Chan, Winnie M. F. and Simester, A. P. (2011) Four functions of mens rea. The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol.70 (No.2). pp. 381-396. doi:10.1017/S0008197311000547

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Abstract

Everyone agrees that mens rea is relevant to fault. The maxim actus non fit reus nisi mens sit rea has been around for centuries.1 According to foundational principles of the criminal law, it is normally not enough to support a conviction that D perpetrates the actus reus. Neither should it be. Causing harm to another person may be unfortunate, but the moral turpitude associated with a criminal conviction requires some element of fault. And to show that, we need mens rea.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	K Law [Moys] > KM Common Law, Public Law
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Criminal intent, Guilt (Law)
Journal or Publication Title:	The Cambridge Law Journal
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
ISSN:	0008-1973
Official Date:	July 2011
Dates:	Date Event July 2011 Published
Date of first compliant deposit:	1 August 2016
Volume:	Vol.70
Number:	No.2
Page Range:	pp. 381-396
DOI:	10.1017/S0008197311000547
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Funder:	Singapore. Ministry of Education
Grant number:	R241000045112 (MoE)

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