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DELEUZE'S 'BECOMING-SUBJECT': DIFFERENCE
AND THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL

Clifford Scott Stagoll

Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
University of Warwick
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Summary

This study argues that a theory of the distinctively human individual lies latent within Deleuze's readings of Hume and Bergson and his two major metaphysical treatises. This evolving theory derives from efforts to re-think the concept of 'the subject' in terms of 'difference', 'becoming', 'repetition' and 'event'. Using critical exegesis, the study shows that Deleuze's model is precise and workable, capable of supplanting discredited accounts of the subject and nullifying charges that Deleuze is an 'anti-humanist'.

Deleuze's subject is neither pre-existent nor stable, but always in the process of becoming-other, individuated by inherent differences. Chapter 1 argues that Deleuze's account (and several theoretical resources) can be traced to an early engagement with empiricism, where he uses Humean atomism to define a field of difference 'within which' associationist psychological tendencies define the subject as a 'fiction'. As Chapter 2 shows, weaknesses in this model lead Deleuze to Bergson. Having adopted Bergsonian intuition as his method, Deleuze seeks after the preconditions of the flow and temporality of consciousness. He determines that the subject's constitutive moment is the virtual point of intersection between the physicality of material objects and the 'inner life' of consciousness.

Chapter 3 turns to questions of ontology and ethics, arguing that Deleuze's theory of internal difference accounts for the role of contingent circumstances in subject-formation whilst his theory of the event establishes each lived moment as unique. Deleuze interprets Nietzsche's eternal return as an ontological device entailing the recurrence of difference in the lived time of the subject's 'becoming', and as the means for coherence between the moments of a life. This theory leads Deleuze to an 'ethics of the event' with the goal of transforming human thinking from a concentration on unity and identity towards a more creative and fulfilling life of becoming.
Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used to refer to frequently cited texts:

1. Philosophy and Inheritance

For Gilles Deleuze, 'doing philosophy is trying to invent or create concepts' (N, 25). But whereas Western philosophy traditionally has used concepts to determine or express the essence of phenomena and events by way of subsumption (drawing empirical reality under a category), Deleuze has something different in mind. With his collaborator, Félix Guattari, he champions the creation of concepts capable of 'expressing' states of affairs in terms of the contingent circumstances and dynamics that lead to and follow from them. He envisages this as a thoroughly 'open ended' enterprise. 'Doing philosophy' means creating concepts that are as accessible and useful to artists and scientists as philosophers.

But doing philosophy also entails reappropriating concepts handed down by great philosophers of the past in terms of new problems, uses, terms and theories. As Deleuze puts it, 'nothing of what the great philosophers have written ... grows obsolete, but this is why, thanks to them, we have other problems to discover, problems that save us from a *return* that would only show our incapacity to follow them.' For Deleuze, moving from reiterative history of philosophy to the practice of philosophy means engaging with concepts in new ways so as to better express the events being studied. In his own corpus, Deleuze time and again transforms inherited concepts by placing them under the influence of new forces, functions and problematics. When a commentator claims that Deleuze's early studies of great philosophers 'fit modestly within the history of philosophy', she is failing to appreciate the extent to which Deleuze customarily reworks inherited ideas in terms of his own wilfully creative and transformative philosophical project.

This thesis deals with the nature and implications of Deleuze's creative re-working of one such inherited concept, 'the subject', and the way in which it 'expresses' the human individual. Time and again over the course of his long career, Deleuze returns to rework and reappropriate it in the light of new interests, problems and theoretical resources, sometimes in his own voice and sometimes with Guattari. Consequently, rather than a rigid doctrine and consistent rendition of theories of the subject, Deleuze produces a range of variable, dynamic
and radically incomplete interpretations. In his first full-length work, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, and again in *Foucault*, the subject is a principal presence, but in works such as *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*, it hovers at the fringes, seemingly unrelated to what Deleuze had written about it previously.

In a 1988 article, Deleuze acknowledges the importance of the subject as it has been conceived by Western metaphysics—as perhaps the inaugurating concept of 'modernity'—in terms of two 'functions in fields of thought': 'first a function of universalization in a field where the universal was no longer represented by objective essentials, but by acts, noetic and linguistic.... Second, the subject fulfils a function of individuation in a field where the individual can no longer be a thing or a soul, but is instead a person, alive and sentient, speaking and spoken to (I-You). In other words, the subject has served as a theoretical category of similarity subsuming both the disparate activities of persons and the Individuating circumstances that define them as persons. Typically—as could be claimed of Descartes's reflexive *ego cogito*, Kant's transcendental subject and Husserl's intentional ego—the subject is conceived as a relatively stable, objective and universally rational centre of identity. This indivisible and ahistorical core of faculties and/or functions 'converts being into being-for-us' and acts as arbiter and locus of values, meanings and truths. In terms of 'universalization', the subject is what remains after the theoretical 'removal' of the contingent circumstances of existence (body, gender, class, history, achievements, perspectives, beliefs and passions); in terms of 'individuation', it expresses effects, but only ever in an archetypal manner, consonant with humans conceived as free intellectual agents.

On occasions Deleuze questions this inheritance directly. He asks, for example: 'are these two aspects of the subject ... necessarily linked? Even if they are, isn't there a conflict between them, and how might it be solved? All these questions actuate what has been called the philosophy of the subject.' At other times, though, he 'writes past' it, producing 'philosophies of the subject' without any clear modernist heritage. In either case, though, unlike Lyotard and Baudrillard, who want to dismiss the concept entirely, Deleuze (with Foucault and Guattari) aims to develop new forms of the subject. (We ought to remind ourselves that philosophy's 'subject' is always a *concept*, so that, as Vincent Descombes puts it, 'what we call the critique of the subject is in fact the critique of the *concept* of subject'.)
Some philosophers are unconvinced that a concept with such weighty 'metaphysical baggage' can be reappropriated at all; at least not whilst retaining a sense of continuity with a heritage extending from Augustine to Husserl. Jacques Derrida, for example, believes that one cannot break with post-Enlightenment thinking on the subject whilst retaining its language. At best, Derrida insists, 'the subject' can be just 'an index for ... discussion', since open reappropriation risks re-introducing precisely those problematic characteristics that are in question. By contrast, for Deleuze, it is always better to develop new functions and theoretical fields for an inherited concept than to set it aside as though 'dead'.

The question is, however, with respect to the subject, 'can we find new functions and variables able to bring about a change?' The thesis defended here is that Deleuze can and does; that an alternative and evolving theory of the subject lies latent within some of his works on figures from the received history of philosophy, and in several of the earlier texts written 'in his own voice'. This emerging theory interprets the subject in terms of Deleuze's philosophy of difference and becoming, and produces a model of the continuous individuation or 'becoming' of a dynamic human form. Deleuze's theory of the subject entails not just a psychology and metaphysics of human existence, but also an ethic of affirmation designed to recapture the 'concrete richness of experience' that Deleuze believes has been lost in modernist styles of thinking and living.

The importance of finding and explicating such a theory is at least threefold. First, as Jean-Luc Nancy points out, 'everything seems to point to the necessity, not of a "return to the subject" ... but, on the contrary, of a move forward toward someone—someone—else'. Inherited models of the subject have been criticized heavily by Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and philosophers aligned with structuralism and its post-1968 derivatives. This is not to say that all these critics wanted to kill off the subject completely, but just that the preeminence of the unified, rational and transparent model now appears to many thinkers to be so dubious that its dissolution is justified.

Considerably less attention has been paid to what follows this dissolution, however. As Frank Farrell puts it, many of the critiques presume that there are in their wake no further issues concerning the nature of consciousness, what it means for the world to seem some way or other, what it is for a self to be concerned for itself, and so on. But such questions have not in
fact gone away simply because one conceptual vision has been denounced. I will show that
Deleuze's theory goes some way towards filling this void.

Second, the thesis advanced here recuperates Deleuze from charges that, with Guattari,
he is an 'anti-humanist' whose theories and rhetorical devices have eliminated the possibility of
an ethics of equality founded upon the attribution of rights to humans. The best known
accusers are Luc Ferry, Alain Renaut and Manfred Frank. The difficulty is determining
precisely what is meant by 'anti-humanism' in this context. On textual evidence, it seems to
involve two claims: that Deleuze wants to do away with the humanist model of the subject
inherited from modernism, and that its place ought to be taken by a concept that is not related
specifically to either human individuals or the human genre. The first of these seems a
reasonable characterization of Deleuze's position(s), but I aim to show that the second is not. If
'humanism' designates an appeal to 'common essential features in terms of which human
beings can be defined and understood', then the evolving theory of the subject uncovered here
is decidedly humanist.

Certainly it is easy to find in some of Deleuze and Guattari's works evidence of distaste
for 'the subject' and instances where the concept is divorced from distinctively human traits.
Deleuze states overtly that 'there's no subject' and—more relevant to my reading—that 'there's
nothing transcendent, no Unity [and no] subject' and that 'a multiplicity has neither subject nor
object' (N, 86, 88-9, 113, 145-46). In Anti-Oedipus, The Logic of Sense, and Dialogues with
Claire Parnet, the lexicon of the human is replaced by discussions of individuals as
'transpersonal abstract lines', 'abstract machines', 'machinic assemblages' and 'desiring
machines' moved by anonymous 'forces' and 'desires'. There are discussions of how new
types of 'decentred' subjects or 'nomad selves' might come to 'traverse' humans, plants and
animals. In short, these works appear to be preoccupied with machinic individuations and
effects rather than with human individuals and actions, so that charges of anti-humanism seem
justified.

There are two ways to counter such an interpretation. One way would be to claim that
Deleuze's and Guattari's immoderate use of metaphor and hyperbolic style (which Frank calls
'Dadaist and carnivalesque', fronting 'unsubstantial prattle') disguises a critique of the bourgeois
modernist subject rather than advocating doing away with the concept qua human subject
altogether. Such a position would be simplistic in the extreme, however, since the more radical of Deleuze's and Guattari's texts clearly are serious attempts to vanquish the human in favour of freer dynamics of agency and praxis. (In the Conclusion, I shall say more about this position in respect to the volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*.)

The second way to counter a focus on Deleuze's experimental 'philosophy of desire' is to emphasize that it is only the main focus of writings in the period from 1972 to 1977. By striking a tangent through a wider range of Deleuze's works, one finds an emphasis on the subject as distinctively human without a lapse into the humanism of modern philosophy (that is, the unwarranted and arrogant privileging of the human subject as the locus of meaning and value). As Alexander Nehamas reminds us, 'to characterize oneself as a humanist is not necessarily to be a friend of the human; and to be antihumanist is not necessarily to be its foe.' Even if one agrees with Ferry and Renaut that Deleuze is a *kind* of antihumanist, he is not the kind that takes 'the human' as an enemy. When Deleuze writes about 'others of my kind', he means to refer to a *human genre* (*LS*, 301-21, *DR*, 260-61).

A third reason for expounding Deleuze's theory of the subject is to counter accusations of imprecision. The most explicit of these is made by Pascal Engel in a highly critical 1994 paper. Engel wonders

why, in spite of all [Deleuze's] attempts to find layers in the realm of subjectivity, do we have the impression that his criticism of consciousness and subjectivity is so massive that it often amounts just to some sort of handwaving in a critical direction? After twenty years of criticism of subjectivity we still do not know exactly what was being criticized all along.

If Deleuze's theorization is as ambiguous as Engel suggests, then it could not hold much promise as a means for rethinking the human individual.

But as we shall see, Engel is plain wrong. Deleuze's model is sophisticated, precise and detailed: Indeed the quest for precision is what leads Deleuze to re-think his interpretation over a period of some 40 years. Nor is it the case that Deleuze undertakes "deconstruction" without construction', a tendency that Engel believes typifies the kind of philosophy of which Deleuze's is part. As Deleuze reminds us time and again, every theory multiplies itself in the course of its development. I will show that his theory of the subject is a product of progressively deeper insights, more incisive criticisms, and new problems and perspectives.
2. Deleuze's Styles

A number of philosophers have commented on Deleuze's interpretations and reappropriations of the subject. A brief survey is in order to better situate this thesis, particularly as I have not had occasion to refer to them often in developing my alternative rendition. In his book *Deleuze and Guattari*, Ronald Bogue provides a detailed study of the models of the subject advanced in the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, emphasising the extent to which such concepts as 'desiring machine' and 'nomadic subject' supplant notions of goal-driven and efficient behaviours. In a later piece, he shows how Deleuze's conception of the subject can be allied with Foucault's version by using an ontology of forces to account for 'self-coding' and 'self-formation'. However the subject is not the focus of Bogue's studies of Deleuze's historical works, *Difference and Repetition*, or *The Logic of Sense*.

By contrast, Constantin Boundas agrees with me that 'an important theory of subjectivity' runs through Deleuze's corpus as a product of his efforts to 'open a new space for a new subjectivity'. For Boundas, however, this theory should only be assessed in terms of various theoretical 'series' running through Deleuze's texts, each of which deals with a different aspect of subjectivity, and between which one might locate convergences and resonances. Boundas's most complete depiction of this position is in his article 'Deleuze: Serialization and Subject-Formation'. But even here Boundas makes mainly general observations covering a substantial number of Deleuze's texts without teasing out any one strand of argument to develop in depth. Indeed he holds that one should not try to find 'planes of consistency' across the series other than in terms of two concepts which he deems crucial: the 'cracked I' and 'chaosmos'. I cannot agree with Boundas that these are terms marking the most incisive points in Deleuze's studies of the subject. In fact it seems to me that Boundas shows in his article why discussion of theoretical convergences ought to rest instead upon such critical Deleuzian notions as becoming, difference, dynamism and repetition. This reservation aside, Boundas's are perhaps the most important writings on Deleuze and the subject.

Colwell uses Deleuze's notion of the 'prepersonal' to frame a study that focuses on the singularity of the subject and the status of 'the Other' in Deleuze's work. In manner if not methodology, Colwell's is closest to my reading of Deleuze, since it deals with the constitution
of the individual in the light of the dissolution of the humanist subject. Colwell argues that the prepersonal field not only constitutes the subject, but is the product of its dissolution. Emphasizing continuities in Deleuze's accounts of 'self', 'subject' and 'person', Colwell outlines a 'genetic structure of the Self' in terms of non-conscious repetitions, using it as a basis for describing Deleuze's views on Other and community. The article displays the rich potential of this kind of reading.23

Other commentators on Deleuze and the subject have made less substantial contributions. Rosi Braidotti points out Deleuze's commitment to studying the immanence of the subject with an eye to its redefinition in terms of becoming and bodily intensity, but fails to make clear what she considers to be the outcome. Peter Canning gives a rich and complex account of Deleuze's 'subject-multiplicity assemblage', and opens up numerous theoretical options and connections, but doesn't sustain any particular 'thread'. Philip Goodchild and John Marks identify Deleuze's emphasis upon subjectivity and consciousness in the 1970s texts as continuous with earlier work, but do not provide detailed accounts. Brian Massumi indicates that "human subjectivity" is, in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, but a 'special case' of a dissipated human body system, but makes no connection with Deleuze's historical works or his overt studies of the subject. Finally, Dorothea Olkowski claims that Deleuze reads Nietzsche's texts as countering Kant's transcendentalism by producing a 'residual subject', but her main focus is on other matters.24

Despite this attention and the range of uses to which Deleuze puts his notion of the subject, a sustained study of it has yet to be published. (The most substantial of the works surveyed are short portions of an introductory text, a chapter in a collection, and a journal article.) There are several obvious reasons why this might be. First, Deleuze's works are so rich, contentious and creative that commentators have a diverse range of topics and concepts with which to deal. Second, the subject is not central to Deleuze's best-known works, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. Third, Deleuze's occasional unqualified rejections of the subject might hide from readers its importance in other texts. Fourth, Deleuze's theories of the subject are pursued mostly in works on other philosophers, works with styles of writing and interpretation which make difficult the pursuit of a single theoretical continuity. This last matter deserves some additional remarks in light of its influence upon this thesis.
The difficulty of Deleuze's writing has often been noted. Todd May, for instance, one of Deleuze's most careful and perceptive commentators, has flagged his range of sources, the absence of theoretical unity, and the use of implicit concepts as serious obstacles to wider acclaim for Deleuze's work.\(^{25}\) One might add to this list Deleuze's unstated theoretical assumptions, failure to distinguish his positions from those of others, contentious definitions, changing levels of abstraction, exceedingly selective readings (often focusing on just those aspects that strengthen his own position), and a failure to signal continuities with previous of his works and their conclusions. Such problems are amplified in Deleuze's texts on figures from the history of philosophy which, as Colin Gordon describes them, 'are not so much dissections, still less diagnoses, as anatomies' seeking to disclose the 'internal architectonic construction' of a philosopher's thought by taking theories out of their traditional domain and relocating them amongst Deleuze's own interests and concepts.\(^{26}\) If 'things and thoughts advance or grow out from the middle', as Deleuze puts it, then 'that's where you have to get to work' (\(N\), 161).

Deleuze's style of interpretation is part of his attempt to flee the 'patently repressive role' that has been played by enforced study of prescribed figures from the history of philosophy (\(N\), 5). Two factors enabled Deleuze to make good his escape. First, he concentrated upon philosophers considered marginal to the received history of philosophy, those who 'challenged the rationalist tradition', displayed a 'hatred of Interiority', and pursued a 'critique of negativity' and a 'denunciation of power' (\(N\), 6). This group includes Lucretius, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, Nietzsche and Foucault. Second, Deleuze produced strikingly idiosyncratic and creative interpretations.

Deleuze uncovers in the texts of these thinkers, conceptual relations and lines of investigation which have been overlooked by or hidden from the view of other interpreters. Rather than trying to report a 'true' or 'definitive' authorial intention, Deleuze sets out to produce something new from the texts. He describes his approach as

a sort of buggery or (it comes to the same thing) Immaculate conception. I saw myself as taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous. It was really important for it to be his own child, because the author had to actually say all I had him saying. But the child was bound to be monstrous too, because it results from all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions that I really enjoyed. (\(N\), 6)

Notwithstanding its flamboyant tone, this passage captures something of Deleuze's 'method'
or—perhaps more accurately—his 'collection of approaches'. His interpretations are always productions, as is inevitably indicated to the reader, either surreptitiously or explicitly. This is not to suggest that Deleuze's style is as problematic as, say, Nietzsche's; the question to ask of Deleuze's works on the history of philosophy is less 'what is it about the interpretation that is being told to us by its style?' than 'what does Deleuze's style do to the interpretation?' A reader must consider Deleuze's role as an active rather than relatively passive interpreter.

These characteristics typify Deleuze's approach. He sees his project as a kind of 'nomadic thought' which transgresses traditional boundaries and stylistic expectations. Indeed Jean-Luc Nancy has suggested that Deleuze violates the bounds of philosophical work altogether. Deleuze (and Guattari) proceeds without great regard for such theoretical territories, instead occupying a theoretical 'space' defined by particular concepts and their uses before moving on. For example, Chapter I shows how Deleuze resides temporarily in the space defined by Hume's work on mind and psychology, exhausting its productive potential (a fertile soil designated by the name 'Deleuze's Hume') before moving on to different problems and approaches.

In short, Deleuze thinks with other philosophers rather than about them, bringing his own approaches to bear upon theirs and, conversely, adopting other philosophers' tools and concepts as his own. Consequently, Deleuze's concepts proliferate with each new encounter in a manner indicative of Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 'rhizome thinking'. Rather than opposing theoretical boundaries and hierarchizations of aspects of reality, rhizome thinking seeks to bypass them by generating a range of alternative visions. The image of the 'rhizome', an underground stem that grows continuously and sprouts adventitious roots, is particularly apt. Rather than conceptual order, rhizomatic philosophy invokes disorder, connectivity, unpredictability, rupture and heterogeneity as operative principles. Totalization and unity are subverted by new concepts, temporary arrangements, and constantly renewable categorizations. Ruptures in a system of meaning, value or interpretation are considered inherent to it, and need not be 'theorized away'. Clearly, interactions with other philosophers are fertile fields for Deleuze's rhizomatic generation of concepts, making pursuit of a single theoretical thread even more challenging. (Note that the rhizome is used not only to describe Deleuze's philosophical approach to concept-creation, but also—as in Chapter 1—to theorize processes of
Some theorists have argued that study of 'the subject' and 'subjectivity' is moot because of the under-determined or indeterminate character of the central concepts. Deleuze's aversion to firm and referential definitions and his unwillingness to adopt definitions proposed by other thinkers, although consistent with the tenets of rhizomatic philosophy, makes things no easier. With this in mind, I have usually left open the meaning of such terms until their place in Deleuze's reasoning has been established clearly. However, without some preliminary characterization of Deleuze's sense of the terms, it is easy to 'import' a meaning that is foreign to his project and thereby misleading. The depiction that follows is, then, purely preliminary.

The traditional meaning of 'subject', and Deleuze's objections to it, have been introduced above. If the subject in the traditional sense is 'something invested with duties, power, and knowledge', as Deleuze claims, then a major aspect of his project is to show that the subject is not a thing at all, but just a passive effect of diverse productive processes (A, 176). As such, Deleuze's use of 'subject' can be referred legitimately to the Latin 'subjectum' ('that which lies under') so long as it is conceived as a shifting ground of processes rather than as a static and substantial structure which thinks, feels, desires or perceives. Deleuze's 'subject' is not a power of synthesis, a determinable counterpart of a phenomenal object or the bearer of consciousness. Neither does it equate with individual persons, selves or objects of determination. For Deleuze, any semblance of unity is not due to a gifted essence, but to what Braidotti calls 'the fictional choreography of many levels into one socially operational self' in a manner that is always contingent upon the range of lived circumstances.

Since the eighteenth century, 'self' has been used to refer to either a person (with greater emphasis on the psychological dimensions of the 'inner life' and less on bodily incarnation) or a transcendental self or transcendental ego with attendant cosmic ambitions. Deleuze's texts provide few clues on how 'self' ought to be discriminated from 'subject'. Taking a lead from the French 'moi', the emphatic form of the singular personal pronoun translated as 'self', the term seems to mean in Deleuze's texts something like 'how the subject (qua process) seems to itself in lived reality'. In other words, 'self' seems to function as the subject of enunciation for the 'I', setting aside traditional requirements for self-consciousness. (By contrast, 'soi' is 'self' in the broad sense, conveying a referential neutrality absent in 'moi'.)
The term 'l' (je') also is problematic, since Deleuze's accounts of it are complex and diverse. It might be that one knows what 'l' means just by saying it, as Deleuze and Guattari claim, but this does not make it easier to theorize. Although Deleuze's meanings vary with the text, 'l' is usually the term that designates the speaker reflexively (that is, the linguistic correlate of the subject), without presuppositions about the speaker's being a logical subject of the utterance.

Deleuze uses 'subjectivity' in two distinct senses. On the one hand, it designates 'inner-life' or 'how inner life seems to be' in referring to the subject's direct and pre-reflective acquaintance with 'itself', without invoking presumptions about the nature of self-knowledge or the subject's presence to itself. On the other hand, 'subjectivity' means just 'pertaining to the subject' as Deleuze has theorized it to that point. (Deleuze also uses 'subjectivity'—often in tandem with 'subjectification'—when describing Foucault's account of the influence of social forces upon the constitution of the subject, but this use is not mentioned herein.) Deleuze notes that 'the simple fact that subjectivity is produced, that it's a "way", should be enough to convince one the word should be treated very carefully' (N, 115). With this in mind, I take care to mark the particular meaning of each use.

Finally, Deleuze refers to 'consciousness' ('la conscience') despite a proclaimed aversion to the term and a tendency to devalue consciousness in favour of non-conscious aspects of thought. Whereas consciousness in the technical sense usually entails a unity amongst conscious states, Deleuze adopts the less technical and pre-reflective sense of simply 'being conscious' (or aware) of things, persons, thoughts, or qualities. Nor does this entail necessarily focusing one's (conscious) attention upon some state or other, but only the state's being within the scope of one's awareness.

3. TRACING DELEUZE ON THE SUBJECT

My approach to reading Deleuze in the light of his complex style and aversion to formal definitions has been to work closely with his texts, engaging with the intricate particulars that give Deleuze's theory of the subject its depth. The goal throughout has been to reveal Deleuze's theory of the subject qua human individual and to determine whether or not it
explains successfully all that it seems to explain. As such, my approach is more exegetical than critical, and more concerned with Deleuze's historical works as presentations of his own theory than as accurate re-presentations of other thinkers. Thus, for instance, 'Deleuze's Hume' is considered more important than 'Hume'. To read these texts otherwise would be to overlook the extent to which Deleuze's philosophy of difference permeates his interpretations, and to complicate unnecessarily the revelation of thematic and referential continuities across Deleuze's corpus.

The reading derived from this approach is relatively systematic and linear. I don't mean by this, however, that it is meant to be definitive or 'closed off' from alternative renditions. Rather, I mean that it forms a 'system' in Deleuze's sense of a productive assemblage of heterogeneous elements, and that the argument follows a particular thematic 'line of flight' which develops as more and more concepts are added to the assemblage. In other words, it makes no claim to be Deleuze's 'position' on the subject, but just a line of reasoning that can be read 'into' Deleuze's texts as well as 'out of' them.

The development of this line has not necessitated 'forcing' Deleuze's texts in the manner of some of his own readings. But it has involved constructing and justifying thematic links and conceptual ties from a jumble of hidden relationships and multiple meanings. (Whilst agreeing with André Pierre Colombat that anyone using Deleuze's concepts ought to metamorphose the tools they borrow, I would add that one has little choice in the matter.) It has also required the selection of particular texts from Deleuze's corpus. From the historical works, I have focused upon Empiricism and Subjectivity and Bergsonism because they provide the most detailed, explicit and sustained accounts of the psychological 'mechanisms' (in Deleuze's sense) involved in constitution of the subject and the experience called subjectivity, especially with respect to encounters with the world of objects and the influence of social and economic factors. Other of Deleuze's texts could easily dovetail with this project: for example, Foucault would locate it within wider sociological, judicial and politico-economic contexts, Deleuze's two works on Spinoza could establish a corporeal ethic quite distinct from the psychological one developed here, and Nietzsche and Philosophy would support a reading of psychological phenomena as products and instances of abstract forces, thus situating the subject within a broader metaphysics.
Whilst I have had occasion to return several times to Deleuze's relationship with Kant on issues of methodology, temporality, 'common sense' and self-reflection, I have not otherwise contextualized Deleuze's work in terms of inherited philosophies of the subject. Deleuze is not presented herein as the arch-enemy of Hegel, for instance, as in Michael Hardt's celebrated commentary.  

The thesis is structured around several stages in the development of Deleuze's theory of the subject, each signalled by his engagement with a particular thinker or his adoption of particular concepts. Chapter 1 shows how Deleuze's engagement with Humean empiricism yields a preliminary model of the subject theorized in terms of interactions between dynamic and creative activity on the one hand, and elements of restriction and stabilization on the other. Following Hume's introspective 'psychology of affections', Deleuze argues that atomistic Ideas are at the origin of the mind (a model which antedates, I will argue, the later model of the rhizome). Deleuze locates between Ideas a field of difference 'within which' complex thoughts, lines of argument and other aspects of consciousness develop. The processes of their development, described in terms of Hume's 'passions' and 'principles of association', is constrained by contingent 'general rules' which form and operate under the influence of the life of practice. The subject is derived from these mechanisms of restraint as an habitual 'fiction', a psychological effect called 'I'. On this view, the static model of the subject indicates a tendency to conceive of one's self as a stable entity rather than as an effect of processes. Only by introspecting the difference and activity between Ideas is the more dynamic model accessible.

Read reflexively, Deleuze's Humean model of the subject has three main flaws. First, the part attributed to Ideas makes it a more stable 'structure' than pre-reflective experience would suggest, and one devoid of the temporality evident in consciousness. Second, it does not account adequately for interactions between subject and world. Third, Humean introspection is able to deal only with issues of intensity and not those of 'kind', even though different kinds of conscious activity are inherent to subjectivity.

Deleuze's adoption of Bergson's method of *Intuition philosophique* enables him to construct a 'transcendental empiricism' that theorizes various kinds of conscious activity without privileging concepts used in the account, as Chapter 2 will show. For Deleuze, as for Bergson, Intuition leads to the model of *durée* which allows him to study the *flow* of consciousness as an
interpenetrative continuity of mental states, rather than as a structure invoking dynamism between atomistic ideas. For the Deleuze of Bergsonism, the principal issue is to ascertain the nature of this dynamism rather than the means for ‘reintroducing’ movement to consciousness theoretically.

The ensuing model of the subject rests upon a dualism. On one side is the ‘line of materiality’ which explains perception in terms of movements of images, vibrations, and the sensory elements of the nervous system. Not only does this account transcend Hume’s theory of a purely nominal origin for ideas whilst preserving experiential contingency, it also invokes ‘habit memory’ as a model of the non-conscious that surpasses Hume’s account of habit. On the other side is the ‘line of pure subjectivity’, which rests upon the capacity of memory for preserving the past as a prerequisite for the subject’s constitution. The Chapter will argue, finally, that the subject’s constitutive moment is precisely the virtual point of intersection between objective and subjective realms, a claim carrying important implications for Deleuze’s theory of temporality.

From these psychological conceptions of the subject, I turn in Chapter 3 to questions of metaphysics and ethics raised principally in Deleuze’s first texts ‘in his own voice’, Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense. Using Deleuze’s theories of the ‘event’ and ‘internal difference’ in conjunction with his interpretation of Nietzsche’s eternal return, the dynamism inherent to the subject’s constitutive moment is preserved and multiplied in its individuation and continuity. The theory of internal difference accounts for the part of particular and contingent circumstances in the functioning of Bergson’s lines and Hume’s principles, whilst the theory of the event establishes each moment of subjectivity as unique. Deleuze uses eternal return as an ontological device entailing the recurrence of difference in the lived time of the subject’s ‘becoming’, and as the means for describing how events cohere; specifically, the event of constitution returns continually but differently with every new circumstance and psychological activity. In the process of recurrence, it multiples the open set of differences distinguishing the life of an individual.

Chapter 3 also proposes a Deleuzian ‘ethics of the event’ that is consistent with both his theory of the subject and his Nietzschean goal of the transmutation of human thinking from a concentration on unity and identity towards a more creative and fulfilling life. Using resources
from Deleuze's aesthetics, I suggest that the passive subject qua effect can perform active resistance to typically human thinking by conceiving of life in terms of change.

On my reading, Deleuze's subject is neither pre-existent nor stable, but always in the process of becoming, 'determined' and individuated within a field of difference. More specifically, the subject is a continuously actualized multiplicity of events which 'no longer bear ... any relationship to the One as subject or as object, as natural or intellectual reality', and so not to the traditional humanist subject, either. If the history of the subject has focused mainly upon a ready-made universal type, at least since the time of Kant, then Deleuze brings singularity and individuality back into view (LS, 138-40; N, 115). In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze writes that 'a concept alone is completely incapable of specifying or dividing itself; the agents of differenciation are the spatio-temporal dynamisms which act within or beneath it' (DR, 218). Deleuze's theory is an attempt to come to grips with the nature of these dynamisms, and to reveal them as instances of specificity and division, difference and repetition, and becoming and dynamism.

Overall, then, the positive Deleuze who emerges from this reading of his earlier works champions a radical theory of difference and becoming whilst theorizing the subject in a form that is recognizably human. In fact it is his philosophy of difference that reveals the potential inherent 'within' the dynamic subject for undermining more traditional models and enabling richer, more creative forms of human existence. As I shall mention in the Conclusion, this position does not extend to some of Deleuze's later works, where more radical theories emphasize just the continuities between modes of existence and activity. But to ignore the texts prior to Capitalism and Schizophrenia is to overlook a rich source of theoretical resources for engaging productively with traditional philosophical challenges, as I hope that this thesis shows.
4. Deleuze's Hume

Deleuze returns time and again to Hume's empiricism. His most detailed and sustained account of it is *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, his first full book and the principal focus of this Chapter, although he also contributed short expositions in the earlier *Hume: sa vie, son oeuvre* (with André Cresson) and in his later contribution to François Châtelet's *Histoire de la Philosophie*. Furthermore, Hume is mentioned regularly in Deleuze's published works and interviews: in *Dialogues*, for example, where he acknowledges Hume as an inspiration, in *What is Philosophy?* and, most notably, in *Difference and Repetition*.

Hume's appearance amongst the figures considered by Deleuze to be 'marginal' to the history of philosophy is striking and apparently incongruous. As Deleuze acknowledges, 'every history of philosophy has its chapter on empiricism'. In a chapter on Hume, one usually encounters either a naturalist, extending and radicalizing the work of Locke and/or Berkeley (or Descartes and Malebranche), or a sceptic whose contributions to philosophy are largely or wholly critical. Only in the late 1960s and early 1970s did the focus of Anglo-American Hume studies move away from the epistemological principle that those ideas not clearly grounded in sense impressions should be 'committed to flames' towards Hume's analysis of the passions, the principles of association, and such features of the mind as instinct, propensity, belief, imagination, feeling and sympathy. Deleuze had adopted this emphasis in 1952 and 1953, focusing on the naturalism evident in Hume's principles of human nature rather than on just the strident epistemological assertions of the first few pages of the *Treatise*.

But Deleuze's shift in emphasis extended much further. Whereas it is often held that Hume, finding himself unable to counter his sceptical epistemological conclusions, turned away from philosophy in favour of history, sociology, religion and economics, Deleuze considers Hume's entire corpus to comprise various aspects of the development of a 'science of human nature'. On Deleuze's reading, Hume was always aware that a justifiable philosophy failed to complete this project. Just as human life involves ethical, epistemological and aesthetic
dimensions, so too it involves economic, religious and historical ones. For Deleuze, one cannot properly understand Hume's philosophy without referring to his work in other disciplines, and so Deleuze uses elements from Hume's economics, sociology, history, and studies of religion to help explain his philosophy.

Deleuze argues the need for this approach in the light of Hume's quasi-Newtonian, pseudo-experimental method. According to Deleuze, Hume begins his philosophical investigations with straightforward observations about the world: humans see objects, posit the existence of gods, make ethical judgements, plan work in order to meet economic imperatives, and remain aware of themselves in some sense. Deleuze then sets about developing a theory of human thought to explain these phenomena, thereby concurrently providing a foundation for the moral sciences. Deleuze argues that, because Hume is unable initially to find in thought any element of 'constancy or universality' to which he might refer a psychology per se, he develops instead a 'psychology of the mind's affections', a theory about the regular 'movement' of the mind according to observable social and passional circumstances. Hence:

the option of the psychologist may be expressed paradoxically as follows: one must be a moralist, sociologist, or historian before being a psychologist, in order to be a psychologist. Here, the project of the human sciences reaches the condition which would make knowledge in general possible: the mind must be affected. (ES, 22)

In other words, one needs first to appreciate the conditions surrounding and grounding the affection of the mind in order to understand it. Once the affection is understood, the consequent theory—'a foundation almost entirely new', according to Hume—can be used to found the study of other aspects of human existence, since 'there is no question of importance whose decision is not compriz'd in the science of man' (T, xvi). The theory of the knower undergirds necessarily any subsequent theory of the known, but to mistake this for psychologism is, on Deleuze's account, to underestimate the influence on human thought of socio-cultural circumstances.

Deleuze locates 'the essence of [Humean] empiricism in the specific problem of subjectivity' (ES, 85). He understands Hume's psychology of affections to be concurrently a theory of the constitution of the human subject, guided by a series of questions that can be paraphrased as 'how must the human mind work so as to produce a stable entity capable of believing, anticipating and inventing?' or again, 'how is the mind able to construct a subject?'
Deleuze argues that Hume's moral science is founded upon his answers to these questions. Economic, religious, historical, and sociological realities can only be understood in terms of the thought implicit in their construction, operation and comprehension.

Although Deleuze's conception of Hume's philosophy is unusual in the field of Hume scholarship, readers more familiar with Deleuze's idiosyncratic and selective interpretations of, say, Leibniz or Nietzsche, might be surprised at his integrative strategy. Deleuze's Hume is not a particularly monstrous offspring, and a close reading of Empiricism and Subjectivity reveals that most (but not all) of the detail of Deleuze's interpretation is present within Hume's own work. Nonetheless, Deleuze's emphases and lines of argument are unique: his concentration on 'general rules' and the dynamism of imagination rather than, say, causation and memory stamps Empiricism and Subjectivity as a distinctively Deleuzian work.

This originality can be put down to Deleuze's atypical understanding of the empiricist project generally. His take on empiricism has little to do with the nature of sense impressions or with isolating empirical facts. He considers Hume to be instead a 'philosopher of the outside', distinct from the tradition of metaphysics that has predominated since Plato. Hume does not critique conceptual understanding by drawing distinctions between experiences and concepts, nor does he use concepts transcendentally, such that experience is understood in terms of the concept. Deleuze contends that to have followed such well-worn philosophical paths would have meant Hume's hiding the dynamism and richness of experience behind the stagnancy of 'an abstract first principle', either conceptual or experiential.⁶

Instead, Hume reads concepts from out of the reality of experience, treating them as contingent explanatory tools that can always be replaced or supplemented without building or demolishing some philosophical edifice. Deleuze holds consequently that Humean empiricism is: 'by no means a reaction against concepts.... On the contrary, it undertakes the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard. Empiricism is a mysticism and a mathematicism of concepts, but precisely one which treats the concept as object of an encounter' (DR, xx). Hume's philosophy is mystical because it contains no ultimate, permanent or subordinating explanatory concept, and mathematical in its complex constructions from out of the terms of experience. Concepts determine the transient equivalency amongst actualities (as real existences), but the sensible always determines a difference between them.
The aims of this Chapter are threefold. First, it will show that various of the philosophical 'tools' and concepts deployed by Deleuze in developing a philosophy of difference have their origins in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*. Difference-in-itself is conceived in terms of Hume's atomism, the model of 'rhizomatic' thinking is a radicalized version of relational associationism, and the subjectivity-of-becoming is a dynamic process constituting a psychology of the imagination's affection.

The latter is the locus of the second aim: to demonstrate that Deleuze's interpretation of Hume's theory yields a viable (though preliminary) model of the human subject. A critical exposition of Deleuze's rendition, focusing on the reconciliation of atomism and association (Section 5) by way of the life of practice (Section 6) and general rules (Section 8), will reveal Hume's understanding of the human subject as a product of systematic, habitual thinking, given the name 'I' (Section 9). This Humean subject is understood by Deleuze as a fiction, sufficiently stable to have identity posited of it and to exist in a social realm, but 'containing' elements of dynamism with the capacity to transcend hierarchical thinking of human being in favour of rhizomatic thinking of non-human becoming (an issue introduced in Section 10 and pursued in Chapters 2 and 3). Whilst portions of the model become targets for Deleuze's subsequent attacks on the ontology of identity and being, others provide him with means of escape to a radical metaphysics of becoming.

The Chapter's final (and incidental) aim is to show that, although Deleuze is usually faithful to Hume's writings, he lavishes most attention on elements where his reading is idiosyncratic and goes well beyond the text. These interpretations—of general rules, artifice, habit, and stabilizing fictions—might be intended by Deleuze to correct weaknesses in Hume's theory, but they carry an inordinate weight in his subsequent theorization of the subject. Taking these aims together, the Chapter explicates the basis of the relationship between Deleuze's later philosophy of the subject, and his interpretation of Hume.

5. OF ORIGIN AND ORDER

Deleuze begins his study of Hume in the same manner as Hume begins the *Treatise*: with a statement of Hume's conception of the mind as a set of singularities or, more particularly,
as a collection of ideas, each with a distinct origin or set of origins in experience. Thus experience is not given to the mind so much as the given of the mind, or, as Deleuze puts it, 'the given is the idea as it is given in the mind, without anything transcending it—not even the mind, which is therefore identical with the idea' (ES, 28). The given thus encompasses ideas which are radically disparate, and which lack any capacity to transcend themselves. To be more particular, it comprises 'the flux of the sensible, a collection of impressions and images, or a set of perceptions' (ES, 87). It is the radically disparate and separable nature of ideas, allied with the unique origin of each, that comprises what Deleuze, following the usual interpretation, calls Hume's 'atomism'.

Deleuze spends little time on Hume's well-known axiom whereby all ideas derive from corresponding impressions of sensation or reflection. Instead, he uses the relationship between the two kinds of impressions to indicate Hume's psychology as a system of dynamism and structure, movement and limit, or difference and identity. He writes that 'the impressions of sensation are only the origin of the mind; as for the impressions of reflection, they are the qualification of the mind and the effect of the principles [of human nature] on it' (ES, 31). Deleuze consequently reveals the positivist interpretation of Hume to be bankrupt, since it deals just with the origin of the mind and not with the qualification, or dynamism, evident in the process of affection. The epistemologically-oriented positivist tradition is preoccupied with exclusion from the privileged realm of 'knowledge' of whatever ideas cannot be traced to distinct impressions, whereas, for Deleuze and Hume, one must always bear in mind that the collection of ideas is always and essentially in flux which merely derives from impressions of sensation.

For Deleuze, the collection of ideas is called not only 'mind', but also 'imagination', 'insofar as the collection designates not a faculty but rather an assemblage of things, in the most vague sense of the term' (ES, 22). The Humean Imagination Is not, then, for Deleuze, some 'agent' which controls or manipulates ideas, nor a 'faculty' which forms ideas. Deleuze therefore warns that one must not be misled by Hume's reiteration that ideas are in the Imagination, writing that 'the use of the preposition is metaphorical, and it means to exclude from the mind an activity which would be distinct from the movement of ideas.... Nothing is done by the imagination; everything is done in the imagination' (ES, 23). The Imagination can
be said to be active only in the sense that the collection of ideas moves, or is actively in flux. In other words, the imagination cannot itself be productive and act as a faculty because any movement within the collection of ideas is merely 'the reproduction of an impression in the imagination' (ES, 23).

No doubt many a Hume scholar wishes that things were quite this transparent. Hume is clear that the mind is a collection in flux, a series of isolable perceptions (impressions and ideas) which appear as 'a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance' (T, 253). But his account of the imagination is a different matter. In the Treatise, Hume writes that the imagination is a 'faculty' which variously forms complex ideas, founds the memory, senses and understanding, associates ideas, and so on (T, 10, 92, 265). He also discriminates explicitly between the mind and the imagination: in the first Enquiry, for example, he states that ideas are perceptions of the mind whereas certain impressions are anticipations of the imagination (EHU, 17).

It may be that Deleuze means his account to 'iron out' difficulties with Hume's theory. He might be suggesting that Hume's persistent references to the imagination as a faculty should be subordinated to his conception of the mind as a succession of perceptions. If there is no independent entity called 'mind' separable from perceptions, then 'it' cannot have 'faculties' such as imagination. Alternatively, Deleuze might be proposing that 'imagination' is Hume's short-hand for the relationship between the principles of association and the passions in the formation of complex ideas. If so, then Deleuze's account of his position is inadequate.

To make consistent Delauze's various characterizations of the imagination, one must adopt a third position, an amalgam of these others. The imagination, like the mind, is a collection of ideas, but whereas the mind is a collection simpliciter, the imagination is a collection which incorporates movement between its elements. On this reading, Hume's portrayals of the imagination as 'founding', 'forming', 'associating' and so on refer to activity between elements of the collection rather than to the imagination understood as a unified whole (that is, a faculty in Deleuze's sense, which is capable of doing the 'founding', 'forming' etc.). One should conclude, then, that for both Hume and Deleuze the term 'imagination' is a precise but inconsistently employed technical expression, incorporating two potentials: the potential for elements to be connected, and the potential for other, contingent principles of human nature to
do the connecting (that is, to actualize the dynamic structural potential of the collection).

Deleuze believes that any study of the subject ought to begin with the character of the mind or imagination because the observation that there is experience is free from philosophical presuppositions about its nature. By employing Hume's 'experimental method' of introspection—a simple (though problematic) turning of one's attention 'inward' so that one is 'conscious' of a thought—one becomes aware of experiences without having to say anything else about them (although Hume denies the possibility, suggested by Locke and Descartes, that one can observe the mind observing; all one can perceive are impressions, and not some 'thing'—an 'I'—perceiving the impression). But Deleuze thinks that this simple point is often overlooked or misunderstood: 'Empiricism is often defined as a doctrine according to which the intelligible comes from the sensible, everything in the understanding comes from the senses. But that is the standpoint of the history of philosophy ... [which has] the gift of stifling all life in seeking and in positing an abstract first principle.' To first posit some concept or principle and then interpret all of life in terms of it is to introduce an abstraction to any consequent theory. With respect to the doctrine mentioned above, Deleuze identifies three problems in particular. First, it 'stifles life' by detracting from the 'concrete richness of the sensible'. The differences that permeate experience from moment to moment, event to event, and person to person become hidden behind static concepts and 'thought in general'. Second, even if the definition were attributable to empiricism, merely stating the relationship between the Intelligible and the sensible is an insufficient characterization. At some level, all philosophical positions—even those of non-empiricists such as Plato and Leibniz—derive from experience. Third, according to Deleuze, 'experience for the empiricist, and for Hume in particular, does not have this univocal and constitutive aspect' (ES, 107-8). Deleuze considers Hume to attribute two distinct roles to experience: the collection of distinct perceptions and the various conjunctions of past objects. In neither role is experience constitutive of the dynamism of experience as it is thought.

Deleuze is again pointing out shortcomings in the positivist position since, if one places an emphasis on the relationship between sense impressions and ideas, then Hume's philosophy is incapable of leading anywhere but to the dogmatic determinations of 'Hume's fork'. Not only is this contrary to Hume's intentions for his project, but it ignores his subsequent work on the passions and on morality.
For Deleuze, 'empiricism does not raise the problem of the origin of the mind but rather the problem of the constitution of the subject', and the atomistic nature of the mind means that 'a true psychology is not immediately or directly possible' (ES, 31, 27). Atomism cannot account for thought, but merely provides thought with an object—the mind—having a simple and nominal origin. Hume wants to establish the problematic of ideas as experience, as representations of impressions, while freeing them from any obligation to represent things. The representation of impressions as ideas provides a limit to Hume's theory which cannot legitimately be surpassed: there is no way beyond one's experience, no way to 'peer past' the mind to a world, perhaps, of substances. For Hume as for Descartes, we are familiar only with perceptions, with those events not open to public view. While a study of the nature of the mind could employ a speculative physiology and refer to bodies and matter, this is not Hume's method.

According to Deleuze, Hume instead understands the mind in terms of 'a psychic equivalent of matter, wherein psychology finds its unique, possible objects and its scientific condition' (ES, 28). This is Deleuze's richest characterization of Hume's atomism, hinting at a materialism whilst remaining firmly within the psychological framework established in the early part of Empiricism and Subjectivity. Deleuze agrees with Hume that 'undoubtedly, there is a nature, there are real operations, and bodies do have powers', and that the given most likely comes 'through' the senses in a manner that presupposes organs and a brain (ES, 88). But as Deleuze observes, Hume 'presents this explanation as "probable and plausible", but ... neglects it willingly' (ES, 89). (This neglect will lead Deleuze beyond Hume's theory to Bergson's, as we shall see.)

Rather than guessing at the affiliation between nature and the subject, we must content ourselves 'with knowing perfectly the manner in which objects affect my senses, and their connections with each other, as far as experience informs me of them' (T, 64). Mind, for Deleuze's phenomenalist Hume, is not a representation of nature, but just a set of Ideas and Impressions. We can be sure just that perceptions are the only substances and the only objects and that the constitution of a subject requires something more. Hume's atomism employs these certainties to provide the subject with a 'nominal origin' for, as Deleuze writes, 'if every discernible perception is a separate existence, [then it has] "no need of any thing to support [its] existence"' (ES, 88 quoting T, 234).
Hume's atomism provides Deleuze with more than just a nominal start-point for the development of a theory of the subject, however. Deleuze also finds latent within it a philosophy of difference which is developed, adapted and utilized in his later analyses of various ontological, moral, social, and psychological phenomena, including his studies of the subject. Deleuze considers difference to be the principle of empiricism: "the constitutive principle giving a status to experience ... [is] that "everything separable is distinguishable and everything distinguishable is different" (ES, 87). The collection of ideas is fundamentally permeated by the difference and separateness of its elements. Consequently, and also because ideas are continually 'copied' anew from impressions having a transient existence, any particular idea has (but does not contain within itself) the capacity to relate to any other idea or group of ideas. Deleuze finds here a way of thinking difference; specifically, as the in-between of thinking itself, the 'space' between ideas, as it were, where thought transcends the given. This notion must not be read geometrically, despite Deleuze's later propensity for using geometrical metaphors. The idea of the 'between' is purely relational, since, for Hume, only relations between ideas—and not particular ideas in the atomistic array—can be the subject of belief.

Although the space between elements can be defined only in terms of an array of multiple parts, it can never be thought as 'empty', because to even think about the space—to think at all—requires that thought operate within it. Just as it would be impossible to think if ideas were not different, difference could not be thought without the movement between ideas. The Humean mind can never be static, but must always be active and mutating. Impressions of sensation and reflection constantly pass in and out of existence with 'an inconceivable rapidity' (at least when one is awake and conscious), so that new ideas are always coming into existence. Impressions of reflection cause particular movements between the elements of the array, in a manner that determines simultaneously the arrangement of the whole.

Consequently, Deleuze considers Hume to have shown that the mind's multiplicity of separable elements is the empirical and prior condition for the conceptual determinations of thought (ES, 87-8). Given Deleuze's belief that one's image of thought guides the creation of concepts, and bearing in mind that Hume's model of the arrangement of ideas presupposes no vertical hierarchy, Deleuze develops in his later works a concept of thought as a tangled web of relations between ideas, proliferating 'horizontally' rather than being arranged 'vertically'
according to privileged concepts (N, 148). This is Deleuze's model of the 'rhizome', outlined in
the Introduction. By using this image of thought in conjunction with Hume's notion of mind,
the creation of concepts can be richer, more creative, and allied to the affirmation of becoming.

Deleuze means his model to reflect more accurately than the arboreal one the creative
and dynamic thought-activity in the space between ideas. Humean difference does not
constitute a space that demands subsumptive ordering in order to arrive at 'common sense'
thought. The 'structure' incorporating lines of potential and actual connections between ideas
contains no inherent hierarchy or logically necessary unities or totalities, but only a multiplicity of
heterogeneous elements and the potential for more-or-less complex assemblages. In Hume's
model, the imagination is never complete, but always open to new generations and qualifications,
and to the constitution of new and more extensive connections. Changes in circumstances
lead thought in new (connective) directions. Similarly, Deleuze's rhizome 'can be
broken at any point of its growth without being prevented from spreading through a multitude of
alternate lines'. This is just what Deleuze means when he writes (with Guattari) that 'a rhizome
is precisely a case of an open system', such that 'the concepts relate to circumstances rather
than essences'. The rhizomatic system of the imagination is 'open' to the extent that it relates
the particularity of relations between ideas to the specific circumstances that lead to them. Like
Hume's model of mind, the rhizomatic open system can be defined only by its heterogeneity
and the potential connectibility between any element and any other.

The importance of Hume's atomistic model of mind for Deleuze's 'rhizome' goes
beyond intellectual genealogy. It also leads to a later reading of empiricism with implications for
any reflexive interpretation of Empiricism and Subjectivity. For Deleuze, one of the lessons of
the rhizome is that thought 'grows from the middle' or starts to 'move' or 'live' in-between.
'What is it', he asks, 'that the empiricists found ... which is like a vital discovery, a certainty of life -
which, if one really adheres to it, changes one's way of life? Relations are external to their
terms... Relations are in the middle, and exist as such.' Deleuze considers this to be a
position common to all empiricisms, showing that there can be no 'essence' in an idea: there is
nothing that can assure an idea of a particular place in the array of the given. Thus rhizomatic
thinking is clearly contrary to essentialism, where a term and its relations 'belong' to one
another, so that relations are internal to 'their' terms. According to Deleuze, such notions
conceal the variety evident in life, denigrating the diversity of experience. By showing that relations between ideas are inherent neither in a single idea nor in two terms taken together (except in the taking; that is, in relating them 'together'), but can always change without a commensurate change in the terms, Deleuze reveals the difference between instances, and the dynamic potential for changes in relations.

He takes Hume to think similarly. Atomism 'contains' inherently the possibility of the connection of elements, but is unable independently to account for its realization. Yet to express or even think about the radically differentiable nature of the given demands that ideas be related; the initial focus on simple ideas merely clears the way for analysis of the formation of complex ones.

By emphasizing both the lack of dynamism, or 'qualification', implicit in the atomistic mind, and the presence of dynamism-as-thought within the imagination, Deleuze moves from his sweeping Interrogative characterization of Hume's project to a more subtle and more particular question: 'how is the given transcended?' or again, 'how can a subject transcending the given be constituted in the given?' (ES, 86) Deleuze writes that, for Hume, 'the subject is not a quality but rather the qualification of a collection of ideas.... defined by the movement through which it is developed' (ES, 64, 85). The Humean subject is not some 'thing', some structure, that derives from a linear organization or mathematical aggregation of elements, and nor is it to be understood in terms of the 'copy principle' and the relationship between the sensible and the intelligible. For Deleuze, it must be grasped instead in terms of the dynamic movement between elements of the given.

The imagination is naturally initially a disordered 'fancy'. Its activity is without constancy and uniformity, and has the character of 'delirium, or—same thing from another point of view—change and indifference' (ES, 23). In other words, the imagination is at first without limit, stability or direction. But, Hume points out, 'were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone wou'd join them; and 'tis impossible the same ideas should fall regularly into complex ones' (T, 10). It would be impossible under such conditions for the mind to become a relatively stable subject capable of being an I. Yet introspection reveals that there is something we call 'I' and that ideas are regularly related in particular ways. Therefore, Hume must seek out the means by which the productive imagination becomes settled: if the imagination is by nature
unstable, then some other element must provide it with constancy, structure, coherence, and
generality.

Hume's study of the transcendence of the given reveals that, as Deleuze puts it,
'constancy and uniformity are present only in the way in which ideas are associated in the
imagination' \(ES, 23\). The formation of relations between ideas is a kind of 'law' of human
nature and, as Deleuze tells us, 'like every other law, it is defined by its effects, not by a cause'
\(ES, 24-5\). To be certain of avoiding 'superstition', philosophers must be content with examin-
ing these effects, rather than pursuing 'obscure and uncertain speculations' in seeking after
what cannot be found: the cause or origin of the law. The tendency for Ideas to be attracted to
one another in this manner must be 'resolv'd into original qualities of human nature' rather than
being attributed to some 'faculty', which in this instance would be a meaningless word hiding an
inability to locate an origin \(T, 12-3\).

Hume identifies these effects in terms of three 'principles of association', according to
the kind of relation produced: contiguity between ideas in space or time, resemblance, and
causality. Whilst insisting that it is unnecessary to justify the names and number of the
principles, Deleuze is faithful to this account \(ES, 114\). He considers these principles to occur
in the space between atomistic ideas, relating them and thereby transcending the given. The
principles 'produce an association among ideas, and upon the appearance of one idea naturally
Introduce another', or, in Newtonian terms, they make for an 'ease of transition' from one idea
to another, a tendency that constitutes the essence of relations \(T, 58\).\(^{14}\) By this means, simple
Ideas are tied together to form complex ones, and chains of Ideas form lines of thought, one
idea leading the imagination naturally to the next in flows of words, thoughts, arguments,
reasonings and so on.

The constitution of relations, or transcendence of the given, is not, then, a wholly
random matter, but regular and consistent. In composing relations, the Imagination proceeds
passively along the path of least resistance, according to a principle of ease of transition. The
principles of association represent the potential for movement in the array of the given, and
determine the 'links and principles of union' between ideas, yielding a relative uniformity in
relations, which Deleuze considers to be human nature \(ES, 23-4\).\(^{16}\) Human nature is, then, a
set of propensities and dispositions which on Hume's evidence are 'permanent, irresistible, and

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universal', the most original human instincts (T, 225, 368). As a result, they are also the most secure underpinning for study of the consistent operations of imagination, and it is because of this characteristic uniformity that Hume calls 'natural' those relations which derive from the three principles and hold between ideas objectively.

The places of consistency, universality and inevitability might suggest that Hume’s principles are in some substantial way similar to Kant’s categories of the understanding, which would problematize Deleuze’s reading. But although ‘functionally parallel’, there is a crucial difference between them: Hume does not mean that the principles determine all possible experience, unlike Kant’s categories. Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories makes them formally and logically necessary, whereas Hume considers the principles to be practically necessary, relative to the contingent workings of the imagination, and changeable if future observations indicate the need. (I shall say more about this in Chapter 2.) Deleuze favours Hume’s approach because of the manner of its conception. By dealing solely with questions of practical necessity, Hume affirms that ‘nothing in the mind transcends human nature, because it is human nature that, in its principles, transcends the mind; nothing is ever transcendental’ (ES, 24). There is and can be no subject that does the associating; neither the mind nor the imagination is a pre-existing subject, whether empirical or transcendental. Instead, the subject is produced in the process of the production and stabilization of relations in, but not by, the imagination. Thus order is not imposed from without the mind, but generated within, as a practice of affection, consistent with Deleuze’s prescription for the Humean empirical cure for transcendentalism. It is to this practice that I turn now.

6. BELIEF-FORMATION AND THE WORLD OF PRACTICE

Hume’s emphasis on belief rather than knowledge is tied closely to associationism. Beliefs are sometimes described by Hume simply as vivid or intense conceptions of an idea, but he more often and, according to Deleuze, more tellingly, defines them in terms of the source and nature of this vivacity: a belief is ‘an idea related to or associated with a present impression’, such that some of the vivacity of the impression is transferred to the idea (T, 93; see T, 86, 101, 103). Not only is the imagination ‘transported’ by impressions to ‘such ideas as are
related to it', but some of the vivacity of the impression is communicated to the idea. Should the degree of vivacity be sufficient, the idea is believed.

As Deleuze points out, the formation of beliefs is only possible because of the uniformity granted the imagination by the principles (ES, 24, 34). Without human nature's consistency, beliefs would be unthinkable and differentiation between the vivacity of Ideas impossible; degrees of vividness require a relative measure. Additionally, the principles of association are the means by which vivacity is transferred. To believe is an act of the imagination, but the consequent idea still must find its content and vividness in the simple Ideas offered separately as the given (ES, 72; T, 119, 140). Typically, vividness attends an impression of sensation, is communicated to the commensurate idea and then, by giving rise to an impression of reflection which activates one or other of the principles, is transferred to the attendant idea in the constitution of a relation (although some impressions of reflection do not operate via ideas).

Notwithstanding Hume's claim that his definition of belief will 'be found to be entirely comfortable to every one's feeling and experience', it is actually problematic, not least because some beliefs seem to lack vividness, while other ideas that are believed seem vivid and plain (T, 97). Furthermore, like other eighteenth century philosophers, Hume's focus is on how beliefs are possible rather than on locating attributes that define well formed beliefs. Therefore, as Deleuze points out, 'an entire art and all sorts of rules will be required in order to distinguish between legitimate beliefs and ... illusions' (ES, b).

It is possible to overcome the dilemma regarding the relative vivacity of beliefs and other Ideas by treating 'belief' as a technical term, following comments in Hume's 'Appendix' to the Treatise. Hume writes there that: 'an idea assented to [believed] feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness (T, 629).

As Oliver Johnson points out, this description attributes to belief Ideas a 'special weight or gravity in our minds' that is lacking in Hume's original definition, and a note of steadiness evidenced by introspective study of one's beliefs. We might consequently agree with Hume that belief 'is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgement from the fictions of the imagination' (T, 629). This revised characterization is consistent with both Deleuze's reading of Hume's theory as one of the affections of the mind (one which is felt rather
than observed as a product testable against 'truth') and Hume's dismissal of the philosophical privilege usually accorded knowledge. For Hume, knowledge is limited to whatever is immediately apprehensible or intuitively certain. Whenever we go beyond such ideas to those which are only more or less probable, we are concerned instead with belief.

Deleuze's reading of 'belief' as a technical term leads him to dismiss the role of knowledge in Hume's theory of the subject seemingly sympathetically, on grounds of epistemological scepticism. But Deleuze's position actually centres on another issue: his objection to the philosophically privileged status usually accorded knowledge (and attendant truth claims). Knowledge is the 'great first principle' of traditional epistemology and its attainment becomes a universal goal involving one's identifying and grasping some particular thing—a fact—as though it were the same for everyone at all times. In contrast, belief has no such privileged conceptual status. Belief is never an absolute, but is defined by Hume and Deleuze in terms of merely relative vivacity and relative stability, consequent to a dynamic process of changes in relations. Hence Hume shows not only that beliefs have an origin in dynamism and becoming rather than in static being, but also that this dynamism is inconsistent with the concept of knowledge. Deleuze consequently considers that, with Hume, the subject ceases to be a locus of knowledge, and instead becomes constituted in the process of belief-formation (N, 98).

Given the dynamism of the principles of association, belief-formation is a matter of practice; specifically, a practice of affection. To establish beliefs is to establish relations, 'a fact and a practice' at the heart of subject-formation. If the subject ceased with Descartes to be defined by practico-ethical questions and exercises, and became instead the pure subject of knowledge, as Foucault suggests, then, Deleuze is arguing, Hume completes philosophy's return to practice. It is the nature of practice which counts, and not the inevitable illegitimate beliefs that 'surround thought like a cloud of illusions' (ES, ix).

Hume's account of the dynamic formation of relations between ideas provides Deleuze with a logic that supplements the model of the rhizome, and a strategy that enables thought in its image, and these influences will become critical in his later thinking of the subject. Any relation can change without a change in terms, so that ideas are always composable and serializable. If there is nothing inherent in ideas to determine a particular place for them in the array of the given, if thought 'moves' in the 'space' between ideas, and if this movement is
unrestricted (although relatively consistent), then it is possible at every instant for new and
different ideas to be generated. Relations not only *represent* differences, but simultaneously
constitute and engender them.

The implications for Deleuze’s model of the subject are profound, as the ongoing
constitution of relations undercuts the possibility of locating a final and static subject within a
psychology of the mind’s affections. It suggests to Deleuze that the subject must be under-
stood according to a logic of ‘AND’ rather than ‘IS’, where ‘AND’ does not denote a particular
form of relation (the conjunction), but that which overturns the possibility of establishing the
subject as One, Being, or Whole.21 The ‘AND’ of relations prevents the subject from becoming
a closed system, and represents the abiding possibility of thinking again under different
circumstances, of thinking differently, perhaps ignoring or forgetting particular ideas and lines of
thought.

Deleuze’s interpretation of Hume’s associationism suggests two justifications for a logic
of ‘AND’. First, it reveals that there is nothing permanent about relations between ideas. Each
qualification of the imagination is new, original, and in the process of becoming other and
different (older, past, memorized, inspirational, ...): ‘this’ qualification will make way for a new
passional state, and ‘that’ one. Second, the rhizomatic ‘AND’ is thought independently but for
the context of the terms it relates. It is never ‘subordinate to the One which divides or the Being
which encompasses it’.22 Therefore it can never be understood dialectically, or as internal to
some conceptual model of the actual.

With the production of relations, Deleuze asserts, the imagination, ‘having been a
collection, becomes now a faculty; the distributed collection becomes now a system’ (specifi-
cally, a system of relations) so that Humean empiricism is characterizable as a dualism
incorporating both the given of experience (or ‘nature’) and relations which ‘do not depend on
ideas’ (‘human nature’) (ES, 92). Hume has moved consequently from the absence of ideas to
the presence of affections of the mind. But he has yet to isolate the means by which affections
are given a direction, such that the stable subject might be thought. There is nothing about
either the principles of association or the given which grants relations a direction or specificity.

Hume’s famous analogy between the three associative principles, operating on mental
objects, and gravitation, operating on physical ones, doubtless is somewhat forced (T, 12-13).
But it is apt in at least two respects. First, both association and gravitation are 'laws' which act invisibly but for the evidence of their effects. Second, they both appear to act universally within their domain. All objects have the potential to be drawn towards all others, and all ideas have the potential to be associated with other ideas.

However, in the case of gravitation, the actual causal connection is exceptionless; all bodies attract all others in accordance with a precise, measurable relationship. In contrast, relations between ideas lack universality. Ideas (as the given) are initially independent of one another, and association acts only in designated cases; between particular ideas. As Hume reminds us, nothing is more free than the human imagination, and the principles of association constitute only 'a gentle force, which commonly prevails' (EHU, 47; T, 10). Whilst the principles of association make the connection of ideas possible, they cannot explain why particular ideas become associated.

Deleuze considers Hume to have found the source of this direction in the interrelated forces of the passions, practice, and society (or 'culture', read generally). Whilst the principles of association provide a constantly shifting framework of potential stability, it is the passions, impressions of reflection arising out of the experience of pleasure or pain, sometimes in conjunction with other qualities, which provide them a direction, content, and particularity. As Deleuze puts it: 'the relations find their direction and their sense in the passions; association presupposes projects, goals, intentions, occasions, an entire practical life and affectivity.... Association gives the subject a possible structure, but only the passions can give it being and existence' (ES, 120). The principles of association link ideas, but the passions designate which particular links are constituted. The relationship between the two elements is therefore one of simple effect: the passions are selective and the principles of association constitutive.

To explicate the relationship still more clearly, Deleuze uses his conception of 'reason'. Hume defines 'reason' diversely and myriad times in the course of the Treatise and the first Enquiry. In the former, after much prevarication, he uses the term to mean whatever it is that engages in 'reasoning' about matters of fact. In the latter, it means variously the opposite of sentiment or taste, the opposite of intuition, the opposite of experience, and the employment of the 'understanding' to correct sympathy and the senses. But although Deleuze hints that his conception of 'reason' is meant to parallel Hume's, he actually uses the term to denote the
imagination under the influence of the principles of association.23 Reason is, then, for Deleuze, 'the totality of all of the simple effects of the principles of association, general ideas, substances, and relations'; that is, the totality of the principles of association and the kinds of ideas that they produce (ES, 65).

Deleuze points out that 'reason' (whether as a technical term, as above, or according to its common meaning) is often considered independent of, or even opposed to, the passions and emotions. But Hume has shown that reason and the passions are mutually implicated since, as Deleuze puts it, 'we associate our ideas because we have passions' (ES, 31). Furthermore, 'the mind is not reason; reason is an affection of the mind', so the forces that generate the mind's (or, more correctly, the imagination's) 'movement' or affection are essential to reason (ES, 30). Not only do the passions provide reason its direction, then, but reason can only be 'moved' at all because of some initial upset, determined by the passions. Hume writes famously that "tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger; but it is contrary to the passions and so, for example, we reason our way through ethical discourse (T, 416).

Hume distinguishes two kinds of passions. Direct passions 'arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure', whereas indirect passions 'proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities' (T, 276). Whereas direct passions operate according to 'a "primitive instinct" by means of which a mind that has experienced emotion tends to obtain the good and to avoid evil', indirect passions operate according to a principle of 'natural organization assigning to an emotion a certain Idea, "which (the emotion) never fails to produce" (ES 117 quoting T, 278, 287). Passions are 'excited' by ideas or impressions; by pleasures or pains distinct from the passion itself.

Pleasure is an end always pursued by the passions, whereas pain is avoided, so the passions act as motives to action. (It is pointless to ask the source of this principle since, on Deleuze's account, no answer can be found: recall that principles can be understood only according to their consequences and not their origins.) Although the principles of association invoke means to achieve ends, it is the passions that provide these ends. The principle and relation invoked are both determined according to the utility that they provide in meeting the end, 'although this is not decided consciously, but in accordance with the principles' (ES, 126).
The mutual implication of the passions and society is a complex matter and not at all clear in Hume's work, yet Deleuze provides only a short account of it. His main point is that, since a human individual always belongs to a community, the passions are conditioned by social expectations (ES, 39). But social interactions demand relatively constant actions and reactions on the part of each member of a society, along with 'the availability of collective and individual characters' (ES, 21). The latter refers to the affective and mutually beneficial interaction between individuals and society, which involves consistent compliance by individuals with consistently defined societal expectations.

The passions serve as motives and ends for one's actions and, with respect to the place of an individual within society, they have two effects. First, since an individual's actions determine whether or not she meets social expectations, the passions dictate indirectly whether or not she is able to partake of a 'mutually beneficial' relationship with society. Should she fail to meet social expectations, she will likely experience censor or ostracism. Second, the passions 'implicate society as the oblique means for their satisfaction' (ES, 21). Individuals rely upon social arrangements, via the experience of pleasure and pain, for the provision of communal and material means. Therefore, as Deleuze puts it: 'associationism exists for the sake of utilitarianism. Association ... defines a set of possible means for a practical subject for which all real ends belong to the moral, passional, political, and economic order' (ES, 120-21). Social arrangements provide means and ends for one's actions, but the passions are the implicit determinants of the relationship between social motives and individual actions.

Reason can only be brought to bear 'on a preexisting world and [it] presupposes an antecedent ethics and an order of ends': Hume's studies of the world of practice, his economics, history and ethics, reveal as much (ES, 33). There must be, then, a unification of the system of reason which is particular to the individual with the shared system of culture and ethics that enables the constitution of a settled imagination nameable as 'I'. As Deleuze puts it: 'transcending the partiality of the subject whose idea it is, the idea of subjectivity includes within each collection under consideration the principle and the rule of possible agreement between subjects. Thus, the problem of the self, insoluble at the level of the understanding, finds, uniquely within culture, a moral or political solution' (ES, 64). According to Deleuze, Hume finds the means of this alliance in the nature of reason as the effect of association (ES, 32). Given
that the principles are conferred their direction by the passions, so too must reason finally be subordinated to them. Consequently the ‘understanding reflects interest’, and the role of reason is ‘to make the passions sociable and the interest social’: that is, reason acts as intermediary between the passions and the subject situated within a world of practice, culture and ethics (ES, 22). The imagination is not, finally, the origin of culture, but its product.

Deleuze details several consequences of the argument that reason relies in some sense upon the experience of a practical world. The most important for my purposes is that only with reference to circumstantial experience can one comprehend the particularity of the subject, the particular affectivity of a designated array of the given:

*Circumstance* gives the relation its sufficient reason.... We must take literally the idea that affectivity is a matter of circumstances. These are precisely the variables that define our passion and our interests. Understood in this way, a set of circumstances always individuates a subject since it represents a state of its passions and needs, an allocation of its interests, a distribution of its beliefs and exhilarations. (ES, 103)

Each subject, as the affectivity of mind, could have been otherwise. So not only is the subject necessarily culturally embedded, but the import of the relationship between reason and culture contains no logical necessity. Consequently nothing can be said justifiably of the subject (or ‘the Subject’) that is not a summation of all circumstances, all affections, and all subjects—that is, nothing can be said of it without abstracting to a point where ‘the subject’ refers to nothing at all distinctive. On Deleuze’s account of Hume, the expression makes sense only when it is understood as always and necessarily a particular subject. This point is not pursued in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, but is examined more closely by Deleuze in other texts. He means to show here just that the contingency of experience and passional affections makes subject-formation a distinctive and individuating process.

To this point, Deleuze’s reading of Hume has been quite straightforward, entailing a credible account of the dynamics implicated by introspection. But he has only sketched the place of practical life in restraining these dynamics. Developing this position takes Deleuze beyond a simple (though distinctive) explication of Hume’s position towards a more radical appropriation of notions occupying a seemingly minor place in Hume’s texts. This effort is the focus of Sections 7 and 8.
Deleuze announces that Hume's answer to 'the problem of the Self' is that 'we are habits, nothing but habits' (*ES*, x). Having spelled out Hume's atomism and associationism, Deleuze is able to say more about 'habit' and its place in the relationship between nature and human nature. This will not be his final say on the place of habit in subject-formation, however. As I will show in Chapter 2, Deleuze's subsequent adoption of Bergsonism will entail a radical shift towards a richer and more complex account. But Hume's theory will have pointed Deleuze on his way, raising questions concerning the part of contingency in the development of habits which will become central to his 'transcendental empiricism'.

Hume emphasizes the central and primitive place of habit (which he also calls 'custom') in constitution of the subject when he writes that 'all inferences from experience ... are effects of custom, not of reasoning' (*EHU*, 43). For Hume, custom is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural power in the production of any effects. (*EHU*, 45)

Since Deleuze has shown that 'usefulness' is a matter of the relationship between ends and means, embedded in a social or communal context, and also that matter-of-fact reasoning has to do with belief-formation, habit is clearly central to his account of the subject. Only by explaining the affective psychology of habit and anticipation is he able to reveal how 'we are habits'.

Hume's most protracted and precise explanation of habit is in the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, where he presents a study of cause and effect in terms of repeated and constant conjunction. Hume attributes to habit the inclination to infer 'the existence of one object from the appearance of the other' and to renew some previous 'act or operation' without this being dictated by reasoning (*EHU*, 43). Habit is not simply a customary movement of the mind acquired over a period of time as a consequence of conditioning, but 'a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent', given its impetus by experience (*EHU*, 46-7). In other words, habit, like
the passions and the principles of association, is a principle of human nature, a contingent psychological principle whose origin cannot legitimately be sought. Furthermore, Hume finds that habit 'stands behind' reasoning, as it were, in the guise of the principle of causation.

Deleuze identified two elements that make experience a distinctively social phenomenon: first, the consistency of one's actions and reactions as a function of social expectations and mores, and second, the means-ends relationships implicated in and by the bonds between subject and society. Although each of the principles of association might be active in enabling the recognition and assessment of such consistencies and expectations, only causation can provide the vital anticipatory connection between ends and means (whether these be economic, social, religious, legal or whatever). Experience and sociality only implicate each other because of the stability of the expectations that stand behind them, and only by employing the principle of causation is one able consistently to make judgements of the kind: 'If I work 40 hours this week, then I shall be able to pay my rent'; 'If I abide by the law, then I shall avoid the payment of a fine, and be able to expect protection of my property', and so on. Hume sees this as an unexceptionable principle: 'When the mind ... passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, it is not determin'd by reason, but by certain principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination' (T, 92).

But in this role, Deleuze points out causation is not solely a principle either of nature (experience, the given) or human nature. Without experience, there is no 'in between' of ideas, no space for causation to operate; yet causation is a principle of human nature, a means by which the subject is granted uniformity. Causation requires 'a foot in both camps', as it were. How can the two be reconciled?

Deleuze considers that affection of the Imagination provides evidence that the two are actually in agreement: 'Here, human nature does not by itself produce its effect' (ES, 65).

Experience does not give rise independently to the 'always' of causation essential to the assessment of means-ends relationships. This property comes from habit, the principle that allows the imagination 'to reason about experience, as it transforms belief into a possible act of the understanding' (ES, 68). Habit gives to anticipatory beliefs about what will follow from an antecedent event the epistemological status of certainty, of knowledge. That is, habit makes the relation between antecedent and consequent appear certain (thereby making it possible to
reason about the causal relationship) while remaining on the level of probability (ES, 67, 68).

The mutuality of the relationship between nature and human nature goes deeper, however, even though it is unsupported by a theory of perception. On Deleuze's reading, Hume holds that, in the constitution of causal relations, 'human nature takes the detour of the observation of nature, or of an experience of nature' (ES, 65-6). Specifically, causation is constituted by degrees, becoming 'stronger' and increasingly certain as more and more instances of constant conjunction between two events are observed (T, 130). An experienced reasoner considers it certain that, under ordinary circumstances, one's striking a nail with a hammer will drive the nail into timber, whereas a young child must learn this by observing multiple instances of constant conjunction between a hammer's blow and a nail's movement.

Deleuze's exposition of Hume reveals that the principle of habit presupposes experience whilst remaining different from it, and also that experience forms the basis of practical decision-making on the condition that it is subject to habit in conjunction with the principles of association. The consequence of this agreement is that a new impression of reflection is produced, 'a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another' and 'to transfer the past to the future' (T, 165, 134). Precisely such impressions as these are necessary to ensure consistency of thought and action in a social context.

One might have expected Deleuze to have given at this point an account of the role of memory in Hume's theory, as the means of relating past experience with future expectations. Without memory, defined by Hume as 'a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions' (where these images are more vivid than those of the fancy), there can be nothing to transfer (T, 260). Furthermore, Hume holds that memory contributes to production of the relation of Identity, which becomes crucial to his account of the subject, for 'memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions' (T, 261). But Deleuze fails to provide an account of memory, asserting that 'habit has no need of memory', and holding instead that 'the past as such is not given' but constituted by a reflex synthesis of time (ES, 95). This is a surprising (and frustratingly enigmatic) position—especially given the important place of memory in his later works—due perhaps to weaknesses in Hume's own account of memory.

Deleuze believes that the only worthwhile objection to a philosopher's position is the
kind that 'shows that the question raised by a philosopher is not a good question, that it does not force the nature of things enough, ... that we should raise a different question' (ES, 107).

Kant's critique of Hume's empiricism is like this, and hinges on the question of agreement between the given, the principles of association, and the passions. Under Hume's psychological model, what is 'given' to the mind is both the collection of ideas and the relations which do not depend on ideas; that is, nature and human nature (ES, 108). Kant agrees with Hume that the relationship between the two must be explained by the operation of the Imagination.

Hume's theory is that the imagination becomes 'settled' and 'consistent' in its operation 'insofar as a law of reproduction of representations as a synthesis of reproduction is constituted as a result of the principles [of association and the passions]' (ES, 110). But, according to Deleuze, Kant holds that Hume is providing an answer to a question already tainted by a dualism which presumes that the 'accord' between human nature and nature is an agreement in so far as they interact by means of shared principles.27 Suppose instead, Deleuze considers Kant to suggest, 'that the given is not initially subject to principles of the same kind as those that regulate the connection of representations in the case of an empirical subject'; that is, suppose that Hume's dualism is not immanent to every experience (ES, 111). Any agreement between the subject and the given could then be only accidental, and the subject 'would not even have the occasion to connect its representations according to the rules whose corresponding faculty it nevertheless possessed' (ES, 111). In other words, the rules would not form any kind of 'connection', nor represent an 'effect' shared by the subject and the given.

In *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, Deleuze writes:

we can see the point where Kant breaks with Hume. Hume had clearly seen that knowledge implied subjective principles, by means of which we go beyond the given. But these principles seemed to him merely principles of human nature, psychological principles of association concerning our own representations. Kant transforms the problem: that which is presented to us in such a way as to form a Nature must necessarily obey principles of the same kind (or rather, the same principles) as those which govern the course of our representations. The same principles must account for our subjective moves, and for the fact that the given submits itself to our moves. That is to say, the subjectivity of principles is not an empirical or psychological subjectivity, but a 'transcendental' subjectivity.28

For Hume, there is no a priori synthesis and no transcendental aspect to the agreement, but neither are the principles of knowledge derived from experience. How, then, can Hume answer Kant's criticism without resorting to transcendentalism, and still 'present the agreement between...
human nature and nature as something more than an accidental, indeterminate, and contingent agreement'? (ES, 112)

Deleuze finds Hume’s answer in what he calls the ‘metaphysical theory of purposiveness’. For Hume, unity between the principles of association and the principles of the passions is evidenced by the formation of the subject: the principles of the passions ‘elect, choose, designate, invite’ some Impressions of sensation over others for transformation into impressions of reflection by the principles of association. For this to be possible, Deleuze states, ‘the mind must possess faculties constituted in an appropriate way; there must be a constitution which does not depend upon the mind—a nature’ (ES, 113). For Kant, this ‘nature’ must include a transcendental structure comprising various faculties. But for Hume it involves the dynamic operation of contingent laws of human nature and their complex effects. Not only are the ‘faculties’ to which Deleuze refers defined by Hume in terms of processes arising from the principles of association, but the particularity of the operation of the principles is determined by contingent passions serving practical interests, and not by a pre-existing structure. The interaction between these two constituents is what Deleuze means by ‘purposiveness’, juxtaposed against the imposition of a Kantian ‘rule for representations’.

Deleuze’s characterization of Hume’s position in the debate appears to be question-begging: Kant asks of Hume the Implications of dropping the assumption that the accord between nature and human nature is an agreement; as Deleuze interprets him, Hume replies that the implications cannot be specified precisely because nature and human nature are in agreement. On my reading, Empiricism and Subjectivity does not provide means for defending Hume successfully. The text suggests that Deleuze favours Hume’s position because agreement between nature and human nature is locatable by introspection, whereas Kant’s question can be asked only from a transcendental viewpoint. But it does not declare Deleuze’s objections to transcendentalism clearly. As I will show in Chapter 2, a resolution only comes in Deleuze’s works on Bergson, where he clearly distinguishes Kantian from Humean methodologies on the way to developing a transcendental empiricism and a very different conception of habit.
As a species of natural instinct, habit produces impression of anticipation. But nothing about habit ensures its consistent operation. Without direction and limit, habit will sometimes lead to the unjustified anticipation of events; that is, to the production of causal relations between events which are not actually connected. Therefore, even habits must be qualified by some other principle in order to produce the subject's characteristic stability. The conditioning of habit-formation is undertaken by what Hume calls 'general rules' to which he attributes 'a mighty influence on our actions and understanding' (T, 374). Deleuze's interpretation makes this influence mighty indeed.

General rules are 'passions of the imagination' formed by the reflection of the passions 'together with their circumstances... through the principles of association' (ES, 64). In the process of reflection, general rules transcend the circumstances of their original production to produce 'a system of directed means, a determined whole' or artificial unity which integrates the disparate individuations of subject-formation by binding and directing the imagination.

Moreover, Deleuze submits:

when drives are reflected in an imagination submitted to the principles of association, institutions are determined by the figures traced by the drives according to the circumstances. This does not mean that the imagination is in its essence active but only that it rings out and resonates... We can then conclude that nature and culture, drive and institution, are one to the extent that the one is satisfied by the other; but they are also two insofar as the latter is not explained by the former. (ES, 41, 49)

General rules are necessary for the stabilization of activity within the imagination, not according to logically necessary relations between ideas, but to the direction given by the passions. Therefore: 'the general rule is the resonance of an affection in the mind and the imagination. Rules reflect processes and ideas of practice.... [T]he Imagination reflects affection, and affection resounds inside the mind. The mind ceases to be fancy, is fixed and becomes human nature' (ES, 59). If this activity of the imagination is analogous to the reverberations of sound, then general rules act to 'quieten' or 'soften' it, and to prevent excessive 'echo' in the formation of relations and the transfer of vivacity.

Hume describes two kinds of general rules in Book I of the Treatise (although he sometimes describes them as two separate functions of each and every general rule). The first
kind, 'extensive' or 'determining' rules, represents a propensity of the imagination to extend the scope of judgements formed under one particular set of circumstances to other resembling but non-identical ones. Hume holds that although the tendency to form extensive rules 'proceeds from those very principles, on which all judgements concerning causes and effects depend', they are actually of a 'higher order' than the habit of anticipation. Further, the tendency to invent extensive rules is 'seldom destroyed, where any considerable circumstances remain the same' (T, 147). The influence of extensive rules therefore is exceptionally broad and powerful.

Hume characterizes extensive rules as a natural propension whereby we: 'carry our maxims beyond those reasons, which first induc'd us to establish them. Where cases are similar in many circumstances, we are apt to put them on the same footing, without considering, that they differ in the most material circumstances, and that the resemblance is more apparent than real' (T, 551). In other words, extensive rules have the capacity to integrate whatever is experienced as exceptional or epiphenomenal within a system of the general and essential. The passions are extended and reflected, liberating them from the conditions of their actuality, and projecting them beyond the circumstances of experience. Consequently, habits of thought are formed which incorporate the accidental into some form of illegitimate belief such as prejudice, irrational fear, or some other causal mistake (T, 146). The imagination, which had appeared, with habit, to have acquired stability, turns out once again to be unstable, without the direction and consistency necessary for subject-formation.

According to Deleuze, Hume holds that, since introspection reveals that reason is applied consistently, and since reason is not provided laws for its legitimate exercise by human nature, such constraints must be provided somehow else. While it is characteristic of every belief or inference 'to transcend experience and to transfer the past to the future.... it is still necessary that the object of any belief be determined in accordance with a past experience' (ES, 71). So if the propensity of extensive general rules cannot be destroyed where 'considerable circumstances remain the same', there must be some compensating element that limits it.

Hume contends also that 'general rules commonly extend beyond the principles on which they are founded; and ... we seldom make any exception to them, unless that exception have the qualities of a general rule' (italics added)(T, 551). Thus it must be another kind of general rule that holds belief-formation within the limits of past experience and proper reason-
ing, negating extensive general rules whenever their unchecked operation leads towards erroneous belief and unjustifiable action. Hume calls them 'corrective general rules'.

As Deleuze characterizes them, corrective general rules 'reflect' the affections which resound in the imagination as a consequence of extensive rules, providing beliefs with uniformity even when they are subject to contrary observations. Corrective rules allow us to think reliably, and to differentiate beliefs which cohere with perceived reality from those which do not (ES, 56). They reveal how exceptions and accidents, too, are natural or general occurrences, thus accounting for what extensive rules cannot.

Neither Deleuze nor Hume explains how corrective general rules operate only in correct instances, such that extensive general rules are able to operate legitimately in conjunction with the principle of habit. 30 Deleuze hints, however, that this, too, is a natural propensity of human nature, a suggestion agreed by Passmore in his famous text (ES, 68). 31 On this reading, there need not be a conscious recognition of the 'direction' in which extensive general rules lead belief-formation (whether to justifiable or unjustifiable beliefs), nor a conscious formulation and application of corrective rules, because both kinds of rules are simple propensities. Like all the principles of human nature, corrective general rules can be generated and applied in appropriate instances 'automatically' and non-consciously.

This suggestion is by no means clear in Hume's own (somewhat vague and disordered) account of general rules. Whilst it is clear that Hume considers general rules to be contingent rather than logically necessary, it is debatable whether both kinds of rules are propensities and principles, or whether only extensive rules are propensities—as Hume specifies clearly—whilst corrective rules are deliberate and conscious judgements and interventions. Contrary to Deleuze's reading, Hume seems to suggest the latter:

In every judgement, which we can form concerning probability, as well as concerning knowledge, we ought always to correct the first judgement, deriv'd from the nature of the object, by another deriv'd from the nature of the understanding.... Here then arises a new species of probability to correct and regulate the first, and fix its just standard and proportion. As demonstration is subject to the control of probability, so is probability liable to a new correction by a reflex act of the mind, wherein the nature of our understanding, and our reasoning from the first probability become our objects. (T, 181-82)

Hume is arguing that the imagination's generation of a belief is inevitably followed by an examination of the process by which the belief is formed. Corrective rules, which must also
arise from 'probable reason', take a regulatory role, evaluating both the experiential evidence standing behind the belief and the consequent inference. Thus the imagination's first object is the experience that leads to the belief, whilst its second is the process of belief-formation. Such assessments need not be especially intrusive (such that one feels like one is constantly double-guessing oneself), but might be, as Thomas Hearn puts it, a kind of 'reflex activity of mind wherein our cognitive abilities themselves are scrutinized. If this is the case, then reason can be considered self-correcting, and any errors in the formation of a belief originate from a different source to errors in the corrective rules.

There is other evidence to suggest that Deleuze's take on general rules is contrary to Hume's. When Hume writes that 'nature provides a remedy in the judgement and understanding, for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections' (italics added), Deleuze takes him to be referring to the principles of association (7, 489). Yet Hume's context—a discussion of the nature of artifice—implies that he is concerned with the kind of 'whole' that Deleuze considers to be a general rule. Moreover, Hume first deals with general rules in his analysis of probability (in a section on 'reflections'), where he is concerned with the assessment of the validity of beliefs on the basis of evidence for and against them (7, 141). Numerous texts show Hume to hold that reflecting upon one's mental activity can help correct propensities that are 'destructive of all the most established principles of reasonings' (7, 150).

On my reading, corrective general rules are not 'reflective' because they 'turn back' those affections of the mind consequent to extensive rules, but because they require one to reflect upon the validity of 'resonances' according to the experiential evidence available for them; to engage with one's reasoning in a circumspect and contemplative manner. If this interpretation is accurate, then corrective general rules are indiscernible from what Hume describes as 'general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgement concerning causes and effects', which he clearly means to be applied consciously, and which, through experience and learning, become the precinct of the wise (7, 149). To reason in harmony with these higher order principles is to reason according to corrective general rules, which Hume clearly considers preferable to less disciplined reasoning (the kind conducted by 'the vulgar') which is dictated predominantly by extensive rules.

The question of whether or not Deleuze has mishandled Hume's account of general
rules would not be so important were it not for Deleuze's heavy reliance upon Hume's texts to establish the place of habit and natural tendencies in constituting a passive subject. But Deleuze has provided neither strong reasons for agreeing that the operation of corrective general rules is a precondition for subject-formation, nor an alternative account of the imagination's self-stabilization. This is another flaw in Deleuze's theory which will be solved only later, by his Bergsonian account of habit. Compensation for the reader of *Empiricism and Subjectivity* comes only from Deleuze's agreement with Hume concerning the *effects* of general rules upon the imagination.

The two kinds of general rules appear to be functionally opposed, yet must work together to produce stable beliefs. On the one hand, the passions are "liberated from the limits and conditions of their own actuality"; from the specificity of the means-ends relationship in the light of which they operate (*ES*, 56). On the other, this liberation is constrained by recognition of the particularity of passional activity. General rules allow both the integration of various elements of the subject into a coherent system and the integration of this self into society. It remains for Deleuze to spell out how Hume relates the two functions and to describe the precise mechanisms by which the social whole and the stable imagination are reconciled; to answer the question: "what can make us take hold of something and live in it, because it is useful or agreeable to the Other or to persons in general?" (*ES*, 37)

According to Deleuze, Hume's answer is found in the natural mechanism of sympathy. One's activity in the world of practice is not determined solely by self-interest (a theory which leads inevitably to psychologies of egoism and philosophies of identity), but by a natural and partial sympathy with others. Deleuze omits from his account Hume's claim that selfishness characterizes the 'natural temper' of humans, dismissing Hume's theory of egoism in the light of his claim that sympathy is 'equally natural' (*T*, 487; *ES*, 37-40). In fact, Hume largely abandons his theory of sympathy in the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, arguing instead that selfishness and benevolence are the key motives to action. Deleuze also drops sympathy from subsequent works, where relations with 'the Other' are subordinated to more self-contained versions of the subject. 34

Sympathy arises from the idea that one has of an emotion in another, evoking a corresponding impression in oneself and, consequently, one's 'sentiment of morals' in the case
of most (if not all) virtues. While this requires 'a great effort of imagination', it is also an unavoidable kind of interaction (I, 386). But despite its naturalness, sympathy is partial, being felt most intensely in respect of one's family, clan and friends, so that there are always contradictions between sympathies, carrying the potential for dispute and even violence, the effects of which inevitably are associated with the experience of pain. Therefore, as Deleuze puts it, 'as for the passions, they must either be satisfied artificially and obliquely or snubbed out by violence' (ES, 43).

The problem, then, is to integrate sympathies rather than to limit or restrain them (whereas social contract theory, for example, assumes the latter course). Although the natural partiality of sympathy cannot be transcended, nor sympathies made identical, it is possible to extend sympathies. To this effect, the passions, invoking general rules as their complex effect, produce associations that lead away from conflict and towards integration. Specifically, social institutions are invented which provide a broader social context to one's belief-formation. Therefore, as Deleuze puts it, 'nature does not reach its ends except by means of culture, and tendency is not satisfied except through the institution' (ES, 44).

To the extent that humans are naturally inventive, even artifice, the invented means of transcending partiality, is natural, or, more specifically, a natural product of 'practical reason' (ES, 64). But such inventions are also artificial: whilst sympathy is natural, its extension is not; we cannot reduce society to nature. When Deleuze claims that 'when drives are reflected in an imagination submitted to the principles of association, institutions are determined by the figures traced by the drives according to circumstances', he is referring to the creativity of the imagination and to extensive rules (ES, 49). But there is conscious effort in the design of social institutions, Deleuze and Hume remind us: effort responding to particular circumstances and requirements, correcting and harnessing the imagination's creative potential.

Having pointed to inter-relationships between subject and social world, Deleuze has next to theorize the means of their mediation. For their part in the operation of social institutions, corrective general rules require dictates of adequation. As Deleuze puts it, 'the question is no longer how to specify the rule, but rather how to provide it with the vividness which it lacks' (ES, 50). If extensive rules relate individual sympathies to a social whole, then corrective rules must make the social whole and its circumstances sufficiently immediate to the individual
to ensure its effect. This, too, is achieved by the invention of institutions, so that each one
either 'corrects' others (making them directly relevant to individuals) or relies on others for its
effects. The general rules of culture might therefore be characterized as a multi-layered reality,
full of complex effects and compensations.36

Deleuze's Hume provides detailed analyses of two institutions which illustrate the
compensatory relationship between the two kinds of rules. The first is 'the moral world', which
produces a relatively stable and communal point of view, recognizable by all members of a
community regardless of their partial sympathies (ES, 41). Humans naturally posit the existence
of a social whole or 'society', their membership of it, and various mechanisms that allow it to
integrate the sympathies of members, although, Deleuze argues, these constructions cannot be
explained solely by drives and needs (ES, 48). The particular kinds of institution comprising a
social whole can be understood only by referring to the reasoning of subjects within it, so that
once again the worlds of practice and understanding invoke one another.

Without correction, the authority of the moral world might override the natural partiality
of sympathy upon which other aspects of socialization depend. Also, whilst the subject is only
possible as the correlate of a moral-practical world, the institutions of the moral world must have
immediacy for Individuals. Hume provides commentaries on several of the institutions gener-
ated by the resulting corrective rules: government, justice, obligation, obedience, language,
religion, sexual mores, property rights, political economy, micro-economic theory and shared
histories and customs. These analyses occupy much of Hume's later work, reminding us of
Deleuze's characterization of his project and his status as 'more than a philosopher'.

The second institution given Deleuze's attention, justice, is the example par excellence
of institutions operating within (or 'beneath') the construct of the moral world, 'correcting' it by
allowing various other institutions to retain immediacy for the individual. As Deleuze writes of
the State: 'according to Hume, [it] is not charged with representing the general interest but
rather with making the general interest an object of belief. It succeeds in this by giving general
interest, mostly through the mechanism of sanctions, the vividness that only particular interests
can have for us naturally' (ES, 51). A system of justice is the means to this end. According to
Hume, people have no instinctive motive to act in accordance with laws except for prudential
self-interest. But once laws are established, their usefulness is recognized. The moral
sentiment of humanity and sympathy with the public interest ensures moral approval of whatever serves the social good, producing a natural obligation towards laws which functions in much the same manner as a sense of duty towards one's 'clan' (ES, 44, 47; T, 499-500). In turn, this is reinforced by legal sanctions and a host of social forces which satisfy the passions with a measure of utility (albeit in an 'oblique' or 'indirect' manner).

Utility, the relation between institution and need, proves particularly fertile ground for Deleuze's Hume. By means of general rules, it stabilizes habitual anticipation in particular circumstances and provides a stabilizing framework for all thought. Thus the imagination contains potential for both the extension of the influence of the passions and its constraint: on the one hand, experience is transcended and the imagination is creative in its capacity to form beliefs; on the other, experience in a social context acts as a limit, making the imagination stable and habitual, restricted to beliefs justifiable in terms of Hume's rules for distinguishing causes and effects. (However, as Peter Fosl points out, with the latter function, Deleuze has created what seems to be almost a social determinism, where convention and its effects on the subject become a kind of negotiated agreement between individuals). Consequently, Deleuze observes, culture and nature form a composite whole, and 'the real dualism, in Hume's work, is ... between the whole of nature which includes the artifice and the mind affected and determined by this whole' (ES, 44). Deleuze locates therein both the human potential for the transcendence of experience, for a becoming-other and different from the given, and an explanation of why this potential is only ever partially realized: as a becoming which is sufficiently restrained as to be identifiable over a range of experiences.

9. MADNESS AND THE FICTIONAL SUBJECT

In addition to their role in the integration of partial sympathies, general rules are applicable to many other aspects of thought. General rules take myriad forms or, the same thing, form many diverse wholes having a part in the stabilization of the imagination. After examining two instances, Deleuze is lead to a radical conclusion regarding constitution of the subject.

First, Deleuze examines belief in the existence and extraordinary powers of God and
religion, which possesses the character of a general rule because 'religious feeling confuses the accidental with the essential... [and] is awakened in the strange encounters which we make in the sensible world, and in the exceptional and fantastic circumstances of the unknown phenomena which we (mis)take for essence, precisely because they are unknown' (ES, 74). Hume is clear that claims that one can 'know' God and/or God's 'work' are strictly illegitimate. The extension and reflection of the passions at the root of religious belief does not refer to experience or occur in an imagination stabilized by consistent operation of the principles of association, but only in the unstable imagination of 'mere fancy' (ES, 76).

The place of Hume's theory of religion within Deleuze's account of the subject warrants just a sketched explication. Because the entire content of religious belief is unjustifiable (so that the passions are reflected in an imagination lacking stability), the only correction possible would seem to be total and destructive critique. Yet Deleuze reads Hume's deliberately ambiguous assessment as implying that there is a place for religious belief within the systematic imagination: God assumes the place of the origin or cause of the principles of human nature, serving as 'a thought of something in general' which, qua cause, unites nature with human nature.

This is a problematic position. Not only does Deleuze simplify and misrepresent aspects of Hume's subtle and provocative account of religion, he also ignores Hume's warning that all beliefs about divinity reach 'into fairy land, long ere we have reached the last steps of our theory; and there we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument, or to think that our usual analogies and probabilities have any authority' (EHU, 72). Hume's reasoning, guided by this maxim, never posits belief in God as a 'limiting idea'. In short, Deleuze is right to say that Hume does not launch an all-out attack on religion, but wrong to argue that this is because there is a justifiable place for religion within the psychology of affections. It seems to me as though Deleuze is trying to force Hume's theory to fit his belief that corrective rules create 'a theory of experience wherein all possible cases find a rule of intelligibility ... under a statute of the understanding' (ES, 75).

The second form of whole is belief in a world of objects having a distinct and continued existence (which Deleuze calls 'the World'). In this case, Deleuze's account is plausibly close to Hume's. He considers Hume to have shown that belief in the World originates from the operation of extensive rules, is universal, and is essential to formation of the subject. Deleuze
describes the process of forming belief in the World this way:

The coherence of changes causes the imagination to feign yet more coherence, as it comes to admit continued existence. This constancy and resemblance of appearances cause the imagination to attribute to similar appearances the identity of an invariable object. In this way, the imagination feigns once again continuous existence in order to overcome the opposition between the identity of resembling perceptions and the discontinuity of appearances. (ES, 70)

Thus formation of the belief has three 'moments': the principle of identity, the confusion by which an identity is attributed to similar impressions, and the positing of continuous existence. These moments are indicative of fictitious inference; that is, the improper operation of the principle of habit, or the extension of causal reasoning beyond the grounds of legitimate belief.

With respect to the supposition of distinct existence, a causal relation is assumed between the object and one's perception of it, even though Hume has shown that causality is legitimate only when experience reveals a conjunction of two entities; with respect to continuous existence, the object is conferred with more coherence and regularity than is found in perception. On Hume's model of sense experience, the universe would appear to comprise disparate instances. The imagination replaces the interruption of appearances given in impressions of sensation with a fictional continuity, and allows perceptions to be regarded as originating apart from the mind. Despite experience seeming to be 'a flow of perceptions across the mind's stage', which might have suggested an ontology of becoming-different at every instant, we take the consequent continuity to represent identity. Each impression of sensation appears to be related inevitably and decisively to both prior impressions and objects 'outside' the mind.

Once again, the principles defining the legitimate exercise of reason are surpassed, and corrective general rules are unable to correct the extension. But in this instance, Deleuze asserts, the extensive general rules leading to belief in the World themselves attain the status of principles of human nature:

The entire sense [sens] of the principles of human nature is to transform the multiplicity of ideas which constitute the mind into a system ... of knowledge and of its objects. But for a system to exist, it is not enough to have ideas associated in the mind; it is also necessary that perceptions be regarded as separate from the mind, and that impressions be in some manner torn from the senses. We must give the object of the idea an existence which does not depend on the senses.... To that end, the principles of association do not suffice. (ES, 80)

In other words, the principle that disparate elements of experience should be united in a supposedly continuous identity is a part of being human, albeit that it requires the 'cooperation'
of the other principles. The imagination is proffered as essential the accidental content of experience, without making continuous and distinct existence even a possible object of experience. Only in this manner, Deleuze is suggesting, can Hume's starting point, his atomism, be tied to the principles that constitute thought; only in this way can the system that is the subject be defined: 'the system is completed in the identity between system and world' (ES, 80).

Consequently, fiction (more accurately, the actualized capacity to produce fictions) becomes a principle of human nature. Belief in the World cannot be corrected by the application of a reflective general rule, for as Deleuze puts it: 'to the extent that fiction, along with the World, count among the principles, the principles of association encounter fiction, and are opposed to it, without being able to eliminate it.... It is precisely because fiction or extension has become a principle, that it can no longer be included, corrected, and even less eliminated through reflection' (ES, 82). Thus some aspect of the imagination always must remain unsettled, as mere fancy, so that, from the point of view of philosophy, the mind is a 'delirium' and 'madness': there is no system or synthesis that is not founded upon the imaginary construction of continuous identities and other fictions, and reason and unreason seem to merge (ES, 83). This is not to say that the mind is not at all systematic (which would make constitution of the subject impossible), but only that fictional beliefs are essential to the system. The mind is madness, but it is a madness of limits, or, to put it another way, the creations which constitute madness also constitute the mind as subject by limiting its 'movement'.

Fosl contends that Deleuze's conclusions about the mind's 'madness' result from philosophical abstraction, and not from Hume's own world view, which privileges nature. For Hume, he argues, it is philosophy that perverts and makes alien, and not the operations of the imagination. Had Deleuze been true to Hume's introspective study of human nature, he might not have conceived of disorder as part of an imagination which introspection shows to be coherent and stable. But Fosl is mistaken in his interpretation of Deleuze's terms. For Deleuze, 'madness' must not be read in the usual sense, but rather as a kind of dynamism in the imagination that arises from particular patterns of interaction between general rules (as we have seen). Fosl is also wrong to read 'madness' and 'natural' in opposition. For Deleuze, what is natural and what is madness about the movement of the mind cannot be opposed. His point is
precisely that the imagination cannot become a complete system (naturally) without reference to fictions. In fact, only from the point of view of abstract philosophy could madness appear to contradict what is otherwise apprehended as order.

Deleuze contends that because of the mutual implication of reason and madness in the constitution of the subject, it is in vain that humans 'hope that we could separate within the mind its reason from its delirium, its permanent, irresistible, and universal principles, from its variable, fanciful and irregular principles' (ES, 83-4). Any conviction that one might obtain reasoned and universal truths corresponding to a world of more-or-less stable relations between subjects and objects is to overlook the invention of fictions that enables one to identify oneself and one's place in a world at all.

Whereas Hume's texts follow lines of enquiry to their logical conclusions, regardless of how epistemologically unsatisfying these might be, Deleuze writes *Empiricism and Subjectivity* in such a way as to regularly jolt his reader back to a positive philosophy. At just the point where the mind is melodramatically called 'madness' and 'delirium', Deleuze reminds us that the subject is only possible because experience and circumstance regulate the creation of fictions: 'The only resource and positivity offered to the mind is nature or practice.... Instead of referring nature to the mind, the mind must be referred to nature' (ES, 84). At this point, then, having followed various general rules to the limits of their operation, Deleuze invokes the empiricist principle as a final check on activity within imagination: experience, in conjunction with Hume's rules for proper reasoning, serves as a limit to belief-formation. The question that remains is whether Deleuze means this constraint to require an active subject (must the subject 'refer' beliefs to sense experience in order to validate them?) or whether the 'principles' of madness and delirium are restrained by experience in a manner immanent to the subject's constitution, preserving passivity? Deleuze ascribes to the latter option, although he does not state this in so many words. To find Deleuze's position is to show how he uses Humean resources to move beyond Hume's overt theory of the subject. This theory is a good place to start.

Hume turns to practical life as a potent and comprehensive check on excessive scepticism (the sort which threatens to destroy our most fundamental beliefs about the world). This is Hume's doctrine of natural belief, which he develops in the early parts of Book I of the *Treatise* and employs in Part IV to nullify various sceptical and speculative (interim) conclusions.
According to this theory, we hold certain beliefs because it is human nature to do so. Such beliefs are not consequent to conscious and rational assessment of experiential evidence, but are natural inclinations of what is today called 'naive common sense'. Even if such beliefs are not always justified on the grounds of Hume's rules for good reasoning, they nonetheless cannot be abandoned in practical life.

Deleuze never aligns his account of general rules openly with Hume's theory of natural belief, but the similarities are unmistakable. Like natural beliefs, the fictions of Deleuze's general rules are consequences of the natural operation of the Imagination. Their role, too, is to limit the imagination's capacity to produce fanciful and unjustifiable beliefs that are inconsistent with the stability of the subject as it appears to introspective study: one cannot speculate further about the nature of the principles once they are attributed to a stable and inexplicable origin called God, and one cannot properly believe in fantasies that contradict one's experience once the World is defined and exposed as the source and limit of impressions (even though the fictional products of corrective general rules are themselves exceptions). This is not to suggest, however, that Deleuze's catalogue of the beliefs following from general rules would match Hume's list of natural beliefs exactly. Hume considers universality to be characteristic of natural beliefs, and does not consider belief in God to be universal; Deleuze would agree on this count, but considers belief in God to follow from the operation of general rules nonetheless. By contrast, both philosophers hold that a belief in physical bodies is universal.

But Deleuze's theory of fictions diverges from Hume's natural beliefs on the question of the stable subject. Whereas Deleuze has developed an explanatory trail from the aboriginal perceptions of the mind to the subject as it is introspected, Hume asserts just that natural belief 'gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions [of the mind], and to suppose ourselves possess of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro' the whole course of our lives' (T, 253). By referring belief in the subject's identity to the incomprehensibilities of natural belief, Hume is only telling us that belief in a subject of this kind is unavoidable because of the demands of practical life. His position is utterly without explanatory power, and is not defended in accordance with introspection or the rules for proper reason.

Deleuze's whole project in Empiricism and Subjectivity has been to show that Hume's theoretical resources can and do explain subject-formation. In much the same way that Deleuze
uses general rules to 'fill in the detail' of beliefs in God and the World, he uses them to explain belief in a subject that is identical over a lifetime. That he is able to do so rests upon his understanding of 'universality' in referring to natural beliefs. While Hume uses the term to refer to the degree to which a particular belief is held in common by individuals and societies that he has observed (a distinctly empirical and scientific conception), Deleuze uses it to refer to the inevitability of the operation of general rules; a psychological conception resting upon the distinctive nature of the human genre.

Whereas for Hume natural beliefs are inexplicable, for Deleuze they must be understood as products of general rules. However, just because certain beliefs require the presence of these fictions does not mean that commonality in the operation of rules leads necessarily to commonality in the content of beliefs. As Deleuze has shown in his account of the dynamism of the imagination, subject-formation is guided by the particularity of passional affections in response to circumstances:

The specific progress of a mind must be studied, and there is an entire casuistry to be worked out: why does this perception evoke a specific idea, rather than another, in a particular consciousness at a particular moment?... Circumstance gives the relation its sufficient reason.... Understood in this way, a set of circumstances always individuates a subject since it represents a state of its passions and needs, an allocation of its interests, a distribution of its beliefs and exhilarations. (ES, 103)

Although this quotation appears straightforward, its implications are profound. If general rules explain the stabilization of imagination (and, consequently, the constitution of the subject), and if the effects of general rules are particularized and mediated by experienced circumstances (as Deleuze's casuistry has shown), then the principles of 'madness' and 'delirium' are not nearly so free as they seemed at first: they, too, are constrained by the experienced circumstances of practical life. But whereas Hume's theory of natural belief conservatively refers beliefs in self and world to experience, Deleuze makes the altogether more radical move of explaining natural beliefs as fictions. Deleuze is right to claim that fiction cannot be corrected by reflection (ES, 82). Correction and limitation is immanent to the constitution of the subject as an individual, and is always a product of circumstances. As such, Deleuze's model of the passive subject is preserved. His remaining task is to delineate the way in which general rules lead to belief in the particular subject called 'I'.
For Deleuze's Hume, the dynamic and productive imagination has two qualities crucial to formation of the stable subject. On the one hand, the mind is relational; a dynamic play of forces that produces fictions and transcends the given. The latter function involves both the emplacement of relations according to the principles of human nature and the development of fiction as a further principle. Thus the dynamism of the constitution of relations is implicated in both justifiable and unjustifiable transcendence of experience (these terms being differentiated by Hume's rules for proper reasoning). There is, then, for Hume, a natural human capacity to create increasingly long, disparate and 'obscure' chains of relations. The imagination is able to move habitually beyond the assimilation of the given to the creation of winged dragons, gods, and fantastic ideas that range in and out of existence in the twinkling of an eye.  

But on the other hand, Deleuze has shown that this dynamism serves to limit movements in the imagination and make its productions uniform. These productions are many and varied: a world of stable and more-or-less permanent objects, overt and covert social expectations accompanied by institutions ensuring general conformity, fantastic creatures recognized as fictional, and God. For Deleuze, the tendency to create stabilizing fictions is not incidental to subject-formation, but inherent to it. Throughout Empiricism and Subjectivity, he reiterates that a stable imagination is a precondition for the habit of saying 'I' in referring to oneself. 'I' is a name of an identifiable particular that is sufficiently stable and uniform for the name to have a determinable referent. The principles of human nature—including the principle of fictional creation—are, for Deleuze, synonymous with this uniformity.

Like the principles of human nature, stability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the habit of saying 'I'. Of the other requirements identified by Deleuze, the first, the natural propensity to develop habits, has been considered already. But the second, the principle of attributing identity to experientially disparate ideas, has only been alluded to with respect to belief in the world of objects. Deleuze holds that the implications of this allusion extend to identification of the subject from the flow of ideas within imagination.

Deleuze's determination of the need for stability in subject-formation is peculiar to this early work; for the later Deleuze it would be anathema. I will show in Chapters 2 and 3 that 'I'...
becomes in later texts just one effect of dynamic processes amongst others, without a referent in the concrete sense. The change in Deleuze’s position can be traced to his move away from Hume’s philosophy of the movement between atomistic ideas towards Bergson’s concentration upon the movement or flow ‘itself’.

According to Hume, one is unable to locate by introspection any single idea, simple or complex, corresponding to the existence of a subsistent subject: ‘when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other.... But I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception’ (*T*, 252). The multifarious network of perceptions that one finds instead is characterizable either as ‘a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement’ or ‘a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations’ (*T*, 252, 253). Of course, this is not to say that we are just bundles of perceptions—Hume’s associationism and Deleuze’s study of the subject qua social individual both testify to the contrary—but only that thoughts, memories, feelings, inclinations, beliefs and so on are the phenomena locatable by introspection, and these lack identity over time.

Yet Hume’s account of natural beliefs and Deleuze’s study of social expectations have revealed that belief in the subject’s unity is essential to practical life, and the feeling of identity is sufficient on Hume’s account to constitute it. If there is nothing about perceptions which leads one to posit the subject’s identity, one must look instead to the imagination. Hume considers that:

‘tis evident, that the identity, which we attribute to the human mind ... is not able to run the several different perceptions into one, and make them lose their characters of distinction and difference, which are essential to them. ‘Tis still true, that every distinct perception, which enters into the composition of the mind, is a distinct existence, and is different, and distinguishable, and separable from every other perception either contemporary or successive. But, as ... we suppose the whole train of perceptions to be united by identity, a question naturally arises concerning this relation of identity; whether it be something that really binds our several perceptions together or only associates their Ideas in the Imagination.... This question we might easily decide, if we would recollect ... that the understanding never observes any real connexion among objects, and that even the union of cause and effect ... resolves itself into a customary association of Ideas. For from thence it evidently follows, that identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions and uniting them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of their Ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them. (*T*, 259-60)
The origin of identity must be sought in the processes by which ideas are united. Since the union of ideas is always facilitated by the principles of association in conjunction with the principles of the passions (taken together, the principles of human nature), the idea of the subject's unity also must be sought amongst the operations of the principles (ES, 98). Hume agrees: "Tis ... on some one of these three relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation, that identity depends; and as the very essence of these relations consists in their producing an easy transition of ideas; it follows, that our notions of personal identity, proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas, according to the principles' (T, 260).

But Hume's subsequent account is famously unsatisfactory, resting upon a threadbare account of memory and the sketchy metaphor of a 'train of Ideas' conveying the mind from one idea to another so smoothly that transition is mistaken for 'one continu'd object' (T, 254). Although the ascription of identity to a collection of ideas is contrary to the invariability and continuity inculcated by what Wayne Waxman calls 'the perfect identity prototype', the inclination to do so is, on Hume's model, too great to counter: 42

It is difficulties with this account that force Hume to retreat to his theory of natural belief. In contrast, Deleuze's rendition of general rules enables him to develop a more coherent theory. For him, it is not just that contemplation of perceptions feels so much like that of an identical object that we feign continued existence, but that, when Hume writes that 'ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing: For which reason we must turn our view to external objects', he means to say that belief in the World activates the principle of identity (T, 340). Consequently, Deleuze argues, the subject comes to recognize itself as one object amongst many having a stable, distinct and continued existence. But just as disconnected perceptions cannot justify belief in the World, neither can they justify belief in a subject's identity. Deleuze therefore invokes once again the three moments that lead to belief in the world of objects, holding them to be replicated in the attribution of identity to any flow of Ideas, such that identical chains of association replace mere regularity in the operation of the principles: identical general rules are applied in merely similar situations, the habit of anticipation links past occurrences with present ones so that similarities are emphasized and dissimilarities ignored, and so on.
With respect to the supposed continuity of the subject's existence, repetitive thinking confers ideas with a greater coherence and regularity than initially is found in the imagination. Thinking focuses upon what *is* rather than on what *changes* or *becomes*, and assumes the appearance of the *same* 'train of activity' over and over again, even though, strictly, the transient nature of impressions of sensation and reflection make this impossible. Stability thereby *appears* as identity, such that the relative uniformity and ease characteristic of human nature becomes homogeneity and passivity, reflected in the continued application of reflective general rules.

According to Deleuze, the result of this process is habitual thought and, particularly, the habit of thinking and saying 'I' and meaning an inert structure 'of' the imagination. That the identification of 'I' is indeed a habit or custom in Hume's terms: a 'principle ... which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past' (*EHU*, 44). Specifically, it is a habit of believing in something wholly fictional; an impression of reflection 'triggered' by belief in the World, and expressed by belief in the subject's fictional and static identity.

For Hume as Deleuze reads him, no subject is ever a completed project. Either an imagination is active—inventing and stabilizing relations between ideas, and even identifying them as its own—or there is no subject. The constitution of the subject is the dynamic and complex evolution and qualification of the system of thinking described by Deleuze's Hume. Therefore, as Deleuze puts it: 'the subject is defined by the movement through which it is developed. Subject is that which develops itself.... In short, believing and inventing are what makes the subject a subject' (*ES*, 85). The locus of this movement, the imagination, having been initially a collection identical with the mind, and lacking a principle of organization, becomes a faculty or system. The means for this transformation are inherent within human imagination, so that subject-formation 'is no longer a matter of placing bounds around the mind or of tying it up, but rather of nailing it down. It is no longer a matter of fixed relations, but of centres of fixation' (*ES*, 124). In other words, the subject is defined by the imagination's movement and stabilization, and not by the imposition of limits external to the imagination.

Deleuze's reading of Hume has important implications for his later work on the subject, but only as a starting point or preliminary account: he does not return to the intricate particulars
of Humean theory. This is not to say that his findings in *Empiricism and Subjectivity* are inconsequential. Of greatest significance for this thesis, Deleuze’s Humean model of the subject reveals an essential dynamism, and this attribute will characterize Deleuze’s other models of the subject, as Chapters 2 and 3 will show. There is dynamism in the atomism of experience, in the association of relations, and in the operation of general rules and their fictions. The subject is a consequence of an ongoing process, of becoming rather than being; it is always a task to be fulfilled (lived, thought, theorized ... ). As such, the static 'I' is merely a fiction, a production founded upon the imagination’s relative stability.

But stability plays a key role in the model and, as we shall see, it is this aspect which militates against Deleuze’s adopting it as the way to theorize the subject *qua* individual. For Deleuze’s Hume, the imagination must become stable and its constitutive dynamism regular for subject-formation to be possible, and only subsequent to this stabilization does it become possible to say 'I'. But as we shall see in Chapter 2, this requirement is peculiar to the subject as it is grasped by introspective study. With the adoption of a different methodology—Bergsonian intuition—the subject seems to Deleuze to be *wholly* dynamic; resting ultimately upon becoming rather than stabilization and manifesting a greater capacity for thinking creatively, richly and intensively than Hume’s model would suggest. Furthermore, in this more dynamic model, Hume’s purely nominal origin of ideas proves unsatisfactory, and Deleuze’s Bergson will argue that movement begins with perception.

Nonetheless, theoretical resources with origins in *Empiricism and Subjectivity* reappear in Deleuze’s efforts to surpass Hume’s model of the subject. Hume’s atomism and associationism stand behind Deleuze’s philosophy of a relational ‘AND’ and the externality of difference to its terms which both reappear in such texts as *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition*, the tangle of relations arising from the Humean complex of Ideas, principles and passions has a clear affinity with Deleuze and Guattari’s model of the rhizome; Deleuze’s identification of the part of specificities and circumstances in defining the individual take on greater import in *The Logic of Sense, The Fold and What is Philosophy?*, and; designation of Humean relations and general rules always occurs within a context defined precisely by a range of cultural, social, historical, psychological, and physiological elements, and the preeminence of this practical realm will be preserved by Deleuze in *Bergsonism and Foucault*. Bearing
these continuities in mind, we turn now to Deleuze's Bergsonian model of the subject.
11. FROM HUME TO BERGSON

Although much of Deleuze's philosophy considers relations between human individuals in a social setting, and critiques various theories of the forces shaping the actions and expectations of individuals, Deleuze never again studies the constitution and psychology of the subject in the same depth as in Empiricism and Subjectivity. Nor does the subject assume a central role in Deleuze's accounts (whether on his own or with Guattari) of thinking, desire, knowledge, and morality. After Empiricism and Subjectivity, 'the subject' is neither a preeminent stand-in for the awkward fact of selfhood (as in early modern philosophy), nor a concept privileged as deserving all-out attack (as in so much postmodernism). This is not to say that the subject disappears altogether from Deleuze's work. Rather, the concept is expanded upon, mutated, abstracted or ignored depending upon its relationships with the forces and concepts upon which Deleuze focuses, serving as one conceptual creation amongst many.

Nonetheless, I will argue here and in the final Chapter that a coherent account of the subject can be developed out of Deleuze's texts after Empiricism and Subjectivity, although it would be misleading and contrary to the lessons of rhizomatic philosophy to suggest that only one narrative having 'the subject' as a central character (whether it takes the stage fully developed or in embryonic form, ready to 'become different' as the tale proceeds) runs through Deleuze's texts. My purpose is not to exhaust the interpretative options, but to multiply them by revealing lines of development lying latent within these works.

After Empiricism and Subjectivity, Deleuze did not publish another book for eight years. Hardt considers that the hiatus led Deleuze to 'a dramatic reorientation of his philosophical approach'; certainly there was no return to Hume's empiricism. But the claim is tempered by noting other significant transformations in Deleuze's thinking that occur in much shorter spans of time, especially in the years following the May '68 uprising.

This Chapter will argue that far from representing a 'dramatic reorientation', the pause between publications is a 'space' within which the conjunction 'and' is applied to Deleuze's
studies of the human individual. He develops a theory of the subject that is both auxiliary to Humean philosophical psychology and critical of elements of it. The next Chapter will show that Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense are important products of this evolution, whereby an ontology of the event in terms of difference and affirmation is added to Deleuze's theories of the mind's 'affections'. But in order to establish precisely the character of the subject's constitutive event, I turn first to Bergsonism.

Like the book on Hume, Bergsonism (published in 1966) was written as a short introductory text, and is an innovative account of a famous philosopher who 'seemed to be part of the history of philosophy, but who escaped from it'. It is almost entirely sympathetic to Bergson, and contains a relatively faithful rendering of a limited range of texts (virtually ignoring Bergson's moral and religious works). But although faithful, Deleuze's rendition is also strikingly idiosyncratic. He expands upon numerous undeveloped threads of Bergson's arguments, leading to important psychological and ontological insights (N, 43). As Paul Douglass puts it, 'Bergsonism delights in reminding us of those aspects that caused Bergson to be condemned by his contemporaries, showing that Bergson really did have a vision more complex and unassimilable than even his sycophantic admirers felt comfortable admitting.'

Deleuze means Bergsonism to constitute a 'return to Bergson', by which he means 'not only ... a renewed admiration for a great philosopher but a renewal or an extension of his project' (B, 115). Perhaps more than any other text, Bergsonism constitutes a Deleuzian renewal of the project of a great philosopher. Whereas ideas and arguments from Empiricism and Subjectivity only reappear in Deleuze's later works having been radically recast and transformed, sometimes barely recognizable, the principal arguments from Bergsonism recur regularly in forms transparently close to the original. Furthermore, Deleuze often acknowledges thematic debts to Bergson. His theories of cinema, for instance, return time and again to Bergson's arguments.

There are hints in Empiricism and Subjectivity that Deleuze had in 1953 already adopted aspects of Bergson's problematic. He turned to Bergson to help explicate Hume's accounts of habit, association and time, claiming (perhaps untenably) that 'it is not necessary to force [Hume's] texts in order to find in the habit-anticipation most of the characteristics of the Bergsonian durée or memory' (ES, 92). Soon after publication of the work on Hume, Deleuze
wrote a lengthy essay and a chapter on Bergson, followed by an anthology, before completing Bergsonism. Although none of these texts addresses the concept of the subject explicitly, it is never far away. Bergson’s preoccupations with consciousness, immediacy, inner-time and memory invoke many of the issues to which Hume meant his introspective account of atomism and associationism to be a ‘scientific’ key.

Like Hume, Bergson understands the self as a form of continuity and change, readily apparent in immediate conscious awareness. He writes that ‘there is one reality, at least, which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own personality in its flowing through time—our self which endures’ (CM, 24). I will show that the Deleuze of Bergsonism agrees, and that his reading of Bergsonian method, perception, durée, memory and actualization of the virtual contains a theory of the moment of constitution of the subject which precludes any model of the subject as an unchanging particular.

In an earlier essay, Deleuze claims that Bergson’s theories operate on two distinct levels: methodological and ontological. This Chapter will consider Deleuze’s Bergsonian theory of the subject at both levels, and reveal how he moves beyond the version in Empiricism and Subjectivity. It focuses on five aspects of Deleuze’s Bergsonism in particular. First, in Section 12, it argues that Bergsonian Intuition is the method enabling Deleuze to construct a ‘transcendental empiricism’, an account of the conditions of actual (rather than all possible) experience. Whereas Humean introspection grouped all Ideas together (as mind) and discriminated between them on grounds of relative vivacity, Intuition enables Deleuze to divide consciousness according to its ‘natural articulations’. This division leads him to consider consciousness in terms of a dualism between the world of objects and the inner world of consciousness.

Second, Section 13 will show that consciousness is intuited as a kind of temporality or flow. Bergson’s notion of durée provides a more precise model of this flow than the Humean one. Particular thoughts are never discrete elements, but are always part of an interpenetrative continuity of mental states. Adopting this model as a starting point, Deleuze is able to focus upon the nature and implications of the dynamism of ‘inner life’ rather than the theoretical reintroduction of movement to a static collection of elements.

Third, Section 14 argues that Bergson’s account of perception in terms of movements amongst images, vibrations and receptive functions of the nervous system—the ‘line of material-
ity'—supplements Deleuze’s theory with an account of the origins and nature of sense data. This 'line', the first aspect of Deleuze’s Bergsonian dualism, is the origin of the movement and dynamism evident to intuition in consciousness, and it explains some bodily activity as a kind of non-conscious memory.

Fourth, Bergson’s model of the brain as an interval between stimulation and response, and of pure memory as a capacity to preserve the past, will be shown in Sections 15 and 16 to be the bases for Deleuze’s theory of the movement and becoming of a dynamic subject. On the one hand, the brain is the point of intersection between the inner and outer worlds. On the other, pure memory is the means by which the present moment is related to a past, a necessary condition for the continuity of conscious dynamism. Section 17 will argue that it is precisely this point of coincidence that is the moment of the subject’s constitution. It represents a 'new monism', a unity between the lines which is experienced as consciousness in every present and which gives rise to a virtual whole called 'subject'.

Whilst Empiricism and Subjectivity revealed the subject’s inherent dynamism, these five aspects of Bergsonism theorize this dynamism in terms of psychological 'mechanisms' and non-conscious aspects of thought. For the Bergsonian Deleuze, the becoming of the subject is not restrained by secure rules and fictions, but is an effect of production checked only by contingent and ever-changing circumstances and capacities.

Some aspects of Deleuze’s interpretation (especially with respect to perception) are obscure, requiring familiarity with Bergson’s own works. Parts of this Chapter therefore include expositions of the original texts. Also, reference will be made to Deleuze’s supplementary and complementary readings of Bergson in Difference and Repetition, Cinema 1 and Cinema 2. These works not only invoke and illustrate the Bergsonian ontology of dynamism and images in fields other than traditional metaphysics, but also expand upon some of the cryptically condensed Ideas in Bergsonism.

12. DELEUZE’S BERGSONIAN METHODOLOGY

Bergson argues the need for philosophical 'precision', by which he means theorization of reality on its own terms rather than with respect to concepts supposed to make it (or
experience of it) possible. He believes that philosophical arguments typically lack precision because, in an effort to make them generalizable, philosophers abstract from the conditions out of which they arise; and as Arthur Lovejoy reminds us, generalities are never facts of immediate experience. Deleuze allies himself with Bergson's argument, so any immanent criticism of the theory of the subject advanced in *Empiricism and Subjectivity* must examine whether or not it is sufficiently precise; whether in the earlier work, Deleuze theorized the subject or abstracted from it.

Two aspects of Deleuze's Humean theory militate against its philosophical precision. First, any introspective effort must itself be an aspect of consciousness. It is impossible for introspection to be distinct from the imagination in the manner of a scientific observer undertaking a physical experiment (notwithstanding the problematic nature of experimental method in this regard). By 'paying attention' to mental activity, consciousness is necessarily changed. Second, Deleuze's Hume consequently has serious difficulties locating those ideas constituent of the subject from amongst the transient ideas of the imagination. 'Interference' by introspection means, as Jay Rosenberg points out, that it is impossible to locate a subject that is neither an intentional object of any of its experiences, nor an intentional object of perception. Although introspection *seems* capable of describing an imagination undertaking introspection, it cannot in fact theorize the subject as a consciousness independent of this activity. Immediate awareness of consciousness is clearly not the same as awareness of the introspective study of the imagination.

Deleuze says nothing in *Empiricism and Subjectivity* about Hume's means of accessing the dynamics of consciousness. Although he begins the book with a discussion of the need to substitute a 'psychology of the mind's affections' for a 'psychology of the mind', he fails to spell out how Hume's psychology of affections might be more successful, even though founded upon the same method (*ES*, 21). To the extent that he adopts Hume's study unquestioningly, Deleuze's reading must be tainted with imprecision. To develop a more precise theory, Deleuze requires a method free from pretensions to experimental scientific precision and more attuned to the dynamism and immediacy of consciousness.

In order to achieve philosophical precision, Deleuze abandons the question that framed *Empiricism and Subjectivity* and the method used to develop and answer it. Bergson's work
convinces him that all 'false philosophical problems' (questions or problems which are used to frame an enquiry but which mislead the philosopher because of presumptions entailed by them) derive from a failure to respect differences of nature (or 'kind') in the phenomenon being studied.\textsuperscript{10} We must be aware that 'association ... is not the primary fact: dissociation is what we begin with' (MM, 165). We are in error whenever we try to theorize a whole by beginning with parts considered independent of it, and ought instead to move from the whole (or conditioned) to its parts or conditions by a process of careful decomposition which respects the continuity, complexity and unity of the whole.

This approach marks Deleuze's and Bergson's studies of the subject from those of other philosophers, including Hume and Kant. On Deleuze's reading, the relatively stable unification of atomistic ideas is central to Hume's associationist theory of the subject, as Chapter 1 explained. Kant's transcendentalism, too, presumes a tendency in consciousness towards unity, a tendency integral to his system but not founded in empirical reality. Deleuze and Bergson are particularly troubled by Kant's assertion that the various faculties are party to a principle of unity, working in terms of both an underlying agreement or 'common sense' and regulation by a predominant faculty (the understanding). In turn, accord between the faculties is grounded in the unity of the 'I think'.\textsuperscript{11} In short, Deleuze believes that Kant is in error by employing successive subsumptions to move from parts (the manifold of the given, categories, faculties) to the whole (thinking subject) (LS, 105). I shall say more about Deleuze's criticisms of transcendentalism in the next Section. (Note that Deleuze argues in Kant's Critical Philosophy that Kant's Critique of Judgment goes a long way towards overturning the presumption of unity by proposing a theory of the free and unregulated operation of the faculties.)\textsuperscript{12}

To be consistent with Bergson's edict, an appropriate method for Deleuze's study of the subject must begin with the apparent unity and persistence of one's self and then theorize the components and dynamics of its generation. According to Bergson, it is possible for science and metaphysics to 'become equally precise and certain' since 'they both bear upon reality itself' (CM, 44). But whereas experimental science seems to have at its disposal a method which incorporates the requirement for precision (although perhaps in a self-verifying manner), no such technique obviously is available to metaphysics or, more particularly, the metaphysics of the subject. As Deleuze puts it, there is difficulty in knowing 'how to go beyond experience
toward the conditions of experience, toward the articulations of the real, and rediscover what
differs in kind in the composites that are given to us and on which we live’ (B, 26).

Yet any philosophy that fails to respect the particularity of consciousness in favour of
broad conceptual sketches is subject to metaphysical illusions. The application of abstract
concepts merely gathers together discrete particulars *despite* their differences, and privileges
concepts over what is supposed to be explained. For example, one might try to understand
things as instances of Being, or as useful or corpuscular, thereby presupposing an ontological
and/or epistemological privilege for the concepts ‘Being’, ‘utility’, or ‘corpuscularity’ which is not
evident in immediate experience. Deleuze needs a method capable not only of dissociating
aspects of the whole called ‘I’ according to natural articulations, but of grasping conscious and
material aspects of life without recourse to abstract or general concepts.

Bergson proposes what he believes to be such a method, calling it *intuition philosophique* (hereinafter ‘intuition’). It is notoriously difficult to describe, with as many
characterizations as scholarly commentaries. Most are unsatisfactory, explaining the goal of
Intuition but not the method. Sometimes it seems as though Bergson is trying to express the
inexpressible: a method that can only be hinted at and used. Nonetheless, for Deleuze, an
appreciation of intuition is central to understanding Bergson. Without it, he insists, relationships
between Bergson’s key concepts remain indeterminate (B, 14).

Deleuze claims that Intuition is a ‘fully developed method’ with strict rules, but Bergson
is not really as clear as this suggests (B, 13). Sometimes Bergson aligns Intuition with artistic
sensibility and awareness, or a detachment from reality; at others, he associates it with pure
Instinct. But these are not the versions developed in *Bergsonism*. Deleuze employs Intuition as
a deliberate reflective awareness or willed self-consciousness, a concentrated and *direct*
attention to the operations of consciousness (in contrast with mediated ‘observations of
consciousness by consciousness in a quest for transparency of thought to itself), such that one
must participate in Intuition to grasp fully its meaning and significance. This depiction aligns
with Bergson’s account of the intuition of consciousness as: ‘the attention that the mind gives to
itself, over and above, while it is fixed upon matter, its object. This supplementary attention can
be methodically cultivated and developed. Thus will be constituted a science of mind, a
veritable metaphysics which will define the mind positively’ (CM, 79). The mind continues its
normal functions, yet somehow discerns simultaneously the nature of its workings; indeed intuition can only be considered a 'simple act' because of this essential unity between operations (B, 14).

The apparent peculiarity of intuition as a method also is a sign of its difficulty. Bergson believes in a universal human capacity for grasping things intuitively. But it is a difficult capacity to realize, being contrary to natural tendencies to divide the whole according to degree and utility, the more from the less useful. Consequently he characterizes intuition as a laborious effort to 're-ascend the slope natural to the work of thought', in which the mind 'must do itself violence, reverse the direction of the operation by which it ordinarily thinks' (CM, 183, 190). This effort is successful only when intuition enables the formulation of more appropriate 'concepts', understood in the general sense of 'categories of relation'.

For Bergson, the concepts usually deployed in philosophy are useful for scientific study and for describing the material world, but not for understanding the dynamics of one's life. On Deleuze's reading, Bergson's ideal is instead to tailor concepts that ensure unity between themselves and their 'objects', according to the latter's nature or kind. Consistent with his denunciation of subsumption as a starting point, Deleuze claims that 'it's not a matter of bringing all sorts of things together under one concept but rather of relating each concept to variables that explain its mutations' (N, 31). As such, concepts must be 'no broader than the conditioned', and must refer to and express neither an object or state outside themselves nor a hierarchy of concepts, but only themselves and the 'objects' for which they are formulated (B, 27).

The possibility of studying the unified whole called 'I' relies upon its dissociation into component parts, bearing in mind that this very act abstracts from reality. To minimize abstraction, decomposition must be conducted according to concepts consonant with the nature of the whole. Bergsonian intuition is a precise method of division because it determines such concepts and operates in these terms: it does not presuppose concepts (not utility, spatiality or corpuscularity, for example), but creates them according to natural articulations of kind. As Goodchild puts it, for Deleuze 'a concept always has to be created in an Intuition specific to it', rather than being assumed a priori. For example, intuition reveals that change and becoming are conditions of human consciousness, as we shall see, but these two concepts
are only 'revealed' when one 'pays attention' to consciousness. They are not presupposed as unchangeable and universal concepts in terms of which consciousness must be analyzed.

Deleuze adopts Bergsonian intuition as the most suitable method for his own conception of philosophy, which he calls 'transcendental empiricism'. Utilization of Bergsonian intuition and its edicts will determine the entire orientation and bearing of Deleuze's subsequent studies of the subject. In order to grasp fully its appropriateness, we first must examine what he means by 'transcendental empiricism' and locate its significance for his account of the subject.

Whereas empiricism refers traditionally to the view that the intelligible derives from the sensible, Deleuze makes no such claim. He means just that philosophy should begin from the immediate given, real conscious awareness, without presupposing any a priori categories, concepts or axioms, and then set out 'to present concepts directly' (N, 88-9). These concepts might refer to objects and their relations, to perceptions and their causes, or to any of a range of psychological and physiological relations evident in consciousness. As Bruce Baugh puts it, 'Deleuze is not arguing that the condition of the application of concepts is the existence of a given sensory manifold; the sensory manifold is just an instance of empirical multiplicity.' It is precisely the actuality of the empirical and the priority accorded the a posteriori which, for Deleuze, are ways of avoiding the imprecision and universalizing abstractions of speculative philosophy.

Deleuze's approach is a transcendental empiricism because it is an attempt to locate the conditions of possibility for consciousness (that is, for evident effects, the immediacy of the whole called 'I'). Empirical reality and principles 'leave out the elements of their own foundation' and, because these elements are inaccessible to consciousness, they necessitate transcendental study of their implicit conditions (DR, 255). Deleuze does not conceive of these unthought conditions as abstract philosophical entities, however, but as 'subject-tendencies' forming an Interiority beyond the reach of empirical consciousness, but part of it: 'an inside, an unthinkable or unthought, deeper than any internal world' and Immanent to consciousness (DR, 199-200; C2, 278).

Some scholars have claimed that transcendental empiricism is patterned after Bergsonian intuition, and Boundas goes so far as to insist that 'intuition is identical with Deleuze's transcendental empiricism.' This is an overstatement, confusing a general method-
ological approach with a specific philosophical tool (albeit that other commentators have taken
Intuition to constitute Bergson's philosophy as a 'radical empiricism', equated with the method
of positive science because both are 'empirical').

In accordance with Bergson's edict, Deleuze begins his study of consciousness with the
whole of which we are immediately aware, and decomposes it into natural articulations of kind
(of activity, mental state, function and so on) according to contingent and productive concepts
relevant only to the immediacy of the conscious whole called 'I'. (These parts will be identified
in the remaining sections of the Chapter.) Accordingly, Deleuze maintains that 'there is some
resemblance between intuition as method of division and transcendental analysis: If the
composite represents the fact, it must be divided into tendencies or into pure presences that
only exist in principle' (B, 23).

Far from indicating a transcendental turn, however, Deleuze's approach distinguishes
transcendental empiricism from forms of transcendentalism such as Kant's. For as Massumi
puts it, 'Deleuze's philosophy is the point at which transcendental philosophy flips over into
radical immanentism.... The Kantian imperative to understand the conditions of possible
experience as if from outside and above transposes into an invitation to recapitulate'. A brief
contrast of Deleuze's 'superior empiricism' with Kant's transcendentalism is in order.

Although the precise meaning of 'transcendental' shifts throughout Kant's corpus, the
version that interests Deleuze is as a form of knowledge, not of objects themselves, but of the
conditions of the possibility of knowing them. As such, they are logically necessary for all
selves, rather than individual, psychological or transcendent. The transcendental pretence thus
involves the assumption—unwarranted on Deleuze's view—that the fundamental modes of
human experience are universal and necessary. But it fails to account for differences between
whatever one knows of a phenomenon in advance and what one learns about it a posteriori: its
particularity. Experience is conceived just in terms of re-presentation and the similitudes of
mental functioning (DR, 138).

In contrast, Deleuze seeks after the conditions of actual rather than possible experience.
These conditions are not logically necessary, but contingent upon the nature of experience as it
is lived. As Baugh puts it, 'Deleuze argues that the empirical is not what the concept would be
in a representation if it occurred, something hypothetical, but actuality itself, real existence as
opposed to the possibility of existence'. The conditions never exceed the conditioned: rather than being imposed upon actual experience in the abstract, they are located within it.

The main flaw perceived by Deleuze in transcendentalism is that it reproduces the empirical in transcendental form, and shields these conditions from further critique. In *The Logic of Sense*, he writes that 'the error of all efforts to determine the transcendental as consciousness is that they think of the transcendental in the image of, and in the resemblance to, that which it is supposed to ground' (*LS*, 105). That is, transcendental philosophy typically enters into a kind of circularity whereby conditions are conceived in the reified image of the conditioned. Of most relevance here, dynamic and particular conscious states (dreams, beliefs, memories, experiences or whatever) are conceived by transcendentalism as contained within or given to a pre-existent subject, 'supreme Self or superior I' (*LS*, 106). As the apex of transcendental unity, this supreme Self serves as a domain beyond the empirical and beyond further study or 'demystification' (*NP*, 121). In comparison, Deleuze's starting point is the contingent lived whole called 'I' and intuition opens it to critique by dividing it.

There is a caveat to understanding Bergsonism that Deleuze fails to spell out. Bergson realizes that to express in language the results of an intuitive study of consciousness is to conceptualize and symbolize, and thus to abstract. Yet he means intuition to be free from formal conceptual and symbolic constraints. Accordingly, to communicate about intuition, we should, he implores, use: 'the most concrete ideas, but those which still retain an outer fringe of images. Comparisons and metaphors will here suggest what cannot be expressed' (*CM*, 42). Communication of intuition's findings must retain a power of suggestiveness, pointing to what is otherwise inexpressible, and facilitating a kind of participation in it, whilst also describing as precisely as possible the reality of consciousness. Deleuze's Bergsonism must be understood in these terms.

In accordance with the Chapter's first aim, we find that Deleuze takes Bergsonian Intuition as providing his transcendental empiricism with a method for decomposing a whole in a manner faithful to natural articulations. It enables transcendental empiricism to move from experience of the particular in its particularity to the conditions of experience whilst minimizing abstraction and consequent imprecision (*B*, 28). Section 13 will outline Deleuze's conception of the whole from which his Bergsonian study of the subject must begin.
In accordance with the tenets of transcendental empiricism, Deleuze begins his Bergsonian study of the subject with the immediate awareness of one's consciousness. According to Bergson, 'there is nothing more immediately given, nothing more evidently real, than consciousness, and mind is consciousness.' In this simple statement, Bergson moves (and moves Deleuze) away from Hume's starting point. Mind is not a collection of ideas distinct from the immediacy and dynamism of consciousness, but consciousness itself. Neither does Bergson assume that consciousness is 'possessed' by some particular and unified subject, or that it must be subjected to synthesis. In an insightful piece, Joseph Chiari writes that, for Bergson, 'our inner life helps us to grasp the true meaning of life, thence the importance of consciousness and consequently of psychology as a basis of metaphysical explorations.' This is precisely the direction of Deleuze's Bergsonian project: from the inner life of consciousness, to a psychology of time and memory, and, finally, to a comprehensive and descriptive metaphysics of the subject's constitutive moment.

For Deleuze and Bergson, intuitive awareness reveals consciousness to be essentially temporal; ongoing mental activity which, in its dynamism and the mutual interpenetration of its states, constitutes a kind of time internal to one's self. Bergson calls the conscious reality of this time 'durée' (often translated as 'duration'). He asserts that 'pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego ... refrains from separating its present state from its former states' (TFW, 100). Notwithstanding difficulties invoked by his notion of 'conscious states', Bergson's point is that the temporality of consciousness is a flow constituted by the inter-penetration of thoughts rather than their successive arrangement: 'a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another' (TFW, 104). Durée is the immediate awareness of this flow (TFW, 228). (Deleuze emphasizes the importance of his method when he writes that 'duration would remain purely intuitive, in the ordinary sense of the word, if intuition—in the properly Bergsonian sense—were not there as method' [E, 14].)

Because he believes that intuition's findings are best expressed in images, Bergson
explains *durée* by using analogies with music. Mental states flow together as if parts of a melody: previous notes lingering and future ones anticipated by the mellifluous effusion and unity of the piece, the permeation of each note by others revealing the extreme closeness of their interconnection. To try and grasp this flow as a complete set of notes is pointless, because 'a musical phase ... is constantly on the point of ending and constantly altered in its totality by the addition of some new note' (*TFW*, 100). To speak of mind or consciousness as a comprehensive system is to ignore an analogous attribute of *durée*: it is always flowing, overtaking what might be called the 'not yet' and passing away in the 'already'. (We shall find echoes of this in Deleuze's characterization of the present.)

Intuition reveals to Bergson that while 'it is true that we count successive moments of duration, and that, because of its relations with number, time at first seems to us to be a measurable magnitude, just like space', such quantification is inconsistent with *durée qua* immediate awareness (*TFW*, 104). Indeed *durée* can be contrasted with 'clock time', the time of physics and practical life, which either spatializes time by situating elemental instants end-to-end on a referential grid (thus invoking differences merely of degree) or uses the digits of a time-piece as a crass and imprecise physical image. When arranged in accordance with these models, instants of clock time form a complete set of discrete particulars, externalizing instants in their relation one to another. Time becomes a series of separable instants, consciousness is 'situated' in time as a series of temporally disparate mental states, and movement is conceived in terms of relations between static positions. Thus clock time abstracts from experience by distorting its continuity (*TFW*, 121; *CM*, 145, 341).

But the constitutive integration of moments of *durée* must not be overemphasized. Intuition confirms also that consciousness is not 'one long thought', as it were, but a flowing together of mental states which are *different* from one another in important ways. As such, Bergson contends that differences between mental states allow us to mark one kind of thought or one particular thought from another, whilst constituting simultaneously a singular flow, a merging of thoughts as one consciousness. As Deleuze puts it, 'it is duration that includes all the qualitative differences, to the point where it is defined as alteration in relation to itself'; indeed, he insists, 'there are no differences in kind except in duration' (*B*, 92, 32). In other words, *durée* is the immediate awareness of the flow of changes that simultaneously constitute
differences and relationships between particulars. Because mental states are neither independent nor atomic, change must occur 'within' rather than 'between' them, making it a qualitative rather than quantitative phenomenon. 

This disclosure clearly differentiates Deleuze's Bergsonian and Humean theories. Consciousness is, for Bergson, a continuous becoming-different rather than a series of conjoined atomistic or molecular states. He believes that the latter conception exemplifies all forms of associationism: 'the capital error of associationism is that it substitutes for this continuity of becoming, which is the living reality, a discontinuous multiplicity of elements, inert and juxtaposed' (MM, 134). On such a view, dynamism is not 'read off' reality but imposed between the 'atoms' according to a spatial model. Thus, although associationism can construct pragmatically convenient fabrications, it detracts from the reality of the flow of mental states (TFW, 128, 139).

Deleuze's version of Humean associationism used a set of descriptive principles to theorize the flow of mental states. Recall Deleuze's claim that in Humean empiricism, 'we must... define the given by two objective characteristics: Indivisibility of an element and distribution of elements; atom and structure' (ES, 92). The atomistic given is stabilized and constrained, contrary to the manifestations of consciousness. Any consequent re-creation of dynamism must be, as Bergson puts it, 'the work of the associationist philosopher who is studying my mind, rather than of my mind itself' (TFW, 161).

Another telling contrast is between Bergson's approach to the temporality of consciousness and Kant's. For Bergson, durée is always already present in the given, the empirical reality of consciousness, whereas for Kant, time is both a form of receptive 'intuition' and what must be added to the 'categories' to yield the 'transcendental schemata'. Thus, for Kant, time is not an empirical concept, but an a priori necessity underlying all possible experience. Moreover, despite Deleuze's claim that Bergson is closer to Kant than he realized, the difference between them is marked: Kant proposes a homogeneous time of successive instants, standing in need of synthesis, whereas Bergson's model is of a qualitative permeation of states (C2, 82-3). The distinction between durée and clock time emphasizes to Deleuze the importance of inner time's dynamism. He sees that durée implicates a "transition", ... a "change", a becoming (B, 37). The heterogeneity of mental states therefore must be conceived and theorized as
continuously changing. But as Deleuze and Guattari remind us, it is not enough to substitute traversed space for movement. There is also a need to determine the nature of the becoming-different of consciousness and its temporality.

Whereas Bergson shies away from this challenge for fear of introducing spatial degree into his philosophy surreptitiously, Deleuze takes it up directly. For Deleuze, intuition informs us that, in respect of our immediate awareness of (or 'acquaintance with') consciousness, everything is 'mixed together' so that 'experience itself offers us nothing but composites' (B, 22). Inner life is a flow of various kinds of mental states (memories, dreams, wishes, jokes, observations, emotions, perceptions, calculations and the like) and not just a flow of various degrees (more or less intense, more or less useful, greater or lesser vivacity), as Hume's theory had suggested.

Deleuze means the term 'composite' to refer to 'a blend of tendencies which differ in nature'. Because, on Deleuze's reading, intuition is able to divide composites according to natural differences of quality or kind, it is the perfect means for isolating these tendencies; for dividing the complex whole called 'I' according to the natural articulations of inner life (B, 21, 22, 26). For Deleuze, following the first chapters of Bergson's *Matter and Memory*, principal amongst these is an ontological and epistemological dualism between the publicly perceivable disposition of material objects on the one hand, and, on the other, private mental states and consciousness. He characterizes these as two discrete 'presences': 'that of perception which puts us at once into matter and that of memory which puts us at once into the mind' (B, 26). Deleuze's Bergsonian theory of the subject is built upon this relatively traditional dichotomy, implying a belief that the flow of consciousness and the privacy of one's thinking mitigate against a study centred on just public states, whilst the reality of social mores and a capacity to manipulate and refer meaningfully to material objects curtails any account based just on mental states.

For Deleuze, intuition works by dividing the reality of a domain 'according to lines of different natures' (B, 115). The two aspects of the composite arise from disparate 'lines' of the 'development' of consciousness. Deleuze argues that to theorize matter and consciousness precisely, we must 'push each line ... to the point where it goes beyond our own experience: an extraordinary broadening out that forces us to think a pure perception identical to the whole of
matter, a pure memory identical to the totality of the past' (B, 27). We have seen that for the early Deleuze, transcendental empiricism must begin with the whole—the apparently unified I—as the principal fact of consciousness. But general applicability and philosophical rigour demand that we seek the conditions that make this whole actual. Deleuze must locate and explain the generalizable preconditions for both private thoughts and perception of public states. So whilst his identification of the 'lines of development' is contingent (upon his method and his concentration upon actual rather than possible experience), the conditions presupposed by them are necessary from this perspective.

But mere 'broadening out'—describing the functions on each line—is not sufficient to explain their joint occurrence in consciousness. Deleuze writes that we must first divide the composite 'into two divergent and expanded directions which correspond to a true difference in kind between soul and body, spirit and matter' but 'we can only reach the solution to the problem by narrowing' (B, 29-30). We must follow the lines of consciousness (or 'pure subjectivity') and materiality ('objectivity') through one full cycle, gathering up the implications of their movement along the way, until we rediscover the 'point' at which they intersect (B, 29). Only by tracing the operative conditions along the two lines can the full implications of the point of intersection be grasped.

This Section has argued that Deleuze adopts Bergson's durée as a precise characterization of the intuited flow of consciousness. It leads him to not only emphasize the dynamism that is characteristic of consciousness, but to pursue the conditions of inner time in terms of the two aspects of consciousness evident to intuition. His transcendental survey of each of these two 'lines' must be conducted independently of the other so as to preserve 'natural purity' and make clear the implications of their intersection. Section 14 will deal with the 'line of objectivity' or 'materiality', and Sections 15 and 16 with the 'line of pure subjectivity'. Later sections will detail Deleuze's study of the point of coincidence of the two lines, the moment of the subject's constitution.
For Bergson, it is impossible to sustain the traditional philosophical and scientific division between movement as the physical reality of an external world and as the psychic reality of changes amongst mental states. He insists that movement is 'absolutely indivisible' and that 'movement, whatever its inner nature, becomes an indisputable reality' (MM, 193, 143). According to Deleuze, Bergson 'moves the ground of consciousness' by overcoming the tendency in philosophy and psychology to divide changing mental states (possessing qualities but not extension) from changing material states (understood as quantitative spatial extension) (Cl, 56). As such, as Peter Hallward points out, the disparateness of the two lines is underpinned by a univocity that becomes crucial to Deleuze's account.45

Because Hume had considered the given in respect of a purely nominal or formal origin, there was no need in Empiricism and Subjectivity for Deleuze to broach the precise nature of the relationship between associations within the imagination and the world of objects without. But the exclusion of this question suggests other, more pressing ones. 'How is it possible', Deleuze asks, 'to pass from one order to the other? How is it possible to explain that movements, all of a sudden, produce an image—as in perception—or that the image produces a movement—as involuntary action?' (Cl, 56) Intuition reveals that there is mediation between the world of objects and the one of consciousness, and to set aside this profound reality is hardly conducive to philosophical precision.

For Deleuze as for Bergson, internal and external movement are reconciled in the process of 'pure perception', the direct transmittal of movement from external objects to one's own body and thence to the brain.46 This is not to say that reception of movement by the brain is a sufficient condition for consciousness (as subsequent sections will show), but it is a necessary one. Furthermore, perception and consciousness can be considered to coincide in one important respect. As Bergson puts it:

we grasp, in perception, at one and the same time, a state of our consciousness and a reality independent of ourselves. This mixed character of our immediate perception ... is the principle theoretical reason that we have for believing in an external world which does not coincide absolutely with our perception. (MM, 203)

When we perceive, we are aware of both the state of consciousness invoked and whatever
object is perceived. But although these two states correspond and share a precondition (movement, dynamism), they are produced separately, by different 'mechanisms'. The former has to do with the internal realm, the line of consciousness or pure subjectivity, whereas the latter has to do with matter or objectivity. This Section will deal with the first of these, the line of 'perception-object-matter' \((B, 26)\). Deleuze provides little commentary on the Bergsonian model of pure perception, so I will focus largely on Bergson's texts and their implications for Deleuze's theory, bearing in mind that Deleuze's claim to be an empiricist stems from his belief that, 'on the path which leads to that which is to be thought, everything begins with sensibility' \((DR, 144)\).

One must bear in mind, however, that although Deleuze can theorize the line of materiality as if it were independent of subjectivity, the precision of any consequent model of the subject demands their reintegration, consonant with intuitive awareness of the self as a composite.

Deleuze's study of materiality is, then, following Bergson's suggestion, a provisional model of 'pure' perception—perception before the invocation of memory. Because pure perception operates just in the present, Bergson characterizes it as 'the lowest degree of mind \([\textit{esprit}]\)', on the same level as matter \((MM, 222)\). Deleuze takes this claim seriously, as we shall see. Furthermore, the present 'at which time' perception occurs must also be understood as a purely theoretical construct. As Bergson puts it: 'for consciousness there is no present, if the present be a mathematical instant. An instant is the purely theoretical limit which separates the past from the future. It may, in the strict sense, be conceived, it is never perceived.'\(^{17}\)

Mentions of the present instant refer, then, to a theoretical moment, a distinguishing mark of the differences between past and future (to be teased out later).

Materiality is not limited to objects distinct from one's self, but extends to one's body and brain. On Deleuze's reading, Bergson's theory of perception relies on his characterization of all bodies as possessing material characteristics and spatial volume \((B, 25)\). We experience these attributes in the form of 'images', so that materiality and the image are either identical or very nearly so: Deleuze considers them indistinguishable in practice \((Cf, 61)\). According to Bergson:

it is a mistake to reduce matter to the perception which we have of it, a mistake also to make of it a thing able to produce in us perceptions, but in itself of another nature than they. Matter ... is an aggregate of 'images'. And by 'image' we mean a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a \textit{representation} \([représentation])\), but less than that which the realist calls a \textit{thing} \([chose])\). \((MM, 9-10)\)
In other words, matter must not be understood just in terms of perceptions of materiality, but nor can it be understood as what produces perceptions, since matter and image are the same thing from different ‘perspectives’. It is pointless to look beyond images in order to grasp the presence of objects and relationships between them, and we should neither dismiss our perceptions as illusions of mind nor suppose some object (such as Kant’s transcendental object) ‘standing behind’ images.49 Rather, conjuring up the strictest empiricism, Bergson insists that images are objects in the world which possess the qualities that they are perceived as possessing (MM, 10).49 An object perceived as red and square really is that way (except in cases of mistake); redness and squareness are not subjective attributes. In other words, there is what Deleuze will refer to in later texts as a ‘resemblance’ between perceived qualities and commensurate perceptions.50 Consequently, for Bergson, ‘the movements of matter are very clear, regarded as images, and ... there is no need to look in movement for anything more than what we see in it’ (MM, 23). We need only perceive the actions and reactions evident in images to grasp relations between material objects.

Theories of perception fall into error, Deleuze contends, whenever they overlook the correspondence between one’s bodily perceptive apparatus and ‘the side of being that manifests itself to us in the first place’ (B, 34). The ontological similarity between external objects and one’s body undercuts any possibility of their differing in kind and any need for attribution to the body of such enigmatic properties as thought. As images, the body and its component parts cannot contain images (C1, 58). There is no difference in kind—and thus no difference relevant for transcendental empiricism—between the body and the world of objects (B, 25).

Bergson’s ontology of images has two important implications for Deleuze’s study of the subject. First, the emphasis on relations between moving images allows Deleuze to conceive natural perception independently of static points of reference. In contrast to phenomenology, for example, Bergsonian perception and movement do not imply the activity of a subject.51 For Bergson, objects qua images are ‘luminous’ by themselves without anything—consciousness, for example—illuminating them (C1, 60-1). Second, Bergson’s theory clears the way for a Deleuzian theory of perception as direct, placing us in an unmediated relationship with matter (B, 25). If materiality is always characterized by movement and spatial attributes, then percep-
tion takes the form of materiality or, more accurately, of material affects.

Bergson specifies movement as the transcendental condition of perception. At one level, this is because he understands matter as just 'atoms in motion' (*MM*, 35). At another, he is interested in the directly perceptible aspects of movement; with a body's motion in being first here, upon the desk, and then there, upon the floor. In order to comprehend both levels, one must conceive of movement of ('within') and between bodies.

For Deleuze and Bergson, the nature of stimulation itself is physical, relying on shared attributes of materiality. Not only do sensations have spatial characteristics ('the itch is there'; 'I felt the mosquito land here, on my arm'; Bergson's example of a localized pain caused by a pin prick [*MM*, 53]), they also are constituted by movements. In other words, the world of consciousness is reconciled with that of sensation by means of movement. According to Bergson, perception involves a continuity of successive vibrations being sensed, localized and 'taken up' by the perceptive apparatus of the nervous system (*MM*, 31, 203; *TFK*, 106). Conceived in this way, the distinction between the world of 'external' objects and one's physical awareness of them is a difference purely of degree (*MM*, 202).

Deleuze understands the stimulation of the nervous system as involving 'the operation of contracting trillions of vibrations onto a receptive surface' or 'a series of micro-movements on an immobilised plate of nerve' (*B*, 74; *Cl*, 87). He believes that when we perceive, we contract vibrations or 'elementary shocks' into a felt quality. Since both the process of contraction and the vibrations themselves are fundamentally material, the range of perceptible images is limited by the capacity to receive movement (*B*, 87). (Deleuze's Bergsonian physicalism is supported by developments in science. Recent accounts of chemo-reception in taste and smell, somatic reception in touch, and photoreception and transduction in sight support the suggestion that interaction between bodies must be kinetic.)

Although objects cannot be perceived apart from physical, vibratory movements affecting the nervous system, it is erroneous to suppose that there is some unchanging material element from which perceived qualities originate (*Cl*, 59). As Deleuze writes: 'there is nothing moved which is distinct from the received movement. Every thing, that is to say every image, is indistinguishable from its actions and reactions' (*Cl*, 58). Objects can only be perceived as images, and images are founded in stimulation, and thus in movement. Perception is not
merely a surface affect on bodies, however. It involves 'external images reaching the organs of sense, modifying the nerves, propagating their influence in the brain' (MM, 40). Subsequent to disturbance of the nerves, movement is passed as a 'current' of molecular changes to the brain which, as the centre of affection, enables the 'extension' of perception into the determination of reactions (C2, 47). The effects of perception move between 'layers' of nerves and thence to the brain, so that, as Bergson puts it: 'everything is changed in the interior movements of perceptive centres. But everything is also changed in "my perception". My perception is, then, a function of these molecular movements; it depends upon them' (MM, 22).

Bergson's great innovation is establishing perception as a direct and unmediated transmission made possible by the likeness of bodies in kind, rather than as a 'translation' or interpretation of stimuli. The vibration of nerves can only be distinguished from cerebral vibrations by the degree of movement rather than the kind. As such, perception remains firmly on the line of materiality. At no point do vibrations 'spiritualize into consciousness', changing by some 'miraculous power' into conscious representations (MM, 29-30). As Deleuze points out: 'external images act on me, transmit movement to me, and I return movement: how could images be in my consciousness since I am myself image, that is, movement? And can I even, at this level, speak of "ego", of eye, or brain and of body? Only for simple convenience' (C1, 58). At this stage of Deleuze's transcendental empiricism, any theoretical alliance between the two lines is subordinated by the attribute of movement to the line of materiality.

The model of pure perception advanced so far constitutes an openness by human bodies to all stimuli, implying that every micro-movement encountered must also be perceived. But if this were really the case, we conceivably would be so overwhelmed by images as to be unable to act or respond at all, 'descending', as Bergson puts it, 'to the condition of a material object' (MM, 49). But the intuited subject is clearly mobile and responsive, implying some 'filtering out' of actual perceptions from the range of possible ones.

Because humans are embodied, pure perception is impossible without affection, but these two must not be confused. The difference between them, the measure of what is actually 'absorbed', is real perception, which excludes whatever is not of 'interest' to us. Rather than an additive process (adding consciousness or reality to micro-movements, perhaps), perception is a subtractive one, a selective reduction from the range of stimuli to just those of immediate
importance for the organism \((B, 24-5)\). So, as Bergson puts it, 'while perception measures the reflecting power of the body, affection measures its power to absorb', and the question becomes 'how it is limited, since it should be the image of the whole, and is in fact reduced to the image of that which interests you' \((MM, 56, 40)\).

From the commonality of movement to all images, Deleuze deduces that there can be no difference in kind between the brain and other states of matter \((B, 64)\). The brain is always on the line of materiality, sharing characteristics of movement and spatiality. As such, it is unable to add anything to perception: it cannot manufacture representations of objects, for example, or add consciousness to matter. But this is not to say that the brain cannot serve as a location for activity. Bergson contends that the brain is the site of subtraction from our affection of whatever is of no interest. He argues that 'in normal psychological life' there is 'a constant effort of the mind to limit its horizon, to turn away from what it has a material interest in not seeing', and 'the brain seems to have been constructed with a view to this work of selection' \((CM, 137)\). It receives vibrations from the exterior senses and acts as a 'filter', excluding vibrations which need not elicit a physical response (unessential and distracting images), allowing one to not react to particular stimuli. Thus Deleuze depicts the brain as a kind of 'gap' between vibratory stimulation and dynamic response, an 'interval' that excludes vibrations and 'complicates the relationship between a received movement (excitation) and an executed movement (response)' \((B, 24)\).

Having established the brain as interval, Deleuze considers next the kind of activity within it, beginning with the relationship between sensory stimulation and bodily response. According to Deleuze and Bergson, perception is always oriented towards the practical life of action rather than pure knowledge, and the only movements actually perceived are those relevant to one's bodily actions. For Bergson, 'my perception displays, in the midst of the image world, ... the eventual or possible actions of my body', so that actual perception can be defined as 'the aggregate of images ... referred to the eventual action of one particular image, my body' \((MM, 22)\).

But 'relevance' here must be understood in several distinct ways: the location of objects is always perceived in terms of the position of one's body, as the central image; the only stimuli of 'interest' are those adequate to the receptive capacity of the body, and stimuli are either
perceived or filtered out according to the possible reactions of the body—the greater the body's power of action, the wider the field of perception (*MM*, 31-2, 56). The dynamic of stimulation is the transmission of movements from the general realm of images towards one particular image, in terms of which it is assessed as useful (and perceived) or not (and filtered out by the brain). With a bodily response, the dynamic is transposed: movement begins with the central image and is transmitted 'outwards', towards external ones. In either case, the image of one's own body is privileged.

Yet Bergson's emphasis in his account of perception upon the body and bodily utility is open to question. Alan Lacey challenges it thus: 'granted that human needs range widely, over the intellectual, aesthetic, etc., do we not perceive many things in which we have no interest and which suggest no possible action to us?' There are three possible responses. The first is to agree that Bergson has overstated the importance of bodily actions, and to limit commensurately the application of his theory. The second, suggested by Lacey, is to suppose that Bergson does not mean that perception is defined in terms of action, but that it is only possible to perceive what can be acted upon—the present—whilst memories are preserved in the past. There is little in Bergson's texts to support this reading.

The third response is the one adopted by Deleuze. In *Cinema 2*, he contends that we should read Bergson on the usefulness or 'utility' of stimulations very broadly indeed. Deleuze holds that 'what it is in our interests to perceive' is determined with regard to 'our economic interests, ideological beliefs and psychological demands' (*C2*, 20). These three constituents provide for a vast range of 'interests' and, consequently, a wide range of perceptions.

Unfortunately Deleuze does not expand on this point, and one can only guess at how he might have related it to Humean social and economic imperatives on the one hand, and Bergsonian mechanisms on the other.

Bodily responses are determined by interests and utility rather than accident. Even though reactions are unforeseen, however, they cannot be 'the work of chance'. Rather, the determination of appropriate bodily responses relies upon conditioning by whatever has proved useful in the past, and thus upon memory (*MM*, 65). According to Deleuze, such a memory would be 'a motor tendency' which would be 'sufficient to define a recognition that is purely automatic, without the intervention of recollections (or, if you prefer, an instantaneous memory
consisting entirely in motor mechanisms). The determination of responses cannot be
conscious because the interaction between one's body and external objects is purely material.
It requires instead a kind of 'material memory' or 'conditioned bodily tendency' that operates as
a reflex and ensures the adjustment of bodily motor mechanisms to material circumstances
through the selection of an appropriate response in the light of past experience (C2, 47). 88

For Bergson, 'habit memory' is this means by which stimulus and response are
mutually implicated in their interval instant. It is

fixed in the organism ... which ensure[s] the appropriate reply to various possible
demands. This memory enables us to adapt ourselves to the present situation; through
it the actions to which we are subject prolong themselves into reactions that are
sometimes accomplished, sometimes merely nascent, but always more or less appro-
priate. Habit rather than memory, it acts our past experience but does not call up its
image. (MM, 151)

Bergson does not consider habit memory to be memory in the full sense because it has to do
just with matter. As a purely habitual motor response, habit memory lacks any conscious
aspect. If it is 'memory' at all, this is only because it prolongs the useful effect of past images
into the present without sustaining the images themselves (MM, 82). The only limit to the
selection of an appropriate response is the range of possible bodily movements. This Is
precisely the mechanism that Deleuze thinks constitutes the sensory-motor recognition enabling
the instantaneous determination of utility and thus the scope of actual perception (B, 67, 71; C2,
44).

In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze provides an interesting contrast between
Bergson's habit memory and Hume's theory of habit. Recall that, for Hume, habit is 'a species
of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able
either to produce or to prevent', given its impetus by experience (EHU, 46-7). Much the same
could be said of Bergsonian habit memory. But whereas Bergson writes about stimulation,
movement and images, Hume merely refers to the given qua given; and where Bergson writes
of bodily responses, Hume considers the mind's affection. Consequently, whereas Hume
understands the mechanism of habit in purely psychological terms, Bergson considers it to have
a material dimension. 89

For Deleuze, Bergson's understanding of habit has to do with a 'closed repetition, ... A
A A A' whereas Hume's invokes an 'open' one, 'a repetition of cases such as AB AB AB AB'
In the latter, difference occurs between the terms (in the expectation of the inevitable consequence of a causal relationship coupled with the experience of a cause), whereas the former invokes difference only 'in the contraction of the elements in general' (DR 72). In other words, for Hume, the constitutive difference between one cause and effect relationship and another is the particularity of the mental process that runs from A, to an expectation of B (on the weight of evidence of the conjunction of ABs experienced in the past), to B. Difference is constituted by the movements involved in a psychological process, and relies upon memory.

By contrast, for Bergson, a stimulation A leads automatically to some response, which will not even be recognized as B, but simply acted (MM, 167). Every new response constitutes difference, whilst referring only to habit memory and not to any conscious activity: only materiality and its characteristic movement constitute habit. Although habit memory relates previous responses to each new stimulus by means of the assessment of utility and the brain's selectivity, each stimulation of the nervous system is nonetheless distinct from what has gone before at the level of materiality, and habit memory is restricted necessarily to this level.

Bergson would agree with Deleuze's Hume that 'we should call past not only that which has been, but also that which determines, acts, prompts, and carries a certain weight', but he would not agree that we always are aware of the means by which this weight is exercised (in our expectations, for instance)(ES, 95). When Deleuze argued that, for Hume, habit had no need of memory, he might have had in mind a Bergsonian resolution to Hume's inadequate account of habit. Only by invoking an automatic and unconscious memory can Deleuze's down-playing of memory be reconciled with Hume's belief that causation relies upon constant conjunction and expectation.

In Bergson's theory of movement and perception, Deleuze finds a way of reconciling private mental states with the disposition of publicly accessible material objects. By focusing on the dynamism of this interaction, Bergson contends: 'what was immobile and frozen in our perception is warmed and set in motion. Everything comes to life around us, everything is revivified in us' (MM, 157). Whereas Hume's subject only emerges once the given is exposed to the dynamics of Imagination, for Deleuze's Bergson the given is dynamic in the first instance: movement is given in perception. Consequently, the subject must be understood as beginning with movement, rather than as a product of Its reconstitution. This inherent dynamism, and the
role of the brain as an Interval, will be crucial to Deleuze's account of both the activity of the other line of development; pure subjectivity, to which I turn next, and the productive potential of interaction between the two lines.

15. THE DYNAMICS OF PURE MEMORY

Being distinct from consciousness, the line of materiality cannot account for the temporality of *durée*. But one of its characteristics forms the starting point for Deleuze's study of the line of pure subjectivity. For Deleuze, Bergson's philosophical aim is to begin 'from the body or moving thing to which our natural perception attaches movement as if it were a vehicle' and then to reveal consciousness as 'in reality only a movement of movements' (*C*, 23).

Dynamism is not introduced between discrete mental images, but is present at the origin of images, in perception. Only by realizing that movement is innate to both mental states and material ones is it possible to conceive correctly of the interaction between them. Or again, only by approaching the theorization of inner time with an appreciation of the preservation of movement in perception is it possible to grasp properly the nature of consciousness.

In fact, as Deleuze points out in his works on cinema, images are defined by their animation. If movement is taken from the moving body, there is no longer a distinction between image and object, so that 'we find ourselves ... faced with the exposition of a world where IMAGE=MOVEMENT' (*C*, 58). Moreover, according to Deleuze, consciousness multiplies the movement 'inherited' from perception, so that movement is a mobile section of duration, but duration is not a mobility of static sections (*C*, 8).

For Deleuze's Bergson, consciousness is a product of 'pure' or 'true' memory, the mechanism that makes possible the preservation of movement essential to the flow of mental states. Studying pure memory situates Deleuze upon the line of pure subjectivity because, rather than being 'weakened perception' or 'nascent sensations', for example (characterizations which Bergson thinks typify the view of most psychologists), pure memory is entirely distinct in theory from materiality (*MM*, 139-40).

Bergson believes that pure memory stores every conscious event in its particularity and detail. Being 'coextensive with consciousness', it 'retains and ranges alongside of each other all
our states in the order in which they occur, leaving to each fact its place and ... marking its
date, truly moving in the past and not ... in an ever renewed present' (MM, 151). In other
words, the perceptions of actual existence are duplicated by a virtual existence, virtual images
with the potential for becoming conscious, actual ones. Thus every lived moment is both actual
and virtual, with perception on one side and memory on the other; an ever-growing mass of
recollections, commensurate with an ever-increasing range of perceptions.61

Taking his lead from Bergson, Deleuze contends that the virtual is defined by its
potential for becoming conscious (CM, 91-106; MM, 28, 163, 319). Rather than merely
simulating the real (as in 'virtual reality' media, or being abstract or modelled upon the real, the
virtual has the reality of its potential, which, for Bergson, is not 'fixed' (a capacity awaiting one-
off realization), but determined just by the circumstances of its actualization. In the words of
Steven Maras, this potential 'is not a lack awaiting realization, or the acquisition of existence, but
presupposes and shapes the real'.62 Indeed Deleuze's and Bergson's use of the word 'virtual'
rather than 'possible' represents the difference in kind between simple realization and actualiza-
tion, which is discussed below. In short, the possible becomes real, whereas the virtual always
'possesses' the reality of its potential (DR, 211).

For Deleuze, the nature of the interpenetration of moments is clear (remembering that in
the context of durée, 'moments' and 'instants' are purely theoretical constructs): past and
present do not denote successive moments, but coexistent ones. In the process of duplication,
the virtual Image is defined by the present of which it is past, rather than in accordance with
some new present in relation to which it is just relatively past (B, 71; C2, 79). The common
tendency to conceive of the past as 'caught' between the old present that it once was and the
present in relation to which it is now past contains two false beliefs: that the past is constituted
only after having been present, and that it is reconstituted by the new present whose past it now
is (B, 58). These errors lead one to think in terms of 'cessation', 'replacement' and 'reconstitut-
tion' even though such notions are inconsistent with the intuited awareness of time as a flow.
Instead, on Deleuze's account, pure memory is formed simultaneously with each new instant, so
that a moment of the past relates just to the moment that is its corresponding present.

(Moreover, Deleuze argues in Proust and Signs that if each present moment coexists with a past
one, as this account demands, and if that past moment coexists with its past moment, then the
past as a whole must coexist with the present.\textsuperscript{63}

Deleuze observes that, as a collection of purely virtual images, memory has no psychological existence, but is instead a purely ontological element, an 'extra-psychological' and eternal 'past in general' (EB 55-7). This claim can be used to explain Hume's failure to provide an adequate theory of time. His introspective methodology limited him to study of the conscious realm whereas, for Deleuze's Bergson, the power of the past \textit{qua} past is only locatable in ontology. Since this realm is beyond the reach of a psychology of affections, Hume's approach is constrained.\textsuperscript{64}

Deleuze's reading of this point also can be used to counter Merleau-Ponty's famed critique of Bergson. Some Deleuze scholars have rejected Merleau-Ponty's appraisal out of hand because it is suffused by phenomenology and the presumption of a pre-existent subject. Boundas, for instance, writes simply that 'the objections of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are too much involved in the phenomenology of consciousness and subjectivity to be of much use to a theory of real time.\textsuperscript{65}

Merleau-Ponty reads Bergson as claiming that the past is always present \textit{in consciousness}, and he attacks this position on the grounds that 'no preservation ... can make consciousness of the past understandable'. Memories do not 'refer to the past' or 'point to the past', but are only memories as such in the present, so that every memory 'is a fresh perception'. Even if we read Bergson as claiming that perceptions are preserved in the unconscious, Merleau-Ponty contends, then a preserved memory \textit{qua} memory persists only in the present, when it is 'reproduced'. According to him, 'reproduction presupposes re-cognition, and cannot be understood as such unless I have ... a sort of direct contact with the past', which he considers Bergson's theory to lack.\textsuperscript{66}

As Boundas suggests, Merleau-Ponty's account is indeed riddled with references to a pre-existent subject which possesses and re-cognizes memories, contacts the past and so on. But I believe that Deleuze's reading can help to disclose important points in the positions of both Bergson and his critic. For Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty is right to say that memories \textit{qua} recollections are only memories in the present. But because of the relationship intuited between ontology and psychology, Deleuze is able to argue that memories \textit{qua} virtual images are preserved in the non-conscious realm of the virtual: a preserved memory \textit{persists} in the past but
recollections exist in the present. Furthermore, as I will show below, there is for Deleuze's
Bergson a means of 'direct contact with the past'. Rather than presupposing recognition,
however, it presumes just a non-conscious principle of utility and an instantaneous mechanism.

In effect, Deleuze counters Merleau-Ponty by bringing together two disparate phases of
Bergson's corpus. Bergson's early works pursue a wholly psychological conception of duration,
whereas later ones present durée as the foundation for a complex and multi-layered ontology, of
which psychology is but one barely privileged example. By deploying resources from both
fields, Deleuze is better able to answer Merleau-Ponty's criticisms, which are directed at
Bergson's psychology.

As a collection of virtual images, pure memory is not preserved in space or matter, and
nothing can be lost from it. It cannot be a product or attribute of the brain because it is
ontologically and logically independent of the line of materiality. Deleuze reminds us that pure
memory is 'on' the line of pure subjectivity, so that it would be 'absurd' (or, at least, contrary to
division by intuition) to mix the two lines by conceiving of the brain as a 'reservoir' of recollec-
tions (B, 54). Pure memory is distinct from the body, protected from physical weakness and
illness. Loss of memories is not a loss of 'contents' from pure memory, but merely a break-
down of the mechanisms enabling recall.37

Since memory is temporal and purely ontological, 'recolletion ... is preserved in itself
rather than in something of another kind (C2, 80).38 Specifically, on Deleuze's rendition of
Bergson's model, pure memory stores the virtual images of memory on various 'levels', 'planes',
or 'sheets'. However, Deleuze insists,

it is not a case of one region containing particular elements of the past, particular
recollections, in opposition to another region which contains other recollections. It is a
case of there being distinct levels, each one of which contains the whole of our past,
but in a more or less contracted state. It is in this sense that one can speak of the
regions of Being itself, the ontological regions of the past 'in general', all coexisting, all
'repeating' one another. (B, 61)

In other words, pure memory cannot be divided into levels according to the presence or
otherwise of particular virtual images, since every level contains the totality of the experienced
past. The contents of every plane are repeated on every other one, thereby coexisting on
various levels of the temporal Being of pure memory. Even this coexistence and totality of
levels is purely virtual, so the totality of the set of virtualities constitutes the virtual whole of pure
Although each level contains the whole of one's past, the past is stored: 'in a more or less contracted state, around certain variable dominant recollections. The extent of the contraction ... expresses the difference between one level and another' (B, 64). That is, the distribution of images upon any plane is relative to some particular virtual image, the one from which all others on the plane derive their meaning and history. The 'distance' of each particular memory from the dominant one expresses this relativity as an 'expansion' or 'contraction' so that, on every level, degrees of expansion and contraction coexist (B, 60, 86). One might suppose (although neither Deleuze nor Bergson states it clearly) that there are as many levels as there are dominant memories. Each former present is a dominant memory on its own plane, as the element that particularizes all aspects of the plane. 80

Although the various levels of pure memory possess functional similarities that enable them to form a virtual whole, we should also note the sites of difference implicit within memory. There are differences between levels (with respect to dominant defining images), on each particular level (between memories arranged in terms of dominant images, evident in relative degrees of expansion and contraction), and in the constitution of every level (such that the virtual whole is always changing with the accumulation of new experiences on new planes). The only constants in pure memory are difference, virtuality, and theoretical function.

As pure virtuality, the past cannot be experienced and thus cannot coincide with consciousness. As Deleuze puts it in _Difference and Repetition_, we cannot say of the past that it was because, as a virtuality, 'it does not exist, but it insists, it consists, it is' (DR, 82). The past has ceased to act, but it has not ceased to be. But although the past coexists with each present, it cannot, in virtual form, constitute the present (B, 61). The present is necessarily actual, and it is ontologically unfeasible for a virtuality to form an actuality without simultaneously changing form (C2, 78-9).

Nevertheless, pure memory can be revealed to consciousness. In Bergson's words, consciousness 'has but to remove an obstacle, to withdraw a veil, in order that all that it contains ... may be revealed.' On Deleuze's account, this revelation takes the form of an 'actualization' of relevant virtual images, a concept rarely mentioned in Bergson's texts but central for Deleuze. It is the means by which the virtual becomes conscious without assuming a
particular, final and preordained 'position' in consciousness. Colwell gives an excellent definition: actualization is 'the process in which the virtual differentiates itself in the active creation of something new, an actual that does not resemble the virtual from which it arose.' In our case, actualization entails a change of kind from virtual image to actual recollection image by which it takes on psychological significance.

The contrast between actualization, on the one hand, and realization and concretization, on the other, is instructive. These latter are cases where the possible becomes 'its' corresponding reality in a single, non-repeatable operation. But as we saw earlier, the virtual is always already fully real, 'possessing' the reality of its potential. Furthermore, there is no foreordained 'location' in consciousness for the recovered image: its place is determined by wholly contingent circumstances. As Deleuze points out in Proust and Signs, even the apparent identity between a present memory and the memory as it was in 'its' past present is actually a vehicle for revealing the particularity of circumstances surrounding each one, and thus for disclosing differences between them.

In Deleuze's Bergsonian model of memory, actualization is the recall of particular virtual images to consciousness. In this process, virtual images become actual ones of a kind that Deleuze calls 'recollection images' (indeed a recollection is actualized only when it becomes an image) (B, 63). Consequently: 'the past is not to be confused with the mental existence of recollection images which actualize it in us. It is preserved in time: it is the virtual element into which we penetrate to look for the *pure recollection* which will become actual in a "recollection image"' (C2, 98). In other words, pure recollection is always virtual and the recollection image is the form in which it becomes-actual in relation to some present.

Since only the present is actual within consciousness, actualization involves images which were virtual and 'hidden' taking on a psychological significance (B, 55-7). Only with actualization, Deleuze insists, does psychology 'open on to ontology' (B, 63). The psychology of the present, in its very momentariness, interacts with ontology in the constitution of the present. Deleuze's theory of memory-functions—which tries to explain this connection between ontology and psychology—has important implications for his theory of inner time, and it is to this theory that I turn now.

As with Deleuze's account of pure perception, his theory of the operations of memory
begins with the need for a bodily response to some stimulus: actualization occurs whenever a present perception necessitates reference to the past. (As with habit memory, 'need' and 'response' must be read very broadly.) Specifically, in order that a recollection reappear in consciousness, it must be brought from pure memory to the point where action is to occur (MM, 153). Thus perception and recollection are mutually implicated in the selection of an appropriate memory: recollection is actualized because of stimulus provided by a perception, and the consequent recollection image is extended into a bodily response. In Deleuze's terms, recollection enters into a kind of 'circuit' with the present, the recollection image referring to the perception-image and vice versa (B, 66).

There is, then, a kind of material interplay between Deleuze's two lines of development, even though its effect is different on each. For Bergson, this is wholly consistent with the human individual's being embodied. He claims that 'whatever idea we may frame of consciousness in itself ... , we cannot deny that, in a being which has bodily functions, the chief office of consciousness is to preside over action and to enlighten choice' (MM, 141). Memory rather than mere habit is the means of enlightenment, for even though the mutual implication of perception and recollection implies that habit memory and pure memory might also be interconnected, and despite Bergson's assertion that they provide each other a 'mutual support', the two are nonetheless of different kinds and must not be conflated (MM, 152).73

The physical requirement to which conscious intervention responds also determines the particular recollection image. On Bergson's account, the process of actualization is determined by a principle of utility in respect of present perceptions and circumstances, its primary task being to evoke past perceptions analogous to present ones, to recall what preceded and followed from them, and so to suggest the most useful response (MM, 140-1, 228). The brain, on Deleuze's account the gap between stimulus and response, provides the interval within which this conscious reflection occurs (B, 52-3). The lines of materiality and pure subjectivity both operate within this gap, but whereas the 'choice' of the former is mere bodily reflex, that of the latter is properly a choice of the appropriate memory.

Bergson contends that associationism misunderstands this process by assuming that all possible memories carry the same degree of applicability to any current perception. Consequently, he insists, it is unable to explain how a recollection 'clings to the perception which
evokes it’ or ‘by what caprice a particular recollection is chosen among the thousand others
which similarity or contiguity might equally well attach to the present perception’ (MM, 241). As
we saw—and as Deleuze emphasized—Hume acknowledges the importance of utility in his
associationism, but fails to provide adequate explanations of either its interaction with habit or
the psychological mechanism by which the correct habit is invoked consistently. A deeper
account of memory might have allowed Hume to have explained better the consistency of one’s
actions and the importance of repeated experiences.

Deleuze identifies two aspects of memory which perform the tasks of locating and
recalling the appropriate virtual images. The first of these, ‘recollection memory’, is the means
by which memory is accessed and the most appropriate virtual image located. Memory cannot
be located in the present, in consciousness, so we must try to locate a memory image properly
in memory (in the past), ‘where it is in itself’, as Deleuze remarks, ‘and not in ourselves’ (B, 56).
Since psychological effects cannot rely upon other psychological effects for their power, they
must rest instead upon stored memory at the level of pure ontology.

Consequently, for Deleuze’s Bergson, the appeal to recollection is ‘a genuine leap’
into the past (B, 56). In other words, it is a psychological movement into ontology in an effort to
actualize the appropriate memory (B, 56; C2, 80). One cannot make conscious the past as
pure virtuality, but must place oneself into the past and consider it as if it were present. But
this does not mean that the process of remembering is subject to wilful manipulation, a kind of
voluntarism. The ‘leap’ signals instead an involuntary memory of the kind explored by Deleuze
in Proust and Signs: to remember is to make the leap, and we remember ‘automatically’, in
response to contingent conditions.

But the process is more subtle than this. If with Deleuze we characterize pure memory
as a virtual whole of numerous ‘planes’, then one might either leap to the appropriate plane and
discover the requisite image or else not find it ‘because it is on a different sheet ... belonging to
a different age’ (C2, 123). Deleuze and Bergson agree that although one sometimes strains to
access the past, one more usually encounters the appropriate level spontaneously. Neither
specifies clearly what happens if one doesn’t, although Deleuze hints that one must start over,
seeking it on another level, whereas Bergson contends that one must continue the process by
honoring in on ‘a certain region of the past—a work of adjustment, something like the focusing of

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a camera' (B, 62; MM, 134). The leap into ontology is not always a single movement, then, but sometimes a process of working towards the plane and image of maximal utility.

As a leap from a particular present into the past in general, recollection memory is the means of linking psychology with ontology, or the present state of consciousness with the order of Being of what already has been experienced. It is troubling that Deleuze provides so little detail on this enigmatic proposal. On a charitable reading, one might argue that Deleuze's position is simply beyond the expressive capacity of language. Less charitably, however, one might wonder whether the attempt to tie ontology and psychology in this way is a 'step too far' for Deleuze. Perhaps it is for this reason that commentators by-and-large have neglected this aspect of Deleuze's Bergsonism. I shall adopt the more charitable approach, recognizing nonetheless that this is an under-developed aspect of Deleuze's account.

For Deleuze, the leap is omnidirectional—from the particular to the universal—so that recollection memory is 'oriented and dilated toward the past' (B, 52). Contraction memory, however, begins in the past (on the plane located by recollection memory) and contracts towards its future, the experienced present. It is the means for adapting the past precisely to the present so as to maximize its utility (B, 70). Since it is not possible to make actual or 'call to consciousness' a single memory from out of its plane (that is, apart from its place in one's whole past or history), this kind of memory must 'contract' the plane around the privileged image. Thus contraction provides a context for the recalled image and brings to consciousness a plane of memory in maximally contracted form (B, 74; DR, 82).

There is no future 'awaiting' this movement, nor a previously constituted present that becomes past by some other mechanism, but only the constitution of the present immanent within the conditioning of a response. It is as though pure memory 'presses itself forward', towards a future that is experienced as the present. Thus recollection introduces difference into the present by constituting the moment as a newly actualized image.75

Deleuze contends therefore that 'the sign of the present is a passage to the limit, a maximal contraction which comes to sanction the choice of a particular level as such, which is in itself contracted or relaxed among an infinity of other possible levels' (DR, 83). The passage of the appropriate plane through the various degrees of contraction cannot surpass the moment at which a bodily response is required; actualization must always be completed in the present.
Earlier, I quoted Boundas's ready dismissal of Sartre's critique of Bergson, which is directed explicitly at the latter's account of the relationship between past and present. For Sartre, Bergson conceives the 'profound self' as 'constantly contemporary with the consciousness which I have of it', but in such a way that Bergson cannot explain how the past can be 'reborn' so as to 'become active' and 'exist for us'. In other words, Sartre does not think that Bergson explains adequately how inactive, non-conscious memories might be made conscious again, without their having either a 'force of their own' or a subject of which they are part.

There are, Sartre claims, no 'bridges' between past and conscious present, and he insists that Bergson ought to have started instead from one's existence in the present and then explained how the past might be made present to one's self, rather than trying to bring the past into the present.78

It seems to me too easy to dismiss this charge—as Boundas does—as being too heavily tarred with the phenomenologist's brush (although he is right to claim this of such Sartrean statements as "my" past is first of all mind), and more instructive to turn instead to Deleuze's account of Bergson.77 For Deleuze, recall is a matter neither of voluntarism nor the self-realization of virtual images, but of the activity of non-conscious mechanisms under the force of a practical imperative to bodily action. Past and present are indeed distinguished, as Sartre would have it, but not separated absolutely: they are each aspects of intuited durée. By forming the 'bridge' between past and present, Deleuze's notions of the 'leap' into the past qua virtuality and of the mechanisms of subsequent actualization, deflect Sartre's critique without presupposing a pre-existent concrete self or principle of unity.

Deleuze's Bergsonian theory of recall seems rather vague in parts. His account of actualization is short, and full of under-developed concepts like 'contraction', 'relaxation' and—most noticeably—the 'leap' into the past. Perhaps this is due to Bergsonism's being a report of Bergson's own intuitive studies, communicated using imagery and metaphor which do not lend themselves to argument in the traditional sense (even if Deleuze was inclined towards such an approach).78 More positively, Deleuze's account of pure memory and recall specifies a psychological mechanism which provides: a (complex yet rather mysterious) connection between the virtual and the actual; a means for productive alliance between the mutually implicated ontology of images and the line of pure subjectivity; a further instance of the
Importance of dynamism to 'inner life', and, as the last Sections will show, a basis for constituting the *temporality of durée*.

**16. TEMPORALITY OF THE PRESENT**

As Deleuze writes, 'it is recollections of memory that link the instants to each other and interpolate the past in the present' (*B*, 25). In the actualization of a particular virtual image, the past 'connects with' and influences the present of which one is conscious. Memory—and not perception, the *cogito*, or awareness of one's embodiment—defines consciousness. Thus, as Goodchild points out, our habits, beliefs, values, conventions, codes and expectations cannot be objective and impersonal, but must always relate entirely to memory.\(^79\)

Deleuze studies in some detail the constitution of the flow of mental states and its reliance upon memory, locating connections which lay concealed within Bergson’s texts. His principal line of arguments begins with this observation:

We have seen that pure recollection was contemporaneous with the present that it *had been*. Recollection, in the course of actualizing itself, thus tends to be actualized in an image that is itself contemporaneous to this present. Now it is obvious that such a recollection image ... would be completely useless since it would simply result in doubling the perception-image. Recollection must be embodied, not in terms of its own present (with which it is contemporaneous), but in terms of a new present, in relation to which it is now past. This condition is normally realized by the very nature of the present, which constantly passes by, moving forward and hollowing out an interval. (*B*, 71)

Being virtual, every memory relates to the present it was when actual. But if the virtual image was actualized in terms of this previous relationship (as with realization), it would be inapplicable to the selection of a response to a present perception. With the recollection and contraction functions, however, a relationship is established between the virtual image and the present in terms of which it is recalled. Thus the recollection image is determined by the relationship between its virtual form and the actuality of the present stimulation.

Consequently, as Boundas puts it, 'memory, through an active synthesis of time which belongs to it, represents the old present, *qua* old, in the actual present, in which case the past coexists with every new present in relation to which it is past.'\(^80\) Memory re-presents a previous present as the present memory or recollection image, thereby bringing to consciousness what is already past. But the recollection image is precisely what constitutes the new present, and it
Invokes the past as the present from which it is ontologically distinguishable. A particular past is placed in contact with the present and becomes the actual, present (recollection) image.

Deleuze’s account of the line of materiality revealed that the brain forms the interval between stimulus and response. But now we find that because the recollection image is actualized so as to enable the selection of an appropriate response to a stimulus, it, too, must be recalled to the brain. Deleuze refers to this when he writes that the recollection image ‘makes full use of the gap, it assumes it, because it lodges itself there, but it is of a different nature’ (C2, 47). As the precondition for the temporality of consciousness and the determination of responses, pure memory actualizes the recollection image in the present, in the brain. (It is not the activity of pure memory that occurs in the brain, however, since only the actualized recollection image really fills the interval [C2, 47].) Pure memory bridges the interval by ‘blending the past with the present’ and ‘fulfils’ it by relating stimulus to response. Therefore, Deleuze writes, ‘with recollection images, a whole new sense of subjectivity appears’: the temporal character of the subject (C2, 47).

Bergsonian intuition revealed that it is always a mistake to try to account for actualization in terms of a series of points in time. When Deleuze says that the present is the most contracted form of the past, he cannot mean that it really is a point in time, a point at which contraction—thus actualization—is complete, over and above previous instants where it was not. Bergson’s focus upon the immediate awareness of inner time and our relations with the world of material stimuli allows a better reading.

Bergson claims that the present accords precisely with the span of our ‘attention’ (CM, 112). So long as consciousness attends to the formulation of a response on the line of pure subjectivity, the present persists, even though, on Deleuze’s account, it can persist only as a theoretical and interval moment. There is no particular, measurable period of time (‘duration’ in the traditional sense) corresponding to the activities of consciousness: the actualization of pure memory is timeless, properly understood, and produces both the most contracted form of the past and the forward-most point of the past’s pressing towards the immediate future (that is, towards a response, an action). Thus Bergson gives a sense to Deleuze’s assertion that ‘the present is not, rather it is pure becoming’ (B, 55).

Introducing the dynamism of the present, Bergson contends that:
inner duration is the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the past into the present, whether the present distinctly contains the ever-growing image of the past, or whether, by its continual changing of quality, it attests rather the ever increasingly heavy burden dragged along behind one the older one grows. Without that survival of the past in the present there would be no duration but only instantaneity. (CM, 179)

Deleuze’s accounts of inner time and the two aspects of memory enable him to flesh out the nature of the prolonging of the past and the contribution of the past to the present. Specifically:

the past is implicated in the present that is the future of what is past, a relationship actualized by contraction memory; the present demands the past in the determination of an appropriate response, where recollection memory seeks out the appropriate level, and; the future—signified by bodily responses, actions—is only possible because of the ongoing constitution of presents consequent to the other processes. The two functions of pure memory produce what Deleuze calls an ‘active synthesis’: recollection memory implicates the general past in the constitution of the particular present, and contraction memory actualizes some particular level of the past in the present (DR, 82). 63

As both Boundas and Goodchild point out, Deleuze’s success in specifying precisely the nature of the conjunction of moments rests upon his moving freely between a psychological theory of ‘temporal awareness’ and an ontological theory of time. 64 But, Deleuze reminds us, any claim that the constitution of durée necessitates a theoretical movement between the two is contrary to Bergson’s later focus upon ontology (B, 34). (That Deleuze finds a link at all between Bergson’s ontology and the immediacy of the intuited self helps to rebut Paul Douglass’ claim that his Bergsonian ontology ‘subtracted the humanity’ from Bergson’s work.) 65

It seems that with the clarification of the effects of the two aspects of memory, Deleuze has attained the point at which the line of pure subjectivity intersects the line of materiality, the point of convergence that he indicated as his theoretical goal. Evidence for the claim is manifold. First, the actualization of virtual images has to do, in contraction memory, with possible bodily actions and, in recollection memory, with activation of pure memory by perception. Second, both perception and consciousness involve a contraction (of sensation and memory respectively) and the preservation of movement, motion, change, or becoming (B, 74). ‘What is the framework common to recollection in the process of actualization (recollection-becoming-image) and the perception-image?’ asks Deleuze. ‘This common framework is movement’ (B, 67). Bodily and conscious activity share dynamism as a precondition, so that
movement can serve as a 'medium' between them. Third, the theory of memory is unthinkable without the theory of pure perception. This is clear from Deleuze's unpacking of the differences between habit memory and true memory, and of the role of perception in activating memory in the determination of a response.

But, Deleuze argues, Bergson's dualisms are not the last word in his philosophy (B, 22). Deleuze must seek out the effects of the similarities and confluences between the two lines of development at the point of their reconciliation so as to explain the monism apparent to intuited awareness. He must make explicit the implications and effects of the intersection in terms of the whole called 'I', rather than merely identifying interactions between the two lines. How he does so is the focus of the final Section.

17. THE SUBJECT AS VIRTUAL WHOLE

Having followed the lines of materiality and pure subjectivity through a full cycle of development, Deleuze examines the nature of their coincidence and intersection. He holds that: 'the question is not whether the two lines meet and mix together. This mixture [mélange] is our experience [expérience] itself (B, 26). This point is 'a new monism', a product of the independent development of each line (B, 74). I will argue that it is also the moment of the constitution of Deleuze's Bergsonian subject.

Deleuze's study of the dualism of Bergson's theory enables him to grasp the dynamics of the coincidence of the lines. On the one hand, memory provides perception with its subjective character: perception would have purely material consequences (reflex responses) were it not for pure memory. Deleuze has discovered three ways in which recollection is a precondition for perception: first, it is requisite for constitution of the present in which perception proceeds; second, we perceive precisely what is useful according to recollection images, and; third, as Bergson points out, memory 'prolongs a plurality of moments into each other, contracting them into a single intuition' (MM, 218). Perception only has an effect in consciousness because, by contracting moments together, memory allows the multiplicity of stimulatory vibrations to be given as a unity in the present.

But on the other hand, perception provides memory a stimulus and content. For this
reason, Deleuze holds that 'the corporeal attitude really is a condition of the mental attitude' (B, 69). If the virtual memory image were to remain virtual, it would be non-conscious and powerless. Pure memory must be 'called upon' by present circumstances conveyed by perception, according to the mechanisms of body and the line of materiality. Furthermore, memory has a content (virtual images) only because of the perception and transference of images by micro-movements.

The relationship between the two lines is, then, mutually implicative; they form two mutually insufficient theoretical preconditions for actual consciousness. As Deleuze presents it, quoting Bergson, 'these two acts, perception and recollection, "always interpenetrate each other, are always exchanging something of their substance as by a process of endosmosis"' so that "the two terms which had been separated to begin with cohere closely together" (B, 26, 74 quoting MM, 67). Although each line is theoretically 'pure', they 'mix together' as consciousness, entering into 'a kind of circuit' whereby the past, as recollection image, refers to present perception, and perception invokes memory (C2, 45-6; B, 66).

The effect of the relationship between the lines of materiality and pure subjectivity is the constitution of the flow of time intuited as durée. Only through their 'circuit' can the interpenetrative flow of mental states and inner time be related to both an objective world (via perception) and consciousness (via memory). The challenge in developing Deleuze's theory of the subject is to relate the whole called 'I' to this flow, and, according to Deleuze, we are already on this path when considering interactions between perception and pure memory (B, 25-6). Unfortunately, Deleuze does not follow the path's full length in Bergsonism, although he gives many clues as to its direction.

Deleuze emphasizes that the two lines co-exist in the interval of the brain, that is, in the 'gap' between stimulation and response. This is the point at which they intersect practically or actually rather than merely theoretically, and where each new present is constituted either by conscious recognition or non-conscious reflex (B, 52-4). Here, virtual memory images are actualized or reflexes activated in response to perceived stimuli, with the goal of producing an appropriate bodily response in the future, the new present constituted by the activity itself. In Bergson's words, this interaction involves 'conserving the past and anticipating the future in a duration in which past, present and future tread one on another, forming an indivisible continu-
ity. Such memory, such anticipation are consciousness itself. The point of interaction between the lines is precisely the point of interpenetration of images or mental states, and thus of the interpenetration of (purely theoretical) moments of duration. Consequently, for Bergson, consciousness characterizes the present, the moment which is always actually lived, as intuition has revealed. Consciousness, activity and actuality cannot be disconnected, yet they are only ever connected at the point of intersection between materiality (perception) and pure subjectivity (memory), in actualizing responses.

For Deleuze's Bergson, the flow of mental states must be understood as a virtual totality or virtual whole. Durée constitutes the kind of whole characterized by the flow of memory (itself a virtual whole) into the actualized activity of the present moment, towards a bodily reaction. But for Deleuze, the word 'whole' has a particular meaning, referring not to anything actual, but to a virtuality comprising real parts that are never totalized (B, 131-2). The virtual whole of duration is a whole by virtue of the interconnectedness of its elements, both constitutive (memory, perception, brain, body, virtual and actual images, mental states, reflexes) and constituted (inner time, flow, experience, consciousness).

This whole cannot be actual but only ever virtual, since coming into existence is not a transition from the possibility to the reality of a whole, but the production of something new on the basis of relations between existing forces and new circumstances. On this model, there is 'no longer any coexisting whole; there are merely lines of actualization', each of which represents 'an actualization of the whole in one direction' (B, 100). The separation is theoretical, but actualization is experienced reality. The functions of each line are only independent until they meet (in the 'space' between a perception indicating a need for action and a 'hesitant action' [C1, 65]), where their product is the actualization of a virtual whole in the present. Deleuze contends, therefore, that 'subjectivity ... appears as soon as there is a gap between a received and an executed movement, an action and a reaction, a stimulus and a response, a perception-image and an action-image' (C2, 47). As such, the subject cannot be given and then actualized retroactively, as it were, but must be actualized in the process of its coming-to-be-present or, more precisely, its becoming-in-the-present; and since durée is always becoming, subjectivity can never be completed.

Deleuze introduces his point about the productive coexistence of the lines late in
Bergsonism, when discussing the notion of universal memory and the existence of multiple durations. Its full implications for a theory of the subject only become evident when read in conjunction with an earlier claim that: 'the subjective, or duration, is the virtual. To be more precise, it is the virtual in so far as it is actualized, in the course of being actualized' (B, 42). To spell out these implications is to summarize Deleuze's argument. The virtual whole of durée, a product of interactions between the lines of materiality and pure subjectivity, actualized as the experienced present, constitutes the 'subjective' in Deleuze's sense of 'the subject's immediately experienced reality'. So by bringing together his discussion of the constitution of durée with his claim that durée is the lived reality of the whole called 'I', the nature of this reality can be traced to conditions operative on each of the two lines and their effects at the point of their intersection. As Deleuze puts it, 'the only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped at its foundation' (C2, 82). Thus subjectivity necessarily is a flow, an ongoing process of actualization, and 'the subject' is the intuitable unity—the virtual whole—of this flow. Hence, according to Deleuze and Guattari in the context of a later work, What is Philosophy, 'the actual is not what we are but, rather, what we become, what we are in the process of becoming... The present, on the contrary, is what we are and, thereby, what already we are ceasing to be.'

The virtual whole of duration can be called 'the subject' and identified as 'I' without sacrificing philosophical precision, but only on condition that the two terms are understood to relate to durée and not a determinate and complete particular. It is better to refer to 'the subject' here to emphasize that this virtual whole is a product of the lines of materiality and pure subjectivity. Whereas use of the term in respect of Deleuze's Hume was liable to mistake, detracting from the dynamism of activity that constituted the subject as an indeterminate fiction, in Bergsonism this dynamism is always implied by the lines and their characteristic movements.

Deleuze has emphasized the movement and change on each of the lines, and its importance extends to the experienced effects of their intersection. With respect to the immediate awareness of movement, Bergson writes that 'I pass from state to state' and 'I say ... that I change, but the change seems to me to reside in the passage from one state to the next'; with respect to the intuitive location of movement, he contends that 'what characterises the person is in our view the continuity of movement of its inner life.' In so far as inner life is temporal, durée is intuited as a continuity of movement. But for Deleuze it is not just that one is...
aware of changing 'sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas', as Bergson puts it, but that a whole complex of dynamic effects and interactions stands behind it. Specifically, movement, change or becoming is inherent within the generation and modification of stimuli, in the flow of mental states, responses, anticipations and expectations, in waiting and experience, in the constitution of the instant, in the actualization of the virtual past and the transition from stimulation to response. **Durée** is but the psychological reality corresponding to a range of constitutive changes on multiple theoretical 'levels' identifiable by intuition. As Deleuze puts it in the work on Hume, 'subjectivity is in fact a process, and ... an inventory must be made of the diverse moments of the process. To speak like Bergson, let us say that the subject is an imprint, or an impression, left by principles' (ES, 113). For the Deleuze of Bergsonism, the principles of the subject are all the aspects of perception and recollection.

The implications of this dynamism for Deleuze's conception of the subject are profound. It means that 'it is we who are internal to time': as a virtuality in the process of becoming actual, the subject is constituted in the unfolding of presents (C2, 82). It means, too, that there can be no static or stable subject to serve as a precondition for possible experience, since inner time is the means by which a subject always differs 'now' from 'then' (B, 31). In other words, there is no medial, privileged, static and identifiable something, a closed whole or 'thread' upon which mental states are 'strung', authorities granted, and determinations made. Over lived time there is a progressively greater depth of memory and breadth of experience, so that, although circumstances might remain ostensibly the same, they cannot act upon the same I. As D.N. Rodowick puts it so well, 'time cannot be reconciled with identity ... In the form of the selfsame. The formula of Ego=Ego has been replaced with I is an other.'

Deleuze contends that, when thinking about any whole, the inclination is to assume that it exists because change has ceased and a stable state been achieved, in which case movement can occur only when the whole is neither given nor giveable. But his Bergsonism reveals an alternative conception: if the whole is not giveable, this is because it preserves dynamism by being open, dynamic and productive (C1, 10). In this case, the subject is an open (virtual) whole defined by relations between objectivity and subjectivity, matter and memory, perception and recollection, action and response, influenced anew by each new stimulus. As such, Deleuze conceives of 'the finality of the living being' in terms of its being 'essentially open onto
a totality [the experienceable world] that is itself open': for Deleuze, change is both the universal aspect of relations between wholes and the defining aspect of particular wholes (B, 105, C1, 11). Thus, for Deleuze as for Bergson, 'for a conscious being, to exist is to change'.

Consequently, whenever one considers oneself in terms of duration ('from the inside', as Deleuze puts it, as with intuition) one becomes aware of oneself as a whole that is open and changing: mental states are unified but always becoming different, forming a 'multiplicity' (C1, 65, 7, 9). The subject is not a whole despite changing, and nor can a subject be 'added to' and thus changed. Instead, the subject is a whole by virtue of changing, where change is understood in terms of 'its' specific actualization; that is, temporally rather than spatially. To make claims about future (or possible) states of the whole called 'I' under such circumstances is merely to speculate, and thus to introduce imprecision, and it is for this reason, I suggest, that Deleuze abandons his habit in Empiricism and Subjectivity of writing about the I, and focuses instead upon durée as the awareness of selfhood.

The reader of Bergsonism and Deleuze's texts on cinema ought to bear in mind that Bergson recast his position on the nature of the subject time and again over the course of his long career, and Deleuze rarely notes these vicissitudes. In several texts, Bergson insinuates a belief in the existence of a static self: he sometimes uses 'I' to refer to a basis for common experiences, and regularly refers to 'the self', 'the soul' and even 'the fundamental self' without attending to the implications of these terms. Although Deleuze warns his readers that there are points in Bergson's texts (especially Time and Free Will) where he seems to assume the existence of 'a conscious and enduring subject confused with duration as psychological experience', he puts this down to careless expression (B, 48). Deleuze prefers to focus on quotes that imply that Bergson's position is clear-cut and fully amenable to his own interpretation.

On my reading, Deleuze's Bergsonian theory of the subject is weakened by its failure to reckon with another characteristic revealed by intuition. Specifically, the subject is individuated by its dynamism: 'I' refers to a particular whole. This implies the need for a theory of individuating difference, a theory lacking in Bergsonism and Deleuze's other essays on Bergson. In fact, Deleuze will not attend to this issue in depth until he writes Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, at which times he reconfigures the formula 'I is an other' by focusing on the
specificity and continual repetition of the processes of subject-formation.

Nonetheless, Bergson enables Deleuze to surpass the theory of the subject advanced in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*. Whereas Hume’s thought provided Deleuze with a model of the subject consequent to an underlying dynamism and contrary to visions of permanence and identity, Bergson allowed him to detail this dynamism. By adopting Bergson’s Intuition as his method, Deleuze is able to pursue the conditions of actual experience according to the natural divisions of consciousness.

Specifically, Intuition reveals the experienced reality of the subjective whole to be temporal, typified by the continual interpenetration and ‘natural indivisibility’ of conscious states. By stipulating the nature of the given, Deleuze’s Bergson locates the origin of the subject’s dynamism, reaching beyond subjective effects to the world of objects *qua* images. Deleuze subsequently covers a great deal of theoretical ground: by theorizing the continuity of consciousness in terms of pure memory, he explains habit and the preserved influence of the past; by focusing on the process of actualization in terms of different kinds of functions—the two lines of development—he overcomes difficulties implicit in discriminating kinds of ideas according to mere degree (vivacity); by studying the nature of ‘internal’ change, he is able to think ‘I’ in terms of becoming and open systems, whereas, for Hume, the ‘I’ is preserved just because constitutive processes are repeated.

The Deleuze of *Bergsonism* and *Cinema* would agree with the Deleuze of *Empiricism and Subjectivity* that ‘the subject is defined by the movement through which it is developed [de se développer soi-même] and ‘is that which develops itself [ce que se développe]’ (*ES*, 85). The diversity and change evident in the moments of the life of a subject must not be subjugated by theory to a unity external to it. Instead, using transcendental empiricism, Deleuze is able to theorize this movement with greater precision. Every interaction and activity creates another difference, so that the subject is change. Chapter 3 will examine Deleuze’s account of the manner in which this change becomes continual and individual.
Repetition, Difference, and the Becoming of the Subject

The greatness of a philosophy is measured by the nature of the events to which its concepts summon us or that it enables us to release in concepts.

-Deleuze and Guattari

18. FROM BERGSON TO DELEUZE: CONTINUITY AND PARTICULARITY

Deleuze's studies of Hume and Bergson adopt different philosophical 'methods' in pursuit of a precise theorization of the subject. Despite marked differences, these methods share a point of inauguration: claims to an immediate acquaintance with one's self as a particular individual nameable as 'I'. Using Humean introspection, Deleuze accounts simultaneously for the apparent particularity and continuity of this awareness, and for its dynamism (or 'flow'). He argues that relations between atomistic ideas are dynamic but regular, stabilized by the practicalities of social life and various regulative fictions. One of these is belief in a static self, where the similarity of experienced instances is mistaken for identity.

Bergsonian intuition also deals with a psychological dynamism underlying awareness of self, but in a different way. It finds the origin of movement outside the psychological realm, in the world of matter. Each moment of human consciousness is constituted by interactions between psychic mechanisms and material objects. The former are described in Deleuze's account of 'the line of pure subjectivity', whilst the latter invoke a 'line of materiality' incorporating the world at large, the human body, and a pragmatic need for bodily responses to imposed circumstances. Subjectivity is a pure effect of interaction between these lines, and the dynamic subject is a virtual whole constituted continuously at the point of their intersection.

But the concepts and voices of these two philosophers have contributed to Deleuze's study not just in a positive sense. They have also limited it, despite Deleuze's Inventive readings and extensive modifications. Introspection and intuition condition the kind of account found in Deleuze's historical works, and contribute their own 'blind spots' as part and parcel of the methodological pluralism inherent in his transcendental empiricism.
Both Empiricism and Subjectivity and Bergsonism lead Deleuze to theorize the subject in terms of change, difference, and becoming. In the former text, he finds that discrete ideas must be reconciled with the dynamism of imaginative affects by means of passional 'movement', such that 'the subject is defined by the movement through which it is developed' (ES, 85). In the latter, the particularity of instantaneous interactions between lines of subjectivity and materiality can be reconciled with the flow of durée only by deeming continuous the constitution of successive presents. In each case, the nature of the dynamism invoked is particular to the method and system: changes within the Humean Imagination are specific to the conditions and presuppositions of the 'psychology of affects' whereas the dynamism of durée is distinctively the product of Bergsonian dualism.

The 'blind spots' in these characterizations become evident in the light of Deleuze's later works, where it becomes clear that in two important respects they prohibit his provision of a sufficient account of the subject's dynamism. First, neither of the earlier texts provides a sufficiently precise account of how this dynamism, having undercut traditional notions of personal identity, can be reconciled with the fact of saying 'I' and meaning distinctively one's self at any and every moment of one's life. What does it mean for the singular 'I' to refer meaningfully to a Humean fiction or a Bergsonian becoming-other? Empiricism and Subjectivity showed each association of Ideas to be discrete, constituted by particular passions, impressions, applications of general rules, and contingent circumstances. Bergsonism demonstrated that the flow of inner life rests ultimately upon a succession of constitutive events. Although Bergsonian intuition provides assurance that moments merge such that their continuity is not quantitative (a discrete multiplicity of points) but qualitative (an imbrication of moments), Deleuze's Bergson provides an account just of the moments and not of the merging. Consequently, Deleuze and Guattari write that 'when Bergson says that there is always time between two instants, however close to each other they may be, he has still not left the domain of functions and introduces only a little of the lived'. For the constitutive function to live, the closeness would be a mergence or coalescence.

Second, neither work explains in depth how the particularity of distinguishing circumstances, functions, movements and so on relates to the particularity of the dynamic subject; to just oneself and not others. One is left to ponder, in other words, just how the various kinds of
factors common to all human consciousnesses (and I shall often refer to this list in what
follows)—thoughts, impressions, perceptions, stimuli, responses, moments, images, processes,
events, memories, situations, lines, regions, planes, spans of attention, chance circumstances,
virtualities and affectivities—have a particularizing effect or range of effects in terms of just a
single consciousness. Or again, how might Deleuze move from a theory about human
individuals to a theory of the individual human?

One might reply, of course, that the mere presence of such factors delineates a specific
conscious immediacy; that the set of individuating elements describes a differentiated con-
sciousness necessarily. But there are a number of objections to this claim. Most significantly,
as Roderick Chisholm famously contends, it does not account for the fact that whenever one
uses the term 'I' the reference is all of oneself and the intention is one's own 'essence'. In
Deleuze's theory, dynamism of consciousness is essential to one's subjectivity (notwithstanding
disquiet about terms like 'essence'). A mere set of elements neither possesses the requisite
dynamism nor accounts for dynamic effects consequent to their being 'situated' in conscious-
ness: for Deleuze, their being in consciousness is less important than their effects as conscious
activity.

This Chapter deals with the challenges of these two questions, using Deleuzian
resources to explain how the dynamism and individuating differences inherent in the Humean
and Bergsonian models might be reconciled with the continuity and particularity of the subject
nameable as 'I'. Rather than reverting to a founding identity in terms of which difference can be
re-presented ('a supreme self or a superior I'[LS, 106]), it locates a dynamic means of relating
inherently particular and momentary states of subjectivity to one another and to the dynamic
self.

In locating and deploying these resources, the Chapter will venture deeper into
Deleuze's metaphysics, having noted with him that 'individuals and persons [personnes] are, in
themselves, ontological propositions' (LS, 118). Commentators have barely touched upon the
correlation between Deleuze's metaphysics and deficiencies in his historical works, and have
still less frequently deployed theories of difference and becoming to surmount such weak-
nesses. This is especially surprising given the opportunities provided by Deleuze's styles and
creative exegeses. His adoption of multiple methods constitutes an experimental pluralism
leading inevitably to radically varied visions of the subject, each of which turns nonetheless upon such crucial concepts as difference and becoming. Conversely, accounts of the subject in *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense* are sketchy, but assume deeper and concrete meanings in the light of some of Deleuze's historical essays.

Answers to the questions of unity and continuity are found in a range of Deleuze's works (including those written with Guattari). The most explicit come in his metaphysical treatises, the first major works written in Deleuze's own voice: *Différence et répétition* (published in France in 1968) and *Logique du sens* (1969). These texts collect and pursue various of the themes introduced in Deleuze's studies of other philosophers, but are chiefly innovative rather than exegetical. The former provides a metaphysics of difference-in-itself and repetition-for-itself, written using constantly changing concepts and images of thought. Deleuze calls the latter, an interpretation of Stoic *leksis* and the works of Lewis Carroll, a 'logical and psychoanalytic novel'. Neither represents itself as a contribution to the evolving theory of the subject developed here on Deleuze's behalf. But by using theories of the event, internal difference, and repetition, in conjunction with Deleuze's highly creative interpretation of Nietzsche's eternal return (originally delineated in the epochal *Nietzsche et la philosophie* [1962]), one is able to complete a precise theory of the dynamic subject.

I will argue that the two problems are solvable using a single line of argument, hinted at in *Difference and Repetition*:

That identity not be first, that it exist as a principle but as a second principle, as a principle *become*; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the nature of a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own concepts, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in general already understood as identical. Nietzsche meant nothing more than this by eternal return. (*DR*, 40-1)

Identity must be always referred to an underlying difference and becoming, rather than vice versa. But difference in this sense must have (or be) its own concept, rather than being merely what distinguishes instances. I will argue that by locating and exploiting this concept in terms of the processes involved in subjectivity, it becomes possible to unearth a new and dynamic vision of the individual, 'contained' within eternal return. It becomes possible to theorize both the particularity and continuity of the becoming-subject in the productive time of eternal return; that is, in the repetition of distinguishing differences and distinguishable moments.
To this end, first, Sections 19 and 20 introduce Deleuze's concepts of 'internal difference' and 'event' as tools for engaging with differences between individuals of the same genre. The former accounts for the particular and contingent circumstances of Bergson's lines and Hume's principles, and ensures their productive interaction. The latter establishes every moment of subjectivity as unique or 'haecceitic', an individuating moment in a particular life.

Second, the question of Deleuze's theorization of the continuity and unity of the dynamic subject will be broached using his unique interpretation of Nietzsche's eternal return. On this reading, introduced in Section 21, eternal return is an ontological device entailing the productive recurrence of difference manifested in the lived time of the dynamic subject's becoming. In Section 22, eternal return is used to describe how events cohere over the course of a lifetime by means of a shared internal dynamic. This account subverts the distinction between events that was evident in Empiricism and Subjectivity and Bergsonism. Section 23 discusses the temporality of the dynamic subject in terms of Kant's claim that there is, in models of the subject such as Descartes's, an unbridgeable 'gap' between I and Self. It argues that Deleuze's model of time as a synthesis of continuous becoming surmounts this problem without resorting to Kantian models of pure time.

Third, Section 24 examines Deleuze's account of individuation and its correlation with the theories of human kind presented in Chapters 1 and 2. It argues that, in productive becoming, eternal return multiplies the differences defining each event. The life of an individual is distinguished according to both the open set of internal and external differences and a productive becoming in which moments mutually implicate one another.

Fourth, in Sections 25 and 26, Deleuze's ethics of the event will be studied in terms of his desire for a transmutation of human thinking away from a concentration on unity and identity towards the creation of concepts and images that recover something of the richness of existence. Section 25 will show that this desire invokes the conundrum of how a passive subject might undertake an active resistance, and that the answer—founded in Deleuze's aesthetics—reveals much about the relationship between the contingency of internal difference and the regularity of external difference. As Section 26 explains, the consequent aesthetic must pass the test of the thought of eternal return if it is to be sufficiently affirmative as to signal a transformation from typically human thinking to a new kind that characterizes the Overman.
Finally, in Section 27, I will summarize the key arguments from this Chapter and recap their implications for conceptions of the subject.

19. INTERNAL DIFFERENCE AND CONSTITUTIVE EVENTS

In an early work on Bergson, Deleuze argues that for philosophy to have a positive and precise relationship with reality, it must engage with differences between 'individuals of the same genre'. Such differences must be conceived neither as 'simply spatio-temporal' nor as 'genetic or specific', but rather as properly internal to 'the thing (chose) itself:

Without prejudicing what the nature of difference as internal difference is, we already know that it exists, if we suppose that there are differences of nature between things of a same genre. Thus, either philosophy proposes this way ... for itself (differences of nature in order to arrive at internal difference), or else it will only have a negative and generic relation with things, it will end up in the element of [mere] criticism or generality. 6

The supposition that there are differences between individuals of the genre 'human' is implicit in use of the term 'I' to mean just one's self, and explicit in durée's 'internality'. Application of Deleuze's dictum to the study of the subject demands exploration of the nature of internal difference and how it distinguishes subjects. As such, one is led at once to the problem of particularity, outlined above.

In the same article, Deleuze extends his Bergsonian emphasis on relationships between difference and 'kind' or 'nature', arguing that 'the articulations of the real give us the difference of nature between things' whilst 'the lines of fact show us the thing itself identical to its difference, the Internal difference identical to the thing'. 7 Chapters 1 and 2 have concerned the former. The principles of human nature and the twofold articulation of durée are distinguishing marks of human consciousness in terms of 'difference in general'. Human individuals differed from all else 'not in themselves, but in something else': in the processes that constitute them, the principles and lines of development uncovered by Deleuze's Hume and Bergson (DR 30).

To theorize differences between human individuals, attention must be turned from such general constitutive conditions to actual and specific ones implicated in the constitution of any consciousness and becoming-subject; that is, to the open set of particularizing elements listed in Section 18. In Deleuze's words, 'the individuating difference must not only be conceived
within a field of individuation in general, but must itself be conceived as an individual difference’ (DR, 252). Only when one envisages the Humean principles or Bergsonian lines in terms of the uniqueness of circumstances, passions, stimuli and so on has emphasis shifted from external difference, the distinctively human lines of development and the location of kinds (or 'genres'), to internal difference, individuation, and the individual. In other words, only when 'difference of nature has itself become a nature' is it possible to deal with the particularization of the subject and hence with questions of why and how, necessarily, I am I whilst always becoming-other. Furthermore, only then does it become evident that internal difference always precedes differences of species, genre or part, as we shall see (DR, 38).

As Frank points out, Deleuze's insistence that difference not only separates but establishes continuities is central to his investigation of whether or not, without recourse to a transcendental unity or law of subsumption, subjectivity can be explained on the basis of differentiation. Only if Deleuze reconciles his generalizable theories of consciousness with an account of the individuation of the subject can he be faithful to transcendental empiricism's delineation of every self as both distinctively human and apparently 'unified' and continuous. This Section will show that such reconciliation is not merely possible, but implicit to Deleuze's account of subjectivity. Whereas Frank argues that Deleuze fails to show how familiarity of consciousness with itself can be generated beyond non-identity in repetition, I will argue that Deleuze shows that internal difference, the principle of non-identity, is requisite to the repetition constitutive of the subject.

Deleuze's multiplicitous approaches to the philosophy of difference provide numerous 'ways in' to the role of internal difference in constitution of the subject. One might approach it via the perspectivism of parts of Difference and Repetition, for instance, or from Deleuze's reading of the Nietzschean will to power. This Chapter will begin instead where the previous one left off, with the temporal and psychological effects of the intersection between Bergsonian lines of development. It will show that application of Deleuze's concept of the 'event' to the study of the moment of intersection provides means for relating internal to external difference in a manner crucial to understanding the dynamics of the subject.

In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze introduces a new nomenclature to describe instantaneous productions intrinsic to the convergence of various kinds of forces. 'Events' are changes
Immanent to a confluence of parts or elements, subsisting as pure virtualities and distinguishing themselves only in the course of their actualization in some body or state (although that from which an event distinguishes itself does not distinguish itself). Deleuze characterizes them in terms consonant with Stoic ἐλεκτα: as incorporeal transformations subsisting over and above spatio-temporal disclosure, but expressible in language nonetheless. He contends that 'the event ... expresses what is happening, without destroying the nature of the thing [chéso]' (LS, 277). Events signify the internal dynamic of interactions between particular forces whilst always preceding them as virtualities. As such, they are the modes of individuation of any multiplicity, contrastable with traditional conceptions of essence.

The incorporeality of the event is essential to Deleuze's notion of subject-formation. With Guattari, he writes: 'the event is not the state of affairs. It is actualized in a state of affairs, in a body, in a lived, but.... it is the virtual that is distinct from the actual'. As we saw in Chapter 2, the virtual is a real potential: an event is the potential immanent to a particular confluence of forces. Take as an example a tree's changing colour in the spring. The event is not what evidently occurs—the tree becomes green—because this is merely a passing surface effect or 'expression' of an event's actualization, and thus of a particular confluence of bodies and other events (weather patterns, soil conditions, pigmentation effects, planning permissions, ...) (LS, 92). Consequently, on Deleuze's account, we ought not to say 'the tree became green' or 'the tree is now green' (both of which imply a change in the tree's 'essence'), but instead 'the tree (greens). By using the infinitive form 'to green', we make a dynamic attribution of the predicate, an incorporeality distinct from both the tree and its green-ness which captures nonetheless the dynamism of actualization. 'In all cases', Deleuze insists, 'the predicate is only a relation or an event', where 'relations themselves are types of events' and events are 'types of relations [between forces]' (LS, 53). It is not that the tree 'becomes what it is', but that 'it is what it becomes'.

The dynamic character of this model has led to criticisms. Alain Badiou, for example, asks how Deleuze can 'extract from the organicist scheme of the Multiple a theory of the singular-as-event, when event means: everything that happens in as much as everything happens?' Instead, Badiou continues, Deleuze ought to have asked, 'what are the conditions of an event for almost nothing to be an event?' Badiou is concerned that Deleuze's model
deprives the event of a characteristic disruption or rupture, committing him to the view that everything is an event just because everything is dynamic. But Badiou’s objection founders on two fronts. First, rather than expelling rupture, Deleuze’s theory multiplies it. The event is not a disruption of some continuous state, but rather the state is constituted by events ‘underlying’ it, which, when actualized, mark every moment of the state as a transformation. As Massumi puts it, the event ‘has only an abyssal present infinitely fractured into past and future’: as potential, an event is future; as actualized reality, it is past, and the difference between future and past marks a rupture.¹³

Second, on Deleuze’s model, it is valid to consider events in Badiou’s terms—as relatively rare transformations—according to a particular plane of consistency, the order in which the arrangement of events ‘is no longer chaotic, [but] ... consistent or real’.¹⁴ As Deleuze writes: ‘with every event, there is indeed the present moment of its actualization ... in which the event is embodied in a state of affairs, an individual, or a person.... But on the other hand, there is the future and the past of the event considered in itself, ... impersonal and pre-individual’ (LS, 151). A plane defined by a particular concept might be characterized by ‘empty periods in which nothing happens’, punctuated by evident transformations.¹⁵ Actualized events are changes of the kind referred to by Badiou, relative to the plane, but even moments of inactivity are, in terms of a precise philosophy of the event-in-itself, moments of incorporeal potential where the confluence of forces dictates no evident transformation. Deleuze’s notion of the incorporeal event captures perfectly the momentary uniqueness of the nexus of forces—whether or not to some evident effect—whilst preserving a place for discontinuity in terms of some particular concept or plane of consistency.

In terms of the concepts deployed in Bergsonism, the moment of Interaction between the two lines of development is the ‘event’ of subject-formation: the constitutive effect immanent to their confluence and manifested in every present. (The terms ‘event of subjectivity’ and ‘subjectivity event(s)’ will be used to invoke this moment henceforth.) Furthermore, this moment also is one of further production, generating yet other relations ‘to existence and to time’ (specifically, the dynamic nature of the becoming-subject, the temporality of durée, and the constitution of the present) in a manner typical of Deleuzian events.¹⁶ I will show that these relations, too, help tie internal to external difference in Deleuze’s theory of the subject.
In his theory of events, Deleuze is not interested just in such machinations as those established in *Bergsonism*, but also in the productive potential dormant within events. 'To think is to create,' writes Deleuze, and he means not merely that 'one thinks and thus creates' but that thinking and creating are constituted simultaneously as events of subjectivity (*DR*, 147). Thus the general theory of the event provides a means of access to the immanent creativity of the constitutive thinking-event of subjectivity.

More specifically, since subjectivity-events are actualized by both the intersection of the lines and the particulars invoked 'upon' them (situations, regions, planes, spans of attention and so on), as Chapter 2 illustrated, the theory of the event provides a means for reconciling internal with external difference at the very instant of the subject's production. Consequently, a Deleuzian metaphysics of production makes it possible to decipher the immanence of the subject in terms other than intersection and congruence.

On the evidence of transcendental empiricism, any suggestion that the event of subjectivity serves as a focal point for teleological interactions between the lines of development is mistaken. As Braidotti points out, for Deleuze, a becoming can never be an unfolding of an essence in some teleologically-ordained process: the event can never be a virtual endpoint. Furthermore, as explained in Chapter 2, Deleuze argued that it is impossible for one virtuality (the event of subjectivity) to direct or determine the outcome of others (the genealogy of each line of development). The event is always immanent to its conditions, and thus free from predetermination and exact repetition.

Neither should one interpret the event of subjectivity as though it represents a means towards, or kind of, coincidence along the length (that is, throughout the development) of the lines. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze asks rhetorically, 'when we speak of communication between heterogeneous systems, of coupling and resonance, does this not imply a minimum of resemblance between the series, and an identity in the agent which brings about communication?' (*DR*, 119) His categorical reply is that it does not, much less that a theory of the event could explain such an affinity. The lines are distinguishable and 'contain' productive potential precisely because they are of different kinds, have distinct natural articulations, and are free from determinate structures.

In that case, one might ponder how it is that the lines interact at all, and how they
intersect so as to produce the event of subjectivity, evident in durée. For the moment, it is possible just to sketch the beginning of Deleuze's answer, although a deeper account will come later, when further theoretical resources are traced upon the theory of the event. Deleuze declares that any wholly original production (like the dynamic subject) is constituted by 'difference in the series' and by 'differences of difference in the communication between series' (DR, 299). The meaning of the former is clear from Bergsonism, whilst the latter invokes internal difference: events are actualized at the point of convergence of forces and, given the impossibility of their exact replication, such convergence demands a difference between forces (or lines). Furthermore, Deleuze argues, 'communication' between series is possible only under the influence of a shared unthought and non-conscious characteristic; a means of reconciliation which falls outside creative consciousness and which Deleuze calls a 'dark precursor'. Such a characteristic will always be 'the disparate, the difference in itself of the difference between series' (DR, 120). But this is precisely internal difference: Deleuze is saying that interaction between lines will rest finally upon the unthought which differentiates each line from others. Thus there are not three distinct aspects to production of the subject, as Deleuze's statement above would suggest (difference in series, difference between series, communication between series), but just two: external differences of the kind dealt with in previous chapters, and internal differences which both distinguish events and act as catalysts for the productive intersection of series or lines.

This interpretation has significant implications in terms of those internal differences (listed in Section 18) that define Bergson's lines of development. Most importantly, subjectivity is wholly contingent and immanent in yet another sense, hinted at in Chapters 1 and 2, but as yet merely implicit in such notions as 'circumstance' and 'stimulus': the particularity of the dynamic subject is contingent not just upon the intersection of lines of development defined by difference-in-general, but upon the even 'deeper' contingency of the particulars defining each line. Specifically, these non-conscious facets of pure subjectivity and materiality serve both to differentiate the lines and bring them into 'communication'. For this reason, Deleuze holds that 'thought thinks only on the basis of the unconscious' (DR, 199). To claim that subjectivity is coincident to the mere functioning of the lines would be to ignore the particularity of the moments of their development (internal difference) and the precondition for their interaction.
Deleuze is sure that once multiple series come into contact, the constitution of dynamic effects is assured:

Once communication between heterogenous series is established, all sorts of consequences follow within the system. Something 'passes' between the borders, events explode, phenomena flash.... Spatio-temporal dynamisms fill the system, expressing simultaneously the resonance of the coupled series and the amplitude of the forced movement which exceeds them. The system is populated by subjects ... [which are] indistinguishable from the contemplation of couplings and resonances. (DR, 118)

The dynamism of such interactions is precisely what undercuts notions of a 'well-constituted subject endowed with independence and activity' in favour of what Deleuze calls 'the system of a dissolved self' (DR, 118, 78). Even more explicitly, Deleuze states that 'the subject's what's missing from events': events are not related to a subject, but rather the becoming-subject is constituted by events as pure effect (N, 146).

Consequently, even this preliminary study of the 'event' and its implications reinforces Deleuze's claim that 'the self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modification' (DR, 79).

By revealing the nature of the relationship between internal and external difference, the theory of the event underscores the contingency and particularity of the constitutive moment of subjectivity as a unique creation, leaving us in a better position to relate subjectivity generally to individual consciousness. If the particularity of subjectivity is located in the event (in terms of immanence and contingency) and the event is determined by the particular unthought conditions of its emanation (circumstances of each line, the dark precursor), then resolution of the problems of individuality and continuity requires an account of the means by which internal difference is preserved in the event-becoming-continuity. Moreover, in the light of Bergsonism, any adequate account must deal with the difference of every event from every other and from itself, describing a continuity of difference as time rather than a continuity of the same 'within' time.

20. INDIVIDUATION AND HAECCEITY

In a work that influenced Deleuze heavily, Gilbert Simondon contends: 'we cannot have either an immediate or a mediated knowledge of individuation, but only one that is a process
parallel to the process with which we are already familiar. We cannot know individuation in the common sense of the phrase; we can only individuate, individuate ourselves and in ourselves. It is not possible to intuit or introspect all the aspects of becoming-other (which would require accessing the unthought), but only to build an account of the process beginning from awareness of one's continuously changing existence; such is the lesson of Deleuze's transcendental empiricism. As shown in Chapters 1 and 2, neither is it possible to 'think away' the dynamism of the process of becoming-other (the human individual is no mere organization of parts [DR, 247]) or to found the account upon a pre-existent individuality. Rather, one must think as becoming or creativity alongside the intuitively accessible immediacy of becoming. Consequently, to use terms originating from transcendental empiricism's Bergsonian echo of Simondon, Deleuze must establish the individuating nature of the becoming entailed by subjectivity-events.

To show how he does so is the aim of this Section, bearing in mind that although Deleuzian events are always 'individuating' or 'particularizing', they do not constitute the human individual in the circumstances of their production. For Deleuze, individuation 'properly precedes ... every element of the constituted individual', and the becoming entailed by the constitutive event of subjectivity is the means of becoming-individual of the dynamic subject (DR, 38, 276). As such, the particularity of events alone does not answer the questions of continuity and individuality. As Deleuze and Guattari point out, 'you are ... a set of nonsubjectified affects' having 'the individuality of a day, a season, a life (regardless of its duration)." Every event is individuated in and as a moment, whereas the I is individuated over the course of a lifetime, over countless constitutive events and their moments. In other words, the individuation of a particular dynamic subject involves 'fluid fields' of events: today's experiences, memories of childhood play, anticipations of tomorrow's glories or failures, and the numerous conjunctions and interrelations of such fields according to principles of external difference. To theorize the productivity of events in terms of subjectivity, one therefore must locate a means for reconciling individuation at the level of the event and the moment with that at the level of continuous experience and what Todd May calls 'a unified duration encompassing everything that passes'.

Moreover, Deleuze insists that individuation precedes the determination and makes it
possible, so that the means of reconciliation also is essential to understanding properly the mechanisms outlined in Chapters 1 and 2 as those of distinctively human consciousness (DR, 152). The terms 'I' and 'self' become relevant to human thought only when the dynamics to which they refer obtain their 'content' in the form of concrete instances of internal difference. In Deleuze's words, 'individuality is not a characteristic of the Self but, on the contrary, forms and sustains the system of the dissolved Self' (DR, 254). As such, 'I' and 'self' do not refer aboriginally to human individuals, but rather assume this referent in the course of the unfolding of circumstances and events; that is, in the individuation of processes of external difference. Thus, in becoming-subject: 'what cannot be replaced is individuation itself. Beyond the self [[moi] and the I [Je] we find not the impersonal [l'impersonnel] but the individual and its factors, individuation and its fields' (DR, 258). Only in the course of individuation, in the distinctive interaction of internal with external difference, does the becoming-subject become-human and, simultaneously, become-other such as to undo more traditional notions of I and Self (DR, 277).

In the previous Section and Chapters, I argued that, in three respects, every event of subjectivity is a unique confluence of forces. First, no event is ever constituted by a preliminary or precedent unity between the lines of its production, being instead the primitive effect or change generated at the moment of their intersection. Second, the event is produced neither in the image of some model nor as a representative copy or likeness of a more fundamental reality, being, rather, a wholly immanent, original and creative production. Third, as pure effect, the event has no goal. In each of these respects, every event is distinct and unique, disparate by virtue of its internal difference. Each is, then, 'individual' in the usual sense.

Consequently, it is pointless to study the subject's becoming in terms of such traditional philosophical notions as copy, resemblance, design, aim or unification. Another kind of concept is necessary, one which supplants reports of hierarchy with, first, echoes of immanence and internal difference and, second, the necessity of the event of subjectivity for the becoming-subject uncovered by intuition. Deleuze uses the terms 'haecceity' and 'pre-individual singularity' in just such a sense, characterizing them as individuated, usually non-material entities on a virtual 'plane of consistency' defined by some particular concept; a product of the movement and rest of intersecting lines or 'heterogeneous series'. (The relationship between plane and concept is neither omni-directional nor omni-temporal, however, but a field presupposed by the
concept, so that the plane is always already inaugurated within the concept, or immanent to it.)

Haecceities might be conceived, then, as unique points emanating from dynamic interactions between forces upon such a theoretical 'plane', and differences between them can be drawn out of a minimal resemblance by means of comparison.25

Consider the plane of consistency defined by the concept 'becoming', so crucial to Deleuze's accounts of the subject, where points are situated according to temporal relationships between actualizations of various kinds of entities. On this plane, no haecceity is immanent to something other than itself. Each is situated 'in its own place' according to the concept. In respect of the becoming of subjectivity,

such a plane is, perhaps, a radical empiricism: it does not present a flux of the lived that is immanent to a subject and individualized in that which belongs to a self.... The event does not relate the lived to a transcendent subject=Self, but, on the contrary, is related to the immanent survey of a field without subject.26

Subjectivity-events, considered as haecceities, occur upon the plane of becoming wherever Bergsonian lines of development intersect, without necessitating a pre-existent subject 'within which' they occur. Moreover, as set out in Chapter 2, no haecceity is ever a static universal ('form', 'substance', 'person' or 'subject'), but only ever a transitory 'happening'.27 As such, a haecceity has no beginning or end, but only a time of production, of effect, of individuation. Thus, consonant with Deleuze's account of durée, individuation over the course of a lifetime is not a process of 'stringing various finite moments together', but of relating multitudinous effects in the real time of their production.

A life is individuated neither by some inner principle of unity nor by the presence of a self-same subject, but only by the differences inherent in the becoming of every subjectivity-event constituting it. (This point will be explored in greater depth in later sections.) As a unique point, every event of a life is distinguished necessarily from events defining other lives and inanimate forms of existence. That events cannot be aspects of more than one life is a point reflected in Deleuze's conception of events as haecceities, and explicable in terms of his Bergsonian account of subjectivity-events as ever-new moments of production. But only with reference to the role of internal differences can the origin of this particularity be theorized and located in interactions between the dynamic subject and the world of objects (DR, 70-2).

Deleuze explicitly uses his notion of haecceities when discussing subjectivity and its
relation to the dynamic subject, knowing subject, Self (Moi) and I (Je). In The Logic of Sense, he spells out his conception of the relationship between constitutive events qua haecceities and the becoming-subject which, until this point in his corpus, had been merely inferrable from the apparent alliance between internal and external difference:

Far from being individual [individuelles] or personal [personnelles], singularities preside over the genesis of individuals [individus] and persons [personnes]; they are distributed in a 'potential' which admits neither Self nor I, but which produces them by actualizing or realizing itself, although the figures of this actualization do not at all resemble the realized potential. Only a theory of singular points is capable of transcending the synthesis of the person and the analysis of the individual as these are (or are made) in consciousness [conscience]. (LS, 103)

The dynamic-subject is an effect of the actualization of constitutive events, as deduced in Section 19. It is pointless to seek a 'resemblance' between individual events and human individuals, but profitable to study the correlation between them in terms of difference and production. Only in these terms will it be possible to reconcile haecceitic moments with the time of subjectivity qua flux (as in Hume) or flow (Bergson).

Furthermore, Deleuze argues that the field of pre-individual singularities 'cannot be determined as that of a consciousness' because 'a consciousness is nothing without a synthesis of unification' (LS, 102). But there is no such synthesis pre-existent on the plane of becoming. This 'field' is, then, 'an unconscious surface' rather than a conscious one. Bearing in mind Deleuze's rejection of the possibility of a transcendental subject or pre-existent self, it is futile to pursue a conceptual consistency in terms other than becoming, the temporality of creation that defines the plane.

This Section has located in Deleuze's theory of haecceities the theoretical means for assimilating individuation of events (thus internal difference) with subjectivity-events in terms both of particularity and temporality (and thus in terms of the two problems framing this Chapter). The next challenge is to deploy it in theorizing the derivation of Individuals from the field of pre-Individual singularities; that is, to ascertain how 'the individual is always an individual in general, born ... from a singularity which extends itself over a line of ordinary points' (LS, 116). The question must be: how does every haecceity relate sufficiently 'close to' another that subjectivity is intuited as ceaseless and continuous rather than staccato and discontinuous?; or again, how might the nature of the temporality of subjectivity be reconciled with the productive difference which founds it? (Caveat to this task, we must bear in mind that the becoming-
subject is but one kind of 'individual-in-general'. Deleuze's metaphysics and ethics provide no justification for privileging the human individual and consciousness over non-conscious individuals. On the contrary, the world 'already envelops an infinite system of singularities selected through convergence', and the finite kinds of convergence uncovered in Deleuze's studies of Hume and Bergson are but particular instances \([LS, 109]\).

21. DELEUZE'S ETERNAL RETURN

In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze provides a clue as to his conception of the nature and means of unification. He writes enigmatically that pre-individual singularities 'possess a mobile, immanent principle of auto-unification through a nomadic distribution, radically distinct from fixed and sedentary distributions as conditions of the syntheses of consciousness' \((LS, 102)\). This principle is 'always mobile and displaced to the extent that a paradoxical element traverses the series [from which they derive] and makes them resonate' \((LS, 103)\). Although Deleuze does not name it, clearly he means the 'dark precursor', or internal difference; the unthought characteristic that brings series' into relation.

However, simply rearranging pre-individual singularities on another plane of consistency—this time denoted by the concept 'internal difference' rather than becoming—does not bring us closer the goal of relating them in the real time of production. The full implications of the concept of internal difference become clear only in the light of Deleuze's subsequent claim that the subject can be conceived in relation to a 'continuum or circle of convergences' \((LS, 113)\). Bearing in mind that transcendental empiricism discounts the possibilities of convergence upon a point (be it a superior concept, principle or goal) or subsumption into a continuum (transcendental subject or Self), one must interpret Deleuze's claim in a particular way; reading 'continuum' as an allusion to temporal flow and 'circle of convergences' as referring to either the intersection of the lines of development or the consequent event of subjectivity (in either case, to the unification of haecceities). In the light of this interpretation, Deleuze's assertions in *The Logic of Sense* take on great import for a theory of the subject: the unification of pre-Individual singularities must now be envisaged as immanent to their constitution and consequent to a 'paradoxical process', founded in internal difference, which at once derives from the production
Deleuze provides precisely the device necessary to explain these interactions in his interpretation of Nietzsche's eternal return, which he deploys in both *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition* to theorize the relationship between multiple singularities in the constitution of bodies, be they material, psychic, biological or social. This Section, and those following, will show how it is relevant, too, to constitution of the becoming-subject, the psychological 'body' exhibiting (but not possessing) the problematic attributes 'continuity' and 'individuality', enveloping and connecting singularities without operating apart from, 'upon', or 'above' them.

Deleuze develops a unique reading of eternal recurrence, ignoring the problematic character of Nietzsche's descriptions of it and quoting very selectively from Nietzsche's texts. This approach has led to criticisms. For example, Bernd Magnus complains that Deleuze fails to discriminate between Nietzsche's published works and the *Nachlass*, apparently regarding the use of unpublished notes as unproblematic. Henry Staten accuses Deleuze of being inattentive to the texture of Nietzsche's texts and reading Nietzsche 'simply in order to extract a philosophical doctrine'. James Winchester and Michael Roth both protest that Deleuze fails to reconcile successfully a radically pluralist reading of Nietzsche on forces with what they contend is a device ensuring the return of the *same* forces.

These complaints would be more weighty were they not instances of 'reading past' Deleuze. As evident in his renditions of Hume and Bergson, and as he declares in *Negotiations*, Deleuze is a willfully creative interpreter (N, 6). His readings are not meant to be systematic renderings of the original texts (a possibility precisely contrary to Deleuze's theory of the rhizomatic development of concepts), but creative and revolutionary outgrowths. Deleuze's rendition of eternal return reflects his own emphases and interests, turned in fresh contexts to his own ends, and moving beyond even Nietzsche's multitudinous versions. Moreover, Deleuze is convinced that in order to properly understand eternal return, one *must* read Nietzsche's commentaries on the doctrine creatively, displacing the 'manifest content' in favour of 'the latent content situated a thousand feet below' (*DR*, 264). For Deleuze, this 'manifest content' is at once metaphysical, temporal, and ethical.

Karl Jaspers noted that, even though the eternal return is the 'decisive point' in
Nietzsche's philosophy, it has been largely avoided by commentators.\textsuperscript{32} On the occasions that it has been tackled directly, eternal return is usually presented as a mechanistic eternal recurrence of the \textit{same}, a view apparently derived from the cyclical hypothesis of time entertained by the Ancient Greeks and replaced by Newtonian notions of linear time.\textsuperscript{33} Given Nietzsche's conception of the state of humanity, this reading entails the depressing prospect of the return, over and over again, of the human spirit of \textit{ressentiment} and the tendency to reactive formations of unity and identity.

Deleuze considers such interpretations to be completely wrong-headed, claiming that eternal return does not presuppose the One, the Same, the Equal or equilibrium. It is not a return of the All. It is not a return of the Same, nor a return to the Same. It thus has nothing in common with so-called ancient thought, with the thought of a cycle which makes All come again, which passes through a state of equilibrium, which leads the All back to the One, and which comes back to the Same. (\textit{DR} 283)

According to Deleuze, Nietzsche in no way privileges sameness and unity, whether on his own terms or as an inheritance from philosophical tradition. Rather, Nietzsche's eternal return has to do with a cycle of becoming \textit{anew}, and not with becoming \textit{again}. As such, it seems congruous with such original productions as subjectivity-events: indeed Deleuze tells us that eternal return is 'the theory of pure events' (\textit{LS}, 178).

Deleuze seldom provides overt justifications of his readings of other thinkers. But in this case he is careful to ally his reading with Nietzsche's, even though it is distinctive. He explains, first, that to ascribe to Nietzsche a mechanism for the return of the Same is contrary to his fundamental anti-Platonism. Nietzsche was opposed to all notions of self-identity and essence, of being-same and being-equal, and the idea of a cyclical return to and through the same states would be anathema to him. Whenever eternal recurrence is read as the return of some self-identical particular, this particular invokes what Deleuze terms 'the identity of the One as a principle', for without this principle the function of 'returning' has no subject (\textit{DR}, 125-6). Like Deleuze, Nietzsche finds no place for such a principle in the metaphysics of change. For the One to truly be one, it could not have 'left itself' in order to return, for the leaving precludes its being a self-same instance (\textit{DR}, 126). Consequently, eternal recurrence cannot be said of the same (\textit{DR}, 300).\textsuperscript{34}

Second, at about the same time as Nietzsche developed the notion of eternal recur-
rence and introduced it as an original creation, he criticized explicitly the Greek hypothesis of cyclical temporality and returning, and opposed his invention to it (DR, 6). Deleuze asks, 'how could such a connoisseur of the Greeks be justified in regarding his own thought as prodigious and new, if he were content to formulate that ancient platitude, that generality regarding nature well known to the Ancients?' (DR, 6) Third, Deleuze explains, the Ancients 'only approximately and half-believed' in their version, which 'was not so much an eternal return as a system of partial cycles' founded in empirical observations of earthly and celestial bodies (DR, 242). Nietzsche's version of eternal return, by contrast, is a system of complete and interrelated cycles (though not perfectly 'circular' ones), derived from profound metaphysical and ethical hypotheses and other premises.

Fourth, Deleuze holds the traditional interpretation of eternal return to have ignored crucial passages from Nietzsche's texts, especially Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Referring to a decisive portion of this work, Deleuze asks:

why ... does Zarathustra become angry and suffer such a terrible nightmare when the dwarf says: 'All truth is crooked, time itself is a circle'? As he explains later in interpreting his nightmare: he fears that eternal return means the return of Everything, of the Same and the Similar.... That is why Zarathustra denies that time is a circle, and replies to the dwarf: 'Spirit of Gravity, do not simplify matters too much!' (DR, 298)

The dwarf's interpretation is 'too easy' precisely because it views the eternal return in the manner of a cyclical mechanism; as the return of the same realities over and over again.

On Deleuze's behalf, we might add that there are resonances of his interpretation in Nietzsche's terminology. Nietzsche uses interchangeably the expressions 'return' (Wiederkunft) and 'recurrence' (Wiederkehr). But the two have quite different meanings. Whereas 'return' suggests a movement that 'goes back to the same', 'recurrence' implies a new occurrence or beginning. Clearly Deleuze aligns himself with the latter. Furthermore, the component expression usually translated as 'the same' comes from the German das Gleiche even though, as Joan Stambaugh points out, the meaning of the term lies somewhere between 'the same' and 'the similar'.

This protracted meditation on Deleuze's side of the dispute with the traditional reading of eternal return is not mere capriciousness. Each justification of Deleuze's rendition is concurrently a partial explanation of it. Rather than presupposing a return of the same, Deleuze insists that eternal return can be said only of a production without identity, resemblance or
equality (DR, 241). It cannot involve the return of either a self-same agent or a necessary condition for recurrence, but instead it 'repudiates these and expels them with all its centrifugal force' (DR, 90). The very action of recurring, of beginning again under new conditions, means that there can be no return of the same. Repetition can be merely represented as equivalence. In fact, each recurrence is a recurrence of the new, so that eternal return expels even 'my own coherence, my own identity, the identity of the self' (DR, 91). As with the haecceity implicated in (or as) every event of subjectivity, any process that invokes movement (becoming-different), secures necessarily the exclusion of self-identity.

What 'returns' is instead an original production according to the particularity of the conditions of creation. Applying this notion to subjectivity, every event or moment—the 'same' event in respect of external difference; that is, with respect to the genre of human consciousness—is distinguishable according to its unique set of characteristics, forces, or internal differences. We are reminded of Deleuze's assertion that 'the self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modification—this term designating precisely the difference drawn' (DR, 79). I will contend that, by substituting the haecceity of each productive moment of subjectivity 'into' the Nietzschean model of returning, it becomes possible to explain both the dynamic subject qua continuous becoming and the particularity and unification of this becoming. In other words, using eternal return as an ontological device, one can theorize the becoming-subject in terms of the difference and time of a life.

22. Unity, Continuity, and the Eternal Return of Becoming

On Deleuze's interpretation, eternal return does not apply to 'individuals, persons, and worlds', but is the return 'of pure events which the Instant ... goes on dividing into already past and yet to come. Nothing other than the Event subsists' (LS, 176). Each moment of eternal recurrence, like each event of subjectivity, is a new production, so that previous moments and states are already past whilst the future is the promise of new events. What is more, 'taken in its strict sense, each thing exists only in returning' (DR, 67). Each movement through a 'cycle' of becoming is creative and productive rather than repetitive. As such, in Deleuze's words, 'repetition is truly that which disguises itself in constituting itself, that which constitutes itself only
by disguising itself (DR, 17). Repetition is always disguised in its uniqueness, in the haecceity of its moments, but unique and productive moments are the very 'essence' of repetition.

The implications for Deleuze's theory of the subject become clear upon considering eternal return as the return of this distinguishing difference between moments. Eternal return never means continuation, perpetuation or prolongation, nor even the discontinuous return of something which would at least be able to be prolonged in a partial cycle (an identity, an I, a Self) but, on the contrary, the reprise of pre-individual singularities which, in order that it can be grasped as repetition, presupposes the dissolution of all prior identities. (DR, 201-2)

Every repetition, every event of subjectivity, is a haecceity. As such, each repetition of the moment of subjectivity is a repetition of difference. In respect of distinguishing (internal) differences, it is not the same subjectivity which returns (in contrast to repeated external differences, which define a genre), but a different one. Eternal return is the production of difference in repetition, and the recurrence of some particular kind of event infers the production of difference between instances (DR, 41-2). Thus internal differences between specific events constitute what Deleuze calls the 'interior of repetition', the particularity of the inevitable becoming-different entailed by eternal return qua production. In Deleuze's words, 'if [internal] difference is the in-itself, then repetition in the eternal return is the for-itself of difference' (DR, 25, 125).

Now it is apparent that the language of external difference employed in Chapters 1 and 2 is insufficient for the study of individuality and continuity. To say, for example, that Ideas are 'related continuously' or that lines of development 'continually intersect' is to conceal the specificity of the relation or intersection; in other words, to disguise the difference inherent in 'continuously' or 'continually' (or 'again', or 'once more'). Every moment of eternal return invokes both the difference of the moment of becoming and differences 'internal' to that moment; those forces or circumstances which define the moment as unique. The same principle of human nature, the same line of development, the same mechanism, the same effect—each of these terms conceals a 'returning of that which returns', a returning of difference. In fact, the resemblances allowing us to postulate 'lines', 'kinds' and 'principles' at all are only ever what Deleuze calls 'functional effects of that difference which alone is originary within the system' (DR, 125).

In so far as it is accurate to attribute a 'subject' to eternal recurrence, it is the different
rather than the same; 'difference is the new': 'when the names of pause and rest are carried away by the verbs of pure becoming and slide into the language of events, all identity disappears from the self, the world, and God' (DR, 126, 136; LS, 3). Or again, if we insist on thinking eternal return in terms of circular movement, Deleuze contends, then we must envision difference 'at the centre' and 'the eternal passage through ... divergent series' as the circumference (DR 125, 300). The centre of the circle moves from one cycle to the next—so that the static subject is displaced from its privileged position—and the 'circumference' is described by always-already individuated points of intersection.

With eternal return, Deleuze's account of the subject moves from the general claim (exemplified by the readings of Hume and Bergson) that the subject is a modification or dynamic effect to one in which difference 'founds' modification. It is not only external difference that undercuts the possibility of identity, however: both external and internal difference are implicated. The next task is to isolate the means by which eternal return achieves the envelopment of haecceities such as to explain the continuity and individuality of the dynamic subject. Another facet of Deleuze's rendition of eternal return—becoming, its nature and time—will be of assistance.

Taking his lead from early notes in Nietzsche's Nachlass and other texts, Deleuze uses the term 'becoming' (devenir) to describe the continual production of difference immanent within the constitution of events. In the becoming of eternal return, difference 'unfolds as pure movement' (DR, 24). Thus becoming is the 'pure movement' evident in changes between particular events over the course of a productive 'cycle'. Inverting this characterization, Deleuze writes that 'return (revenir) is the being of becoming itself, the being which is affirmed in becoming' (NP, 24). That is, the returning of difference, the most 'stable' element of becoming, is what remains in each moment after becoming is (theoretically) subtracted such that 'returning constitutes the only Same of that which becomes' (DR, 41). (As Keith Ansell-Pearson expresses it, "to use the form of paradox we could say that the eternal return is the same of the different, "is" the one of the multiple, "is" the resemblant of that which returns, etc.") In short, eternal recurrence is the constant in the multiplication of difference, even though its constancy is in every respect dynamic. (As for Nietzsche's own texts, one can talk of being, but only in respect of 'being created' and thus of 'becoming different'.)
Consistent with the continuity of eternal return and the nature of events, becoming is not the phase between beginning- and end-points of a cycle, nor a range of 'supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes' (DR, 261). Rather than a product, final or interim, becoming is the very dynamism of eternal recurrence which, in Deleuze and Guattari's words, is 'not defined by points that it connects, or by points that compose it [events of subjectivity, for example]; on the contrary, it passes between points', having 'neither beginning nor end, departure nor arrival, origin nor destination.... A line of becoming has only a middle.'

Thus the theory of becoming represents a radicalization of the lessons of *Empiricism and Subjectivity*: becoming is a line of 'and' situated between heterogeneous terms, invoking the terms 'themselves' in the course of connecting or unifying them.

Given these characteristics, the usefulness of the becoming of eternal return as a tool for theorizing subjectivity becomes apparent. In *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, the in-between was too well defined, the end-points (ideas) acting as points of delineation. In *Bergsonism*, the in-between prevented moments from being sufficiently close to one another, creating a succession rather than a perfect flow. But the 'location' and dynamism of Deleuze's Nietzschean concept of becoming makes it ideal for theorizing the consolidation of events, being neither merely an attribute of, nor an intermediary between events, but rather a characteristic of the very production of events. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is not the case that time exists between one event and another, but that every event is a 'meanwhile' which 'belongs to becoming.' In its movement, eternal return produces events *qua* haecceities: each event is unique, but 'shares' its having become-different in the course of its production. Thus eternal return simultaneously differentiates events (in terms of the relationships between internal and external difference) and unifies them (in terms of becoming, its internal dynamic). The becoming entailed by the production of haecceities forms concurrently a continuity between events. In other words, the means of relating moments is immanent to their production, so that haecceities are unified in the dynamic of subjectivity 'itself'.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze translates this conclusion into the language of difference-in-itself: 'the eternal return has no other sense but this: ... the assignation of difference as the origin, which then relates different to different in order to make it (or them) return as such' (DR, 125). Internal and external differences are at the 'origin' of the event of subjectivity,
and the becoming entailed by continual return of the event is the means of their union. But, because the affinity between becoming and any event is always determined by the specificity of internal and external differences, the nature of this relationship is as yet ambiguous. The remainder of this Section will set out the implications of this indeterminacy for the dynamic-subject, and Section 23 will define it in terms of the temporality of becoming.

Given that events have no beginning- or end-point, their relationship with becoming is neither one of 'joining' nor one in which haecceity is the 'end' of one productive process, to be supplanted or supplemented by the next. Rather, as Deleuze puts it, events are 'superficially condensed' in the course of their production (LS, 178). That is, they are unified in their very becoming. It is not just that eternal return 'envelops' them within an order of becoming, but that becoming is the dynamism moving 'through' every event. Each haecceity is simultaneously start-point, end-point and mid-point of the ongoing cycle of production. Given the open set of contingent circumstances (internal differences), eternal return must pass through and generate one event before the next one(s) and after the previous one(s). Thus the nature of the becoming of eternal return is temporal, and every event of subjectivity is implicated in every other over the course of a lifetime, in terms of both difference and becoming. (Of course, Deleuze's Hume and Bergson have described the psychological dimensions of this metaphysic.)

This impacts significantly on Deleuze's conception of the dynamic subject. As Deleuze puts it, "one repeats eternally, but "one" now refers to the world of Impersonal individualities and pre-individual singularities' (DR, 299). Or again, 'the true subject of eternal return is the intensity and singularity' and 'as soon as the singularity is apprehended as pre-individual, outside the identity of the self, ... it communicates with all the other singularities, without ceasing to form disjunctions with them' (LS, 300). Here, communication takes the form of becoming, and disjunction the form of difference. Under these conditions,

each dissolved self returns through itself only by passing into the others.... Intensity, being already difference in itself, opens onto disjoint or divergent series. But since the series are not subject to the condition of the identity of a concept in general, no more than the entity which traverses them is subject to the identity of a self as individual, the disjunctions stay disjunctions. Their synthesis, however, is no longer exclusive or negative, and they take on ... an affirmative sense by means of which the mobile entity passes through all the disjoint series. (LS, 299-300)

This dense passage requires clarification. Deleuze means that the subject is 'one' only in the course of its becoming-other; in the continuous production and unification of new and disparate
moments. These moments are individuated as haecceities, but defined by the terms of the series from which they arise (lines of production, principles of human nature). As such, they are products of the continual productiveness (eternal return) of external differences, particularized by internal difference upon these series, and unified by becoming-different, the endogenously generated being of eternal return. The intensity defining the productive threshold of the event is thus the point at which, simultaneously, the dynamic subject is produced and becomes different from 'itself.'

In this sense, the importance of difference to Deleuze's notion of the subject is escalated, undermining absolutely a model founded upon identity. If 'identity' is still attributable to the dynamic subject, it takes on a new meaning. As Deleuze writes in *Difference and Repetition*: "returning is ... the only identity, but identity as a secondary power, the identity of difference, the identical which belongs to the different, or turns around the different. Such an identity ... is determined as "repetition". Repetition in the eternal return, therefore, consists in conceiving the same on the basis of the different' (*DR*, 41). The 'identity' of the dynamic subject refers merely to the unity of its moments, and thus to difference and becoming.

23. ETERNAL RETURN AND THE TEMPORALITY OF THE FRACTURED 'I'

If the dynamic subject is unified in terms of difference and becoming, and if the relationship between difference and becoming is necessarily temporal (due to their parts in the eternal return of production), then an explanation of the temporality of the becoming-subject—the determination of the relationship between becoming and event in its own time—is crucial. This Section argues that, in his studies of the temporality of the subject and the relationship of 'I' to self, Deleuze augments his account of Bergsonian duree with a greater theoretical complexity and an interesting perspective on the history of the philosophy of the subject to which he is responding and contributing. It shows that Deleuze uses Rimbaud's phrase 'I is an other' as a motif for two crucial and distinct aspects of the continual becoming-other of the subject.

We have seen that that which returns in eternal return, becoming, as the means of unification of successive events of subjectivity, is necessarily temporal. As such, the dynamic
subject is a temporal unfolding of relations and differences. Moreover, as shown in Chapter 2, according to Deleuze's Bergson, the present constitutes temporality for consciousness as the moment of constitution of the becoming-subject. Just as eternal return serves as an integrative device for events, so too it integrates 'presents' in the flow of becoming of which one is intuitively aware. The precise nature of Deleuze's conception of the relationship in the present between I and becoming-subject therefore has vast significance.

In Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition, Deleuze argues that when Kant discriminates in Critique of Pure Reason between I and Subject, he makes an important point against Descartes's Identity-based model of the self. With Descartes, the definitive subject is identified by the self-conscious I of the cogito ergo sum, and this I subsequently becomes the basis of all predication and the credibility of experience. Kant accepts that the subject as I is the formal and logically necessary condition of experience, but, on the grounds that existence cannot be proved by means of consciousness alone, he does not consider this to have established the subject as an existent. In other words, Kant accepts the cogito ('I think') as the ultimate but unknowable condition belonging to and preceding every experience, but not the ergo sum ('I am') understood as a substantial and existing subject.44

Kant’s position leads him to distinguish two senses of the 'I think' (although the terms of his distinction vary from text to text). He writes, 'that I am conscious of myself is a thought that already contains a two-fold I.'45 On the one hand, the cogito as thinking-I is always immediately self-present as the thought of itself; this is the 'I as subject'. On the other hand, there is a self that the thinking-I knows, the 'I as object'. Whilst the former is determined in the very process of thinking, the status of the latter is not so clear. Deleuze contends:

if it is true that the I think is a determination, it implies in this respect an indeterminate existence ('I am'). But nothing so far tells us under what form this existence is determined by the I think: it is determinable only in time, under the form of time, thus as the existence of a phenomenal, receptive and changing self. I cannot therefore constitute myself as a unique and active subject, but as a passive self which represents to itself only the activity of its own thought; that is to say, the I, as an Other which affects it. I am separated from myself by the form of time, and nevertheless I am one, because the I necessarily affects this form by carrying out its synthesis and because the Self is necessarily affected as content in this form.... It is like a double diversion of the I and the Self in the time which relates them to each other, stitches them together.46

The I as object is not determined as existing purely by the self-presentation of the 'I think'. In fact, on Deleuze's reading, Kant complains that Descartes does not detail how the undetermined is
determinable at all (DR, 85-6). For such determination, there must be a separation between 'I think' and 'I am', such that the former posits the latter as an object (what Kant calls a 'psychological I' which underlies 'all perceptions and their connection, whose apprehension is the way the subject is affected'). This determination is only possible in a temporal form where the two moments of the reflection of I upon self are distributed such that each subsists non-simultaneously with the other (DR, 86). Thus time is the means of distinguishing the two aspects of the interiority of the cogito, as the internal difference of the subject, as it were. Whereas 'Descartes could draw his conclusion only by expelling time, by reducing the Cogito [as a unity] to an instant', Deleuze argues, in reality, 'it is not the other which is another I, but the I which is an other, fractured I' (DR, 86, 261).

With the I 'fractured' by time, Kant's argument subverts the Cartesian case where I equals existent self. As Deleuze puts it, 'the I and the Self are ... separated by a line of time which relates them to each other, but under the condition of a fundamental difference.' He and Guattari identify two implications. First, one's undetermined existence can be determined within time only as a passive, receptive and phenomenal subject, an 'affectable, modifiable, and variable self' subject to determination by the 'I think'. The I takes the passive subject as the object of awareness, conceiving before and after 'images' of itself becoming, the contrast between them re-presenting the becoming rather than presencing it. Second, and consequently, the 'spontaneity' of which one is aware in the 'I think' cannot be an attribute of a substantial and spontaneous being' but only 'the affection of a passive self which experiences its own thought ... being exercised in it and upon it but not by it' (DR, 86). 'I am therefore determined as a passive self that necessarily represents its own thinking activity to itself as an Other that affects it. This is not another subject but rather the subject who becomes an other.'

Thus the becoming-subject is always a temporal subject, irreducibly divided.

Like Kant's 'fractured' subject, Deleuze's dynamic subject subverts the notion of foundational identity. But as we saw in Chapter 2, the historical works in which his model is proposed and developed do not introduce a division between active I and passive self. Rather, I (je) is employed as the direct and immediate correlate of self (moi) and subject (subjet) as though there is no fracture but just such theoretical challenges—met admirably by Deleuze—as determining the means of 'direct access' to one's self and relating I to the multiple moments of
becoming-subject. It is not just that, for Deleuze, the 'I think' ('I introspect', 'I intuit', 'I expect' and the like) cannot 'gaze upon' an identifiable subject, but that the time of production of becoming-subject and its correlative 'I' somehow subverts the notion of a fracture. But how might Deleuze justify this position against Kant? How might he vindicate having not theorized subjectivity in terms of a fracture in the time of production? The balance of this Section will argue that I and dynamic subject are reconciled by the nature of the time of creation in the productive moment of eternal return.

Deleuze follows Kant in seeking after the nature of the time distinguishing 'between the act of the I and the ego to which this act is attributed'. Clearly it is not durée, the time of inner life, for this is the time of just the active element, the 'I think'. Rather, it is the pure and empty form of time corresponding to the becoming of subjectivity 'itself', the time of the unfolding of events of all kinds, whether these be intuitions, memories, bodily responses, constitutive events of subjectivity, or correlations of I with Subject (DR, 65). This is the time of the unfolding or becoming of any-event-whatever; 'for Kant, it is a question of the form of time in general... a line, a pure straight line', the undeviating and enduring form of all that moves and changes, such that all motion is in time but not of it.62 Obversely, for Deleuze, time must be conceived in terms of movement and change.

Like other theorists with sophisticated models of time (Leibniz, Kant and Bergson, for example), Deleuze's conception varies dramatically across his corpus. In Difference and Repetition, time is explicated in terms of various kinds of synthesis, forming a catalogue of revisions to his theories. (The Nietzschean model of time introduced in Difference and Repetition is not revised significantly in subsequent works.) It corresponds with the various kinds of relations distinguished by Deleuze between past, present and future, syntheses which constitute the experienceable present in time, the moment of subjectivity which alone exists. (As he reminds us, 'synthesis constitutes time as a living present, and the past and the future as dimensions of this present' [DR, 76].) These models provide deeper insights into Deleuze's conception of the temporality of I and Subject.

The first synthesis identified by Deleuze is the time of habit, the passive founding (fondation) of time by the constitution of a passing present as a contraction of former presents (DR, 79). It is formulated in response to the problem of how moments succeed one another,
encapsulated in such questions as 'how will I relate this event to what has gone before?' and 'how might the present be understood as succeeding the past?' In this synthesis, Deleuze contends, instances of productive repetition are experienced as disparate but, in the transactions of imagination or in non-conscious ('automatic') responses, they are drawn together into a single instance in accordance with some 'resonance' (utility, for example). The new present is assumed to cause the present to pass.

This synthesis aligns with Deleuze's Humean model of causation and expectation in imagination and with his Bergsonian account of body memory. It relates just to the non-conscious, to functions of the becoming-subject rather than I, and leads to the paradox that time must be constituted in the process of contraction, even though this process must be conceived separately from time, somehow passing in the time constituted (DR 79). This incongruous implication indicates to Deleuze that the model is insufficiently precise and comprehensive. (In Nietzsche and Philosophy, he outlines a relatively unsophisticated alternative to this contractile model. There he claims that eternal return is a simple synthesis of time; a coexistence of past, present and future in the single moment of returning that allows time to pass [NP, 48, 55].)

The second synthesis deals with the problem of 'how the present will pass into the past'. Deleuze's response is set out in Bergsonism and Proust and Signs in the course of establishing what he calls later the foundation (fondement) of time as virtuality. Chapter 2 showed that Deleuze's Bergson believes that the present passes in the course of its constitution on some plane of memory, as a virtuality corresponding to the actual present that it was in the past. Memory enables the present to pass by providing it a new form.

Under this model, there is an ontological and psychological breach between present and past. 'I' pertains always to the present, the moment of thought and utterance that gives the past its meaning in terms of recall to the present, whilst the becoming-subject is related to both present and past by the mechanisms of external difference. Bergsonian intuition, which claims access to the immediacy of both I and subject, aligns the two, whereas a focus upon the ontological breach would otherwise discriminate between them.

In Difference and Repetition, in a chapter entitled 'Repetition In Itself', Deleuze sketches a sophisticated model of time which moves his theory of the subject beyond the Kantian
'fracture'. Whereas the first two syntheses overlook or underplay the 'becoming-ness' of existence, the forward thrust of the constitution of the subject, this third model invokes a dynamic of the future in order to theorize planning, expectation, the pragmatic employment of consistencies, waiting, the desire for particular outcomes, and so on. For this later Deleuze, time must be conceived in terms of the affinity between events and the relationship of becoming-different between moments, rather than the passing and replacement of presents. This third synthesis dissociates Deleuze's theory from the Kantian fracture by introducing an immediate correlation between I and subject.

In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze writes: 'insofar as it eludes the present, becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming to move and to pull in both directions at once' (*LS*, 1). Again, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari assert: 'becoming cannot be conceptualized in terms of past and future.... Every becoming is a block of coexistence.' For Deleuze, becoming must be conceived in terms neither of a 'deeper' or transcendental time nor a kind of 'temporal backdrop' against which change occurs. Becoming-different is its own time, the real time in which changes occur. This time which does not change but in which all changes unfold is not a Kantian *a priori* form dependent upon attributes of a particular kind of consciousness. Rather, it is the time of production, founded in singularity, event, difference and becoming, and consequent to relations between internal and external differences. Since, for Deleuze, both I and self are dynamic (as insisted upon in his works on Hume and Bergson), they must both be situated in the real time of their creation according to the mechanisms of external difference. The question yet to be answered is whether the Kantian fracture persists in time conceived in this way.

Deleuze's third synthesis is effected by eternal return. Rather than presuming a present and a past which somehow must be related, it tackles instead the question 'what is the time in which becoming becomes?' As we have seen, in eternal return, the present is merely the productive moment of becoming, the moment correlating to the productive threshold of forces and thus to any event whatever. As such, it represents the disjunction between a past in which forces have had some effect and a future in which new arrangements of forces will constitute new events. The futurity of becoming is constituted not just in the *continuity* of eternal return,
but in the present moment's being a precedent for future ones: future arrays of forces cannot exclude the effects of passing presents but must relate to them in terms of external difference.

This synthesis does not invoke a contraction of moments or a means by which the present is forced to pass, but the production of new moments in the direction of becoming different from past arrangements of forces: the future. For this reason, Deleuze calls eternal return 'a belief in the future' which 'affects only the new' in the process of becoming or 'metamorphosis' (DR, 90). Or as Bounas puts it, 'pure repetition of pure difference disturbs the repetitions of habit and the repetitions of memory, since the linear succession of lived presents and the circular recognition of revolving pasts are now replaced by the eternal return of [differentiation].' Deleuze's earlier emphasis on lived moments is displaced by a focus upon the temporality of productive repetition, and thus upon the relations between internal and external differences implicated as the time of production. The consequences for the subject are profound. If becoming is the pure and impersonal time that divides the becoming-subject from its past and future incarnations, then it provides an opportunity for challenging the constraints of life in the time of identity and unity: it is time for the dynamic subject's liberation.

For Deleuze, the pure and empty 'form' of time is the time of production, an 'open and changing totality', so that eternal return is the time 'within which' time itself unfolds (C2, 238). Like Kant's model of time, it is not an empirical concept, universal object or subject of thought, it does not contain empirical content and is not finite. But whereas Kantian time is a 'form of intuition' and a condition for the possibility of synthetic knowledge, Deleuze's time of eternal return is always an 'unfounding' (défodement), purely immanent to production: if becoming is constitutive of events, then 'time must be called the event of events' (LS, 276). It is an open set of moments related one to another merely in the process of becoming. Indeed the expression 'pure and empty form of time' only has meaning if interpreted as 'the ever-expanding set of unified moments of production, expressed in every present'. Time does not 'pass' but 'becomes'; the past does not pass to be replaced by a new present, but rather the present becomes past, present and future in the milieu of productive differences. James Leigh puts it well: 'if there were ever such a thing as pure present without its synthetic relationship with both past and future, time would stop. But time does not stop, and we can no more think a moment of pure present than we can a moment of pure being.'
The characteristics differentiating Deleuze’s conception of time from Kant’s are crucial to understanding why the theory of the subject developed here does not incorporate a ‘fracture’ between I and Subject. But first I must deal with the plausible claim that this question is moot because Deleuze has avoided the possibility of the ‘fracture’ by unifying in eternal return the kinds of synthesis that would otherwise lead to it.

Recall that the time of eternal return ‘contains’ such productions as derive from the first two syntheses: the founding of time (the living present) and the foundation of time (virtual past). (Jean-Michel Salanski gives an interesting but simplistic characterization of this implicative relationship, arguing that Deleuze’s third synthesis is a ‘good’ one replacing the two ‘bad’ ones of habitus and pure past.) In other words, eternal return is the time ‘in which’ external differences constitute temporal effects, or a ‘dimension of actual intensities’ in which disparate virtualities become actual. As shown in Sections 20 and 22, eternal return of the moment of subjectivity necessarily implicates, for example, the recall of the purely virtual past into the present (into actuality), and the expectations founded upon past outcomes. Deleuze thus attests that we are led by the study of production ‘within’ eternal return ‘to other syntheses as though to other witnesses, thereby leading into the domain of another nature in which there is no longer either self or I in the traditional sense, and in which ... we encounter the chaotic realm of individuation’ (the productive effects of interactions between internal and external differences) (DR, 258). In order to give the lie to the objection, one need only distinguish between eternal return and these other ‘witnesses’ or secondary syntheses. Deleuze’s version of ‘the pure and empty form of time’—becoming per se—is, at the level of external differences, manifestly distinct from the temporalities of particular productions.

In fact, conceived in terms of eternal return, these other syntheses are not temporal at all. Symptoms of this are found in the absence of a workable account of time in respect of Hume’s principles, and the status of durée as pure effect in Bergsonism, subordinated in its production to various psychological and ontological mechanisms. The time of becoming allows Deleuze to move beyond what Boundas calls Bergson’s ‘mythification of the old present’ which invokes a correlation of past to present moments that borders on ‘the reintroduction of identity’. The repetitions of eternal return overturn those of Humean habit and Bergsonian memory by introducing a movement towards the future. Only the act of creation recurs.
Furthermore, the first two syntheses accord past, present and future the status of cardinal points, despite an inherent dynamism. Each is implicated 'in' (or 'with') the others only in the time of eternal return. In either case, contrary to the objection considered above, it is not simply by unifying the times of all distinct productions that Deleuze does away with the problem.

Deleuze's model of the pure and empty form of time explains why the 'fracture' between I and subject does not arise in his accounts of the subject. For there to be a 'fracture' at all, there must first be some coherence between the two, otherwise they are utterly disconnected. Since the fracture in the cogito can arise only in terms of the pure and empty form of time, this coherence must also arise in time thus conceived. But, for Deleuze, these terms (like all unities founded in events) are situated just in the real time of their own production—the time of eternal return—rather than in a pre-existent form of time. Each has its own line of becoming and plane of creation, and these are distinguishable just in terms of the universality of becoming. There is no universal 'backdrop' against which their relationship can be assessed in temporal terms, nor any basis for assessing relative 'speed'. To appropriate words from Deleuze's study of the kinds of temporal synthesis, there is no founding or foundational time within which the two terms can be made static and hence contrasted and related, but only the unfounding time of ongoing production in which they are necessarily segregated from each other, from themselves, and from other unified aspects of subjectivity. Therefore there is no cleavage 'in' or 'by' time, but only a distinction between times, a continuous distinguishability in terms of the eternal return of subjectivity-events.

We have seen already that 'I' refers for Deleuze to a single effect of the becoming subject located by introspective or intuitive effort, rather than some foundational, self-present entity. This is what Frank calls 'inter-referentiality' between the two, where I reflects subject despite the disparate time of 'its' production. It is not that there is a temporal cleavage in the relationship between the terms, but that the 'relating process' is its own time, the time of its production, supplementing times of the fictional I, the becoming-subject, the unfolding of a lifetime, and so on. If the I always designates the past in terms of memories, as argued in Chapter 2, and if the becoming-subject is at once both a product of past events and a 'pressing into the future', then the process whereby the former refers to the latter constitutes a time of reference in the present that incorporates both past and future. Strangely, then, far from being
either a temporal unification or division, the affiliation between the two terms actually *multiplies*
time.

Even though the later Deleuze fails to make his conception of the relationship between I
and subject explicit, there is significant evidence that he favours this kind of argument. In
*Difference and Repetition*, he writes: ‘what the self has become equal to is the unequal in itself.
In this manner, the I which is fractured according to the order of time and the Self which is
divided according to the temporal series correspond and find a common descendent in the man
without name, without family, without qualities, without self or I’ (*DR*, 90). In terms of its
essential dynamism, the self or subject is always becoming-other than itself. The I is 'fractured'
in a sense different from Kant's: it is always re-fractured by the present in that it, too, always
becomes-other, but because of its foundation in the past. We are left with a self that 'still
retains some resemblance in its matter' (according to external difference) and an I which 'retains
an identity, however attenuated' (*DR*, 258). Their common descendant is the temporality of
external differences which constitute it. Only when this vision is 'filled out' by particularity, by
internal differences, does it take on a name, as a particular self or I with 'its' own time.

This Section has argued that Deleuze's interpretation of Kant's critique of the unity
supposed by Descartes in his *cogito* could credibly be considered as a challenge to Deleuze's
theory. But by enunciating Deleuze's own conceptions of time, and relating them to eternal
return as the time of production, it becomes possible to consider 'I' and 'subject' in a new light.
Far from representing a 'breach' or 'fracture', the relationship between them in terms of time is
just a reflection of the distinguishability of all aspects of the Deleuzian subject, operating in 'its'
own time and according to a distinct kind of interaction between operative internal and external
differences. For this reason, the meaning of the I's 'referring to' the subject—its serving as the
referent—has been left deliberately ambiguous: each sense ascribed to the term will have its
own time. This is to say neither that the two terms are unrelatable, nor that they must be unified
to make sense of their relationship, but that every kind of relationship between them is ascrib-
able to the time of eternal return. As such, I and subject are merely non-identical 'folds' which
mirror one another in the unfolding temporality of becoming.

Consequent to this analysis, Deleuze's use of the phrase 'I is an other' takes on a
different meaning from the one that he locates in Kant. For the Deleuze of *Difference and
Repetition, it enacts a fundamental idea in the philosophy of difference: that identity is always divided from itself by the time of repetitive production, the impersonal form of time, the time of eternal return. There can never be a self-identical subject because every aspect of subjectivity has its own time of development. The temporality of human existence is but the accompaniment of the subject’s becoming, change, deterritorialization and individualization. It is to the last of these functions, the second aspect of the becoming-subject, the 'one' or 'I' qua particular, that I turn next.

24. INDIVIDUATION AND THE ETERNAL RETURN OF DIFFERENCES

In explaining the continuity of subjectivity, I have had cause to mention the roles of internal and external difference. In particular, Section 19 showed that Humean and Bergsonian versions of external difference mark off one cycle of returning from another, and that internal differences invoked in the course of each cycle differentiate events (remembering that such demarcations are always virtual rather than actual, for to take them as actual would mean reverting towards Deleuze's Humean model of a relatively stable imagination). This Section will explicate the roles of internal and external difference in terms of the second matter focusing the Chapter: individuality. It will show that eternal return preserves and multiplies these differences, so that every dynamic subject is distinguished by the open set of differences and the line of becoming through which the subject develops. It will consequently fill out the claim in Section 20 that the subjectivity-event is genuinely 'haecceitic' (to coin a neologism).

Simondon, to whom Deleuze registers a debt in The Logic of Sense, points out that in a dynamic system, 'a relation does not spring up between two terms that are already separate individuals, rather, it is an aspect of the internal resonance of a system of individuation.' The becoming-subject is such a dynamic system. A subject cannot be determined as an individual by somehow connecting pre-existent events (as for Hume), but only by a process of individuation inherent to the ongoing production of events. In other words, like unification, individuation is immanent rather than subsequent to the constitution of pre-individual singularities. With respect to Deleuze's eternal return, this means that individuation does not follow the constitution of multiple haecceities, but is inherent to their becoming and production.
Neither may individuation be theorized in terms of the becoming-subject's having already become. As Simondon puts it, 'instead of grasping individuation using the individuated being as a starting point, we must grasp the individuated being from the viewpoint of preindividual being'.77 Individuation of the becoming-subject can be described only by setting aside the notion of a subject and examining the productive process instead. In other words, one must deal with individuating and immanent effects in terms of haecceities or events rather than the virtual whole that they generate. Deleuze agrees with such an approach, having time and again rejected any claim that individuation of self might be re-cognized by self (NP, 39, 41-2, 80; DR, 85-6).

Frank criticizes Deleuze for not dealing in Difference and Repetition with the intricacies of the constitution of a pre-reflective consciousness and their implications for individuality. According to Frank, Deleuze's focus upon 'pre-conscious' internal difference is an error because it diverts him from considering or proposing models of the subject which are consistent with his rejection of familiarity-with-self and his commitment instead to the non-identity of repetition.65 Frank fails to appreciate, however, that by the time Deleuze wrote Difference and Repetition, he had already provided the kinds of account that Frank is after. This is not to say that the links to Empiricism and Subjectivity and Bergsonism and their discernment of the relevant external differences are obvious, but just that Frank's criticisms are unjustified.

Individuation of the subject turns for Deleuze upon the particularity and productive dynamic of the becoming of subjectivity-events. Bearing in mind that every event is itself 'individual', there is particular importance in Deleuze's assertion that 'we do not raise contrary qualities to infinity in order to affirm their identity; we raise each event to the power of the eternal return in order that the individual, born of that which comes to pass, affirm her distance with respect to every other event' (LS, 178). In the light of Deleuze's conceptions of the ongoing constitution of the dynamic subject, it would be a mistake to read 'the individual' here as referring to a pre-existent subject. Deleuze means instead that we shall only find the distinguishing particularity of the virtual whole of an individual life by studying the continual production in which specificity is generated, and not by comparing every quality with every other in terms of some superior concept. Just as for the unification of the becoming-subject, the theorization of individuation (and thus determination of the I as a definitive particular) rests
upon the dynamics of production and difference.

Events are not individuated by external differences alone. Although Deleuze claims for
dynamic subjects a shared nature founded in such external differences as psychological
tendencies and memory functions, these proclivities do not 'contain' the conditions of their own
specificity. They depict but minimal similarities between instances of the genre, whilst Deleuze's
study of difference and repetition reveals that, 'however small the internal difference between ...
two series, the one story does not reproduce the other', so that 'ressemblance and identity are
only functional effects of that difference which alone is originary within the system' (DR, 125).
Deleuze claims that events are specified in the first place by internal differences intrinsic to their
production—pre-individual, haecceitic singularities—which, in the case of the dynamic subject,
invokes unthought conditions such as those noted in Section 18, and the 'dark precursor' which
initiates the intersection of lines of development (DR, 126). In other words, individuation of
subjectivity-events is always a product of the differences which simultaneously distinguish and
unite lines of development.

Deleuze characterizes internal differences as the 'fringe of indetermination' of individu-
als; the uncertain conditions which differentiate between kind and instance-of-kind and give the
principles of human nature a 'content'. Rather than signalling that a self or an I is incomplete,
the unthought is always an indefinite condition of the possibility of the subject's becoming (DR,
258).

The event of subjectivity is conceived properly, then, as a moment in which difference is
multiplied (two lines of external difference meet, each line having engaged a set of internal
differences; every moment of intersection is unique) and defined (as the effect of a particular set
of differences; a particular effect at a particular moment). It is unique in terms of both the
internal differences leading to it and the particularity of the interactions constituting it, reflecting
human nature's always-new 'relationship' with contingent circumstances. Every instance of the
productive effect of external difference (the lines of becoming), and every interaction between
internal differences and these lines, constitutes a propagation of haecceitic points, the propaga-
tion 'itself' (the being of this becoming) constituting the individuality of each moment or event in
the life of a becoming-subject. 

Now, for the Deleuze of Difference and Repetition, following Simondon, individuation is
of the first order of importance, the primary and principal philosophical fact. As outlined in Sections 19 and 20, the determination of kind or nature of which individuals are instances is a second order issue. The specificity of haecceities (thus the *interplay* between internal and external differences) is the chief fact of production. As such, Deleuze’s theories of individuation evidence a change from his focus in *Empiricism and Subjectivity* and *Bergsonism* upon the explication of human nature, towards one guided by the metaphysics of difference. Thus he writes that ‘opposition, resemblance, identity and even analogy are only effects produced by ... presentations of difference, rather than being conditions which subordinate difference and make it something represented’: internal difference precedes external difference, and internal and external differences together precede the determination of kinds (*DR*, 145).

One might wonder what led Deleuze to change his focus. The answer, it seems to me, is his study of time or, more precisely, the temporality of production ‘within which’ operate the principles, lines and analogies discovered in Deleuze’s earlier works. (As such, *Bergsonism*’s stress on *durée* and kind represents something of a turning point.) The dynamic subject is not defined in a moment, in a single event, but over the course of a lifetime, a series of events distinguishable in terms of internal and external differences but unified in the time of their production: eternal return. As Deleuze puts it, ‘things are reduced to the difference which fragments them, and to all the differences which are implicated in it and through which they pass’ (*DR*, 67). But rather than claiming the role of individuation for each event considered separately, ‘we call individuating factors the *ensemble of ... envelopting and enveloped* intensities, of these individuating and individual differences which ceaselessly *interpenetrate* one another throughout the fields of individuation’ (italics added)(*DR*, 254). Deleuze finds that ‘individualization is mobile, strangely supple, fortuitous and endowed with fringes and margins; all because the intensities which contribute to it communicate with each other, envelop other intensities and are in turn enveloped’ (*DR*, 257). In order to think individuality, therefore, one must recall ‘the multiple, mobile and communicating character of individuality’, the continual exchanges between a structure built upon difference *and* the processes of envelopment entailed by eternal return (*DR*, 254).

If the difference which individuates the course of a life is doubled in every event of subjectivity, it is multiplied still further in the repetitive production of eternal return. As Simondon
puts it, 'any process, and any relation within a process, is an individuation that doubles the 
preindividual being', so that all of the processes invoked in the lifetime of a dynamic subject 
multiply the pre-individual being constituted by events.\textsuperscript{71} The connectivity of events, their 
envelopment in the time of becoming according to the being of becoming, individuates every 
open set of events as a \textit{particular} continuity. It is not just that every event differs from every 
other event, but that the time of production of every open set of events also differs from every 
other one, constituting a kind of internal difference that distinguishes times of becoming and 
processes as well as events.

In as much as subjectivity is a continuity of effects, then, it is individuated as a particular 
flow of becoming or envelopment. A Deleuzian characterization of Simondon's contention that 
life is 'a perpetual individuation' would invoke eternal return: only difference returns, but the 
process of returning constitutes difference as a particular time of returning, a temporally 
individuated continuity of events or open whole of effects.\textsuperscript{72} Because such temporality is 
immanent to the productive inter-relationships between the internal and external differences 
characterizing it, it is sufficient to determine 'its' becoming-subject as a particular, a chaotic web 
of relationships and their effects which, arising in eternal return, has neither beginning nor end 
(\textit{LS}, 264).

As with unification, the process of individuation is non-teleological. There is nothing 
about events or their envelopment in the time of production that signifies or invokes what 
becomes. Similarly, too, individuation is immanent rather than transcendent to the production of 
particular open sets of conjoined events. Each becoming-subject is a wholly unique production, 
an instance of the Deleuzian 'simulacrum' whereby notions of original and model, copy and 
reproduction, are redundant, and Platonic conceptions of resemblance and identity are 
displaced. The 'human individual' \textit{qua} particular becoming-subject is conceived as simulacrum 
\textit{in terms of} the distinctiveness of repetitive becoming:

The simulacrum functions in such a way that a certain resemblance is necessarily 
thrown back onto its basic series and a certain identity necessarily projected on the 
forced movement. Thus, the eternal return is, in fact, the Same and the Similar, but 
only insofar as they are simulated, produced by the simulacrum,... It does not presup- 
pose the Same and the Similar; on the contrary, it constitutes the only Same—the Same 
of that which differs, and the only resemblance—the resemblance of the unmatched. It 
is the unique phantasm of all simulacra (the Being of all beings). (\textit{LS}, 265)

This quote helps clarify Deleuze's conception of the relationship between the human individual
and the genre 'human'. For Deleuze, as we have seen, human kind is defined and determined by individuation and thus by typical patterns of interaction between internal and external difference. These interactions are always haecceitic, or instantaneous and unique, their effects particular and immanent. As such, in Deleuze’s words, ‘the same and the similar no longer have an essence except as ... expressing the functioning of the simulacrum’ (LS, 262).

Furthermore, for Deleuze, the simulacrum of the kind 'becoming-subject' is a temporal production of which the subjectivity-event is the ‘foundational’ (though timeless) unit. A ‘profound link’ between eternal return and simulacrum comes into view (LS, 164). Eternal return ensures that ‘every thing, animal or being assumes the status of simulacrum’, the ‘superior form’ that entails not just the product, but the processes of production and the differences and interactions inherent in them (DR, 67). The dynamic subject qua simulacrum is individuated in the unifying productions of eternal return. Far from presupposing a sameness in the image of which it works, however, eternal return is the time of individuation, endowing such terms as 'external difference', 'human nature', 'principles' and 'lines of development'—terms which conceal differences under a cloak of similarity—with particular content. Thus Deleuze’s theory of the temporality of production ties his interest in external difference and kind to his meditations on internal difference and the individual.

The implications of Deleuze’s conception of the human individual as simulacrum are even broader than this, for it also helps to clarify his conception of the meaning of 'I'. The Individual nameable as 'I' is never a stable or completed subject or self, but a particular and original continuity of effects immanent within the complex of differences. Deleuze states that 'just as singularity as differential determination is pre-individual, so is individuation as individuating difference an ante-I or ante-self', and that I and Self are ‘undermined by the fields of individuation which work beneath them’ (DR, 277, 152). The former point was borne out in Sections 19 and 20: difference determines each subjectivity-event as haecceity, such that ‘every thing ... must see Its own Identity swallowed up in difference, each being no more than a difference between differences’ (DR, 56). In this Section, I have scrutinized the latter, and argued that, for Deleuze, individuation, being a flow and time of becoming in eternal return which invokes internal and external differences, means that 'I' and 'subject' always indicate the subversion of traditional notions of identity in favour of dynamic forms:
the differences included within the I and the Self are ... borne by individuals: nevertheless, they are not individual or individuating to the extent that they are understood in relation to this identity in the I and this resemblance in the Self. By contrast, every individuating factor is already difference and difference of difference. (DR, 257)

Once the concepts of self and I are given precise meanings in terms of the immanence of productive effects, it becomes evident that the dynamic subject cannot equate with a static self identifiable as I, nor even a plural or multiple self, and that the subject is instead properly multiplicitous (DR, 78-9). As Deleuze puts it, consistent with Simondon's assertions noted above, 'individuality is not a characteristic of the Self but, on the contrary, forms and sustains the system of the dissolved Self' (DR, 254). The differences and processes that establish individuality give rise, too, in the same time (of eternal return), to the dynamic subject.

These processes also are the means by which underlying differences are reconcilable with the I. In the context of a study in the Deleuzian spirit of Nietzsche's will to power, Alphonso Lingis provides a theoretical vision useful for defining 'I':

what makes this life ... my life, a life in its own right, something individual and identifiable, is not the fact that it has an inner principle of unity, issuing from the identity-pole of a self-sovereign ego; it is rather that this life, this force, marks a difference in the field of forces. It is only conceived in a field of force, and it is itself something by marking a difference in that field, by forcefully maintaining a line of tension in that field. (DR, 25)

The field of forces relevant to production of the Deleuzian subject is precisely the set of differences and becomings invoked in eternal return. Theorization of subjective individuality must be conducted in terms of multiple subjectivity-events, the mobility of their production in eternal return, and the communication of the lines of development of which they are effects, and thus in terms of multiplicitous external differences defining the lines and internal differences invoked in each cycle of eternal return and in the dark precursor. If repetition is always effected by an order of difference, and if the order of difference invokes both internal and external differences, then the repetitive production of haecceitic events is effected in the interplay of both kinds of differences (DR, 25).

The term 'I' has as a referent, then, the multiplicity of ever-changing, ever-multiplying differences, effects and events. Specifically, it refers to the past and present moments of the becoming of the individuated dynamic subject, to all aspects of the thought and unthought invoked in and by eternal return, and to the eternal return itself, as a process, time and open set of differences. But this broad description disguises the concrete meaning attached to 'I' in its
every use. After all, individuation is a lived process and, as Deleuze writes, 'where one no longer says 1, individuation also ceases, and where individuation ceases, so too does all possible singularity' (DR, 276). To cease saying 1, to cease marking the distinctively human individuation that is one's own, is to ignore the kinds of coherence towards which Deleuze pointed in Empiricism and Subjectivity and Bergsonism; the concord in social interactions, words and memories which are always reflected uniquely in one's life.

I have argued that eternal return provides means for surmounting the dilemmas of continuity and individuality used to frame this Chapter. With respect to unification, events are related by eternal return in a kind of envelopment consequent to the nature of becoming; the subject is a virtual whole by virtue of the movement between events. Any becoming-subject is 'the same' over time by virtue of 'the repetition in the eternal return of that which differs' (DR, 301). Thus, finally, it rests upon the sameness of production. This is not to say that the same subject returns, but that returning is the same of the dynamic subject. With respect to individuation, the continuity of any becoming of eternal return is differentiated by the complex of differences operating within its continuous productions. Only eternal recurrence individuates the production of difference both in the moment or event of subjectivity and over the course of a lifetime. Finally, however, both continuity and individuality rest upon the particular nature of constitutive events, accenting the importance of Deleuze's two historical studies whilst concurrently diverging from them.

25. TRANSMUTATION OF THE UNTHOUGHT: AN ETHICS OF THE EVENT

Eternal return annuls the possibility of identity, introducing to existence the dynamism of becoming in the temporality of relations between differences. As such, it ensures the ever-renewed creativity of human life encapsulated by the becoming-subject. But, as evident in Hume's fictions and the 'difficulty' of Bergson's intuition, the human tendency is to not think in these terms. Human individuals tend to conceive of themselves in terms of a theoretical identity, such that 'I' is presupposed to refer to an unchanging essence.

In Empiricism and Subjectivity, Deleuze's account of the manner in which one comes to believe in the stability and unity of the subject is heavily dependent upon particular aspects of
Hume's theory. Nonetheless Deleuze's later accounts of the process—most notably in *Difference and Repetition, The Logic of Sense* and *Foucault*—contain echoes of these early arguments. Deleuze claims that the tendency to think of oneself in terms of identity is consequent to social, economic and political institutions (notably language, work, State, family, religion, production, the marketplace, morality, and certain forms of art) as well as philosophical ones that he finds in Plato, Descartes, Kant, and Hegel.

The former set of Influences and their effects are subjected to close and sustained scrutiny in *Anti-Œdipus*, where Deleuze and Guattari argue that there is no reason to suppose that such forces are 'initially human' ones. They claim instead that forces enter into dominating relations with the external differences defining the human genre by means of capacities and mechanisms internal to the forces themselves.\(^{75}\)

Time and again Deleuze returns to the influence of various philosophical positions upon human thinking. For him, philosophy is an important kind of production which helps to form dominant images of thought. He claims that, considered as a kind of production, 'philosophical discourse has always been essentially related to law, institutions, and contracts—which, taken together, constitute the subject matter of sovereignty'.\(^{76}\) In thinkers that he establishes as philosophical 'enemies', Deleuze finds a tendency to dignify 'common sense' and 'good sense' as ultimate and necessary grounds for all thought. The former 'subsumes under itself the various faculties of the soul' (a *sensus communis*) and 'the given diversity' of perception, and founds itself in epistemological and/or ontological unity such that 'one and the same self perceives, imagines, remembers, knows, etc.' (*LS*, 78) This model, once it is related to such notions as truth and representation (collectively, 'good sense') becomes the 'implicit presupposition' of 'conceptual philosophical thought', and 'it is in terms of this image that everybody knows and is presumed to know what it means to think' (*DR*, 131). Thus, for example, for Descartes, common sense and the Cogito are taken to be of the essence of 'determinations of pure thought', expressing the unity of all the faculties and the possibility of their relation to any object of thought (*DR*, 132, 133).

For Deleuze, the influence of social and philosophical pressures is substantial indeed. They promote unity as the orthodox image of thought, the unthought ground that makes thinking possible and by which it must be judged or measured, supporting these claims with
detailed but 'puerile' accounts of, say, misrecognition and error (DR, 131, 158). The notion of unity is fabricated by thought but, once constructed, it is imagined to be a necessary precondition for thinking such that, as Goodchild puts it, 'one has already oriented oneself within such an image of thought in order to find the image.'

For such orthodoxy, the unified 'I think' is an essential precondition for the operation of the faculties, so that even though 'both the I and the Self each begin with differences' (as we have seen), 'difference is crucified' (DR, 138, 257). It becomes habitual to interpret the immanence of conscious activity as though attributable to a substantial unifying principle. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, 'thought cannot stop itself from interpreting immanence as immanent to something, the great Object of contemplation, the Subject of reflection', so that the incompossibility of the given is unified and attributed to an unchanging Subject or Self (italics added).

As such, instead of conceiving of oneself as a creative capacity for becoming and change, the human tendency is to think of oneself merely as an empirically verifiable instance of the universal concept of 'the human individual', 'self' or 'subject', defined by consciousness, will, memory, a quest for knowledge and so on, differing from other individuals in terms of just the particularity of one's instantiation. In other words, one tends to conceive of oneself first as a human being rather than an instance of becoming, not realizing that individualization precedes the determination of kind and that, as Deleuze puts it, 'Being is said in a single and same sense of everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said differs; it is said of difference itself' (DR, 36). We fail to realize that 'it is not we who are univocal in a Being which is not; it is we and our individuality which remains equivocal in and for a univocal Being'; that human being is a being of eternal return, of variation, dynamic and unique psychology and 'experientiality', of processes and movements (DR, 39). Thus, for Deleuze, the characteristic attitude of individuals is not merely an unfortunate psychological trait, but the one that typifies all humans.

Deleuze shares with three of the thinkers most influential on his development—Nietzsche, Bergson and Foucault—the belief that the tendency to think of oneself in terms of unity, passivity, stability and identity is mistaken, 'base', 'stupid', and in need of change. For Nietzsche, it is always a mistake to posit a 'pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject' in the manner of philosophical idealism. The idea of the 'soul' as 'a "being" and as 'something
that is not process but enduring substance' is, he contends, a useless piece of 'ancient
mythology'. If being human means thinking such fictions, then 'it is not a question of man at all:
he is to be overcome'.

According to Deleuze, Foucault saw Nietzsche's as a first attempt at the dissolution of
the Western concept of 'man' (sic), and he conducts a critique of the static and autonomous
subject along Nietzschean lines. On Deleuze's reading of Foucault, 'there never "remains"
anything of the subject, since he is to be created on each occasion, like a focal point of
resistance, on the basis of the folds which subjectivize knowledge and bend each power.' Each change in the constitution of forces or relations between forces undercuts the notion of a
stable subject.

Chapter 2 showed how Bergson's studies of consciousness subvert necessarily the
notion of a stable subject. But, on Deleuze's reading, Bergson also champions the
transformatory role of philosophy in moving beyond the typically human:

Bergson is not one of those philosophers who ascribes a properly human wisdom and
equilibrium to philosophy. To open us up to the inhuman and the superhuman ... to go
beyond the human condition: This is the meaning of philosophy, in so far as our
condition condemns us ... to be badly analyzed composites ourselves. (B, 28)

In other words, if human thought is typified by a conception of oneself as a foundational unity,
then Bergson's study of the becoming of the subject is meant as a basis for moving beyond the
distinctively human to the non-human, embracing the creative possibilities of existence.

Deleuze takes on the task of destroying the 'image of thought which presupposes itself
and the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself' (DR, 139). Philosophy must affirm life as
difference and becoming, enhancing creative power and potentiality rather than diminishing it in
a process of subsumption. It must resist the tendency to think in terms of unity, favouring what
Deleuze terms 'a larger, more active, more affirmative life, a life that is richer in possibilities', an
awakening of the forces of life, the differences that define us. If the unthought Image of
thought can be transformed, then there exists the power to recast life by revealing new ways of
thinking and new modes of existence.

But to achieve his goal, Deleuze first must find a way of solving a conundrum: if the
image of unity is unthought and generated by a complex of social and philosophical influences,
how might he facilitate its transformation using just the resources of philosophy? In other
words, how might the influence of a differentiated complex of forces be replaced by the philosophy of difference championed by Nietzsche, Bergson, Foucault and Deleuze? His answer, evident in all his later texts, is to use thinking as a catalyst to unleash difference as an unthought force upon the unthought, exposing the current orthodoxy to its 'intimate enemy' (LS, 139-40). To think of difference is consciously to introduce into one's life the difference constituted by the thought.

The formulae proposed by the philosophers of difference for achieving the transformation are eclectic. Deleuze's own model adopts resources from all three of the others, and also from Spinoza. The final sections of this Chapter will outline and argue for his proposal.

Deleuze and the other philosophers of difference agree that ontology ensures change in the nature of human existence regardless of how, or whether, it is thought. Each in his own way shows that the canon of the static subject delivered to us by philosophical modernity is anything but a metaphysical necessity. But on another level they agree, too, that there is value in resisting the reduction of thinking to a process governed by unity. As Deleuze puts it, if human thought imprisons the becoming of the human and creative life, then the human individual must 'liberate life' by exposing unity to the 'abyss' of difference. By thinking and living differently, one regains something of the concrete richness of experience and its continual dynamism, variety and intensity, not just for the individual in his or her time, but also for a 'people yet to come', for whom the unthought image of thinking might be made different.

Bergson expresses this hope explicitly, writing that the affirmation of universal becoming means:

"everything comes to life around us; everything is revivified in us. A great Impulse carries beings and things along. We feel ourselves uplifted, carried away, borne along by it. We are more fully alive and this increase of life brings with it the conviction that grave philosophical enigmas can be resolved ... since they arise from a frozen vision of the real and are only the translation, in terms of thought, of a certain artificial weakening of our vitality."

For Bergson, then, there are philosophical as well as existential advantages. Similarly, Foucault argues that 'one must give rise to thought as intensive irregularity—disintegration of the subject' in order to achieve a 'liberation of man'. And for Nietzsche, such a 'reversal of Platonism' will free humans from the heavy burden of original sin and the stigma of being but poor copies of God.

For Deleuze, resistance to the diminished life of the unified subject entails necessarily a
new 'style of life'. Following Foucault, he takes this to mean that it is an *ethics* whereby the constitution of a mode of existence is an 'ethos' or way of expressing the world as becoming. He does not mean that an affirmative life must accord with a moral code, a set of restraining rules (which is, Deleuze agrees with Foucault, a matter of knowledge and power), but rather with optional rules that help to assess what one thinks, does and says. Deleuze claims that 'it's the styles of life involved in everything that makes us this or that' (*N*, 114, 100). Rather than being assessed in terms of content, the concepts and images in one's thinking must be appraised with an eye to the way in which they are thought and lived. Thus Deleuze relates ethics to the aesthetics or art of living and dying. (Despite Deleuze's sometimes disjointed and sketchy approach to the development of an ethics, some commentators have claimed that it is a—perhaps the—pivotal focus of his work. Significantly, Foucault called *Anti-Oedipus* 'a book of ethics', although he begged the authors' forgiveness for doing so.)

For Deleuze, the aim of affirmative ethics is to live in such a way as to express 'what one is': an effect of events, becoming different at every moment and in every interaction of the relevant differences. As Ansell-Pearson puts it, 'in "becoming what one is" the task is to become the offspring of one's events, not one's actions, since the action is produced only by the offspring of the event.' To live in a manner affirming one's being as a becoming is to break with the 'natural' tendency towards unified thinking, and to be reincarnated as a creative product of singularities. For Deleuze, following Nietzsche, affirmation of dynamism and difference means changing one's conception of what it means to be a human individual in such a way that difference is freely *revealed*. It requires disclosure of the constitutive role of pre-individual singularities, releasing one's conception of events from the constraints of Being and 'the sedentary boundaries of the finite subject'; replacing the subject *qua* abstract universal with a model founded on the impersonal individuating factors of a fluid world, singularity and transition (*DR*, 258; *LS*, 107). In place of a static subject, the individual conceives herself as *event* such that, in Deleuze's words, 'the event is actualized within her as another individual grafted onto her' (*LS*, 178). To affirm the event of one's becoming is thus to undercut the static subject with an immanent, distinctive, and momentary singularity, to affirm the transience of one's existence and the inevitability and potentiality of always becoming-other. The prospect of transformation is centred upon the world of experience, *this* world, rather than a transcendent world or world
yet to come.

The affirmation entailed by an ethics of the event has more to do with one’s attitude or stance towards constitution as a dynamic subject than with the delimitation of the kinds of events constituting the subject. It is, therefore, quite distinct from the project set out in this Chapter and the previous ones. To affirm the event, Deleuze claims, is to become worthy of the contingencies constituting it, ‘to become worthy of what happens to us, and thus to will and release the event, to become the offspring of one’s own events, and thereby to be reborn, to have one more birth, and to break with one’s carnal birth’ (LS, 149-50). External difference will ‘happen to us’; but it is important to ‘live up to’ the potentiality of external difference.

The full implications of this claim are only evident in the light of Deleuze’s study of the relationship between individual and event. Recall that the continuity of events defining the human individual is necessarily virtual, serving as a “potential” which admits neither Self nor I, but which produces them by actualizing or realizing itself (LS, 103). The life of every human individual ‘contains only virtualities’ and ‘is made of virtualities, events, singularities’, becoming actual only when it is ‘lived’ or given determinate content according to a chance concatenation of internal and external differences. Events ‘wait for us and invite us in’; “my wound existed before me; I was born to embody it” (LS, 148). Thus, when Deleuze says that ‘the subject’s what’s missing from events’, his meaning is twofold: that events qua virtualities preclude the possibility of a static subject, and that the dynamic subject follows from the actualization of events. So to affirm the event is not to affirm just the actual event—what has become of a life already—but to sanction also the chance nature of all events qua virtualities, and consequently one’s existence into the future, the time of eternal return. Thus, crucially and paradoxically, Deleuze is advocating an ethics wherein the passive subject (the subject as effect) must actively affirm the event as its mode of existence. To affirm life means affirming events-to-come and the chaotic interaction of ‘their’ forces, as well as the becoming-subject as the ‘quasi-cause of what is produced within us’ (LS, 148). There is no stronger indication than this of the pure immanence of Deleuze’s theory, for only if the processes of affirmation and actualization are immanent to the play of differences constituting them both can this ethics overturn the paradox to creative effect. Only in a philosophy of immanence can affirmation—as an actualized product of thinking—impact upon thought, the latter produced at the same time as the former, and with
creative (ethical) effect.

Clearly Deleuze's is no ordinary ethics. The constitution of a mode of existence consistent with the affirmation of the event has to do with thinking, feeling and being; with both ontology and psychology (in Deleuze's Humean sense of the word). However the relationship between ethics and these other fields is indubitably not omni-directional. We have seen already that life makes thought active; that contingent circumstances force one to think (we are reminded of Hume and social circumstances, and of Bergson and conditions relevant to the body). As Deleuze puts it, 'thought has no other reason to function than its own birth' (C2, 165). But, on the other hand, thinking can make a life or mode of existence affirmative by 'discovering, inventing new possibilities for life', such that the thinker 'expresses the noble affinity of life and thought' (NP, 101). Creative thinking entails the thinker, the passive or becoming-subject, affirming actively the interaction of internal and external differences in the productive moment, an act consonant with the very event of subjectivity and one able to transform the life of the thinker.

Such transformative thinking will not be guided by a quest for knowledge, which favours a conservative and ordered lifestyle founded upon regular coherences between ideas and world. What is of interest for Deleuze in encounters between the dynamic subject and the changing forces of the world are opportunities for unique relations and new possibilities. Rather than merely expressing philosophical, socio-economic and other forces, affirmative thinking also must reflect an ethos of creative resistance by substantiating new interactions between becoming-subject and internal differences. To think is always to create anew; such is the lesson of the becoming of the event (DR, 147). But this is no mere 'cult of the new': to become fully creative—to transform life—demands that thinking repudiates concepts such as constancy, coherence, ordering and subsumption in favour of the dynamism, difference and becoming of new complexes of forces.

The question, however, is how the esoteric concept of 'affirmation' might be adopted in active thinking by an immanent or passive subject without recourse to a subject-model able theoretically to transcend and alter its own thinking. In other words, how might one change one's thinking from a preoccupation with questions like 'how might I discipline my self?' to affirmations such as 'I'll play!'
In _Negotiations_ we find a synopsis of the schema delineating Deleuze's responses to this question in _Nietzsche and Philosophy, Difference and Repetition, The Logic of Sense_ and _Foucault_. This schema, which attests to the influence of Nietzsche and Foucault on Deleuze's thinking of difference and the subject in the 1970s and 1980s, involves bending force, making it impinge on itself rather than on other forces: a 'fold', in Foucault's terms, a force playing on itself. It's a question of 'doubling' the play of forces, of a self-relation that allows us to resist, to elude power.... It's no longer a matter of determinate forms, as with knowledge, or of constraining rules, as with power: it's a matter of _optional rules_ that make existence a work of art, rules at once ethical and aesthetic that constitute ways of existing or styles of life.... It's what Nietzsche discovered as the will to power operating artistically, inventing new 'possibilities of life'. (N, 98)

We have seen already that eternal return is the ontological device that doubles (and further multiplies) difference. But it also serves Deleuze as an ethical device, moving study of the subject beyond the domain of discriminable relations between becoming-subject and world, and into a realm where rules 'are in some sense _optional_ ' (N, 113). As the most powerful rule, eternal return is the means for a creative aesthetics of life, engaging both the force of time as change _and_ the invention and execution of transformatory thinking. Only with eternal return, Deleuze argues, can one actively engage with both these facets of an ethics of the event.

26. ARTISTIC LIFE AND THE THOUGHT OF ETERNAL RETURN

The notion of an 'aesthetics of life' brings together Deleuze's conceptions of the active will, creative life, and the passive nature of the effects defining a particular life. As such, it conjoins his theories of on art, interrelations between forces, and active willing and thinking. To explain the consequences of the fusion, one must turn first to Deleuze's works on Foucault and film theory, using these texts to locate means by which active transformation might be reconciled with the passivity of the event. Once this reconciliation is completed, the import of Deleuze's optional ethical rules as means for transformation will become clear.

In _Negotiations, Foucault_ and various conversations with Foucault, Deleuze displays a sympathy for the Foucaultian inheritance and exercise of the Ancient Greek notion of 'aesthetic existence' as a kind of 'doubling or relation with oneself'. On Deleuze's reading, 'doubling' has to do, not with replication of the self by the self, but with the repetition of events, doubling difference again and again in and as the effects of interaction between those differences
inherent in concrete circumstances. (One is reminded of the kind of doubling that Deleuze considers typical of the human genre, discussed in Sections 23 and 24.) The subject is consequently divested of interiority and identity and transformed into a constant reiteration of events, with the ethico-aesthetic focus firmly upon one's life and production rather than a final 'product' (N, 98-9).

To live an 'aesthetic existence' is, for Deleuze, echoing Nietzsche, to engage actively with the differences and events that constitute one's life, to become an 'artist' and an 'inventor of new possibilities of life' (NP, 103). By means of new images of thought and new expressive forms, an artist engages with the world of differences and sets forces in play by 'inciting, inducing, preventing, facilitating or obstructing, extending or restricting' (N, 95).95 Traditional rules defining knowledge, truth, unity and incompossibility are wilfully replaced by concepts, images, characters and forms which are valid just in terms of the artist's creative thread (C2, 131, 145). It takes the form of deliberate experimentation, the aim of which is to create new concepts 'determining' the future of thinking. If thinking is a play of differences, then to actively engage thinking with other differences is to 'double' them and create new threads across the web of forces that constitute a life, and simultaneously to think the subject's becoming.

But the question remains of how a thinker might create his or her life without standing apart from it, directing it as a product under review. In other words, how might Deleuze overcome the paradox of transformation that arises from his theory of immanence? The answer comes in Deleuze's deployment and development of the analogy between life and art. Just as an art-work is both self-contained (or 'internal to itself') and integrated with the circumstances of its production, display and inspection, so artistic life integrates its internality and differences with the creative terms of its production and engagements. It is as though an improvising actor simultaneously plays both 'I, the character' and 'I, the actor'. The actor neither stands apart from, nor completely identifies with the character, but produces 'it' in the course of a creative process. The character is real and becomes increasingly real the better it is played but nonetheless, qua character, it is neither wholly real nor wholly fictional (C2, 151-2).97 From the point of view of the performer who has to make a conscious effort to play the part, the events of the character's life are 'staged', but always in terms of the actor's own character. Similarly, the creative thinker is simultaneously thinker and (in terms of the rules of external difference).
process-of-thinking; not gazing upon the process or directing it, but engaging with it in the
course of its creation. The 'self=sefl' form is replaced by an inequality founded upon new rules,'Thespian rules', which introduce a new meaning to Rimbaud's 'I is an other' from the one
tendered in Difference and Repetition.

In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze relates his actor analogy to his model of temporality.
An actor plays a part only in the present, in the productive moment, whereas the character
being played also reflects past events and future ones: memories and conditioned responses on
the one hand, hopes and fears on the other. According to Deleuze, 'the role has the same
relation to the actor as the future and past have to the instantaneous present which corresponds
to them' (LS, 150). In the relationship between actor and character, we find the nature of
correspondence between each instant, the course of a lifetime of differences, and the eternity of
continual production (LS, 147). At every instant, the actor extracts the pure present from the
events of a lifetime in a disjunction which, in being played, 'affirms the disjunct as such' (LS,
178-9). The playing of the character in the present affirms the moment of creation and its
difference from, and simultaneous accord with, the range of differences defining past and future.

But there is more to the affirmation of difference as the nature of one's existence than
just creative thinking. For Deleuze, it is not enough merely to accept one's becoming different
in the process of thinking. This would be to play the character without really committing to the
performance, or to pay lip-service to a part rather than engaging with it as a life; that is, to think
about difference without actively creating it, in a Stoic form of amor fati. Instead, Deleuze
champions the active affirmation of the implications of becoming different as the 'essence' of
one's existence. Affirmation means actively desiring all of the connotations of the event for the
passive subject; not ordering the chaos of differences and virtualities comprising a life, but
affirming their divergence (LS, 264; DR, 52).

Earlier sections have spelled out the range of implications that must be affirmed. First,
one's life is but a continual production of difference, a becoming without identity, a stable
'foundation' or a substantial essence. Second, productive eternal return, 'the theory of pure
events and their linear and superficial condensation', reveals the necessary implication of all the
haecceities of one's life in and between all of the others in a temporal continuity. If one is truly
'individual'-haecceitic—at any one moment, then the life of the individual must be conceived as
'passing through all the other individuals implied by the other events' of a lifetime (LS, 178). In terms of Deleuze's Thespian ethics, the present event invokes past and present necessarily, so that 'the character is inseparable from a before and an after, but he reunites these in the passage from one state to the other' (C2, 150).

The third implication has so far been described in insufficient depth to do justice to its place in Deleuze's ethics. Specifically, one's life is defined by the range of interactions between internal and external difference. External difference is given its 'content' by internal difference as a chance concatenation of forces that defines every moment of eternal return. To affirm oneself as difference and becoming thus is to welcome this accidental destiny, to affirm thinking as a 'dice-throw' and an 'experiment in chance', and to desire the serendipity of one's existence.

The chance element of internal differences comes from the 'outside', from the unfolding future and the world of Bergson's Images and Hume's impressions, so that, as Deleuze puts it, the 'inside' of the subject is 'an operation of the outside'. (In his essay 'Nomad Thought', Deleuze describes Nietzsche's version of this relationship as a 'communion' or 'immediate relation' between the 'inner soul of consciousness' and the outside.) The forces of the 'outside' impact upon what we think we are and might become. Thus, in every subjectivity-event, there is a (yet another) multiplication or 'doubling' of difference in the interchange between dynamic-subject and circumstances, so that 'inside' and 'outside' become blurred in their inevitable fusion and interaction. In other words, unlike Foucault, Deleuze considers the distinction between internal and external difference to subvert itself in the speed and repetitiveness of interactions.

Finally, then, in respect of the third ramification, 'the real difference is not between the inside and the outside ... but is rather at the frontier', the point at which difference is lived, where 'what happens inside and outside ... has complex relations of interference and interlace, of syncopated junctions' (LS, 155). The life of the human individual finally depends upon difference doubled and multiplied in the constitution of the event, and it is a 'human' life just because of the range of these fortuitous interactions. Rather than judging them against a desired outcome or pre-determined goal, one must embrace their happenstance character as the determining aspect of the particularity of one's existence. In the game of chance that is life, each unique coupling of differences is a point on the die, and the ethical imperative is to throw
again and again, affirming the *necessity* of chance in production of the event (*DR*, 198).\(^{102}\)

As we saw in Chapter 2, this frontier is precisely the 'place' at which thinking occurs, so that Deleuze contends: 'only thought finds it possible *to affirm all chance and to make chance into an object of affirmation*. If one tries to play this game other than in thought, nothing happens; and if one tries to produce a result other than the work of art, nothing is produced' (*LS*, 60). Just as creative thinking overturns the image of subject as a unity, one must also affirm the implications of becoming different by thinking them; by welcoming chance and becoming, conceiving moments of one's life as inevitably interconnected—but without reference to a substantial subject. Only by thinking the nature of the character precisely can the part be played sufficiently well.

Deleuze believes that there is an imperative available for testing the strength of affirmation of one's engagement with difference: the thought of eternal return, which Deleuze advances in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and develops further in *Difference and Repetition*. I shall here outline it only in brief, but have discussed it elsewhere in depth.\(^{103}\) Deleuze believes that as a *thought* (rather than as an ontological device), eternal return provides the conscious will with a 'practical rule' for engaging with difference. Every thought (and thus every value, meaning, image and consciously directed action) must accord with the rule: 'whatever you will, will it in such a manner that you also will its eternal return' (*DR*, 7). Whatever is willed in accordance with this test is willed completely and affirmatively, for all time, so that 'all the half-desires and hesitant yearnings, the qualified excesses and provisional indulgences, of a cautious and calculating will' are completely eliminated in taking responsibility for one's creative thinking and interpretations; in other words, for one's artistry. The actor commits to the performance *for all time*, for all the time of returning, and signals the continual production of difference (this instance of willing is distinct from previous ones), the implication of each haecceitic moment in all others (to will a thought is to desire it forever), and engagement with the chance forces of internal difference (welcoming both the circumstances of willing and a heterogeneous and uncertain future).\(^{104}\) In the process of willing, the subject necessarily becomes-other. By placing thought immediately within the practical realm of changing events, it ties the nature of thinking of the becoming-subject to the becoming which it constitutes *qua* activity.\(^{105}\)
Deleuze claims that 'if eternal return is the highest, the most intense thought, this is because its own extreme coherence ... excludes the coherence of a thinking subject' (DR 58). The extreme cohesion of differences in the productive and singular repetition of events prohibits the static subject. If the human tendency is to think in terms of the coherence of such a subject, then the transformation consequent to creative thinking and the thought of eternal return heralds a new kind of existence.

Clearly the affirmation of life in terms of the ethic and aesthetic of the event is not indicative of the human genre as it is characterized by Deleuze, Nietzsche et al. Rather, such thinking heralds the 'death' of 'that which is one'—the subject of sameness, identity, becoming-equal and inertia—in favour of the haecceitic forces which enhance life (DR 115). 'One dies' in every moment of eternal return to be replaced by the 'one' of pre-individual singularities (LS, 152; DR, 259). Understood as a creative becoming, life simultaneously differs from death and, in the Deleuzian sense, affirms it, so that the eternal return actually empowers the individual to will its own passing. (Deleuze is echoing the distinction in Blanchot between personal death on the one hand, and impersonal and infinitive death on the other, where the former relates to the death drive and 'contradiction' of the ego, and the latter to the release of singularities from the ego, wherein 'one' never, finally, dies.)

In Deleuze's aesthetic of life, the greatest value attaches to 'the becoming of the real character when he himself starts to "make fiction", when he enters into "the flagrant offence of making up legends" and so contributes to the invention of his people' (C2, 150). The event of becoming-subject in accordance with the ontology and ethic of eternal return (the actor's committed performance) is, then, a revolutionary moment. It represents a moment in 'the Invention of a people' of some new kind, the creation of a new genre for which, in Deleuze's words, 'the people no longer exist, or not yet' (C2, 216, 217).

Deleuze sometimes identifies the people invented by the artistic life with Nietzsche's Übermenschen. For the Deleuze of Foucault, for instance, the Overman 'is the form that results from a new relation between forces' when the human frees life 'within himself. It is the dynamic-subject passed into awareness of the metaphysical implications and ethical demands of its own existence qua becoming. In The Logic of Sense, the Overman is a mode of individuation typified by active life and the thought of intensity and singularity (LS, 107). It
represents a distinct break from such typically human images of thought as identity, unity, totality and universality. Thus, for Deleuze as for Nietzsche in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the Overman becomes the motif of the meaning and goal of eternal return: the creative initiative of the passive subject coupled with the random events of existence to move beyond human reality to 'a new way of feeling, thinking, and above all being (Overman)' (*NP*, 71). But if one does not think creatively and does not adopt an aesthetic ethic, then one is condemned to a human life of unity wherein the richness of experience is concealed behind identity, stability and substance, and one is doomed to remain but an 'epiphenomenon' of existence (*DR*, 55).

Finally, then, art and philosophy converge or become indiscernible in Deleuze's ethics of the event. At this point is the simultaneous production of a new kind of people and a new life for the individual. As in Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*, art for Deleuze must be viewed from the perspective of life, facilitating a creative transformation of existence and expressing the fundamental nature of one's life as eternal return. This art is, for Deleuze, an aesthetic of resistance, expressed wholly in thinking, producing no product but a life which disturbs one's reality and morality (*LS*, 60). It is not, however, an abstract production without rules, but one guided by a strict and testable edict of affirmation and creation, consistent with the temporality of the event and the production of the passive subject. This test, instantiated in the thought of eternal return, is the means by which the stable, coherent subject is expelled from the economy of thinking in favour of a more radical becoming-subject (*DR*, 57).

The consequent work of art, the creative life of the Overman, is like a painting that begins outside its frame and traverses the frame in the course of a continuous reworking of the picture. For Deleuze, 'far from being the delimitation of a pictorial surface, the frame immediately relates this surface to the outside.' To traverse the frontier between 'inner life' and the 'outside' is, for Deleuze, to affirm the transitory essence of creative and ethical existence. Only by moving outside the frame does one really live the life of the dynamic subject unearthed by Deleuze in Hume and Bergson.
By focusing upon Deleuze's ontology, *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense* move the grounds of his thinking of the subject, even though there are few clear acknowledgements of this in the text. The subject, psychology and the human kind of individual are just shadowy presences, usually concealed behind Deleuze's elegant accounts of haecceity, difference, becoming, and the event. Only by working through these key concepts in the terms provided by Deleuze's earlier works—supplemented by the few overt references to subjectivity—do their implications for the *human* dynamic become evident.

Read in this manner, the Deleuze of the late Sixties emphasizes the importance of the concept of difference and the crucial roles of eternal return in the subject's continuous becoming-other. The concept of difference-in-itself helps to explain the roles of contingent circumstances and processes of individuation without presupposing a founding identity. As the theory of pure events, eternal return affirms internal and external differences, disparateness, chance, becoming and multiplicity as *inherent* to constitution of the dynamic subject (*DR*, 300). Identity is but a 'secondary power', subordinate to difference and repetition. It is not the individual that returns, but events ('mobile individuating factors' [*DR*, 41]), constituting the individual in the process of their becoming (*LS*, 176).

In terms of the haecceity of the event, eternal return is the process by which 'thought encounters life' and thinking acquires a new image of itself. Eternal return 'smashes to pieces' the illusion that self is founded upon unity and identity, and ensures exclusion of the notion from thought (*DR*, 89-90). It reveals instead the 'joyful wisdom' of difference operating in events as 'the secret coherence which establishes itself only by excluding ... the identity of the self, the world and God' (*DR*, 90-1). In other words, eternal return ensures the breakdown or 'unfounding' of the subject's identity only to replace it with a shifting 'foundation': the becoming-different of events (*LS*, 263). The mechanism enables Deleuze to conceive of human becoming as Individuation-In-progress. 'I is another' replaces 'Ego=Ego' without introducing a temporal 'crack' of the kind that afflicts Descartes' theory. 113

As a dynamic effect, subjectivity is always temporal, so that 'we are internal to time, not the other way around' (*C2*, 82-3). Eternal return discloses and imposes the liberating time of
the event, which has neither past nor future except in terms of becoming. Events mark every moment of becoming as a present such that chronological time is 'overturned by movements' (C2, 129). If indeed 'we are internal to time', it is not time of a 'pure form', but of the continual division of returning and the continual returning of division (past/present, self/other, before/after, circumstance/effect, ...).114

Deleuze derives from this model an ethics that harnesses the creative potential entailed by becoming-other in the cause of transforming thought. Difference contains the potential for the passive subject's active resistance to images of unity, and affirmation of an uncertain future and immanent otherness. This ethic does not need the human, but is, rather, the means for surpassing the human in favour of the Overman such that, in Deleuze's words, 'there never "remains" anything of the subject, since he is to be created on each occasion, like a focal point of resistance'.115 It involves the creation of different ways of existing and thinking, new images, optional rules; in short, life as a work of art, leading inevitably to the death of the unified subject (N, 92). This is what Rodowick calls Deleuze's 'utopian aspiration'.116

In Deleuze's theory, 'self' and 'I' are just indicators of the kind of individuation typical of the human genre. They correspond in referring to the process of becoming, but, because of their independent functioning, each has its own time. As Deleuze puts it, 'I can serve as a universal principle for recognition and representation' founded in individuation, whereas 'self' corresponds to a kind evident in patterns of external difference (DR, 151-2). In other words, 'the I forms the properly psychic determination of species [thus invoking internal difference], while the Self forms the psychic organization' (DR, 256-7). In the light of Empiricism and Subjectivity and Bergsonism, these claims have precise meaning. They refer to the passage of a life, to patterns of interaction between dynamic subject and world so complex that the subject-form as traditionally understood clearly is inadequate.
Conclusion: Deleuze's Becoming-Subject

28. MACHINES AND PLANES

I have argued that there is a workable and evolving theory of the human subject latent within Deleuze's interpretations of Hume and Bergson, and two of his metaphysical treatises. But, as noted in the Introduction, not all of Deleuze's works are readily congruous with such a reading. Most notably, the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, written with Guattari, and Deleuze's essay 'Immanence: A Life ...' seem to be at odds with my rendition of Deleuze on the subject. I address here the possibility and advisability of constructing a union between the two approaches.

In the former work, especially Anti-Oedipus, cited variously as Deleuze and Guattari's 'major mature work' and 'unsubstantial prattle', the subject is never a central theme. But not only is its absence sometimes conspicuous, the authors regularly go out of their way to repudiate the concept, favouring freer forms of agency and praxis instead. For this Deleuze of the early- to mid-1970s, human existence is not characterizable by conscious and non-conscious mechanisms and relations of difference, but by a fragmented unconscious and relations of non-subjective productive desire. This emphasis mirrors Deleuze's concern with seemingly more malleable relations between personal and politico-economic realms in the aftermath of May '68, and leads him to claim that 'there is only desire and the social and nothing else'. The principal tasks of Anti-Oedipus are to describe the body of desire and formulate means for its escape from rational regulation and socially imposed hierarchical forms.

The pivotal break from the account proffered in Deleuze's historical works comes with the introduction of two new subject-models, the 'desiring-machine' and the 'body-without-organs', which are meant to do away with the subject as a locus of constraint by the forces of capitalism and psychiatry. Desiring-machines are neither human individuals understood in terms of utility, consciousness and activity, nor technical machines, but organic expressions of unconscious desire; decentred, non-unified and without a fixed identity. Relations between the desiring machine and other existents are described by Deleuze and Guattari in terms of a 'body-without-organs', a depersonalized and disorganized 'surface' upon which flows of desire are
recorded. On this model, the body is not experienced as 'one's own', but as an anonymous configuration of forces beyond nodal identity. In both cases, the notion of the subject as an individuated instance of a particular genre vanishes under inherent disorganization and the implicit homogeneity of desire. If there is still 'something on the order of a subject ... on the recording surface', as Deleuze and Guattari claim, then it is merely 'peripheral to the desiring-machines'; not an effect proper, but an epiphenomenon. To use Deleuze and Guattari's terms, the subject is 'molar', operating at the level of the whole (on my reading, a passive whole qua effect), whereas the philosophy of desire functions on a 'molecular' level, beyond the reach of 'repressive' forms of power, authority and law. To think in these terms is to 'liberate' desire, to express it freely as a positive and creative force rather than as an expression of lack.

Even this sketch discloses the significant discontinuities between Capitalism and Schizophrenia and the theory of the subject advanced in Deleuze's earlier works. Deleuze and Guattari are attacking not just Freudian psychoanalysis and capitalist institutions of economy and law, their ostensive targets, but any attempt to develop conceptual order through the imposition of explanatory schemas upon the unconscious realm. Deleuze's disdain for philosophical transcendence has spilled over into an attack on all efforts to 'make sense' of the expression of unconscious forces, efforts which he now associates with formulation of means for their control. As such, Deleuze and Guattari oppose any theory of the subject disposed towards a principle of individuation predicated upon consciousness, utility and/or consistency.

There are also numerous thematic inconsistencies between the two positions. For instance, in Capitalism and Schizophrenia: the unconscious realm is afforded an absolute privilege over the conscious; pure flows of desire replace flows of mental states and their enabling mechanisms; the notion of 'genre' or kind becomes highly transitory rather than readily Intuitive; social forces are not locatable 'outside' the individual, influencing subject-formation, but are always already incorporated within the desiring-machine (as well as in the 'world' and the forces mediating between them); parts are unrelated to wholes, and; pure expressions and random interactions supplant intentions, selections and tendencies.

Despite such conspicuous discontinuities, the sheer audacity, complexity and radicalism of Anti-Oedipus, allied with Deleuze's thematic preoccupations, ensure that there are ways of opening up viable lines of connection or continuity. Such a line becomes apparent if Anti-
Oedipus is read as a critique of the workings and influences of the economic, judicial, and social systems which Deleuze's Hume understands to be essential to stabilization of the dynamic subject. Alternatively, Anti-Oedipus can be conceived as an account of the social unconscious that supplements Deleuze's earlier focus on consciousness, or as a radicalization of some of Deleuze's earlier positions or concepts. A number of commentators have adopted the latter approach. Goodchild, for instance, argues that Capitalism and Schizophrenia represents an extension of Deleuze's Humean scepticism about the possibility of knowledge. But whereas Empiricism and Subjectivity was concerned with the mechanisms and dynamism of belief-formation, the later works concentrate upon the genesis of thought in terms of its psychosocial and ethico-political conditions. On a similar tack, Bogue argues that unconscious desire is a radicalized version of Nietzsche's will to power as Deleuze interprets it in Nietzsche and Philosophy. Or again, one could trace an increasingly radical 'decentring' of the subject from the stable Humean version of Chapter 1, to the complex of pre-individual events outlined in Chapter 3, to a desiring-machine, barely cognizable as a subject at all. On such a reading, the dynamism introduced into the subject model by Hume's introspection can be seen as a precursor to Capitalism and Schizophrenia's obliteration of any possible identity.

Finally, one could argue that these two 'phases' of Deleuze's philosophy share an underlying politics. Baugh points out that 'Deleuze thinks that there is a link between transcendental empiricism's ideal of intuiting empirical actualities as historically produced "virtual multiplicities" and a political practice which would ... treat individuals and the differences between them in a positive way, in terms of the causal geneses that produced them.' Far from celebrating marginality, such a position rejects it on the grounds that there can be no universally discriminative norm or standard, but only singularities borne of contingent circumstances. Similarly, in the later works, the philosophy of desire is meant to overturn determinations of marginality and inferiority by eliminating 'fascistic forms of subjectivity'. For Deleuze and Guattari, the subject qua binding identity follows from the unity of the State: 'first, the objective, imperial collective bond; then all of the forms of subjective personal bonds; finally, the Subject that binds itself.' But the desiring machine is anti-conformist, immune to bonds of these kinds because it rebels against institutions that operate in the cause of order. Bonds founded upon the continuities of desire displace bonds of hierarchy, control and subservience, eliminating the
tyranny of marginality at each level.

It is beyond my scope to expand upon these lines of flight, which are only meant to illustrate the potential for finding and exploiting connections in Deleuze's otherwise disparate texts. The range of such opportunities is not really so surprising given his conception of philosophy. If philosophy is all about fashioning new concepts and images of thought, if each of these defines a new plane of theoretical consistency, and if each point on a plane is consistent and connectable with any other in terms of the originating concept, then the development of connections across the plane becomes relatively simple. It might even be, as Braidotti claims, that Deleuze chooses his concepts and images with an eye to their potential for conceptual inter-connectedness and 'web-like interaction'. One finds such productive conceptual consistencies in the examples cited above: institutions, thematic continuity and anti-fascist politics (respectively) provide their terms.

But the question for Deleuze's reader is not whether such lines of connectivity can be formulated—clearly they can—but whether (and how far) one ought to stretch one's arguments in order to define them and 'make them work'. It is all very well to adopt Deleuze's creed of conceptual connectivities and transitions, but to move restlessly across territories defined by disparate images and concepts risks making Deleuze's corpus into a unified system, a closed and integrated whole, contrary to the lessons of the rhizome. (Although I don't mean to suggest that the lines of connection proposed above would fall to such a criticism.) For these reasons, I have by-and-large limited my study of the Deleuzian subject to those works where the continuities are clear, pronounced and productive, and have also emphasized the discontinuities in Deleuze's thinking of it.

An altogether more demanding challenge to my interpretation is posed by Deleuze's essay, 'Immanence: A Life ...' which, like parts of What is Philosophy?, constitutes a movement in the later works towards greater metaphysical abstraction. If Deleuze's images and concepts invite an unjustifiably systematic Deleuzian 'theory of everything', then this essay, published in 1995, is Deleuze's own attempt at such a totalizing metaphysics. Its challenge to my reading is more practical than theoretical, and deserves comment.

On my interpretation, Deleuze's ethics of the event is in lived time, the time of passive synthesis and the production of the dynamic subject. As such, the temporality of thinking,
production, action and memory are meshed according to the coincidence of durée and the
effect of interactions between lines of development, evidenced by the apparent unity that
characterizes the starting-point for transcendental empiricism. The passive subject is able to
participate actively in the formulation and adoption of transformative ethics precisely because
the 'speed' of production of immanent effects matches the speed of thinking.

But Deleuze's accounts of the subject are not always characterized by such an
alignment. In some of the later works, where Spinoza's influence is strongest, Deleuze
conceives of events as occurring at infinite speed.11 He contends that consciousness 'crosses
the transcendental field [of events] at an infinite speed which is everywhere diffuse' and
'expresses itself as fact only by reflecting onto a subject which refers it to objects.'12 In other
words, events are actualized at such a pace that there is no room for conscious intervention or
active transformative ethics. Productive interactions between the world of objects and inner-life
are so rapid that every constitutive event of consciousness is always already surpassed by the
next. Eternal return in its ontological guise ensures that the subject always becomes other than
itself, but the transition is so quick that the subject has no capacity to respond, let alone to
intervene with affirmative willing or conscious creative effort. How, then, might one 'live up to'
the event in the manner championed by Deleuze in his Nietzschean moments? How might
philosophy intervene in favour of a 'people yet to come'? How might one affirm becoming such
as to become 'a master of one's speed'? (LS, 123) Deleuze provides no answers.

Furthermore, in What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari claim: 'this speed requires a
milieu that moves infinitely in itself—the plane, the void, the horizon. Both elasticity of the
concept and fluidity of the milieu are needed.... to make up "the slow beings" that we are.' This
non-extended, unthinkable and imperceptible virtual plane of Immanence is the 'horizon' upon
which all events become.13 Production is related to the plane's infinite speed, rather than to the
temporality of any specific concept. With this plane of Immanence, then, Deleuze's focus has
shifted from the constitution of a life, the life of individuation, to Life, the condition of possibility
of all events and concepts, including any particular life. Thus the passivity of the dynamic
subject is multiplied to infinity.

This is not to say that Deleuze ignores altogether the place of particular lives upon the
plane. But now he conceives of a life as just a kind of 'abstract line', a certain 'living subject'
which 'passes through' points on the plane but is 'freed' from any relationship with 'the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens'. Conceived in this way, broad consistencies with the Humean and Bergsonian visions remain. Each life can be conceived as a continuous relation between interpenetrating and impersonal haecceities defined by internal differences. On the plane of immanence, as Deleuze puts it, 'the singularities or events constitutive of a life coexist with the accidents of the corresponding life, but neither come together nor divide in the same way.' The abstract line can be conceived as representing a unity between individual and circumstance, subject and object, consistent with Deleuze's metaphysics of movement and difference and his disclosure of the fallacy of the transcendent and subsumptive subject.

But difficulties arise when the minutia of the plane of immanence are teased out. Deleuze envisages that events of a life and events of Life 'do not communicate with each other in the same way as do individuals'. He argues that the line of a life connects in some mysterious way with all events on the plane, just as everything is interconnected with everything else in a dense web of heterogenous forces (N, 146). The consequences for the account of the subject are extreme. In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze claims that 'there is no longer a subject, but only individuating affective states of an anonymous force'. In The Logic of Sense, he defines the subject as a nomadic becoming Incorporating haecceities, but goes on to claim that it 'traverses' humans, plants and animals, unconstrained by particular kinds of individuation and indicative 'tendencies' (LS, 107). In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze first asserts that 'we should not say that the Individuals of a given species are distin-
guished by their participation in other species: as if, for example, there was ass or lion, wolf or sheep, in every human being', but then goes on to claim that 'the thinker ... is laden with stones and diamonds, plants "and even animals" (DR, 254).

To disagree with such extravagant claims is not just to take Deleuze too literally, but to oppose the plane of immanence as an imprecise philosophical model in the Bergsonian sense. To agree with Deleuze that 'one does not think without becoming something else' does not mean that the 'something else' is of an alien kind, a kind 'that does not think—an animal, a molecule, a particle' (even if we define each of these just according to 'what it can do' in terms of its relations, perceptions and environment). In becoming other, the subject is individuated as a human kind according to external differences. Even if the frontier between internal and
external differences is always shifting—as Deleuze has argued—transcendental empiricism remains capable of discerning the genre defined by external difference. In short, Deleuze seems to have forgotten the principal lesson of Bergsonism: that one should 'rediscover what differs in kind in the composites that are given to us and on which we live' (B, 26). The consequence of excluding genre from his theory of the plane of immanence is to devalue his rich accounts of the concrete conditions of distinctive human experience—of social, historical, judicial and economic circumstances, and their psychological and ontological import—in favour of an abstract metaphysics in which such circumstances are but the 'white noise' of becoming.22

Apart from the Imprecision of an all-encompassing plane of immanence, there are other reasons for preferring Deleuze’s earlier conceptions of the human individual over later ones. Some commentators have expressed unease over the political implications of both the philosophy of desire and the universal plane of immanence. If the politics of desire is about ‘breaking down’ the ‘dichotomy between desire and interest, so that people can begin to desire, think and act in their own interests’, as Goodchild describes it, and if there is no complimentary mechanism for integrating and regulating their actions, then the consequent politics is certainly troubling.23 Yet this is precisely the case with Deleuze’s later theories which, as Descombes points out, incorporate no philosophy of responsibility, right, justice, community or personal morality, and just the thinnest account of inter-subjectivity. Such deficiencies (amongst others) lead Bernard Flynn to warn of the ‘dangerous political implications’ of Deleuze and Guattari’s pronouncements on the pathological and schizophrenic.24

Deleuze states: ‘a theory is exactly like a box of tools…. It must be useful. It must function. And not for itself. If no one uses it, … then the theory is worthless or the moment is inappropriate.’25 Therefore he prefers his readers to ask just one (composite) question of his philosophy: "Does it work, and how does it work?" Does it work for you?’ (N, 8) The principal positions advanced in Capitalism and Schizophrenia and the essay on the plane of immanence do not ‘work’. They do not provide a set of concepts that address the nature of consciousness or human existence precisely. Rather, these works are deliberately abstract and unworkably imprecise and speculative, far removed from the carefully justified methodologies and concepts that governed Deleuze’s earlier studies of consciousness and self.26 How might Deleuze’s reader relate the fragmented desiring-machine to the need for consistent actions in attending to
life's practical exigencies? How can the body understood as an anonymous recording surface be correlated with one's own physical pains and pleasures? The later works rarely even acknowledge such challenges, let alone deal with them adequately.

29. THE BECOMING-SUBJECT

I have defended the thesis that there is an evolving theory of the subject latent within some of Deleuze's texts from the 1950s and 1960s. In two of these works, Deleuze actively reappropriates inherited theories. In the others, he 'breathes life' into the subject in the course of studying other concepts and images of thought. Critical exegeses of these texts have shown why Deleuze considers it a mistake to conceive of the subject as a relatively stable, objective and rational centre of identity: because the dynamics of consciousness preclude such an account. For Deleuze, the subject is a passive but ever-changing effect of a confluence of psychological, material and ontological forces, and his texts provide a workable (though sometimes under-developed) account of the origins and nature of these characteristics.

Chapter 1 showed that Empiricism and Subjectivity yields a preliminary account of the subject as a relatively stable system of dynamic interactions between atomistic ideas. The system is structured according to the dictates of 'passions', on the one hand, and a confluence of stabilizing rules and fictions, on the other. On this account, the human genre is definable in terms of introspectively evident tendencies located in the 'space' between ideas, the field of difference and activity which recurs in varying forms throughout Deleuze's corpus. According to the Humean Deleuze, the subject is a habitually constructed and fictional entity that is necessary for the imagination's consistent operation and the capacity to live within a community. The name 'I' refers to the product of such thinking, the apparently stable 'structure' arising out of atomism and associationism.

Hume's exaggeration of the systematicity and stability of this structure, coupled with his failure to theorize adequately the origin and nature of ideas, leads Deleuze towards Bergson. Chapter 2 showed how Deleuze, having adopted intuition philosophique as his method and a strict transcendental empiricism as his strategy, reveals Hume's account to be imprecise and inconsistent with the temporality of consciousness. For the Bergsonian Deleuze, consciousness
is experienced as an interpenetrative flow of mental states, always moving and changing rather than being re-constituted by the introduction of movement 'between' ideas.

The various kinds of ideas evident within the flow suggest that the life of the subject is, in a sense, dualistic, relating an 'inner' life of ideas to an 'outer' world of objects. This realization serves as the starting-point for Deleuze's quest after the preconditions of subjectivity. By tracing the operative conditions on each 'line of development', he finds that difference is implicated in every function and mechanism. In the first place, there is difference between self and object; in the second, between particular sensations, bodily dispositions, and responses; in the third, between memories in virtual and actual form; in the fourth, between the two lines of development themselves; in the fifth, between moments of a life. By working through the production and effects of these differences, Deleuze theorizes the present as a particular but passing moment, the transitory 'point' of experience at which the subject is constituted. As such, the temporality of the subject's production and consciousness are wedded together.

The distinction between virtual and actual is central to Bergsonism, but its full import is only realized later, in Difference and Repetition and The Logic Of Sense. Chapter 3 showed how Deleuze accounts in these works for the individuality of the 'I' as a particular unity of mental states and bodily effects and affects. Deleuze uses 'the event' to describe the singularity and implicit dynamism of each moment of a life (whether defined in terms of Hume's principles or Bergson's lines of development) and a version of Nietzsche's eternal return to delineate the ongoing becoming and mutual implication of such moments. On this account, each instant of a life, qua event, is defined by its 'internal difference', the particularity of circumstances implicated in its production, whilst the repetitive becoming-different of subject-events ensures that the moments of a lifetime cohere. Paradoxically, the distinguishing difference of each mental state determines it to be part of a union of such states, so that past moments invariably are implicated in the production of future ones, even though the subject lives just in the present. As such, in every moment of a distinctively human existence, the subject becomes-different or 'other than itself', whilst forming simultaneously a 'virtual whole' or 'multiplicity' nameable as 'I'. In other words, the potential entailed by each virtual point of intersection between Bergsonian lines is actualized as a particular moment in the life of a subject: repetition is not a function of the subject, but rather the subject is an effect of repetitive actualization.
The extent to which Deleuze's changing theory of the subject implicates his core philosophies of difference and becoming makes all the more surprising its widespread neglect by commentators. One's conscious life is 'one's own' not just because the mental states that define it differ in some respect(s) from those of others' 'inner lives', but also because they are defined by yet 'deeper' layers of difference and contingency. Difference between actualizations is not determined just by the particularity of the actual, but by the differing history of every production, beginning with the disturbance of thought by some specific external circumstance and accentuated throughout the range of repetitious mechanisms and functions. From the succession of such elements arise 'emissions of singularities' possessing 'a mobile, Immanent principle of auto-unification', and Deleuze's theory of becoming serves to explain this principle (LS, 102).

The 'open set' or 'virtual whole' of such differences is not referred to a transcendent structure (or concept) in order to ensure its lived coherence: Deleuze's theory contains no universal Subject, Unity, Object, Reason or Judgement. Nor can the integration of differences rest upon consciousness, because consciousness and subjectivity are productions of the interaction between differences of certain kinds (LS, 102). Instead, for Deleuze, the continuity of a life rests upon contingent and intuitively accessible processes which are 'sometimes unifying, subjectifying, rationalizing, but just processes all the same' (N, 145-6). As such, 'all of thought is a becoming ... rather than the attribute of a Subject and the representation of a Whole.' As a becoming in Deleuze's sense, it lacks any fixed terms; it is without origin or goal, beginning or end. As Deleuze and Guattari put it: 'what is real is the becoming itself, ... not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes.... [A] becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself.' Instead, the subject is an effect of becoming, a passivity resting upon a range of contingent transitions.

Under these conditions, 'I' does not designate a subject qua object of attention, as in the Cartesian model, but a particular process of becoming; that is, 'I' refers to becoming 'itself', naming 'something which happens ... between two terms which are not subjects'. More specifically, 'I' refers to the conditions of transformation and difference constituting a subject's unity, making it a 'life-enhancing fiction' for fashioning strategic generalizations without introducing a stifling identity, as Susan Bordo and Mario Moussa point out.
human qua distinctive genre or kind, even if, for Deleuze, they are 'perhaps no more than indices of the species: of humanity as a species with divisions' (italics added) (*DR*, 151). In so far as 'the human' is distinguishable in these earlier works, Deleuze is no anti-humanist in Frank's or Ferry and Renaut's sense.

Because Deleuze's account rests upon the contingency of events, and thus upon contingent circumstances and processes, he claims that 'the transcendental field is no more individual than personal, and no more general than universal', although it exhibits nonetheless a 'surface organization' which 'however impersonal and pre-individual' serves as a condition for the definition of the human genre (*LS*, 99). As such, in his theory, 'the notion of subject has lost much of its interest on behalf of pre-individual singularities and non-personal individuations'.

This is not to say, however, that we lose interest in the subject as a lived reality. (Neither does Deleuze, for as François Zourabichvili points out, it is the 'passage of life' which points Deleuze towards the unformedness of becoming in place of the static self.) One lives in terms of one's lifetime: I guard my health, plan for the future, cherish my memories, and enjoy or suffer each moment. The subject is indeed transitory, becoming-different at every instant, but Deleuze's theory of productive recurrence also emphasizes its continuity, and it is in the interplay between these two aspects of Deleuzian subjectivity that we locate another kind of potential.

As Deleuze puts it, 'the dissolved self opens up to a series of roles', so that 'it is not a question of our undergoing influences, but of ... merging with them' (*LS*, 298). We are able to experiment with our becomings—as Deleuze and Guattari put it, to 'make consciousness an experimentation in life, and passion a field of continuous intensities'—and embrace life as a process of change by living and thinking creatively, partaking of the richness of one's experiences according to new or modified images of thought. But this is no pop-existentialism: it has a rule for engagement (the thought of eternal return), an ontological reality (difference, becoming) and a temporal one (memory, futurity), non-conscious elements (bodily reflex and planned response), and constraints upon our creative freedom (community, law, economics).

Moreover, if the human tendency is to think in terms of unity, sameness and fixed principles, as Deleuze contends, then his theory of the subject reveals an alternative genre of consciousness, defined by creative discord, difference and changeable concepts. 'I is an other' is not just the lesson of Deleuze's philosophy of difference and repetition, but the creed of a liberated subject.
For Deleuze, philosophy is about formulating new concepts and rehabilitating inherited ones. His account of the subject uses novel concepts to show how inherited versions like the autonomous Enlightenment Self and transcendental ego under-value the dynamism of the conditions and processes of lived reality. The subject is always a dynamic production of a range of cultural, linguistic, social, historical, psychological, physiological and unconscious forces. But Deleuze's project is not wholly critical. By tracing the conditions and consequences of these forces, he theorizes precisely how the various transformations implicated in subject-formation culminate at the level of difference-in-itself and repetition-for-itself. Each of the texts studied here brings a new perspective to this task, so that Deleuze's theory evolves continually: for Deleuze, philosophical precision is not about stasis or theoretical bedrock, but creativity. The reward for pursuing the thematic continuity defined as 'the subject' through Deleuze's more systematic works is a concept refreshed by exposure to new methodologies, psychologies, ontologies and ethics, bringing to consciousness the nature and richness of the dynamic of consciousness itself, and this, after all, is Deleuze's idea of 'doing philosophy'.
Notes

Introduction

2. Deleuze, 'Philosophical Concept,' 95.
4. Perry, 'Deleuze's Nietzsche,' 178.
5. Deleuze, 'Philosophical Concept,' 94. Frank holds that if there is one theme that gives a 'profile and coherence to thought in modern times', it is the subject (*What is Neostructuralism?*, 191-92).
7. Deleuze, 'Philosophical Concept,' 94.
8. Descombes, 'Apropos of the "Critique,"
10. Deleuze, 'Philosophical Concept,' 94.
17. Frank, *What is Neostructuralism?*, 316-17, 347. Frank also holds that these texts constitute the 'blind denigration' of neostructuralist critique (26).
19. Engel, 'Nietzsche-Structuralism,' 32.
20. Ibid.
22. Boundas, introduction to *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 11, 13-14; 'Serialization and Subject-Formation.'
23. Colwell, 'Deleuze and the Prepersonal.'
27. Nancy, 'Deleuzian Fold of Thought,' 107.
28. The rhizome can be contrasted usefully with the image of the root tree which has, as Patton points out, a point of origin, a schema of development, a hierarchical form of segmentarity, a principle and system of dichotomous division, and a centre of concentric circles in its growth ('Notes for a Glossary,' 45-6). Such arboreal images as Porphyry's 'tree' of logical categorization, Descartes' depiction of metaphysics as the tree roots from which issues the trunk of physics and the branches of the social sciences, and Chomsky's 'grammatical trees' come to mind. On a humorous note, Schrag provides a maxim for rhizome thinking: 'Go the
crabgrass, thou sluggard, consider its ways and be wise!’ (Resources of Rationality, 31)


30. I have not had occasion to quote Deleuze on the Freudian ego, and so this second sense of
‘moi’ has no place here.


33. Hardt, Gilles Deleuze.


Chapter 1: Deleuze’s Hume and the Psychology of Affections

1. Deleuze and André Cresson, David Hume: sa vie, son oeuvre (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1952); Deleuze, ‘Hume,’ in Histoire de la Philosophie, ed. François Châtelet (Paris:

2. Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 15.

3. See ES and David Hume. See also Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume
(London: Macmillan, 1949); Passmore, Hume’s Intentions.

4. A similar characterization of Hume’s start-point is examined in greater detail by Capaldi, David
Hume.

5. In the English translation of ES, ‘l’esprit’ is always translated as ‘mind’, and alternatives such
as ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ are ignored. This is consistent with the French edition of Hume’s Treatise
used by Deleuze.

6. Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 54.

7. This is what Deleuze means when he writes that ‘sensation has one face turned toward the
subject ... and another, turned toward the object (‘the fact’, the place, the event).’ (Francis
Bacon, 27)

8. Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 54.


10. See for example Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 6-7, 10-11, 505-6.

11. Boundas, introduction to Deleuze Reader, 22.

12. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 369; see also N, 32.

13. Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 55.

14. Hume problematizes the precise character of the relationship between ideas and the
principles when he writes that the principles constitute ‘a secret tie or union among particular
ideas, which causes the mind to conjoin them more frequently together’ (T, 662).

15. The use of the word ‘nature’ alludes to Hume’s understanding of ‘natural’ as easy and usual,
rather than forced, unusual, and artificial.

16. In the English version of Empiricism and Subjectivity, ‘transcendance’ is translated
consistently as ‘transcendence,’ and ‘transcendental’ as ‘transcendental.’ But ‘dépasse’ is
translated variously as ‘surpasses’ and ‘transcends.’ ‘Exceeds’ might have captured Deleuze’s
meaning better.

17. This discussion has to do specifically with belief ideas. Some impressions of reflection do
not operate by way of ideas; for example, causality is not as efficient a conductor of vivacity as
direct impressions.


19. Deleuze, ‘Philosophical Concept,’ 94.


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22. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, 57.

23. Deleuze occasionally goes further, integrating reason with philosophical relations (see for example *ES*, 65). This suggests consistency with Hume’s use of the term, because reasoning about matters of fact is necessarily the province of philosophical relations. Nonetheless, Deleuze clearly states that reason is of two kinds: that which proceeds on the basis of certainty and leads to knowledge, and that which proceeds in terms of probabilities and results in belief. The term should therefore not be considered as equivalent to Hume’s use, or even consistent with it.

24. For a discussion, see Boundas, introduction to *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 8.

25. It will be pursued later, in examining the ontology of *DR* and *LS* and the notion of *durée* in *B*.

26. Hume emphasizes this point by writing that ‘custom ... is the great guide of human life.... Without the influence of custom ... we should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect. There would be an end at once of all action, as well as the chief part of speculation’ (*EHU*, 47).

27. See *EHU*, 44.


29. Hume’s example of the first kind of belief is the unwarranted assertion that ‘an Irishman cannot have wit, and a Frenchman cannot have solidity’; his example of the second is that when one is suspended in a solid and safely secured iron cage, one is afraid of falling despite one’s experience in similar situations which have proved safe (*T*, 146, 148-49).

30. For suggestions as to how this might occur, see Martin, ‘Rational Warrant’; Lorne Falkenstein, ‘Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism in Hume’s Account of Belief’, *Hume Studies* 23 (1997), 29-72.

31. See Passmore, *Hume’s Intentions*, 64.


33. Hume provides a set of rules for distinguishing those objects which are properly causes or effects from those which are not; see *T*, 173-75. Each rule is of the kind that an experienced reasoner applies automatically, and which derives from repeatedly formulating beliefs and using the consequences as a measure of their effectiveness. Hume holds these rules to be ‘all the Logic I think proper to employ in my reasoning.’ (*T*, 175) Some commentators believe that Hume shows that the formation and application of corrective rules can be improved through education, while others hold that it cannot. For the first view, see Capaldi, *David Hume*, 127; for the second, see Hearn, ‘“General Rules” in Hume’s Treatise’ and Martin, ‘Rational Warrant’.

34. Boundas recuperates the Other within Deleuze’s philosophy in ‘Foreclosure of the Other.’

35. The reference to violence comes from Hume’s suggestion that selfishness, when combined with the scarcity of essential goods, means that each person’s possessions are exposed to the violence of others (*T*, 487). He claims that the problem threatens social cohesiveness.

36. There are parallels between this model and Althusserian structuralism.

37. For a discussion of Deleuze and social determinism, see Fosl, ‘Empiricism,’ 323-4.

38. Ibid., 325-6.

39. In the eighteenth century, ‘common sense’ often referred to a kind of ‘sixth sense’, an extra-sense.

40. Cf. *T*, 187 and *ES*, 96-8: Hume writes that ‘the sceptic ... must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body.... Nature has not left this to his choice’, while Deleuze spells out Hume’s argument in arriving at this point, indicating a tacit agreement.

41. In a later text, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that it is the principles of association which ‘enable us to put some order into ideas, preventing our “fantasy” (delirium, madness) from ... producing winged horses and dragons’ (*What is Philosophy*, 201). The later claim can be reconciled with the earlier by noting that even the activity of general rules in constituting fictions and wholes proceeds according to the principles.

43. It is striking that whereas Deleuze considers the fictional wholes arising from general rules to be essential to thinking, Foucault finds these same fictions to obstruct it, writing that 'the world, the self, and God ... [are] three conditions that invariably ... obstruct the successful formulation of thought' (Michel Foucault, *Counter-Memory*, 176).

**Chapter 2: Deleuze's Bergson and the Temporality of Consciousness**

3. Douglass, 'Deleuze's Bergson,' 372.
4. These issues are considered at *ES*, 44, 48, 102-3 respectively.
6. Deleuze, 'La conception de la différence,' 79.
7. The conventions of translation used herein for Deleuze's and Bergson's terms are, with one important exception, those adopted by the translators of *Bergsonism* (B, 9-10). To differentiate Bergson's notion of inner time from the usual use of 'duration', a physicalist model of the passing of discrete instants, *durée* is left untranslated. However *Bergsonism* and translations of some of Bergson's texts use 'duration'. Quotations are given in the published form. Of other important terms, 'souvenir' is translated as 'recollection', *mémoire* as 'memory', and 'détente' as 'relaxation'.
10. Deleuze, 'La conception de la différence,' 85. See also *CM*, 110.
11. See Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, xi and *DR*, 133. Some philosophers have argued that the reason, and not the understanding, predominate in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, see Lovejoy, *The Reason*, 1-34. For a discussion of Deleuze's criticisms of Kant's presumptions of unity and accord, see Patton, *Introduction to Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, 7-8.
14. Such characterizations lead Copleston to trace the method's origins to Maine de Biran (*History of Philosophy*, 182, 185). Chiari, amongst others, aligns intuition with the faculty of imagination as it is characterized by Blake, Coleridge and the Romantics, as a kind of immediate 'seizing of reality', or awareness of experience as experience; but this is a controversial portrayal (*French Thought*, 41).
15. See *B*, 104.
16. Deleuze and Guattari use the term 'concept' in numerous distinct and often problematic senses. MacKenzie provides a fine study of its meaning in the context of Deleuze's philosophical constructivism in *Creativity as Criticism*. This issue will be pursued in Chapter 3.
17. Deleuze, 'La conception de la différence,' 80-1.
19. Deleuze, 'La conception de la différence,' 85; *DR*, 56-7.
20. This doctrine aligns Deleuze and Bergson with thinkers as diverse as Schopenhauer, Schlegel, Fichte and Jacobi.
22. When introducing transcendental empiricism, Deleuze refers to Schelling, who also characterized his philosophy in terms of the pursuit of the conditions of real experience ('La conception de la différence,' 85).
23. Deleuze, 'La conception de la différence,' 85.
24. See for example Boundas, 'Ontology of the Virtual,' 87.


27. For a discussion of other senses of the term, see Caygill, Kant Dictionary, 399-400.

28. For a discussion of the 'reactive' political implications of this model as conceived by Deleuze, see Baugh, 'Transcendental Empiricism,' 143 and Hardt, Gilles Deleuze, 29.


30. See Boundas, 'Ontology of the Virtual,' 88.

31. Bergson, Mind-Energy, 68. We are reminded of Schopenhauer's claim that philosophy must 'start from direct and intuitive knowledge' which he only finds in 'self-consciousness ... which is within and subjective.' (World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, trans. E.F.J. Payne. [New York: Dover, 1958]: 452, 163; see also 30, 82-3, 99-9.) Bergson is equivocal on the meaning of the term 'consciousness,' sometimes using it as a stand-in for 'durée' and sometimes in the more usual philosophical use of the term; see Lacey, Bergson, 132-3, 148-50.

32. Chiari, French Thought, 39.

33. On translation conventions, see Chapter 2, note 7.

34. For a contrast, note Jacques Derrida's controversial claim that even musical analogies rest upon a spatial conception of time; see for example "Ousia" and "Gramme": Note on a Note from "Being and Time," in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

35. See Boundas, 'Ontology of the Virtual,' 84.

36. For a concise discussion, see Caygill, Kant Dictionary, 398.

37. Bergson nevertheless acknowledges that Kant moved from the Platonic tradition by arguing that 'our senses and consciousness are in fact exerted in a real Time, that is, in a Time which changes continuously' (CM, 141). Rose argues that the impossibility of adequately describing durée leaves Bergson reproducing a Kantian antinomy (Dialectic of Nihilism, 97-8). For a reply to Rose, see Hardt, Gilles Deleuze, 22-5.

38. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 486.

39. For a discussion of Bergson's concerns, see TFW, 103-4.

40. Deleuze, 'La conception de la différence,' 84.

41. See also Deleuze, 'La conception de la différence,' 85.

42. See MM, 9.

43. The geometric model of structure and consequent mathematical ones will recur throughout Deleuze's philosophies of difference, especially in The Fold. For a discussion of their implications, see Bogue, 'Playful Fold,' 10.

44. Because these conditions are only fully defined in terms of differences located within the composite (specifically, differences between tendencies and presences that together comprise the composite), they cannot, once separated, exist as real or complete but only in principle.

45. Hallward, 'Redemption from Interest,' 10.

46. Vincent Descombes contends that this view continues a tradition (originating with Descartes) of playing out the definition of matter in the relationship of body to mind, a tradition which means that 'French philosophy reserves a seat of honour for psychology, which is reputed to study this relationship' (Modern French Philosophy, 57). For this reason, Deleuze's study of perception, like his work on Hume, is as much philosophical psychology as metaphysics.

47. Bergson, Mind-Energy, 8.

48. Deleuze points out that one's image of matter need not be complete, but that additions to it will not complicate Bergson's characterization: 'No doubt there can be more in matter than in the image we have of it, but there cannot be anything else in it, of a different kind' (B, 41).
49. Bergson sometimes suggests that the world of individual things and substances is merely a fiction of the intelligence. But the infrequency and location of such claims suggest that this is not his favoured position. For a discussion, see Copleston, History of Philosophy, 183-4.

50. Deleuze, Fold, 97.

51. See Boundas, 'Ontology of the Virtual,' 84.


53. Bergson's studies of the effects of damaged nerves are meant to support his view that perception involves a 'flow of current' from the periphery of the body to the brain, rather than some function of the brain itself; see for example MM, 21.

54. Deleuze contends that 'something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition, but of a fundamental encounter (DR, 139).

55. Lacey, Bergson, 131.

56. Ibid.

57. In Cinema 1, Deleuze defines 'need' or 'interest' negatively, as 'the lines and points that we retain from the thing as a function of our receptive facet, and the actions that we select as a function of the delayed reactions of which we are capable' (C1, 63). This definition does little to clarify Bergsonism, but emphasises Deleuze's difficulty in settling on an appropriate meaning.

58. See Bergson's famed (and problematic) example of a dog welcoming its master (MM, 82). Presumably, the dog does not recognize its master, but just habitually associates its master's appearance with the trained or conditioned response of tail-wagging.

59. In Empiricism and Subjectivity, Deleuze hinted that the body has a role in constitution of the subject, but his effort was short and cryptic. He writes that in respect of practice, the body 'is the subject itself envisaged from the viewpoint of the spontaneity of relations that, under the influence of the principles, it establishes between ideas.' (ES, 96-7) Deleuze does not return to this claim.

60. According to Deleuze, cinema has been an ambiguous ally in revealing this. In early cinema, time was represented primitively, by the movement of otherwise static objects, thus misconceiving movement as 'snapshots of reality' separated by intervals within which movement is restored by means of an external mechanism. But in later works, new techniques depict flows of time and 'blocks' of movement-images, suggesting to viewers the 'powers of thought'. (See Douglass, 'Delouze's Bergson,' 381-82 and Rodowick, Deleuze's Time Machine, 18-38)

61. Bergson, Mind-Energy, 165; see also 157.


63. Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 56-7.

64. Deleuze's account of the ontology of the pure past is controversial. Bergson does not deal with the past in terms of ontology in early texts such as Time and Free Will (where his main concern is psychology), but only in such later works as Matter and Memory.


66. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 413.

67. Bergson's detailed studies of aphasia and amnesia are meant to support this claim. According to Deleuze's interpretation, 'illness never abolishes the recollection-image as such, but merely impairs a particular aspect of its actualization.' (B, 70)

68. See also B, 54.

69. Recent neurobiology might provide workable alternatives to such an assumption. An example is Gerald Edelman's theory of memory as a 'cartography' of time and recollections that maps out relations between regions of the past and the passing present for a point of view on their division. (See The Remembered Present [New York: Basic Books, 1989].) I mean just to provide a workable reading of Deleuze's position, and not to survey the range of alternatives.

71. Colwell, 'Deleuze and the Prepersonal,' 19.
72. Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 56; see also *DR*, 85.
73. See *MM*, 214, 237-8 for a discussion of their relationship.
75. Deleuze, 'La conception de la différence,' 101.
76. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 81-2, 161-2, 163, 693.
77. Ibid., 163.
78. Deleuze's later reports of Bergson's model are little different; see for example *DR*, 80ff.
80. Boundas, 'Ontology of the Virtual,' 93.
81. For an account of the 'blending' of past and present, see Kolakowski, *Bergson*, 42-3.
82. Deleuze, 'La conception de la différence,' 107.
83. See also *MM*, 220.
85. Douglass, 'Deleuze's Bergson,' 370.
86. Deleuze's reference to a 'circuit' comes from Bergson's account of the relationship between an object perceived and a physical response that affects the object. Bergson writes that 'we maintain ... that reflective perception is a circuit, in which all the elements, including the perceived object itself, hold each other in a state of mutual tension as in an electric circuit, so that no disturbance starting from the object can stop on its way and remain in the depths of the mind: it must always find its way back to the object from where it proceeds' (*MM*, 104). In place of his more usual term—'composite'—Deleuze sometimes represents the two lines, when interacting, as a 'mixture'. He claims that 'things, products, results are always mixtures' ('La conception de la différence,' 84).
88. Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 112.
91. For a discussion of this point in terms of Deleuze's broader project, see Goodchild, *Question of Philosophy*, 117.
92. See also Deleuze, 'La conception de la différence,' 89.
93. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 3 and *CM*, 149. For Bergson, such a conception of the subject 'has no reality' and is merely a symbol of the artificiality of placing mental states side-by-side, contrary to their intuitable continuity (*Creative Evolution*, 4).
94. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 5; Rodowick, *Deleuze's Time Machine*, 150. Deleuze writes that 'in the life of the psyche there is always otherness without there ever being number or several ('La conception de la différence,' 88).
95. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 7. According to Deleuze, Bergson's vision of the living being as an open whole situated amongst and interacting with other open wholes is revolutionary precisely because it focuses upon relative movement between wholes rather than relative stability (*CT*, 9-10).
96. Thus Boundas holds that Deleuze's conception of mental states proceeds according to the formula, 'multiplicity=movement=becoming=difference' ('Ontology of the Virtual,' 82).
97. See for example *MM*, 133ff, *Creative Evolution*, 1 and *TFW*, 135, 165, 166, 167, 180, respectively.
98. For Bergson's discussion of the associationist fault in the employment of atomism, see *MM*, 163, 241. Regarding the need to perceive change in its natural indivisibility, see *CM*, 156.
Chapter 3: Repetition, Difference, and the Becoming of the Subject

1. Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 34.
2. See Boundas, 'Ontology of the Virtual,' 100.
5. There are exceptions. See for example Rodowick's use of arguments from later texts to fill out his account of Deleuze's theory of cinema (*Deleuze's Time Machine*) and Bogue's account of continuities with the historical works in discussions of *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense* (Deleuze and Guattari).
6. Deleuze, 'La conception de la différence,' 80-1.
7. Ibid., 82.
9. Deleuze, *What is Philosophy?*, 156. See also Goodchild, *Question of Philosophy*, 48-9. Deleuze uses such a case to exemplify how one might 'grasp' difference (*DR*, 28-9). In *A Thousand Plateaus*, 'event' is replaced by 'incorporeal transformation' to differentiate Deleuze's and Guattari's position from other philosophies of the event.
16. In *The Fold*, Deleuze writes that 'relations are types of events' and 'events in their turn are types of relations; they are relations to existence and to time' (52).
17. Deleuze explicitly aligns the terms 'thinker' and 'individual' at *DR*, 253: 'The thinker is the individual [Car le penseur est l'individu même].'
19. Deleuze refers to this issue in his study of Spinoza's conception of consciousness. See *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, 21.
22. See *DR*, 152.
23. May, 'Politics of Life,' 27.
24. For a fine discussion of the metaphysics of Individuation and its implications for conceptions of the already-constituted individual, see Simondon, 'Genesis of the Individual,' especially 297-300.
28. Deleuze, 'Philosophical Concept,' 112. See also *LS*, 344.
29. Constantin Boundas gives an account of the relationship between individuals and singularities in terms of 'connection' in 'Serialization and Subject-Formation,' 106-7. He argues that individuals are constituted 'as they select and envelop a finite number of the singularities available to them.' But this suggests that the individual *does the selecting*, as though it has an existence apart from and prior to the process of selection, which is contrary to Deleuze's focus on the immanence and passivity of connections between singularities.
30. See NP, 39ff. Deleuze’s interpretation follows Klossowski’s reading of eternal return; see ‘Nietzsche’s Experience’ and Vicious Circle.

31. Magnus, ‘Nietzsche’s Philosophy in 1888,’ 81-2; Staten, Nietzsche’s Voice, 24, 26; Winchester, Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Turn, 76; Roth, Knowing and History, 199.


33. Deleuze pays scant attention to another empirical conception of eternal return: as consequent to a finite quantity of matter within an infinity of time. For a discussion, see Magnus, Nietzsche’s Existential Imperative, 218.

34. See also DR 67, 241-2 and 299.

35. See also Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 47-8.

36. Stambaugh, Nietzsche’s Thought, 31-2. There is an abundance of other textual support for Deleuze’s position; see Leigh, ‘Eternal Return,’ 216.

37. For a partial list and discussion of references where Nietzsche emphasizes becoming, see Bell, ‘Philosophizing the Double-Bind,’ 374.


39. For a discussion of this aspect of Nietzsche’s texts, see Nehamas, Life as Literature, 183-4 and Ackermann, Nietzsche, 162-3.

40. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 293. In a statement suggesting the dynamics of both Deleuze’s Humean imagination and Bergsonian lines of development, Martin Joughin writes that becoming must be understood as ‘a free play of lines or flows whose intersections define unstable points of transitory identity’ such that becoming is ‘intrinsically transformative, creative, and marginal’, incorporating and producing multiple states from multiple events (N, 186n8).

41. As Braidotti puts it, Deleuze, ‘defines the process of becoming as the encounter of éccélités, single individualities that share certain attributes and can merge with each other because of them’ (‘Bugs and Women,’ 129-30). Goodchild provides an excellent characterization of these qualities; see Question of Philosophy, 93-4.

42. Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 158.

43. This gives an unintended sense to Alexander Nehamas’s claim that ‘the eternal recurrence is not a theory of the world but a view of the self’ (Life as Literature, 150).

44. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 336-7 (A 354), 339 (A 348).


46. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, viii-ix. In the English translation, ‘moi’ has been rendered as ‘ego’. For the sake of consistency, and to better reflect Deleuze’s meaning, I have changed the translation to ‘self’, although the capitalization of the original is preserved.

47. Kant, What Real Progress has Metaphysics made?, 73.

48. See also Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy, 31-2.

49. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, viii.

50. Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 31; see also DR, 65.


52. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, ix.

53. Ibid., ix, 41.

54. Goodchild, Question of Philosophy, 49-50 presents the first synthesis in these terms.

55. See Goodchild, Question of Philosophy, 50.

56. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 292.

57. Note that this contrast between Deleuze’s position and Kant’s is somewhat problematic. Deleuze is not specific about how we might distinguish Kant’s conception of time from eternal return, and the difference between them is only clear on a reading of Difference and Repetition.
informed by later texts. As Bogue points out, Deleuze's quasi-Nietzschean definition of time in Kant's *Critical Philosophy* could well be a definition of eternal return: 'the form of that which is not eternal, the immutable form of change and movement' (*Deleuze and Guattari*, 132).

58. Boundas, 'Ontology of the Virtual,' 101. In place of my insertion he uses the word 'differentiation' to refer to his earlier discussion of processes which are the subject of his article.


60. Leigh, 'Eternal Return,' 217.

61. Salanskis, 'Idea and Destination,' 65.


64. Frank, *What is Neostucturalism?*, 377.

65. See *LS*, 93.


67. Ibid., 311.


69. Deleuze finds a similar affiliation between internal and external differences in the Stoic conception of events. On his reading, the Stoics conceived of the event as invoking a 'double causality', a mixture of bodies and external differences on the one hand, classified as cause, and, on the other, events and internal differences which are the quasi-causes of the event (*LS*, 94).

70. See also Simondon, 'Genesis of the Individual,' 301.

71. Ibid., 302.

72. Ibid., 305.

73. Deleuze cites Klossowski's studies of the dissolution of traditional conceptions of Self as especially valuable; see *LS*, 178, 283.

74. Lingis, 'Will to Power,' 51.

75. In 'Nomad Thought', Deleuze provides an alternative conception of such forces, characterizing them as 'instruments of codification'.

76. Deleuze, 'Nomad Thought,' 148.

77. Deleuze gives a detailed listing of the attributes of dogmatic images of thought at *DR*, 167.


80. Ibid. See also *LS*, 113.


82. Deleuze, *Foucault*, 105.

83. Ibid., 92.

84. The Spinozist line to Deleuze's theory, which is distinct in its essence from the other influences, will not be pursued here. For a fine outline, see Macherey, 'Encounter with Spinoza,' 152-6.

85. Deleuze, *Foucault*, 95.


87. Foucault, *Counter-Memory*, 183; Deleuze, *Foucault*, 91, 130-1.


89. Ansell-Pearson, 'Living for the Event,' 25.

90. Deleuze, 'Immanence,' 5-6.
91. Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 159.

92. See also Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 54. Note that Deleuze's Spinozist use of the term 'expression' means that life ought to be lived creatively.

93. See LS, 178.

94. See for example Deleuze, *Foucault*, 101.

95. See Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 11.

96. For a discussion with respect to the 'truth' of images, see Patton, Introduction to *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, 14.

97. See also Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 159-60.

98. Deleuze, *Foucault*, 87, 117; see also NP, 25-30; LS, 59-60, 180; DR, 198.


100. Deleuze, 'Nomad Thought,' 144.


102. For a good account of the depths and intricacies of Deleuze's dice-throw analogy, see Olkowski, 'Nietzsche's Dice Throw;' 126ff. See also my *Defence of Deleuze's Interpretation*, 40ff.

103. For a more detailed account and critique of Deleuze's use of eternal return as an ethical device, see my *Defence of Deleuze's Interpretation*. See also Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari*; Goodchild, *Deleuze and Guattari*, Leigh, 'Eternal Return'; Olkowski, 'Nietzsche-Deleuze', 'Nietzsche's Dice Throw.'

104. For a discussion, see Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari*, 31.


107. Deleuze's meaning in this section is lost in the English translation of LS, where 'on' is translated as 'they' rather than as 'one'.


112. Deleuze, 'Nomad Thought,' 145.

113. See C2, 133.

114. For a discussion of time as scission, see Canning, 'Crack of Time,' 81.


**Conclusion**

1. Lecercle, 'Looking-Glass,' 88; Frank, *What is Neostructuralism?,* 347.

2. Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 29. Although I present Deleuze's theory of difference as distinct from the philosophy of desire, Goodchild finds a continuity between them predicated upon sexual desire as a paradigm case (*Deleuze and Guattari*, 41).


5. Deleuze acknowledges these two relatively distinct stages in his work, along with a later one focusing on aesthetics (*N,* 135).
8. For a description of the relationship between concept and plane further to that advanced in Chapter 3, see MacKenzie, 'Creativity as Criticism', 6; May, 'Difference and Unity,' 36.
10. Gordon uses the phrase 'theory of everything' to invoke the possibilities entailed by a de-transcendentalized philosophy and non-hierarchical discourse ('Subtracting Machine,' 33).
11. For example, Deleuze, 'Immanence,' 3; Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 48.
12. Deleuze, 'Immanence,' 3.
13. Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 36. Like many of Deleuze's concepts, his definition of 'the plane of immanence' and its variants shift subtly between texts. Compare the account in *What is Philosophy?*, where it is characterized at one point as the unthought image of thought, with those in *Cinema 1* and 'Immanence.'
15. Deleuze, 'Immanence,' 5.
16. On this latter point, see Deleuze, 'Immanence,' 5 and Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 45, 47-8.
17. Deleuze, 'Immanence,' 5.
18. See also Ansell-Pearson, *Virulent Life*, 46.
20. Similar claims are made by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus*, 85.
21. Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 42. See also Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, 482.
22. For a discussion of Deleuze's study of kinds in terms of anthropomorphism, see Massumi, 'Autonomy of Affect,' 231.
26. Hardt writes that Deleuze 'operates on the highest planes of ontological speculation.' In respect of the later works, I do not read this as a compliment (*Gilles Deleuze*, xiii).
27. See Canning, 'Crack of Time,' 87.
32. Deleuze, 'Philosophical Concept,' 95.
34. Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*, 134.
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The presentation of this thesis follows guidelines in *The Chicago Manual of Style*. 13th ed. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982. Periods are placed according to the 'British style', except where the use of abbreviations makes this unworkable.


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