Reader, p.83
24. Ibid, p.83
25. F Nietzsche, Geneology of Morals (Vintage, 1967), especially essay 2 section 16 on the internalisation of instinct and the emergence of 'bad conscience.'
26. Deleuze/Guattari, Anti-Oedipus
27. DP, p.25
28. Ibid, p.26
29. LCMP, p.170
30. Ibid, p.170
31. DP, pgs. 77-78
32. Ibid, p.137
33. Ibid, p.138
34. Ibid, p.138
35. Ibid, p.215
36. Ibid, p.143
37. Ibid, p.136
38. Ibid, p.143
39. Ibid, p.143
40. Ibid, p.144
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41. Ibid, p. 144
42. Ibid, p. 145
43. Ibid, pgs. 145-46
44. Ibid, p. 148
45. Ibid, p. 148
46. Ibid, p. 148
47. Ibid, p. 147
48. Ibid, pgs. 151-52
49. Ibid, p. 154
50. Ibid, p. 161
51. Ibid, p. 161
52. Ibid, p. 161
53. Ibid, p. 161
54. Ibid, p. 164
55. Ibid, p. 163
56. Ibid, p. 164
57. Ibid, p. 167
58. F Reader, p. 71
59. DP, p. 228
60. Ibid, p. 228
61. Ibid, pgs. 137-38
62. Ibid, p. 25
63. Ibid, p. 271
64. Ibid, p. 271
65. Ibid, p. 29
66. Ibid, p. 29
67. Ibid, p. 30
68. Ibid, p. 29
69. Deleuze, Foucault, p. 26
70. DP, p. 213
71. Ibid, p. 304
72. Ibid, p. 184
73. HS, p. 90
74. Ibid, p. 89
75. Ibid, p. 144
76. Ibid, p. 144
77. Ibid, p. 144
78. DP, p. 183
79. Ibid, p. 183
80. Ibid, p. 184
81. Ibid, p. 191
82. Ibid, p. 209. The whole trajectory of DP is determined by this transition from negative discipline that confines, excludes and prohibits to a positive construction and investment of space-time.
83. DP, p. 193
84. Ibid, p. 193
85. PK, p. 98
86. DP, p. 181
87. Ibid, pgs. 170-71
88. Ibid, p. 189
89. Ibid, p. 192
90. Ibid, p. 192
91. G Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, (Athlone, 1984) p. 18
92. AK, p. 127
93. HS, p. 136
94. HS, p. 144
100. See pages 81-91 of HS where Foucault sets out an 'analytics' of power in opposition to an analysis made in terms of a 'repression of instincts' and the theory of law as constitutive of desire since both are underpinned by a 'juridico-discursive' conception of power.

101. Deleuze, Foucault, p.136
102. DP, p.265
103. Ibid, p.202
104. HF, cited in J Bernauer, op cit, p.1
105. See J Bentham, The Panopticon Writings, (Verso, 1995)
106. DP, p.280
107. HS, pgs. 88-89
108. HS, p.89
109. DP, p.194
110. HF, The Subject and Power, in Dreyfuss and Rabinow, op cit., p. 220
111. Ibid, p.220
112. Ibid, p. 220
113. F Reader, pgs. 375-76
114. PK, p.158
115. PK, p.39
116. Ibid, p.39
117. DP, p.145
118. PK, p. 144
119. DP, p.26
120. Ibid, p.26
121. PK, p.198
122. F Effect, p.103, see also Dreyfuss & Rabinow, p.224
123. DP, p.210
124. DP, p.211
125. DP, p.211
126. HS, p.139
127. Ibid, p.98
128. Ibid, p.98
129. Ibid, p.99
130. Ibid, p.99
131. Ibid, p.99
132. Deleuze, Foucault, p.74
133. HS, p.94
134. DP, p.217
135. HS, p.96
136. Ibid, p.95
137. Ibid, p.96
138. Ibid, p.96
139. Ibid, p.99
140. Ibid, p.93
141. Ibid, p.94
142. Ibid, p.100
143. Ibid, p.101
144. Ibid, pgs. 101-02
145. F Reader, p.85
146. G Deleuze and C Parnet, Dialogues (trans) H Tomlinson and B Habberjam (Athlone, 1987)
147. HS, pgs. 94-5
148. HS, p. 95
149. Deleuze
150. HS, p. 93
151. PK, p. 196
152. HS, p. 93
153. Ibid, p. 92. "Power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organisation."
154. M Foucault, "Subject and Power", in Dreyfuss & Rabinow, op cit., p. 220
155. Ibid, p. 220
156. HS, p. 102
157. HS, p. 142
158. Ibid, p. 146
159. Ibid, p. 71
160. Ibid, pgs. 55-6
161. Ibid, p. 130
162. Ibid, pgs. 154-55
163. Ibid, p. 103
164. Ibid, p. 44
165. Ibid, pgs. 81-2
166. Ibid, p. 61
167. Ibid, p. 61
168. PK, p. 211
169. HS, p. 69
170. Ibid, p. 77
171. Ibid, p. 56
172. Ibid, p. 70
173. Ibid, p. 145
174. Ibid, p. 145
175. Ibid, pgs. 144-45
176. Ibid, pgs. 144-45
177. M Foucault, "Subject & Power", in Dreyfuss & Rabinow, op cit, p. 220
178. Ibid, p. 221
179. Ibid, p. 221
181. M Foucault, "Subject & Power", in Dreyfuss & Rabinow, op cit, p. 215
182. The family is that junction point or relay in the governmental network that enables these ends to be achieved. The family loses its status as 'model' and becomes a segment, a privileged one, in the functioning of population. The family becomes less the model of good government than an instrument in its constitution and functioning. The 'economy' of the family is accordingly elevated to an economy of populations, a 'political economy' or science. This new science arises "out of the perception of new networks of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory and wealth." This new science also develops techniques and instruments for intervention in the fields of economy and population.
183. Deleuze, Foucault, pgs. 94-5
CHAPTER 5

2. G Deleuze, *Foucault*, p.98
3. *LCMP*, p.42
4. M Foucault cited in J Miller, p.336, see also *Remarks on Marx*, p.121
7. *F Reader*, p.351
9. G Deleuze, *Foucault*, p.110, see also p.96
10. G Deleuze, *Foucault*, p.98
11. *PPC*, p.253, see also *Foucault Live*, op cit, p.330
12. *UP*, pgs. 11-12
13. M Foucault, Preface to *Anti-Oedipus*, op cit, p.330
17. *UP*, p.8
19. Ibid, p.121
20. G Deleuze, *Pourparlers*, op cit, p.156
21. *UP*
23. *F Reader*, p.356
24. *UP*, p.80
25. *Foucault Live*, p.207
26. G Deleuze, *Foucault*, p.117
27. M Foucault cited in J Bernauer, op cit, p.1
28. Deleuze, *Foucault*, p.87
29. *OT*, p.50
30. *M&C*, p.11
31. *LCMP*, p.170
32. *F Reader*, p.356
33. Ibid, p.356
34. Ibid, p.356
35. Ibid, p.356
36. *UP*, p.27
37. *F Reader*, p.355
38. Deleuze, *Foucault*, p.104
39. F Reader, p.355
40. UP, p.11
41. UP, p.77
42. UP, pgs. 50-52
43. PPC, p.263, but see also F Live, p.303
44. UP, p.10
45. M Foucault, "Subject & Power" in Dreyfus & Rabinow, op cit, p.212
46. F Reader, p.46
47. Deleuze, Foucault, p.119
48. LCMP, p.185
49. Ibid, p.185
50. Ibid, p.185
51. Ibid, p.185
52 F Reader, p.388
53. Foucault Live, p.296, also PPC, p.257
54. M Foucault, "The Ethics of the Care for the Self," op cit, p.129
55. F Reader, p.385
56. Ibid, p.385
57. Ibid, p.385
58. See the introduction to UP, especially "Forms of Problematisation" pgs. 14-32
59. Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.160
60. F Reader, p.388
61. Ibid, p.343
62. UP, p.11
63. Ibid, p.9
64. Deleuze, "What is Dispositif?", in M Foucault Philosopher, T Armstrong, op cit, p.165
65. AK, p.131
66. UP, p.9. The English translation reads "the living substance of philosophy, at least if we assume that philosophy is still what it was in times past, i.e., an "ascesis," askesis, an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought."
67. Ibid, p.11
68. F Reader, p.340
69. UP, p.9
70. LCMP, p.194
71. UP, pgs. 6-7
72. LCMP, p.194
73. Deleuze & Guattari, What is Philosophy, op cit, p.158
74. Deleuze, Foucault, p.108
75. Ibid, p.107
76. F Reader, p.38, see also PPC, pgs. 86-95
77. Deleuze, Foucault, p.115
79. Deleuze, Foucault, p.122
80. UP, pgs. 29-30
81. OT, p.278
82. Deleuze, Foucault, p.104
83. Deleuze, Difference & Repetition (trans) P Patton (Athlone, 1994)
84. AK, p.175
85. Deleuze, Foucault, pgs. 118-19
86. Ibid, p.107
87. Ibid, p.107
89. Ibid, p.7
90. See P Guattari, *The Three Ecologies*
91. UP, p.8
92. Deleuze, Foucault, p.103
93. Ibid, p.96
94. Ibid, p.40
95. M Foucault in "Subject & Power" in Dreyfus & Rabinow, op cit.
96. See the Subject & Power, in Dreyfus & Rabinow, op cit, especially pgs 220-221
97. F Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, op cit, p.270
98. Deleuze & Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op cit, p.9
99. PK, p.194
100. Ibid, p.195
101. Ibid, pgs. 194-95
102. PPC, p.37
103. M Foucault in "Subject & Power" in Dreyfus & Rabinow, op cit, p.212
104. M Foucault, Remarks on Marx, p.31
105. Ibid, p.8
106. Thousand Plateaus, p.151
107. Ibid, p.150
108. Remarks on Marx, p.49
109. The 'machinic' is taken here to refer to the heterogeneous assembly, connection and distribution of its own parts and material as immanent condition. The subject is a component that is used, transformed, invested, relocated etc. Thus Foucault talks of a 'multi-segmentary machine' made up from all kinds of machiners: 'machine-prison', 'hospital machine,' 'machines for learning' (school), 'observation machines,' etc. The subject passes through all of these machines.
110. Thousand Plateaus, p.20
111. Remarks on Marx, p.46
112. Remarks on Marx, pgs. 121-22
113. Ibid, pgs. 123-24
114. Deleuze, Foucault, p.98
116. TFO, p.27
117. Ibid, p.27
118. Ibid, p.27
119. Deleuze, Foucault
120. Deleuze, Foucault, p.87
121. F Reader, p.343
122. See Especially "The Ethic of Care for the Self as Practice of Freedom" in *The Final Foucault*, Philosophies & Social Criticism, 1982
123. Foucault refers variously to an art of living, arts of existence and techniques of life to designate an experience that is, for us "extraordinarily close." F Live, p.323. See also "The concern for truth," pgs. 293-308, especially pgs. 298-99.
124. F Guattari, "Chaosmose" cited in J A Fernandez, Towards a Queer Chaosmosis, Angelaki, Vol 1, No 1, p.103
125. "The Ethic of Care for the Self as Practice of Freedom", op cit, p.115
126. F Guattari, "Toward a New Perspective on Identity", p. 97, Angelaki, Vol 1, No 1, 1993
127. F Guattari, "Chaosmose", op cit, p.94
128. Foucault Interviews
129. "The Ethic of Care for the Self as Practice of Freedom" op cit, p.121
130. F Guattari, "Chaosmose" in Fernandez, op cit, p.27
131. F Guattari, "Toward a new Perspective on Identity - An Interview with F Guattari" in Angelaki, Vol 1, No 1, pgs. 96-98

**EPILOGUE**

3. G Deleuze and F Guattari, What is Philosophy?, op cit, p.158
5. F Reader, p.246
6. G Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, p.192
7. M Foucault cited in O'Farrell, op cit, p.32
8. F Reader, p.388
9. G Deleuze, Dialogues, p.viii
10. UP, p.9
11. OT, p.278
12. See Foucault’s preface to Anti-Oedipus, op cit.
13. G Deleuze, Foucault, pgs. 92-3
14. UP, p.9
15. Remarks on Marx, p.121
16. G Deleuze, Nomadology: The War Machine (Semiotext(e))
17. G Deleuze, Cinema, Vol. 11, p.246
18. G Deleuze, Foucault, p.122
19. G Deleuze, Spinoza
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