A FOUCALDIAN COUNTER-HISTORY OF MANAGEMENT

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Submitted for the Qualification of PhD
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May 1999
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CHAPTER SUMMARIES

PART ONE: OBJECTIVE; OBJECT; METHOD

Part one defines this thesis’s research questions: how has Management come to be such a powerful but unquestioned presence in Western life?; and, why does so much ‘new’ Management knowledge appear to be similar to earlier Management thinking? It outlines the object under investigation and determines the method by which these questions may best be investigated.

1. INTRODUCTION
This work investigates two seemingly unrelated phenomena. First, Management has come to cast great influence across life in the 20th century, with most aspects of knowledge and being now seen as subject to Management principles, principles regarded as universal. This appears to be normal or regular, and largely goes without comment. Second, so much espoused as new in Management may be seen to be a re-iteration of similar principles. This work argues that these phenomena can both be accounted for by the same reason: Management’s co-dependent relationship with the 20th century’s dominant, but specific, world-view - ‘Modernism’. This chapter defines this study’s focus, outlines ‘Management’ and introduces the counter-historical approach of Michel Foucault as the method best suited to carrying out this investigation.

2. FOUCAULT
Foucault’s aim was to write counter-histories that exposed the way in which subjects develop grand-origins and histories to make their present singular conceptions appear more solid, universal and objective. This undermining of an established history enabled assumptions to be re-framed and, consequently, ‘thinking differently’. While his methods changed throughout his studies, Foucault’s penultimate book, The Use of Pleasure, demonstrated how his different approaches could be seen to inform one another. Using this work and the interpretations of Dreyfus, Rabinow and Deleuze as guides, a method that draws on Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical approaches is described. A method that outlines different world-views (epistemes) as a means of isolating and analysing the forms and statements that constitute Management, before examining how the formation of these forms creates a web of power that shields privileged ways of seeing and speaking from conceptions that might question their universal and objective status.

iv
PART TWO: GRID

In Part Two a normative tableau is developed. Three different episteme are presented as a framework against which the specificity of Management's forms, formation and subsequent ways of 'seeing and speaking' can be analysed in Part Three.

3. THE ANCIENT GREEK EPISTEME
The Ancient Greeks saw wisdom as metis: the ability to incorporate many orders, forms and dimensions and apply them in one's own fashion on a pragmatic basis. It is based on the following assumptions: that the world is composed of a kosmos and an irreducible chaos; that the world may be seen as a macrocosm of one's self and that all beings' movements are shaped by their particular telos; that access to knowledge comes through one's interpretation of similitude; that history and time would change while its elements often 'spiralled' back; that there will always be many schools of thought; and that human behaviour or ethical decisions will be steered by custom, convention and the particular telos of the individuals concerned.

4. MODERNISM
Modernism sees intelligence as the furthering of certainty and control, via a general method, toward objectively measurable universal ends. It is based on the belief that firm foundations for knowledge can be found by looking beneath secondary conventions to the universal dimensions of space; the analogy that the world and its components are directed and move as a clockwork mechanism; that knowledge comes from measuring and representing things objectively through the application of objective units; a view of time as universally linear, history as evolution and being as driven by the quest to be at the cutting-edge; that at this edge there should only be one central school of thought, and this is scientific; and, that human sciences will determine the correct or normal manner in which Man should act. This promotes looking at the world from a hierarchical-triangular perspective, as an observer from a detached, objective, central perch, upon particular subjects against universal measures and aims. The universal aims that Modernism has come to speak in terms of include Humanism, the new, capital gains and, since the turn of the 20th century, performative efficiency.

5. POSTMODERNISM
Postmodernism advocates the 'faulty' logic or eclectic mix of ideas from whence, it argues, difference may flourish. It is based upon the dissolution of the unitary foundation-space and essentialism of Modernism and a return to 'secondary' surfaces; seeing the world as a rhizome; discovery as nomadology and eclecticism; history and time as more than linear and progressive; Modern science as being just one 'language game'; and, the death of Man and return to particular conventions, journeys and ends. Its style is not the expert's homology, as in Modernism, but the inventor's paralogy. For this way of thinking to work, Postmodernism requires the recovery of Ancient or un-Modern forms so as to relativise Modernism.
PART THREE: ANALYSIS

Part Three examines the way that Management's history encourages the privileging of certain forms and 'visibilities'. These aspects, which are widely regarded as universal, are shown to be specifically Modernist. However, their privilege is maintained by a web of links or formation of institutions that discourages their being questioned. Management is thus a particularly influential subject within Modernism. However, it is limited by appearing unable to speak or see in any manner other than Modernist.

6. SERMON - THE HISTORY OF MANAGEMENT
Management's history claims that Management principles are universal but only since the application of a scientific approach has Man begun to fully understand them. This view is made regular by a tight knit, but not obvious, web of different fora that repeat the same message. However, it is demonstrated that this is based on the prevailing beliefs of Management historians in the 1950s and 1960s. They identified the origins of their present in the work of engineers who they saw as the first to begin uncovering Management's basic good: 'efficiency'. However, this discovery can be shown to be due to subjective beliefs and politically contingent expedients encouraged by problems bought to the fore by Modernism. As Management sought more academic credibility, a more ancient heritage was sought. But the past was looked at only in terms of the Modern principles that historians had determined as their object. Thus, Management sees nothing of the past apart from that which further strengthens the belief in the universality of prevailing Modern beliefs. The 'sermon of development' promoted by Management's history is a singular view that maps neatly onto the beliefs of Modernism.

7. PULPIT - THE SHAPE OF THE BUSINESS SCHOOL
Doubling the formation of Management's historical sermon is the simultaneous emergence of a pulpit: the Business School. In the 1950s and 1960s the professionalisation of Management saw the development of complementary associations concerned with the subject and a particular form of Business School come to be regarded as belonging at universities. A large contributing factor to these schools being taken seriously was the establishment of a standard curriculum that located Management's place on the 'Tree of Knowledge'. This curricula promoted a way of seeing re-iterating that of the history of Management, by drawing from psychology, sociology and, in particular, economics. As the histories of these subjects are wholly Modern, these connections further reinforce the acceptance of the forms that are taken as contributing to Management. This Business School, a singularly American institution, is entrenched as it is identified as a 'best practice' model for the rest of the world.

8. PROPHESIES - MANAGEMENT'S VISIBLE FUTURES
Management's formation is doubled again by the nature of what is seen by the Business School gaze. In the 1960s and 1970s the view emerged that organisations were more like organisms than machines. However, informed as it is by Modernism, Management's conception of the organism was highly mechanised. In the 1980s, culture was seen to be the answer to organisational problems but only as it was linked to efficiency and viewed in a positivistic and unitary manner. In the 1990s, Management developed a Postmodern approach that was, unlike other fields' conceptions, strangely Modernist. Management, tightly bound by its singularly Modern historical conception of itself, lacks the ability to access other forms that might enable it to relativise this singular view and say anything substantially different.
PART FOUR: DISCUSSION

Reformulating the historical view of Management may enable it to see differently. Part Four investigates how this might be done and flags up the implications of doing so for Western society in general.

9. THINKING OTHERWISE: RE-FRAMING HISTORY, RE-VIEWING MANAGEMENT

Having identified Management's tight-knit Modernist history as limiting, one may begin to think differently by taking a wider historical view and connecting to un-Modern ways of seeing. Two aspects problematised in Management over the past decade are broached as examples: whether strategy is about 'top-down' design or 'bottom-up' emergence; and why business ethics seems to have little impact on decision making. With a broader historical conception of Management, the first problem, based on a triangular hierarchical view of organisation and the idea that one must represent the way things are without logical contradiction, would not be framed: strategy may be seen as both emergence and design. The second problem might be differently addressed by questioning the Modernist assumption that business ethics must be about the provision of general codes.

10. CONCLUSION

Management comes to have such a powerful yet unobtrusive presence in Modern times because its particular formation, its ways of seeing and speaking replicate Modernism's beliefs and are well suited to providing answers to Modernism's key problematisation: the determination of general non-personal ends toward which progress may be objectively measured and through which control may be maintained without recourse to subjective traditions. However, the other side of this productive capacity is that Management is so well cut to fit Modernism that its historical formation cannot incorporate anything other than Modern forms. This disables its ability to think differently which is why much of what is presented as new in Management appears similar to what it has said before. The similarity of their formations means that not only are Management's singular forms maintained and shielded by Modernism, but that Modernism's singular perspective is shielded and maintained by Management. Thus, re-framing the history of Management, apart from enabling Management to think differently, may go some way toward challenging Modernism's hold on our world. In light of this, areas for future research toward dimming the limiting influence of Management and Modernism's specific diagram are highlighted.
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PART ONE: OBJECTIVE, OBJECT, METHOD

In a very real sense, these papers constitute a history of management written by those who made that history. They present it with vision, with vitality and with an authority that is beyond challenge. Thus the principal directions in which management thought will develop in the foreseeable future have already been pointed out by the pioneer thinkers who provide the substance of this book.

Merrill, Classics in Management (1960 & 1970).

This has been a story about footprints, the individuals who left them, and the times in which these people lived. The past must not be buried but used as a foundation and guide for the footprints that will be made in the future. Within the practices of the past there are lessons of history for tomorrow; there is a flow of events and ideas that link yesterday, today and tomorrow in a continuous stream.


Management’s conception of its past gives it vision, vitality, foundation and authority. Management histories like to promote this effect. However, what they remain silent on is how this conception, the continuity between past, present and future that gives the field a sense of universality, represses alternative vistas.

This thesis may be best described as a ‘counter-history’. That is not to say that it develops a more truthful version of the events that have led to Management. Rather it attempts to unsettle the orthodox history of Management by putting forward an alternative view: that what is conceived as the ‘continuous stream that provides an authority beyond challenge’, is a particular and contingent view of a specific object that
was formed far more recently than Management histories would have us believe. It therefore stems Management thought for no fundamental reason.

In so doing, this work may often appear somewhat polemical. However, it should be recognised that such an approach is well suited to its aims, within the limitations of a thesis such as this. Its 'pole' is that Management's current 'stream' is so narrow, and its set of historical 'substance' so limited, that Management's 'foreseeable futures' are destined to continually repeat the same lines. Moreover, given the increasing diffusion of Management principles and the subsequent influence of these principles through their now being applied in evaluating performance in many different subjects, this limit effects more than that which we might directly associate with the realm of Management.

If Management is to say anything substantially different then its history must be re-thought. Re-thinking this history may also enable the diminution of the stifling effect that Management's narrow range of principles presently has on 'being' in Western society. Part One begins this argument by outlining the study's objectives and research questions, its object of inquiry and the method used toward these aims.
This work investigates two seemingly unrelated phenomena. First, Management has come to cast great influence across life in the 20th century, with most aspects of knowledge and being now seen as subject to Management principles, principles regarded as universal. This appears to be normal or regular, and largely goes without comment. Second, so much espoused as new in Management may be seen to be a re-iteration of similar principles. This work argues that these phenomena can both be accounted for by the same reason: Management's co-dependent relationship with the 20th century's dominant, but specific, worldview - 'Modernism'. This chapter defines this study's focus, outlines 'Management' and introduces the counter-historical approach of Michel Foucault as the method best suited to carrying out this investigation.

1. **INTRODUCTION**

**I. Objective**

The extent of this study's compass came into view as these two renditions of the same passage of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (XII, 1075a) were placed side by side:

For the efficiency of an army consists partly in the order and partly in the general; but chiefly in the latter, because he does not depend upon the order, but the order depends upon him.

We must consider also in which of the two ways the nature of the universe contains the good or the highest good, whether as something separate and by itself, or as the order of the parts. Probably in both ways, as an army does. For the good is found in the order and the leader, and more in the later; for he does not depend on the order but it depends on him.

The first is from the inside front cover *Functions of the Executive* by Chester Barnard (1938). The translation Barnard uses is H. Tredennick's, published in 1935 by Barnard's publisher: Harvard University Press. The second is Smith and Ross's Oxford translation from 1908.

Barnard is now regarded as having had "a more profound impact on the thinking about the complex subject matter of human organization than any other contributor to the
continuum of management thought” (George 1972: 140). Moreover, The Functions of the Executive, reproduced in 1968 to widespread acclaim, is considered “the most influential book in the entire field of management... since Taylor’s Scientific Management” (Koontz 1980: 51; Clutterbuck & Crainer 1990: 15).

Barnard’s reproduction of Aristotle may not seem so significant. It is not one of Barnard’s famous phrases or a key proposition. However, it tees up, frames and adds weight to the famous phrases to come. Barnard was not an authority on armies, but on the Management of organisations. The quotation, cast with the authority of Aristotle, serves to show how important leadership is to the Management of organisations of any sort. Aristotle’s words thus provide the effective condition within which Barnard’s view of Management is set, the criterion by which the leader or manager will have his worth bestowed. This is efficiency.

What strikes upon the juxtaposition of the two Aristotles at the head of this chapter is the lack of efficiency in the 1908 translation. Indeed, for anyone familiar with Ancient Greek (or the development of English), Barnard’s version immediately grates. The Greeks did not have a word to equate with efficiency as we read it now. How then does Aristotle come to begin Management’s most influential book in this way?

Barnard’s quotation starts part way into Aristotle’s passage, turning ‘For the efficiency...’ into the beginning of a sentence which it is neither in Treddenick or the original Greek (thus, we do not get the sense that Aristotle was using the relations of a general and an army as an analogy to describe how the world contains the highest good - or how the world is given form). However, the word efficiency is taken from Treddenick’s translation. How does it come to be there? How does the good, the greatest
good, or the ultimate cause of form (for it is in this sense that Aristotle is referring to ‘good’), come to be efficiency?

One might surmise that Tredennick transposed a meaning of efficiency much earlier than our own into this position. For Aristotle is, in a sense, writing of ‘the efficient cause’ of things in the manner that a pious Isaac Newton claimed concern in his physics only for what he called ‘efficient causes’ - those things that God’s design caused (Clark 1992). From the Latin *efficiens*, efficient, in the 17th and 18th centuries, was taken to be ‘the cause that makes effects to be what they are’. Perhaps efficient has been placed in this way, but this is not our century’s view of the word. Our understanding springs from a sense channeled in the last half of the 19th century, as efficiency was applied to machines by engineers and subsequently became a measure of a machine’s worth: ‘the ratio of useful work performed to the total energy expended or heat taken in’. In the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), the first application of this meaning as an analogy for human behaviour is attributed to Alfred Marshall in 1916. However, it was used a few years before this by manufacturing theorists with engineering backgrounds. Here it was taken to be the general measure of an organisation’s worth.

However, this thesis is not driven by an aim to uncover what Aristotle really meant, or by seeking to demonstrate that Smith & Ross’s earlier translation is more correct than Treddenick’s. Its objective is not to trace the evolution of the word efficiency or prove that Barnard wrongly appropriated Aristotle to his own ends.¹ Rather, what is of interest to this investigation is how this invocation of efficiency ‘comes to pass’, to seem natural, unobtrusive and regular in our century. This is not an account of how Management appropriates other ideas and fields, but of how Management’s language and

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¹ Barnard’s (1938: 60) personal definition of efficiency, “eliciting of sufficient individual wills to cooperate”, is quite different from the perception of efficiency that most moderns bring to interpreting his presentation of Aristotle.
its way of looking at the world has come to be so powerful as to inform other ideas and fields that one might consider removed from it.

When one reads the first page of Barnard's book, one is both interested and comforted by the fact that the wise Aristotle informs Management. However, when the translation from before what most authorities consider the origin of the discipline of Management (the publication of Taylor's *Scientific Management* in 1911) is placed against Barnard's, one may begin to wonder at how, in our age, Management seems to be guiding our translation of Aristotle? It may not be a conscious process, but Aristotle is attached to Management (and reinforces the prevailing conception of it) as he speaks the Modern language of Management, a language that did not exist when he spoke. How is it that by the middle of the 20th century, Management consciousness (or unconsciousness) informs Aristotle? Why does it seem natural that efficiency is, in Aristotle's day and ours, universally, self-evidently, the evaluative condition?

This is not just a Management matter. Management is now a necessary hub through which most of life must pass. Management education has been the fastest growing sector in Western higher education since 1940 (Locke 1988) and Management techniques are increasing employed to organise the provision of other academic disciplines. Civil government, health, sports, education - all must now be seen to be efficient or subject to good Management. Being has now become a Management problem. How does Management come to have such force, a force that is as pervasive as it seems unobtrusive?

While this is this thesis's scope, it was arrived at via a more particular focus. This project began as an investigation into why Management had difficulty recognising
Postmodernism in a manner that other fields such as architecture, philosophy and art history did? Management's view of Postmodernism seemed decidedly Modern. It was seen by Management as a revolutionary advance celebrating the new above the old, and was dismissive of other approaches that it saw as naive or 'less true' than it. Following this line of questioning led this research to broader concerns. A further question, which addressed the same phenomenon but in a more general way, arose: why does so much that is presented in Management as 'new' appear similar to what has gone before? Examining these questions led to an inquiry into Management’s unobtrusive social force as it became apparent that the answer to them had wider consequences. It would turn out that Management’s pervasiveness and why ideas presented in Management as new appear similar to what has gone before could both be accounted for by the same reasoning. A reasoning that will be better grasped after what this thesis takes Management to be and the method by which this reason was reached have been outlined.

II. Object

This study's object of inquiry is 'Management'. Given the wide-ranging nature of the usage of this term, it is pertinent to outline its contours with regard to this particular work. Firstly, Management here is limited to Western views and English language discourse (although it could be argued that what is espoused in this forum is seen as a 'global model'). Secondly, the focus is on the discourse of Management knowledge or Management’s way of seeing knowledge rather than the practice of Managers. While The Academy of Management is not the only society dedicated to the articulation and dissemination of this knowledge, it is regarded by most 'dealing in' Management knowledge to be the premier association of its type. Much about the nature of this study’s
object can be understood by looking at *The Academy's* formation as a microcosm of the contours of Management itself.

*The Academy* was formed in the late 1950s. Its stated purpose is “to foster the general advancement of research, learning, teaching, and practice in the management field... publish[ing] scholarly papers, conduct[ing] forums for the exchange of management knowledge, and provid[ing] services that enhance the science and practice of management”. While *The Academy* has a global reach and effects, it is based in the United States and dominated by US members (over 80 countries are represented, but 83% of the membership is US based). Figure 1, which shows an advertisement for *The Academy's* web-site, depicts this global yet American nature.

A further key dimension of Management is its connection of ‘business’ and ‘universities’. Firstly, Management primarily means ‘Business Management’. This close association with business may be seen in the structure of *The Academy's* sub-divisions. Of the 22 of these (as at 1998), one is specially marked out to deal with the “Public and Nonprofit Sector” (or anything other than Business Management). However, at the same time, almost all of *The Academy's* Board of Governors, chairpersons of its sub-divisions and Editorial Boards of its journals are university academics. This indicates the legitimation granted Management knowledge by its association with universities, Western society's highest seats of learning. Management is thus a conjunction between two previously un-joined aspects of life: Business and Universities. This conjunction takes place in the form of the Business School.

In keeping with this, the nature of Management is shaped by its particular differentiation and connection of ‘practitioner’ and ‘academic’ constituencies. Management’s form in this regard can be further illustrated with reference to the way *The
**Figure 1**: The Global (but American) ‘Academy of Management’. Source: Advertisement for the Academy’s web site, from “The Academy of Management Review” (1998).
Academy's "Journal" has developed into three. According to their respective statements of purpose, the "Journal" now specialises in empirical investigations, often written in highly statistical language that make recommendations about "organizational practice and management technique". The Academy's "Review" publishes "scholarly" works that "advance the conceptual development of organizational and management theory". The Academy's "Executive" aims to be a "bridge", taking academic knowledge and communicating it in a suitable form for business managers, while also accepting articles from professional practitioners. Other Management journals are also arranged along this academic-practical continuum. The wider Management literature also ranges from more academic theorising to 'pop-Management' aimed at practicing managers, with the understanding that the theoretical-academic and empirical-practical inform one another.

The aim of The Academy's journals is to publish "articles in fields of interest to members of the Academy of Management [and] these fields of interest are reflected in [its] divisions and interest groups". Eleven of these fields are aspects of the object Management and named accordingly (e.g., International Management, Social Issues in Management). However, almost all of the remainder relate to aspects of organisation or organisational issues (e.g., Organization Development and Change, Organizational Behaviour). This highlights that the field we are seeking to map here relates to the Management of, or Management within, organisations. Hence, how the subject of Management sees the object 'organisation' greatly informs its formation.

In sum, the configuration of 'Management', in this particular study, refers to discourse relating to Management's archive of knowledge and its manner of looking to

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2 The "Journal", at the academic end with the "Review", relates to peers such as the Administrative Science Quarterly, the Journal of Applied Psychology and the Journal of Applied Behavioral Science (Beyer 1997). The "Executive" seeks the same bridge to 'enlightened practitioner' as the Harvard Business Review, the Sloan Management Review or Business Horizons.
build this archive. Management centres around the Management of business although its influence may spread wider than business itself (this is beginning to manifest itself in *The Academy* as one of the most recent sub-divisions, Health Care Management, illustrates). Management is simultaneously associated with universities and business via its placement within business schools. Management means the management of organisations. Management is an institution centred around The United States of America, although its regard, and most would say influence, is increasingly global.

**III. Method**

The objective of this thesis is to investigate two questions: how does Management come to have such force, a power that means that so much of life must be approved by its gaze, a potent and unobtrusive or natural presence?; and, why does so much that is presented in Management as new seem remarkably similar to what has gone before? What does one assume in asking questions such as these? And, consequently, how might one investigate them?

Firstly, these are questions of how what counts as *knowledge* in a particular domain is produced; the *power* that maintains, supports and diffuses this knowledge into other areas; and the *institutions*, both 'material' (e.g., the Business School) and not just material (e.g., the assumed history of Management) that uphold and give expression to it.

Secondly, these questions assume that Management is a pervasive force, but they do not assume the existence of a fundamental management object. Hence the objective here is to question the current orthodoxy, but it is *not hermeneutic* in the sense that it does not seek to recover the essence of management or knowledge in general. At the same time, this line of questioning acknowledges the structural influences of history, but it is
not structuralist in the sense that it embraces an existential ability to influence the direction of thought by being critical of current orthodoxies. Hence, these questions have a critical dimension, not so much in the sense of bringing the power/knowledge/institutions of Management down, but in that they are concerned with how the contingent institution of Management stifles alternative conceptions.

Thirdly, these are historical questions, but not in the sense of a conventional history that charts the progression of a particular concept from its origins to its present, more advanced state, but in that they consider the way in which conceptions have changed over time without there being any fundamental essence underpinning them.

Fourthly, they are questions that investigate how a particular network of knowledge/power/institutions can diffuse over time to influence whole cultures. Thus, they require an investigation that cuts across many epochs and traditional disciplines.

Finally, these questions are asked not with recourse to the activity of managers or academics, but to the discourse of Management contained in texts. The assumption is that the 'play of meaning' in texts is representative of Management and, conversely, that this play has an impact upon the practice of Management. In light of this line of questioning, this study employs the works of Michel Foucault. In presenting the case for employing Foucault the alternatives are firstly reviewed.

The quotations that began this chapter might make Alasdair Maclntyre's work immediately appear relevant. Maclntyre’s (1981; 1988; 1991) broad ranging histories are concerned with the developments that have shaped Western moral beliefs. He is best known for advancing the thesis that all rationality must be historically constructed and based on traditional practice, and that the Enlightenment project of developing an
objective and universal ethical code has left us with no recourse with morality - despite our language presupposing this recourse. MacIntyre’s solution is a return to a ‘true’ Aristotelian ethics. While MacIntyre’s approach would likely uncover much of interest in a project such as this, his nostalgic bias toward essential old-world views; his being, apart from his anti-progressive stance, a more or less conventional historian; his subsequent taking of texts largely as read; and his concern with morality and philosophy above social institutions, make his work less than consummate.

Were this thesis to focus solely on the play of meaning within and between texts, then the work of Jacques Derrida would provide an excellent focal point. Derrida (1976: 158) believes that there is nothing fundamental that provides meaning in our world and “nothing outside the text”. Meaning comes only from the relativity of words at play in texts, and this is a play that embroils us and is beyond our control (Derrida 1981: 41). Derrida sees these relationships as historical rather than essential. However, rather than a critique that seeks to ‘bring down’ a particular way of thinking, his strategy consists of working ‘within’ a metaphysics or set of traditional beliefs, finding its weak points (its inconsistency where consistency is promoted; its historical rather than fundamental privileging of terms), and then attempting to widen the breaches thus uncovered. Consequently, Derrida recognises no evolutionary direction to history or any utopic state that we may recover from the past. Despite our beliefs to the contrary, meaning unfolds in a process of dissemination as words and texts cut across, inform and ‘build upon’ one another. Claiming that “A text always has several epochs and reading must resign itself to this fact”, Derrida (1976: 102) seeks to trace a path among textual strata in order to stir up and expose forgotten and dormant sediments of meaning that have accumulated and settled into the fabric of the text.
Derrida’s critical focus on texts and disbelief in fundamentals appear to make him a more useful source of method for the achievement of this work’s objectives than MacIntyre. However, while Derrida emphasises the role of power in maintaining what we privilege as knowledge, he does not analyse power per se or employ a particular theory of it. In addition, his focus on philosophical thought and texts rather than on institutions in the ‘real world’, and the lack of a strong historical dimension to his critique (while Derrida recognises text-meaning as historically stratified, he is more interested in exposing instances of this fact rather than examining how they came to be), prevent Derrida’s mode of inquiry from being ideal in this instance.

By contrast the work of Edward Said would maintain the emphasis on text analysis while establishing a closer contact with knowledge and its institutions. Said (1976: 41) is concerned with the power that texts convey or have over us, but deplores the position that elevates textuality to a privileged place in the production of meaning, claiming that it is “not only naive, it is worldly-blind”. For Said (1983: 35), texts are “in the world, and hence worldly”. The analysis of a text is thus important, not in and of itself, but because it offers us a way to engage with the world.

This brings us to a crucial difference between Said and Derrida. Said claims that the great failing of modern critics is their uprooting of their critical work from the historical or cultural realities that shape it - they achieved methodological independence, but by forfeiting an active situation in the world. According to Bove (1992), Said’s differentiation stems from a desire born of his immediate worldly work of the 1970s - to encourage the Palestinian resistance by exposing the workings of ‘Orientalism’. This required a critical-political discourse that made more of both the intellectual’s engagement on the side of the repressed and the nature and availability of resistance.
Criticism, for Said, is consequently a political act in the service of a moral principle. In keeping with this, his work generally proceeds by revealing colonial or racist attitudes in canonical literary texts or, on a larger scale, engages whole cultural myths (e.g., the Western concept of ‘Orientalism’). His critical task is to challenge dominant value systems, to provide a politics of textual and socio-political “decolonization”. It is about “struggles for definition, attempts at overcoming” (Harari 1979: 47). It is “oppositional” and its “goals are non-coercive knowledge produced in the interests of human freedom... a fundamental human and intellectual obligation” (Said 1983: 30).

The strengths and weaknesses of Said’s approach with respect to the aims of this thesis are likely already apparent. Said is more concerned with text analysis than MacIntyre, while his clear linking of text and world gives his studies a more institutional and historical dimension than those of Derrida. However, Said’s utopian view of fundamental human obligations and moral principles that the critic must work in the name of, and his presupposition of a hegemonic ‘colonial’ opposition that is more obvious, and less insidious or beguiling than the object of this inquiry, count against his work being used as the method of inquiry here.

A more detached, apolitical or general view of the self-sustaining ability of networks of knowledge, power and institutions may be found in Meyer’s (1977) and Powell and DiMaggio’s “neo-institutionalism” (1983; 1991). This argues that institutions emerge in self-reinforcing clusters as isomorphic responses to and reflections of structures and beliefs held in the culture in which they reside. Had this view developed more of an emphasis on how particular practices come to shape entire cultures, as opposed to just how particular institutions are the result of a culture, and an emphasis on ‘non-material’ institutions like histories as much as what are traditionally seen as
organisational institutions, then this approach may have proved as fruitful as following Foucault. Indeed, Meyer, Powell and DiMaggio’s more structured approach is used to mark out Chapter 7’s examination of the formation of the Business School among a cluster of Management corporations that sprang up simultaneously in the 1950s and 1960s. However, perhaps the aspect that counts most against using neo-institutionalism here is its tendency to a structuralist perspective that appears to encourage the idea that institutions are bound to be a reflection of the structures about them and downplay the influence of particular individuals. This thesis wishes to emphasise that Management could have, and can be, different.

While the work of Foucault shares much with those outlined above, there are crucial differences. Like MacIntyre, Foucault had an affinity for employing other systems of thought to relativise current thinking, but he was not overtly nostalgic. Like the neo-institutionalists, Foucault saw contingencies as shaping institutions more than any rational grasp of the true nature of things. However, he would also use particular practices toward making more general comments regarding society, pay particular interest to the influence of how a power/knowledge/institution web thought its history, and be ultimately concerned to actively show how things could be ‘thought differently’.

Like Derrida, Foucault did not recognise a centralising force that ‘grounds’ knowledge, or fundamental, timeless meanings - for both, truth is shaped by specific views and by systems of micro-power that maintain them and limit alternative conceptions. In this respect, both Foucault and Derrida regarded texts as a kind of theatrical space within which these power-plays take place. However, Foucault’s work has a considerably ‘thicker’ historical dimension to it (indeed, the idea that the institution
of knowledge does not relate to universal conditions - that every such configuration is historical and particular - is threaded through all of Foucault's work). It is with regard to these historical configurations that Foucault advanced his attempts to understand the dynamics of power in the formation of knowledge.

As Said (1983) notes in his comparison of Derrida and Foucault, Derrida's theory of textuality brings criticism to bear on a signifier freed from any obligation to anything signified, whereas Foucault's theories move criticism from a consideration of the signifier to a description of the signifier's place, a place rarely innocent, dimensionless or without the affirmative authority of discursive discipline. Foucault also believed in the individual's ability to change thought and thus shape practices. Thus, Foucault (1972: 602) focussed on texts because this was where the multiplicity of power-forces that shape societies can be seen and shown, as the first step toward practical reconfigurations. He consequently denounces Derrida's textual isolationism as "trifling". Whereas Derrida regards language as all-encompassing, Foucault finds that power occurs prior to language or knowledge, both producing and repressing it. Relations of power to knowledge thus became the aim of Foucault's critiques.

It is this view of power that primarily distinguished Foucault from Said. Whereas Said criticised Derrida's focus on texts, he criticised Foucault's over-emphasis on power. Said (1983: 245) writes that: "The problem is that Foucault's use of the term pouvoir moves around too much, swallowing up every obstacle in its path (resistances to it, the class and economic bases that refresh and fuel it, the reserves it builds up)". This obviously vexes Said, as Foucault's assertion that power is 'always-already' everywhere leaves little room for the generally active adversarial critic. Hence, Said's typical charge against Foucault (as well as Derrida) is "political quietism". However, Foucault's
“provisional but powerful amoralism” (Robbins 1992: 61) is a necessary step in his analysis for two reasons: firstly, because any ‘side’ is just as capable of becoming an orthodoxy and marginalising other alternatives; secondly, because his theory of power led him to believe that general opposition ‘against the power’ would only enable the power to organise itself against that position and hence become stronger. Hence Foucault sought:

not to arrive at a priori moral or intellectual judgments on the features of our society produced by such forms of power, but to render possible an analysis of production itself [and] this scrutiny of power in terms of knowledge and knowledge in terms of power becomes all the more radical... through its rigorous insistence on this particular brand of neutrality (Gordon, in Foucault 1980: 237).

Foucault would thus be vehemently opposed to Said’s belief in universal moral principles, and a ‘general best way of being’ was seen by Foucault as the sort of nostalgic hermeneutics that he wanted to get beyond, particularly in his later works.

However, Foucault did not let this limitation preclude him from finding particular positions to critique the hegemony of particular orthodoxies. Indeed, at the level of the particular case, Foucault’s works are so compelling that even Said (1983: 224) admits that “in his concrete presentation of the local situation in which... power and knowledge are deployed, Foucault has no peer”. It is Foucault’s failure to take a general political stance, other than seeking to undermine particular orthodoxies, and then see where this might lead him without first determining a general moral stance, that Said finds problematic. However, it is this and the other qualities described above that makes a Foucauldian method the most appropriate means of investigating this study’s object.

This Foucauldian approach is outlined in more detail in the following chapter. This thesis will then draw upon these to shed light upon why so much that is presented in
Management as new appears similar to what has gone before, and why Management has come to be such a powerful but unobtrusive force. The reason that this thesis provides to account for these phenomena is reasonably simple: Management is sustained by the elements and networks of the 20th century’s dominant, but specific, mode of thought, hereafter called ‘Modernism’. Management has difficulty recognising anything other than Modern forms. It has only one style and that is ‘Modernist’.

Consequently, most of what is presented in Management as ‘new’ is remarkably similar to what has gone before because it is all Modernist. Indeed, conceptions of Management are so tightly Modernist that it is almost impossible to recognise other un-Modern configurations of organisation or management as such (hence, Management has difficulty recognising Postmodernism in the way that other fields do because their recognition relies upon an eclecticism that can draw from a myriad of historical styles). Moreover, Management comes to have such a potent and regular force because it suits prevailing Modernist ways so well. In fact, one could say that it is the Modernist worldview that has enabled Management’s configuration. Management has formed in response to the Modernism’s key problematisation: the need for objective non-personal ‘ends’ by which progress can be generally measured and though which society may be controlled without outwardly impinging on the liberty of individuals - ends like efficiency. This has enabled Management to be considered a science, or at least on its way to becoming a science. In return, Management supports the continuation of Modernism’s dominance. Hence, Management easily spreads far and wide in our consciousness: from business to pleasure to academe, and even into the translation of ancient texts. It fits and it suits.

Having prefigured this work’s conclusions, it is important to point out its limitations. In order to delineate the contours of this thesis’s object, certain liberties have
been taken. The wording of the previous sentence has been chosen carefully so as to indicate that this study has stopped short of 'defining' its object, as might be the norm for a work such as this. This is due to the belief that tying down what management 'is' at the outset would defeat the purpose of a work that argues that management could be thought differently. At the same time, as the use of Barnard at the outset of this thesis indicates, management is more a complex network of other concepts (e.g., 'administration', 'leadership', 'organisation') than Section II of this chapter may have indicated. Had a more open view of the outline of management been used, then the nature of the work that follows would likely have been quite different, perhaps focusing on the dynamic interplay of different forces and conceptions within management, and consequently being 'messier' than what is presented here. Indeed, the counter-history presented here, in taking Management to be a unitary object, is a more straightforward or 'arboreal' story than what might otherwise be the case (an irony that will become more obvious at this thesis folds toward its conclusions).

Given that this is a broad and exploratory study, it should be understood that working within these sorts of limits is a 'necessary evil'. However, recognising them here will enable many areas for future research to be easily identified in the concluding chapter of this work. Before this, the following chapters examine how the historical formation of Management and Modernism reinforce one another, and how this formation is specific and contingent and granted its privileged status for no objective reason. Therefore it need not be respected. And, once this has been recognised, they demonstrate how one may begin to think differently by countering a taken-for-granted history.
Foucault's aim was to write counter-histories that exposed the way in which subjects develop grand-origins and histories to make their present singular conceptions appear more solid, universal and objective. This undermining of an established history enabled assumptions to be re-framed and, consequently, 'thinking differently'. While his methods changed throughout his studies, Foucault's penultimate book, *The Use of Pleasure*, demonstrated how his different approaches could be seen to inform one another. Using this work and the interpretations of Dreyfus, Rabinow and Deleuze as guides, a method that draws on Foucault's archaeological and genealogical approaches is described. A method that outlines different world-views (epistemes) as a means of isolating and analysing the forms and statements that constitute Management, before examining how the formation of these forms creates a web of power that shields privileged ways of seeing and speaking from conceptions that might question their universal and objective status.

2. FOUCAULT

The object was to learn to what extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently.

Seven years after Foucault had begun his series on the history of sexuality with the publication of his introductory volume, the second volume had still not appeared. The problem was one of method. Unbeknown to Foucault, Volumes 2 and 3 of *The History of Sexuality* were to be the culmination of his work, followed as they were by his untimely death. It now seems apt that after the long pause to reconsider his approach, Foucault began Volume 2, *The Use of Pleasure*, with an overview of his work to that point, an expression of why the two volumes to come needed to indulge in a detour in order to achieve the original aims of the series, and, in the light of this, boldly state what he could now see as the telos of all his histories. This is described in the quotation above: "learning to what extent the effort to think one's own history can enable one to think differently". This may seem a simple enough objective, but Foucault (1985: 8) spent four decades thinking how he could work toward this within what he referred to as "the labyrinth one
enters when one sets out to trace the history of the games of truth”.

Foucault’s particular aim in *The History of Sexuality* was a history of “sexuality”, but not in the sense of tracing sexuality’s evolution by outlining its successive variations toward the pinnacle of our understanding of it in the present. Rather, it sought to counter the notion of such a history. Foucault wished to examine how the experience of sexuality came to exist and be self-sustaining through a correlation of fields of knowledge, constraining norms, and forms of subjectivity that now made us see ourselves as subject to sexuality. He wished to investigate how this web was so well-formed that it had made “sexuality”, a recent invention and “singular experience”, seem so “banal” or so normal that we assume that it refers to a constant universal object which, consequently, must have a history that stretches well beyond our own society’s culture.

In the introduction to *The Use of Pleasure*, Foucault explained that to write of “sexuality” as a singular rather than a constant experience in this way required tools capable of analysing the three major “axes” that constituted it: the formation of the sciences that refer to it; the systems of power that regulate its practice; and the forms within which individuals are able and obliged to recognise themselves as subjects in terms of “sexuality”. His earlier works could provide the methods that enabled him to tackle the first two axes. The third, however, required that Foucault take a step back. Part way into his study of sexuality, he realised that he could not achieve his aims without a critical history of the desiring subject. If he was to argue that sexuality was a singularly Modern experience, he now recognised that he needed some basis for saying so. He had to be able to point to the possibility of an individual experiencing himself or herself as a subject but without the Modern emphasis on sexuality. Volume 2 and 3 of the *History of Sexuality, The Use of Pleasure* and *The Care of the Self*, would take a detour back to the
Ancient Greeks and Romans to show an alternative conception.

While these themes will be revisited later in this chapter, they illustrate at the outset how Foucault’s method was very much a work-in-progress intertwined with his particular counter-histories. The introduction to The Use of Pleasure does offer a diagram that links all of Foucault’s work, a diagram that has been best fleshed out by Dreyfus and Rabinow’s articulation of what they term “Interpretative Analytics” and Deleuze’s discussion of what he calls “Foucault”. Their depictions, along with Foucault’s histories, form the basis of the method to be followed in this study. However, before they are broached, it will be helpful to understand the ways in which Foucault is not a regular historian and the development of his particular variations on his counter-historical style.

I. Not a historian

The studies that follow, like the others I have done previously, are studies of “history” by reason of the domain they deal with and the references they appeal to; but they are not the work of a “historian.” Foucault, The Use of Pleasure (1985).

Entitling this thesis as a “Foucauldian history” makes it important to specify how the adjective “Foucauldian” changes what might be perceived as straightforward history. Foucault himself provides a clue in his claim to write histories without being a “historian”. The historian that he does not wish to be confused with is that individual who writes history in a Hegelian manner - he who uncovers the truth of the events, the theses and anti-theses, of a past period and presents them as a chain of progress across linear-time that leads to (i.e., causes) the present higher-level synthesis. Here, events or causes not seen as contributing to our current achievements are glossed over. This adds up to a history of ‘winners’, where past events, while seen as separate from the present, are
believed to be linked in a cumulative sense, and this ‘chain’ is looked back at in terms of present circumstances. What this type of history does, albeit unwittingly, is simply legitimate or add credence to the present establishment.

Foucault (1985: 9) claimed that “instead of legitimating what is already known”, his endeavour was to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently by rethinking the history of historians. Further insight into what such an approach entailed is provided by Maurice Florence’s entry on “Michel Foucault” in the *Dictionnaire des Philosophes* (Huisman 1984). It suggests that Foucault’s opuses be referred to as “critical histories of thought”. These are neither histories:

of the acquisitions of truth nor a history of its occultations; [but] the history of the emergence of truth games. It is the history of ‘veridictions’, understood as the forms according to which discourses capable of being deemed true or false are articulated within a domain of things: what the conditions of that emergence have been; what price has been paid for it, as it were; what effects it has had on the real; and the way in which, linking a certain type of object with certain modalities of subject, it has constituted for a time, a space, and particular individuals, the historical *a priori* of a possible experience (Florence, in Huisman 1984: 314).

It has recently been revealed that Florence was an anonymous pseudonym for Foucault.

Foucault proposed that the histories of “historians” are part of the “truth games” that created objects that we assume to have a real or ahistorical existence. It was these histories that he sought to question. Hence, he used such histories, or the assumptions they promoted, as points that his work would unravel by showing them as part of a web of contingent relations. Foucault’s histories engaged in a “recurrent dialogue” with the historian’s history to produce “counter-history” (Noujain 1987), or “a counternemory... a transformation of history into a totally different form of time” (Foucault 1977b).

Foucault’s counter-historical practice consisted of a number of non-conventional approaches: a historical nominalism; a writing of histories of the present that resisted
writing the past in terms of the present; an exposition of problems rather than periods; an awareness of the dispersion of events; a promotion of a multiplicity of lines of explanation; an acceptance that history must be written from a particular viewpoint; seeing continuities where historians see discontinuity and vice versa; and a focus on the spatialisation as opposed to a temporalisation of reason. These aspects are described below.

Throughout his work Foucault remained sceptical of historical abstractions or generalised objects that were believed to remain true across all periods (e.g., Man, madness, power, homosexuality), instead seeing only singular instances. Rather than believing in a history that traced the development of objective separate institutions and the separate subjects that examine them, Foucault adopted a ‘historical nominalism’ that viewed subject and object as enabling the articulation of one another. Hence, he argued that ‘Man’ did not exist until the practices constituted by the rise of humanism and the human sciences took hold (Foucault 1970); that Madness could not be conceived without the conditions that enabled psychology (Foucault 1965); and that Power in general does not exist but is always-already locally present in particular diagrams of strategic relationships (Foucault 1977a).

Thus, Foucault saw the generalised objects that we take for granted as objective and universal as singular nominal entities created by a particular way of thinking about specific problems. Homosexuality was not, for Foucault (1978), a timeless experience that has only recently been correctly addressed. But nor was it the name by which a different, more profound experience has been misunderstood. Rather, homosexuality, as it is now understood, only became comprehensible in terms of discourses and practices carried on in response to the problem that the Modern age made of homosexuality: it was
not seen to contribute to the value that Modernity placed on the stable nuclear family and the efficient production and management of the next generation. A discourse on this problem created our object ‘homosexuality’. Our nominal understanding of homosexuality today has a real impact on current practices, but Foucault argued that it should not be assumed that other periods would conceive of homosexuality as a problem (and thus an object) in the same way, nor be less or better developed in their understanding. The Ancient Greeks, for example, encouraged homosexuality amongst men of the upper classes below marrying age, as a means of satisfying male sexual and companionship needs while ensuring that the women they should marry remained ‘pure’.

In producing histories of these co-constituted diagrams of subjects and objects, Foucault did not seek to articulate the string of evolution from past to present. In Discipline and Punish (1977a: 31) he asks of himself why he wanted to write history: “Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present”.

Foucault wished to counter the notion that our objects have developed independent of us throughout history. To this end he focused on how they are singularly constituted by a web of relations that spreads out to sustain understanding, rather than seeking to plot the past in terms of its attempts to arrive at what we now hold dear. Foucault argued that the webs of relations that sustain our current beliefs and objects expand out from the development of a particular problem in a dispersive manner. Hence, the transition into Modernity, which sought to move beyond customs and traditions like the power of the sovereign or his agents to ‘do violence’ in order to maintain control of society, made a problem of how control or discipline was to be upheld. This problem created the necessity, among other things, for human sciences to come forth and objectively state
what the norms that should be adhered to were. From this point, a web of relations spread out to legitimate this development. Crucially, this web included a history that would connect the human sciences to the firmly established natural sciences and demonstrate how the human sciences constituted a further advance. Noujain (1987) demonstrates this dispersive outlook by illustrating the key dimensions of Foucault’s depiction of the formation of psychoanalysis (Figure 2). The subject emerges as part of Modernity’s quest for bands of normality, which sustains itself by latching onto the already accepted scientific institutions of the Modern hospital and the science of psychology. The history of psychoanalysis spoke of how these advances led to its subject, but it remained silent on how it joined and thus gave increasing power to other non-scientific elements that Foucault saw as crucial and intertwined with the possibility of psychoanalysis: for example, the confessional, a particular inheritance of Christianity and the presence of the organisational form of asylums once used for containing leprosy victims before the decline of the disease.

This picture presents psychoanalysis as informed and sustained though a concentration of elements interwoven across time. Thus, Foucault’s (1977b: 159, 153) histories, rather than seeking a “supra-historical viewpoint [that] aims to draw within a totality well closed upon itself a history at last devoid of diversity... capable of endowing all the shifts of the past with a semblance of reconciliation”, instead offered “a system of complex elements, each of them multiple and distinct, incapable of being ruled by any power of synthesis”. This dispersive view of events should be seen together with the promotion of a multiplicity of lines of explanation. For, given the shape of history described above, it becomes impossible to capture and determine how events were truly caused in a linear-progressive sense.
Figure 2: Noujain's Depiction of Foucault's History of Psychoanalysis.
Consequently, the counter-histories of Foucault did not attempt to explain whole periods in relation to other periods against the criterion of linear progress. Instead, they began with present concerns or particular problems: ‘why prisons?’, ‘why do we treat madness as we do?’. Through a depiction of contingencies of the sort described above, they then sought to problematise assumptions that are taken for granted: ‘because they are the best form for discouraging criminals’, ‘because our methods are the best suited to counter (i.e., normalise) madness’. Foucault did not, for example, seek to give us a whole picture of Modern society, but started by saying ‘confession has become a vital component of Modern society’, before asking ‘how did this come to pass?’

Given the dispersive nature of events and the multiplicity of lines of explanation, there are always many ways to write history. Because there was a “polyhedron of intelligibility” (Flynn 1994: 38), Foucault insisted that no history can give the complete or objective story. Consequently, he sought not to reveal the whole truth, but rather just enough to question what historians promoted as the truth of the evolution of an object. “Historians”, wrote Foucault (1977b), “take unusual pains to erase the elements in their work which reveal their grounding in a particular time and place”. Foucault’s “historical sense” would become one that was “explicit in its... acknowledg[ing] its system of injustice. It’s perception is slanted, being a deliberate appraisal, affirmation, or negation”.

One way that Foucault pursued this aim was by problematising conventional continuities and discontinuities. Modern historians needed to depict how some things ceased across linear time (i.e., archaic methods of knowing Man) while others continued (e.g., the object Man). Foucault sought, for example, to demonstrate that Man was a discontinuous, recent and singular conception, while the new human sciences that would ‘know Man more truthfully’ actually continued with many archaic traditions.
Foucault also moved from linear time as the model for history to space as a guiding paradigm in order to upset the historian’s history. He drew upon spatial metaphors like Bentham’s model prison “The Panopticon” or Velasquez’s “Las Meninas” to depict the ‘architecture’ through which people in a particular society saw the world. These ways of looking would, Foucault argued, determine and shape whatever objects are seen and how they are spoken of. Foucault often began his histories by juxtaposing two different ‘shapes’ or ways of seeing, as in Discipline and Punish where the violent public torture unto death is placed next to the order of a prison’s daily timetable from a few decades later, or in The Order of Things (Foucault 1970: xv) where a Chinese encyclopedia’s categories illustrate “the exotic charm of another system of thought [which is at once] the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that”.

An approach to history like the one described above might be considered anti- or un-historical (indeed, Clifford Geertz (1978) termed Foucault a “nonhistorical historian”). However, only, claimed Foucault (1980: 70), by “those who confuse history with the old schemas of evolution, living continuity, organic development, the progress of consciousness or the project of existence”. Foucault sought to counter this view by engaging different histories in a number of ways on the coil of his working life.

II. The histories 1: early works

But after all this was the proper task of a history of thought, as against a history of behaviours or representations: to define the conditions in which human beings ‘problematize’ what they are, what they do and the world in which they live. Foucault, The Use of Pleasure (1985).

While the counter-historical aims described above were present, to greater or lesser extents, throughout his work, Foucault’s histories are often divided into periods. Usually
a distinction is made between the early, archaeological and genealogical works (cf. Burrell 1988). While these categorisations represent clear differences of approach, one should be wary of viewing them in isolation. Each indicated a reconfiguration of approach given the recognition of problematic elements of the methods that preceded it. However, Foucault's approaches do not replace one another: "each is discovered after the fact to have been of implicit interest to the earlier one, for which it served as a moving force" (Flynn 1994: 28).

In his early works, Madness and Civilization (1965), Mental Illness and Psychology (1976b) and The Birth of the Clinic (1975), Foucault developed a critique of psychology and psychiatry: a critique of the scientific or positive psychology that assumes "normal" (and subsequently "abnormal") sanity, to be an objective, pre-existing condition. Foucault (1976b: 73) contests this assumption via a counter-history that shows that "Man became a 'psychological species' only when his relationship to madness made a psychology possible"; only when the Age of Reason made madness a problem to be isolated and resolved and, hence, an object of inquiry. 'Madness', as such, was not always present, waiting to be discovered by a rigorous enough science of the human; rather, it was brought into being by the very practices that made talk of such a science possible and the 'institutional gaps' of a particular age (e.g., empty leprosoriums).

Thus, Foucault (1965: 548) termed his history of madness "a history of what made the history of the science of psychology possible". Madness and Civilization critiqued the way in which psychology constructed its own history, one that enabled it to perceive itself as 'arriving' in "that happy age in which madness [an objective continuity] was at last recognized and treated in accordance with a truth to which we had long remained blind" (Foucault 1965: 142); a history that blinkered itself from recognising
that the very possibility of its existence is historically constituted.

In order to write such a history, those promoting psychology are shown by Foucault to engage in questionable practices. Firstly, they write history as anticipation, where the past is viewed in terms of the present’s advanced heights. This in turn enables an interesting accepted, but paradoxical, history to take hold. A history that incorporates the view that madness was an unrecognised object up until it was rigorously grasped by Modern science. Here, Modern historians retrospectively find the origin of psychology. But also, to further demonstrate psychology’s worth, this history incorporates the view that the approach taken to madness before Modernity was erroneous, notwithstanding that history is telling us that such an object had not been recognised yet.

Psychology’s ‘madness as mis-recognised object’ thesis promoted its own scientificity. Moreover, by idealising the move by which it made its breakthrough into becoming a science and demoting anything that went before this, it filtered out of its history any view that might challenge it. It had to. Psychology’s claim to have achieved the first access to an object that was already present before its discovery can only remain plausible if psychology links in the disappearance or discontinuity of the un-Modern beliefs that promoted the false assessment of madness. Foucault’s counter-history presented evidence that many pre-Modern views continued into Modern psychology.

Foucault took these conclusions further. Not only did he seek to show that psychology was un-scientific (i.e., based on historical contingencies that created it and its object, and gaining legitimacy from a self-made, non-factual and paradoxical history), but also that its attempt to found itself as a science had not overcome a mis-recognition. It had, in fact, led to a mis-recognition of a primordial understanding of its object. Foucault (1965; 1976b) claimed that the Modern discovery of ‘madness’ concealed real madness:
prior to psychology, Renaissance understanding was richer and more realistic.

Foucault's counter-history led many to question the privilege afforded psychology and psychiatry, but it also met with criticisms. Most obviously problematic was the assumption that madness has an essence that psychology is taking us away from and which Foucault's seemingly hermeneutic reading might bring us back to. For we may ask, how was it that Foucault knew that the earlier experience was more essential (Derrida 1978; MacIntyre 1991)? Moreover, even if Foucault did have access to a knowledge of true madness, he failed to make this knowledge clear. Nor did Foucault define exactly what he took psychology or scientificity to be. Consequently, it is hard to know what he leveraged his critique against. Also, his belittling of psychology, by claiming it to be un-scientific, had the effect of further promoting accepted scientific norms as something that should be universally aspired to. In acknowledging these problems, Foucault was obliged to reformulate his approach.

III. The histories 2: archaeology

Foucault's archaeological period comprised two major works: The Order of Things (1970), which investigated the formation of sciences since the 16th century, and The Archaeology of Knowledge (1976a), primarily a methodological discussion. While Foucault (1970: xxiv) claimed The Order of Things to be "an echo of my undertaking to write a history of madness in the Classical age", it also marked a number of changes in his approach. Rather than addressing the history of a particular human science, Foucault (1970: xi-xii) now sought "to determine the basis or archaeological system common to a whole series of scientific 'representations'”. He maintained the target of critiquing the 'scientificity' of human sciences. However, the critique of the practices of a particular
human science because of its 'un-scientificity' was replaced with a critique of the *historical interpretation* that all human sciences give to their own scientificity. He did so by focusing on their common object (Man) and on the role played by common discourse in shaping practices. Foucault’s problem was no longer ‘how could a counter-history show a particular Modern science to not be a science and thus keeping us from the truth?’ Instead, he was now concerned with ‘what, in our Modern times, *motivated* the human sciences to present themselves as sciences, to create histories that promoted their scientificity and the consequences of this will-to-science?’

Subsequently, archaeology’s most important concept is that of the *episteme*. Recognising the difficulties in promoting a pre-Modern understanding of madness as superior to the Modern, Foucault now presented the view that all knowledge, all conceptions of objects, are historically bound by the *epistemic* ‘strata’ within which they are situated. He (1970: xiii-xxii) defines an episteme as “the conditions that a statement has to fulfill... to give it, at the time when it was written and accepted, value”; the “modalities of order [that are] recognized, posited, linked with space and time, in order to create the positive basis of knowledge”; the “space of order [within which] knowledge is constituted”. Or, as he explained in a later work:

> something like a world-view, a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that the men of a particular period cannot escape (Foucault 1976a: 191).

In the Modern episteme the view is such that the human sciences had to satisfy the conditions of the so-called ‘normal’ sciences.

By following the “rules of a ‘discursive policing’” (which they have to do in order to have value), statements continually reactivate and entrench these rules (Foucault
1976a: 61). Foucault (1970: xxii) claimed that his enterprise now was "not so much a history, in the traditional meaning of that word, as an 'archaeology'... a history which is not that of [knowledge's] growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility". By showing these singular conditions and the specific statements that these conditions would allow, he sought to show that current epistemic arrangements are not natural or superior or having a value that must be respected.

Foucault drew a number of different episteme in *The Order of Things*. The first, from the Middle Ages to the 16th century (the "Renaissance"), characterised knowledge according to the interpretation of the web of traditional or mythological similitudes between various beings, across what Moderns would see as separate categories. Here, both people and words were defined as other beings within the web of reality. The second episteme (the "Classical") ran from the 17th to the 18th century and sought to order knowledge by using universal measures to differentiate objects from one another and represent them via positivistic language (now separated from other beings) on objective tables. The third (the "Age of Man") sought to know the depth behind the tables (Foucault claimed that it added "verticality" to the Classical’s "horizontality"). This came about as the object ‘Man’, a generic species, was recognised. Man was seen as above other species. In order to make sense of this, the Age of Man added a time series to the Classical age’s tables to show the evolution or progression of beings. This required the essential functions and origins underlying different variations to be determined so that the stages of progression that each being stood at could be plotted.

Foucault demonstrates the epistemic change from the Classical Age to the Age of Man by showing the way that the 17th century’s ‘natural history’, ‘grammar’ and ‘the study of wealth’, which had focused on measuring and recording different things relative
to one another, were replaced with biology, linguistics and economics. In order to show the progression that concerned the Age of Man, biology searched for essential functions and how these could be seen to rank the species, with Man, given his superior faculties, at the top. Linguistics, making an object of language, searched for the root of all languages showing Man's development as a languaging animal. Economics, seeing Man as an economic animal, added the underlying component of labour that explained the categories of wealth and impoverishment - categories whose order the Classical Age left without explanation. This Age also saw the invention of what 'the human sciences' - psychology, sociology, anthropology - according to the discursive rules and modalities of order of the Age of Man.

The history of the human sciences tells us that the application of the scientific method enabled us to see the object 'Man', which had been poorly understood by earlier episteme. However, Foucault (1970) claimed that Man "the study of whom is supposed by the naive to be the oldest investigation since Socrates" appears (or is separated out and privileged) for the first time in the field of Western knowledge only as the human sciences emerged in the Age of Man. We pay a price for not recognising this and for the will-to-science that sees Man as a universal object subject to scientific inquiry.

Foucault found that the Age of Man and its empirical sciences (linguistics, economics, biology - themselves modeled upon chemistry, physics and natural history) shaped the historical emergence of the human sciences. It was only in an episteme where beings could be viewed as solely empirical objects, and plotted relative to one another on tables subject to temporal development, that generic 'Man' could be spoken of. It was only in an age where Man could be seen as the empirical sciences considered plants or minerals that the human sciences could emerge. It was only by being guided by the
mechanisms and classificatory schemes of the empirical sciences that the human sciences
could gain a purchase on their object. Furthermore, there was no alternative for the
human sciences but to develop a historical link with the empirical sciences if they were to
become regarded as legitimate branches of knowledge, and for their statements to have
value within the Modern episteme. However, by doing this, the human sciences entered
into a state of instability that immediately and irrevocably deprived them of any possible
scientificity, and, at once, any possible alternative grounding.

Foucault (1970: 366) argued that the way in which the object of the human
sciences is conceived "at the same time makes it impossible for them to be sciences". While human fields of study attempted to become more scientific, their object, unlike the
animal and mineral objects of biology and chemistry, continued to be understood to be, in
no small part, transcendental as well as empirical. The effects of transcendentals are
difficult to know empirically, but the human sciences needed to use empirical methods of
discovery if they were to be sciences. Thus, the human sciences burden themselves with
an unsatiable need for self-demystification, because one can never prove, with the
instruments of the empirical sciences, the role that the unconscious or spirituality, for
example, is playing. Foucault (1989: 4) describes the human sciences as consequently:

caught as it were in a double obligation, a double and simultaneous obligation:
that of hermeneutics, interpretation, or exegesis: one must understand a hidden
meaning; and the other: one must formalize, discover the system, the structural
invariant, the network of simultaneities.

In other words, Man is an impossibly "half-empirical, half-philosophical" being
(Foucault 1970: xxiii). Add to this the fact that the Age of Man has made Man both the
subject and the primary object of knowledge, and one finds that "the sciences of man,
ccaught in various doubles, simply cannot be normal" like the sciences that they appeal to
(Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 116). This peculiar and paradoxical form infuses the human sciences with an oscillatory and uncertain nature, a "transcendental mobility" (Foucault 1970: 364). Hence, we have witnessed a historical debate, ever since their inception, as to whether the human sciences are yet proper sciences, and how, if they are not, they may be made so. Foucault (1970: 365) now claimed that this whole debate is "vain and idle" - the human sciences are structurally incapable of becoming sciences.

The Order of Things goes on to argue that more than being vain and idle, this debate is counter-productive. The desire to apply scientific method as a means of being considered capable of producing legitimate knowledge, leaves the human sciences oscillating about uncertainly in a 'no man's land' between attempting to be scientific and not becoming sciences, while not motivated to stake out approaches of their own. Moreover, the epistemic drive to 'anthropologisation' led to the established sciences incorporating 'human concerns', eroding their previously well-defined abilities and their credibility. Foucault (1970: 355) claimed that this was the greatest problem facing knowledge in our times. His solution? - that we must recognise the 'specificity' of human studies, that what we now refer to as the human sciences should not be viewed as sciences at all, but "constitute... side by side with the sciences and on the same archaeological ground, other configurations of knowledge".

While Foucault had plugged many of his early method's loop-holes, archaeology was to open more. While his counter-history now went further toward specifying that which his critique was leveraged against, through the drawing of epistemes, Foucault still did not define the nature of scientificity. Moreover, the manner of his critique could not help but reinforce the worth of 'normal sciences' by accepting that they had achieved methods suitable to their objects. In addition, Foucault still indicated that access to a
positive or true understanding of objects was possible. How else could his specificity thesis work? Also, if one took specificity seriously, did it not lead to a point where infinite orders of knowledge could be justified on the grounds of the specificity of particular objects? If this was the case, how then can one offer any sort of critique?

This leads to a deeper conundrum, one that Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) see as akin to the doubled entrapment that The Order of Things accuses the human sciences of. Archaeology’s bind is that Foucault implies that an episteme is deterministic and enclosing: a structure of thought from which the thinkers of a particular period cannot escape (e.g., 1968: 17-19; 1976a: 72-4, 146-7). Foucault the archaeologist, like anyone else, can say nothing outside of this structure. Despite this obvious entrapment, Foucault insisted that the archaeologist remains detached and just describes the general discourse that determines particular practices. On this logic, Foucault must lose touch with the practices that he seemed to want to have some effect on. In any case, if he had wanted to engage with particular concerns, nothing he could say now would make any difference as, based on the logic described earlier, whatever he said would be always-already caught up in the epistemic web of his time. Foucault’s rigid, structuralist (although the association angered him - cf. Foucault 1970: xiv) conception of episteme and the archaeologist’s relation to them, denuded Foucault’s ability to offer any critique of consequence.

IV. The histories 3: genealogy

What was missing from my work was the problem of ‘discursive regime’, the effects of power proper on the enunciative play. I confused it too much with systematicity, the theoretical form, or something like a paradigm. Foucault, Power/Knowledge (1980).

While Foucault (in Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: viii) maintained that he was never a
structuralist, he admitted that during his archaeological period he was “not as resistant to the seductive advances of structuralist vocabulary as he might have been”. After a six-year period of reflection, Foucault found in Nietzsche the inspiration to continue his counter-historical work without the elements of archaeology that now sat uneasily with him. While he continued his quest to show up particular practices as contingent and thus un-scientific, he announced a change of method in the paper *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History* (1977b). All the seeds of Foucault’s later work may be found within it.

Foucault picks up on Nietzsche’s anti-positivist view (particularly apparent in *The Genealogy of Morals* which argued that good and evil were historical developments), that there are no objective or essential forms that can be appealed to. All that exists are chaotic webs of change and chance relations. However, in being afraid of this non-foundational uncertainty, people look to historians to sort through things so as to show that the present in actual fact rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities. In order to ensure our belief in current morals (or anything else), historians scour the past for their grand origin and demonstrate how we have progressed from there to our present state. In Foucault’s words (1977b), this “origin [becomes] the site of truth” and in a circular manner “makes possible a field of knowledge whose function is to recover it”. “In placing present needs at the origin, the metaphysician would convince us of an obscure purpose that seeks its realization at the moment it arises”; this “truth” then becomes “the sort of error that cannot be refuted because it [has been] hardened into an unalterable form in the long baking process of history”.

In adopting Nietzsche’s view, Foucault escapes from the structural positivist tendencies of archaeology. All knowledge is historical as before, but all history, and consequently the development of humanity, can now only be “a series of interpretations”
Moreover, these interpretations have been created and imposed by particular interests, not by the nature of things.

Our historical foundations have no real foundation at all. However, they have real effects in shaping of knowledge. The obvious question, which remained unasked in archaeology (where there were merely epistemes guiding things and no further explanation given), becomes 'if there is nothing positive that knowledge can attach itself to, then what sustains our belief in the interpretations that we take as knowledge?' Nietzsche's answer was 'power'. It became Foucault's as well. Whereas archaeology concerned itself with highlighting the statements that constituted various archives or epistemes of knowledge, genealogy would move on to focus upon the relationship between knowledge and power, or as Foucault (1977a: 28) called it: "power/knowledge":

it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power/knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge.

It is important to note that the power/knowledge relationship that genealogy is concerned with draws upon unconventional views of both power and knowledge. Knowledge is not looked at as being either objective or subjective, but is regarded as a real and central competent in the historical transformation of various regimes of power and truth. Power, on the other hand, was not seen as a possession that one group holds and another lacks, but a complex "network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity" (Foucault 1977a: 26). Nor is power seen as negative. It is particularly not seen as something that knowledge is, or should be, free of the effects of. For genealogy, knowledge is only possible but for power:

We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms... In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained
of him belong to this production (Foucault 1977a: 194).

The role of power in the establishment and ordering of a field, in setting out what knowledge can be and what it is not, is what permits it to speak of knowledge. Hence, "there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations" (Foucault 1977a: 27). This is why Nietzsche saw claims to objective reason as nothing more than the disguised 'will to power', and Foucault (in Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 114) came to believe that the idea that science is knowledge without the influence of power or interpretation is "our own deepest lie".

However, while power is positive, or "perpetually creating knowledge" in this sense, Foucault (1980: 52) believed that "conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power". Alternatively, as Deleuze (1988: 29) described it, "Power 'produces reality' before it represses". Playing an integral part in the producing-repressing power/knowledge web of a field, or what it sees as the truth, is the linear progressive history that a subject constructs for itself out of a multiplicity of potentially contributing elements. This historical aspect produces by shaping the view and boundaries of the subject, thus making knowledge possible. However, it at once forms a network that represses any other interpretations which might challenge its unity and truth. This network may not be consciously developed but it is played out in a subject's discourse. Here we might find texts reduplicating events and origins taken to be important, and these texts used to educate initiates, so as to eventually nullify their particularity and personal nature. Things thereby come to appear more solid and objective, so as to make them seem regular or beyond doubt (Eribon 1989: 220-1).
What, consequently, does genealogy seek to do? Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 120) simply state Foucault’s research strategy at this time as:

study those doubtful sciences thoroughly enmeshed in power, which in spite of their own orthodoxies show no sign of becoming normal sciences; study them with a method which reveals the truth itself to be a central component of modern power.

A central element of the web that sustains the truth of subjects that are claiming to be scientific is a history written so as to connect the subject to Modern science. Hence, Foucault aligned his project to Nietzsche’s (Daybreak 44) concern to expose the influence of a field’s grand origins and subsequent continuities to the present, to show “the insignificance of the origin... with more insight into an origin”. Insight that would show the revered origin to be an arbitrary construction based on present concerns - a simulated foundation. Thus, the genealogist sets out to demonstrate that the objects of his or her investigations have:

no essence, or rather, its essence is that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms. [While the] entire historical tradition aims at dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity [genealogy] transposes the relationship ordinarily established between the eruption of an event and necessary continuity... records the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality... disturbs what was previously considered immobile (Foucault 1977b).

Henceforth, Foucault (1977b) spoke of counter-history as being “effective” to the degree that it deprives subjects “of the reassuring stability of life and nature” that is believed to underpin them; to the degree that it “introduces discontinuity into our very being”, “uproots traditional foundations and disrupts pretended continuity”.

Within Foucault’s archeaologies, the specificity of particular fields came from a positively existing difference in that field’s object. In this way, all specific approaches could be shown to be equally valid if an understanding of their primordial object was recovered. After the genealogical turn, Foucault regarded all subjects as shaped by a
solidifying web constructed of past strategic problematisations, expedient relationships, alliances and chance meetings, subsequently interpreted into a history that gave the appearance of positivity. Genealogy was thus concerned to investigate and stress the arbitrary development of these power/knowledge relationships - the manner in which they produce knowledge and marginalise alternatives. No longer are practices or epistemes conceived as marginalising the truth of reality, or the specific nature of what subjects aim to be. What these orders marginalise, due to the power invested in a particular historical line of privileged elements, are other possibilities.

Foucault would still cast doubt on the scientificity of human sciences, but he no longer sought to critique human sciences due to their un-scientificity or to critique the motivation behind the will to link their histories to established sciences. Foucault’s work was now directed against a subject’s claim to scientificity as an attempt to invest particular forms of knowledge with the power of a surplus value to the detriment of others. Genealogy asked:

What types of knowledge do you want to disqualify in the very instant of your demand: ‘Is it a science?’ Which speaking, discoursing subjects... do you then want to ‘diminish’ when you say: ‘I who conduct this discourse am conducting a scientific discourse, and I am a scientist?’ (Foucault 1980: 85).

Recognising the way that archaeology’s detached manner had distanced him from the things that he wanted to redress, Foucault now sought to first get inside specific sites where particular practices of power take place. He then looked at how particular groups imposed a particular interpretation on events and made ‘history’ of them by connecting them to specific contingent elements in the past. Instead of looking from the outside into the practices that were determined by an episteme, Foucault now worked from the inside out. He returned to the case approach of his early works’ dispersive examinations of
particular practices. However, given that he now believed the historical effects of power to be always-already present, he now dismissed the nostalgic hermeneutic approach that claimed to be able to read and recover some underlying essential truth. Foucault (1980: 218) now also saw no compulsion to be bound by analysing the particular practice he began with. Given that power was an all-encompassing, all-connected network of relations, he would start with a particular “obligatory historical given... give it serious consideration” (“I do not place myself outside it”, he now said, in recognition of one of archaeology’s flaws, “because it is not possible to do this”) and then let what he discovered of the power/knowledge surrounding this take him to other things.

The first genealogical study, *Discipline and Punish* (1977a) was sub-titled *The Birth of the Prison*. Foucault began with the assumption that prisons represent the pinnacle of a great natural progression upon previous punishments. He then demonstrated this assumption, based on a history that showed prisons as an outcome of Man’s increasing civilisation, liberty and humanity to Man, to be dubious, and delineated the manner in which the power/knowledge invested in the discipline and punishment system that sustains prisons diffuses across all fields of knowledge and life in Modernity.

*Discipline and Punish* started with the juxtaposition of two quotations. One described the gruesome public torture and slaying of the regicide Damiens in 1757. The next, dated some 80 years later, listed the rigid timetable of activities for boys incarcerated in a young persons’ prison in Paris. A great discontinuity had taken place. All of a sudden, prisons and universal penal codes had sprung up in Russia (1769), Prussia (1780), Tuscany (1786), Pennsylvania (1786), Austria (1788) and France (1791). Foucault argued that this discontinuity came as control was problematised. While the sensibilities of the late 18th century made violence carried out in the name of the
sovereign on the bodies of individuals unacceptable, order and control were just as imperative. Foucault portrayed a transition from traditional modes of societal control, from authorities with the power to take lives and brand bodies to authorities with the power to observe, examine and know normal human functions and in turn communicate how internal self-discipline or self-management with regard to these functions constituted 'good behaviour'. This problematisation of control saw the deployment of what Foucault described as the two prongs of Modernity's instrument of power: surveillance and normalisation. While it was not 'good form' to tell individuals how to behave, it was acceptable for science to identify what is normal so that people could maintain and correct themselves in the interest of the 'greater good'. Nor was it appropriate for Moderns to be seen to force others to act in certain ways against their will, but it was seen as not inappropriate for the powers that be to monitor developments in order to ensure adherence to normal standards.

By the 20th century, prisons were entrenched as the institution for managing and reforming criminal deviance in Western societies. This assumption was reinforced by a history that highlighted how superior (morally or economically) prisons were to earlier methods. The institution of the prison formed a self-sustaining system with other new Modernist practices. By standardising all-encompassing laws and guidelines for punishment, each person (case) could now be tried by an overseeing judge as an individual responsible for his or her own actions (in keeping with the liberal thinking of the day) against an independent objective catalogue of types of crimes (i.e., manifestations of abnormality) and appropriate general punishments (i.e., corrective measures). Deviants could be incarcerated in prisons for the appropriate length of time and monitored accordingly, further reinforcing norms regarding suitable forms of
normalising ‘treatment’. A catalogue that could be subject to rigorous scientific statistical analysis emerged (here we have the birth of the science of criminology). Alternatives to this system could not provide empirical statistics and were subsequently dismissed as unproven.

Foucault’s counter-history argued that rather than criminals being a natural pre-existing object that Modern methods could now treat properly, Modern legal codes in tandem with Modern prisons shaped them. Prisons, rather than reforming criminals, actually created them. Foucault showed that through a contingent history where those in power have controlled knowledge in their field, the prison system had established, grown and maintained itself while consistently failing to achieve its stated aims and undermining alternatives (one might note how prison populations have grown since their inception, the response to which is almost always a call for tougher codes and more prisons).

The prison became the hub of Foucault’s analysis. The geography, or ‘spatial visibility’, of the Modern prison, and in particular Bentham’s Panopticon with its ability to maintain surveillance over a number of different cells (Figure 3), became for Foucault (1977a: 184) the metaphor of the spirit of Modernity. From here, he argued that other Modern organisations - armies, factories, schools - achieved the same aims in similar ways, despite accepted histories to the contrary. He viewed fields like pedagogy and criminology as sustained by similar power/knowledge webs. Further, he revisited his early studies on psychology and medical practice with genealogy’s change of emphasis.

At this point, Foucault re-viewed the emergence of the medical science and its counterpart, the well-disciplined and ordered Modern hospital, as enabling the establishment of one another while simultaneously marginalising alternatives.
**Figure 3:** The Visibility of the Panopticon – Bentham’s Plan for the Panopticon (1843); Interior of the Penitentiary at Stateville, USA (20th Century). Source: Foucault “Discipline and Punish” (1977).
Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, public health had increasingly been problematised by states whose governments saw ‘surety of human resources’ as a crucial cog in their economic and military well-being. Correspondingly, medicine was to become more like physics or chemistry and take its references not so much from various author-authorities but from an objective object: Man. In order to do so, it required a domain of such objects to be perpetually offered up for examination in order to enable the formation of a ‘back catalogue’ that could create general objective categories: categories of measurement and bands of normality within those measures. In order for the hospital to emerge, it had to provide the conditions that enabled the formation of these categories and norms or laws (e.g., normal function, type of illness/symptoms or ‘abnormalities’, pulse, temperature, colour, blood count) and an examination facility where Man could be charted and monitored against these standard criteria. The hospital emerged to provide a tableau or order, against which the individual case could be plotted, codified and treated objectively by the overlooking subject of medical science.

The influence of The Order of Things still resonates as this is the “operating table” that Foucault (1970: xvii) referred to then:

in two superimposed senses: the nickel plated, rubbery table swathed in white, glittering beneath a glass sun devouring all shadow - the table where, for an instant, perhaps forever, the umbrella encounters the sewing-machine; and also a table, a tabula, that enables thought to operate upon the world, to put them in order to divide them into classes.

However, beyond describing this episternic gaze, genealogy is interested in showing the way the operating tableau provided by the Modern hospital links with medical science and the general object Man so as to perpetuate each other within a self-sustaining system. A system that spreads out to incorporate the schools that educate doctors; the legal and other institutions (e.g., prisons) that reward their discipline and punish their indiscretions;
and, the general emphases of Modern society.

While the Modern hospital might be seen as a consequence of advances in medical science (Porter 1997), Foucault’s (1977a) analysis demonstrated that one could not have formed without the other. Rather than a linear-causal view of scientific methods being applied to Man which enabled his truth to be known, thus leading to the establishment of medical science and to the establishment of the Modern hospital, Foucault’s genealogy showed the subject (medical science) and object (Man) sustaining one another in conjunction with a new type of institution - the bureaucratic hospital where subject continually meets/creates object. Once this network was established, the power vested in the web of relationships between doctors and ‘specialists’, their scientific education and research, hospitals, clinics, and Modernity’s general scientific and humanist beliefs, marginalised alternative un-scientific therapies (which lacked the objective tableau necessary to support claims to scientificity) and the individual’s particular knowledge of him or herself.

While Foucault began with the particular problem of the accepted presence of prisons, his genealogy spread to incorporate the view that while Modernity believed that science had enabled a certain objective knowledge of Man, by demonstrating that the body obeys the laws of physiology which escape the influence of history, these laws were in fact a historical formation. The general theme of Discipline and Punish (1977a: 25-6) thus became demonstrating that knowledge of “the body is also directly involved in a political field... Power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it... force it to carry out tasks”. Foucault recognised that the combination of knowledge and power localised in the body, indicating how the body should be looked after and used by its owner, was now a general mechanism of power of great import.
After *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault continued his genealogical quest by focusing on the way in which sexuality had become part of this general mechanism of power, and subject to increasing normalisation and surveillance. By the late 20th century, it was common knowledge that Modern Western society had finally begun to approach sexuality in an appropriate manner. After the barbarity of pre-Modern societies and the Victorian Age’s humorous prudishnessness with regard to sexual practice, the matter-of-fact application of scientific methods to sex and sexuality was enabling Moderns to chalk up another advance and further ‘emancipate’ themselves.

The first volume of this project, *The History of Sexuality - An Introduction* (1978), highlighted the way that history has formed to support contemporary views regarding how sexually liberated and therefore advanced our times were. It then argued that these beliefs could be shown to be not a moral advance, or reflective of a better understanding of the object ‘sex’, but related to the emergence, development and effects of a singular problem and a specific configuration of power/knowledge.

This counter-history questioned the orthodoxy that held the Victorian Age to be repressed and prudish, seeing instead a period with an unusually fervent interest in sex. In Victorian times, an individual’s ‘sexuality’ became subject to intense scrutinisation, a further human object for scientific codification and normalisation. Foucault (1978: 24) argued that sex, like illness and crime, came to be:

inserted into systems of utility, regulated for the greater good of all, made to function according to an optimum. Sex was not something one simply judged; it was a thing one administered...; it had to be taken charge of by analytical discourses. In the 18th century sex became a ‘police’ matter - in the full and direct sense of the word at the time: not the repression of disorder, but an ordered maximization of collective and individual forces.
Sex thus became an important problem to be considered and new discourses emerged. At the level of the individual, norms of sexual behaviour were laid out and types of deviance or abnormality came into view and were registered. At the end of the 19th century, perhaps the height of the Age of Man or Modernism, Freudian psychology emerged, and the effects of types of sexual behaviour on whole populations and society came to inform newly-created fields like sociology and population ecology. Foucault showed that the notion of defining one's sexuality in terms of a particular 'type' did not appear until the Victorian's invented it (debunking the idea that sexuality was an object continuous through history). Further, rather than our century being a liberated break from Victorian prudishness, Foucault (1978: 34) displayed our age as a continuation of their “regulated and polymorphous incitement to discourse” about sex.

Genealogy had enabled Foucault to overcome many of archaeology’s problems. He was no longer constrained by the all-encompassing deterministic notion of the episteme, nor by the positivism of his earlier hermeneutic or structuralist quests to determine the underlying essence or cause of things. By engaging first with a particular problem or field and then working outwards, Foucault could engage with real issues and develop counter-histories with a view to enabling people to think differently. However, genealogy soon encountered problems of its own.

Whereas archaeology was denuded by the all-embracing nature of the current episteme, genealogy’s argument left no space outside of power. While archaeology could no longer think an inauthentic order (any order could be justified with regard to a particular object), genealogy turned every order, even the genealogist’s, into an inauthentic order, a facade sustained by power and necessarily marginalising alternatives.
This was perhaps not too difficult a problem for Foucault as he claimed that his works should never be regarded as new orthodoxies, only as tools for undermining established orders. However, by taking his anti-orthodox stance further, Foucault did paint himself into something of a comer. Foucault now recognised no order. Swinging away from the concept of the episteme, he rejected all critical or structuralist forms, disparagingly associating them with “left intellectual... master of truth and justice”. He would not state even the normative position that his analyses took (Foucault 1980: 126).

As critics were quick to point out, this left no point from which Foucault could be critical, as any critique could only be made relative to an established standpoint. Taylor (1986: 93), among others (Habermas 1986; Honneth 1991; Brenner 1994), argued that Foucault’s histories relinquish any critical power they may have by claiming there is “no order of human life... or human nature, that one can appeal to in order to judge or evaluate between ways of life”. Foucault’s claim to be critical while eschewing even a normative framework amounts to a “performative contradiction” (Habermas 1987: 276ff.). He could not criticise institutions unless he made clear what his critical analysis was based upon or what his standpoint, even if it was only considered a normative standpoint, was.

In any case, despite eschewing them, Foucault does adhere to normative positions and even universal theories (e.g., “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge”; “the exercise of power creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge” (Foucault 1977a: 27; 1980: 52). Indeed, this is not surprising given that Foucault (1977b: 156; see also 1975: 134) claimed that genealogy, having much “in common with medicine”, is an “approach similar to that of a doctor who looks closely, who plunges in to make a diagnosis and to state its difference”. To see things so, Foucault must have, at least implicitly, worked from some standpoint and used
some criteria. Indeed, a number of passages in *Discipline and Punish* condemn the effects of power on the grounds of the “asymmetry” involved (Kunneman 1986: 368). Foucault’s genealogy stood accused of “crypto-normativism” (Fraser 1981: 283).

**V. The histories 4: interpretive analytics**

Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow at Berkeley enabled me, through their comments and their rigorous questioning to undertake a theoretical and methodological reformulation. Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure* (1985).

Foucault paused for seven years after the first Volume of *The History of Sexuality*. The problems with genealogy’s criticality, described above, clearly concerned him. He had struck up a working relationship and friendship with two American professors, Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus, during his visits to Berkeley in the late 1970s. At the beginning of *The Use of Pleasure*, he credits this association with enabling him to undertake what would be his last methodological reformulation. In the work that articulated this re-think, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983), in discussion with Foucault, arrived at a combination of genealogy and archaeology: a style beyond structuralism’s belief in there being a positive social rule-structure that determines discourse and knowledge, and hermeneutics’ search, through some form of exegesis, for the deeper universal meaning of things behind the structural-cultural boundaries apparent in discourse. They term it “interpretive analytics”.

Whereas Foucault’s early works might be termed hermeneutical, and archaeology (despite Foucault’s protests) structuralist, Dreyfus and Rabinow claim that genealogy is the beginning of Foucault’s attempt to move beyond late-Modernity’s two most obvious choices for undoing conventional or naive historical analyses. However, interpretive analytics emerged as Foucault took “the archaeological step back” from genealogy.
necessary to enable him to be analytical and critical. Interpretive analytics requires a blend that was undervalued as Foucault, increasingly concerned to respond to the weaknesses inherent in archaeology, moved toward a genealogical emphasis and commentators tried to articulate the difference between what they took to be two distinct methods.

Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 104, their italics) make it clear that one should not look for a "pre- and post-archaeology or genealogy in Foucault". In order to demonstrate the potential complementarity of the two, they return to the cusp where Foucault recognised the deficiencies of archaeology while seeking to retain it within his research strategy. In his 1970 inaugural lecture as Professor of the History of Systems of Thought at the College de France, he announced his proposed research programme by drawing links between the genealogical and the archaeological (here termed "critical"): Critical and genealogical description are to alternate, support and complement each other. The critical side of the analysis deals with the system’s enveloping discourse; attempting to mark out and distinguish the principles of ordering, exclusion, and rarity in discourse... The genealogical side of analysis, by way of contrast, deals with series of effective formation of discourse: it attempts to grasp... the power of constituting a domain of objects, in relation to which one can affirm or deny true or false propositions. (Foucault, in Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 105, underlining added).

While genealogy looked at the role of power in the formation and maintenance of knowledge, archaeology enabled the provision of a system within which the forms or statements of this formation could be marked out and analysed.

Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that while the role of archaeology may have been downplayed in an attempt to differentiate Foucault’s later method, it is always crucial to genealogy. Archaeology does the initial work of: free[ing] us from a residual belief in our direct access to objects; in each case the "tyranny of the referent" has to be overcome. When we add genealogy, however, [another] level of intelligibility and differentiation is introduced. After
archaeology does its job, the genealogist can ask about the historical and social roles [a practice] plays (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 117).

Genealogy looked at the power/knowledge of a specific discourse and its history. However, one must remember that Foucault the genealogist was also concerned to show a specific discourses place in the larger context of power/knowledge in order to evaluate its claim to describe reality. Thus, while *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality* began with particular unquestioned problems and the power/knowledge that sustained them, in interpretative analytics it is important to acknowledge that underlying this particular concern, and the universal history of continuity that adds value to it, must be an archaeological belief in cultural discontinuities, that things have been different and subsequently could be different again. As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 106) put it, "having begun on the inside" as a genealogist, Foucault must then employ archaeology to "move one step back from the discourse he is studying and treat it as a discourse object". He must recognise that to be historically analytical or critical requires an archaeological isolation of the present condition relative to alternatives. It requires something like an articulation of different episteme.

In response, Foucault introduced the concept of the *dispotif*. While Foucault did not spell out its limits, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) believe that the dispotif is similar to the episteme except in two crucial respects. Firstly, it encompasses the non-discursive practices or ways of seeing that genealogy was concerned with as well as the discursive statements that archaeology took as its focus. As Foucault (1980: 194) explained, a dispotif may include both what we might call ‘high-brow’ and ‘low brow’ forms of knowledge: “discourse, institutions, architectural arrangements, regulations, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophic propositions and morality".

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Secondly, unlike the episteme, the dispotif is not seen to be a positively existing structure that causes all discourse. It is a normative construct that depicts general socio-cultural trends toward a particular purpose. By drawing from discursive and non-discursive components, the analyst seeks to interpret a set of flexible relationships and merge them into a single apparatus in order to isolate a specific historical problem.

Consequently, the dispotif is a framework constructed by the interpretive analytical counter-historian that relates to the practice being analysed. Hence it cannot be a universal grid for analysing all things and it must be recognised that the grid itself will be necessarily connected to the practice in question. The outlining of a dispotif provides a sense of distance necessary for analysis. However, dispotif and practice should not be seen as detached. Foucault’s English translators generally turn dispotif into a “particular apparatus” (Dreyfus and Rabinow prefer “grid of intelligibility”) to convey Foucault’s concern that it be viewed as a tool to aid analysis, not as an end in itself.

Foucault, as an interpretive analyst, was analytical (but not structuralist) by taking seriously the problems, cultural beliefs and conceptual tools of the past and present, but not the solutions and conclusions based on them. He replaced the notion of ontology with a kind of history that simply focused on interpreting the cultural practices that have made us what we are, accepting that we are nothing but our history and that our practices are not less real for being historically constructed. Foucault, as interpretive analyst, was interpretative here (without being hermeneutic). By seeking to get close to the actors’ involvement and then distancing himself from it, in order to provide a comparative reading of the coherence of the practices of society, he did so believing that he may lead people to re-think and change things without claiming that his reading corresponded to
the truth of the everyday meanings shared by the actors or revealed the intrinsic meaning
of practices. The interpretive analyst realises that they are themselves produced by what
they are studying and can consequently never stand fully outside it, but that they must
create some nominal distance in order to say anything that could encourage thinking
differently.

The step back to archaeology that Foucault had to take to report the strangeness or
singularity of our practices no longer considered these practices as meaningless because
they were without foundation. Since we share cultural practices, we may interpret other
practices in other societies as different and we may thus develop some common footing
for proceeding with analysis. In interpretative analytics, however, such footholds can no
longer claim to be universal, guaranteed, verified or grounded.

Foucault consequently re-started his counter-history of sexuality by carrying
forward genealogy’s focus on particular problems and on more than just discursive forms,
while at once echoing the statement of intent issued at the College de France over a
decade earlier:

It was a matter of analysing not behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their
“ideologies”, but the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, 
necessarily, thought - and the practices on the basis of which the
problematisations are formed. The archaeological dimension of the analysis
made it possible to examine the forms themselves; its genealogical dimension
enabled me to analyze their formation (Foucault 1985: 12).

Taking seriously the singularly Modern interpretation of the sexual subject as a problem
that had a real effect on people today, as drawn in first volume of *The History of
Sexuality*, he stepped back to construct a dispositif or grid; a grid that at once related to the
problem he was seeking to isolate and could provide a backdrop against which the
singularly Modern sexual subject could be viewed. A grid, beginning with the Ancient
Greeks, that drew alternative views of subjectivity from that of the Modern subject, with
its general sexual orientation based on the human sciences' discoveries.

VI. Method: Foucault

As for what motivated me, it is quite simple... It was
curiousity - the only kind of curiosity, in any case, that is
worth acting upon with a degree of obstinacy: not the
curiousity that seeks to assimilate what is proper for one to
know, but that which enables one to get free of oneself. After
all, what would be the value of a passion for knowledge if it
resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgableness and
not, in one way or another and the extent possible, in the
knower's straying afield of oneself?

Foucault died shortly after completing the *Care of the Self* (1985), leaving the *History of
Sexuality* project unfinished. It was left to others to more fully articulate or speculate
upon the method that his histories had sought. The most highly regarded of these post-
Foucault reviews is that of Foucault's friend and fellow philosopher Gilles Deleuze.

Deleuze's overview was not afraid to view the past in terms of the present by
seeing Foucault's concluding works as what his earlier studies had been aiming for (an
irony that Foucault would have likely enjoyed). Foucault's work "culminated", wrote
Deleuze (1988: 96), "in the *Use of Pleasure*'s searing phrase: 'to get free of oneself'.
Adopting such a perspective, Deleuze is able to skip across the debates over the
differences between genealogy and archaeology and see Foucault's works as one. Hence,
the title of the book in which Deleuze describes Foucault's approach is simply *Foucault*.

How do Foucault's inquiries merge so as to culminate in the stated aim of *The
Use of Pleasure*: re-thinking history so as to get free of one's self? Deleuze best sums this
up in a diagram drawn in the final chapter of *Foucault* (see Figure 4). Deleuze argues that
1. Line of the outside
2. Strategic zone
3. Strata
4. Fold (zone of subjectivation)
Foucault’s subjects are constituted through the existence of material strata, a diagram of power/knowledge, a line of the outside and the fold of subjectivation.

The stratum is a combination of the archive that archaeology took as its task to draw, with its regularity of statements (or ‘statement curves’ as Deleuze calls them), that created subjects, objects and institutions; and, the particular ways of seeing that Foucault focused on in later works. The strata of knowledge are a “practical assemblage” of ways of saying and viewing which continually reactivate and reinforce one another.

“Loosely lacing” the seen and said, the view of the subject, objects, institutions and the way they see, and maintaining these forms over other alternatives, is a diagram of relationships of power/knowledge. These diagrams are not necessarily consciously determined but their “alliances weave a supple and transversal network that is perpendicular to the sedimentary strata” and blend a “‘mushy mixture’ of the visible and the articulable” (Deleuze 1988). The diagram always marks out the line of the outside of the strata. Its formation protects the strata from other influences that could undermine and radically alter its forms.

The diagram and line of the outside are, of course, the work of Foucault’s genealogical period. However, as Deleuze (1988: 96) points out, the first volume of The History of Sexuality “explicitly closes on a doubt... an impasse”. This is not due to the conception of power but rather because Foucault found the impasse to be where power itself places us. If power is all-inclusive, everywhere and limiting everything, how can we get free of it, to the outside of it? Foucault came to think that the only means was the fold of “the inside of thought, the self”. Hence the knowing subject or the “zone of subjectivation” becomes a third axis of Foucault, beyond knowledge and power, an axis that Deleuze (1988: 96) claims was perhaps: “present from the beginning in Foucault
(just as power was present from the beginning in knowledge). But it could emerge only by assuming a certain distance, and so being able to circle back on the other two”.

The three dimensions of knowledge, power and self are irreducible yet constantly imply one another. Moreover, and crucially, the idea that runs through all Foucault’s work is that these dimensions are not universal conditions - they are historical. This means that they are subject to change if one can get to the outside of their present constitution to bring non-stratified or diagramatised points into the present. Foucault (1985) believed that the best access to the outside lies on the “inside of thought”. Here one may invoke a “memory of the outside, beyond the brief memory inscribed in the strata and the archives, beyond the relics remaining in the diagrams”; so as “to think one’s own history” rather than take for granted the history or “memory” that sustains the present forms; “so as to enable thinking differently”. Thus, Deleuze’s (1988: 119) Foucault concludes by claiming that “to think” (by this he means to engage in effective thought as a counter-historian) means:

- to be embedded in the present-time stratum that serves as a limit: what can I see and say today? But this involves thinking of the past as it is condensed in the inside, in the relation to oneself (there is a Greek in me, or a Christian in me, and so on). We will then think the past against the present and resist the latter, not in favour of a return but ‘in favour of a time to come’ (Nietzsche), that is, by making the past active and present to the outside so that something new will finally come about, so that thinking, always, may reach thought. Thought thinks its own history (the past), but in order to free itself from what it thinks (the present) and be able finally to ‘think otherwise’ (the future).

This helps explain Foucault’s return to the Greeks. On the one hand, the re-visitation offered access to an ‘outside’ set of power/knowledge relations, something other than the present forms and their formation that might enable thinking otherwise. On the other hand, the Greeks placed great stock on the ‘care of the self’, on thinking oneself as well as responding to general norms, something that the Modern quest for codes of
normality diminished. The dispositif that began in Volumes 2 and 3 of *The History of Sexuality* provided both a context and an alternative for critiquing Modern arrangements.

The method employed by this study takes its cues from the counter-histories of Foucault and Dreyfus, Rabinow and Deleuze's interpretations of what Foucault was seeking to achieve by them. As the research questions stated in Chapter I indicate, this work is generally concerned with the way in which Management has become established as something that all forms of life must appeal to; the way that all domains are now potentially open to Management; the way that being has become subject to Management. This state of affairs goes largely unquestioned as Management's importance now seems so natural or banal. It is a state promoted by historical assumptions that suggest that the recognition of good Management as an important problem represents an advance on earlier societies, societies that were either not clever enough to recognise Management or working towards Management but not scientific enough to address it properly. This thesis develops a counter-history, taking the historical configuration of Management that is "given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory" (Foucault 1984a: 45) and subjecting it to a "nominalist critique" by tracing it to "arbitrary constraints" and showing the "historicity of the subject" and its "constitutive character" (Foucault 1981: 14; 1984a: 45; 1984b: xi): a counter-history that argues that "institutions and ideas that we take for granted" may be more recent than we assume (Foucault 1988a: 161). Its aim is to call the present establishment of Management into question by illustrating its singularity so as to enable thinking otherwise.

Having set this up this line of questioning in Part One, Part Two creates a dispositif or grid. It is comprised of three normative episteme. As mentioned earlier, this work
argues that Management, as it is presently seen, is completely Modernist. Management is
completely sustained by, and plays no small part in sustaining, Modernist beliefs. It is
claimed that this is why Management has come to be such a powerful but unobtrusive
presence (and at once seemingly unable to innovate substantially). In order to
demonstrate Management's tight-knit relationship with Modernism, Part Two's disjunctif
is built around Modernism's approach to knowledge, something close to a combination of
the Classical and the Age of Man episteme that Foucault drew in *The Order of Things.*

As a means of demonstrating alternative ways of thinking, two further episteme
are presented. One is an interpretation of the approach to knowledge that Modernism
strove to overcome, the Ancient Greek view that was revitalised during the Renaissance.
The other depicts the view that has in recent decades mounted the most serious threat to
Modernism's hegemony: a mode that requires accepting the pre-Modern so as to
relativise the Modern that is here termed Postmodernism. This grid will enable a
framework against which the forms and formation of Management may be evaluated in
Part Three.

Part Three comprises three chapters. The first, Chapter 6, begins by outlining the
accepted history of Management and the consequent nature of its forms that this history
presents as universal. Placing them against Part Two's grid shows them to all be
specifically Modernist. It then develops a history that counters Management's history
across a number of dimensions. It suggests that Management, and Management's view of
organisation, was established by historians of the 1950s and 1960s whose particular

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3 Combining two modes of thought that Foucault saw as distinct is not seen to be too problematic. As Dreyfus and
Rabinow (1983: 99) point out, disjunctifs should always be relativised, and in any case: "Foucault's analysis of the
Classical Age also reveals, in spite of his insistence on the cataclysmic break between the Age of Representation and
the Age of Man, a deep continuity with the present. In the Classical Age all beings were already represented in a
totalizable picture on a table, and although the representor who lays out the table had not yet emerged, the place was
already awaiting him where he would appear as Man."

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predisposition saw a way of seeing articulated by engineers at the turn of the 20th century as a *grand origin*. This view is shown in this thesis to be an expedient personal response to a political situation brought about by Modernism’s specific problematisation of and particular need for universal and unifying non-traditional ends. In addition to determining these disciplinary origins, Management also seeks an Ancient heritage to provide it with more grandeur. Chapter 7’s counter-history goes on to demonstrate how this is achieved by viewing the pre-Modern past and key historical figures through the eyes of the Modern present. The chapter then examines the way in which the subject has striven for scientific status but never quite gained agreement as to the achievement of this status. It concludes by outlining the web of repetition and reduplication that discourages us from seeing Management’s singularity or questioning its perceived solidity or universality, despite the contingencies described above.

To use Foucault’s (1978: 8) terms, what Management is about and what remains to be achieved, which is the integral historical “sermon” of Management’s formation investigated in Chapter 7, is redoubled by the establishment of the “pulpit” from which the sermon is developed and issued: the Business School. Through their close alliance, the forms of Management and the subject-view of Management represented by the Business School enable one another. Chapter 7 investigates the emergence of a particular type of business school in the 1950s and 1960s, the way in which this connects to already established disciplines (economics, psychology, sociology) and how this form is spreading to become a global model.

The formation of Management’s accepted history and sermon of development, its accepted forms and the specific form of the Business School link to create a diagram of power that draws a line of the outside that sees anything other than Modern as other to
Management. The diagram of Management maps perfectly onto the diagram of Modernism. Hence, each strengthens the other. However, Management is limited by its consequent lack of ability to speak and see in any other manner apart from Modernist. Chapter 8 examines the way in which this formation’s gaze has blinkered Management’s view of the future, making new objects, like the idea of the organisation as an organism rather than a machine, culture and Postmodernism, into Modernist forms and again redoubling the establishment of the sedentary Management sermon and the Business School pulpit.

The final part of this thesis attempts to achieve Foucault’s aim to ‘think differently by re-thinking history’. Taking the view that the formation of Management is a “historical and cultural reality”, and as such, subject to change (Foucault & Sennett 1981: 4), Chapter 9 seeks to ‘get free’ of what Management sees and says by connecting to the ‘outside’ provided by the survey of the Ancient Greeks and a Postmodern approach. It takes areas problematised by Management in the past few decades and asks if they might be viewed otherwise without the constraints of their unrecognised Modern heritage. Such a critique may help Management to begin to ‘stray afield of itself’ and think differently. Given Management’s current influence on life in general, it may also help us to question some of our assumptions about how being in the world is judged.
Part One outlined this study’s objective - to investigate how Management has come to have such force in society, and why so much that is presented in Management as new seems remarkably similar to what has gone before. It defined ‘Management’, the object under scrutiny. Further, it described the method by which the questions posed of this object will be addressed - a blend of Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical approaches in keeping with what Dreyfus and Rabinow term ‘interpretative analytics’ and what Deleuze simply calls ‘Foucault’.

Part Two now outlines the particular dispositif or grid against which Part Three’s exploration of Management’s forms and formation will be analysed. The grid is composed of three chapters, each outlining three normative episteme: the Ancient Greek - the approach to thinking that Modernism sought to overcome; Modernism - the past three centuries’ dominant world-view; and Postmodernism - the term most commonly used to encapsulate the many thinkers that now challenge Modernism’s dominance. Each chapter is divided into seven sections addressing each episteme’s view of space, place and foundation; the analogies that it draws from; how it believes knowledge should be read or discovered; attitudes to time and history; the co-existence of many different schools of thought; what is seen to guide human action; and, by way of conclusion, a summary of the ways of seeing and saying privileged by that episteme.
The Ancient Greeks saw wisdom as *metis*: the ability to incorporate many orders, forms and dimensions and apply them in one's own fashion on a pragmatic basis. It is based on the following assumptions: that the world is composed of a *kosmos* and an irreducible *chaos*; that the world may be seen as a macrocosm of one's self and that all beings' movements are shaped by their particular *telos*; that access to knowledge comes through one's interpretation of similitude; that history and time would change while its elements often 'spiralled' back; that there will always be many schools of thought; and that human behaviour or ethical decisions will be steered by custom, convention and the particular *telos* of the individuals concerned.

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**3. THE ANCIENT GREEK *EPISTEME***

Koyre (in Shapin 1996: 1) distinguishes the conceptual changes at the heart of Modernism as “the most profound revolution achieved or suffered by the human mind since Greek antiquity”. The primary body of thought that Modernism would look to transcend and overcome grew out of the Ancient Greek episteme.

This attempt to outline the Ancient Greek world-view must be prefaced with a number of admissions. That this is a brief chapter seeking to describe the way a collection of different people thought across many centuries, indicates that what it presents is a simplification. That the Greeks were not one nation and that one of the points made in this chapter is that many schools co-existed within their ‘thought-world’ indicates that this chapter is a synthesis. Further, in drawing upon material from Homeric, Archaic and Classical periods, this chapter falls foul of those Modern scholars who like to contrast the different ‘shame’ and ‘guilt’ cultures that begin and end this span of periods. However, this contrast is less absolute than some imagine and the differences indicated above are relative - there are more than enough consistencies from which a normative episteme
significantly different from Modernism can be drawn. In so doing, the ways of seeing and saying of the Ancient Greeks are explored across six interconnecting aspects: the co-appreciation of kosmos and chaos; the microcosmic analogy of the human; knowledge as the interpretation of similitude; time and history as a spiral; the existence of many incommensurable schools of thought; and ethics shaped by telos, custom and convention.

I. Kosmos on an irreducible chaos - the presence of the determinate and indeterminate

In the beginning, Eurynome rose naked from Chaos, but found nothing substantial to rest her feet on. Graves, Greek origin myth (1981).

The central presupposition in Greek creation myths was that kosmos relied upon chaos (more correctly thought of as a 'gap', a 'yawning' or an 'indeterminate void' in addition to its singular Modern connotation of disorder - Castoriades 1997). The first distinct cosmological entities emerged out of an originative gulf, and the Greeks appreciated the co-existence and ultimately irreducible co-dependence of kosmos and chaos in the world. One enabled and defined the other.

The best known representation of these forces is the dual characterisation of Apollo and Dionysus or Bacchus (see Figure 5), the Athenian art and drama gods that Nietzsche made so much of in The Birth of Tragedy. Here, Nietzsche outlined his view that the combination of kosmos and chaos, the appreciation of the necessary co-existence of the Apollonian propensity to calmly shape the world with ideal forms of pleasing proportion⁴ and the licentious Dionysian tendency to shatter form and transgress the

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⁴ Apollo: is the god of light, prophesy, divination and 'law and order'. He is often associated with the laws of the sciences of music and medicine. Pindar (Pyth. 5.63) described him as the god who implants in humans "a harmonious disposition" and is the god most clearly a constructor. Apollo's hymns are filled with stories of his activities: great and beautiful foundations, splendid walls, impressive frames, imposing heavy roofs (Detienne 1989: 45). Handy (1978) characterizes Apollo as the "god of bureaucracy".
FIGURE 5: THE FORMS OF APOLLO AND DIONYSUS.
SOURCE: FARNELL "CULTS OF THE GREEK STATES" (1907).
boundaries between reason and unreason, was the “metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic will” that enabled the Greeks' intellectual achievements. Nietzsche did overstylise the characters of Apollo and Dionysus. However, what their co-rule symbolised pervaded Greek thought: from the tragedy of Euripides, Sophocles and Aeschylus that worked from the premise that even the most ordered and purposeful life was permeated with ambiguity and uncertainty, and subject to a tricky, individual fate (Vernant 1978) to Thucydides' political analysis, where life was a mixture of orderliness and the contingent, unpredictable and indeterminate (Edmunds 1975; Johnson 1993).

Such thinking was also manifest in what we might distinguish as philosophy. As an example, one may consider the way in which Christian scholars misconstrued Heraclitus’ description of the one constant ‘truth’ (aletheia). Aletheia, for the Greeks, was defined as “taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen” (Dreyfus 1991: 270). This implied that there was an innumerable number of ‘things’ that might be known but that complete certainty of knowledge was never possible. Many things were ‘in light’ or formed part of the kosmos, while many were unseen. We might bring things ‘out of the chaos’ in our inquiries; at the same time, others would fade into darkness. However, Heraclitus wished to make clear that there was one constant, something that was never hidden or that we could never hide from. In fragment B16, he cryptically asks:

*How can one hide himself before that which never sets?*

Christian thinkers took Heraclitus to mean that no human could hide from the

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5 Dionysus or Bacchus is the god of wine and vegetation. He represented the unreasonable element in humans and the conflict of reason and convention on the one side, emotion on the other. Pre-sentimentally, a young Dionysus, disguised as a goat-kid, was torn limb from limb by the Titans. It was Apollo who formed the ambulance corps that reconstructed the Dionysian puzzle-pieces. In contrast to Apollo, Dionysus was humble and suburban, travelling from makeshift room to room enjoying temporary residences and “changes of set” (Robert & Robert 1973: 110). Others have suggested that Dionysus “defies definition” (Henrichs 1984: 209) due to the “multiple inversions and contradictions” of his character (Segal 1982: 266). Given this, Henrichs (1984: 234) and Goldhill (1987) agree that the best way to sum up Dionysus is as the “god of paradox”. Dionysus’ worship was fostered as a healthy antithesis of civilisation.
omnipresence of God. However, a different view emerges on considering the Greek language used. Heraclitus spoke of the thing that never sets, that never-goes-into-concealment, that never reaches an end but is at once always rising and hence ever-present or ever-true. There is a double meaning in the Greek 'never-sets' (λέθος) that implies both revealing and concealing. The riddle, therefore, is not just 'what never sets or is always ascending or always present', but also 'what never sets but is at once revealing and concealing'. The answer was not some essence of things or omnipresent creator. It was rather an 'unfolding' of being, whereby the light of one's becoming revolved to place some things in view or light, while at once leaving some things concealed. What never sets is always present and is always revealing some things from its point-of-view but concealing others, always uncovering some kosmos, but putting a chaos in darkness. It was the unfoldingness of being, where one sees some aspects, but can never see or know all at once (Heidegger 1984).

This non-linear view of development led the Greeks to a different understanding of innovation from Modernism. Feyerabend (1987: 143-61) contrasts the Ancient and Modern by juxtaposing passages from the 4th and 16th Centuries: one from Augustine (354-430) illustrating the quantitative importance of progress which arose in antiquity, describing how the arts and sciences are enriched by recording and thus increasing the number of remembered skills, styles and senses; and one from Vasari's (1511-74) Lives of Artists: "it is inherent in the very nature of the arts to progress step by step, from modest beginnings, and finally reach the summit of perfection". By Vasari's day, development did not mean the recognition of more styles. On the contrary, by aiming toward capturing essential truths, it sought to unify and reduce them.

The Greeks' development of mythology provides a good example of their view
here. Origin myths, like the one quoted at the beginning of this section, were a well- 
spring to which a tapestry of myths and tales referred, all connected in some way, but not 
necessarily consistently so (Elliot’s depiction in *Middlemarch* of Casaubon struggling to 
write a ‘Key to All Mythologies’ but overwhelmed by material on which he could impose 
no hierarchical order is an irony illustrative of Modernity’s attempt to come to grips with 
the Greek manner). This tapestry came to pass, as the Greeks approach to the 
‘supernatural’ was *both* innovative *and* conservative.

Mythology was dynamic in that new deities, from the East or North perhaps, or 
new stories added to the archive of old deities, were continuously being ‘unconcealed’. 
However, the new took their place alongside, rather than supplanted, the old (innovation 
increased the number of beings rather than homogenised and increased their quality). 
Often old myths would fall into darkness as they lost relevance or popularity, but the 
Greeks did not actively overthrow traditional beliefs. This made for a somewhat messy 
mythological palette but by a series of expedient compromises, the many dynamic deities 
flourished side by side. The Olympians came to co-exist (not always peacefully, but co- 
exist nonetheless) with one another and a myriad of regional gods and goddesses and 
semi-historical figures without being undermined by them (Kearns 1985).

All developments were seen by the Greeks as interconnected with the whims, 
fates and loyalties experienced by the myriad of gods. All things, or every being, was 
“full of gods” (*Aristotle OTS*: 411a 7-8). Herodotus’ (9.100) historical survey concluded 
that “the role of the divine in affairs [wa]s clear through many proofs” (all Herodotus’ 
‘wise men’ knew this, e.g., Solon, 1.32; Amasis, 3.40; Artabanus, 7.10) and there was 
what Dodds (1953: 13) terms a “constant daily dependence” on what we would call the 
supernatural. Consequently, Modern historians often imply that the Greeks’ belief system
was 'un-developed'. Murray (1934: 265) claimed that their kind of religion “was not really religion at all”. Similarly, Bowra (1930: 222) observed that the Greek’s “anthropomorphic system has of course no relation to real religion or morality. These gods are a delightful, gay invention of the poets”. While Greek religiosity did not square with the singular and detached ideal form of the “Rational planner” God, encountered in the next chapter and with whom Bowra and Murray are familiar, their views overlook the way in which the Greeks did not separate the supernatural and the natural, religion and everyday life, the visible and unseen, the determinate and indeterminate, in the way that Moderns tend to.

Language may again provide insight here. For the Ancient Greeks, mythos, at its most basic level, meant ‘word’, but it could be used in many different variations: rhetoric; conversation; a thing said, fact, or matter; a threat, command or mission; something thought, an unspoken word or purpose; a saying, proverb or rumour; a tale, story or narrative; or a professed work of fiction. Myth could refer to both what we might call tangible and non-tangible things, the present and the imagined. This indicates the extent to which the Greeks could feel the presence and influence of both the seen and unseen or heard and unheard (this also illustrates the ambiguity of Greek where a word’s exact meaning was often only discernible with reference to the context in which it was used - this was a relativistic rather than a positivistic system). Hence, the scene from the Illiad (I.198) where Athena plucks Achilles by the hair and warns him not to strike Agamemnon. Athena may only be visible to Achilles’ subjective aletheia, and therefore,

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6 Similarly, logos has many competing translations: ‘discourse’, ‘story’ (Thucydides dismissed Herodotus as a ‘logos-maker’ in this sense), ‘relationship’, ‘reason’, ‘judgment’, ‘definition’, ‘ground’. Moderns, finding such things frustrating from a positivistic point of view where language is supposed to mirror reality, would emphasise ‘reasoned judgement’. Modern historians of science would praise the Greeks for having developed the concept of logos but see them as naive for not having worked with a universal conception of it or method by which it could be applied (Whitehead 1926; Barnes 1987).
not what Moderns would see as objectively true, but to the Greeks she was real, nonetheless. Similarly, the Greeks developed the word *panic* (after Pan) because they felt the presence of a real invisible being who swayed the emotions of flocks and herds and thus named what they were conscious of (Barfield 1926; Boardman 1997).

II. The analogy of the intelligent organism

The universe was folded in upon itself: the earth echoing the sky, faces seeing themselves reflected in the stars. Foucault, *The Order of Things* (1970).

In an epistemé where beings were constantly being ‘unconcealed’, without any belief in reductionism or fundamentalism and with a relative and ambiguous language, it was essential that relations of microcosm to macrocosm should be conceived, as both the guarantee of knowledge and some limit of its expansion. The Greeks consequently used themselves as a model for their world. As Collingwood (1960: 8) writes:

> The Greek view of nature as an intelligent organism was based on an analogy: an analogy between the world of nature and the individual human being, who begins by finding certain characteristics in himself as an individual, and goes on to think of nature as possessed of similar characteristics.

While Modernism would ground its gaze upon the clockwork machine and the notion of evolution or progressive development, the analogy informing the Ancient Greeks was their subjective understanding of themselves (Clark 1992 - see Figure 6).

Humans were quite literally, as Protagoras (*Ref.*.) said, “the measure of all things”. For the Greeks, the stars were not, as they are for us, “bodies infinitely remote in space, which move according to the inflexible laws of mechanics, and whose composition is chemically determinable”. They were “divinities” (Seznec 1953: 37). When pre-Moderns looked up, they did not so much see a place, whether heavenly or earthly, as a

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**Figure 6:** A Pre-Modern Microcosm.

*Source: Seznec “The Survival of the Pagan Gods” (1953).*
“bodily vesture, as it were, of a living being” (Barfield 1926: 85); a living being comprising a combination of other beings (see Figure 7). This analogy gave the Greeks a perspective that viewed the universe like an individual human, as consisting of qualitatively different parts that required different treatment (Dresden 1968). It also meant that each individual’s aletheia was largely subjective - dependent upon ‘looking out’ from their understanding of themselves. It encouraged seeing both order, structure, certainty (as one could find in a human life) and consistency (as one could see across humanity); and disorder, chance, paradox, unpredictability (as one could find in a human life) and difference (as one could see between humans). Heraclitus (frag. B50, B2) made sense of this by claiming that while all things are one, united in the fact that the universe is at once divisible and indivisible, generated and ungenerated, mortal and immortal, most lived as though they had an understanding of their own.

Viewing the world through the analogy of themselves, the Greeks could do nothing else but conceive of their Gods anthropomorphically, or ‘naively’, as Bowra accuses. In keeping, the gods and goddesses displayed all the human emotions: they were kind and cruel, merciful and merciless, petty and petulant and, as Herodotus is fond of reminding us, “jealous and interfering” - they each had highly developed and developing ‘personalities’. Furthermore, just as in human societies, there was a plurality of gods and goddesses each having their own spheres of interest that often conflicted with those of others. Indeed, even within each god, there was a plurality of loyalties. This made conflict inevitable, their knowledge imperfect and their decisions unclear. That the gods were not necessarily ‘all-knowing’ further reinforced the notion that people could not overcome life’s chaos - to think so would be hubris (Sophocles Ant. 456-7). These were quite different role models from the Christian deities.
FIGURE 7: THE ANCIENT SPIRAL OF BEINGS – ASTROLOGICAL CEILING,
SOURCE: SEZNEC “THE SURVIVAL OF THE PAGAN GODS” (1953);
AN ANCIENT VIEW OF THE HEAVENS WITH COPERNICAN LOGIC SUPERIMPOSED,
SOURCE: LODGE “PIONEERS OF SCIENCE” (1913).
Movement in space, of god, a person or anything else, was also conceived in terms of how people saw their own movement. The Greeks generally believed in teleology, that the entire world’s beings (we might say ‘things’) were animated, like people, by a unique destiny or telos. The sun rose over the still earth each day because it was fulfilling its telos. Hence, the sun would be punished if he should “transgress his measures” by exceeding the particular task assigned to him (Dodds 1953: 8). Hence, Helios’ son Phaethon was struck down for being so bold as to reach beyond himself by taking the sun-chariot’s reins from his father. Hence, the helmsperson would be punished for not acting in the way that could be connected to the tradition of good helmspersons. Thus, all natural motion had a developmental character, in the sense that all bodies naturally moved so as to fulfil their traditional natures, to transform the potential into the actual, to move toward where it was natural for them to be. Aristotelian physics was in this sense modelled on biology, employing explanatory categories to comprehend living beings. Just as the acorn’s development into the oak was the proper and obvious transformation of potential into actual, so the fall of a stone or the rising of the sun was the actualisation of their potential, the realisation of their particular ‘nature’. Beings that were thought heavy were attracted to the heavy earth and fell; beings seen as light were attracted to the air and rose. For this reason, Ancient views of matter are often referred to now as “animistic”. Anima (‘soul’ in Latin) was in all beings in keeping with what were seen as their particular purposes. The Modern Hobbes could sarcastically remark that it was “as if stones and metals had a desire, or could discern the place they could be at, as man does”. But pre-Modern thinkers would not have got the joke.

The resonance between traditional accounts of natural motion and the flow of personal experience is evident. People offered teleological explanations of their behaviour
that identified what are known to be traditional purposes of things, or 'natural effects', as their cause. For example, on this view, a striker in football moves toward the opposition's penalty area when his team is on the attack because he is moving into his natural position to fulfil his purpose, to score goals - not because the neurones in his brain send signals to his nervous system to operate his body in an efficient ergonomic way. Greek knowledge was consequently heavily dependant upon not only the personal analogy but also custom and tradition to support it and define its categories or 'places for beings'. It was also based upon a belief that a 'similitude' between particular beings could be read.

III. Knowledge through the interpretation of similitude

The most important traditional view [of how we know] was that of Aristotle, according to which when we come to know something, the mind becomes one with the object of thought. Of course, this is not to say that they become materially the same thing; rather, the idea is that they are informed by the same eidos [or Being]. Here was a conception quite different from the representational model... being informed by the same eidos, the mind participated in the being of the known object, rather than simply depicting it. Taylor, Overcoming Epistemology (1987).

The Greek manner of knowing is the opposite of Modern science in that while the scientist's access to knowledge is granted by her application of a method that detaches her from the object under investigation, the Ancients saw knowing as a matter of connection. Here, the knower knew by achieving a 'sympathy' between herself and what she is seeking to know or by becoming sympathetic to the connection between other beings. One knew by recognising signs that indicated similitude via such means as analogy, affinity, sympathy and antipathy.

These links created a great web that connected the beings of the universe. Here, stars, in general, had the qualities of eyes (and vice versa) as both gave out light, while, as
Crollius told it, the constellations of stars were:

the matrix of all the plants and every star in the sky is only the spiritual prefiguration of a plant, such as it represents that plant, and just as each herb or plant is a terrestrial star looking up at the sky. So also each star is a celestial plant in spiritual form, which differs from the terrestrial plants in matter alone... the celestial plants and herbs are turned towards the earth and look directly down upon the plants they have procreated, imbuing them some particular virtue.

Such similitude could only be discerned through the reading and interpretation of signatures - or signs on the surface of things. As Foucault (1970: 27) describes:

the unexpected affinity... between aconite and our eyes... would remain in obscurity if there were not some signature on the plant, some mark, some word, as it were, telling us that it is good for diseases of the eye. The sign is easily legible in its seeds: they are tiny dark globes set in white skinlike coverings whose appearance is much like that of eyelids covering an eye.

The walnut was a microcosm of the human head - so the shell of the fruit cured wounds of the pericranium, while internal head ailments could be prevented by the use of the nut. Opium sent you to sleep because poppies had a particularly dormative gait, not because it had a corpuscular microstructure that acted on physiological structures in such a way as to cause sleep. The sun and the sunflower naturally attracted one another; while some plants shared historical-mythological hatreds - the olive and the vine hated the cabbage and the cucumber flew from the olive (Gabbey 1985).

Galen's (129-99AD) human anatomical knowledge, the West's dominant tradition until the end of the 16th century (although this view persisted in China and India), was criticised by Moderns because it was not based on the dissection of humans (Petherbridge & Jordanova 1997). However, as plants were like animals living head down, their mouths buried in the earth, cutting humans was not necessary for Galen. Knowledge of the human body could be ascertained from analogy with animal and plant anatomies (see Figure 8). The world here was a vast collection of beings. Moderns would separate these
Figure 8: Galen’s Physiological View.
Source: Singer “Greek Biology and Greek Medicine” (1922).
into hierarchical categories: natural and supernatural, terrestrial and celestial, animal, vegetable and mineral, beings and things; but the Ancients saw a ‘flat’ mass criss-crossed by a network of plural relationships. Knowledge required connecting with and interpreting these relations (see Figure 9).

Rather than having any detached representational qualities, language was another being woven through this tapestry. It lived and partook in the great network of resemblance and signs. Due to the fact that words were subject to similitude too, they also contained signs. The Greeks wrote from left to right because writing was connected to the movement of the ‘second heaven’ - home of the seven planets; and the names of being were lodged within the beings they named: strength was ‘written’ in the body of the lion, regality in the eye of the eagle. Thinkers in the Renaissance (Duret 1613: 40) queried this, finding that, while other languages had lost this quality, it remained in the ancient language of Hebrew. Here:

the stork, so greatly lauded for its charity toward its father and its mother, is called Chasida, which is to say, meek, charitable, endowed with pity... The horse is named Sus, thought from the verb Hasas... and it signified to rise up, for among all four-footed animals the horse is the most proud and brave...

As indicated in Taylor’s quotation at the head of this section, the human ‘mind’ could no more be above this web of similitude than language. Just as there was no distinction between language and other beings, there was no separation between mind and matter, or between subject and object. The knowing human was just another element subject to sympathy or antipathy, connection or disconnection from knowledge. The sympathetic view of knowledge led, in this respect, to what Modern philosophers call Greek psychology’s “failure to distinguish”, via Cartesian logic, perception and intelligence or mind, which is seen to have created confusion (Urmson & Ree 1989: 259).
FIGURE 9: THE ANCIENT INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF BEING.
SOURCE: SEZNEC "THE SURVIVAL OF THE PAGAN GODS" (1953).
For the Ancient Greeks, knowledge came to one as she found herself connected to the similitude relevant to her situation. Often wise connections (or feelings) came suddenly, placed by gods who were connected to relevant spheres of interest. It was as if there was a mass of knowledge elements that one might hold at one's disposal to deploy on an 'as-needed' basis, have revealed to one or be concealed from one as appropriate (in this manner the Trojans were described as "remembering flight and forgetting resistance" - *Ill*. 16.356). It was as if one hoped that the gods would allow them the necessary connections or at least not obscure them at the vital moment (as when Automedon is described as having had a god "put an unprofitable plan into his breast and taken away his excellent understanding" - *Ill*. 17.469); or, that when the connection was best not known, the gods would prevent it (as when Patroclus hopes that the gods with "preserve him" from Achilles' vindictive feelings - *Ill*. 16.35). Thus, thoughts or impulses often arose against one's 'will'. They were not owned by one's consciousness but endowed with a personality and energy of their own and so could pass through one or be implanted. People could have the power of the gods within them leading to a temporary insanity which was not ascribed to psychology, but to an external daemonic agency (wine was said to produce a similar effect but the implication was not that this boldness can be produced naturally, but rather that wine had a supernatural connection). Hence, Sophocles (*Ant*. 603) could speak of madness as "an Erinys in the brain"; Achilles could be said at one point to know "lion things" (*Ill*. 24.41) while Nestor and Agamemnon shared thoughts "friendly to each other" (*Ody*. 3.277).

Summarising many of the themes discussed here thus far, Demokritos (in Simplicius *CoOTH* 294-5) related that "We in reality know nothing firmly but only as it changes in accordance with the condition of the body and of the things which enter it and
of the things which resist it... And a man must recognise by this rule that he is removed from reality”. On this way of seeing, how could someone own thoughts like a possession? Further, how could one consciously accumulate and transfer objects of knowledge into the head of another? On the one hand, knowledge’s connections had personalities of their own and one had to develop their own relationships with them. On the other, because the relations between gods and humans and language and other beings were always shifting, and the hermeneutics of similitude and the semiology of signatures always coinciding with some parallax (hence the need for interpretation), every situation to come would be different and no general theory would be practical.

The Ancients’ approach to educating followed this. Recognising that there was no useful transferable prescriptive approach, they favoured story-telling or narrative (which sounds more impressive) as a means of stimulating each person’s unique *telos*, *daemon* or approach to seeking to connect with the connections of knowledge. Perhaps the best-crafted exposition of this approach is that of Plutarch (*Per. 2*):

> It is true, of course, that our outward sense cannot avoid apprehending the various objects it encounters, merely by virtue of their impact and regardless of whether they are useful or not: but a man's conscious intellect is something which he may bring to bear or avert as he chooses, and can very easily transfer it to another object as he sees fit. For this reason we ought to seek out virtue not merely to contemplate it, but to derive benefit from so doing so. A colour, for example, is well suited to the eye if its bright and agreeable tones stimulate and refresh the vision, and in the same way we ought to apply our intellectual vision to those models which can inspire it to attain its own proper virtue through the sense of delight they arouse. [Such a model is] no sooner seen than it rouses the spectator to action, and yet it does not form his character by mere imitation, but by promoting the understanding of virtuous deeds it provides him with a dominating purpose.

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IV. Spiral time - history changing while its elements are repeated

[H]uman affairs form a circle, and... there is a circle in all other things that have a natural movement and coming into being and passing away. This is because all other things are discriminated by time, and end and begin as though conforming to a cycle; for even time itself is thought to be a circle.

Despite the claim of Modern historians that their tradition began in Ancient Greece, the writers of Greek antiquity never undertook what Fukuyama (1992) calls a “Universal History”, that is, an attempt to find a linear-progressive patterns in the overall development of human societies generally. The historical excursions of Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon certainly do not fit this bill, and while Plato spoke about a certain natural cycle of regimes in the *Republic*, and Aristotle’s *Politics* discussed the causes of revolution and how one regime yields to another, ‘revolution’ was used very much in its now less common sense of ‘re-volving’, rather than overthrowing and moving forward. In keeping with the views described above, Aristotle believed that no regime could satisfy people completely and that the ensuing dissatisfaction would lead to the development of a different regime as another was concealed, in an endless imperfect cycle.

History for the Greeks was cyclical or, more exactly, spiral, given that elements would often come around again without joining up to form the same pattern. Time, by the Classical period at least, was a combination of linear and circular. While things constantly changed and were different than before, they were not qualitatively progressive. Elements, including knowledge, would always be coming and going. Herodotus, who described his work as the result of his wanderings and researches from his particular viewpoint (or *historiai*) in an attempt to keep the memory of some deeds of
the past alive in the present, considered his work “artistically completed” with the revisiting of the character of Cyrus the Great that began the work, with “the tail of the snake curved round into his mouth” (Rawlinson 1997: 727). While Eco (1992) notes that although Modern historians like to focus on what they see as the embryonic rational or linear-progressive aspects of Greek thought, the Greek world was at once attracted by Apeiron (infinity) or that which has no modus: that which existed but was not part of present norms, yet could, one day, spiral back. This way of seeing was connected to the myth of Hermes:

Fascinated by infinity, Greek civilization, alongside the concept of identity and non-contradiction, constructs the idea of continuous metamorphosis, symbolized by Hermes... In the myth of Hermes we find the negation of the principle of identity, of non-contradiction... and the causal chains wind back on themselves in spirals: the after precedes the before, the god knows no spatial limits and may, in different shapes, be in different places at the same time (Eco 1992: 28-9).

Subsequently, the past, present and future were interwoven. The concept of telos made the past and future very much alive in the present and time was not able to be separated out into progressive stages. Given the web of knowledge relationships and interests, time and history could not follow a linear united path progressing toward to a unifying end or connected to some underlying universal humanity. Greek physics also worked from these assumptions. In Demokritos’ atomism, matter was made up of minute particles. Different rearrangements produced the effect of changeable qualities but there was no guiding intelligence. The blind interplay of atoma happened by chance:

The atoms struggle and as they are carried about... because of their dissimilarities and... differences, and as they are carried about they collide and are bound together in a binding which makes them touch and be contiguous with one another but which does not genuinely produce any other single nature whatever from them; for it is utterly silly to think that two or more things could ever become one... they hold on to one another and remain together up to the time when some stronger force reaches them from their environment and shakes them and scatters them apart (Simplicius CoOTH 294.30-295.22).
The notion of a Universal History is therefore not a universal concept - it would be Christianity that first introduced the necessary beliefs to sustain an interest in it: the concept of the fundamental equality of all men and all nations as branches of a more general humanity under God’s plan; and the concept of a history that was linear and finite in time (beginning with God’s creation of man and ending with his final salvation).

V. Many schools of thought

The factors preventing knowledge are many: the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of human life. Protagoras, (frag. 4).

Moderns resolved the ‘factors preventing knowledge’ by agreeing a universal method, dividing the world up and specialising in order to build up the collective store: de-personalising knowledge so that intelligence, accumulated in a life of relations, did not die with individuals. Moderns, unlike the Greeks, did not assume that connections would continuously multiply or that some portions of knowledge would always be in chaos. Hence, Laplace (1749-1827) would write that the expressions of probability, used in his time to describe the likelihood of events, were expressions of partial ignorance that the Modern ‘Commonwealth of Knowledge’ would soon resolve. He argued that because we did yet not know all the mechanical causes of things we had to resort to conjecture in the interim and some conjectures could be shown to be more probable than others.

Greek thinkers, not seeing themselves as part of a Commonwealth with a common cause and one true general method, and lacking the will to collectively know all, were free to be less ‘disciplined’ and more broad-ranging than their Modern counterparts. For the Greeks, the spreading, relative and interpretative nature of things meant that one school of thought would limit rather than determine knowledge. Many incommensurable
and unspecialised schools (now usually referred to collectively as ‘pre-Socratic’ - i.e., pre-proper philosophy) existed side by side and one could legitimately postulate many different answers to questions like “what came first?” Mythology suggested Chaos. Thales answered Water; Anaximenes Air. Parmenides countered that since plurality and change were ‘givens’ and no unity could generate a plurality, there could be no singular primordial element. Empedokles posited Fire, Water, Earth and Air as the uncreated elements that produced the world through processes of Love and Strife or connection and separation. Demokritos postulated a vast number of constituent elements which “act and are acted upon as they happen to touch (for in this way they are not one) and generate by coming together and interlocking” (Aristotle OCTB 325a 33-5). Others named a single directive force or principle - Mind or Intelligence. This all amounted to what Dodds (1953: 43) called an “imperfectly mapped jungle” of thought. Modern historians of science would look back on the Greeks and claim that what needed to be overcome was the existence of many schools operating independent of each other, each “infected with an eager generality” (Whitehead 1926: 10). However, this ‘jungle’ enabled the development and co-existence of the wide-ranging, and quite different, views of the West’s two most influential thinkers: Plato and Aristotle.

In his Early Dialogues, seeking the elimination of conflict of meaning through the convergence of all parties on a single stable view, Plato depicted Socrates seeking pure definitions through a dialectic of argument, refutation and counter-argument. Socrates asked questions like “what is courage?” and worked toward the essential answer by reasoning against specific answers like “look at Laches, he is courageous”.

Plato built upon these ideas in what are usually referred to as the Middle Dialogues, searching for un-hypothetical starting points on which to found knowledge,
the permanency underlying change that explained the essence of objects. From this emerged the ‘Theory of Forms’. This distillation, from Socrates’ search for definitions, evolved from Plato’s observation that common names were used for different examples. Given this, he believed that there must be, for example, a perfect ‘beautiful’ form that we refer to in giving meaning to calling particular things beautiful. Empirical observations would show that such forms did not exist in the world around us but they had to exist to make sense of our world and speech. There must be, Plato argued, another world that contains these forms, a second ‘Theory World’ of ideal or pure Forms, which had to be sought in our ‘mind’s eye’ or imagination. Knowledge of these Forms must therefore be the starting point for development. Once these ideals were conceived, we could direct our own imperfect world toward them.

While the position adopted by Plato may appear orthodox from a Modern point of view (largely because it was utilised by the founders of Modernism, as the next chapter will demonstrate), it idiosyncratically transformed many elements of popular belief in his own time (Davies 1984). For example, Plato turned the unique telos or daemon within each human that various gods may act upon into a sort of lofty universal spirit or Freudian super-ego (Dodds 1953). It was this transformation that led to Plato being named the psychological key to Christianity, scientific rationalism and Modernism.
While Aristotle also demonstrated Apollonian or Modern characteristics, more significant were his attempts to counter Plato’s idealistic Theory World (Annas 1986). For Aristotle, every-being existed on the surface of everyday life - one could not lift or abstract Forms over and above particular things and actions. Subsequently, he avoided applying general theories across a number of subjects, respecting the circumstances of specific cases, claiming that one should “look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits” (NE 1094b. 23-5). He thus exhorted thinkers not to aim at a general certainty in human affairs. The thinking of both Aristotle and Plato co-existed for a time. However, beyond antiquity, it was Aristotle’s brand, closer to the pre-Socratics than Plato, that prevailed (Toulmin 1990).

VI. Ethos: telos, custom and convention

To ask whether Homer’s people are determinists or libertarians is a fantastic anachronism: the question has never occurred to them, and if it were put to them it would be difficult for them to understand what it meant. 


As indicated above, a human’s direction in life was influenced in this episteme in a number of ways at once: by the gods and the particular relationships that one had with them, by relationships with other sympathetic or antipathetic beings, by the customs and traditions that shaped these relationships, and by the individual human in question. Even

1 It should be noted that elements of Plato’s later thought are mindful of the irreducible nature of chaos, returning to the pre-Socratic type views he sought to overthrow. For example, Plato’s Later Dialogues appear at times to undermine the Theory of Forms (e.g., Timaeus 29). Above all, the later Plato points out that there will always be arbitrary factors and things we cannot explain: “the world is the product not of reason alone, but of the combination of reason and... the indeterminate cause” (Tim. 47-8; Laws 709, 899).

2 He developed structured schema and categories that classified reality; while he thought that there were many different sciences, each with their own axioms, he carefully divided and classified these and defined their logics drawing largely on the model of geometry; and his investigations into first causes and dynamic principles have been identified as laying the foundations for Modern science.
‘within’ each human a number of conflicting relationships played. Indeed, the Archaic Greeks had no unified concept of what we call ‘soul’ or ‘personality’. Homer, who has no word for the living personality, only credits people with something like it once they are dead or near death. The *thumos* that he refers to may have been ‘the organ of feeling’, but this enjoyed an independence which the word organ does not suggest to us, influenced as we are by the later concepts of organism and organic unity. One could converse with their *thumos*, almost as one person to another. Usually one took its advice, but one could scold it or act without its consent. A person may even have more than one, as did Odysseus when he “planned in his *thumos*” to kill the Cyclops immediately but was restrained by a second voice (*Odyssey* 9.299ff.). It is on this basis that Aristotle describes humans as ‘political animals’ for they acted not only on instinct or deterministically but also by debating and weighing up the claims of their different interests and influences before making decisions that could shape their destiny.

Consequently, the Greeks saw their actions as influenced from a number of different competing angles in a manner that Modern psychologists or structuralists would call “over-determined”. This allowed the Greeks to explain why things did not always work out as anticipated (there was always a gap in knowledge here because it was hard to know which determining forces were in play and which would win out). However, it was problematic if one wished to establish linear causal links between actions and consequences. It also made it difficult to believe in a general prescriptive moral code as actions in particular circumstances could not be determined in advance of those circumstances and the interests that converged on them playing themselves out. However, the Greeks saw ethical questions as of great importance. A great deal of thought was given to how one could ‘carry oneself’, given the assumptions described above.
For Aristotle, the responsibility fell to the prudent individual who understood that they were operating in an unstable domain, without underlying essence or overriding law, and that their success subsequently owed “more to a good eye than to an unshakeable knowledge” (Aubenque 1963: 23). The prudent individual must therefore be open to opportunity or inspiration and seek connection to the relevant types of knowledge and tradition as they became apparent on a case by case basis. For example, the Greeks believed that the actions of a skilled physician did not follow a textbook but were connected to those of a skilled helmsperson. Both, given that it was impossible to know with certainty the anger or benevolence of the conditions in advance, had to negotiate a route with the aid of recognisable signs and compared with their experience of analogous situations, and obliged to make their way by conjecture based on particular traditions, individual circumstances and opinions (Pindar Pyth. IV270; Plato Rep. 360e-1a).

Acknowledging particular traditions or teloi rather than general codes consequently shaped ethics and correct human action. Aristotle’s moral schema involved three elements: untutored human nature, a human-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos and the moral precepts that allow him to pass from one to the other. Once one was aware of the telos they was aiming for (an awareness that could only come from self-reflection on one’s tradition and place in one’s world), “is” could imply “ought” and moral statements became statements of fact. ‘Knowing thyself’ (the Athenian’s favourite maxim) as opposed to knowing the general rules or human norms was what was most important here as this would enable one to know the interests, gods, myths, analogous situations and traditions that acted upon oneself or that one regarded as important. Knowing, or not forgetting, or connecting with, these things would help answer what one must do in order to be true to one’s traditions and community of relationships. This was
what one ethically ought to do and early Greek thought did not distinguish between ought and must. For example, to say ‘they are a good helmsperson’ implied that they, for a fact, did certain things that helmspersons traditionally did. This inspiration from the past would enable the helmsperson to react to the unique situations they faced and the influences acting upon them, thus adding to the tradition. On this view, each must seek to fulfil a unique combination of roles: member of a family, citizen, helmsperson, philosopher, servant of his or her Gods and so on, each of which had its own point and purpose. Of course, these things, which hinge upon the second of the three Aristotelian elements, are particular, culture-bound and shaped by tradition.

The subjectivity and the influence of particular customs and traditions that Modern science and ethics would try and be above were consequently crucial elements here. This was reflected in all aspects of Greek thought. Cambyses was shown by Herodotus (3.36) to be mad for failing to respect traditions other than his own, for not recognising that “custom is king of all”; Protagoras’ showed that any given thing was “to me such as it appears to me, and is to you such as it appears to you” (Plato Theaet. 152a); and for the atomist Demokritos (in Simplicius CoOTH 294-5), everything was “by convention”. By ‘convention’, writes Galen (EATH I 417-8K), Demokritos “means something like ‘by custom’, ‘relatively to us’, ‘not in virtue of the nature of things in themselves’”.

Ethos here was more about individual deportment across a community of relationships than achieving objective universal ‘goods’ or adhering to general norms, about finding a way of carrying oneself in a manner that was consistent enough to contribute to the community and different enough to enable others to recognise one and think one exemplary in one’s difference. Ethics was at once about being unique and about
complementing a community of relationships, aware of and developing one's traditions so as to be remembered in a positive light. For the Greeks, ethics were both determined and existential, both individualistic and collective.

**VII. Summary - seeing wisdom as metis**

I think of what Apollo affirms when, through the mouth of the poet Bacchylides, he says to Admetus: "You are a mere mortal; therefore your soul must harbour two thoughts at once". Blanchot, *The Infinite Conversation* (1993).

The world seen and spoken of by the Ancient Greeks comprised an irreducible blend of chaos and kosmos; cycles, spirals and lines; particular paths and connections and ordered frameworks. In their episteme there was order to be found but it co-existed on an irreducible measure of chaos. Their way of seeing was informed by the subjective analogy of the individual person and their numerous relations, who they saw as a reflection of a multi-dimensional mass of gods and goddesses. In particular, the personae of Apollo and Bacchus were invoked to characterise the co-dependence of kosmos/chaos.

This analogy of the intelligent organism provided a microcosm which promoted the appreciation of the commonality or generality between things and the fact that each being had a nature, place and path particular to it. These particular natures were interconnected according to traditional contingencies and organised according to no overriding logic. They connected to others sympathetic to them and resisted those that were antipathetic. Knowledge was thus to be gained by reading similitudes. However, these connections were always relative, multiple and unfolding (while the spiralling interconnection of past-present-future ensured that being remained constant, beings were always becoming or changing, with some aspects in light and others in dark) so
interpretation had to be used and the outcomes of particular actions in advance would always be somewhat uncertain. The plurality of the network of relations and the fact that humans and their language were constantly wound up in this play rather than objective knowers and representers encouraged the co-existence of many schools which, because of the connectedness of what Moderns might see as things from disparate categories, did not specialise in particular spheres. Ethically, one sought to become a unique identity while being true to one’s many relations and traditions. One’s ethos or aims in the present were thus seen by the Greeks to be influenced by one’s particular relations and traditions. This pre-Modern visibility may be expressed with reference to the symbols below. Symbols that represent the ‘architecture’ with which they saw: the webs of being and connections that had to be read in order to know; the subjective microcosmic analogy; the co-appreciation of *kosmos* and *chaos* represented by the co-forms of Apollo and Dionysus; the spiral of history and particular inter-connections of past traditions, present and future.

This architecture was matched by the Greek’s manner of speaking. Articulating this world required the reading of similitude through the interpretation of analogous signs rather than appealing to objective universal measures. Language was thus seen as part of
the system of signs, relativistic and context dependent and analogous stories were invoked as a means of inspiring others to make a connection to knowledge. The style of thinking/acting and speaking that was admired was *metis*, perhaps best translated as 'practical wisdom' or 'effective intelligence'.

For the Greeks there existed a dichotomy between being and becoming, between order and contingency, between the integrative and dispersive. However, as Detienne and Vernant (1978: 5-6) explain, it was not simply:

that a series of oppositions between antithetical terms [were] set up. These contrasting concepts which are grouped in couples together form a complete system of antinomies defining two exclusive spheres of reality. On the one hand there is the sphere of being, of the one, the unchanging, of the limited, of the true and definite knowledge; on the other, the sphere of becoming, of the multiple, the unstable and the unlimited, of oblique and changeable opinion. Within this framework of thought there can be no place for *metis*.

Subsequently, unlike the multi-dimensional Athena - a woman born from a man - neither Apollo or Dionysus are described in myth as having *metis on their own*. It is significant that the quotation by Blanchot that began this section describes Apollo speaking through connection to 'Baccylides'. Detienne and Vernant (1978: 5-6) continue:

*Metis* is characterised precisely by the way it operates by continuously oscillating between two opposite poles... Thus when the individual who is endowed with *metis*, be he god or man, is confronted with a multiple, changing reality whose limitless polymorphic powers render it almost impossible to seize, he can only... enclose it within the limits of a single, unchangeable form within his control - if he proves himself to be more multiple, more mobile, more polyvalent than his adversary. Similarly... to pursue his way... across a world which is fluctuating and constantly oscillating from one side to the other, he must himself adopt an oblique course and make his intelligence sufficiently wily and supple to bend in every conceivable way and his gait so askew that he can be ready to go in any direction.

Not surprisingly, Plato was at great pains to dismiss intelligence as *metis*, going to considerable lengths to expose the impotence and harmful nature of its oblique procedures. The various forms that it could take ran contrary to his singular Ideal Forms.
Aristotle, by contrast, lauded *metis* (Detienne & Vernant 1978). Hence we see the reason why the much-admired wily Odysseus is most commonly preceded by the epithet 'resourceful' - his greatness lay in his happy knack of being able to bring the right knowledge and experiences, lived or heard, to bear at the right moment to determine the best path for him in the circumstances. This view of wisdom reflected back into the episteme thus described. It supposed a relativism but not one that collapsed into an 'anything goes' solipsism. Moreover, it guaranteed the existence of *chaos*. For how could *metis* be practised if not for the uncertain collusion, connection and cross-pollination of different circumstances and traditions?

After the co-existence of many disparate schools, the particular legacy from the Greek tradition that emerged into the Middle Ages is termed 'Aristotelianism', a manner of thinking based on Aristotle as modified by the Scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages. Plato's thinking survived in translation in the Arabic world but it had, for the time being, been lost to the West. The Renaissance of the 15th and 16th centuries was so called as many of the Ancient works that had been lost were 'unconcealed' again as they were brought back from the East (in particular, those of the more idealistic or mathematical philosophers like Plato and Pythagoras).

This was a time of great ferment as thinkers attempted to describe the world that was being resurfaced around them, an age of fantastic books of great range that would offend the sensibilities of the 17th century, books such as della Porta's (1535-1615) *Natural Majick* where instructions for making a mirror to make one's face "seem like an Ass, Dog, or Sow" and "merry sports with plain looking glasses" were placed next to 'serious' discussions of the uses of concave mirrors; or Aldrovandi's (1522-1603)
Natural History where animals (including an excellent chapter on serpents) were outlined via a mix of exact descriptions, reported quotations, fables, their use in heraldry, their habitat, their sympathies and antipathies, their mythological values and their use in medicine and magic. Buffon (in Foucault 1970: 38) would later express astonishment at such a work, complaining that it was “all legend” (“Indeed”, Foucault wrote, “for Aldrovandi and his contemporaries, it was all legenda - all signs to be read”).

Thinkers such as Machiavelli (1469-1527) and Montaigne (1533-1592) were once again free to be incommensurably informed by both a practically-minded Aristotelianism and a theoretically-minded Platonism. Machiavelli worked from the premise that investigations should issue generalisations from which laws could be drawn. However, he also believed that no matter how good a stock of generalisations one amassed, Fortuna, the goddess of unpredictability, was ineliminable from human life (MacIntyre 1981). His approach consisted in a willingness to follow laws or virtues when possible and an equal willingness to disregard them when fortune and changing circumstances constrained him or presented unexpected opportunity. Given that things were unpredictable, it was pointless to take a solely reductionist approach to theory making. Consequently, Machiavelli “confronted theory with practice”, expressing his maxims via narrative experiential examples rather than general laws (Skinner & Price 1988). Montaigne (1995: 79) similarly found “all grosso-modo judgements to be lax and defective” and that the “only thing that is universal about the human race is precisely its irreducible difference” (in Gardiner 1996: 42). He also concluded that “unless some one thing is found of which we are completely certain, we can be certain about nothing”. In rising to this challenge, Modernism would soon upset the incommensurable co-habitations that inspired metis. The Western World’s last serious microcosm picture is dated 1572 (Seznec 1953).
Modernism sees intelligence as the furthering of certainty and control, via a general method, toward objectively measurable universal ends. It is based on the belief that firm foundations for knowledge can be found by looking beneath secondary conventions to the universal dimensions of space; the analogy that the world and its components are directed and move as a clockwork mechanism; that knowledge comes from measuring and representing things objectively through the application of objective units; a view of time as universally linear, history as evolution and being as driven by the quest to be at the cutting-edge; that at this edge there should only be one central school of thought, and this is scientific; and, that human sciences will determine the correct or normal manner in which Man should act. This promotes looking at the world from a hierarchical-triangular perspective, as an observer from a detached, objective, central perch, upon particular subjects against universal measures and aims. The universal aims that Modernism has come to speak in terms of include Humanism, the new, capital gains and, since the turn of the 20th century, performative efficiency.

4. MODERNISM

Modernism is a complex system seeking to assert itself and achieve mastery in an environment deemed dynamic and complex.

“The knowledge, I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophises orderly”. This is Descartes’ 17th century rock of certainty, upon which much of how the Modern world sees is built. It was well received by a society increasingly ill at ease with the chaos, relativity and uncertainty accepted in an episteme influenced by the Ancient Greeks. It proved a successful counter-punch against Montaigne’s 16th century “unless some one thing is found of which we are completely certain, we can be certain about nothing”.

Why was one century comfortable with Montaigne while the next warmed to Descartes? Toulmin (1990) argues that the rise of Protestantism challenged Europe’s over-arching unifying authority - the Catholic Church. In the unstable aftermath of wars
fought over foundational assumptions, the 17th century wanted to find a way whereby divisive pluralism could be laid to rest once and for all - through the development of an all-encompassing rationality.

Giddens (1990) relates this desire for certainty to the rise of four "institutional dimensions" that furthered and were enabled by the rise of European nation-states. The economies of these states brought together the twin dimensions of capitalism and industrialisation, marking a break from traditional modes of production and conspicuous consumption to the measured and collective implementation of technology in a continuous quest for cost minimisation and profit maximisation. This sparked increased investment and continual growth via constant innovation and reworking of production processes. Consequently, a capitalist economy is intrinsically unstable and restless. However, for it to function well, it requires a stable certain environment conducive to encouraging the long-term investment (chaos on kosmos rather than the other was around). The success of a nation-state thus relied upon providing an underlying stability without overly harnessing capitalism's restless energy. This required the development of the two other dimensions: gentle methods of surveillance and the monopoly control of violence through the development of national military forces, police and judiciary systems. The implementation of these two means of co-ordination and control required the establishment of certain objective foundations against which particular actions could be measured. Such procedures were also necessary to bring order to property rights, another crucial cog in the wheels of capitalism.

Foucault (1977a) similarly put the desire for objective universal certainty down to the arrival of an Age that saw the rise of humanism, egalitarianism, secularism and capitalism making traditional modes of control - customs, class-systems, violence done to
the body - increasingly untenable. He argued that these had to be replaced with other, more subtle, forms of control. The emphasis shifted to the development of centralised procedures of *normalisation* via the identification of bands of objectively normal behaviour and *surveillance*, in order to ensure that these norms were adhered to.

However, the *Philosophes* of the 18th century Enlightenment did not see developments as so contingent. For them, the ideas of the 17th century's great thinkers - Descartes, Galileo, Newton - came about and proved persuasive because they were closer to the truth than what had passed for knowledge before. The *Philosophes*, or *'Modernes'*, as they were often called, saw themselves and the events they lived through as adjudicators of a contest between the 'ancien regime' and a new body of knowledge that they delineated. They judged the new to be a progression, a sign of contemporary Man's righteous assertion over other worldly beings. Combining this with the opposition being fought out in their Age between traditional and new forms of production and government, enabled this to be seen as the Age of Revolutions: the Glorious, the French, the American, the Industrial and the Scientific. These are 'revolutions' in the Modern sense, as the overthrow of the past, rather than the Ancient view of re-emergence or things coming around again.⁹

Modernism's key beliefs, and two differences from the Ancient Greek episteme, can be seen in the desires described above. Firstly, they indicate that it had become Man's aim and destiny to overcome *chaos*, via the accumulation of a certain ordered set of general principles that represented the way things actually worked. This was the project that the thinkers of the 17th century are seen to have begun. Secondly, they indicate that Modernism is 'revolutionary' in that the new, because it is regarded as bringing us closer

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⁹ To the 17th century, a 'revolution', in keeping with its Latin prefix 're' (meaning 'back to' or 'again'), invoked the idea of celestial bodies moving around in an circular orbit, or the return and recurrence of a particular point in time.
to certain understanding, is both better than the past and 'consigning it to history'. This is how the *Philosophes* made sense of the ideas of the 17th century. They articulated the history of thought as a linear path and saw themselves as moving on this path beyond a view of the world that accepted an ever-present measure of uncertainty or *chaos*, and the corresponding view of intelligence as *metis*. Man now believed he had the power, if he put his mind to it, to assert a great degree of *kosmos* over *chaos* and gain a greater degree of control. Intelligence was now about furthering certitude, about "enlarging the bounds of Human Empire, to the effecting of all things" (Bacon *NA* III: 156).

The assertion of objective certainty over *metis* required a complex system of interlocking components. The objectification of space via the removal of subjective particularity from our comprehension of it would enable traditional opinions to be swept away and 'firm foundations' on which to build to be established. The clockwork mechanism would provide a complex but unvarying analogy for conceiving motion against objective space. Certain knowledge would untangle the messy web of similitude via the development of mathematics as a 'universal calculus', the development of horizontal tableau assigning certain 'species' a definite place within universal space, and the discovery of underlying characteristics would order a verticality of progress or hierarchy of evolution. This verticality encouraged an objective certainty of time, nature, history and knowledge as cumulative, collective and linear - where the new must be more evolved than the old. The Scientific Method would be identified as the most evolved and hence one true school of thought, and the centralisation of knowledge academies would establish institutions with which to accumulate, order and unify these laws. Finally, the birth of Man, a generalisable object subject to scientific inquiry, would enable certain norms about this most complex of specimens to be developed, norms that would inform
humane general codes and provide certainty with regard to normal human action and the
general ends toward which humanity should direct itself. The following paragraphs
describe the development of these dimensions of Modernism’s system of assertion.

I. Kosmos underneath: firm foundations, certain space

Men are taught and wont to attribute stupendous
unaccountable effects to sympathy, antipathy, fuga vacui,
substantial forms, and especially to a certain being that
they call Nature; for this is represented as a kind of
goddess, whose power may be little less than boundless
[and this] veneration has been a discouraging impediment
to the empire of man over the inferior creatures of God.
Boyle, Works 5 (c. 1620).

To measure a quantity one needs a unit. Ideally this unit
should have universal rather than local significance.
Anonymous, The Making of The Modern World -
Milestones of Science and Technology (1998).

The Greek tradition encouraged veneration towards the natural world and the unclear web
of relations that sustained and moved its beings. This dynamic web was now seen as an
impediment to the pediment that had to be laid as a foundation for certain knowledge.
Bacon wrote of commencing “the whole thing anew upon a better plan... a total
reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all human knowledge, raised upon the proper
foundations”. Descartes was “convinced of the necessity of... commencing anew the work
of building from the foundation, if [we] desired to establish a firm and abiding
superstructure in the sciences”. His “design was singly to find ground of assurance, and
cast aside the loose earth and sand that I might reach the rock”. In Power’s words, these
were “the days that must lay a new Foundation of a more magnificent philosophy, never
to be overthrown, a true and permanent philosophy”.

To achieve this pediment, knowledge had to be disenchanted, de-individualised
and depersonalised (Midgely 1992). ‘Surface differences’ had to be undermined to reach
the common, the underlying and the unvarying. Whereas the Aristotelians had been "deceived about the character of the facts of the natural and social world by interposing interpretations between themselves and experienced reality", Modernes would "strip away interpretation and theory and confront fact and experience just as they are" (MacIntyre 1981: 78). The Modern depersonalisation and consequent 'Enlightenment' required the establishment of newly ordered categories and distinctions.

Firstly, in the Ancient Greek episteme, all things contained and were moved by anima (cf. Hobbes' quip that it was as if "stones and metals had a desire"). However, there was now an increasing distinction made between animate and inanimate objects, between animal, vegetable and mineral. Now a hierarchy was set whereby the mineral and then the vegetable provided the static ground upon which animals, of which Man was superior, moved.

Secondly, the Aristotelian view assumed different domains of space, each subject to particular principles dependant on the 'personalities' of the beings involved. All beings on earth, and between the earth and moon, were subject to familiar processes of birth and change and decay and all motion was rectilinear and discontinuous while the perfect bodies of the sun, the stars and the planets moved in steady and smooth circles over the world. Galileo's identification of blemishes on the sun that moved irregularly and a far greater array of celestial forms than had previously been encountered, forms that did not always appear to be moving in a circular progression, threw the Aristotelian system into doubt. The observations and experiments of Kepler and Galileo would show space as a singular domain, a consistent unvarying fabric against which action took place (Shapin 1996).

Thirdly, Descartes made I think, therefore I am the rock of certainty upon which
all knowledge could be founded. Once this had been established, the knowing mind was the one unvarying thing we could be sure of. This bestowed upon the mind a privileged status, taking it out and placing it above the action. From here, we could begin to build from this foundation toward a knowledge of all else. All other objects extended below the knowing mind were matter. Descartes moved the world beyond the Greek view of knowing as an indistinguishable combination of thinking and acting (Parmenides frag. 3). Reason became a detached activity, humans seen as Rational in that they could self-consciously think without having these thoughts coloured by particular involvements.

Fourthly, from his mind-matter split, Descartes’ account of the reality of matter began by distinguishing between primary and secondary qualities. The secondary qualities were those based on convention and sense data that Descartes claimed could not have real existence. Underneath these, however, lay permanent objective primary qualities (a quite different perspective from the Ancient view that placed an emphasis on interpreting the signs on the surface of things). A knowledge of the underlying primary qualities, largely determined in terms of ‘function’ or movement across the fabric of space, would provide further foundation. This process of ‘Enlightenment’ is depicted below.
If this is combined with Descartes' distinction between the separate, observing, knowing mind and extended matter or 'body', it can be said that reality (i.e., primary qualities) is pure extension in 'space'. In *On Method* Descartes explains, "Nothing remains in the idea of a body except that it is something extended in length, breadth and depth; and this something is comprised in our idea of space, not only of that which is full of body, but even what is called void space [chaos]". As mind is regarded as pure thought, unextended and separate from the body, so real matter, its counterpart, is pure extension devoid of substantial qualities except those involved in the nature of extension across the units of objective space. The 'deadening' of the mineral and the vegetable, under the animal; the creation of a unitary backdrop of space; the separation of mind over matter; the focus on the existence of objective primary functions beneath the superficial qualities - together, these assumptions re-ordered the prevailing view of the world.

The changes are manifest in this period's development of mapping. Maps had always existed. However, Modernism's quest for objective certainty, voyages of conquest that brought forth a diverse flow of empirical facts to be codified, the recovery of the Ptolemaic map into Europe and geographical knowledge and objectivity in spatial representation becoming commodities (as accuracy of navigation, the exact determination of property rights and investments, political boundaries and rights of passage became imperatives for the new nation-states), led to very different forms.

Medieval mapping emphasised the personal and 'mystical', rather than the rational-mathematical and objective qualities, of spatial order. Landmarks were often depicted in terms of their relative importance to a community or map-maker at the time of
The map’s construction, as opposed to their ‘actual’ size. The Ptolemaic grid, by contrast, presented an underlying objective framework on which in-coming data could be spatially egged (see Figure 10). Ptolemy had imagined how the world as a globe would look from outside or above. As a result, one could imagine that mathematical principles could be seen as primary and applied, as in optics, to the problem of global representation. Maps became abstract and functional systems for the factual codification and control of phenomena in space. Helgerson (1986) argues that Saxton’s (1579) Atlas of England and Wales (its cover emblazoned with “justice and peace have kissed each other - Truth shall spring out of the earth and justice shall look down from heaven”), enabled the English for the first time to assert a “visual and conceptual possession of the[ir] physical kingdom”.

Man’s ability to objectively space and hence assert himself over his world was advancing in other spheres. Vasari reported the Renaissance’s progress with regard to the ability to represent Man and his surrounds with perfect perspective and an accuracy that duplicated the senses (Byzantine art was now dismissed as a naive attempt, or a step on the way to more truthful expressions, rather than a particular style with different objectives of depiction). In the 17th century, Still Life (nature-morte) would go further, seeking to isolate, capture the essence of and represent Man’s objects (Sterling 1981). At the same time, patterns of life were increasingly measured against abstract units of measurement. Worth was objectified through the spread of centralised monetary systems while other objectivising practices emerged in banking, accounting, trade, agricultural production and the setting of standard chronological time (Kostof 1985).

The new order is apparent in Elizabethan portraiture where the presence of maps and globes mastered by Her Majesty and her court is a recurring theme. The Armada Portrait (see Figure 11), for example, shows the Queen in stark realistic style, with her
FIGURE 10: THE CHANGING VISIBILITY OF MAPPING – “PLAN DES DIMES CHAMPEAUX” (C. 15TH CENTURY); MERCATOR’S DEVELOPMENT OF PTOLEMY’S PERSPECTIVE (C. 16TH CENTURY); MAP OF FRANCE FROM A PROSPECTUS FOR A ‘NOUVELLE TOPOGRAPHIE’ (1780); MAP DRAWN UP BY THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO FACILITATE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION (1789). SOURCE: HARVEY (1990).
FIGURE 11: ELIZABETHAN PORTRAITURE – THE ‘ARMADA’ PORTRAIT (1588); THE ‘DITCHLEY’ PORTRAIT (1592).
hand resting surely on the world and the imperial crown significantly placed over it - the world becoming 'subject' to centralised human knowledge and control. A certain depth, that did not exist within the web of similitude had emerged - the beginnings of a new hierarchy. The 'Mind of Man' may look down on all the operations of life with the belief in their being underlying common grids, and primary qualities marked out using objective units, subject to the universal language of geometry or mathematics.

This spatial visibility transcends linear time to still be with us today, particularly in the form of multi-national corporations as they make particular decisions against underpinning general foundations. These forms are taken as indicative of an underlying global business culture as they span the nations of the world above local differences (Figure 12). They implement general principles of human psychology, motivation, marketing and business ethics. They employ advances in communications technology that overarch and unite the world’s disparate traditions, making earth an increasingly smaller and monitorable place. They are housed in offices of the Modern or International style, which, drawing from the great technological optimism at the turn of the 20th century, presents Modernism’s starkest expressions, a style that seeks to reduce buildings to “the absolute Platonic, pure minimum evocation” (Filler 1986), as indicated in the functional maxims of its gurus (e.g., Mies’ “Less is more”, le Corbusier’s “a house is a machine for living in”, and Loos’ “Useful = Beautiful”).

On the walls of these towers, Modern, mostly abstract, art is hung, cutting under secondary cultural differences to the essence of humanity, saying something to everyone from everywhere, while saying nothing explicit that could be claimed as offensive by any (Figure 13). While architecture was at its ‘most Modern’ in the first decades of the 20th century, Abstract Impressionism, a style that attempted to go further than the perfect
representation of the senses offered in Still Life and the height of Modern art, peaked in the 1950s. Impressionism had sought deeper understanding by representing what an artist's eye 'really saw' at the moment of conception, not what one could study in detail in perfect relief. Munch demonstrated the possibility of getting beneath surface appearance and distilling emotions into universal experiences through the use of simplified, sinuous forms and evocative blocks of colour (Piper 1988). Apollinaire described the works of his Cubist friends as "paintings in which the artist had tried to express the essential reality with great purity". The Abstract Impressionists, who saw colours and shapes as the purest means for expressing emotion, sought a medium freed of all extraneous conventions to capture the objective essence of the human experience and psyche and "to make individual psychology extinct" (Compagnon 1994: 67).  

II. The analogy of the clockwork mechanism - certainty of objective motion

The universe is not similar to a divine animated being, but similar to a clock.
Kepler, Mysterium Cosmographicum (c. 1605).

Kepler added to this view in a footnote to the second edition of Mysterium Cosmographicum in 1621: "[i]f you substitute the word 'force' for the word 'soul' then you have the very principle on which [my] celestial physics... is based". While he formerly believed that the cause of planetary motion was an internal soul that animated the planets, like other beings, toward their particular telos, he was now convinced that they were moved from without by a unified mechanistic force.

The conception of the foundation of an objective universal space, underneath

10 Freud's psychoanalysis, often referred to as 'depth psychology', is marked out as a key point in Modernism's advance for similar reasons (Toulmin 1990). Freud's (1895) Interpretation of Dreams expresses the belief that the workings of repressed memories rather than base surface physiological abnormalities cause most nervous illnesses (and are also the basis of non-neurotic personalities).
particular actions, was twinned with a reconfiguration of the understanding of movement. The depth provided by unitary characteristics presented a backdrop against which action could be objectively measured and understood as subject to unifying principles. In the words of Edgerton (1976), the “most far-flung places could all be precisely fixed in relation to one another by unchanging co-ordinates [meant] that their proportionate distance, as well as their directional relationships, would be apparent”. This possibility emerged as the Ancient Greek view of movement was seen as not particularly useful to enlarging the bounds of the human empire of knowledge. Bacon, for example, was exasperated by the Aristotelian animating principle, not so much because it did not make sense to him, but because he could not imagine an ‘applied’ teleology as he could imagine an applied mechanistic physics (Crombie 1957).

But how did one make palpable and communicate a new view of movement that, while it might seem more useful, went against sensory perception and everyday experience? Galileo’s part in establishing Modernism’s unitary backdrop has already been mentioned, but it is worth noting here that while his telescope had enabled him to question many traditional premises, it was not yet so powerful as to provide enough empirical evidence to infer an alternative model of movement. Galileo required more to seriously undermine this aspect of the Aristotelian system. The influence of Platonism, mathematics and the clockwork analogy would further develop what his telescope saw.

In the 15th and 16th centuries Plato was ‘recovered’ via the re-translation of his works from the Arab world (Brown 1994). Thinkers during the Renaissance had demonstrated how theories could be given more credence if they could be connected back to ‘the classics’ (Dresden 1968) and the invocation of Plato enabled Galileo to bridge a gap. Reference to Plato and Pythagoras legitimated an imaginative and mathematical
treatment of the world, as opposed to a dutiful empiricism or Aristotelian traditions. For Plato, the material world was an imperfect realisation of an ideal world on which it was patterned. Thus, one could best understand the material world by viewing it first in imagination from the vantage point of the ideal (Westfall 1971). This point could only be found in the mind's-eye, in reason and imagination. “Imagine what would be observed,” the Galilean Salviati says to the simple Aristotelian Simplicus in Galileo's Dialogue, “if not with one's actual eyes, at least with those of the mind”.

The Platonic view also looked on nature in geometric terms and conceived of the kosmos as constructed according to the principles of mathematical order. Galileo now argued that knowledge ought to be imagined as mathematical in form because nature was mathematical in structure, quoting Plato's dictum that “the world was God's epistle written to mankind and it was written in mathematical letters” (Kepler claimed likewise that “God... in creating the universe and regulating the order of the cosmos, had in view the five regular bodies of geometry as known since the days of Pythagoras and Plato”).

Mathematical reasoning was, however, somewhat difficult and abstract. It did not bring to mind an analogy that could readily express the new system that the new thinkers proposed. However, suitable metaphors were now ready-to-hand. The development of chronometers had paralleled advances in the objectification of space. While early clocks were somewhat unreliable and costly, by the late 16th century (with the discovery by Galileo of the isochronism of pendula), mechanical clocks telling time according to one constant rhythm that did not vary in length according to the season and latitude as with the sundial, had become an increasingly reliable feature of everyday life and language. The clock provided a credible and powerful analogy that could be used to transmit a challenge to traditional thinking that people could relate to. The universe must move like
clock-work, a complex arrangement of parts moving in different directions at different angles and speeds in unison and regular harmony, according to a universal logic against a universal space. The machine-clock consequently became the "founding metaphor of Modern science" (Dupre 1993: 2).

For the astronomical tradition up to Galileo, only the heavenly motions offered scope for geometrical analysis. However, after Galileo's success it was thought that mechanics could also be applied back to terrestrial motions. If it was possible to infer the movement of the heavens through a mechanistic and mathematical imagination, then, given that space was universal, so it was that the behaviour now attributed to the heavens could be brought down to earth. Perhaps the vegetable, the animal and even Man was like a machine? Hobbes, dubbed the father of psychology, wondered what it was that held action in human societies together, from whence did or could an underlying order and equilibrium in changing human affairs come (this was later termed the 'Hobbesian mystery')? After visiting with Galileo in 1636, he conceived of generalising the science of mechanics, geometrically deducing human behaviour from the abstract principles of Galileo's science of motion. Hobbes thought that an all-inclusive theory could be built, starting with simple movements studied in geometry and culminating in the movements of humans in political life (Valentine 1997).

Descartes also adopted Galileo's new view. The machine provided him a powerful analogy with which to conceive movement on earth: "it is not less natural for a clock, made of the requisite number of wheels, to indicate the hours", he would claim, "than for a tree which has sprung from this of that seed, to produce a particular fruit". Descartes endeavoured to further eliminate obscurity by promoting the view that all natural phenomena are caused by invisible (but imaginable) mechanisms, entirely similar to
those mechanisms becoming familiar in everyday life. While one could not sense these mechanical characteristics, one could employ one’s mind’s eye to find them. This view implied that complex objects were best tackled by dismantling them and treating their component parts, or building blocks of matter, before reconciliation via over-arching unifying theories. This conception of nature was “startling in its bleakness - but admirably contrived for the purposes of Modern science” (Westfall 1971: 31).

For Descartes, the human body was also “a machine”, but one “made by the hand of God, which is incomparably better arranged and adequate to movements more admirable than is any machine of human invention”. Despite Galileo’s well documented problems with the Catholic church, the Churches soon took to and reinforced these new mechanistic views. The Ancients believed that the human body was connected to the universe through a series of ‘occult’ correspondences and influences that had emerged with no over-riding logic. However, the mechanical metaphor implied that the world had been built according to some plan, and who else could have built such a magnificent machine but God? For thinkers like Bacon, Descartes and Newton, faith in God was both a conclusion of research and a starting point. Newton, for example, dealt only with what he called ‘efficient causes’ - those things that God’s design caused. He never doubted that the only possible final cause was God - The Prime Mover, an all-knowing, all-overseeing, rational planner (Dupré 1993; Clark 1992). This view was soon regarded by the Churches as far more agreeable than anima. Imbuing the natural world with a range of inherent active powers tended to dispense with the explanatory role of a God conceived as the one wholly supernatural entity. The idea of one all-powerful God as the Rational creator of a wondrous artifice that only human vice could upset, promoted the Church as the monopoly supplier of a complete and stable knowledge of the supernatural.
Modernism was thus set in motion as mathematically inclined astronomers discovered that their unitary creator God was a mathematician who had employed Platonic principles of geometry. Galileo’s telescope and Kepler’s experiments provided enough evidence to induce that Aristotle was incorrect. Their mathematical reasoning and idealism, combined with these evidential empirical fragments, gave a vantage point from which to deduce an alternative. Galileo’s assertion that the Earth would “become a heavenly body in the Copernican system” (Westfall 1971: 22) indicates how the Modern had turned over the Ancient. From a view of the world, and upward to the heavens, through the metaphor of a person in terms of their own experience, the gaze of knowledge had now become one where the world’s movements were looked down at as operating like an ideal mechanism, just like Galileo and Kepler had proven the heavens to be.

III. Representation, order and beyond - certainty of knowledge

Method consists entirely in the order and disposition of the objects towards which our mental vision must be directed if we would find out any truth.

Descartes, On Method (c. 1637).

[N]ow the history of man is merely the continuation of that of animals and plants; the universal historian finds traces of himself even in the utter depths of the sea, in the living slime. He stands astounded in the face of the enormous way that man has run, and his gaze quivers before the mighty wonder, the Modern man who can see all the way! He stands proudly on the pyramid of the world-process; and while he lays the final stone of his knowledge, he seems to cry aloud to listening nature: “We are at the top, we are at the top; we are the completion of Nature!

Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History.

Changes brought about by the Modern episteme with regard to how knowledge was sought have already been indicated. The separation of universal primary features and units of measure underneath the play of similitude, and the rational knowing mind as over and above, had made a knowledge of action based on generalisable external factors a
possibility. Beyond this, Modernism would seek to apply three new measures toward ordering things and making knowledge more certain: detaching an objective universal language that the separate knowing mind could bring to bear to represent things (formerly 'beings'); establishing objective tables, not unlike Ptolemy's grid, upon which different things could be permanently ordered; and, finding the underlying characteristics that united the spread of things tabled.

Now that all matter could be viewed as comprising mechanisms, and since mechanistic workings could be expressed in mathematical symbols, mathematics became formally capable of objectively representing all things. The novelty in Descartes' method was the affirmation that knowledge is not created through the deduction of particular sympathies, or from the accumulation of particular cases as Bacon suggested, but from perceiving the universal, general and timeless in the particular. Similarly, Descartes looked behind the differences of separate modes of inquiries to their common method and assumptions. *The Method* describes his subsequent discovery, by the application of algebra to geometry, of the generality of mathematics. Mathematics could underpin and unify all the spheres of knowledge that Aristotle was content to leave subject to their own particular maxims, its objectivity bedding down the fabric of abstract time and space without reference to local human experience against which all being could be seen.

In this spirit, Leibniz (1646-1716), whose early work included a project to preserve peace within Europe by finding a rational foundation for Christendom acceptable to both churches and the construction of a calculating machine, developed the Infinitesimal Calculus. It was Leibniz's belief that the aims of the Enlightenment could be more readily achieved if a *characteristica universalis* could be developed. The 17th century had witnessed a lively interest in the invention of an artificial language to replace
Latin as the medium of international communication and scholarship, that left Leibniz a substantial body from which to work. An interest in such systems developed at this point for two reasons. Firstly, mastering Latin was seen as time-consumingly inefficient: Milton remarked that “we do amiss to spend seven or eight years merely in scraping together so much miserable Latine and Greek, as might be learnt otherwise easily and delightfully in one year” (OE 1644). Secondly, the lack of a logical relationship between Latin words and their objects came to be regarded as problematic. Latin, although far less relativistic than Greek, had developed without systematic forethought. Moderns wished for a language built from a clean slate to logically represent objects, a language in which “grammar was regular and simple... syntax grew from natural processes of thought, and the significance of every part of an unknown made its meaning clear upon analysis” (Schumaker 1982: 134). Much less exertion would be required to distract the memory from the further intelligence and, more importantly, mastery of the language (given that it positively mirrored reality) would bring a certain understanding of everything.

In addition to language losing its kinship with other beings, to become regarded like mind, as a separate entity capable of objectively representing things, Modernism saw the development of what Foucault (1970) calls a “general science of order”. The establishment of measures, like mathematical units, independent of the teeming world but having real meaning, would enable objective grids, tables or taxonomies upon which different beings could be classified. Different ‘things’ would come to be categorised by common units of size, function, complexity, life-span and so on. While, the old system of

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11 For example, Lodgwick’s (1647) *A Common Writing: Whereby Two, Although Not Understanding One the Others Language, Yet by the Help Thereof, May Communicate Their Minds One to Another*, Beck’s *The Universal Character, By Which All the Nations of the World May Understand One Anothers Conceptions, Reading Out of One Common Writing Their Own Mother Tongues* (1657), and Dalgarno’s *Ars Signorum* (1661), announced by the author as “News to the Whole World of the Discovery of a Universal Character, and a New Rational Language”.  

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similitude was messy, hard to graph and always open to fresh possibilities, the Modern system of comparative order mapped out and fixed things and made the relations between them certain. It did so by appealing not to particular signs that have to be interpreted but to general units that could be used to analyse particular cases. Linnaeus' (1707-78) project of discovering the concrete domains of nature, which led to the "certain characterisations of organisms" (Barnes-Svarney 1995: 139), is but one example of "the table" as the 18th and 19th centuries' "centre of knowledge" (Foucault 1970: 75).

A certain 'verticality' would be added to this horizontal tabling of knowledge in the 19th century. Between 1775 and 1825, the Age of Revolutions, people became increasingly conscious of change or the discontinuity of the present vis-a-vis the past. Men wondered at where the characters in their tables had come from and became curious of the primary essences that must underlie the different characters they had categorised. ‘Time’ was thus added to the tables via the search for internal similarities, similarities that went deeper than the characteristics that were used in the comparisons that determined the lay out of tables. In biology we witness the search for essential functions. In economics, the basic underlying component of ‘labour’ is added to the categories of wealth and impoverishment. In linguistics the root of all languages is sought in order to make sense of differences and similarities between existing dialects. This verticality would certainly connect phenomena and express the coherence of empirical multiplicity. It is manifest in the ‘trees’ or ‘pyramids’ that are now a commonplace way of representing life and the linear relations between different types of life: with Man at the top looking down on the slime at the bottom (see Figure 14).

Ordering things into objective tableaux, demonstrating their uniform links over time, and recording these things with a universal representative language (all enabled by
**Figure 14:** The Biological Triangle-Hierarchy.  
Source: Bonner "The Ideas of Biology" (1962).
the belief in a certain objective space underpinning being, a means of objectively viewing things from above and the external and universal analogy of action running like clockwork), encouraged Modernism to see knowledge differently from the Ancients. Now knowledge did not have to be experienced or connected to. It could be captured, codified, put behind glass or accumulated in the archive, and transferred without personal contact. Modernism thus solved the problem of “the entry of the individual into the field of knowledge” (Foucault 1977a: 191; 1975) and enabled the “sciences of the individual” that Aristotle had warned against (Flynn 1994: 43). Knowledge had become both cumulative and progressive.

**IV. Linear time, history as evolution, the quest for the new - certainty of development**

Infinity is [now] posed as that which has not yet been determined, as that which the will must indefinitely dominate and appropriate. It bears the names of cosmos, of energy. It gives rise to research and development. It has to be conquered, to be turned into the means to an end.

Lyotard Political Writings (1993).

With regard to authority, it shows a feeble mind to grant so much to authors and yet deny time his rights, who is the author of all authors, nay, rather of all authority. For rightly is truth called the daughter of time, not of authority.

Bacon (c. 1620), in Shapin The Scientific Revolution (1996).

The notion of time that Bacon refers to was no longer cyclical or spiralling. No longer were the past, present and future interwoven. Time, like other units of measure, was readily reducible to objective units. It was linear, unidirectional and positive. Moderns come later than Ancients, time and knowledge is cumulative, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Therefore the virtue of being ‘new’ implies a greater knowledge. In the 5th century, the Latin term *Modernus* was used to distinguish the official Christian present from the pagan Roman past, and to this day to be Modern is to be new over and above the
old. The titles of many of the Scientific Revolution's key texts indicate the inversion of a scheme that had given the past an intellectual authority: Kepler's (1609) *Astronomia Nova*, Galileo's (1638) *Discourses and Demonstrations concerning Two New Sciences*, Pascal's (1647) *Experiences Nouvelles Touchant le Vide*, Boyle's (1660) *New Experiments*, and Bacon's (1626 & 1620) *New Atlantis* and *New Organon* (labelled so as to highlight its replacement of Aristotle's *Organon*). Modernism sees the authority of past authors as 'dated' and tradition as something that *could* and *should* be overcome, promoting a view whereby being or thinking 'new' becomes the value above all others (Compagnon 1994). Being was "reduced to the *novum*", to be at the 'cutting-edge' (Vattimo 1988: 99). This edge was seen as leading an advancing mastery via increasing the store of certain objective knowledge - the hunting down of infinity or *chaos*.

Modern capitalism, science and art all promote this will for the new. The nature of market competition forces capitalists to seek out new processes that will enhance their own profitability, relative to the social average, by reducing inputs over outputs. The scientific method would enable knowledge to advance on the 'path of certain progress' by uniting the Commonwealth of Knowledge. Once united, the Commonwealth could march forward efficiently building on firm foundations and ever-reducing *chaos*. This process is formalised in the notion of falsification whereupon scientific reason is a dialectic process, accumulating and progressing via the application of 'negative method', hunting down and eliminating internal contradiction and discord toward stable laws.

Linking this view of time and knowledge as advancing upwards and onwards toward the certain truth with Modernism's characteristic of seeking the underlying essentials that unite particulars, Descartes, in *On Method*, explains that "we shall comply with [reason] exactly if we reduce involved and obscure propositions step by step to those

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that are simpler, and then starting with the intuitive apprehension of all those that are simpler, attempt to ascend to the knowledge of all others by precisely similar steps”. Modern art followed a similar path. At the conclusion of the famous Salon of 1846, Baudelaire described the “advent of the new!” as the imperative that artists must strive for. Manet obliged, and is regarded as the first Modern artist due to his showing the present, as opposed to mythological or historical stories. Once art reaches the point of representing the present, rather than reflecting traditions into the present, it attaches itself to, and begins to move with, ‘the times’. Once tradition is left behind, it is a short step to a concern with being at the cutting-edge and art thus develops a sense of continual forward revolution. However, in order to distinguish itself from decadence, or change for change’s sake, revolution had to be identified with a course leading toward some sort of collective betterment. To this end, what the Moderns sought was ‘the essence of art’. Change must be about reduction and purification: from Manet to the Impressionists, the Cubists, the Abstractionists and on to “the white canvas, the slashed canvas, the charred canvas” (Eco 1994: 66; Compagnon 1994), all seeking to abstract the essence of art, life, emotion, and to be ahead of previous attempts in this respect.

With time regarded as a one-way advance, the future is ahead of the present and the present ahead of the past. History becomes progressive (how else could the Philosophes make sense of the Moderns over the Ancients?; how else could revolution be seen as an overcoming and leaving behind of the past?). Such thinking was not unique at the time of the 18th century revolutions. It can be connected to the early Christian scholars like Augustine who thought of progress in wisdom as the movement upwards toward God. What was different here was that this idea was now used to dismiss traditional thinking. Indeed, the Modern desire to revolt was acted out in the belief that it
would enable Man to emancipate himself from the shackles of tradition. As Collingwood (1960: 10) has observed, this aspect of Modernism could only have arisen from "a widespread familiarity with historical studies... of a kind which placed the conception of process, change and development in the centre of their picture".

Descartes dismissed history as an improper branch of knowledge because it focused on particulars rather than universals. However, Modernity’s gathering of information from all parts the world, and its interest in turning all beings into knowable objects, brought a great vogue for historical books by the time of the French Revolution (Bryson 1968). Yet, if history was to be taken seriously this interest had to be aligned with the view that human nature was universal. As Hume (1711-76) explained, history’s "chief use" would become "to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situation, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour" (Hume Enq.).

History became a predominant facet of Modernism by becoming the search for the universal underlying uniformity of the many particular historical events that were coming to be seen, thus addressing what Descartes saw as its original weakness. The differences between particular cases could be accommodated if one could show how the present state of a case had progressed from the past by building over the underlying origins. Turgot (1727-81), in On Universal History, sums up history’s new approach thus:

Universal History encompasses a consideration of the successive advances of the human race, and the elaboration of the causes which have contributed to it... the human race always remaining the same during these upheavals, like the water during storms, and always proceeding towards its perfection. To unveil the influence of general and necessary causes, that of particular causes and the free actions of great men, and the relation of all this to the very constitution of man; to reveal the springs and mechanisms of moral causes through their effects - that is what history is in the eyes of a philosopher.
Consequently, historical similarities were seen as confirming the universality of human nature, and differences perceived as the result of being at a different stage of a common process of development. The growing awareness of change over time, combined with the desire for the commonalities that bind, promoted the Modern aim to bring to light the permanent structures and essences that underlay all phenomena - to provide the unifying ‘meta-narratives’ (‘meta’ from the Greek for ‘over and above’) that explained the mechanism by which all history’s narratives progressed forth (Toulmin 1990). The most influential historical meta-narratives are those of Hegel, Marx and Darwin.

Kant (1724-1804) had viewed humans as eternally divided between animal desires and reason. Hegel (1770-1831) argued that this division was not natural, it could be overcome and equilibrium restored, reason and reality brought back into accord (Windsor 1990). In Ancient Greece, Hegel claimed, human nature was more harmonious, people were not conscious of any conflict between their desires and reason. By questioning and showing that conventional assumptions could not be logically sustained, Socrates upset the balance. History here witnesses the birth of the Modern concept of a reasonable, reflexive, restless and somehow alienated, individual consciousness. As a result, simple harmony breaks down. History, in Hegelian terms, is consequently seen as a purposive process of dialectic change, whereby there is a movement of thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis, thesis, and so on, toward the restoration of equilibrium at a higher level, embodied in a state of intellectual freedom called ‘Absolute Knowledge’ (“a higher form of truth through reconciliation and the unification of oppositions” - Gadamer 1981).

Consequently, Hegel defined history as the charting of this process. This perspective of the history of thought as a progressive mediation of lower positions, with
each new step witnessing the redundancy of those before it, strives to decipher, describe and analyse our steps along such a path. Aspects that cannot be seen as contributing to collective progression can be dismissed as not relevant - hence the mixed reception afforded the Greeks by Modern historians of science. What these historians do not see is Nietzsche's 'brilliant un-unified co-appreciation'. Instead, the Apollonian aspects are categorised as the 'beginnings' of Science that will be developed upon, the Dionysian aspects and appreciation of *metis* either left aside or listed as evidence of the naiveté that science was to overcome as it progressed (Whitehead 1926). The Hegelian dialectic has become Modernity's most pervasive view of the nature of history (Crombie 1957).

The depression of 1847, the first crisis of capitalism recognised as such, threw into doubt assumptions about its ever-progressive nature (Harvey 1990). Modernity could now be seen to not only be alienating Man from his true nature, as Hegel saw it, but also failing to provide material gains. Marx (1818-83) and Engels' *Communist Manifesto* was published in 1848. Like Hegel, Marx took alienated Man as his start-point. Through capitalism, an individual's 'force' becomes an objectified commodity to be bought and sold. This objectification of work served to alienate workers and consumers from the fruits of labour and separated Man from his natural state. While Marx sought the overthrow of capitalism ("one of the names of Modernism" - Lyotard 1993: 25), his model was essentially Modern. History progresses dialectically to culminate in a conflict-free society where Man realises his fundamental nature and is emancipated. If Man asserted himself over the machinery of history ("up to now, history has made man: from now on Man can make history" wrote Marx (*GI*)), a consensual utopia would result.

The idea of historical progress as a common process that connects and effects all aspects of life received a great boost from Darwin's (1809-82) *Origin of Species* (1859).
“All species, here or long gone”, wrote Darwin (in Silver 1998: 271), “belong to one biological family [and they can be arranged] on the great Tree of Life” (Figure 15). The thesis put forward by Darwin argued that the species that survived and prospered on the tree were those best suited to their environments. This explained the change of all species, regardless of particular differences. No longer did each species require a special act of divine creation: its particular form could be put down to natural causes operating over time within the system of the real world.

On this view one could no longer be satisfied with just looking for causes in the present within God’s divine design. Whereas thinkers like Newton had merely focused on the ‘efficient causes’ of God’s machine as it came to us - the stationary engine, Darwin’s view encouraged looking back down the linear causal chain of life. Modernism now saw time as an infinite causal chain stretching ever-back and ever-forward. Modern Man could no longer depend upon definite beginnings any more than he could be comfortable with particular traditional ends, notions that Aristotelian teleology and Christian providence had provided. Time was now a train, unfixed and without hub or terminus.12 Modernism’s point-of-view comes to be “the idea of history with its two corollary notions of progress and overcoming” (Vattimo 1988). “Historical periodization, a way of placing events in a diachrony ruled by the principle of revolution” becomes, in Lyotard’s (1991: 34) words, “an obsession characteristic of modernity”.

12 Married to the notion of linear time, Darwin’s particular use of ‘evolution’ even changed the West’s conception of the word. No longer would it be seen in its earlier sense of vegetative growth, an unfolding out from and circling about a centre (as did a bud). Evolution became a straight-line historical progression (Barfield 1926).
**Figure 15:** Darwin's Taxonomic Tree — showing the relation of Man to other primates. Drawn by Darwin on April 21, 1868. 
**Source:** Gruber "Darwin on Man" (1974).
V. One science and the centralisation of knowledge - certainty of method and institutions

Reason must not be content to follow, as it were, the leading strings of nature, but must proceed in advance with principles of judgement according to unvarying laws, and compel nature to reply to its questions. For accidental observations, made according to no preconceived plan, cannot be united under a necessary law. But it is this that reason seeks for and requires. It is only the principles of reason which can give to concordant phenomena the validity of laws, and it is only when experiment is directed by these rational principles that it can have any real utility... To this single idea must the revolution be ascribed, by which, after groping in the dark for so many centuries, natural science was at length conducted into the path of certain progress.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Bxii-iii).

Bacon wrote that the mind should not be “left to take its own course” but should be “guided at every step; and the business done as if by machinery”. The passage reproduced above is part of Kant’s depiction of the strides made, from Bacon until his own day, toward a Modern method, a method that is largely ‘Newtonian’. With time an arrow, only one school of thought could be closest to representing the truth without logical contradiction. The view of knowledge brought together by Newton is that which Modernism identified as ‘cutting-edge’.

Inspired by the mechanistic philosophers he first encountered as an undergraduate (Descartes, Boyle, Hobbes), Newton (1642-1727) had similarly seen his mission (Opt. Query 31) as overthrowing the case-specific approach of the Ancients:

To tell us that every Species of Things is endowed with an occult specifick Quality by with it acts and produces manifest Effects, is to tell us nothing: But to derive two or three general Principles of Motion from Phaenomena, and afterwards to tell us how the Properties and Actions of all corporeal Things follow from those manifest Principles, would be a very great step in Philosophy.

Newton’s work toward this aim would bring together mathematics and mechanism in what would become the definition of Good Science - the ‘holy-grail’: a universal theory that showed the world and its constituent parts to follow mechanical laws that could be
expressed in the language of mathematics.

Other laws of force had been developed, but before Newton they were largely specific (e.g., the magnet attracts iron but not copper). Newton's Law of Gravitation proved a power of gravity pertaining to all things proportional to their quantities of matter. This was universal, applying to planets revolving around the Sun and apples falling to Earth. As such, it affirmed the Modern tenets that space was universal, that all matter contained related basic building blocks or essence, and that it was uniformly subject to forces other than telos. Newton asserted an infinitely sized universe united by the identity of its fundamental contents and laws, a universe with no qualitatively physical distinctions, where astronomy and physics become interdependent and united because of their common subjection to mathematics. His law showed the world to be ordered and deterministic, that equilibrium maintained through gravitational attraction was a natural state and, being universal, extending beyond what had been observed in the present or past to what has escaped observation or has not yet been observed, it encouraged the belief that future states could be predicted.

Newton (1953: 1) summed up his method for arriving at such laws as follows: "discovering the frame and operations of nature, and reducing them, as far as may be, to general rules or laws - establishing these rules by observations and experiments, and thence deducing the causes and effect of things". It was based on the following assumptions. Firstly, that phenomena positively exist unaffected by, and independent of, the human mind. Secondly, that these phenomena exhibit generalisable laws that can be seen to govern events. Thirdly, that these laws can be grasped by induction (whereby laws can be discerned in the observation of events) combined with deductive reasoning (whereby laws can be developed in one's mind and then tested). Fourthly, these laws can
be used to make predictions about the nature of future events. To this model would be added what Popper termed 'falsifiability' whereby the scientist would seek to improve knowledge (i.e., reduce the chaos of uncertainty) by comparing predictions with phenomena and adjusting laws in light of the difference. (One can see how this model both inspired Hegel’s thesis-antithesis-synthesis model of progression and fortified it).

\[ \text{Mind} \]
\[ \text{Laws} \]
\[ \text{Induction} \]
\[ \text{Deduction} \]

\[ \text{Matter} \]
\[ \text{or Phenomena} \]
\[ \text{Predictions} \]

This is the model of seeing knowledge that has held sway in the West since the 18th century. It is clearly different from the Greek approach and adds deduction to Bacon’s half-Modern model of accumulating observations of phenomena. In effect, it replicated the step into his mind’s eye that Galileo made in order to overthrow Aristotle (combining empirical observation with Platonic idealism) but it was Newton’s success in developing his universal theory that would see it formalised as a universal method.

Following Galileo, Newton rejected physical theories unless they could be mathematically expressed and deduced from experiment. Their view in this regard is indicative of another of Modernism’s idiosyncrasies. As the telescope and the clock were being accepted as containing objective truth, mechanical means, in the form of artificially
contrived experiments controlled by the machinery of the laboratory, became increasingly acceptable as ‘standing for’ things in nature, despite showing things as different to how they were often felt by the human senses. Since space had been shown to be one and all matter subject to the same underlying principles of movement, it followed that mechanical experiments could replicate natural activity. Mathematics and machines would substitute for common human experience in order to provide a better window on knowledge. One of Aristotle’s basic distinctions - that what was natural and what was contrived belonged to distinct categories, so that one could not be implied from the other - was undermined, and human experience was no longer the measure of all things.

Agreement on the certain method for gaining knowledge, and the idea that experiment in one domain could stand for action in another, meant that learning could be centralised into public institutes by the Modern nation-states. The medieval schools had been run by independent schoolmen and had thrived on argument, conflict and contentiousness. The ‘sickness’ of Ancient knowledge practices was seen by the Modernes to have at least partly resulted from such competitive individualism. Their ‘cure’ lay in making the ‘method-machine’ a State tool.

Laying out a template in New Atlantis, Bacon described “Salomon’s House” as a bureaucratically organised research institute serving the interests of an imperialising state. Its purpose, typically Baconian, was both the extension of the “knowledge of Causes” and the “enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire”. Moves to establish such institutions were soon afoot. Observatories at Greenwich and Paris were founded in Charles II’s time,

13 By arguing that orthodox doctrine and common sense should not be taken for granted in physical reasoning this stance that had to be taken. This reasoning could not be tested other than by mechanical analogy: the motion of a cannonball would have to serve as a model for the motion of Venus.
with the specific aim of “perfecting navigation and astronomy” (Clark 1969: 214). Others with more general aspirations followed in the late-17th century in France, Britain, Italy and Germany (Ronan 1983).

The British Royal Society was established in 1660 “in order to bring together all manner of different thinkers from different traditions, in the hope of bringing to fruition the reform of natural philosophy which was widely perceived to be already well under way” (Porter & Teich 1992). This was to be achieved via the pursuit of “a Dominion over Things, and not only over one another's Judgments” (Sprat 1667). A publicist of the Society (in Shapin 1996) wrote that very “mischievous consequences” had flowed from the fact that “the Seats of Knowledge, have been for the most part heretofore, not Laboratories, as they ought to be”. It was hoped that subjectivities such as insensory capacity, variations in wit and divergence of interest might be corrected by the mechanical action of the proper method carried out under the auspices of public academies. Instead of old ideas talked round in circles, new knowledge would be born and shown to be true to all. The combination of the Modern institute and scientific method allowed the collection of information (inputs) to be subjected to the same standardised processes in order to produce objectively true laws (outputs). These could then be accumulated, building up the collective store of knowledge upon firm foundation. The new Academies developed a form uniquely geared to the production of the new along predetermined lines - bureaucracy.

The centralisation of academic pursuits enabled the decentralisation and

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14 At the outset, the Modern institutes further reinforced the primacy afforded science by seeing other spheres as best left aside. It was felt that discussions on religion and politics had generated unproductive divisiveness and conflict (Boyle noted that the progress of knowledge had been held back by the consideration of “morals and politicks into the explications of corporeal nature, where all things are transacted according to laws mechanical”). Thus, it was decided prior to its inaugural meeting that since such subjects could only divide people, there would never, under the auspices of the French Académie, “be a discussion of the mysteries of religion or the affairs of state” (Shapin 1996).
specialisation of academia. Once the proper method was established, scientists could forgo time spent developing and justifying approaches and get on with probing deeper into particular areas, knowing that others would be addressed in a similar fashion through the Commonwealth adding to a collective store. This is illustrated by the emergence of the Modern encyclopaedia in the 18th century. The *Encyclopédie*, brain-child of the *Philosophes*, was one of the first reference books to recruit experts as contributors in their respective discipline areas, earlier works with similar aims having been written by one or a small group of ‘jacks-of-all-trades’. Unlike the work of Montaigne, della Porta and Machiavelli, each contributor here wrote careful to efficiently publicise only the facts that had been produced so as to appear disinterested, his accounts devoid of personal experience and nuance. Moreover, in the Modern encyclopaedia, authors did not need to print their name after their essays, the person reporting the knowledge was no longer regarded as important - the knowledge was objective and spoke for itself.

In the Prospectus of the *Encyclopédie*, Diderot (1780) announced that in forming the “tree of all knowledge” (the “first crucial step” in the volume’s planning), he was indebted to the “extraordinary genius” of Bacon’s bureaucratic vision from *New Atlantis*. Diderot envisaged the *Encyclopédie* as truly bringing together the many aspects of knowledge hitherto gathered by the Commonwealth (Figure 16). While knowledge now had many branches, sub-branches and leaves, they could all be connected back to one unitary originative stem: scientific ‘Raison’.
VI. Human sciences - certainty of Man, his correct actions and our collective aim

Nature and Nature’s laws lay hid in Night; God said,  
Let Newton be! And all was Light.  

Newton’s [natural philosophy is] chiefly to be valued as it lays a sure foundation for natural religion and moral philosophy.  

Moderns, not content with the Ancient’s subjective, over-determined and teleological view of what guided human action, soon sought to remedy the situation through the application of the principles outlined above. While the Modern knowledge institutes that formed in the 17th century chose to leave divisive human affairs to one side, Newton’s breakthrough, an increased confidence in his method as universally applicable, and discoveries that pointed further toward there being common elements underlying all things (e.g., Hooke’s (1635-1703) discovery of vegetable cells with his microscope), soon saw ‘human things’ brought into the fold. Finding a correspondence between the general harmony of nature and that of humans and human society was the next step in Modernism’s assertion. It was a step that other changes brought about by Modernity had now made very necessary.

The nation-states of the West had become powerful by developing along capitalist lines. For this to continue, they needed to maintain their capitalist economies, and this required stability - stability that had previously been ensured by traditional means (e.g., religion, knowing one’s place, teleology, a sense of community). Modernism’s invention of time as linear and progressive and the undermining of particular customs now threw these into doubt. Having removed the influence of particular subjective or tradition-based ends in its quest for the certain, the general and the collective, Modernism would require some measures to enable it to give being an aim and enable progress to be assessed. Thus,
new problems were created. How does one define general modes of being? Modernism’s answer: *normalisation* or through recourse to a definition of what is normal and hence acceptable for every human. The question then became: how can the norm-rules be policed in order to maintain a stable society? Modernism’s answer was through *surveillance*. Modernism would see the development of two particular forms toward this quest for the provision and maintenance of general directions or collective measures of progress: *generic Man*, a new being driven by common elements to be investigated by the new ‘human sciences’; and *bureaucracy* as an ideal form of organisation, applicable not only to centralised knowledge academies and the military, but to all of Man’s institutions.

One may see the transformation of the human object by Modernism through contrasting the figures of Da Vinci and Borrelli (Figure 17). Leonardo depicts the particular life-model he found before him, and still draws from Galen’s animal analogies (by the end of the 16th century, Vesalius’ (1514-64) more stylised anatomy, based on the dissection and aggregated observation of humans, had become the legitimate system in the West). By the late 17th century, Borelli’s *De Motu Animalium* saw the body not just using an ordered and exacting approach, but reductively and idealistically through the metaphorical template of a machine (O’Malley 1969; Porter 1997). Da Vinci still attributed human action to a spontaneous animistic principle or the *natura naturans*. By the end of the 17th century this concept had disappeared, and the word ‘nature’ itself had come to mean mechanical properties or *natura naturata*. By the 18th, the works of Camper and von Soemmering that emphasised measurement of space and proportion claimed to be influenced by the aesthetics of Winckelmann who, in 1764, proclaimed “the absence of individuality” as an attribute of beauty. A new being had emerged: a
Figure 17: The Changing Conception of Man – Leonardo da Vinci (c.1500); Borelli (c.1700); British Health & Safety Association (c.1990).
generalisable object called Man comprised of the functional elements universal to his species. In time, Man’s minutest actions (soldiers’ steps, sitting, digestion) were subject to detailed analysis and a rigorous classification of bodily inputs, processes and according to this sort of abstract depiction. Norms for all aspects of human physiology and behaviour could henceforth be established by experts who scrutinised this object in ever-increasing detail.

Man’s social relations also became subject to the Modern gaze. Locke, having absorbed the work of Descartes, put forward a liberal interpretation of the State of Nature that resonated with the objective space appealed to in physics in his Treatises on Government (1689-90). “Man is free” he claimed, “and in this condition all men are equal” (Osborne & Gaenler 1992: 87). Locke’s philosophy was influential in the drafting of the American Constitution, the outcome of a revolution that saw Americans breaking free of the shackles of the ancien régime and building society anew upon objective principles. The Declaration of Independence concludes: “We hold these truths to be self-evident [Franklin having substituted “self-evident” for Jefferson’s original “sacred and undeniable”]: that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, among these are life, liberty...”. Its claim to “self-evident” truths” is modelled not only on Locke and Descartes, but also on Newton, Euclid (a great influence on Newton) and, through these men, on the geometry of Plato and Pythagoras. Indeed, one can see the 18th century’s doctrine of natural rights as a search for Euclidean axioms in politics (Russell 1961: 55).

Modern states would govern more certainly than before by invoking self-evident truths in the way that Descartes had based Modern philosophy on finding and using self-

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15 Rousseau’s argument for direct democracy governed by an abstract general will that arose as individual differences cancelled each other out, often seen as the philosophical underpinning of the French Revolution, argues similar lines.
evidentials as the basis of knowledge (Clark 1969). This was a view of society where equilibrium would be assured by appealing not to strong individuals or traditions, but to the underlying essentials that characterised all humans. Further, as the optimism regarding the finding of ‘objective best ways’ grew, secondary differences between humans could be increasingly tolerated. Laws such as the English Toleration Act (1689) were subsequently founded in an attempt to quell post-Reformation factional conflict, “confident in the ability of the Truth to vindicate itself” (Lyon 1994: 62).

We find here an equivalent of the Modern aim to separate knowledge from particular traditional circumstances and unite it under general principles. Modern Man can be separated out, seen as an independent atom above traditions, without chaos ensuing as each individual is subject to common properties that ensure equilibrium. The Ancient Greeks did not consider themselves as separate atoms but as members of particular traditions that they sought to develop (Bremmer 1983). In the Modern world, with all matter made of the same essence and subject to common principles, even society could be broken into constituent units of analysis and subject to universal tradition-free laws. With particular traditions no longer accepted as guiding action, one was compelled to self-consciously reflect on oneself against humanity as a whole. To ask “Am I a good human?” as opposed to “Am I a good helmsperson?”; reflection that could be informed by the universal standards of normality being produced by the bureaucratically arranged knowledge institutes as they began to apply themselves to the ‘sciences of the human’, and maintained by bureaucratic forms of Modern governments, legal systems, police forces and military bodies. Saint-Simon (1760-1825), later termed the ‘founding father’ of sociology, saw such forms as the great hope for Man’s stability and progress in the aftermath of the French Revolution.
This combination of bureaucracy and the objective scientific knowledge of Man had a double effect: a knowledge of what the normal human was and should do, and a subjection to be maintained, either by bureaucratic institutions, or by individuals themselves who could be provided with information about normality and keep themselves and their fellows ‘under surveillance’ accordingly. Foucault (1977) consequently named the Modern prison, that emerged simultaneously across Western countries along with new penal codes in the 18th century, and in particular Bentham’s (1843) *Panopticon* (see Chapter 2), as the metaphor of Modernity (Miller 1993), a form that reflected that of the bureaucratic nature of the times. Bentham’s (1748-1832) design replicated the triangular scientific method and was the mirror image of Diderot’s tree, the surveillance stem matching the trunk of reason - the one way of looking into, knowing and maintaining all subjects.

The belief in general commonalities that inspired this gaze also seemed to offer great possibilities for the establishment of a certain objective moral code and provide universal aims for Man to collectively progress toward. The key thinkers from the 17th to the 19th centuries, Locke, Kant, Smith and the Utilitarians, rejected the Aristotelian view of humans as having a specific *telos* comprising their many individual roles that implied case-specific ways of acting toward particular ends. Instead, they sought to find the underlying ethical principles behind an individual’s different roles, secondary characteristics and traditional circumstances. Modern ethics took the first and the last elements of Aristotle’s scheme - an un-tutored human nature and the moral precepts that allow one to pass from this to something better - but wished to remain silent about *telos*. It disconnected individual difference from how they ought to act. In the words of Henry
Sidgwick (1838-1900), a new ethical science would be born from applying “the same disinterested curiosity to which we chiefly owe the great discoveries of physics” (in MacIntyre 1990: 181).

Thus, the Modern desire for the new would be twinned with the removal of traditional ends from ethical equations and lead to the opening out of the Christian notion of time that first heightened the will to see oneself as improving and moving upward unto God. Time, in Modernism, positively progresses, but as economic or scientific logic gathers steam (fuelled by an increasing secularization of society encouraged by the aforementioned increasing toleration of surface or secondary religious differences), this progress becomes unbound by providence. One life on Earth before God implied an ending. ‘Man’, emphasised by the Modern focus on the general human, may go on indefinitely. The belief in providence transformed into a belief in Man’s progress as the ultimate aim (Lyon 1994). After undermining the Aristotelian view of teleology, change had to be given a general direction (Clark 1992).

A number of starts toward the identification of general directions or achievements against which progress could be measured were made. Kant arrived at one unifying ethical principle. Believing there was a element of objective reason in all moral judgements, he defined the Categorical Imperative: “Act as if the maxim from which you act were to become through your will a general law”. Utilitarians such as Bentham and J.S. Mill (1806-73), aimed for universal emancipation (or the greatest freedom for the greatest number), arguing that the moral rightness of an action, or progress, was to be judged on the contribution it makes to the increase of general human happiness (or ‘greatest good’). How the fathers of the newly established United States sought to fill the morality gap left by the removal of telos (with a mix of Protestant/Capitalist ethic and a
utilitarianism implying that anything that led to this ethic was ‘good’) is characterised in the writings of Benjamin Franklin (in Weber 1930). Franklin declared that ‘Honesty is useful, because it assures credit; so are punctuality, industry, frugality and that is the reason they are virtues’.

However, Modern ethical theorists seemed unable to fully cover the chaos they had created by abstaining from particular customs and ends. The general ends and maxims they suggested in their stead proved as problematic. Despite the apparent disinterested reasonableness of ends such as the ‘greatest good’ or the ‘greatest use’, they were difficult to measure and it was hard to find solid foundational reasons why people should fall in behind them without circularity of argument. Franklin (in Weber 1930: 53) had to make a ‘twist back’ to tradition to validate his position. He asks: “If we thus ask, why should ‘money be made out of men’?” Franklin asserts, one only need consult the Bible for the answer: “Seest thou a man diligent in business? He shall stand before kings”. However, such reasoning would become increasingly unacceptable in a secularising age. At the same time, Kant and the Utilitarians general moral ends were running aground as it was recognised that people’s surface differences often made them reason ‘abnormally’ and wish for different general laws.

However, a de facto general morality, hinted at in Franklin’s words, was establishing itself. The capitalist market was coming to be seen as resolving the Hobbesian mystery and filling the morality ‘gap’ that Modernism had created. A new science called political economy emerged to argue that social order was possible because of the myriad free and independent decisions to buy and sell on the market which the price mechanism allows. The market, an ‘invisible hand’, is thus the source of
spontaneous order. The objective, fundamental principle or general law that co-ordinates human behaviour and society, is that every-Man, whether a helmsperson, wood-turner or parent, acts in terms of economic self-interest. Economic gain was discovered to be a universal aspect of human nature, not just a means for achieving particular ends as was previously thought, but a universal end-in-itself (MacFarlane 1978; Roll 1992).

Of course, the founding document of this new science is seen to be Smith’s (1723-1790) Wealth of Nations (Roll 1992). Smith’s view dove-tailed neatly with emerging Modern tenets and subsequently gained much credence. Smith was greatly inspired by Newton, whose system he used as a model. He constructed his system by demonstrating mutual connections between individual cases and thus the interdependence of all economic phenomena (while the atoms, acting according to universal propensities with which they are endowed, are, in Smith’s work, humans - each held in equilibrium by the invisible natural law of the market that operates like the invisible hand of gravity - Smith 1983: 145-6; Lowe 1951; Blaug 1992). Further, his “concept of the market, with its ideal perfection and preordained rationality”, stood like a Platonic ideal form (Lowry 1987: 4).

In addition, Smith ‘spoke’ in such a way that carried more weight in the Modern episteme than the alternative philosophies of the time. Whereas Mandeville’s (1714) Fable of the Bees had put forward a view that required the State to maintain “human vice or passion of luxury for the good of society” (McMylor 1994: 92), Smith’s system was a self-regulating mechanism that worked if left alone (after all, it was built by God, whose work an earthly repairman could never improve on) and replaced Mandeville’s key words ‘passion’ and ‘vice’ with the seemingly disinterested, unemotive, unsubjective terms like ‘interest’ and ‘advantage’ (Hirschman 1977). Whilst Steuart’s (1767) Principles of Political Economy, published a decade earlier than The Wealth of Nations but making
most of the same points, compared Modern states to watches which are continually going
wrong, making "the workman's hand... necessary to set it right", Smith's mechanism was
perfect. Pope's (1710) Essay on Criticism could say "'tis with our judgements as our
watches, none go just alike, yet each believes his own", 70 years further into Modernity
this would not do. The Wealth of Nations subsequently suited the Modern way of seeing
right down to the ground. It clearly argued that a laissez-faire economics was the obvious
system of natural liberty and thus the greatest provider of good. Further, its measure of
progress mapped neatly onto the arboreal form described in this chapter. This measure
was the division of labour or specialisation toward collective economic achievement.

By the end of the 19th century, moralists who had continued the quest for a
general law had developed a principle that shared economics' foundation of the self-
interested individual. G.E. Moore (1873-1958) had 'discovered' a liberating general
moral law - 'emotivism': the view that all moral judgements, for all people in all cultures
at all times, are "nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling"
(MacIntyre 1981: 11). The universal moral foundation was that we all act as separate
individuals according to our own detached self-interest. To a large degree, people today
now think, talk and act, as if emotivism were true, regardless of their theoretical stand-
point. Hence, the science of psychology has, in the 20th century, been given far more
credence than ethics as a guide to behaviour.

The belief in economic Man and emotivism further strengthens the human
sciences and bureaucracy. If we take emotivism to be universally true, owners of capital
are justified in believing that all workers are consistently acting in accordance with only
their short-sighted wants and thus justified in believing that a measure of external control
is necessary to ensure that our collective rational-economic ends are met. Bureaucratic
forms are therefore necessary and applicable instruments in all situations. At the same
time, given Modernism's corresponding belief that people will not necessarily feel any
compulsion to do anything for anyone else, organisation or community, bureaucracies
must apply the laws of motivation and other psychological and social science to get the
most out of people.

Reviewing the development of Modernism, one may note the important role that
the triangular-hierarchical bureaucratic form, based on centralisation and specialisation,
plays. It is the form of the institutes that produce scientific norms, and the form that
polices society in the light of these norms. It is the form to which the science of
economics looks to provide the measure of social progress: the division of labour. Even
though the objective norms or ends that are produced via it may be questioned, it has
become increasingly difficult to question the overarching 'end' according to which this
form acts. MacIntyre (1981) terms this Bureaucratic Rationality: the circular process of
matching ends like economic progress and performative efficiency, through the means of
increasing efficiency. Subsequently, performative efficiency has become both the means
and end of Modernity, albeit a 'restless' or 'infinite' end that can never be arrived at.

As was discussed in Chapter One, this is a quite recent manner of speaking
efficiency. It emerged only as the bureaucratic form became entrenched, as a way of
saying to match Modernism's architecture for seeing. At what was perhaps the height of
Modernism's scientific-mechanistic optimism, the last half of the 19th century, this
Modern sense of efficiency was first used by engineers as the measure of a machine's
worth. It was soon employed to fill the gap that Modernity had opened up in its search for
a general measure and end for Man. The following quotation from a popular science
compendium, of the same decade as Barnard’s (1938) translation of Aristotle that began this work, shows the extent to which this new sense of efficiency had come to provide a general way of understanding Man’s underlying essence by the mid-20th century:

We can measure the amount of food that a man or an animal consumes over a given period of time, and we can measure the energy yielded during the same period. If we burn an equal weight of similar food in a suitable apparatus and find out how much energy its combustion yields, and if this value is equal to the energy yielded by the experimental subject, then evidently the living-organism so far as its energy output is concerned is really and precisely a combustion engine (The Science of Life, Wells et al. 1931: 22).

The Science of Life then presented a diagram of the human digestion system (Figure 18), a general input-process-output order that stands for all humans.

In lieu of the discovery of more tangible general ends that Man can be related to, performative efficiency, and the economic and psychological logic that underpins it, has come to stand as a potential standard measure of achievement. Hence, Modernism’s bureaucratic architecture of seeing informs, and comes to be reinforced by, a new mode of speaking: speaking in terms of performative efficiency. Lyotard (1993: 25) subsequently terms Modernism’s crucial equation as ‘performativity’, expressed as inputs over outputs, where the object is “the endless optimization of the cost/benefit ratio”. Thus, the apparatus of the triangular-hierarchy looks down upon the arrow of ‘inputs-processes-outputs’ and judges the process of life according to the ratio of the first over the last. By the first decades of the 20th century, after a long quest for general objective human ends, this thinking, perhaps more than anything else apparent at the time, appears to provide Modern Man the possibility of a certain direction and a general measure of progress toward which it could legitimately aim and govern according to.
Modernism is about Man collectively asserting himself over and above particular traditions, other beings and ahead of the past by increasing his stock of ordered certainty and reducing *chaos*. Its complex system began to emerge as the *Philosophes* of the 18th century declared the great thinkers of their own time and the century previous to be in advance of anything that had gone before. It reached its expressive heights in the scientific-mechanistic optimism of the late 19th century, Modern architecture in the first part of the 20th century and Modern abstract art in the 1940s and 1950s.

Modernism sees the world as constructed upon universal dimensions and underpinned by essential characteristics. Thus, if one can sweep away the subjectivities of tradition, one may find firm foundations upon which a certain knowledge of the world may be built up. Thus, the best way of seeing is from an objective viewpoint, detached from particular influences. This enables the primary commonalities and secondary differences between things to be measured, drawn and ordered with certainty.

As these things are established, Modernism can see action as subject to a unifying common logic that can be objectively expressed and understood, and hence controlled. To express this, the machine replaces the analogy of the individual subjective microcosm as the way of seeing, and the objective and universal language of mathematics becomes a key mode of articulation. Modernism also separates the beings that the Ancients saw as enmeshed in the web of similitude into 'parts': 'mind' for objectively inducing and deducing, 'words' for positively representing, 'past' and 'future' separated from 'present' in order to see progress, and the ordering of all other things into 'boxes' on universal grids which enable the links between things to be tidied up and certainly established.
The view of past, present and future as separate but unified along one collective continuum, and history as evolutionary, promotes the idea that there should only be one best mode of being closest to the truth, one school of thought. For Modernism, this is the triangular, detached observational mode of Modern science. Once the mode of inquiry is centralised, bureaucratically-arranged institutions that produce and present a unified and depersonalised spectrum of objective knowledge flourish. The tree, the mirror image of the triangular-hierarchy and mapping neatly onto a belief in an omnipotent Rational-unitary overseeing God, provided a united and decentralised analogy with which to see both knowledge and life as stable, cumulative and growing onward into the future. Modernism’s visibility may be expressed by the ‘architectural’ symbols below.

Modernism sees in terms of general units and tables, ‘objective’ viewpoints above the surface of being used so as to see the underlying primary essences of things, arboreams characterised by central stems and specialised branches, causal decision trees, linear time with past present and future distinct from one another, and the analogy of the machine that sees in terms of inputs and outputs. Knowledge here must strive to
positivistically represent or articulate the order of the way things, for all people, are - irrespective of context. Hence, Modernism privileges equations, statistics and diagrams over pictures and stories as these expressions tend to depict general theories or norms.

The gaze depicted above would be applied to enable a new generic object to be articulated: Man. The data gained by this application could be used to determine general behavioral norms for guiding correct human action and substitute for traditional modes of control. Hence, Moderns would boil physiology down to expressions of general mechanistic functions, economics would speak of economic self-interest as universal, moralists would arrive at emotivism, and psychology would inform Moderns more than ethics. The conception of this new being would enable Modernism to replace the Ancients’ dependence on case-specific ends and speak of general meta-narratives toward which humans can aim and against which cases can be objectively measured. However, by the turn of the 20th century while physiological norms had been developed, moral norms against which progress could be measured had proved difficult. What was ‘discovered’ in lieu of these, however, was that Modern economic logic, particularly specialisation and the arboreal division of labour, psychological emotivism, and the idea of performative efficiency inspired by mechanical engineers might suffice.

The style of thinking privileged here is a homology that builds up the store of general theories from the base of the Commonwealth of Knowledge. Moderns speak and see in terms of the hierarchical triangle, of standing over and above, looking down on the straight arrow-tipped line and measuring performance against a universal grid of measures. Consequently, Modernism requires the dismissal of the Ancient Greek conception of metis - the subjective ability, learnt from analogous experiences and tales, to shuttle in one’s own way between certainty and chaos, between general theory and
particular uncertainty, of respecting and working with both Apollonian and Dionysian
tendencies. Intelligence in Modernism is about being at the cutting-edge of knowledge,
employing the complex system described above toward the establishment of objective
certainty, about expanding the Apollonian and marginalising the Dionysian - about a will
to assert oneself above, to contest and to dominate, chaos.
Postmodernism advocates the 'faulty' logic or eclectic mix of ideas from whence, it argues, difference may flourish. It is based upon the dissolution of the unitary foundation-space and essentialism of Modernism and a return to 'secondary' surfaces; seeing the world as a rhizome; discovery as nomadology and eclecticism; history and time as more than linear and progressive; Modern science as being just one 'language game'; and, the death of Man and return to particular conventions, journeys and ends. Its style is not the expert's homology, as in Modernism, but the inventor's paralogy. For this way of thinking to work, Postmodernism requires the recovery of Ancient or un-Modern forms so as to relativise Modernism.

5. POSTMODERNISM

Simplifying to the extreme, I define *postmodern* as incredulity toward meta-narratives.


Baudelaire argued that style depended upon positioning with respect to flux and change, ephemerality and fragmentation, irrationality and paradox: one "could contest them, embrace them, try to dominate them, or simply swim with them, but never ignore them". Modernism, by this logic, is best defined as seeking to contest and dominate, to ground and build an order that captures the *chaos* of complexity and look down upon this order with a certain perspective. Postmodernism, by contrast, is happy to find and use Modernism’s forms, while at once embracing and swimming the *chaos*. It does not view *chaos* as a predicament to be rectified. It sees the gaps between forms and orders as necessary if one is to go-between and combine them in order to create. 'Post-ist' terms signifying the decline of the Modern style (e.g., post-industrialist, post-avant-gardist, post-structuralist, post-empiricist, post-Fordist) have been in circulation for some time. However, Jean-Francois Lyotard’s expansion of the term ‘Postmodern’ from the arts into the social sciences in *The Postmodern Condition* (1984) has provided the word most
commonly used to encapsulate the alternative approach to knowledge that now challenges Modernism’s dominance (Beatson 1990).

Lytotard (1984) defines the Postmodern against Talcott Parsons’ view of society as a unified totality (a “unicity”) and Habermas’ (1975: 105) vision of a ‘fully communicational society’ where the ‘right norms’ are agreed upon and a unifying consensus may be fairly attained. Parsons claimed to have conquered Hobbes’ mystery of order by seeing a ‘central value system’ - shared orientations that bound all societies beyond disparate individual motivations. Hence, for the Modern Parsons (1954: 216-8), “a process or set of conditions either ‘contributes’ to the maintenance (or development) of the system or it is ‘dysfunctional’ in that it detracts from the integration, effectiveness, etc., of the system” and “the most essential condition of successful analysis is a continual and systematic reference of every problem to the state of the system as a whole”. For Lyotard (1984: xxv), Parsonian thinking in particular and the general Modern drive to apply seemingly benign external and unifying criteria from ‘on high’, like ‘integration’, ‘progress’, and ‘efficiency’, “does violence to heterogeneity”.

Jurgen Habermas’ answer to this potential for ‘violence’ was the move to a “fully communicational society” where a consensus as to criteria that were fair to all would be reached allowing us to proceed with certainty. However, in a later work, The Differend, Lyotard (1991) explains why some party will always be wronged by universal consensus across heterogeneous genres. To debate how a resolution between two parties will be reached, or how we might litigate toward a consensus, we must first assume a language for doing so - and this language will already favour one or other of the parties. For example, strikes by workers and demands by trades unions habitually invoke matters of pay and conditions which accept the language of the employer and argue, toward
consensus, along the lines that the employer is not respecting the terms of that language (by the same token, the search for truth in Modernity is directed by the language of the scientist, giving him or her the advantage).

Postmodernism is incredulity toward the appeal to meta-narratives that Parsons believes must override the particular and speak for the system as a whole, or that Habermas' society must bring to bear in order to achieve consensus; the meta-narratives that communicate, either consciously or subconsciously, the objective general rules and measures that litigate over specific cases. By connection, Postmodernism is at once incredulous to what Blanchot (1987: 80) calls Modernism's "accelerated accumulation of rational apparatuses" that hoist these metanarratives up to create the distance between the objective view that employs these metanarratives and particular cases. Its approach is to undermine Modernism's complex system without revolutionarily dismissing its forms, products and orders, for to overthrow in this manner would be to continue to support one of Modernism's key metanarratives: 'avant-garde iconoclasm'.

Postmodernism comprises a number of interconnected strategies which will be outlined in the sections to follow: the dissolution of the unitary space, firm foundations or grounds upon which Modernism built; a return to being in amongst the 'secondary' surface conditions that Modernism sought to overcome; the consequent adoption of the analogy of the 'rhizome' as opposed to the unitary arboreum; a subsequent emphasis on discovery through nomadology and eclecticism; time and history as more than linear; seeing Modern science as one form of inquiry among many rather than as the method above all others; the death of Man and the re-appreciation of particular conventions in guiding human action; and finally, knowledge as 'paralogy' instead of furthering the marginalisation of chaos through the determination and application of one central logos.
These strategies provide problems with regard to seeing Postmodernism as an episteme in the epochal sense that Foucault applied in *The Order of Things*. In fact, as Lyotard notes, neither the Modern or the Postmodern can be defined as clearly circumscribed historical entities. The Modern because it always comprises within itself the compulsion to exceed itself (although Lyotard (1991) claims to see its “dawnings” in Descartes’ first-person narrative where the ego “confesses” its desire to “master every *datum*, including itself”); while, in a sense, the Postmodern is the Modern in its nascent state - the state of narratives before the construction of metanarratives. As Lyotard (1991: 34) would say “I used the term ‘postmodern’ [in] a slightly provocative way of placing (or displacing) into the limelight the debate about knowledge. Postmodernity is not a new age, but the rewriting of some of the features claimed by Modernity”.

I. *The dissolution of unitary foundation-space and return to ‘secondary surface’*

It remains to be seen whether the ground arrived at is really a ground, that is, whether it provides a foundation; [whether] it is an ultimate ground (*Ur-grund*); or whether it fails to provide a foundation and is an abyss (*Ab-grund*); or whether the ground is neither one nor the other but presents only a perhaps necessary appearance of foundation.


Giving grounds must come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting [because the language in which we think] is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there - like our life.


The primary element of Modernism that Postmodernism rewrites is its “claim to ground its legitimacy on the project of liberating humanity as a whole through science and technology” (Lyotard 1991: 34). What does this claim entail? Firstly, *Humanity* - the idea that there is a generic Man with universal characteristics. Secondly, *Science and
Technology - the idea that there is an objective Science that looks upon all objects the same and informs the development of Technology which is controlled by Man toward his assertion or liberation. Thirdly, beneath all this, Ground - that there is something substantial standing-under (sub-stantia) being, enabling Science's apparatus to be based on solid foundations and providing the backdrop or standards of normality against which progress can be measured. Postmodernism calls this grounding, making meta-narratives like Science and Liberation and objects like Man possible, into question. Its development may be seen as influenced by the coming together of many disparate historical events.

The first of these events was the transposition of the belief in providence into the Modern belief in progress. The Christian notion of providence altered the conception of time, encouraging an emphasis toward a serene ideal future-place. Then Modernism added a crucial desire. This desire sought a universal core of natural (in addition to supernatural) certainty that could ground all knowledge and unite subjective differences. In the confidence that such a core was on the way to being discovered, difference was relegated to being a mere surface or secondary condition. For example, the English Toleration Act of 1689 was supported by the authorities, including the Church, because of their confidence in the ability of a deeper primary truth to vindicate itself over subjective views from different traditions. This will to overcome tradition eventually fixed upon the Church(es) as their supernatural certainty was dismissed as mere secondary belief in the name of a natural certainty beyond religion. In Christian societies the quest for a better future was underwritten by clear ends as promoted by the Scriptures. As Modernity brought these down in the quest for pure objectivity, all that remained were means, which became de facto universal ends. Hence, the belief in providence became a belief in progress where the most acceptable measure of progress was secular.
performativity (ever more efficient and essential expressions), a metanarrative beyond particular traditions (so it was thought). Modernism thus quested in ever-decreasing circles toward a core of evermore essential abstractions. This abstractionism can be seen in the Ptolemic grid, the Universal Calculus or Newton’s and Kepler’s theories, but also in the forms of Modern architecture and art. Art became Modern as it moved beyond relating the past into the present. An avant-garde component emerged, inspired by the establishment of the ‘art market’ (capitalism’s restless quest for innovation plays a part again) that sought to be at the forefront of the present, to settle a score with the past and tradition, to leave it behind, to ‘deface’ it, to wipe out its vestiges and find an unsullied essential purity - the universal experience beyond time: to show “the heavens in a handful of dust’ as in the paintings of a Pollock” (Eco 1994: 62). Painting went upwards and onwards until artists found themselves with nothing left but to destroy the figure and:

arrive at the abstract, the informal, the white canvas, the slashed canvas, the charred canvas. In architecture and the visual arts, it will be the curtain wall, the building as stele, pure parallelepiped, minimal art; in literature, the destruction of the flow of discourse, the Burroughs-like collage, silence, the white page; in music, the passage from atonality to noise to absolute silence (Eco 1994: 66-7).

The Modern style was here painted into a corner of its own making. All had come to pure nothing, ground zero. A prominent architect observed that “Mies based his art on three things: economy, science, technology; of course he was right. It’s just that I am bored. We all are bored” (Filler 1986). Mies and his Modern peers had reduced architecture to a point where it was, in his own words, “almost nothing” and after almost nothing, the only thing left to do was nothing. However, as we have seen, Modernism must be about the production of the new - doing nothing new was intolerable.

A second event, running parallel to Modernism’s quest to dry out and establish essential common-ground, was information technology’s bringing more difference into
the picture. The world witnessed an "explosion and proliferation of Weltanschauung" (Vattimo 1992: 5), as these were made more visible due to laws like the Toleration Act, world travel and advances in communications. Developments from the printing press to the internet increasingly displayed differences from all over the world and highlighted the inability to achieve universal centres without recourse to anti-progressive censorship.

Other developments shook the ground that Modernism built. The emphasis on marketing and customer needs, on consumer choice as opposed to scale efficiencies, flexible production processes, the diffusion of market information and knowledge, access to a myriad of commodities and views, and speedy world-wide distribution and dissemination, have contributed to what Bell (1973) termed the 'information age'. Here, information is primarily for the benefit of consumers and consuming rather than efficient supply "becomes the hub around which the life-world rotates" (Lyon 1994: 66). Bell (1976) went on to write of the way that Apollonian principles of regulation now struggle with the Dionysian principles of diffusion, fragmentation and total experiences as forces for global standardisation confront individual consumer choice. Touraine (1971: 4-5; see also Berger et al. 1973) writes of this paradoxical condition where:

In a seemingly paradoxical way, the unified global culture facilitated by the spread of
electronic technologies has done much to relativise once-dominant Modernist ideas, by enabling individuals to access and juxtapose a myriad of world views for their own individual ends, to mix and match or 'channel-hop'.

This is the world for which Baudrillard writes. In Baudrillard (1988a; 1988b), the media is the medium for the signs that stand for consumer objects. These signs still contain meaning but now 'float freely' without direct or obvious representational qualities. Think of "Marlboro Country," "The Real Thing," Benetton campaigns and car advertisements where the mechanics of the car are secondary to surface symbolic statements. This illustrates a condition of 'hyper-reality', with the dissolving of distinctions between objects and their representations and meaning being relative rather than centralised. Understanding is here composed of multiple "images, interpretations and reconstructions circulated by the media in competition with each other and without any 'central' co-ordination" (Vattimo 1988). In this state, people are left to draw their own desired or pragmatic connections. This allows space for the involvement of particular cultures once diminished by Modernism. Contrary to the belief that Modern mass-media would bring about the homogenisation of society, developments have enabled minority groups and local initiatives to voice particular concerns as post-industrial information networks fragment (Huyssen 1986; Compagnon 1994).

To recap, Modernism sought ever more essential expressions in its quest to both ground things and produce the new towards this aim. However, this ethos became problematic as Modernism's centres increasingly ran dry, bereft of the stuff of invention. At the same time, pluralistic forces saw an increase in the awareness of difference while the emphasis on individual consumer wants and needs increased the legitimacy of
particular as opposed to general choice. Eventually, artists and thinkers, offered nothing more by Modernism’s ethos, could not resist playing with pluralism. Progress eventually had nowhere to go but to let go and disintegrate into an eclectic ‘hyper-plurality’ - and this is termed the Postmodern style.

It is a style most obviously manifest in the post-industrial city. Here, elements of the pre-Modern city (e.g., Venice) with its ancient buildings and cultural and historical landmarks, and the Modern (e.g., New York) with its sturdy grid-iron streets upon which functionalist high rise buildings were established, give way and collapse together. Lyon (1994) and Harvey (1990) suggest Los Angeles as an archetype (Deleuze and Guattari suggest Amsterdam with its web of canals for reasons that will become clear in the section that follows this). LA houses Star Wars technologists and movie stars, squalid slums and gentrified neighbourhoods. It sprawls heterogeneously but lacks an identifiable centre. It comprises mini-cities that refer nostalgically to other geographies (Manhattan, Venice, Westminster) but which in no way represent the ‘original’. Roman/Greek columns, Chinese dragons and Egyptian pyramids are intermingled with office blocks and giant adverts for Coke and Marlboro. Cultural ‘space’, in the sense that local cultures were considered separate and objectively definable on the world-grid, is problematised, as traditions wash into one another without losing their sense of place. The work-a-day time-clock world, originally designed to schedule workers so they could uniformly service the machinery of organisation in the Industrial Revolution, is also problematised as global markets and instantaneous communications require, and enable, an increasing number to work ‘odd’ hours. Being becomes vivid, simultaneous and interconnected.

But what of Hobbes’ mystery? In the circumstance described above, what is it that
grounds and binds things or at least stops them from falling apart while enabling change? Modernism’s answer of ‘the underlying essences’ had run dry as it eventually closed off all avenues for invention. Lyotard (1993: 21) re-writes this puzzle by drawing on Wittgenstein to theorise the existence of the Postmodern Condition.

Wittgenstein’s early work, recorded in the *Tractatus*, was Modern in extremis. Its atomistic, hierarchical ‘picture theory’ of language (where Objects = Names, States of Affairs = Elementary Propositions, Facts = Propositions and World = Language) built upon the Cartesian split of the matter in the world and the mind that represented it through language, and suggested, like the universal grammarians, that one can translate sentences of language into logical calculi that represent exactly what can be said without any scope for misunderstanding. The sum of the calculi would lay bare the structure of legitimate thought about the world and the problems of philosophy would be solved. However, the first paragraph of *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein’s only other book, illustrates a great change of heart. It is an excerpt from Augustine ("the first Modern" - Lyotard - 1993: 25). Wittgenstein (*PI*) claimed that this offers “a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects... Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands”. Wittgenstein had set his target: his earlier ‘picture theory’ and the tradition that goes back to Plato that words get their meanings by association with essential ideas. Due to the general acceptance of this particular view, Wittgenstein claimed that we have been led to ask the wrong questions. Specifically:

questions of the essence of language, of propositions, of thought [suggesting that language] is not something that already lies open to view, but something that lies beneath the surface... hidden from us. [It thus] comes to look as if we should search for something like a final analysis of our forms of language... as if there were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light. [W]e [therefore] feel as if we have to penetrate phenomena (*PI* 90-2).
The same conclusion is drawn by Heidegger, named, along with Nietzsche, as “the philosopher of postmodernity” (Vattimo 1988; Collini 1992; Compagnon 1994). Heidegger critiqued the Modern assumption that what is ultimately real is what ‘stands under’ things. From this springs Modernism’s ‘spectator attitude’ which looks down upon the world and encourages questioning along the lines of ‘what is this?’ or ‘what is that?’, ‘what is life?’ or ‘what is a culture?’, as if these ‘things’ were solid, stable objects against solid objective units of measure, and away from questions like ‘what is is?’ or ‘what is being?’ Heidegger (BT 24) argued that while Descartes’ cogito ergo sum claimed to put things “on a new and firm footing”, what it left underdetermined was “the meaning of the Being of the ‘sum’”. It had to, claimed Heidegger, because Being occurs only as ‘unfolding’, ‘being-in-life’ or ‘Being-there’ (Dasein) - it is never an object (BT 427).

In its quest for certainty, by separating things out for analysis, Heidegger claimed that Modernism made us forget that “[s]elf and world belong together in the single entity Dasein. Self and world are not two beings, like subject and object” (BPP 297). We can be the kinds of people we are only by virtue of the practical contexts of worldly involvement in which we exist. Hence, Being is what unfolds in the web of interactions and traditions that we move through life - there is no external foundation ground beneath or external viewpoint above (BT 194).

Assuming we have an either/or choice between ur-grund or ab-grund, Moderns believed the discovery of there being no ground to indicate that all is chaos. Neither Heidegger nor Wittgenstein saw it thus. For both, we may not be able to determine how the world and words hang together, but we can say that they do and that they do so by people living and using language. Wittgenstein explained that “It is what human beings
say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions [intentional states] but in the form of life" (PI 241). For Heidegger and Wittgenstein, the source of intelligibility of the world was the public practices or language ‘game-rules’ through which alone there can be any understanding. What is shared is not a conceptual schema, a belief system that can be made explicit and justified. Rather, it is ‘average comportments’, manners that enable us to ‘carry ourselves’ in particular publics. As this rule-following is not a hidden inner mental activity but a socially created public matter it “presupposes a custom” (PI 80-1). Hence, being is shaped by the rules provided by custom and tradition as conveyed in social interactions through language (BT 165, 212). Language, in conveying custom, is the ‘House of Being’.

Due to the existence of many different unfolding practices and traditions, there is no one logos of language, there are many different ‘language-games’, each governed by their own rules. Consequently, words can have different uses in different language games so there is no essential ideal underpinning words or measure of over and above the context of a particular game. However, these local language logics hang together with others to ensure that we always act with an appearance of ‘grounds’, albethey shifting.

Individuals may comprise many different gaming relationships without having a core essence or essential human characteristics. Hence, both our selves and our words are without unitary essences. However, things are imperfectly held together in a manner that Wittgenstein calls ‘family resemblance’. To illustrate, if we take the word ‘game’ we find that there are many types of things that we call games: professional sports, mind-games, games played with children and solitaire games. One might expect that for us to recognise the many different game-things as games, they must all share an essence or a pure form
and have some quality or qualities that make them positively distinguishable from those that are not games. Wittgenstein claimed that they only have a 'family-resemblance' in the way that a set of brothers and sisters may share certain similarities that enable them to be identified as related, without having a discernible essence as distinct from other sibling sets. Our understanding of what the 'thing' that is referred to by the word 'game' is created by the context in which it is used.

To gain a theoretical means of expressing the Postmodern, Lyotard appropriates Wittgenstein's notion of an irreducible plurality of language games. Lyotard sees no unified continent of language, only islands ruled by different language games, logical according to their own logic. All that remains under or in being are flexible networks of these games which may not have anything in common nor be translated into one another, just as a full-house may not be translated into a chess move. However, if we concern ourselves less with establishing the common ground beneath them, if we cease seeing "truth as a deep matter" (Rorty 1989: 9), we are freer to move in and out of them as our particular concerns see fit. Thus, the heterogeneous web of language-games present the appearance of foundation that prevents all being chaos while enabling people and communities to invent by moving between and combining elements of different games in unusual ways - a movement enabled by the imperfect fit between games. Knowledge here becomes more akin to island hopping than collectively stoking the engine of one big train.
II. The analogy of the rhizome

We're tired of trees. We should stop believing in trees, roots, and radicles. They've made us suffer too much. All of arborescent culture is founded on them, from biology to linguistics. Nothing is beautiful or loving or political aside from underground stems, aerial roots, adventitious growths and rhizomes.


At the end of *The Postmodern Condition* Lyotard (1984) concludes that the public in the so called information-age must be given free access to “the memory and the data banks”. Language games would then be played, dispersed and connected with maximum, unchannelled information, so as to be: “non-zero-sum games, and by virtue of that fact discussion would never risk fixating in a position of minimax equilibrium because it had exhausted its stakes”. Knowledge here would not be contained in an arboreal way.

The centralised control of knowledge that Modernism has required to achieve its aims, symbolised in the application of the analogy of the tree, is viewed incredulously by Postmodernism. In *Mille Plateaux*, Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 18) note that it “is odd how the tree... the root-foundation, *Grund*, *racine*, *fondement*... has dominated Western reality and all of Western thought, from botany to biology and anatomy, but also gnosiology, theology, antology, and all of philosophy”. As outlined in the previous chapter, the tree was well suited to Modernism’s development. Well suited to depicting categorisation in such a way as to determine the one branch to which the object in question belonged, for depicting binary either/or logic. Well suited to showing the causal path that underlies something and the progression and evolution of things across linear time. Well suited to illustrating the stem of Raison that connects all things and, in mirror image, the hierarchies with those at the top (e.g., Man) looking down on those below.

Deleuze and Guattari argue that this view supports the uncritical acceptance of there
always being an originating first principle or archê, which subsequently sees beings
categorised too rigidly; a philosophy of representation and identity that over-looks the
‘gap’ or difference between particular manifestations or interpretations of the same
concept; a philosophy that is ‘sedentary’. As an antidote they advocate the ‘rhizome’.

The rhizome, according to Deleuze and Guattari, may assume many diverse
forms, from ramified surface extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and
tumours. To illustrate, they begin their discussion of the rhizome with a musical score
that sees the ordered Apollonian note-lines combined and transgressed by a dissolute
Dionysian string (Figure 19). Unlike a tree or tap-root that plots points, unifies and fixes
an hierarchical order, any point of a rhizome can cut across space and time to connect to
another. Rhizomes are thus made up of dynamic multiple lines of connection, rather than
positions. While the tree is filiation, the rhizome is about alliance. The tree imposes the
sedentary verb ‘to be’, but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction ‘and...and...and...’.

And yet, the rhizome does not destroy the tree. Indeed, within the world-rhizome tree
structures may exist and guide action. “The brain itself is much more a grass than a tree...
but many people have a tree growing in their heads” (Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 15).
Guattari’s (1995) Chaosmosis subsequently develops a vision of philosophy part dipped
in chaos, and a liminal people happily shuttling between chaos and form while
acknowledging that beneath being no universal ‘plinth’ is given.

That the rhizome is ‘flat-surface’ or ‘simultaneously all-connected’, maps the
Postmodern re-writing of Modernism’s relation with the past. Postmodernism recognises
the connection of being across time, the intermingle of the many plateaux of past, present
and future. Hence, we see a turn to the past that Modernism had sought to overcome. In
Eco’s (1994: 67) words, a “recognizing that the past, since it cannot really be destroyed,
Figure 19: The Rhizome.
Source: Deleuze & Guattari, "Mille Platteaux" (1988).
because its destruction leads to silence, must be revisited: but with irony”.

Eco argued (1994: 59-62) that the Modern novel diminished amusement resulting from the plot in order to “encourage pure epiphany in its extreme form of materialistic ‘ecstasy’”. However, citing Aristotle’s Poetics, Eco claimed that “no matter what, a novel must also - especially - amuse through its plot” (Aristotle added that it should also mix order with an unexpected twist - Apollo/Dionysus). Hence in Eco’s The Name of the Rose a plot is developed, but through reference to other plots. It operated at the fourth level removed, with autre action set in motion by a quotation from a discovered manuscript. Eco then set about writing what Vallet said that Mabillon said that Adso said...

In talking about the construction of his work, Eco noted (1994) his re-appreciation that books always speak of other books (this is close to Derrida’s view (1976: 158; 1978: 226) that there is “nothing outside the text,” that meaning is driven by the surface connections with previous texts experienced by the reader and writer, connections that “disseminate”, like a drop of ink discharged into water). There are no necessarily new elements, but one might set about linking elements in inventive ways. Thus, Eco had no qualms about borrowing quotations from Wittgenstein and placing them in the mouths of his Middle Ages characters. They are, despite Modernism’s view of the evolution of thought, things that his characters might well have said.

Eco (1994: 68-71) also sees the Postmodern as re-writing a connection between another Modern binary dichotomy: the cutting-edge and the popular. Modernists held that the approval of the public was a bad sign: if a novel was popular, this was because it said nothing new and only provided what the masses were expecting. By contrast, Postmodern literature seeks to create works that are high and low brow, challenging and generally enjoyable, to move beyond “the quarrel between realism and irrealism, formalism and
We may return to the Post-Industrial city to illustrate how one may act in such a rhizomic world. For Harvey (1990: 1-5), Raban's Soft City, an account of London life, is a "historical marker, written at... that cusp in intellectual and cultural history when something called 'postmodernism' emerged from its chrysalis of the anti-Modern to establish itself as a cultural aesthetic in its own right". The soft city is 'pliable', a "labyrinth, honeycombed with such diverse networks of social interaction oriented to such diverse goals that the encyclopaedia [of Modernism] becomes a maniacal scrapbook filled with colourful entries which have no determining, rational or economic scheme":

[If] or better or worse [the city] invites you to remake it, to consolidate it into a shape you can live in... Decide who you are, and the city will again assume a fixed form around you. Decide what it is, and your own identity will be revealed, like a map fixed by triangulation. Cities, unlike villages and small towns, are plastic by nature. We mould them in out images: they, in their turn, shape us by the resistance they offer when we try and impose our personal form on them. In this sense, it seems to me that living in a city is an art, and we need the vocabulary of art, or style, to describe the peculiar relation between man and material that exists in the continual creative play of urban living. The city as we imagine it, the soft city of illusion, myth, aspiration, nightmare, is as real, maybe more real, than the hard city one can locate in maps and statistics, in monographs on urban sociology and demography and architecture (Raban 1974: 9-10)

**III. Discovery as nomadology and eclecticism**


The multiple must be made, not by always adding a higher dimension, but rather in the simplest of ways, by dint of sobriety, with the number of dimensions one already has available - always $n - 1$. Deleuze & Guattari, *Mille Plateaux* (1988).

Pulling back from the metanarratives at the level above being and resisting the urge to look for the synthesis underneath, the Postmodernist sees the world from the surface as a
rhizome. Here language and what the Modernist calls ‘Mind’ are intertwined with the customs and practices of being, thereby losing their objective representational ability. Knowledge and discovery must come from shuttling between forms (of language, of perceived objects or tree-formed orders) and drawing connections, the eclectic and pragmatic combination of what unfolds on one’s way.

Deleuze and Guttari develop the term nomadology to depict such an approach. In _Anti-Oedipus_ (1977) they argue that Modernity’s unifying system of capitalism promotes paradoxical ‘schizoid’ désirants, individuals with multiple personalities, thanks to revolutionary desires for the avant-garde and innovation being always-already mingled with opposing desires for repression and conformity. The work then attacks Freudian psychoanalysis as a mechanism for policing and channelling vagrant and molecular dimensions of desire, thus privileging and reinforcing the molar dictates of the capitalist-Modernist order. As a counter-measure, rather than see it channelled away, they wish to celebrate this schizoid tendency by promoting a nomadism that spreads across and picks up elements of Modernism’s and other era’s tracts as a means of inventing fresh desires across the structural limits of the capitalism.

In the face of the treasure trove of choice contained in the databases that the information-age now places at our fingertips, Lyotard (1984: 76) similarly promotes the view that “eclecticism” must be the eventual result of “the degree zero of contemporary general culture”. One is now free, he claims, “to listen to reggae, watch a Western, eat Macdonald’s for lunch and local cuisine for dinner, wear Paris perfume in Tokyo and retro clothes in Hong Kong...”. What forms spring from this nomadology?

Postmodern architecture reflects the recognition of a failure on Modern architect’s own terms, as Mies, Le Corbusier and Wright inspired an over-population of shoddy
glass boxes rather than emancipating. However, it is also a recognition that architecture's scope for innovation had been exhausted by the dictates of the Modern fathers (Jencks 1991; Blake 1977). By 1966, Venturi (1966) was proclaiming that "less is a bore" (being ironic with Mies' dictum "less is more") and advocating an architecture concerned with the quirks of its users based on a kind of collage - a 'personable' architecture; an architecture without expert architect, employing the languages of local consumers. In 1972, he advocated an ethic of superficiality and the forgetting of 'deep meanings', leading Jameson (1984: xviii) to declare Postmodernism as "about a commitment to surface... in all senses of the word" (ironically, however, one must think deeply to come to the decision to contrive depthlessness - Eagleton 1987). Postmodern architecture reflected a view of society no longer based on a belief in unitary progression. Since the Postmodern distrusts unifying or totalising discourses, one must be content with a modest fragmentary architecture of mixed codes. Whereas Modernism, believing its calling to be universal, erected the same building everywhere, Postmodernism was free to enjoy an "eclectic collage of contrasting architectural styles pillaged from disparate periods of history, together with borrowings from the contemporary vernacular" (Burgin 1986).

Along these lines, Jencks (1991) argued for an architecture that was pro-ornament, pro-metaphor, pro-humour, pro-historical reference, taking its cue from local conditions and their different user-constituencies and, thus, piecemeal, hybrid, complex, eclectic, ambiguous and about collage and collision; but mostly, an architecture with a split personality or about 'double-coding' - operating at more than one level. An architecture that is new and old, elitist and popular, ironic and sincere, even Mannerist and Baroque. An architecture that may combine the tools and techniques provided by Modernism with other historical approaches in order to communicate with different communities of public.
Jencks (1991: 6-7), describes Stirling's *Staatsgalerie* in Stuttgart as an exemplar:

Here one can find the fabric of the city and the existing museum extended in amusing and ironic ways. The U-shaped palazzo form of the old gallery is echoed and placed on a high plinth, or 'Acropolis', above the traffic. But this classical base holds a very real and necessary parking garage, one that is ironically indicated by stones which have fallen to the ground. The resultant holes show the real construction - not the thick marble blocks of the real Acropolis, but a steel frame holding stone cladding which allows the air ventilation required by law. One can sit on these false ruins and ponder the truth of our lost innocence: that we live in an age which can build with beautiful, expressive masonry as long as we make it skin deep and hang it on a steel skeleton. A Modernist would of course deny himself and us this pleasure for a number of reasons: 'truth to materials', 'logical consistency', 'straightforwardness', 'simplicity'...

To signify the permanent nature of the museum, [Stirling] has used traditional rustication and classical forms including an Egyptian cornice, an open-air pantheon, and segmental arches. These are beautiful in an understated and conventional way, but they aren't revivalist either because of small distortions, or the use of a Modern material such as reinforced concrete. They say, 'We are beautiful like the Acropolis or pantheon, but we are also based on concrete technology and deceit'. The extreme form of this double coding is visible at the entry points: a steel temple outline which announces the taxi drop-off point, and the Modernist steel canopies which tell the public where to walk in. These forms and colours are reminiscent of De Stijl, that quintessentially Modern language, but they are collaged into a traditional background. Thus Modernism confronts classicism to such an extent that both Modernists and classicists would be surprised, if not offended. There is not the simple harmony and consistency of either language; instead we are uneasily confronted with the understanding that we live in a complex world where we can't deny either the past and conventional beauty, or the present and current technical and social reality...

At Stuttgart the blue and red handrails and vibrant polychromy fit in with the youth that use the museum...while the classicism appeals more to the lovers of Schinkel. This is a very popular building with young and old, and when I interviewed people there - a group of plein air painters, school children, and businessmen - I found their different perceptions were accommodated and stretched.

Likemindedly, Compagnon (1994) finds Postmodernism's emergence in painting between Modern Abstract Expressionism and Pop Art's simple-deep philosophy, best captured in Warhol's re-productions of everyday 'icons'. After Abstract Expressionism, Pop problematised the distinction between elite and mass art. Pop recognised Modern art unwittingly being a bedfellow to capitalism, but rather than criticising capitalism or
feeling any angst about such an unholy alliance, it was happy to cynically exploit the link. Art now recognised the media as a 'partner in crime' and no longer had tradition as an opponent. Unfolding into the space left by Pop’s diminution of Modern art, Jencks (1991) points to Mariani’s Postmodern incorporation of a Renaissance style as a conduit for depicting an illogicality in a manner reminiscent of Escher’s ‘Drawing Hands’ (1948); while Harvey (1990) highlights Sherman’s self-portrait depictions of the plural plasticity of human personality - how one can be different but connected at once (Figure 20).

Postmodernism re-thinks a number of Modernism’s dichotomous contrasts: that new is better than old, present is ahead of the past, progress is better than reaction, avant-garde is better than kitsch, high culture is superior to low culture. Instead of Modernism’s cutting-edge, where one always sought to be ahead of the past, at the benchmark of the present and moving into the future, to be avant-garde ahead of kitsch, or to be progressive - above and beyond tradition rather than merely reflecting it - Postmodernism saw the flat surface of an artist’s palette with traditional styles co-existing, waiting to be connected. In the absence of a religion of the future, Postmodernism did not seek to ‘change the world’. With Modernism’s hierarchical dichotomies flattening out, it was free to explore a nomadic trans-avantgardism: an uncommitted travelling, or weaving, over a broad repertory of forms in any direction.
Figure 20: Postmodern Forms – Mariani’s “The Hand Submits to the Architect”, Source: Papadakis (1987); Sherman’s “Untitled” and “Untitled #92”, Source: Harvey (1990).
IV. History and time as more than linear and progressive

Temporalizing does not signify that [the] ecstases [of time: past, present and future] come in a 'succession'. The future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes itself present in the process of having been. Heidegger, Being & Time 350.

We can see... a slow movement of our culture, now worldwide, back to a "centre which could not hold" (to misquote Yeats). The return has various causes, but among the most important is that the value of any work must depend partly on tradition, both for its placement and quality. The [Modern] tradition of the new has made such a fetish of discontinuity that now a radical work of quality is likely to have the shock of the old. Jencks, Postmodern vs. Late Modern (1991).

If the desire to publish of 'the new' dismissing tradition was a significant marker of Modernity, then the book title terms that signal the emergence of a Postmodern zeitgeist are the 'end' or 'death' of: the death of things that sustained and drew upon the Modern apparatus: The End of Law? (O'Hagan 1984), The End of Economic Man (Marsden 1986), The End of Organized Capitalism (Lash & Urry 1987), The End of the History of Art? (Belting 1987), The End of Ideology (Bell 1988), The Death of the Author (Adair 1992), The End of History (Fukuyama 1992), The End of Macro-Economics? (Simpson 1994), The End of the Nation-state (Ohmae 1995) and The End of Science (Horgan 1997). These titles signify the calling into question of the vehicles by which Modernity was to achieve progress away from particular conventions. Postmodernism sees a world beyond universal progress, questioning Modernism's linear conception of history and time.

Heidegger, for example, made a distinction between the 'historiographical' view of history that Modernism concerns itself with and what he called 'true history'. Historiography is concerned with the past as an object that no longer exists. It studies 'the facts' as facta: deeds and things that are over and done with - no longer here. Every
significant element of the past is a stepping stone toward the present, something to get beyond as we move on time’s arrow. Heidegger’s alternative view looked at the past with a sense of the way that it is still with us, still making its presence felt - not simply the isolated, analysed, categorised and explained ‘has been’ of the past, but the ‘has been’ (BT 393ff.). Consequently, the future is no later than the has been, and this no earlier than the present (BT 350). All three are interwoven, are inherent within and run through one another. The fragments that have been are the mix from which the present is formed (Noujain 1987), and the sequence of history, like “twists of a kaleidoscope” (Miller 1993: 153), conformed to no universal norm of reason and evinced no higher purpose. It followed that no metanarrative existed by which a period could be judged better or worse than what had gone before. History, therefore, could not be regarded as linear progress.

Derrida’s work came to the same point. For Derrida, with no God or belief in tradition to guarantee them, language signifiers float free, only able to be understood relative to one another. Consequently, he highlighted the inability of concepts to mean without the presence of opposites. The relationship between terms is one of mutual definition, so opposites must be always-already present in language. This calls into question the way in which an episteme will privilege one term (e.g., civilisation) above another (e.g., barbarian) by seeing one as an advance on the other. Derrida (1988) argued that the Modern episteme privileges terms via the marginalisation of its opposites, enabling people to determine a linear path of progress. However, such privilege is not linked to any objective truth but to contingencies and traditional precedents. Claims that ‘civilised’ is a later evolutionary stage thus cannot be objectively supported. In a similar manner, Nietzsche (GS 34) had hoped to see “history placed in the balance again”. This, in his words, would allow “a thousand secrets of the past” confined to history by
Modernism’s certain path, “to crawl out of their hiding places - into the sunlight”.

The paragraphs above also indicate Postmodernism’s aversion to being typecast as belonging to a particular epoch as opposed to another, due to its belief that being may be simultaneously interconnected without regard for Modern exclusive categories of space and time. As such, the chronological boundaries of Postmodernism are constantly being re-written. Eco (1994: 65-6), for example, reports the way in which the Postmodern has become increasingly retro-active: “first it was apparently applied to certain writers and artists active in the last twenty years, then gradually it reached the beginning of the century, then still back further. And this reverse procedure continues: soon the Postmodern category will include Homer”.

Postmodernism’s activation of the retro in this way was inevitable once the assertion that Western thinking was in the process of recovering from Platonism became a Postmodern motif (Rorty 1982; Severino 1982; Vattimo 1988; Lovibond 1990), and Nietzsche and Heidegger consequently came to be seen as leading lights (Arac 1987; Lyon 1994). Nietzsche depends on a recovery of: “Homer, tragedy, Democritus, Thucydides, the older Hellenic instinct, and Dionysus” (Lampert 1993: 443), while Heidegger (ID: 24; Siedel 1964) believed that understanding our present and future required a ‘mental leap’ into the pre-Modern thinking of the likes of Heraclitus and Parmenides. In this respect, Postmodernism is a recovery, a crawling out of thoughts rejected by the Platonic-Cartesian-Newtonian thrust, a resurfacing of many of the aspects that Modernism sought to assert itself over (Eagleton 1987; Toulmin 1990; Harvey 1990; Lovibond 1990). The diminution of the Modern metanarrative of linear progress and forgoing the past has enabled Postmodern thinkers to see development in thought as about drawing connections across Modern boundaries of space and time. Thus the
relativism that Feyerabend (1993: 226) connected to is: "the kind that seems to have been defended by Protagoras"; while Durand (1979) sees a stream of thought running in opposition to the Modern mechanistic paradigm through the "vivifying breath of Hermes, a breath that runs through Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida, Barthes and Deleuze".

These views of a rhizomatic rather than a linear development of knowledge can be seen now in many spheres' re-connections with the ancient past. Political theorists argue that the Thucydidean approach to analysing international political conduct, which broadly incorporated national character and tradition, individual characters of statesmen and the role of rhetoric, should be re-animated as an alternative to the Hobbesian approach that reduces human thought and action to one cause (Johnson 1993). In ecology, the Modern search for the universal mechanisms that govern ecosystemic community structure, has been joined by a transdisciplinary 'landscape ecology' and an Aristotelian recognition that there is no correct scale with which to conduct all inquiries (Zonnefeld 1990; Levin 1992; With 1994). In psychotherapy, authors have begun to see people as contradictory rather than straight-forward beings, examine the way that Modernity marginalised the study of the soul because it could not objectively quantify and measure its effects, and recover the role of the "soul's call" against conventional psychology's explanation of behaviour as reaction to external events (Moore 1993; Hillman 1996). And, in physics, developments from Schrodinger's (1954: 1-19) argument for a return to the ideas of the Presocratics who worked "without the fateful [Cartesian] division that has hampered us for centuries", where the delimitation of disciplines "in water-tight compartments had not yet sprung up"; to Capra's The Web of Life, A New Synthesis of Mind and Matter (1996), illustrate a shift from an emphasis on objects to non-grounded relationships.

Postmodernism is incredulous to the Modern privilege afforded the idea of linear
time and the corresponding progressive or Hegelian view of historical development. However, just as the rhizome incorporates the tree rather than signaling its extinction, Postmodernism’s re-writing of Modernism’s time coils about the linear. Burrell (1992) advocates a “spiral” view of time in this respect. Identifying two main conceptions of time: “unitary linear” and the “cyclical” where history repeats rather than advances, he associates the Postmodern with a cyclical-linear “spiral” concept. Here aspects of the past will resonate in the present and future without things ever being as they were, while we may still observe progress within the framework of a particular language-game. Burrell illustrates the spiral view with the metaphor of the Cretan Phiastos disc, noting the Minoan’s labyrinthine aversion to the straight line and the closed circle. Thus, the direction of time or history, like an Escher print, depends on how one looks (Figure 21).

V. Science as one language game among many

I think that I have at last made you realize one thing, Aristos, that any expression of an abstract idea can only be an analogy. By an odd fate, the very metaphysicians who think to escape the world of appearances are constrained to live perpetually in allegory. A sorry lot of poets they dim the colours of the ancient fables, and are themselves but gatherers of fables. They produce white mythology. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy (1982).

Just as Modern art had led to a blank white canvas, Modern Science’s dominance as a mode of inquiry can be seen as dimming the lights of alternative approaches while sterilising and eventually denuding knowledge. (Horgan (1997), for example, argues that science is increasingly unable to find anything new because of its long static method and the ‘theory of diminishing returns’). Postmodernism is dubious not so much toward science as to its dominance, incredulous to just another language game (and a not particularly colourful one at that) being hoisted above others. Lyotard’s attack on the
FIGURE 21: ESCHER’S “RELATIVITY” (1953).
hegemony of Modern science reflects the intellectual environment of philosophers like Derrida for whom science is sheer surface masquerading as something more substantial. However, *The Postmodern Condition* (1984: vii) is described in its preface as more particularly a “discussion of the consequences of the new views of scientific research opened up by theorists like Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend”.

Prompted by a chance reading of Aristotle’s *Physics* (like most science students, Kuhn had never read “an old document in science” - Rogers 1997: 121), Kuhn began to question the textbook view of science as a sequence of theories replacing one another and improving itself by getting closer to a grasp of reality. He (1962: 2-3) concluded that Aristotle just looked at the world differently, and that:

The more carefully [one] stud[ies], say Aristotelian dynamics, philogistic chemistry, or caloric thermodynamics, the more certain they feel that these once current views of nature were, as a whole, neither less scientific nor the product of human idiosyncrasy than those current today. If these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths can be produced by the same sorts of methods and held for the same sorts of reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge. If, on the other hand they are to be called science, then science has included bodies of belief quite incompatible with the ones we hold today. Given these alternatives, the historian must choose the latter. Out-of-date theories are not in principle unscientific because they have been discarded. That choice, however, makes it difficult to see scientific development as a process of accretion.

Kuhn wrote his ideas up in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, arguing that science does not develop ‘rationally’ through the accumulation of individual discoveries and theories bringing us ever closer to the ‘real thing’. All theories are based upon sets of underlying assumptions by which the world is understood, and these are shaped by custom, tradition and myth. Kuhn termed these sets ‘paradigms’. Once a paradigm is set (by becoming the dominant way of looking at the world and hence dismissing other alternatives), it constrains approaches to knowledge via educational initiation into a disciplinary branch, whereby research becomes a “strenuous and devoted attempt to force
nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by [this] education” (Kuhn 1962: 5). Paradigms thus tend not to shift when ‘new evidence’ is found but when broader community-wide assumptions alter. That Newton’s theories were accepted in Modernity did not make his concepts more true than Aristotle’s. One could not choose objectively between them. Both had to be judged on the terms of their own particular environments.

Feyerabend joined Kuhn’s quest for a method that acknowledged the inescapable role of tradition in formulating knowledge. Modern science, for Feyerabend (1993), was a tradition-bound practice that did not recognise itself so, while criticising other traditions on these same grounds. He thus (1993: viii) claimed that “science should be taught as one view among many and not as the one and only road to truth and reality”. His own work found that science knows no ‘bare facts’. Indeed, any ‘fact’ is already viewed in a certain way, and is therefore ideational - ordered by one’s particular gaze. This being so, the progress of knowledge “will be as complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as the ideas it contains, and these ideas in turn will be as complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as the minds of those who invented them” (Feyerabend 1993: 9). While Modern science has sought to unify into one paradigm or view, Feyerabend’s analysis ironically showed science’s great discoveries as the result of disparate practices or traditions coming together. This lead him to a different strategy for the development of knowledge by deconstructing Modernism’s dichotomy of reason and practice.

Feyerabend argued that brought up under the influence of the Cartesian split Moderns differentiate thinking from doing, place reason above practice, and wonder at the relationship between them (e.g., for idealists, reason’s authority is independent of practices and traditions and reason should guide good practice; for naturalists - and materialists and empiricists - reason is guided by practice, simply describing the way that
practice works and hence relies upon practice for both its content and its authority). However, Feyerabend argues that any concept of reason is always dependent on an opposing conception of unreason, and the difference between reason and something unreasonable can only arise from categorising different types of practice into differences of 'kind'. Thus, reason is based on identifying things as either positive or negative, a categorisation process that is in itself a practice. Reason and practice are thus two different types of practice rather than different entities.

Illustrating how such practices must intermingle to create knowledge, Feyerabend (1993) invoked the analogies of the relations between an old map and an experienced traveller. Originally, maps were constructed as images of, and guides to, the nature of reality as experienced and idealised by those who drew them (presumably reason was also once understood in this way). The traveller uses the map of someone-who-has-gone-before to guide their way, but the map does not tell them what to do - it must be tempered according to their own purposes, and its use influenced by their own background of practical experiences. The traveller's action is thus guided through the pragmatic interaction between the tradition or past embodied in the map, and their own personal aims for the future and other traditional approaches acting upon them in the present. Feyerabend argued that using reason (practice that has become embodied over time - like a map), without paying heed to practical environmental contingencies (like weather conditions) will soon lead one astray; while reason without the guidance of a particular practical purpose cannot lead us anywhere - the map does not tell us where to go. However, at the same time, practice is vastly improved by the structure and impetus provided by a map depicting some reason or order. Different practices and reason (i.e., two types of practice based on tradition) must spark off one another for invention or
intelligence to take shape. Ironically perhaps, one of Feyerabend's key examples of this process in practice is Galileo's interaction of his own aims, the traditions of his role models like Plato and Copernicus and his telescopic instrument. Again, Postmodernism is not anti-science, it just seeks to re-write its dominance.

Consequently, Feyerabend advocated a 'pragmatic philosophy' that viewed different practices and traditions relatively, much as a traveller views different countries. Each country will have things that they like and dislike. In making a decision to act, such as deciding where to spend time, they will compare traditions: climate, landscape, language, temperament of the inhabitants, possibilities of change, opportunities for advancement, vices and so on. They will also be aware that initial demands and expectations may turn out to be inappropriate and so permit the process of choice to affect and change their nature, which is, after all, another tradition influencing the process. In this way, traditions are always relative to one another, and relative to the pragmatist, who is both a participant and an observer, both subjective and objective, and inseparably so.

Feyerabend (1993) concluded that if no one paradigm can represent reality, if they are all based on particular traditions, contingencies and chance, then the only defensible approaches to knowledge are an ideology of the end of ideologies, a realisation that there is no tradition however ancient or absurd that is not capable of adding to knowledge, and relativism. This, he (1987: 15) argued, would help "overcome the chauvinism of science" and thus be "excellent medicine for epistemology, and for the philosophy of science".

This reconfiguration of the approach to knowledge, reliant as it is upon the reconnection of things split by Descartes and a realisation that knowledge is informed by traditional practices, has received reinforcement in the past two decades from the anti-
representational findings of Umberto Maturana and Francesco Varela’s biological studies. Maturana and Varela argue that cognition is not transforming transcendental data into objective mirror pictures in the brain. Rather, it is a projection of an individual and community’s own cognitive structure or experiential mind-set. Given that observation circumscribes all knowledge and we constitute the reality of our observations through language, knowledge is relative to the languaging observer. The languaging observer’s ability to receive knowledge is shaped by their previous experiences or the experiences of those who have informed them, and the patterns of language that their community uses to express things. All of these aspects are culture and experience-specific. They overlay our biological make-up with impressions and rhizomatic ‘waterways’ that eventually shape our biology and steer behaviour and interactions by ‘structurally coupling’ us to our environments in particular ways. Hence, how we receive the world depends on the way our cognitive streams or patterns emerge (Maturana 1990: 13). Thus, nothing external to the biology and languaging of observers can determine how a phenomenon will be received or determine its effect. Cognitans and extensa, mind and matter, cannot be separated, pure objectivity operating above experience is unattainable, and invention can only come from the interaction of different structural couplings.

In the light of Kuhn, Feyerabend and Maturana, scientific commentators like Koestler, Monod and Sagan have recognised ‘the death of the spectator’ and questioned Modern assumptions about the arboreal separation of intellectual disciplines that frustrate the combination of different logics. In place of this they seek a return to an un-specialised approach, and promote a Postmodern view where the scientist “includes himself in his science” (Toulmin 1982). A conclusion not unlike Nietzsche’s call in The Gay Science to make science a little “jaunty and ignorant again”.

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VI. The death of Man and the return to particularity

Every culture that has lost myth has lost, by the same token, its natural healthy creativity.
Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy 23

What matters most... is always culture.
Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, Germans 4.

Lyotard (1984: 37) claims that Postmodernism is the result of a huge “delegitimation” movement in European Modernity for which the philosophy of Nietzsche is a central document. What is central (or ‘nodal’) in Nietzsche, is his announcement of the death of the Rational Universal God and the generic Man that belief in Him inspired. Vattimo (1988) suggests this death to be the “the birth” of Postmodernity.

The death of Man can be seen as the result of the diminution of Modernism’s apparatus indicated in the sections above, and, in this respect, perhaps this may be more correctly regarded as the death of two characters, both of which had been given life by the ascendancy of the Cartesian cogito. The death of man the subject, the detached scientist who looks down upon things. Moreover, the death of the Man the object, the humanistic belief that enabled Man with generic characteristics to become a general object subject to the scientist’s gaze. Nietzsche’s rumbling of Man inspires all the thinkers focussed on in this chapter: from Heidegger’s questioning of the spectator attitude, to Foucault’s engagement with Modernism’s interpretation of subjectivity as a manifestation of the Age of Man rather than a universal foundation stone; to Derrida’s exposition of the death of the controlling author in the face of the realisation that words are caught up in a play of forces that inhere within writing itself; to Deleuze and Guttari’s letting go the unified ego in favour of the ‘schizoid’ dispersive nomad.
The death of Man makes Postmodernism incredulous toward the human sciences, and particularly Modernism's appeal to self-evident human characteristics that formed the basis for the universal moral codes that would take the place of particular custom, culture or tradition-led ethics. By the end of the 20th century, moral historians were beginning to record the crumbling of the Enlightenment's search for the objective ethics, as it eventually hoisted itself on its own petard in much the same way as Modern art and architecture. Alaisdair MacIntyre (1981) describes the turn of events in After Virtue, arguing that in its quest for a global, secular and rational morality in place of Aristotelian particularism, the Enlightenment project created a global-culture in which an unresolvable tension was inevitable and no moral judgements possible.

MacIntyre explains that the aims of Modernity are firmly grounded in a belief in liberal individualism. Men were to detach themselves from the shackles of custom and tradition to become the masters of their own destinies. However, the problem with this was that it tended to produce societies that were difficult and inefficient to control, thus hindering the development of Man's collective progress. Hence, Modernity spawned bureaucracy as a global form to keep operations progressing smoothly (even though we have no real rational basis underpinning our faith in these institutions, Moderns come to consider believing in them preferable to believing in other non-secular institutions). Unfortunately, there is no way in which bureaucratic rationality and liberal individualism can be achieved without one compromising the other. Thus, MacIntyre (1981: 33) concludes that there are now only two:

modes of social life open to us, one in which the free and arbitrary choices of individuals are sovereign and one in which the bureaucracy is sovereign, precisely so that it may limit the free and arbitrary choice of individuals. Given this... it is unsurprising that the politics of Modern societies oscillate between a freedom which is nothing but a lack of regulation of individual behaviour and forms of collectivist control designed only to limit the anarchy of self-interest.
Uncoupling morality from the custom-based Aristotelian schema, could only lead, argues MacIntyre, to a succession of failed attempts to find an objective moral code and on to the blank canvas of the ‘everybody does what they feel’ psychology of emotivism. This is held in place by an overarching “bureaucratic rationality” maintained by managers who claim not to engage in moral questions, preferring to refer decision-making back to what are regarded as the objective principle of bureaucratic rationality: efficiency. Hence, the West is left with only a “simulacra of morality”. This enables us to talk and act as though we have recourse to a framework for resolving moral issues universally and objectively, which we cannot, while at the same time particular moral debates can find no terminus as the appeal to particular circumstances is no longer considered legitimate.

Nietzsche argued that the nihilistic conclusion described above offered a way around Modernity. God’s death leaving history opening out into a void, the death of the foundation stones of the general characteristics of Modern Man, and the realisation that an objective science of ethics is a sham, means that we each just owe allegiance to our own historical tradition, which is but the contingent product of a shifting deployment of cultural and corporeal forces rather than unquestionable self-evident truths. Recognising this frees us up to question some of the ‘borrowed manners’ and ‘received opinions’ that any culture implants, enabling a person to ‘re-style’ themselves to an extent, or to ‘re-write’ their own histories, to be subject to their own ‘subjectivity’ rather than the dictates of externally imposed meta-narratives.

However, this does not leave one completely free to start from a clean slate, or mean that ‘anything goes’. Heidegger’s (BT) concept of ‘thrownness’ expresses the limit
nicely. Here one is thrown in the present toward the future in a direction shaped by historical experience. However, if one recognises that this is the case and begins to question some of the aspects of the past that are throwing a subject in this way, one may put something of a rudder in the wash so as to influence their travelling to some extent.

This view in no small part draws upon a re-recognition of the role played by culture, practice, myth, and narrative as things that unite past and future so as to give the present meaning and provide decision making guidance. These are aspects that must be subject to interpretation, the sorts of things that Modernism's emancipatory spirit sought to overcome but could not dismiss (even the belief in the scientific method required a faith in the tales of its history). Thus, we should perhaps not be too surprised to find Lyotard (1991: 56) responding to this dimension of Postmodernism by co-opting Aristotle to express the idea that justice cannot be a matter of conforming to predetermined objective conceptual schemes: "a judge worthy of his name has no true model to guide his judgements, [he must] pronounce judgements... just so, without criteria, This is, after all, what Aristotle calls prudence. It consists in dispensing justice without models". Knowledge of our particular place in the world, experience of situations analogous to that before which we find ourselves in the present and awareness of particular circumstances and customs can be our only guides. We have come back around to the position of Aristotle's prudent individual.16

16 Maturana and Varela's studies bring a similar reappraisal of Aristotelian tradition in asking how might we assess different knowledge claims in an episteme like this? Maturana (1990) focuses on how we recognize knowledge. If we observe someone acting effectively in a domain then we assume that they have knowledge relevant to it. Hence, the only way of assessing knowledge is through observing action. Here we may find objective knowledge ("in parentheses" - to use their terminology) if the domain or language game is made explicit (e.g., the domain defined by the rules of mathematics). Thus, 'knowing' can only be verified through effective action within domains set by tradition, rather than through reference to any abstract un-tradition-bound criteria. Knowledge or intelligence is "effective action within traditional domains toward particular purposes" (Brocklesby 1997: 6).
VII. Summary - seeing and expressing thinking as paralogy

Knowledge so conceived is not a series of self-consistent theories that converge towards an ideal view; it is not a gradual approach to the truth. It is rather an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives, each single theory, each fairy-tale, each myth that is part of the collection forcing others into greater articulation and all of them contributing, via this process of competition, to the development of our consciousness. Nothing is ever settled, no view can ever be omitted from a comprehensive account. Plutarch or Diogenes Laertius, and not Dirac or von Neumann, are the models for presenting a knowledge of this kind.


Postmodern knowledge['s] principle is not the expert's homology, but the inventor's paralogy.


Modernism privileges a style of thought that seeks progress through the abolition of chaos or uncertainty, via the development of an apparatus that looks down on things in the world through the lens of one central logos, so as to see the general orders underlying these things. Postmodernism questions this apparatus in a number of interconnected ways. The idea that there can be the co-dependant dimensions of an objective view above and a universal grid below that enables objective measurement is called into doubt as Postmodernism seeks to acknowledge our being on the surface. Consequently, the idea that there exist metanarratives that can judge local narratives is questioned. Consequently, the tidy centralising, hierarchical, linear and binary analogy of the tree is crossed with the analogy of the rhizome to indicate how the Modern distinctions of discrete space and place; past, present and future; primary and surface; more evolved and less, may be seen as simultaneous and interconnected - washing into one another. Consequently, discovery as abstracting and representing the essence of what underlies is joined by an approach that seeks to spread across connections and eclectically open (or re-join) connections - a nomadology or trans-avant-gardism. Consequently, Modernism's key metanarrative of
the new being separate from, more advanced, and hence better than, the old - time as linear; history as progressive; knowledge as cumulative - is undermined. Consequently, science becomes one local language game, one form or order, or one way of travelling across forms, among many others. And, consequently, the primary generic object caught between Modernism's universal apparatuses: Man, is questioned, as a person's particular background of traditions, experiences and circumstances are seen as guiding their actions, rather than some universal underlying characteristic of the species or humanistic aim.

In the light of these views, Postmodernism privileges a different approach to thinking or action. Lyotard terms this 'paralogy': an approach based on the irregular juxtaposition of traditions and 'faulty' logic that spawns invention, as opposed to an emphasis on the consonance and sameness of relations that leads to refinement within pre-set boundaries. This view determines Lyotard's (1984: 65-6) vision of knowledge as a search not for consensus, but for 'instabilities' and 'undecidibles', as a practice of many logoi grating against one another, of keeping the question of method open, as opposed to the repeated implementation of a dominant logos. It is an approach that Modernism would see as naive, "pre-science" in Kuhn's (1962) terms ('Science -1' in Deleuze and Guatarri's). The view of Postmodernism in this respect is that of Levinas' 'end of history' (as described in Derrida 1978), where the realisation "is not absolute Logic, absolute coherence of the Logos with itself in itself, is not agreement in the absolute system, but Peace in separation, the Diaspora of absolutes". Hence Lyotard's (1984: 80) claim that it is the preservation of "difference on which the fate of thought depends", and his (1991) interest in developing an approach that favours the acknowledgement of the "differend" as opposed to one that must litigate a close in order to dispense with things and put them behind us. Featherstone (1991: ix) paradoxically suggests that the Postmodern aims for a
"commonality [that] entails the capacity to recognise differences as legitimate and valid".

We may see Foucault’s attraction to Blanchot’s presentation of ‘otherness’ and the ‘outside of thought’ in this light (Blanchot 1991). Descartes cogito led to the Modern belief in the certainty of the “I”. In turn, this put the emphasis on interiorising thought - we must bring knowledge inside our heads, visualise it, define it and thus own it, and in doing this we must assume we have an objective method for doing so decided in advance. In Maturana’s language, this structurally couples us to receive only those responses that match our predetermined way of inquiring. Knowledge defined in this way must tend toward homology, the answer is always closed somehow by the mode of questioning. By contrast, Foucault describes Blanchot as writing not ‘in’ the first or third person but of the void, the surrounding space: of that which is “exterior to our interiority”; of that which cannot be determined or represented (cf Lyotard’s encouragement of “putting forward the unpresentable in presentation itself” 1984: 78-82). For Blanchot, what is important “is never in things or people, but in the impossible verisimilitude of what lies between them: encounters, the proximity of what is most distant, the absolute dissimulation in our very midst” (Foucault, in Blanchot 1991). Blanchot writes in a manner “attracted and negligent”, in the sense that the inquirer is unaware of the attraction so that he may lose himself in its object (in much the same way as Aristotle’s notion of eidos). A sense that enables the naiveté of paralogy to be enacted. A sense that keeps one open to being led by what they encounter rather than fitting objects into a pre-determined way of seeing.

In keeping, Foucault’s own method and practice was purposely inimitable. “Every issue”, he claimed, “is a separate battle” (in Sheridan 1985: 18), hence, he insisted that “the intellectual can no longer play the role of the adviser. The project, tactics, and goals to be adopted are a matter for those who do the fighting” (Foucault 1980: 188). Thus, his
texts, like all texts, should be seen as toolkits, elements of which could be used or discarded by anyone to ask old questions in new ways and new questions of old problems "as they would a screwdriver or monkey wrench, in order to short circuit or disqualify systems of power" (in Weeks 1985: 21). Alternatively, they may be seen as "instruments of analysis... In other words, a topological and geological survey of the battlefield". These instruments or surveys gain their currency not from providing clear goals, or capturing or representing truth, but in the sense that Feyerabend talks of maps as traditions in their own right, frameworks that can order particular thoughts or that can be used as a comparator against situational experiences. By different instruments or traditions being brought together in this way inventive local solutions may be sparked off, or how being may be shaped and hemmed by structures driven by the accidents and quirks of history may be seen, so as to help local people force greater articulation. In Postmodernism, the 'intellectual' can no longer tell people what must be done, correct laypersons' views, find a logical coherence across cultures or co-ordinate efforts towards some utopic vision of collective progress. They can only investigate the opportunities that such diversity offers as "the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the ethics, the ethos, the practice of self" are transferred to individuals (Foucault 1988b: 18; Bauman 1987; 1992).

While many have been quick to associate Postmodernism with the Critical Modernism of Habermas and Adorno (Kellner 1988; Poster 1989), it on this line of argument that one can see the problem that Foucault and Lyotard have with Habermas. We may see their differences more clearly by contrasting the two views' readings of Kant's definition of 'critique' from What is Enlightenment? (underlining added):

Enlightenment is man's exit from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-
incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own reason!

Critical Moderns, still believing that Man must share a fundamental unitary essence and seeing universal emancipation to still be a relevant meta-narrative, sought to discover and provide the theoretical framework that showed everyone how to escape their ‘self-incurred tutelage’. Foucault and Lyotard, inspired by Nietzsche and Heidegger, take a different slant, re-writing the notions of ‘self-incurred tutelage’ and ‘enlightenment’. On their view, accepting any objective criteria, approach, essence, ethical or cultural end as above others, would be a further form of self-incurred tutelage. For them, critical thinking is about highlighting the idea that any categories, utopias, models or frameworks, whether they be the categories of scientific reason or Habermas’ theory of knowledge constitutive interests, are subjective and contingent on particular traditions and without natural foundation. This view argues that Critical Modernists, in order to free us from historically imposed structures and categories, simply promote further universal structures and categories based on their own historical traditions - universal structures that ‘do violence’ to individual divergence. From this view-point, individuals should be encouraged or left to think for themselves about how categories shape them; indeed, to question any set of categories. Local people possess their own reason, but after being conditioned to defer to the objectivity of experts, they lack the resolution and courage to employ it. There is a sense of freedom in this, but one that comes from accepting that a common end may not be normal. Consequently, we are free to accept that difference will likely, and quite normally, counter the achievement of consensus, free to be different or ‘abnormal’ to see non-conformity as legitimate rather than as holding up progress.

However, Postmodernism does not underwrite non-reflective pragmatism. It is not
so much that ‘anything goes’; rather that ‘everything depends’. A community or individual depends upon its own particular history and traditions. Thus, recognising that people must act in communities, Postmodernism promotes providing tools for the analysis of the history of epistemes or paradigms and the people who play roles in them. While locals would be able to apply the tools they wished, in the manner that they felt appropriate, it would not mean that any recommendations that stemmed from such analyses would necessarily work. A community or an individual is always affected by what tradition deems desirable and what historical decisions make feasible. There may not be one truth, but there will be compelling local narratives to be worked with.

Thus, Postmodernism is not opposed to rationality per se or about abandoning rationality (Smart 1992; Raulet 1986; Ghirardo 1984), but about allowing both Modern and un-Modern frameworks to compete for attention. Rorty (1992: 92) describes this realisation as a “stage in which all descriptions are evaluated according to their efficacy as instruments for purposes, rather than by their fidelity to the object described”.

In summary, Postmodernism sees the depth (wherein lies the essence of things) and height (from which one should look down upon things), that Modernism draws upon, as an artificial creation. It sees life on the surface, like a rhizome, ungrounded but held together by a web of cross-cutting traditions and individual paths, with past present and future running in to one another. In doing so it is free to look beyond those approaches held up by Modernism to other forms and styles of thought. In this way we may let in an ever “increasing ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives” that sparks invention. A manner that may be illustrated by a wash of both the symbolic forms of Modernism (from pg. 88) and the Ancients (from pg. 136).
In keeping, Postmodernism can recognise no universal language with which to speak this world, no general objective theories, only particular local language games. It recognises that there must always be different schools of thought and sees knowledge gained by individuals engaging in an eclectic nomadology - connecting different schools, ideas, analogies and forms. Each path fashioned individually by drawing upon one's experienced traditions. One might visualise such a path by superimposing Deleuze and Guattari's Dionysian string of a "piano piece" (see Figure 19, pg. 153) onto the mesh of symbols above.

Consequently, the style of thought privileged is not Modernism's homology, but paralogy: the 'faulty' logic that accepts the non-flush, the differend and the combination of many logoi by 'slaloming' the chaos between different forms and orders (Foucault likemindedly describes a "'slalom' (of personal communication) between traditional philosophy and an abandonment of all seriousness" (in Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 205)). A style of thinking that promotes moving between and invoking different approaches as circumstances arise. A style not unlike metis.
**PART THREE: ANALYSIS**

Part Three uses the normative grid developed in Part Two as a framework for analysing the forms that Management incorporates, the bodies through which these forms are spoken of, repeated and institutionalised so as to reinforce their legitimacy, and consequently, Management's 'visibility' - its mode of seeing and speaking.

Chapter 3 described the Ancient Greek episteme as one where language was relativistic and contextual; where the architecture for seeing was based around a co-appreciation of kosmos and chaos; around particular perspectives, traditions and connections; around the interconnectedness of beings that later societies would separate through their cohabitation seeming illogical: mind and body; past and present; individual and community. Wisdom was seen as metis, the ability to be resourceful enough to move quickly between kosmos and chaos, or ordered frameworks and particular contingencies, to be inventive enough to combine different tools to combat particular problems.

Chapter 4 outlined the Modern episteme as seeking to assert order over this hitherto 'hotchpotch' arrangement through the development of universal grids and essences below, and apparatus hoisting an objective viewpoint above, the plane of action. Modernism's sights are thus configured by a triangular hierarchy, with knowledge looked at from above, thanks to an apex provided by a centralised stem of
knowledge or school of thought that may be decentralised and applied to all branches of
life 'on the ground'. In keeping, it seeks to speak positivistically so as to objectively
represent the objects of its inquiries, and to speak with universal, de-personalised meta-
narratives, normal measures and ends against which things may be plotted and toward
which they may be aimed. In the past century, performative efficiency has established
itself as the most pervasive of these non-personal meta-narratives.

Chapter 5 showed Postmodernism as a re-connection with Ancient thinking on
two counts. Firstly, by re-appreciating the forms and traditions of the past that 'crawl
out' as Modernism's meta-narratives descend. Secondly, by developing a style of
thinking not unlike metis. However, while we can say that the Postmodern requires their
recovery, this is not to say that the Postmodern episteme is the same as that of the
Greeks. To think it so would be to overlook Postmodernism's dependence on the re-
appreciation of local tradition and spiral view of history. Postmodernism must recognise
Modernism's influence now as such traditional influences can never be fully overcome.
Hence, Postmodernism only seeks to 'rewrite' some of Modernism's aspects rather than
'consign it to history'. Jencks (1988: 45-6) consequently describes Postmodernism as a
language that "revives, simultaneously, every single period of Classicism. That's what
is so extraordinary. It revives all periods, Egyptian architecture and painting". In this
way, Postmodernism is clearly a recovery of the Ancient. However, Jencks goes on to
claim that, Postmodernism also revives: "Hockney, let's say, in his early phase, and
Michael Graves among other people. It revives Mannerism. It revives 1900. It revives
Rationalism". By recovering the pre-Modern while seeking to maintain rather than
overcome Modernism, Jencks argues that Postmodernism "doesn't look like anything
we've ever seen before". Herein lies the difficulty for Management.
As Part Three will show, Management, as it has been conceived, finds it has an incredible strength in Modernism but will find itself unable to see and speak in other episteme because its historical configuration has created a line of the outside that prevents it from recognising anything beyond the Modern. Unlike other fields discussed in Chapter 5's review of Postmodernism - Art, Architecture, Philosophy, Ecology, Physics - Management can see nothing un-Modern to recover, no alternative styles with which it might relativise its Modern approaches, no other Classicisms with which it might become Postmodern.

Foucault (1978: 8) began Volume 1 of the *History of Sexuality* by outlining how historical assumptions incorporate “the form of a sermon” that indicates how a field or subject should develop and how this is at once a “statement of oppression” in that it limits alternative futures. Chapter 6 demonstrates how Management has developed a particular reinforcing history that only sees the present and can only ever speak of the future in Modern terms. It shows how the sermon that springs from this is now taken for granted as providing a universal view of Management, a view that is protected by a dense web of experts and institutions. This formation makes a singular view: that of Modern Western historians in the 1950s and 1960s who read a particular situation in America in the first decades of the 20th century (a response to a specific problem that required reference to a general de-personalised end that would make Modernity’s political apparatus make sense) appear as the grand-origin of Management, the moment of the scientific discovery of Management’s universal object. In this way, a particular subjective set of historical views limits Management’s future in a manner that is as unnecessary as it is unrecognised.

Chapter 7 shows how a particular form of the ‘Business School’, the key ‘pulpit’ from which this sermon is delivered, re-doubles this singular formation, and thus, further
lessens the likelihood of its supposed objectivity being called into question. ‘Organization’, the primary object of Management, the subject ‘Management’ and the institution of the ‘Business School’, were not developed one after the other in a linear-logical manner. They emerged simultaneously, reflecting a particular logic back to one another, and consequently contribute to a formation that works in perfect harmony to promote the supposed universality of its conception of Management.

Chapter 8 investigates how the formation of Management, the historical ‘sermon’ and ‘pulpit’ through which this is issued in the present, has shaped Management’s ‘prophesies’ or its visible futures, in such a way that Management continues to unwittingly promote the same singularly Modern perspectives. How Management, given its historical appreciation of itself and its general lack of awareness of the contingent particularity of this appreciation, finds it almost impossible to see or to say anything substantially different.

These three chapters draw upon a wide range of texts, across a spectrum that might be termed ‘low-brow’ to ‘high-brow’, to analyse the forms and formation of Management. As Foucault (1989: 9) made clear, “many things contain thought” and we should not necessarily be compelled to look to the latest ‘cutting-edge’ contributions to ascertain the current state of knowledge. Indeed, being concerned in this thesis with what might be termed the ‘background noise’, the taken-for-granted assumptions or ‘murmur’ that supports the formation of Management, would encourage looking more to standard textbooks than scholarly monographs, as it is here that we might find the more settled or less contested premises. Thus, most of what is examined here is taken from history books, standard teaching texts, old canonical ‘classics’, encyclopedia and dictionaries, public reports and mainstream articles. In certain circumstances more current scholarly discourse
is drawn upon, as in Chapter 8's discussion of Postmodernism in Management, but this is due to the fact that this discourse has only just begun to settle into the main fabric. In any case, it should be remembered that what is required of the counter-history that follows is not an all-encompassing survey just enough to encourage others to question the universality of Management as it is currently formed.
Management's history claims that Management principles are universal but only since the application of a scientific approach has Man begun to fully understand them. This view is made regular by a tight knit, but not obvious, web of different fora that repeat the same message. However, it is demonstrated that this is based on the prevailing beliefs of Management historians in the 1950s and 1960s. They identified the origins of their present in the work of engineers who they saw as the first to begin uncovering Management's basic good: 'efficiency'. However, this discovery can be shown to be due to subjective beliefs and politically contingent expedients encouraged by problems bought to the fore by Modernism. As Management sought more academic credibility, a more ancient heritage was sought. But the past was looked at only in terms of the Modern principles that historians had determined as their object. Thus, Management sees nothing of the past apart from that which further strengthens the belief in the universality of prevailing Modern beliefs. The 'sermon of development' promoted by Management's history is a singular view that maps neatly onto the beliefs of Modernism.

### 6. SERMON - THE HISTORY OF MANAGEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aprox. Year</th>
<th>Individual/Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Aprox. Year</th>
<th>Individual/Ethnic Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2700 B.C.</td>
<td>Egyptians</td>
<td>1810</td>
<td>Robert Owen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1491</td>
<td>Hebrews</td>
<td>1832</td>
<td>Charles Babbage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>F.W. Taylor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350</td>
<td>Plato</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Hugo Munsterberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Varro</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Thomas Edison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 A.D.</td>
<td>Jesus Christ</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Henri Fayol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1436</td>
<td>Venetians</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Elton Mayo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Sir Thomas More</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>James. D. Mooney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1525</td>
<td>Machiavelli</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Chester Barnard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1776</td>
<td>Adam Smith</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Colonel Urwick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1785</td>
<td>Thomas Jefferson</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Max Weber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1799</td>
<td>Eli Whitney</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Herbert Simon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>Boulton and Watt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There is not a great deal of discourse on the history of Management. This may be for a number of reasons. Firstly, through its association with economics (which will be discussed in the next chapter), most view Management as 'timeless', 'ahistorical' or
concerned with the present and the future, with being at the cutting edge. Hence, Management history is akin to Economic history. It is not seen as particularly useful and to study it is taken as a sign of failure to achieve the level of proficiency necessary for really meaningful work: "best left to those underendowed for fully professional work at the modern level" (Stigler 1982: 107). Secondly, because Management defines itself as based upon other disciplines like Economics, Psychology and Sociology, it views an understanding of their history as sufficient for understanding its own. Thirdly, the history of Management is not contested. There is little debate as to its key moments. After a flurry of works in the 1950s and 1960s, no comprehensive new history of Management has appeared in the past two decades. The history of Management is so regular that it offers no scope for the ambitious historian. It is this regularity which makes it little more than a murmur - a background noise taken for granted in Western societies, and more powerful for being so. This marks it out as a target for a Foucauldian counter-history.

The list presented at the head of this chapter is just such a regular view (although others give more time to events rather than people: the advent of Protestantism, the Scientific Revolution, the American Civil War, the spread of U.S. Railways - Chandler 1962; 1977; Gross 1964; Wren 1994). It is a summary of the 95 ethnic groups, men and one woman (Parker Follett) who fill C.S. George’s (1968) “Managerial Continuum” at the beginning of his History of Management Thought (see Figure 22 for a copy of the beginning of this Continuum outlining the ‘discoveries’ of the key contributors). Being part of the history of Management connects all of these people and events - from the Egyptians to Simon.

Apart from George, there are very few volumes written on the history of Management. Standing over what has been written is the spectre of Alfred Chandler, who
## The Managerial Continuum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approximate Year</th>
<th>Individual or Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Major Managerial Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4000</td>
<td>Egyptians</td>
<td>Recognized need for planning, organizing, and controlling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2700</td>
<td>Egyptians</td>
<td>Recognized need for honesty or fair play in management. Therapy interview—&quot;get it off your chest.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2600</td>
<td>Egyptians</td>
<td>Decentralization in organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Egyptians</td>
<td>Recognized need for written word in requests. Use of staff advice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>Hammurabi</td>
<td>Use of witnesses and writing for control; establishment of minimum wage; recognition that responsibility cannot be shifted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>Egyptians</td>
<td>Centralization in organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1491</td>
<td>Hebrews</td>
<td>Concepts of organization, scalar principle, exception principle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Recognized need for organization, planning, directing, and controlling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600</td>
<td>Nebuchadnezzar</td>
<td>Production control and wage incentives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>Mencius</td>
<td>Recognized need for systems and standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Principle of specialization recognized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sun Tzu</td>
<td>Recognized need for planning, directing, and organizing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>Socrates</td>
<td>Enunciation of universality of management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 B.C.</td>
<td>Xenophon</td>
<td>Recognized management as a separate art.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cyrus</td>
<td>Recognized need for human relations. Use of motion study, layout, and materials handling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350</td>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>Scientific method applied. Use of work methods and tempo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plato</td>
<td>Principle of specialization enunciated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>325</td>
<td>Alexander the Great</td>
<td>Use of staff.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 22:** The Management Continuum - Timeline Outlining the Key Discoveries of Management. Source George "The History of Management" (1968 & 1972). Only a portion is shown here.
“singlehandedly developed the reference points in business history on which management researchers must rely” (Leontiades 1989: 30). His work, particularly *Beginnings of Big Business* (1959), *Strategy and Structure* (1962) and *The Visible Hand* (1977), is seen as the “signal contribution” (Lee 1990: 176; Jones 1997), a “landmark [that has not] been updated” (Leontiades 1989: 109) and providing “the paradigm for future research” (Waring 1991).

While the research agenda in the United States is “cast within Chandler’s conceptual framework”, in Britain the “Chandlerian revolution” has been less marked (Harvey & Jones 1990: 5). The British doyen of Management history is Colonel Lyndall Urwick. Urwick’s historical work in marking out Management’s foundation has seen him lauded as “the only Englishman to rank beside the great management pioneers” (Management Today 1984: 50; Child 1969; Huczynski 1993). Particularly influential is Urwick’s series *The Making of Scientific Management*, written with Edward Brech (1951; 1953) and published in the decade after World War II.

individuals. According to these works the history of Management runs as follows.

I. The accepted history
Management "is as old as human society itself" (Mooney 1947: ix). Its "roots... go deep, just as do those of such other, older professions as theology, law, medicine, and education" (Appley, in Merrill 1960). Consequently, Management's history begins with those clever civilisations like the Egyptians, who "recognized the need for planning, organizing and controlling" (quotation marks, unless otherwise stated, refer to George (1972)) and the Chinese who "recognized the need for organization, planning, directing and controlling, and the principle of specialization". The Greeks also recognised the "principle of specialization" and "applied the scientific method", albeit not to the principle of specialisation, while the Romans developed bureaucracies. All of these civilisations, and the Hebrews, acted according to organisation's three universal principles: "co-ordination, scalar hierarchy and the functional division of labour" (Mooney 1947).

Then there are key contributions from prominent individuals. Jethro lectured Moses on "the benefits of delegation and sound organization" (Mooney 1947; Merrill 1960; Dale 1960; Caplow 1964). Plato and Socrates made "timeless observations about the management of people" (Merrill 1960). Jesus applied "unity of command" and discovered the need for "human relations" in Management. A number of Italians developed accounting procedures. Thomas More "called for specialization".

These ideas were further advanced with the coming of Protestantism. "As civilization developed, so did more positive feelings about work. Following the teachings of Judeo-Christian philosophers (such as Luther and Calvin), beliefs in the value of work
eventually became a cherished tradition in American society”. This enabled the discovery that “Labor is good in itself [and that one] becomes a better person by virtue of the act of working” (Greenberg & Baron 1995: 127). These discoveries, and the related concept of economic individualism, “put great stress on the religious and economic advantages of highly specialized work” (Dessler 1986: 35) and “resulted in specific guidelines for the creation of a capitalist spirit” (Wren 1994: 25).

The coming of the Scientific Revolution “made it inevitable that some hardy pioneers should attempt to provide scientific principles for the management of man” and offered “a scientific vehicle upon which the manager could begin to build his discipline”. Gross’ (1964: 117-8) The Managing of Organizations explains the development thus:

All the ancestors of administrative thought operated on the premise that by the exercise of reason men could devise feasible and consistent means for attaining desirable ends. During the great intellectual upsurge of the Enlightenment this premise became an explicit and articulated principle... Copernicus, Galileo, Bruno and Kepler destroyed the old image of man and his planet as the center of the universe... By the time of Descartes, Spinoza, Newton, and Locke, rationality had become a widespread article of faith. Both man and universe were seen as behaving in accordance with natural laws... By discovering these laws and acting in accordance with them, man could control his irrational impulses and win true freedom... Throughout this entire development, superstition, supernaturalism and the dead hand of tradition were persistently countered by sober, skeptical and scientific calculation... if we look closely enough, we can find in the Enlightenment the seed germs of modern administration. Without exception the pioneers of administrative thought addressed themselves to the extension... of the rule of reason. [Thus ]the Enlightenment provided the broad set of cultural values within which the industrial and administrative revolutions emerged and grew.

Light’s (1966) The Nature of Management tells of Modernity conquering Aristotelianism along similar lines while in Brown’s (1971) Organization, the triumph over Aristotelianism is held up as a prescription for the way that Management should advance.

Building upon the Enlightenment’s advance, Adam Smith applied the Newtonian method to economic endeavour so as to see the connection between the division of labour
and the progress of civilisation. This led to his “brilliant argument on the economic advantages that society would reap from the division of labor” (Robbins 1993); his applying the “principle of specialization to manufacturing workers”; his discovery that division of labour is a universal characteristic of organisation (Khandwalla 1977); and his foundation of the field of economics (Lekachman 1964). Economics is, thus, the discipline on which Management is based. Smith’s discoveries drove the Industrial Revolution and the rise of the factory. This is where “management in the sense which we know it” begins (Sheldon 1924: 37; Urwick & Brech 1951; Bendix 1956) and where the problems Management is concerned with “first reared their heads” (Pollard 1965).

Hence the importance of Thomas Jefferson. In addition to his constitutional contributions to the formation of America, Jefferson wrote to his friends from France of techniques inspired by Smith’s idea. These “anticipated Whitney’s whole interchangeable parts idea” (relatedly, Wren (1994: 28-30) incorporates the Declaration of Independence and a discussion on Locke’s work inspiring the American and French Revolutions into The Evolution of Management Thought). Whitney and his partner, clockmaker Simeon North, developed an approach to assembly that “absorbed Adam Smith’s concepts of how to control organizations” in such a way as to anticipate the factory system (Clutterbuck & Crainer 1990: 3). Boulton and Watt are doubly important. On the one hand, “the heart of the industrial revolution was really the steam engine” (Wren 1994: 37). On the other, their Soho factory was “an organization in which all of the current and accepted methods of production planning were to be found in embryo” (Urwick 1956).

Babbage (1835: 261) then contributes by expanding on the virtues of the division of labour, determining that it is “no less applicable to mental productions than to those in which material bodies are concerned”. He (1835: 268) described his major managerial
work, as "one of the consequences that has resulted from [my work on] the calculating engine", and recognised that Management’s evolution was tied to its increasingly intimate connection with the calculating sciences.

In the same era, Robert Owen (1813: 17) was seeking a manufacturing principle that would:

speedily divest [us] of all the ridiculous and absurd mystery with which it has hitherto enveloped by the ignorance of preceding times. [Hence] all the complicated and counteracting motives for good conduct, which have been multiplied almost to infinity, will be reduced to a single principle of action, which, by its evident operation and sufficiency, shall render this intricate system unnecessary, and ultimately supersede it in all parts of the earth.

In his quest, Owen was “far ahead of his time in urging that [we pay] at least as much attention to the welfare of ‘vital machines’ as ‘inanimate machines’” (Merrill 1960). “Living machines”, Owen (in George 1972: 63) informs us, “may be easily trained and directed to procure a large increase of pecuniary gain... The economy of living machinery is to keep it neat and clean, treat it with kindness that its mental movements might not experience too much irritating friction”. Having had an “intuitive grasp of the principles of sound management”, Owen is obviously “the pioneer of personnel management” (Urwick & Brech 1951).

By focusing on the rise of big business in the United States, Chandler, beyond references to the emergence of classical economics, focuses on the next key period: from 1850. This was when Management became a separate and full-time task with the rise of the railways. Their growth across the US enabled companies to become geographically dispersed which, in turn, made the personal surveillance of many business transactions impossible or at least inefficient. These companies had to develop an alternative and this was found in the adoption of military models of bureaucracy. At the same time, the
railroads opened up new markets, enabling companies to expand production and improve economies-of-scale. This could only be done by employing the same bureaucratic principles. As they did so, companies found that many economic transaction costs, for things that would have previously been bought from commission agents on the market, were minimised by their being standardised and carried out under one ‘roof’. Chandler showed how the ‘visible hand’ of organisation came into being by more efficiently fulfilling the market’s ordering functions, thus surpassing Smith’s invisible hand of the market. Subsequently, Management became widespread as it became a necessary function to maximise the efficiency of the structures and technology required for operationalising such large-scale organisations. Williamson (1983: 125), for whom, like Chandler, “efficiency is the main and only systematic factor response”, conversely argued that organisations emerge as a response to market failure and not because the latter become more efficient markets. In other words, organisations emerge when markets lapse and become inefficient (i.e., individual transaction costs become too high). Efficiency is, for both Chandler and Williamson, the cause of organisation.

At the turn of the 20th century, a group of “pioneers” that recognised the “gospel of efficiency” emerged into this organisational environment. They “started to apply to administration the methods of scientific observation which had already yielded dramatic and highly applauded results in the physical sciences” (Gross 1964: 119). Management’s Pioneers, “comparable to Galileo” (Urwick & Brech 1951), were those who:

recognized that the ‘antiquated scheme of business principles’... bore no logical relation to the intellectual standards, the mode of thinking customary in the exact sciences. Yet it was these standards, this mode of thinking, which were the basis of the inventions which had revolutionised its technical processes and were adding incalculably to its productive potential by the decade. On the principle of the ‘hair of the dog’ they attempted to apply the methods of science to the
problems of direction and control.

These Pioneers brought together the strands of Management's ancestry: bureaucratic organisation, efficiency, planning, coordinating, directing and controlling, the industrial revolution and factory production, the division of labour, specialisation and the scientific method so as "to correlate the growing mass of intuitive ground rules into clearly enunciated principles" (Gross 1964: 119). It is not surprising, therefore, that these pioneers of Management should be industrial engineers: "As engineers attempted to make machines more efficient, it was a natural extension of their efforts to work on the human side of the equation" (Greenberg & Baron 1995: 17). Most prominent among these pioneers were Frederick Taylor and Henri Fayol.

Taylor "marked the new industrial spirit [with] his substitution of the scientific method [over] records of what has been done or opinion of what can be done" (Gantt 1961: 39). He (1911) described the necessity of a "great mental revolution" that would focus on: "Science, not rule of thumb" (this now considered part of the dead hand of tradition). Taylor's (1911) work resulted in Management's "four universal principles". Hence, "any book which attempts to show how management thought was developed must inevitably start with Fredrick Winslow Taylor" (Pollard 1974: 3; Kelly 1968: 18; Brech 1967). His list of contributions is twice the length of the next most significant individual or group on George's Continuum. His Principles of Scientific Management "is not merely the precursor of modern organization... it is in many respects its origin" (Dotson 1967).

Whereas Taylor is the "father of scientific management", Fayol is "the father of

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17 First: Develop a science for each element of a man's work, which replaces the old rule-of-thumb method. Second: Scientifically select and then train, teach, and develop the workman. Third: Heartily cooperate with the men so as to insure all of the work being done in accordance with the principles of science which has been developed. Fourth: The management takes over all the work for which they are better fitted than the workmen, while in the past almost all of the work and the greater part of the responsibility were thrown upon the men (Taylor 1911).
management principles" (Greenwood 1965: 5). He revolutionised Management by conceptualising it as a separate body of knowledge that was applicable to all forms of group activity, and developing the first comprehensive theory of Management that could be applied to all endeavours. Fayol (1916) defined Management as a universal set of functions: planning, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling; and identified its 14 general principles, the first of which is the division of labour. In 1947, with the publication *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisations*, Weber consolidated these ideas with his depiction of the matching principles of organisation: bureaucratic specialisation and the division of labour, hierarchisation, standardised training, status differentiation, centralisation, and impersonalised and disciplinised behaviour.

After thinkers like these had laid the foundations of Management proper, "New Pioneers" emerged (Gross 1964; Wren 1974). Munsterberg, Mayo and Parker Follett discovered that "Man is a human being - even in industry" (Whyte 1959: 3). They focused upon the "human" or "other" side of work to that of the engineering Pioneers. In so doing, they sought to build upon and surpass them via a rigorous application of "more" or "better science in management", by drawing upon advances in the new sciences of psychology and sociology. Consequently, one important trend that sprang from the thinking of the new pioneers was the emphasis placed on attaching the word 'new' to Management works. Now that the groundwork of Management was set in place, great currency was attached to improving upon it (Child 1969).

If the Pioneers brought an engineering outlook to bear and the New Pioneers sought to build on this with a psychological perspective, Chester Barnard was a "pioneer in developing the philosophical groundwork of management" (Miller 1978: 410), showing that "one must begin on the theory of organization with Plato" (Barnard, in
Pauchant 1994: 825). Barnard (1938) saw that traditional mechanistic definitions of organisation were naive and sought to define organisation as an "open system of consciously coordinated activities".

While later theorists would see Barnard's approach as both a step toward integration in his own day and as an ideal unifying framework for grasping Management thought in our times (Wren 1994; Robbins & Mukeji 1990), the period through to the 1940s generally suffered through a lack of integration. The writers listed above "did recognise and understand the functions of management [but] no unified theory of management was developed" (George 1968: 76). Because of this, the first half of the 20th century is inauspiciously termed "a period of diversity in management thought" (Robbins 1991: 33). Urwick (Urwick & Brech 1953: 160) describes the problem thus:

earlier publications have a historical significance in line with the story of the evolution of management itself [because] they represent the oozing out of the spring at source and its first trickling together into the tiny brook. By the 1920s it was growing into a stream, continuous, swelling, broadening. And within ten years - to continue the analogy - it had become necessary to build the reservoir that would contain and marshall the growing flood.

This is how Mooney and Urwick find their niche on Management's Continuum. Mooney surveyed the history of humankind to discover the three universal principles underlying all organisation: co-ordination, scalar hierarchy and the functional division of labour. Greatly inspired by Mooney proving the universality of organising principles, Urwick surveyed the extant Management literature so as to "collect, consolidate, and correlate the principles of management". These studies lead us from the "period of diversity" toward the period in Management characterised by a sermon of "integration" (Gross 1964).

While Herbert Simon castigated Urwick for being naive, old-hat and unscientific
(using "terms not unlike those used by an Ubangi medicine man to discuss disease" - Simon, in Gross 1964: 182), his aims during the post-diversity phase of Management were much the same as the historian. "We require a serious effort toward the construction of a common language [to] bring together this scattered and diverse body of writing about organizations into a coherent whole" (March & Simon 1958). George's Continuum ends with Simon but he is a key contributor to the project that most clearly embodies the aims of Management's integration phase in the 1950s and 1960s. A project inspired by the publication of "The Management Theory Jungle" by Harold Koontz in 1961.

Koontz (1961) recognised that: "No science, now regarded as mature, started out with a complete statement of incontrovertibly valid principles". Consequently, he claimed that while the period of diversity had been a necessary stepping stone, "any science proceeded, and more than that has been useful, for centuries, on the basis of generalizations, some laws, some principles, and some hypotheses". Koontz argued that Management must now take four steps toward maturation: distilling and testing fundamentals; defining a body of knowledge (Management, he claimed, "should deal with an area of knowledge and inquiry that is 'manageable' [as] no great advances in knowledge were made so long as man contemplated the whole universe"); clarifying management semantics; and making Management a specific discipline so that more established branches of knowledge could be identified as its basis. Koontz's own strategy toward these aims was to "encompass and synthesize the diversity of the day" via the "process approach" which sees managers "performing the four [Fayolian] functions of planning, organizing, leading, controlling", with a feedback loop incorporated, in keeping with open-systems thinking pioneered by Barnard (see Figure 23).

The following year, Koontz played host to a conference of the world's most
FIGURE 23: THE 'REVOLUTIONARY' PROCESS APPROACH.
distinguished management academics and practitioners with the intention of "working toward a unified theory of management" (Koontz 1964). While a consensus was not achieved, most remained optimistic that "within perhaps five years - certainly not more than ten years hence - a general theory of management will be evolved, stated, and generally accepted in management circles" (Frederick 1963: 212). At this point, having produced a regular understanding of Management's past that legitimates it as a worthy field of knowledge, the histories of Management tend to tail off.

II. Management history's key continuities and discontinuities

Apart from one or two interesting but minor items from British Industrial literature, serious thought on 'organization' begins with F.W. Taylor in the United States and Henri Fayol in France... Management subsequent writings go back to the bases provided by these men. Brech, Organization: The Framework of Management (1965).

The accepted history, related above, indicates several key moments of continuity and discontinuity that enable its sermon to make sense. Management is as old as civilisation. It is, therefore, an important, constant and distinguished object. However, key discontinuities occur in the 17th and 18th centuries as the method by which Management can be best understood emerges (during the Scientific Revolution) and the conditions in which Management now works arrives (during the Industrial Revolution). A further break takes place at the cusp of the 20th century as Pioneers bring these two strands together by applying scientific methods to industrial problems. In fact, as we have seen, this is where Management 'really, seriously begins'. This raises a problem. How can Management be as old as civilisation and really begin at the turn of the 20th century?

Management historians circumvent this illogicality by drawing on various Modern devices. In a manner reminiscent of the approach of the historians of Psychology
(see Chapter 2), it is claimed that earlier approaches were not civilised or clever enough to properly recognise their object and/or failed to apply the proper method (i.e., scientific principles). Hence, Mooney (1947) points out that while some Ancients were clever enough to act according to Management principles, they were not so clever as to articulate them. Wren (1974) similarly diminishes pre-Modern thinking by noting that it was “dominated by cultural values that were antibusiness, antiachievement and largely antihuman”. Greenberg and Baron (1995) show pre-Protestant people to be less civilised for not knowing the “true value of work”, and Light (1966: 10, 17) explains that while:

Men have always acted in groups... It is only in the last sixty years that serious attempts have been made to deal with the subject of organization analytically and to apply general principles to building up the structure of industrial enterprises. This work originated with Frederick Winslow Taylor [and this is the origin of organization study... It has only recently been recognized that there is a general ability to manage which can be made the subject of a recognized ‘discipline’ based on objective research.

Hence, one may draw upon the notion of a Cartesian split between thinking and doing Management, and associate the adjective ‘serious’ and ‘rational’ with the nouns ‘scientific’, ‘ordered’ and ‘disciplined’ to further smooth over the illogicality of Management’s dual beginnings. “The emergence of modern management had to be based on rational ways of making decisions”, explains Wren (1994: 33, 1), hence, “the genesis of modern management thought is found in the work of early pioneers who sought to solve the problems created by the factory system”. Duncan (1990: 2-3) agrees that:

the seeds of management thought were not planted when people started ‘doing management’; they were sowed, quite literally, into the soil of human history when people started trying to make sense out of what was being done. Management as a discipline began when people started systematizing it, codifying it, and developing prescriptions for how to manage it better. Eventually theories that could be taught and learned emerged. That was the beginning of management... Of course there were managers and organizations, and some people understood management processes and leadership [previous to this]. But there was no discipline management.
Correspondingly, George's (1972: 45) second chapter, *Management During the Medieval Period*, concludes that: “From the viewpoint of management thought, the period is not especially noteworthy”, while his third chapter, on the 1700s, is given a telling title: *A Managerial Awakening*. Here we find “a series of happenings had had a real impact on managerial practices”. While the “practice of management is ancient the formal study of the body of management is relatively new” (Wren 1974: 3).

The co-existence of Ancient origins and Modern beginnings are also, somewhat circularly, explained away by relating the idea that Management only really began when it was a separate field. In other words, when the Modern principle of specialisation, of which Management seems to want to be the science, had developed far enough to ensure that it could emerge. Incorporating this distinction, Gross (1964: 91) explains that while:

> For tens of centuries considerable thought has been given to organizations and their governance. Only by thoughtful and deliberate effort was it possible to build and operate the world's earliest armies, churches, governments, empires and other complex enterprises... But this belongs to the history of administration, not of administrative thought... Only in the 20th century has administrative thought emerged as a differentiated field of sustained writing, conscious observation, abstract theory, and specialized terminology.

Similarly, Child (1969: 13-16) argues that “Management as a purely technical factor has always been pursued to some degree wherever work activities have been organized”. However, his History begins when managers were “set apart from other employees”, when “a distinct managerial social stratum” emerged, with the “foundation of specialized institutes catering for a specifically managerial management” (a wonderful term) and with the emergence of a “specialized literature”. Consequently, according to Child (1969), nothing of great import happened prior to 1911.

One final way of relating to a grand heritage while not feeling compelled to dwell upon it, to claim both a glorious ancient past and a scientific foundation, is enabled by
applying the Modern criterion of the cumulation and integration of knowledge. Thus, Gross (1964: 115) points out that, “although the early political philosophers often discussed aspects of formal organization structure, their thought reveals no clearly-articulated concept of an organization”. Wren (1974: 32) notes that we need not take pre-Modern Management too seriously because its ideas “were largely localized” seeing as “there was little or no need to develop a formal body of management thought under... nonindustrialized circumstances”. Further, George (1968: 26) makes it clear that while “in these early times, management thought existed, [it did so] only in a somewhat nebulous and unsophisticated state... the principles were not united in a scheme of management thought, nor is there any evidence of any chronological building of various management techniques upon previous conceived ones”.

In keeping with this association of unification with worthiness, the “mental revolution” that began Management thought around 1911 (as the continuous and grand object of Management was subject to proper scientific examination within a Modern industrial context), is seen to be followed by a linear and positive continuity of increasing integration. The sermon is that Management has developed by becoming more integrated, more scientific and hence closer to the truth and it should continue to do so. New cutting-edge approaches should be developed so as to build upon and integrate the principles developed by the pioneers toward an ever more mature scientific field. These key moments of continuity and discontinuity mean that the forms incorporated by the history of Management - Platonism, the machine metaphor, the quest for a unified science, a specific specialised discipline contributing to the centralised Commonwealth of Knowledge, the application of the human sciences, bureaucracy, planning, coordination and control, the good of efficiency, history as evolution and knowledge as cumulative,
revolution followed by the integrated quest for the new advance - are all Modernist. The key chronological boundaries - the Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries, the Revolutions, the turn of the 20th century and it mechanistic-scientific optimism, the 1950s where the history of Management was first written up and the quest for integration began, are all key Modern boundaries or lines of the outside.

Despite the acceptance, or lack of critical comment on, the history described above, the historical understanding of Management is not based on a universal view, or the correct view of a universal object that we have only recently been clever enough to properly recognise. It is based upon a contingent view that found efficiency to be ‘the problem’ and the Modern scientific method to be the approach toward solving this problem, and correspondingly, created a specific object which has been solidified by a historical understanding that makes it seem solid and universal to us. The sections that follow present a counter-history that undermines this history on the following bases: by showing it to be based on specific subjective views held by those first historians who wrote it up in the 1950s and 1960s; by demonstrating that a key moment of discontinuity, Taylor’s ‘discovery’ of Scientific Management in 1911, was a result of social circumstances particular to the turn of the century and political and legal expedients (in any case, Scientific Management was not new nor particularly scientific); by highlighting how the universal object of Management was created by looking at pre-1900 events as anticipating our present understanding; by outlining how this history turns men into Modernists by focusing only on the aspects of their work that fit the accepted Continuum; and by showing that despite the attempts to integrate Management and thereby ‘mature it’ as a science, the field shows no signs of achieving this aim.
III. Counter-history 1. A specific view

The concept of management as a specific body of knowledge and practice forming the basis of a specialized profession has begin to emerge only in very recent times. Until the science and art of management was thus recognized as a subject in itself, a discrete discipline, there was no foundation on which to build an interest in its history. Urwick & Brech, *The Making of Scientific Management* (1953).

In explaining the uniqueness of their history, Urwick and Brech, as an aside, acknowledge something very important. Their history is unique to their time because it was in this period that Management was regarded as ‘serious enough’ (i.e., coming close to fulfilling Modern criteria) to have a history. Perhaps it is not surprising that despite assuming that it is reporting on universal objects and principles, what their history sees is related to their specific predilections and the prevailing understanding of their time.

The most obvious observation that one could make to begin is that almost all of those who are serious contributors to Management’s history are white men, as are those who wrote their history. Indeed, almost every one of the entries on George’s Continuum dated after the advent of Protestantism refers to White Anglo-Saxon Protestant males. Beyond this, we may observe that those pioneering Management historians worked with very particular views as to what their object was and with very specific views as to their historical task. Further, they worked within in a time with a very set view of Management.

The 1950s saw the professionalisation of Management, with the foundation of schools of business as normal parts of most American universities, the beginning of doctoral programmes to train Management scholars, the establishment of academic journals and the formation of professional associations. Selznick (1948) had published
his oft-cited article *Foundations of the Theory of Organization*, laying down the subject's epistemological foundations using Barnard's definition of his object and citing Parsons' structural-functional analysis, "relat[ing] contemporary and variable behavior to a presumptively stable system of needs and mechanisms", as exemplary. In 1954, the newly-formed American Management Association (AMA) was determining the "universality of the basic functions" of Management (Greenwood 1965: 2-3). They found these functions to be "planning, organizing and executing," organizing effectively meaning 'the division and ordering of labour', and executing being, by its AMA definition, "synonymous with controlling" (Appley 1954: 11). Within a decade Mee's (1963) study of "writers, consultants, industrialists and 'academicians'" confirmed that these fundamental functions of Management were 'true' because they were accepted by most of his respondents to be so when they were put to them as such. The pioneering historians of Management wrote in this environment, with aims, methods and particular appreciations of the object of their inquiries that could not but see only that which related to Management thus defined.

Koontz (1964), for example, whose prolific output from the 1950s to the 1980s mark him out as a 'tracer element' throughout Management, admitted that his project was "influenced by the concern that the development of management theory and research was going off in many directions, with confusion, interschool rivalries, and wasted research efforts". The ultimate purpose of his quest for unity was "increasing efficiency" which was also the reason for developing Management theory and the "goal of all managers" (Koontz & O'Donnell 1974: 7).

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18 Koontz (Koontz & O'Donnell 1974: 7) went on to make the curious claim that "since in all fields of human cooperation, efficiency of group effort lags far behind that of machines, application of principles of management will further human progress".
Urwick's historical aim was “to demonstrate that the body of knowledge about management is sufficiently large to make it a more scientific, more unified field than was commonly supposed” via the “collection, consolidation, and correction of [existing] principles of management”. To “crystallize the similar concepts that had been independently developed, thereby giving them more credence and serving to mold them into a system of managerial thought” (in George 1972: xii, 142-3). He believed Management theorists should “apply the methods of thought developed by the physical sciences so as to build a store of general principles, arrived at by induction, that can then lift management from the plane of empiricism and tradition” (Urwick 1937: 49; 1956: ix; 1960: 12). He viewed organising as a process of “subdividing all the activities necessary to any purpose and arranging them in groups which may be assigned to individuals... in a cold-blooded, detached spirit” like the preparation of an “engineering design” (Urwick 1956: 289-91; 1947). Further, Urwick’s regular co-author, Luther Gulick (in Gross 1964: 120), sums up the corresponding purpose of Management succinctly: “whether public or private, the basic ‘good’ is efficiency”.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Urwick, “an early disciple of Taylor” (Kelly 1968: 18), identified Management’s pioneers as those first concerned with applying the “‘discourse of reason’ to the problems of industrial management, to bring an adequate intelligence to the control of the forces released by a mechanised economy” (Urwick & Brech 1951: 9): Taylor and Fayol, in other words. Thus, Urwick wove their thinking to form his history’s ideological template. Fayolian managerial tasks - forecasting, planning, organisation (i.e., the division of labour), directing and control - provided a means of categorisation (George 1972). Taylor’s ideas provided Urwick (1947) with what Management should strive for, its evolutionary meta-narrative: ‘scientificity’. Hence,
Urwick effectively wrote the history of his own beliefs. Despite occasionally suggesting as much (e.g., Child 1969), later historians still followed his lines.

When Chandler came to the fore, Management histories had largely been concerned with tales of individual businesses and entrepreneurs (Greiner 1972). Arguing that “historians ha[d] provided social scientists with little empirical data on which to base generalizations or hypotheses concerning the administration of great enterprises [and had not] formulated many theories or generalizations of their own”, Chandler (1962: 1) proposed “an examination of the way different enterprises carried out the same activity”. He subsequently provided a “spur to generalization extraordinary in its impact” (Harvey & Jones 1990: 12; Jones 1997). However, it was not so much that Chandler discovered the generality that others had not be clever enough to see, as his background and Modern definition of the object of his inquiry that lead him to see commonalities.

Chandler was greatly influenced by Talcott Parsons, for whom he worked as a graduate student, was even greater. Parsons introduced him to structural-functionalism sociology and to the theories of Weber, Durkheim, Taylor, Mayo and Barnard. It is perhaps not surprising that Chandler (1962: 1) should define his role as “to provide social scientists with empirical data on which to base generalizations or hypotheses”. McCraw (1988: 19-21) suggests that Chandler’s “absorption of Weber’s maxim that bureaucracy represents the institutionalization of rationalism” caused a “lifelong preoccupation with rationality”. Indeed, Chandler (1977) came to assume that managers were so rational that he described them as seeking to “perfect their techniques” (an expression repeated 23 times in The Visible Hand). His notion of perfection amounted to a standard that evaluated techniques according to their productive efficiency and Darwinian survival. If a
technique contributed to material growth and was used for a long time, it had been perfected and its existence within the business environment was assured (Waring 1991).

The object of Chandler's inquiries was also particularly Modernist. "Modern business enterprise is easily defined", he claims on page one of The Visible Hand (1977). "As I indicates [shown here as Figure 24], it has two specific characteristics: it contains many distinct operating units and it is managed by a hierarchy of salaried executives". The figure (a replica of one from Strategy and Structure), is a complete reflection of Diderot's "Tree of Knowledge" (see Figure 16, pg. 123), the central disciplining core enabling unified specialisation along pre-determined lines. Chandler (1962) recognised that his concerns, thus defined, were somewhat particular. Subsequently, however, his work gained such kudos that later historians will understand him to be defining the field of research for the history of Management in general.

Those few critics who have sought to doubt the visibilities described have generally been rebuked through applying the very criteria to which these visibilities relate. Pre-empting any who might criticise his boundaries, Urwick (Urwick & Brech 1951: 177; 1953: 222), while always being keen to be seen to appeal to scientific logic rather than reportage of opinions, is not shy of twisting back to popular beliefs to justify his views. He states that critics of Management should note that "[w]ith every decade it becomes clearer that those who believe in management in the modern sense are 'inherently in line with the march of events'". Child (1969: 27) similarly justifies concentrating only on "industrial management" because "in this it adheres to the predominant emphasis in management thought".

There are few sceptics with regard to Chandler's thesis. Very few question his
idea that a managerial revolution occurred in the mid and late 19th century in America (John 1997). Of those who do not question this discontinuity but question whether it did in fact mark an advance, perhaps the most vociferous have been Piore and Sabel (1984). They contend that crossing from labour-intensive craft manufacture to capital-intensive production was a mistake and advocate moving back toward more flexible, labour intensive production. However, what is primarily a moral argument has been processed in standard fashion by the majority of historians. Piore and Sabel are criticised for neglecting to provide any quantitative demonstration that craft production could be economically competitive with bureaucratic production (Williams et al. 1987).

IV. Counter-history 2. Taylor and Roosevelt's particular world

President Roosevelt, in his address to the Governors at the White House, prophetically remarked that "The conservation of our national resources is only preliminary to the larger question of national efficiency". F.W. Taylor, opening line The Principles of Scientific Management (1911).

Looking in the manner described above, it is not surprising that historians should see Taylor’s (1911) Principles of Scientific Management as Management’s origin. Taylor was the first to study and develop theories of Management scientifically and to do so against the universal, objective, and hence, unquestionable criterion of efficiency. Acknowledging President Roosevelt may seem a simple opening demonstration of the importance of the subject matter to follow, but the nature of this grand origin may be better revealed with a knowledge of the contingent relationship between the President and the engineer, and the engineer and a lawyer named Louis Brandeis. Scientific Management, rather than being an objective discovery of the foundational attributes of Management, is the coming together of the interests of these three men in a particular
culture faced with specific problems.

Theodore Roosevelt was the most successful politician in what is referred to as the Progressive Movement during what is now called the Progressive Era in American history (generally, 1890-1920). The United States had grown on the back of a laissez-faire economic outlook and the assumption that the country’s natural resources were inexhaustible (Ekirch 1974). The Progressive Movement developed in response to the problems that this psyche had caused by the end of the 1800s. Namely the *ad hoc* and self-serving development of newly mapped resources in the West by particular business interests, and, partly in relation to this exploitation, glaring social and political abuses fostered by rampant big-business lobbying (Hofstadter 1962). In hindsight, Roosevelt (in Andrews 1958) claimed that “The relation of the conservation of natural resources to the problems of national efficiency had not yet dawned on the public mind”. One of the main reasons why it had not yet dawned was that Roosevelt had yet to employ his great flair for publicity and weaving expedients to promote this view to the American public (Barck & Blake 1965).

In response to the problems of the day, Roosevelt’s platform for the 1901 Presidential Election was the progressive reform of government practices and national conservation. The momentum granted by his winning the election helped him to quickly bring forward his Reclamation Act, which was passed in 1902 so as to centralise the development of new lands (Andrews 1958). However, the conservation programme soon ran into formidable obstacles as business interests, other economic groups and Western politicians who saw it as retarding growth, began to organise against it.

The psyche that had led to the problems that Roosevelt sought to address was well set. American nationality had increasingly absorbed the ideas of individuality, the
freedom to do as one wanted, to stake one's own claims and develop things as the individual saw fit and as his savvy allowed. Disavowal of these ideas left one's patriotism open to question. As Samuel Haber's (1964: xii) study of this period observes, these ideas "could not with ease be attacked frontally, they could [only] be outflanked - and this most successfully when almost inadvertently". At this point in time the term "efficiency" provided the best possible means for such a manoeuvre - for promoting centralisation and conservation without appearing anti-American.

As Haber (1964: ix-x) explains, the development of efficiency in the decades either side of 1900 changed the term in such a way that "efficient and good came closer to meaning the same thing in these years than in any other period". Efficiency had for some time been used as a personal attribute: to describe somebody who was effective, who got things done. In the last quarter of the 19th century a concept of mechanical efficiency developed out of the application of the laws of thermodynamics to the technology of the steam engine. This became intermingled with the previous meaning in such a way as to indicate a general objective measure of effectiveness - the ratio of output relative to energy inputs or, when applied to business, the output-input ratio of dollars. Eventually, just as the efficiency of a machine or an individual could be related to the way their parts combined, efficiency came to also signify a relationship between men - particularly "social harmony". Efficiency had, in the short space of two or three decades, come to be a wide-ranging term that, through association with machines, had been granted an air of benign and unquestionable objectivity and, through its association with social harmony, a sense of obvious 'rightness' not based on any particular interests or beliefs.

Roosevelt's conservation policies, lacking public support, were running aground. However, toward the end of the first decade of the 20th century, Roosevelt began to focus
the attention of the electorate on what he had come to see as the ‘other side’ of conservation. Roosevelt (1910) now pitched that “conservation meant development as much as it does protection” and that the best form of development should obviously be one that develops the most out of the least. In this way, Gifford Pinchot (in Ekirch 1974: 150), Roosevelt’s advisor and most enthusiastic lieutenant, described how both “government and business [came] to accept conservation in terms of simple efficiency and conservation [came to] stand for the same kind of practical commonsense management of this country by the people that every business man stands for in his own business”. Interpreted in this way, conservation as national efficiency appeared to:

provide a popular scientific answer to the new national problems of the twentieth century. It appealed not only to the Progressive reformer’s nationalism and patriotism, but also to his interest in social control and planning. It was democratic in a nationalistic rather than an individualistic sense (Ekirch 1974: 150-1).

So successful was this tack that by the time of Roosevelt’s Seventh Annual Message to Congress which sought to show that “the conservation of our natural resources and their proper use constitute the fundamental problem which underlies almost every other problem of our National life”, Roosevelt was happy to state that the conservation of national resources was preliminary to the larger question of national efficiency (the line that Taylor begins The Principles of Scientific Management with). By 1908, Progressivism, a manifesto that had always been difficult to define, had come primarily to mean “efficiency plus a commitment to collective betterment through the application of the latest advances in science” and leaders in most fields of endeavour were afraid to be thought not “Progressive” (Ekirch 1974; Calvert 1972).

His quest for conservation reinvigorated, Roosevelt announced that a National
Conservation Congress would take place in December 1908. In so doing, the Progressive leadership, always keen to associate their cause with the latest and best in “expert knowledge”, turned their eyes to the professions, who they now accused of hiding behind their expertise as an excuse for inaction on social problems. They particularly looked to engineering, and mechanical engineers were given pride of place at the Congress (Calvert 1972).

If the Congress had been held 30 years earlier, it is doubtful that there would have been any engineers involved. Elevated by now being considered scientific, the development of professional associations and new sources of recruitment as the engineering schools at the land-grant colleges finally took hold (with the scientific association encouraging more boys to take engineering up as a career). Mechanical engineering had been miraculously converted from a trade to a profession in less than 20 years (Calvert 1972). Further, although engineers frequently complained about a lack of status and public recognition, the period from the 1870s through the 1920s was a golden age of prestige. Everybody knew the stories of heroic engineers like the Roeblings and the Brooklyn Bridge. If anything, the image of engineering declined after 1930, its high standing superseded in the public eye by new sciences.

The Association of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) were impressed by Roosevelt, and, for an organisation not reknowned for quick unanimity and consensus, were quick to agree to throw its weight behind his programme. The Society president declared that ASME members must “direct themselves to the larger interests of humanity” and fall in with conservation (Haber 1964). It was not a difficult decision, however. Falling in line enabled engineers to encourage patronage for themselves as members of an important profession at the cost of supporting a programme whose emphasis on efficiency seemed
to further elevate their expertise.

One engineer enthused by his profession's developing social significance and political influence was Frederick Taylor. Taylor's greatest technological achievement had been the development of high-speed carbon tools that permitted a more rapid cutting of steel, greater precision, and hence the possibility of turning out interchangeable parts (Clough 1953). He also had had complementary ideas as to how men might be best arranged to perform work tasks. In 1895 he present his first paper at an ASME conference on "A Piece Rate System". This contained the gist of what would become the Principles although it was much more overtly moralistic and personalised ("if a man won't do what is right", Taylor said, "make him" - in Copely 1923: 183). Those who heard the paper considered it to be nothing special. Continuing with the themes presented in 1895, Taylor published a book called Shop Management in 1903 that achieved a loyal but limited following. In 1910 the ASME shelved a paper by Taylor on the grounds that there was nothing new or interesting in it. As Haber (1964: ix-x) concludes, "the checkered career of the Taylor system might have been completely disheartening to the Taylorites had it not been for the fullness of response that scientific management found among the [Progressive] reformers and their public". A clever lawyer named Louis Brandeis, in what became known as The Eastern Rate Case, would stir up this 'fullness'.

In the decade preceding America's entry into World War I, the high cost of living and persistent price rises were perhaps the most talked about public issues in the U.S., particularly among middle-class and professional families whose incomes were least responsive to general price changes at this time. This group provided the most vocal segment of the population arguing for reform and their attention was aroused and given a
focal point by The Eastern Rate Case of 1910-11.

Action was brought before the Interstate Commerce Commission against the railroad companies’ proposed increase in freight rates in the northeastern states. In early hearings other counsel had presented an argument based on a maze of inassimilable statistics along traditional lines, emphasising the hardship that an increase would bring to farmers and other shippers. Unfortunately this line was not particularly successful in capturing public opinion. The general conception was that farmers had never had it so good. Brandeis, who had come directly to represent eastern business associations from working with Pinchot on his and Roosevelt’s conservation campaign, where efficiency had become something of a buzzword, was more resourceful. He went on the offensive. Even if the railroads could justify the increase, Brandeis argued that the solutions to everybody’s problems lay in introducing efficiency into railroading, and he promised to show how the railroads could actually save themselves a million dollars by doing so - a boast that lifted the case from inside the daily papers to the front page.

As an interested public watched, Brandeis paraded engineers and businessmen like Harrington Emerson who had employed time study techniques in his factories, to argue his case. Taylor’s ideas also caught Brandeis’ eye. However, Brandeis, the expert publicist, recognised their lack of appeal. Taylor’s methods had generally been called by such names as “functional management” and “the Taylor System”. However, when Brandeis, in an informal meeting with some of Taylor’s followers, asked for an attractive label with which to refer to Taylor’s methods, the more commonly used names were rejected and “scientific management” was chosen (Drury 1922: 55).

Brandeis was well aware that attaching “scientific” would strengthen Taylor’s appeal by suggesting disinterestedness, rigour and a method employing the power of laws
of nature to enable Man's control. This was, after all, the age where Modernism was at its height, where Lippmann's (1914) *Drift and Mastery* captured the zeitgeist (Lippmann argued that the rise of science, "the only discipline which gives any assurance that from the same set of facts men will come approximately to the same conclusion", meant that "change had become a matter of deliberate experiment"). The phrase "social science", used to describe a group of new academic disciplines, had caught the public fancy and the adjective "scientific" went far in ensuring any appeal to the public of at least an interested hearing (Mowry 1958). Subsequently, "efficiency" and "scientific management" became the two catchwords of the popular excitement that followed the case.

On the crest of this wave of interest, Taylor quickly released *The Principles of Scientific Management* in 1911. There was nothing very new about the content. Effectively the work was that which the ASME had rejected the year before, which was in itself a continuity of the kernel of the 1895 paper. However, it had a new title and the 'old fashioned' moralism of his system had been toned down to give it the appearance of a neutral device. The focus on efficiency was now also completely overt. Indeed, efficiency is the object of the first five paragraphs of Taylor's 1911 introduction (see Figure 25). *Principles* was serialised in the *American Magazine* just as what commentators call "an efficiency craze" or a "secular Great Awakening" hit America like a "flash flood" (Haber 1964: 52). Roosevelt's continued exhortations, The Eastern Rate Case and the scientific-mechanistic optimism of the day saw the spontaneous creation of efficiency societies, journals devoted to efficiency and groups from women's consumer leagues to school boards to the Protestant church associations exhorting their constituents to investigate their operations toward becoming more efficient. Further, Taylor's
"President Roosevelt, in his address to the Governors at the White House, prophetically remarked that 'The conservation of our national resources is only preliminary to the larger question of national efficiency.'

The whole country at once recognized the importance of conserving our material resources and a large movement has been started which will be effective in accomplishing this object. As yet, however, we have but vaguely appreciated the importance of 'the larger question of increasing our national efficiency.'

We can see our forests vanishing, our water-powers going to waste, our soil being carried by floods into the sea; and the end of our coal and our iron is in sight. But our larger wastes of human effort, which go on every day through such of our acts as are blundering, ill-directed, or inefficient, and which Mr. Roosevelt refers to as a lack of 'national efficiency,' are less visible, less tangible, and are but vaguely appreciated.

We can see and feel the waste of material things. Awkward, inefficient, or ill-directed movements of men, however, leave nothing visible or tangible behind them. Their appreciation calls for an act of memory, and effort of imagination. And for this reason, even though our daily loss from this source is greater than from our waste of material things, the one has stirred us deeply, while the other has moved us but little.

As yet there has been no public agitation for 'greater national efficiency,' no meetings have been called to consider how this is to be brought about. And still there are signs that the need for greater efficiency is widely felt...."

Figure 25: Opening Paragraphs of Taylor's 1911 'Principles of Scientific Management'.
Scientific Management now appeared to be the most obvious mechanism for achieving this aim.

The development of efficiency had enabled a programme that had some few years previous seemed stymied through being perceived as anti-American, to become quintessentially American. The extent to which efficiency had become a feature of America’s (or at least its middle-classes) psyche at this point, is illustrated by histories of efficiency that were briskly written which installed Benjamin Franklin, that most American of Americans, as the “Father of Efficiency” (Haber 1964).

So far had things turned that Roosevelt now drew on efficiency in order to give substance to the political issue that inspired his later years: the articulation of a “New Nationalism” or “Americanization”. A burst of immigration around the turn of the century had led to increasingly obvious ethnic communities and what Roosevelt called “hyphenated-Americans” (e.g., Italian-Américans, Irish-Americans). Roosevelt (in Hagedorn 1957) began to speak of there being “no such thing as a hyphenated American who is a good American”; of how “throughout our whole land we must have fundamental common purposes”. He appealed “to all Americans to join in the common effort for the common good”, claiming that “The prime problem of our nation [now was] to get the right type of good citizenship, and, to get it, we must have progress, and our public men must be genuinely progressive”. What this good all-Americanism actually meant was difficult to articulate until efficiency was applied to the problem. Roosevelt (in Hofstadter 1963: 132-48) began to relate efficiency to his New Nationalism:

National efficiency... a necessary result of the principle of conservation widely applied... will determine our failure and success as a nation. National efficiency has to do, not only with natural resources and with men, but it is equally concerned with institutions. The state must be made efficient [and] the American people are right in demanding that New Nationalism.
By the time that Americanization, as a programme for nation-building, made its first appearance in US politics on the Progressive party platform of 1912, 'efficiency' was one of its foremost catch-cries. Indeed, Progressivism's most famous slogan: "100% Americanism" was proudly derived from Emerson's popular phrase "100% Efficiency" (Higham 1955).

While World War I made efficiency appear common sense internationally (in Britain interest in Scientific Management boomed - by 1916 even the Fabian society offered its conditional endorsement; in France Clemenceau ordered that Taylor's principles be applied in military plants (Seldes 1917; Thompson 1917)), the efficiency craze soon fizzled out in the US. By 1920 social mores had shifted and the efficiency associations and journals had largely vanished.

While Taylor's system retreated from the public domain back to the factory and the use of efficiency in the sense of 'social-harmony' declined, the particular nuances of this period had lasting effect. That "Americans love efficiency" in its mechanistic-effective sense slipped into the national fabric, to the extent that "serious students of American character have come to see such statements as obvious universal commonplaces that deaden our understanding of Americans rather than enlivening it" (Haber 1964: ix). In addition, this specific moment has now come to be known as (the point in time) when the universal basis of Management was discovered. However, it was certainly not seen this way at the time. In 1917, when Seldes (1917) reported on the spread of Scientific Management into Britain, he had to indicate the strange sense in which he was using the word efficiency by labeling it "American Efficiency".

It is important to emphasise that the events that cluster around this period so as to
be seen by Management historians as a key point of origin are particular politically contingent responses to the specific problems of one society at a specific point in time. For an engineering community keen to solidify and advance its status in American society, Roosevelt's conservation initiative offered a programme to which the engineer could not only contribute but which placed him near the top of the tree in terms of determining the future development of society. For politicians trying to create a program of reform without an obvious appeal to conscience or particular interests, without appearing against long-established American values, engineering knowledge of efficiency and Taylor's Scientific Management had an intrinsic appeal. The Progressives developed the notion of social control into a programme of planning that legitimised the role of the politician who sought to centralise government with himself as the overseer at the top. In Haber's (1964: xi) words:

The progressive movement is often described as an attempt to revitalize government by the people... However, alongside the attempt to bring government close to the people was an attempt to keep government somewhat distant. The second tendency was usually explained away as necessary in order to achieve efficiency in the name of scientific management.

The science of efficiency or scientific management legitimatied a view of democracy that pleased both politicians and engineers and provided a platform that not only placated the general public - it positively excited its most vocal slice. This set of ideas also legitimated the elevation of the professions and expertise controlled by the middle-classes and university educated.

Thus, Scientific Management came into being to accommodate particular interests that believed in the need for an ultimate authority 'on top' to the environment of political democracy in which ultimate authority is believed to lie 'at the bottom'. In other words, it emerged to legitimise Modernism's triangular-hierarchical bureaucratic form. It
legitimised the idea that those with 'expertise' should operate above the masses so as to ensure the optimal achievement of the greatest good, as measured by objective universal criteria such as the efficient use of resources, even if this impinged upon individual liberty. It legitimised the particular form that Management's pioneering historians of the 1950s saw as their object: the universal form or organisation that Management was concerned with.

Scientific Management was not a scientific discovery that was the first to discover universal principles so as to give birth to the study of Management in 1911, and beyond the specificities described above, it was certainly not new. It was a more publicity-conscious continuation of the ideas that Taylor articulated at least 16 years previously. Even the term Scientific Management was not new. In 1900 vice-president Roosevelt had called for "scientific management" of the tariff (in Debs 1948), but at this point it aroused no great interest. Nor was Taylor's system particularly scientific. While he fashioned his methods after the exact sciences and this attachment gave his system the appearance and some of the 'inevitability' and objectivity of science and technology, this obscured rather than eliminated his bias. Indeed, in response to a 1912 ASME report on time study that referenced Smith and Babbage but made no mention of Taylor (claiming that his work offered "nothing new"), Taylor argued that he used time study for analytical rather than descriptive purposes. While Babbage was content with gross times of actual performance, Taylor claimed that he broke the job into component parts, tested them (i.e., timed different approaches) and re-engineered the job as it should ideally (i.e., most efficiently) be done. In other words, there was nothing particularly inductive about the development of Taylor's "laws". They were based only upon his personally specific, and timely, predilection: that efficiency was morally good.
V. Counter-history 3. Management history's anticipation of the present

When we look for recorded administrative thought in a more general sense, we find that in most cases it is part of the rich tapestry of philosophic (or even religious) commentary on man and his relations to fellowmen, state and society. At times we find flashes of intellectual lightning that directly illuminate major aspects of administration. At other times... we find writings, that relating to organization and their administration, are presented in a broader context and with a different vocabulary than is usually used today.


Once the fact that Management began, seriously, with the likes of Taylor and the arrival of organisations that were more efficient than the market was established, people began to seek the history of these events so as to provide them with greater gravity. In Gross's words, historians claimed to look for the "intellectual lightning" of the past - not only those flashes that speak of our present concerns but those that speak with a "different vocabulary". However, as the history of Management has been written and solidified, the possibility of different vocabularies has faded rather than increased. As George (1972: xv) points out: "Ferreting out managerial thought today is no easy task because men, though managers, did not write about or recognise management as such until fairly recent times. The management historian must therefore interpret man's actions in a managerial light. And this selective process makes the whole what it is". As Management historians have been very Modern ferrets, their interpretations have seen only those instances that correspond with or anticipate Modern practice. In a history of the sort developed by Management it should be remembered that light only travels from the present into the past so as to see that which confirms our current 'heights'. After all, it is only our Modern agreement as to what Management is that allow us to identify something as "lightning". Thus, "this selective process that makes the whole what it is" has made Management,
even in Ancient times, wholly Modern.

Consequently, Urwick's histories looked prior to Taylor and Fayol, only to see when the emergence of their principles was discerned. For example, he parochially held up Babbage's "remarkable achievement" as having said most of what Taylor would say some 70 years later as an indication that Britain did play a role in the shaping of Management (Urwick & Brech 1951). George (1968: 76-7) similarly describes Babbage as "the harbinger of the new scientific management", noteworthy for "predating" or "preceding" aspects of Taylor's work. Owen is important because he anticipates personnel management; Boulton and Watt because their factory represented Modern organisation "in embryo"; Whitney because he anticipated the factory system; and Jefferson because he anticipated Whitney (and was a "first-class American" to boot). The reason for Chandler's pre-1850 material is shown by the name of his Harvard course: "The Coming of Managerial Capitalism" (Chandler et al. 1996).

With like-minded hindsight, Caplow (1964) developed his 'principle of organisation' (effectively an organisation chart à la Chandler) and found it "feasible to reconstruct tables of organization for the towns and city states of medieval and early modern times, or of early navies and banking houses". He (1964: 51-5) explained that while "the table of organization seems to be a modern device... the concept it represents is very ancient. A famous example is Exodus xviii: 14-22" - Jethro's Management lecture to Moses (see also Dale's (1964: 10-13) use of an organisation chart to see the "Israelites' restructuring" along the lines suggested by Moses the "consultant"). Thus, looking in this way, we can see that "[e]ven the bible refers to management concepts" (Robbins 1991: 31), allowing writers to confirm the age-old importance of Management: "[w]ould you believe that organization theory issues were addressed in the bible? Well they were!"
(Robbins 1983: 32). To go back to George’s Continuum, we might remember Jesus’
expert use of human relations and his application of the principle of unity of command.
Urwick (Urwick & Brech 1953: 216) claimed that “the workshops and markets of Greece
and Rome and of earlier civilizations had to be organized, to be managed, just as are the
factories and shops of today”. However, is this really how the Ancients thought?

One of the historians’ most Ancient examples of Management, the Egyptian
pyramids, provides a good example of how the intellectual lightening that Gross wrote of
merely confirms Modern beliefs as universal. The building of the pyramids is typically
discussed because a large group of people were ordered towards a common goal, labour
was broken down, standardized and specialized, and a minimum wage was set (e.g.,
George 1968). Robbins (1991: 31) describes the “breakthrough” represented by the
pyramids thus: “someone had to plan what was to be done, organize people and materials
to do it, lead and direct the workers, and impose controls to ensure that everything was
done as planned”. Robbins wonders “[w]ho told each worker what he or she was
supposed to do? Who ensured that there would be enough stones at the site to keep
workers busy? The answers to questions such as these is Management”. The implication
is that these are the questions all civilisations have always been most concerned with.
However, to categorise and discuss the building of pyramids from the point-of-view of
labour division, standardisation and specialisation is to miss any different meanings of
work in that society at that time. If one stops to think, perhaps the most remarkable thing
about the building of the pyramids is why they were built? What beliefs possessed people
to create these structures? But Management does not enter into discussion about
particular values or traditional ends. With such a view, a discussion on the ‘different
vocabulary’ that could incorporate the importance of particular spiritual beliefs, that may
have been inseparable from the work ‘itself’, cannot be seen. Indeed, upon reflection, perhaps we should be a little disappointed that great civilisations like the Egyptians and the Chinese can only offer us what we already know, that Management is for all people always and only about planning, directing, coordinating and controlling (George 1968). It is not a particularly rich tapestry.

In a more general way, Mooney's history also blotted out any alternative light. Mooney (1947: ix-x) introduced his history thus: “Organization in the formal sense means order, and its corollary, an organized and orderly procedure. To find and correlate the formal principles that make this order is the aim of this book”. It is no surprise then that he should find formal principles of organisation, and that they should be: co-ordination, scalar hierarchy and the functional division of labour. While Mooney (1947: 4) had to admit that Ancient people did not speak in these Modern terms, even this was used to add power to his argument: “That the great organizers of history applied these principles unconsciously proves only that their technique was inherent in their genius”. Thus, he went on to claim that his principles were universal and consequently, would hold true in the future as well.

While George (1968: 7) felt that Mooney's work did not pay enough mind to the “human side of work”, he admits that “subsequent writers [including himself] borrowed freely from Mooney’s analysis and have [subsequently] used his concepts as a framework on which to hang more humanistic approaches to the managerial problem of organization”. Indeed, in more recent times, Wren (1994: 428) has had no qualms about declaring that “The managerial functions [which Wren takes to be planning, organising, leading, controlling] form a convenient framework for a summary discussion of the past and future”, let alone the present. No problem is seen in viewing the past in terms of the
present. The quotation from Merrill's (1960) *Classics in Management* that began this work (p. 1), that "the principal directions in which management thought will develop in the foreseeable future have already been pointed out by the pioneer thinkers who provide the substance of this book", is more than mere empty rhetoric. It represents a sermon on future development. The historical assumptions that underlie our present understanding of Management shape our visibility of the past. Chapter 8 will investigate in more detail the way they shape the future. However, at this point it is enough to reiterate that it was not so much that the Ancient Egyptians and Chinese saw things in terms of planning, directing, the division of labour and controlling, as the accepted history of Management would have us believe; as that it suited historians of a field that was attempting to establish itself to find that grand old civilisations should see Management as they saw it, albeit more simplistically.

**VI. Counter-history 4. Men made Modern**

**SUMMARY**

...8. Max Weber defined the ideal bureaucracy as having division of labour, a clearly defined hierarchy, detailed rules and regulations and impersonal relationships....

**REVIEW QUESTIONS**

...7. Describe Weber's ideal organization.

In a standard textbook procedure, Robbins and Mukerji (1990: 42-3) conclude each chapter of *Managing Organizations: New Challenges and Perspectives* with 'summary points' and 'review questions'. The above excerpts are taken from the end of Chapter 2, "The Evolution of Management Thought". One crucial point on this evolution is Weber's definition of the ideal bureaucracy, as "Summary Point" 8 makes clear. However, one can see how Weber is made a contributor to 'The Continuum' in the answer expected of "Review Question" 7. At the end of this chapter, students are expected to know that
Weber's "ideal organization" (not his "ideal bureaucracy") exhibits bureaucratic principles. In this way Weber can at once be seen as a founding father of Management and a simple man whose thinking has been moved beyond. This can easily be countered.

In addition to the marking of Taylor's work at 1911, some years after its substance was conceived, it is worth noting the year in which Weber is placed on Management time-lines: 1947, the same year that Urwick's series on Scientific Management began and the post-war republication of Mooney and Taylor works. That Weber had been dead for 27 years makes 1947 seem an unusual choice, until one recognises that this was the year that Talcott Parsons' American translation of *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* appeared. In the 1950s, when scholars in the fledgling subject began to systematically trace the development of Management, they turned to Parsons' recent translation of Weber to legitimate their work (Clegg 1990).

However, these scholars only set upon specific aspects of Weber's work. Weber's individual projects were set against the theme that civilisations could be seen in terms of the balance between rationality and magic, a model that resonates with Nietzsche's Apollo/Dionysis framework (Weber also did not see the problem as choosing one side over the other, but rather how to appreciate both). However, Weber is constantly referred to in Management texts with respect to his investigations into bureaucracy as the most rational form of organising, but not in terms of the other side of this coin that Weber (in MacRae 1974: 87) struggled with: the corresponding "driving out of magic from things". Weber (1948: 337) was sure that bureaucracy was "always, from a formal technical point of view, the most rational type". However, he only believed that this made it the obvious or inevitable form because the particular value set of his times: the manifestation of a "victorious capitalism" resting on "mechanical foundations" where the "objective"
discharge of business primarily means a discharge of business according to calculable rules and without regard for persons” (Weber 1930: 181-2; 1948: 215) made it so. For Weber (1948: 214), there were still other forms of organisation. Bureaucracy was one specific mode, exhibiting only a “purely technical superiority over other forms”, but this was the criterion that Modernity, and, hence, Management historians, brought to the fore.

For those later theorists who read Parson’s freshly translated *Theory of Social and Economic Organization* but lacked the broad historical overview that Weber possessed (or a knowledge of his earlier works that placed this work in context), bureaucracy defined what organisation was, or at least where it started from. By the 1950s, bureaucratic rationality was no longer regarded as a specific way of seeing but as the truthful objective way. Correspondingly, ends like efficiency and mechanistic means like functional sub-division, hierarchy and standardisation, were not particular culture-bound ways of assessing organisation (remember that by this point Mooney had ‘proved’ this by seeing them in the subconscious of great thinkers from all walks).

Weber is thus cast in Management as an “organizational theorist” or Management expert (DuBrin 1984; Wren 1994; Greenberg & Baron 1995) whose “main concern [was] the nature of bureaucracies” (Clutterbuck & Crainer 1990: 18). Moreover, his expertise made him able to see the universality of bureaucracy as the rational and hence only or best form of organisation. By the 1950s, the nature of the age and those doing the interpreting, meant that only particular aspects of his broad ranging concerns were seen, those that supported the prevailing view. A more technologically optimistic age saw Weber’s pessimism dismissed, watered down or not dwelt upon. In this way, Weber was constituted as a precursor of Management, one of its legitimate forebears. By the late 1960s, Weber was so distorted that respected theorists could complain that Weber “went
too far in advocating a machine-like organization” (Dale 1967: 12) and that he paid “repeated homage” to the “Taylor system” (Gerth & Mills 1954: 261; Gross 1964). He was criticised for advocating efficiency to too great an extent despite the fact that the Modern sense of efficiency was a term foreign to Weber’s German tongue at the time he wrote (Albrow 1970). In this way his work could be shown to be naive in contrast to later new and improved ideas.

Weber is not the only thinker shaped by a later age to conform to the needs of a history of Management written after his death. One may have been surprised to see Machiavelli listed on George’s Continuum at the head of this chapter. However, when one looks to see what George lists as his achievements, one can see how Machiavelli’s thought is ‘made to measure’. Apparently, “Machiavelli”, according to George’s ferreting (1972: 47), “gave us clear insight into the machinations of young prince-managers and distilled the thinking of the time into four managerial principles: (1) reliance on managerial consent, (2) cohesiveness, (3) leadership, and (4) will to survive”. No mention is made of the un-Modern mode of thinking attributed to him earlier in this thesis.

Other men get pulled into the fray on what seem quite tenuous grounds, often for little other reason than their being ‘great Americans’. The obscure reference to Jefferson once writing a letter from France that reported ‘a factory in embryo’ has been mentioned. However, even more incredulous is the inclusion of Thomas Edison, the great American inventor. Despite Edison being prominent on the Management Continuum, all George (1972: 160) can find to say about him relates to his study of anti-submarine warfare, a study that even George admits “did not [even] have any noticeable impact on military operations”.
Looking with hopeful hindsight may also reconfigure events. The American Civil War, regarded as a key moment in the making of Modern America, is noted as important to the history of Management because it spurred "considerable study of managerial methods as a means to raising productivity and coping with growing organisational scale and technological complexity" (Child 1969: 37). This may well be true but Chapter 7 shows someone who was actually involved in the Civil War, taking from his experiences a quite different view of management than the one that is being countered here.

VII. Counter-history 5. Not becoming a science

It is scarcely too much to say that the most important index of a science is the state of its systematic theory. This includes the kinds and degrees of logical integration of the different elements which make it up. Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (1949).

The sermon of development promoted by the history of Management tells us that Management's progress is connected to its increasing scientificity. Hence, while L.A. Appley, Head of the AMA, asks in the foreword to Merrill's (1960) *Classics in Management*, "should not the professional manager be familiar with the 'classic' body of management literature as the theologian is familiar with the Scriptures, the lawyer with Blackstone, the physician with Osler, and the educator with Plato?", what Merrill calls the "straight-line progression" of Management "begins with Babbage... as exemplified in his essay on the division of labor [and the] application of the scientific method [that] brought management within the range of... an institution based on a proved body of knowledge". Management must have classics, just like other fields, but Management's classics, unlike other fields, begin with the establishment of Modernity. This seems so obvious that Merrill and other historians never feel the need to justify why the Educator can start with Greek philosophy while the Manager must start with science. In keeping,
Koontz (1964) summed up at the end of Toward a Unified Theory of Management, by reproducing the quotation from Parsons at the head of this section. He went on to claim that there “seemed to be a tacit recognition of Talcott Parson’s statement which places the need for theory in the correct perspective”.

Despite the on-going sermon of scientificity, Koontz’s thinking was somewhat wishful. A review of the discussions presented in the book indicates that the conference participants left as entrenched in their individual perspectives as when they arrived. Two years after the conference, Scott (1964: 485) lamented that “there does yet exist a single, widely accepted theory of organizations”. The following year, Greenwood (1965: 27, 31) described the continued “storm over management doctrines” and noted “organization experts” were continuing to band together in discussion groups in the hope of countering “the dangers of chronic schizophrenia”. At the end of the 1960s, Child (1969: 144) claimed that “the problem of variations in terminology continues to trouble... the study of organization [and] management”. In the 1970s, Bennis (1973) still described the nature of Management as diverse, inchoate, erratic and disorganised, “without a central theoretical armature or empirical base” and Miller’s (1978) research indicated that organisation studies still lacked integration. Even Koontz (1980: 186) had to conclude that at the end of the 1970s, “despite some signs of hope the management theory jungle is still with us”.

Pfeffer (1982: 1) took up Koontz’s cudgels in the 1980s, lamenting that “[t]he domain of organization theory is coming to resemble more of a weed patch than a well tended garden”. Pfeffer sought to “focus research in ways that make the development and refutation of theory occur in a more efficient and faster manner” but, nevertheless, a decade later, he (1993: 608, 599) was still bothered about Management still being “fragmented”, not sharing the “consensus characterizing more paradigmatically
developed disciples”:

in part because of values that emphasize representativeness, inclusiveness, and theoretical and methodological diversity. Although these values are attractive ideals, there are [negative] consequences for the field’s ability to make scientific progress.

However, Pfeffer’s call for paradigm consensus has sparked more “paradigm wars” and divisive debate within the field than ever before (Burrell 1996). While some may maintain the sermon that Management is still closing in, and must close, on scientific normality, after 40 years of attempted integration, it remains a ‘doubtful science’ at best.

**VIII. A web of regularity**

To use the language of Deleuze’s Foucault from Chapter 2 (see Figure 4), the history of Management presents a strata of solely Modernist forms and views. The line of the outside that reflects the nature of the subject back to itself bounds the field in such a way as to only incorporate the Modern. The counter-history above has shown this to be a singular conception, based on accidents, quirks, particular perspectives and temporal contingencies. How then is Management’s notion that it speaks and sees with the authority of grand origins and in a universal manner maintained? It is partly because of a web of links or formation that cuts across the domain of this history, Management and beyond, repeating the historical line thus described so regularly to the point of it hardly being heard. Management historians have cross-referenced one another religiously. The key moments of discontinuity are repeated implicitly in the professional journals of experts. The ‘Continuum’ is abbreviated in introductory textbooks for the benefit of initiates. The same boundaries are accepted by those critical of Management’s power and the popular Management books that are read by those who exercise that power reinforce
them. Further, all of these works gain weight as they are re-issued in updated forms.

To begin, it should be noted that the historians of Management worked with few tangible reference points. The pioneering Chandler and Urwick were left to draw on the work of economic historians. Urwick (1956), for example, credits Roll (1930) for having pointed out the importance of Boulton and Watt, while Chandler was heavily influenced by Shumpeter (McCraw 1988 - this connection to economic history further shields the status of Management's Modern forms, as Chapter 7 will demonstrate). More recent historians legitimated their work through reference to the pioneers who struck out before them, in the process doing little more than embellishing their lines. George (1968) regularly cites Urwick, Merrill and Chandler's early work. Child (1971) saw few precedents for his study, but lists Urwick's as the first "significant history". Gross' (1964) often cites Urwick, as does Light (1966) for whom Urwick wrote a preface. And Wren's (1974) work, the last significant comprehensive volume on Management's history, takes liberally from Chandler, Urwick and both Sidney and H.R. Pollard. The influence of Chandler and Urwick continues to be felt. Wilson's (1995) *British Business History* explicitly models the development it depicts via a synthesis of Chandler and Urwick's evolutionary models.

Management's historical boundaries are also effectively and quietly maintained by academic journals that have unquestioningly showed a heavy Anglo-centric emphasis on the period 1750-1914 (Church 1976; Slaven 1984). The British-based journal *Business History* has (as at 1996) published 344 papers over the previous 20 years. Of these, none focused on a period prior to 1675. No papers investigated thought systems not associated with a Modern world-view. In a recent review of the field published in this journal, Chandler's work was lauded as the "paradigm for future research" (Harvey & Jones
Business History Review, published from Harvard, has printed 720 papers in its 41 year history. Of these, three took as their object periods prior to the European Renaissance. None looked at the West prior to medieval times. Only one paper of the 1064 reviewed, on Japanese feudal systems (Carosso 1973), looked beyond that which lead directly to or are an essential part of the Modern Western industrial experience.

In 1995, The Journal of Management History was launched with the expressed aim of "exploring the whole history of management thought", enabling "subscriber[s] to judge for [themselves] what contribution the major management theorists have made, and how their ideas have been built on or rejected by subsequent thinkers". However, who we are steered to see as the "major management theorists" is apparent in the selection of the first four special issues of the journal. These are devoted to Taylor, Fayol, Weber and "The Engineering Approach to Management". A good majority of the first 48 papers published (as at 1997) have Taylor, Scientific Management, Fayol or Weber as their object. Prominent on the editorial board are Wren and Brech.

There are no explicitly marked out chronological boundaries put before prospective article writers for the journals described above. In fact, the two business history journals are devoid of terms of reference recommending subject matter. Perhaps if there were, they might be questioned, but as things stand, Management's continuities and discontinuities are so regular as to be taken for granted and warrant little critical thought - although, the one paper on Ancient Japan demonstrates that such boundaries need not apply.

One reason why such things go without critical examination is that for most students of Management, the field's history is glossed over (or processed) in introductory textbooks that summarise the accepted history before moving on to the 'subject itself'.

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Textbooks indulge in history for two reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates the worth of the subject that the reader has chosen to study. Robbins (1991) tells us that:

Organized endeavors overseen by people responsible for planning, organizing, leading and controlling activities have existed for thousands of years [this] demonstrate[s] that organizations have been with us for thousands of years and that management has been practiced for an equivalent period.

Secondly, these examples put current knowledge 'in perspective', showing the basis of Management and how far we have progressed from this basis:

An understanding of this [pre-industrial] background is important for putting the classical theories in perspective. [For example,] the highly centralized and mechanistic structures of classical theory had their genesis in the state monopolies of Egypt and the military empire of Rome (Dessler 1986: 15).

However, once this is pointed out it, is made clear that “it has been only in the past several hundred years, particularly in the last century, that management has undergone systematic investigation, acquired a common body of knowledge, and become a formal discipline for study” (Robbins 1991: 31).

Consequently, textbooks follow the lines of laid down by historians:

Despite [Premodern] accomplishments and the practical experience on which they were based, informal knowledge was, and remains, incomplete. What kind of leadership is best? Should decisions be made by groups or individuals? What tactics are most effective in bringing negotiations to a successful conclusion? Common sense [which the Ancients are seen to have relied on] offers only fragmentary and inaccurate answers to these and many other crucial questions (Baron & Greenberg 1995: 6).

Koontz (Koontz et al. 1980: 54), who also wrote textbooks, similarly concluded that “the development of management thought has had a fairly long history, although most of it belongs to the twentieth century. The early strands of thinking evolved around the ideas of the introduction of science into the art of managing”.

In addition to this story, textbooks will often produce summarised Management continuum. For example, the first part of Greenberg and Baron’s (1983) "Timeline of
**Figure 26:** A textbook timeline of management milestones. Source: Greenberg & Baron "Behavior in Organizations" (1983). Only a portion is shown here.

**Figure 27:** A textbook representation of 'Management: Past and Present'. Source: Chandler et al., (1996).
Milestones" is reproduced below (Figure 26). It follows George's suit, placing Weber at 1947, Mayo at 1927 and Taylor at 1911. A teaching text authored by Chandler (1996), with its cover imagery of a man's fist squeezing money in front of a clock (Figure 27), begins its introductory timeline in 1789 with the French Revolution, The Constitution and Bill of Rights and Eli Whitney. It also lists Taylor at 1911. The authors claim that their "comprehensive coverage of important points in history" is used as the basis of their Management history course at Harvard (the most prestigious of all Business Schools) and that this course has "become an integral part of [Harvard's] curriculum".

After the history of Management, textbooks generally make the transition to the 'material of Management' by beginning with its integration. Robbins and Mukerji's (1990: 39) text points out that:

Concern with developing a unifying framework for management only began in earnest in the early 1960s. Like most fields of study, management, in its maturity, has moved towards integration. [The] fact that the most popular current management textbooks follow the process orientation is evidence that the process approach [i.e., the line of planning, organizing, leading, controlling (Figure 23 pg. 197, is from Robbins & Mukerji)] continues to be a viable integrative framework.

Even proclaimed critical texts, like Thompson and McHugh's (1995), the stated aim of which is "to provide a critical alternative to the standard, often American, texts that still predominate", do not question the assumptions at issue here. "The theory and practice of organization", they reiterate, "has developed around bureaucracies, deriving partly from the work of Max Weber, who... was most responsible for drawing our attention to the significance of large-scale organizations". Their critical approach follows this lead. The chapter after their introduction aims to "locate and explain the formation of the large-scale industrial bureaucracies that have been the primary object of analysis of the subject of organization studies". This focus on large-scale organisation was the
criterion used by Pollard (1965: 51) to "define his terms tightly enough so as to find no significant precedents for management problems prior to 1750". Thompson and McHugh (1995: 52) cite Pollard's History as "evidence" for their views.

Monographs critical of Management power in society do likewise. Braverman's (1974) *Labor and Monopoly Capital* 's second chapter, "The Origins of Management", begins with "Industrial capitalism begins when a significant number of workers is employed by a single capitalist". In the next chapter, "The Division of Labor", we are told that the division of labour is the "earliest innovative principle of the capitalist mode of production" and that it has remained "the fundamental principle of industrial organization". Following other historians (in particular Pollard, to whom Braverman (1974: 61) claims to be "indebted"), Braverman mentions the antecedents of the Pyramids, the Great Wall and the Roman Army, but concludes that the "management required in such situations remained elementary" and does not dwell on them. Because the "classical economists were the first to approach the problems of the organization of labor within capitalist relations of production from a theoretical point of view", Braverman argues that they "may thus be called the first management experts". Elsewhere, following Chandler, he cites 1850 as a key point of origin.

Other Critical Management theorists take history on board similarly, as do those with a claimed Postmodern bent. Morgan (1986; 1997) begins his chronologically-ordered list of views of organisation with the machine metaphor and the theories of Smith, Babbage, Taylor, Fayol, Urwick, Mooney and Weber. Hatch (1997: 34) begins her history of organisation theory with "industrialization" and represents the classical theorists whose ideas "ideas form... a backdrop to our discussion of the roots of organization theory" as Smith, Marx, Durkheim, Taylor, Fayol, Weber and Barnard.
Finally, the popular Management literature that informs those who most visibly represent Management's power in society reinforces the standard. Clutterbuck and Crainer's (1990) *Makers of Management* draws extensively on Urwick, Wren and Chandler to present a "Chronology of Management Thinking" similar in form to George's (1968) although their first two chapters are devoted to Fayol and Taylor. Their Chronology draws upon Drucker's "seven conceptual foundations to the post-war management boom" (the first of which is "Scientific Management") as evaluative criteria. Clutterbuch and Crainer's last entry is "1986 Drucker's *The Frontiers of Management*" (one can see how self-referential this web has become). Drucker, the most authoritative of Management gurus (Huczynski 1993 - his biography is titled *The Man Who Invented Management*), confirms what has become a truism. Citing Chandler, Drucker (1991: 11) tells us that "The roots of the disciplines of management go back 150 years... But management as a function, management as a distinct work, management as a discipline and area of study - these are all products of this century."

This cross-referencing is redoubled as great works are reproduced. Drucker's (1991) *Management*, from which the above quote is taken, was first published in 1974 and reprinted five times before 1991. Sidney Pollard's (1965) history was re-issued in 1993 as part of a series of "seminal works in economic and social history". The republication of Barnard's (1938) *Functions of the Executive* in 1968 inspired a new generation to declare his thinking as ahead of its time and seek to think of organisations as more like organisms than machines (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8). Wren's *Evolution of Management*, which was first published in 1972, was into its fourth edition by 1994. Robbins' (1996) text (which cites Wren as the basis of its historical appreciation
and lists Urwick as a key pioneer) was first published in 1979. Similarly, Greenberg and Baron’s book was into its fifth edition by 1995, having first been issued in 1983. Koontz’s Management was first published in 1955. It was published for the ninth time in 1988, eight years after Koontz’s death, by a previous co-author. This is not to mention the re-awakening interest in Urwick’s work on his death in the 1980s (Management Today 1984), and the numerous repackaging and tribute collections recently issued to celebrate Chandler’s life work. Returning to where this section started, with Chandler and Urwick drawing from economic historians, Chandler’s paramount status is now seen to be reinforced by the spread and “growing citation of his work beyond the confines of business history, in the economics [and] sociology literature” (Harvey & Jones 1990: 5). In addition to his ‘ivory-tower’ acclaim, the awarding of both the Pulitzer and Bancroft prizes for literature to The Visible Hand indicates just how wide Chandler’s sphere of influence is.

The web that maintains Management’s ‘line of the outside’ has operated so quietly and successfully that the history of Management is no longer written or read. It is just ‘known’ (how many within the Academy have recently read a history of Management, for example?). After the burst of enthusiasm that culminated in the 1970s, few books on Management history are now produced. The story of Management and the sermon it promotes is only a murmur in the undisputed background of Management and, consequently, society in general. It is more entrenched and more powerful for being so.

This chapter has sifted out the forms that history promotes as belonging to Management’s field, the web of repetition and reciprocity that maintains them and the sermon thus promoted. These things, objects seen and a way of seeing and saying, are
legitimated as universal or an objective advance on earlier understandings by this calm, unitary history. Placed up against Part Two’s interpretive grid, one can see that the shape of this history maps neatly around the Modern strata, only incorporating its specific forms.

This legitimacy of this history and the universality of what it promotes has been called into question. Firstly, the history of Management is based upon the particular aims and influences of those who first wrote it in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. Secondly, what their particular gaze sees as the beginning of the subject, Scientific Management, is less a new scientific discovery than old ideas cobbled together under a new title which, thanks largely to a high profile court case, Roosevelt’s political agenda and particular cultural leanings, found unusual favour in the second decade of this century in America. Thirdly, this is a history that puts words in the mouths of pre-Modern civilisations and respected historical figures so as to make Modern views appear universal. And fourthly, despite the sermon of Management indicating an increasing scientificity the field shows no signs of agreement as to a unitary method or a logical integration of its different elements.

Many more counter-historical questions could have been pondered here. For example, why is it that Management really begins when people started thinking Management rather than doing Management? Surely to do Management one must think it? Why is it decided that Management must wait for science before beginning whereas the same criteria is not applied to what might be seen as related fields? The chapter that follows investigates the institution, that alongside the history described here, has done more than any other to maintain the singular formation and corresponding visibility of Management in the present. This is the pulpit from which Management’s sermon is issued: the Business School.
Doubling the formation of Management's historical sermon is the simultaneous emergence of a pulpit: the Business School. In the 1950s and 1960s the professionalisation of Management saw the development of complementary associations concerned with the subject and a particular form of Business School come to be regarded as belonging at universities. A large contributing factor to these schools being taken seriously was the establishment of a standard curriculum that located Management's place on the 'Tree of Knowledge'. This curricula promoted a way of seeing re-iterating that of the history of Management, by drawing from psychology, sociology and, in particular, economics. As the histories of these subjects are wholly Modern, these connections further reinforce the acceptance of the forms that are taken as contributing to Management. This Business School, a singularly American institution, is entrenched as it is identified as a 'best practice' model for the rest of the world.

7. PULPIT - THE SHAPE OF THE BUSINESS SCHOOL

Whatever else can be said about the American collegiate business school, one thing is certain: It is the mechanism for bringing about any change in business education. If innovations are to be made, it will be through the business schools. Porter & McKibbin, Management Education - Drift or Thrust into the 21st Century, (1988, their emphasis).

The establishment of the first school of Management, under the auspices of a university, is generally attributed to ironmaster Joseph Warton and the University of Pennsylvania in 1881. The next two schools, at the Universities of Chicago and California, emerged around the turn of the century, and a small number of schools followed prior to World War II. However, it was not until the 1950s that Business Schools were generally accepted as members of the academic fraternity across America (Wheatcroft 1970; McKenna 1989). In this decade, and the one that followed, Management was

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19 New Business School start ups in the US did rise steadily from the turn of the century through the 1920s. However, they fell off again in the period from 1930 until the national surge of the 1950s as the status of Management was increasingly contested during this period (Urwick 1951).
increasingly recognised as a serious academic subject, and one that people in business, social organisations and governments believed they needed to know about.

We may observe here a development similar to that outlined in the previous chapter with regard to Management's history. Some pioneering attempts are seen to have taken place near the turn of the 20th century. However, it is not until the 1950s that the field comes to be considered a viable academic subject. How this came to be may be outlined at the outset by relating the simultaneous emergence of the Business School, Management's written history, various professional and academic associations and Management's most prestigious scholarly journals, to Meyer, Powell and DiMaggio's 'New Institutionalism'.

Opposing prevailing assumptions in organisation theory (that organising is rationally purposive and progresses linearly toward expressions closer to optimum efficiency or 'best practice'), New Institutionalism argues that institutions emerge in self-reinforcing clusters as responses to and reflections of structures and prevailing beliefs held in a particular environment. Networks of like-minded institutions spring up to reinforce each other's view so that their patterns of behaviour and assumptions are institutionalised and taken for granted as normal, lawful or beyond reproach.

Powell and DiMaggio (1983) posit three general interrelated pressures which act upon the institutionalisation of a particular field: coercive forces, which relate to problems of legitimacy and political influence; professionalism, or the development of communities based on knowledge produced or legitimated by university based specialists or experts with academic credentials; and, mimetic changes, whereby uncertainty is countered by isomorphic behaviour between interacting institutions so that they reflect and reconfirm their practices back to one another. After World War II, Management was
recognised as an important concern. However, to be taken seriously and establish itself it needed professional associations to give it a central voice and secure a place in academia. This required being seen as legitimate by the existing boards of universities and reflecting back their established procedures. Importantly, how Management fitted into the established Tree of Knowledge had to be determined. Once this was ascertained, a standard of minimum specifications for Business Schools could be seen. Moreover, given the initial uncertainty as to whether Management really belonged, Business Schools, and the field in general, were keen to see this form replicated, reinforced and legitimated by other institutions: professional management associations, a grand history and specialised academic journals. In keeping with Meyer’s (1977; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Meyer & Scott 1983) work on education as an institution, the formation of Business Schools could only take hold if they reflected the wider cultural and symbolic understandings within which they were established. Thus, a self-sustaining network that sees the institutionalisation of Management, and Business Schools as a key component of this, emerged to satisfy the prevailing sensibilities of the American academic and wider social environment particular to the 1950s.

Neo-institutionalism allows us to see how Business Schools are influenced by the structure of the society within which they have emerged, and subsequently the structural isomorphism between schools that follows on from this. While this is a convenient means of marking out the territory, this chapter wishes to get beyond the structuralist limits of this approach by keeping in mind that within the structures that impact upon the form of the Business School, things could have been different. In other words, following

Foucault, things here are not seen to be so structurally determined that they could not have been otherwise. While reflecting Modern structures, the forms of the Business School is not wholly determined by them: different forms could have taken shape and in certain instances did. Given that things could have been different, they could be thought differently now.

Thus, in Foucault’s terms, this chapter seeks to show how the visibility, statements and forms promoted by the accepted history of Management, which the previous chapter demonstrated to be a view specific to the times in which it was conceived, had its perceived universality reinforced by the formation of a particular type of American Business School. This formation is both determined by its structural surroundings and the specific existential viewpoints of individuals who made key choices. This chapter demonstrates how this formation came to be divided in different decentralised units by basing itself on the central branch of economics and capped by ‘capstone’ courses in corporate strategy - thus re-iterating the triangular-hierarchical way of seeing that is Modernism’s particular vision. It outlines how its contributing disciplines come to be economics, sociology and psychology, all of whose histories repeat the view promoted by Management’s history which limits the field of vision and modes of expression to Modernist forms. Furthermore, it examines the way in which the power of this formation has spread as other countries, keen to respond to a perceived need for ‘better Management’, have developed their own Business Schools, not necessarily as isomorphic copies of their American counterparts, but by acknowledging the US model as accepted ‘best practice’ and drawing heavily upon it in their discussions as to what forms their schools should take.

The consequence of these developments is that the mechanism of the US Business
School thus described may indeed be becoming the only 'mechanism for promoting innovation'. However, given that it reinforces Management’s historical view that homogeneously only incorporates Modern ways of saying and seeing, it is a mechanism which is not well suited to innovating in any substantial way. Furthermore, it is a mechanism that could have been, and could be, otherwise.

I. The advent of a curriculum: the reinforcement of a way of seeing and saying

Mathematics, geometry and drawing, book-keeping and penmanship, correspondence and the correct use of the English language, geography, technology, law, economy, history and biography, modern languages. Ten subject areas, to be studied as equal parts.

General Robert E. Lee's suggested curriculum for a "Students' Business School" (1869).

Economics has traditionally provided the only theoretical framework for the study of business, and even today the two fields are so closely related they can hardly be discussed separately.


The first quotation above is General Lee’s suggested Business School curriculum, presented before Washington College’s (now Washington and Lee University) Board of Trustees (Lee had become president of the college after the Civil War). After this entry in the University’s records, a brief note explains that “General Lee’s death in 1870 prevented the fulfillment of his plans”. As already described, the first Business School to materialise was that of Joseph Wharton in the 1880s. However, it would not be until the late 1950s that the Business School would be generally accepted as part of America’s academic fraternity. Playing a large part in this establishment, was the formation of centralised bodies that would ensure that Business Schools were properly standardised and policed. In the early 1950s, the recently formed *American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business* (AACSB), closely affiliated with the AMA, began to exert...
considerable influence. It now required that schools seeking membership offer instruction
in the areas of economics, accounting, statistics, business law and finance (McKenna
1989). Further to this end, two of the most important studies influencing the development
of post-war Management education were published at the end of the 1950s and
sanctioned by the AASCB: Pierson’s (1959) *The Education of the American
Businessman*, sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation, and Gordon and Howell’s (1959)
*Higher Education for Business*, sponsored by Ford. The authors of both reports
collaborated closely and came to the same conclusions.

Primary among these was the view expressed by Pierson in the quotation below
General Lee’s: that economics provides the only theoretical framework for the study of
Management, and therefore that the standardisation of Business Schools’ curricula must
be based on economics. While Pierson’s perspective suggests to him the obviousness and
universalty of such an assumption, this section hopes to show that only since the second
half of the 20th century would the association with economics provide the necessary
academic foundation upon which Business Schools might establish themselves. The
pivotal relationship with economics, and the way of seeing that is reinforced by this, is a
specific view based on the subjective understandings and subsequent decisions of key
individuals and a set of circumstances and contingencies particular to this period.

To begin, it is important to remember that the authors of these studies were
economists by trade and that their works consequently “bear the unmistakable imprint of
the philosophy of economic science” (Leontiades 1989: 2). Thus, having identified
Business Schools’ main problem as being that “Dozens of minor fields of specialization
have been permitted to develop that never should have been introduced at all” (Gordon &
Howell 1959: 217); and that “there is a need for a general tightening of standards in terms of the scope of the core studies” (Pierson 1959: 196), it is perhaps not surprising that they should see ‘the answer’ as the science of economics. The reports called for Management to be rationalised and secured upon a clearly defined academic foundational core. For Pierson, economics provided the “only theoretical framework”, while Gordon and Howell’s model for future curriculum development was organised around three generic disciplines: behavioral sciences (psychology and sociology), applied mathematics and also, but primarily, economics.

Having prescribed a central stem, the reports turned to consider the proper decentralisation of the curricula. The AACSB stated that at least 40 percent of the total hours required for the bachelor’s degree in business must, at the student’s discretion, be taken in any subjects other than business and economics. While not questioning this percentage, both reports complained that “the work that students do in liberal arts subjects appears to have little relation to their studies in business and economics” (Pierson 1959: 164). Thus, both urged schools to specify which types of course students should take outside of the core by designating particular subject areas as “relevant”.

Pierson (1959: 233) went on to complain that he found Management “a vague, shifting, rather formless subject in which neither the foundations at the undergraduate level nor the super-structure at the graduate level can be sharply defined”. Having outlined the central core and then using this as a basis to determine a properly ordered range of contributing subjects, Pierson and Gordon and Howe sought to standardise the curricula’s super-level or ‘sharp end’. They recommended the development of “capstone courses”. These courses, termed “business policy”, would “give students an opportunity to pull together what they have learned in the separate business fields [and] concentrate
on integrating what already has been acquired" (Gordon & Howell 1959: 206).

The model presented by the reports is quite distinct from that of General Lee. In 1960, Huff and McGuire’s (1960), *Interdisciplinary Approach to the Study of Business*, promoted a General Lee type blend of anthropology, biology, ecology, geography, mathematics, philosophy, physics, political science, psychology, and sociology (economics is not mentioned). Two years later, when the 1959 reports had settled into Management’s fabric, the relevant contributing disciplines were clearly only:

a) the engineering approach, which emphasizes productivity increases through organizational efficiency; b) the human relations approach, incorporating psychological and sociological concerns; c) the economic approach, which emphasizes the development of resource allocation and cost control; and d) the systems approach, with emphasis on models and the use of mathematical techniques (Meij 1962).

The increasing lack of acceptance of seeing humans explicitly as machines has seen engineering and mathematics lose favour as Management’s stated disciplinary influences, and led to the adoption of a general set of three - economics, psychology and sociology (Gross 1964; Robbins 1984; Pettinger 1996). Since the early 1960s:

These academic fields [have] serve[d] as the research and literature foundation for any school of business and the various functional subdivisions of the business school [have] draw[n] on the intellectual wisdom of the generic disciplines. In this way the functional divisions of any school would maintain a general business integrity based on the three common properties of their model (McKenna 1989: 46; see also Leontiades 1989: 18).

However, there is a clear pecking order with regard to the contribution of these three contributing disciplines. Mosson’s comparative history of Management education systems (1965: 198) found that while “[e]conomics, psychology and sociology are all to be found in varying degrees... the high prestige of economics - in academic circles at least - has meant that it has been the dominant discipline”.

The standardised formation, enshrined in the Carnegie and Ford reports, came to
be accepted as a universal norm of what Business Schools should be or aspire to be. However, the way of seeing promoted by this formation - the centralised core of economic rationality enabling an ordered decentralisation of contributing activities working toward a capstone from which all can be overseen (a triangular-hierarchy in other words) - is particularly Modern. Indeed, while “the science known as economics” had, by the mid-1950s, “often been defined as the social science of business” (van Metre 1954: 7), and Pierson, Gordon and Howe, would, by the end of this decade, see economics as the only and traditional foundation for Management, the following paragraphs seek to demonstrate that this perspective is specific to the middle of the 20th century. In the 1860s, when Lee spoke, economics was not even considered a worthy academic discipline. While in the first decades of this century economics spoke a language that was seen as of little relevance to business, and the majority of economists’ disdain for the fledgling subject of Management was palpable. Only in the 1950s was economics academically accepted, willing to contribute to the establishment of Business Schools and capable of speaking in terms deemed relatable to Management. The contingent alliance between economics and Management would see Business Schools establish themselves, but this is not to say that the formation that grew out of this is a universal arrangement.

Locke’s comprehensive study (1989: 5) outlines the problem that Business Schools had to overcome before being accepted as worthy, as being to develop a historical connection between what they taught and an accepted scientific discipline, so as to build a bridge between that discipline’s theory and Management practice:

The gap, moreover, was hard to fill, for it was not a question of finding an existing bridge between theory and practice, one that had been shrouded in a fog
of haughty academic prejudice, but of building a bridge between the two. People who established business schools in institutions of higher education quickly learned this lesson for there was, at the outset, no discipline to teach. Science-based management had to be invented.

Such an invention would not have been aided through association with economics in the middle of the 19th century.

While economics was seen as the obvious and natural bridge between established subjects and a science of Management in the mid-20th century, by the late 19th century economics itself was still a marginal concern. At this time, most economists were of what is referred to as the Institutional school, which drew from Adam Smith's more historical and humanistic interests. Empirical, inductive and non-theoretical in orientation, this school encouraged research into specific socio-economic contexts. Economists wrote regional studies about the growth of specific industries and institutions. This was clearly not the stuff to gain acceptance from the mainstream scholarship of the day, which consisted of the traditional arts, the formal or pure sciences (e.g., mathematics, logic) and the empirical sciences. A Historical-Institutional economics was not a traditional art, nor did it replicate the form of a Modern science.

However, another economics emerged in the second half of the 19th century. This took quite different aspects from Smith: the view of man as a Rational-economic being, of each individual capable of evaluating actions in terms of economic utility, and the liberal conception of each man as separate from family, class, country and custom and thus self-determining. Abstracting economic behaviour away from the world of art, law, traditional morality and history, the Neoclassical school offered a more exacting expression of Smith's assertion that the pursuit of individual self-interest produces an optimal social outcome. Further, all of their key determining factors (e.g., marginalism,
utility maximisation, equilibrium) could be mathematically expressed (Toohey 1994).

Thus the Neoclassicists borrowed heavily from mechanistic physics and the language of Modern mathematics. Walras' (1834-1910) sought a pure theory of economics that "resembles the physico-mathematical sciences in every respect" (Walras 1954: 71). Jevons' (1835-82) claimed to offer "a close analogy to the science of Statical Mechanics and the Laws of Exchange that resemble the [Newtonian] Laws of Equilibrium" (Jevons 1888). Pareto (1848-1926) explained that the equations that determine equilibrium are not "new to me, I know them well, they are old friends. They are the equations of rational mechanics. That is why pure economics is a sort of mechanics or akin to mathematics". Adding mathematics to Smith's thinking in order to rid their universe of purposive human activity, they made an abstract model of economic reality just as Newton had created his model of physical reality (Bell & Kristol 1981). 21

For the Neoclassicists' all of economics key concepts were comparable to physics. A particle in physics equaled an individual in economics, work in physics equaled disutility in economics, energy equaled utility, force equaled marginal utility. This attachment enabled the psychological concepts of utility to be considered as if they were suffused throughout an abstract 'commodity space' that behaves like an objective field in physics. This 'utility field' becomes the primary motivating force behind all economic activity, ensuring that the natural tendency of the system is always towards an equilibrium state of maximum utility. Further, one particle-individual could be any particle-individual, as against this space all humans, being at base of the same matter or genus (Rational-economic Man), were subject to the same economic laws (Mirowski 1986; 1989). Hence, Walras (1954: 69), the father of Neoclassicism, developed a 'system

21 While Smith's Wealth of Nations vision was Newtonian, it was only so in an analogical and qualitative sense. Smith was no lover of this sort of mathematics and had no pretensions to qualitative precision.
of equilibrium' which discovered that while people could make individual choices, in aggregate their behaviour would be entirely predictable. Accordingly, he saw market prices resulting from those individual choices as isomorphic to what was known by this time of the mechanistic "character of natural phenomena".

Given that the Neoclassicists argued from assumptions that were not intended to be empirically examined, their debate with the Institutionalists was largely a dialogue of the deaf. In any case, it was the Neoclassicists who won out. Their view of economics, isomorphic to physics and connected to other established disciplines on the Tree of Knowledge through the common language of mathematics, was accepted as a Modern science and the Institutional school declined. Economics was now considered a worthy academic subject, just as the first schools of Management were being established in the United States. Why was it then that Management and economics did not form the allegiance that would take place after the World War II and lead to the establishment of a generic US Business School?

The optimistic Neoclassicists argued that economics should be purer, based far more on a priori logic and rational deduction, than other sciences:

The science of Economics... is in some degree peculiar, owing to the fact that its ultimate laws are known to us immediately by intuition or at any rate are furnished to us ready made by other mental or physical sciences. [Economists make] simple inductions on which we can proceed to reason deductively with great confidence. From these axioms we can deduce the laws of supply and demand, the laws of that difficult concept, value, and all the intricate results of commerce. [Our] method is as sure and demonstrative as that of kinematics or statics, nay, almost as self evident as are the Euclid (Jevons 1888: 18, 21).

22 There is some irony in the fact that Neoclassical economics arrived just as that which had it 'piggy-backed' upon was leaving. The economics of the late 19th century was based upon a view of physics that held favour in the first half of that century, but physics itself had changed greatly by the beginning of the 20th. In the version of physics that the Neoclassicists 'climbed aboard', history and time held no sway. Not surprisingly, the concept of entropy or disorder and decay that emerged in physics in the second half of the 19th century, not to mention notions of endemic instability, uncertainty, the disturbance caused by the observer, theories of catastrophe, chaos and complexity that have come to be commonplace in 20th century physics, were not paid any mind by the Neoclassicists.
Indeed, the Neoclassicists abstracted to the point where things were always about utility optimisation. To the point where Marshall (in Bell & Kristol 1981: 56) could argue that Man does not make particular things: “when he is said to produce material things, he really only produces utilities”. By converting economics into abstract model building, the Neoclassicists could concentrate on general variables. This moved them away from problems of causation, with which the empirical sciences were concerned (which stressed temporal events), to problems of functionalism (i.e., perfecting models). Consequently, they could drop literary forms of analysis in favour of mathematical analysis because all of the important propositions could be stated in equations.

However, the sort of calculi that sprang from this gave scant guidance to entrepreneurs and managers. The Neoclassicists were concerned to express the mechanism of how the market as a whole worked, aspects that the manager had no direct influence over. In Locke’s words (1989: 15), the Neoclassical theory of the firm was:

outward-looking, the entrepreneur’s viewpoint inward-looking, for the theory of the firm treats the operations within the firm as a black box, an unknown, a problem that has already been solved. Because it assumes that the entrepreneur knows how to run his firm efficiently, it stops at the point where the entrepreneur wants analysis really to begin.

Even if the Neoclassicists had spoken in terms of the problems facing managers, their calculi stating general hypotheses would have been less than applicable. Managers had to operate in the practical world without perfect knowledge of cause-and-effect or functionality. They were not faced with perfect solutions and a logic that could be either true or false. At best, they could hope to think in terms of probabilities of outcomes.

Events in Wharton’s first decades demonstrate how economics was unable to provide the bridge that Locke identified as necessary for the establishment of a perceived
science-based Management at this point in time. The early Wharton professors were of
two types. There were those, who, in the words of one historian, found "their curricula
material in the business world, not in the universities (in science)" and of whom the same
writer disparagingly says that "[d]espite their energy and enthusiasm, their scholarship
had essentially been an extended form of business journalism" (Sass 1982: 268).
Alternatively, they were teachers who came from other faculties to teach traditional
academic subjects as part of the curriculum.

Among these were economists. However, Sass (1982) and Locke (1989) note that,
on the one hand, the Neoclassicists, the most highly regarded economists of the time,
were cool to the practical descriptive thrust of Wharton’s business programs, let alone
interested in teaching on them. Having established themselves as academically
legitimate, they held the general academic view of these ‘schools of business’ at the time.
They were suspicious and skeptical of their practical or career orientation. One typical
commentator noted that this “deprive[d] the university of its only excuse for existence,
which is to provide a haven where the search for truth may go unhampered by utility or
pressure for results” (Hutchins, in Pierson 1959). On the other hand, those economists
who did deign to teach at the fledgling business schools, were roundly criticised for
having nothing of relevance to say to their classes. Looking back from the 1950s,
commentators expressed surprise that: “[e]ven the economists in th[is] group [of
traditional academic instructors], whose discipline necessarily called for some
acquaintance with business aims and practices, were wont to seek enlightenment more
largely by speculative than by strictly scientific methods” (van Metre 1954: 3-4). Of
course, while in the 1950s commentators looking back might be astonished that these
economists should be purely abstract as opposed to empirical (which van Metre sees as
"strictly scientific"), and unacquainted with business, the leading economists of the day did not see this necessity. This passage from a German commentator from the early part of the 20th century outlines what his contemporaries saw as an irredeemable divide between Management and economics:

Economics and business economics [may] handle, to a large extent, the same material but they do not have the same spirit. Economics is a philosophical science with philosophical characteristics. Business economics is, on the other hand, an applied science. Chemistry and mechanical technology are closer in spirit to business economics than is economics (Schmalenbach 1919).

What was seen in the 1950s was by no means obvious to thinkers of other ages. Economics would have to take a further turn before the view that shaped the formation of the Business School would appear obvious and universal.

Economists' inability to test their hypotheses in the established manner of the empirical sciences (under laboratory conditions), made it contingent for the subject to adapt into a pure science in order to gain access to the club of accepted academic subjects. However, advances made by the mathematicians of the generation after Boole, such as Quetelet, Galton and Pearson, brought mathematical statistics to a point where its workings could be accepted as a substitute for laboratory experimentation.

Beyond the key advance into Modernity where contrived experiments could be taken as representing or standing for things in the empirical world, statistical testing enabled thinkers to forgo experiment. Given that mathematical principles since the end of the 18th century had been shown to be isomorphic to phenomena, mathematical expressions, developed via the gathering and testing of statistics for probabilities, could be seen as standing for experiment and replicating things-in-the-world. Some economists, tiring of Neoclassical dogma and the consequent lack of applicability of their field
preventing them from availing of the professional opportunities available if their theories could be more practical, found statistics liberating. As economists adopted statistics, econometrics was born, a school of thought that appeared more empirically applicable.

These advances allowed economists to assume a more practical view of decision-making processes in organisations, and the wedding of statistics and economics proved convenient in that probability-based mathematics enabled decisions to be weighed in a manner that seemed to provide advice for business people and leave room for judgment - without undermining Neoclassicism's hard-fought principles. However, statistics was still about numerical data and the inferences that could be made from them. It did not speak a language that managers of the period could relate to. For this to happen, algorithms, sets of rules or routines by which things could be carried out but not necessarily expressed in mathematical symbols, statements that could be related to Neoclassical theory but with apparent 'operational significance', had to be developed.

Statistical mathematicians had applied themselves to making predictions about games of chance from the 1920s. However, with a rising interest in making economics more practically applicable, theorists began to explore the business implications of this thinking with developments like 'game theory'. Here Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) sought to show how entrepreneurs could, under certain assumptions, act so as to achieve a certain minimum gain by following the correct algorithm. By using algebra, matrix theory and probability theory in its calculations, this sort of thinking kept economics connected to its mathematical roots, while bringing it into contact with the realm of electrical engineers working on defense projects during World War II. With extensive funding, these engineers were working on the linear programming of early computers, using Boolean logic to provide algorithms. Danzing, for example, developed
the simplex linear programming algorithm for the United States Air Force in 1947, utilising matrix theory, vector algebra, symbolic logic and statistical techniques to provide comparisons of sets of ratios existing among sets of consumption of various inputs and rates of production of various outputs. While algorithms like these required more information than economics' traditional emphasis on macro costs and revenues, they enabled businesses to define goals in terms of individual optimal quantities of inputs and outputs, and obtain specific directions about how to achieve these goals stated in terms of the various steps available to the firm (Dorfman, Samuelson & Solow 1958).

Economists of the day recognised that these methods approached the firm more from the viewpoint of engineering than economics (in fact much of the mathematics that it required was at this point completely foreign to economists and had to be learnt). However, they were drawn to linear programming as much for psychological reasons as for practical, because whereas it was helpful to Management, it did not undermine the body of economic theory which had been built up so painfully during the 20th century. Linear programming was, the economists insisted, just a special case of marginal analysis and, hence, quite compatible with neoclassical economic theory (Locke 1989). By the 1950s, Neoclassical economics, econometrics and the advance of engineering to incorporate greater levels of complexity, had come together in a new field termed 'business economics'. This field enabled Management to bridge the divide necessary to be taken seriously as an academic subject, an underpinning that granted academic gravitas and supplied methods that it thought it could usefully apply.

Subsequently, van Metre (1954: 7) was able to put the emerging transformation, from broad and academically unacceptable schools of Management to their standardised and acceptable face, down to what he terms the "evolution of economics":

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A highly interesting and unforeseen development which has paralleled the growth of business education in American universities has been the transformation in the science known as economics... Economists are today treading the paths of science in search of signposts to economic truths, rather than scanning the skies of speculative thought for guides to the interpretation of social action. Business practitioners, business teachers and economic scientists all work in varying degrees with the same data in devising their respective plans and procedures. It is important that the body of such data be adequate and that it undergo interpretation relevant to necessary uses in business practice, business education and in the shaping of public policies. Schools of business form the best available middle ground for a juncture of forces pursuing these objectives by businessmen and economists; though in this pursuit the application of science in psychology, engineering, and other fields cannot be ignored.

While early Management programs were associated with departments of economics, these were initially dominated by those committed to the proposition that a proper Management discipline could never be or by those who feared that if it did come into being it would impair traditional concepts of economics. However, as Business School "programs matured, and as economists came more and more to grips with the realities of the world, these men began to make many substantial contributions to administrative thought" (Gross 1964: 195). 'Economists coming to grips with the real world' meant economics becoming a discipline with academic backing which at once could offer a theoretical framework for Management. 'Business School programmes maturing' meant their becoming standardised. These two things coinciding in the middle of this century bequeathed the shape of the Management curricula. It did not take long for this particularity to become shrouded in a manner that gave it the air of a universal association. While van Metre would still recognise the transformation of economics as an "unforeseen development" in 1954, by 1959 the generic Business School's foundational documents, seemingly unaware of this history, would see economics as always providing these schools "only theoretical framework".
The alliance between Management and economics at this 'juncture of forces' was mutually beneficial. Management, like economics, began to attract top students because of its newfound intellectuality, and economics, like Management, started to draw greater numbers because of its greater utility. Economists could begin to speak to governments and business corporations with the authority granted by an air of practical awareness. Management academics could now speak to business corporations and governments with the air of authority granted by the aura of science. Management literature consequently underwent a transformation that was seen to achieve the best of both worlds: "Rhapsodies on the heroic achievements of 'captains of industry' gave way to informative, sober treatises on business and organization and administration, and a rich crop... dealing with the actualities of business life" (van Metre 1954: 4).

The Business School formed a 'juncture' for the forces of businessmen and economists that enabled them to gain greater influence in society. This was not because Business Schools finally recognised that economics had always been Management's natural foundation and organised themselves accordingly, or because conditions meant it could be no other way. Rather it was Management's (or key players within Management) contingent need to be seen to be founded at a time when economics had gained itself scientific status and was now seeking to appear more practically relevant - a set of circumstances quite particular to Western society in the middle of the 20th century. Economics, as opposed to chemistry, engineering or any number of other alternatives, came to be seen as Management's natural foundation.
II. Disciplinary connections - history redoubled

Out of the melee came... a philosopher of astonishing scope. Adam Smith published his *Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* in 1776, thereby adding a second revolutionary event to that fateful year. A political democracy was born on one side of the ocean; an economic blueprint was unfolded on the other. But while not all of Europe followed America's political lead, after Smith had displayed the first true tableau of modern society, all of the Western world became the world of Adam Smith: his vision became the prescription for the spectacles of generations. Adam Smith... gave the world the image of itself for which it had been searching. After *the Wealth of Nations*, men began to see the world about them with new eyes; they saw how the tasks they did fitted into the whole of society, and saw that society as a whole was proceeding at a majestic pace toward a distant but clearly visible goal. 

The professionalisation of Management in the 1950s incorporated the standardisation of Business School curricula. The gaze of the time defined a set of contributing disciplines far narrower than may have been the case in an earlier age. Economics, was emphasised, as were psychology and sociology, albeit to a lesser extent. Engineering and mathematics were acknowledged as historically significant to the formation of Management but not seen as necessary for the aspiring manager or Management theorist. Many other subjects, prominent on General Lee's list, were marginalised: geometry and drawing, geography, law and, in particular, history (Locke 1989; Leontiades 1989). Pierson's (1959) study made no mention of, or recommendation for, history at either an undergraduate or postgraduate level. Gordon and Howell's (1959) report recommended 12 hours of either economic or business history but only in the first two years prior to admission into a business program. In keeping, nothing in the AACSB's accreditation standards required students to take a course in history. The exposure a student receives is "confined within
the context of other business courses and limited to brief comments on the accomplishments of specific individuals in the history of management thought, such as Frederick Taylor, Frank Gilbreth, Elton Mayo, etc.” (Leontiades 1989: 29).

Given its close association with Modernism, it is perhaps not surprising that Management should not see much need to look to the past or critically examine its assumed origins. It is far more concerned with the cutting-edge and the future. While some histories of Management have been written, they are few and far between, say more or less the same thing, and tend to arouse no debate. They generally repeat what people in Management assume to be the case. Thus, people work with an implicit understanding of the basic principles of Management and see no need to question them.

Historical analysis is further discouraged by the belief that Management shoots from the branches of economics, sociology and psychology. Given that these subjects are seen as the ‘contributing disciplines’, their histories can simply be referred to should further historical reference be required. As they are also framed by a Modernist understanding of the world, the histories of psychology, sociology and economics further buttress the contingent Modern views and forms that Management promotes as universal.

Chapter 2’s discussion of Foucault noted psychology’s Modern understanding of its past. While recent years have seen a number of critical histories of psychology, questioning the assumptions that Foucault highlighted (Smith 1988; Richards 1996), the standard history is still alive and influential. Smith’s (1988: 148-9) study demonstrates that histories of psychology still point to the “continuity between powerful symbols of scientific advance and modern psychology”. He provides the following archetype:

to cite a rather crude but certainly revealing example, a well-known collection of readings in the history of psychology begins with an extract from Galileo, where Galileo describes what is later known as a distinction between the primary and secondary qualities. [Thus, m]odern psychology ‘begins’ with Galileo.

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Beyond the formation of the scientific method providing a point of origin, the crucial period in psychology's history is that from 1870-1920, when advances in the life sciences enabled their research techniques to be applied to human mental problems previously seen as the preserve of philosophy, and psychology became an academic discipline (Hearnshaw 1964; O'Donnell 1979; Robinson 1995).

Prior to this, histories may draw links between 'pre-psychology' and selected 'academic classics', in sections with labels like "The Philosophical Antecedents of Psychology" or "Presocratic Speculation". Psychology is in this way embellished not only with the authority of science, but also with Ancient wisdom that both confirms the application of Modern science as an advance and adds gravity. Hearnshaw's history (1987), is typical, including short preliminary chapters on the Greek philosophers, Christian theologians and "significant developments" during the Middle Ages, before three chapters describe the Scientific Revolution. However, these chapters are only a prelude to the discussion of the "metamorphosis of psychology" in the 19th century, "from speculative philosophy to scientific discipline". We can see the 'misrecognised object' thesis and history being read in terms of the present in statements such as "The Sophists themselves may have been embryo practical psychologists, but they contributed very little to psychology as such" (Hearnshaw 1987: 18).

The cost of this legitimating history's one-dimensional view of what is

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23 The boundary of relevance around psychology as it particularly applies to Management is even narrower. The subdiscipline of industrial psychology is seen as being "born" with Münsterberg. Münsterberg received his training in Wundt's University of Leipzig laboratory, before moving to Harvard at the turn of the century where he was in a position to observe the "birth" of Management theory in America and "create the field of industrial psychology with the publication of his text Psychology and Industrial Efficiency in 1913" (Robbins 1993: 700). Thus, industrial psychology is sometimes traced back to the experimental psychology taught in 19th century Germany, but is also seen as coming into being following Taylor. Münsterberg (1913: 3) outlined the field's aim as being to "sketch the outlines of a new science which is intermediate between the modern laboratory psychology and the problems of economics". Industrial psychology "grew up with the encouragement of the followers of both Taylor, who wanted to design machines and people to fit together, and of Mayo and Roethlisberger, who felt that psychology was key to understanding the operations of industrial enterprises" (Gross 1964: 197-8).
significant, is now recognised by a small minority as detrimental to psychology's future development. Smith (1988: 148) argues that this history, in:

assum[ing] a direct line from the past toward the present, [and] awarding praise for contributions to progress... contribute[s] to the normative framework of psychological communities. History texts embody, and hence transmit to students, values important to psychologists' sense of worth and identity. In portraying modern psychology as the inevitable or 'natural' outcome of the application of scientific procedures to psychological topics, they give modern psychology its authority. The student experiences what it is like to inherit a uniquely objective and hence instrumentally effective endeavour... The danger to psychology is that selective history privileges one body of knowledge and practice as 'truth', reducing the imagination's power to conceptualize alternative truths.

Sociology's history marks similarly Modern boundary lines around the strata of Management and its contributors. This is the view from a leading introductory text:

Major questions about the individual and society have preoccupied thinkers in all periods of history: the philosophers of Ancient Greece and Rome reflected upon the way society operated and/or should operate, and for centuries afterwards social and political theorists and philosophers applied themselves to similar questions. But the 'philosophical' analyses of society were essentially based on speculation, on dubious and untested assumptions about the motives of human beings in their behaviour, and on undisciplined theorising, and they lacked systematic analysis of the structure and workings of societies... However, from the 18th century onwards in Western Europe, important changes took place... Many considerable advances were taking place in scientific discovery with regard to the structure and composition of the physical world surrounding human beings, and with regard to the physical nature and make-up of human beings themselves... Could such a scientific, 'rational' approach also be applied to the analysis of humans' social worlds, their relationships, experiences and behaviour within it? Scientific and technological advances laid the foundations for the transformation from a predominantly rural, agricultural, 'manual' way of life to an urban, industrial, 'mechanised' pattern of living... Sociology... emerged against the background of these intellectual and material changes in the second half of the 19th century (Bilton et al. 1987: 2-3).

In this light, it is no surprise to find that the founding fathers of sociology are thoroughly Modern (or interpreted as such): Comte, the "founder of positivism" (Honderich 1995: 705ff.) who stressed the adoption of a scientific method to analyse society so that we might, "know, predict and control" it (a statement that flows into Management texts: e.g.,
“the purpose of OB is to help you to explain, predict, and control human behaviour” (Robbins 1984; DuBrin 1984)); Saint-Simon, who saw in the rationally developed bureaucracy hope for stability and progress in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Marx, who aligned his critique against capitalism in a Modernist fashion (see Chapter 4); Durkheim (1947: 406), who accepted the premise that “the ideal of human fraternity can be realised only in proportion to the progress of the division of labour”; and Weber, whose Modern interpretation by Management historians was discussed in Chapter 6.

Sociology’s founders shared a universalistic conception of the Modernization they saw around them leading further into Modernity, a “gradual obliteration of cultural and social differences in favour of an increasingly broad participation of all in one and the same general model of modernity” (Touraine 1988: 443). Subsequently, the sociology that is seen as an underlying discipline of Management is that which sought to understand the contours of Modernity as they appeared in the 19th century and is framed by the emergence of Modern capitalism and the origin of Modern economics (Smart 1990).

Management’s history claims a special bond to the history of economics. In the first article published in the journal Business History, Ashton (1959: 1-2) argued that the field must be recognised as an offshoot of economic history, its “parent study”. Consequently, in congratulating those who founded the journal, he was pleased to note that their “provenance is a guarantee that business-men and their works will be surveyed with the same passionless eyes as political historians turn on statesmen and diplomats, or sociologists on God’s creatures in general”. Mosson’s (1965: 198) review of Management education in the 1960s is proud to claim that it is greatly “influenced by its history and the prestige of economics”. Since the articulation of this bond, Management
historians have sought closer relations. In reviewing business history’s past and future, Lee’s (1990) prognosis is that it must seek closer links with economics.24

This association both produces and reinforces Management’s understanding that it begins properly with Adam Smith’s division of labour. The quotation from Heilbroner and Streeter at the head of this section, while more emotive than most, captures the general pathos that economic historians felt for Smith at the time the history of Management was being drafted. For them “Smith was the great starting point for all” (Lekachman 1964: 102) and The Wealth of Nations “was destined to become the fons et origo of economics for subsequent generations” (Roll 1992: 121). Marshall (1967) begins his chapter Adam Smith - Beginnings of Political Economy with “the whole of political economy might be divided into two parts - before and since Adam Smith; the first part being a prelude and the second a sequel”. He then goes on to state that “Adam Smith’s first name is peculiarly appropriate, since it is generally agreed that he was the ‘father of political economy’ and the first real economist deserving the title”. Shumpeter, the great economic historian and influence on Chandler, is also clear that “The First Classical Situation” follows upon Smith’s analysis, in 1790. Correspondingly, “There is a surprising unanimity of opinion among historians of economic doctrine [that] political economy as a science [i.e., as a serious subject] begins at a time when the foundations of industrial capitalism were already well laid” (Roll 1992: 10).25 Hence, while earlier periods are acknowledged by Management as “undoubtedly producing many useful forms of organization... With the development of economics, organization was treated more

24 Despite business historians admiration for economic history, economic history itself does not a particular high standing in the eyes of its parent discipline - economics (Stigler 1982). This is hardly surprising for a field that prefers to see itself as ahistorical.

25 This is the same Roll that Urwick drew upon for placing Boulton and Watt at the forefront of Management’s history. His A History of Economic Thought, first published 1938, the same year as Barnard’s Functions of the Executive, is one of the most widely read texts on the history of economics. The 1992 edition is its fifth incarnation.
systematically. For example, the great economist Alfred Marshall classed organization as one of the basic factors in production" (Dale 1967: 12). The formation of Modern economics provides Management's outer limit of serious contributions. No surprise, therefore, that to this day: "the notion of specialization, as developed in economics, serves as business education's basic rationale of how and why businesses evolve" (Leontiades 1989).

However, as in Management's history, further weight is often added to economics by looking beyond Smith to the gravity of ancient times. Again, as with Management, this is very much a history of the past as the anticipation of the present. Roll's (1992) 'pre-history' simply charts the arrival of the 'Classics'. One early chapter begins: "In the three centuries that elapsed between the end of the Middle Ages and the appearance of Wealth of Nations, the classical system of political economy was being prepared".

The "contributions" of the Ancient Greeks are encountered in a similarly Modern manner. Thus Plato finds a place in economic history: "Plato's analysis is of interest to the economist because one of his central concepts, the division of labour, is of paramount importance in the history of economics" (Spiegel 1971: 15). It is interesting to wonder by what reckoning the division of labour is discerned to be one of Plato's "central concepts" as he himself never termed it so. Descent is also often claimed from Aristotle, with particular emphasis being placed by historians on this passage from Politics (I, 9):

> Of everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong to the thing as such, but not in the same manner, for one is the proper, and the other the improper or secondary use of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for exchange; both are uses of the shoe.

In these words, Roll (1992: 16, 21-2) claims that: "Aristotle laid the foundation of the distinction between use-value and exchange-value [and thus] the foundations of much of
later economic thought... Although his words are obscure, Aristotle seems to say that the secondary value of an article - as a means of exchange - is not necessarily 'unnatural'.

Roll addresses this quotation with more than a little wishful thinking though. Aristotle, throughout his work, was clear that money was barren and that use was far preferable to exchange. For Moderns to see this passage as 'a breakthrough' (because exchange value is not "necessarily" deemed "unnatural"), and then read this as the "foundation" of a world view where exchange and the pre-eminence of the market are the tableau against which all human behaviour should be properly understood, seems somewhat hopeful.

Indeed, Aristotle did not possess a "theory of value" as such, and could not adequately explain the commensurability of products, because, unlike Neoclassical economics (which connects use-value with exchange-value via the concept of utility), he assigned these things to different categories, with different ends requiring different courses of action. Antiquity was predominantly governed by a system of use-value and not the market-oriented exchange value that has given rise to the discipline of economics. Thus, the Greeks could not have contemplated economic thought as the Modern world now conceives it. Aristotle's work only deals with the metaphysics of exchange value - what kind of property is it and to what order it belongs. Exchange-value does not really deal with ends and, as such, Aristotle's inquiries are more ethical and metaphysical than economic in the Modern sense. Aristotle's finding was that the pursuit of exchange-value must be subject to human ends that are explicated in ethics and politics (Meikle 1994; McLellan 1996).

In any case, the great Shumpeter at once manages to highlight the "indirect influence" of Greek philosophy on economic thought and minimise its contribution.
While he noted Aristotle's "embryonic" differentiation between use and exchange value, he added that "this is not only commonplace but common sense, and further than this [Aristotle] did not advance" (Shumpeter 1954: 57-60). Moreover, he terms Aristotle's placing the concept 'happiness' in the centre of his social philosophy without giving a utilitarian account of it, "the original sin". Aristotle's analysis is further found wanting because he "gave in, and led his followers to give in, to... the teleological error" and because he went "hortatory on Virtue and Vice" - interested, emotive and irrational terms that Smith's thinking did away with. In this manner, the Ancients can be seen as contributing to economics (Lekachman 1964) and adding gravity to the field by showing its basis to be a universal human concern, while historians can at once see their views as naive and to be overcome by cleverer Modern thinkers (Cannan 1929).

Lowry (1987: xiv) argues that the way economics has configured the line of the outside that creates its self-understanding, means that its "accepted tenet [is] that economic science sprang full-blown from Zeus's head in 1776 with Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations". Thus, it goes against a trend that since the 1970s has seen "works appear daily analysing our ancient debts in areas from physics to city planning, politics, and philosophy to mathematics and the exact sciences". Management, by developing a family tree for itself that has economics as the father, and sociology (also the progeny of Modern economic developments) and psychology (born of Modern science) as its next closest relations, has created an inheritance which brings forward this rogue gene. An inheritance that further ingrains and ingratiates Management within Modernism.
III. The American Business School as global ‘best practice’

In the United States management education is extensive, widely accepted, firmly institutionalized; above all it is vigorous, self-confident, and successful. In a business society formal education for the higher ranks of business has more scope, more energy, more encouragement. And, in addition, it takes its place as one of the many mechanisms intended to further the democratic ideal. The impetus and original model for European management education was the American business school, and the contrast in development and achievement remains a strong incentive to European management teachers.

Mosson, Teaching the Process of Management (1967).

The influence of the American understanding of Management on the rest of the world has already been broached in Chapter 6’s discussion on Taylorism meeting certain needs abroad in World War I. However, despite Taylorism’s influence on Europe, Chandler’s (1990: 389) studies would still find fault with Europe’s businessmen as they failed to move in the “appropriate direction” in the period up until the second World War. A number of studies have examined how the Marshall Plan helped rectify this situation by putting all parties on more or less the same path (Mosson 1965; Kipping & Bjarnar 1998). The period after World War II saw the revival of the concept of the firm and American technology and managerial know-how mobilised as the best means of improving European firms in the rebuilding of Europe. However, beyond the post war period, this section examines the role played by the adoption of the form of the particular Business School described in Section I as ‘best practice’ in the convergence of Western approaches to Management.

As American Management theorists were simultaneously confirming unifying general principles, methodological approaches and standard curricula, other Western countries were looking to establish Management at universities. The War had made many in Europe recognise the importance of the mathematical and algorithmic disciplines that
would provide the basis of Operations Management, criticise accepted Management training and practice, and call for government intervention. However, Management had a difficult time establishing itself in Europe relative to the US. Academic institutions were more conservative and less open to market forces or endowments, and it was not until the late 1960s that European schools of Management began to gain a foothold (Wheatcroft 1970; Locke 1989). Developments in Britain are indicative of the way in which European Business Schools came to pass.

The British government began to investigate the training of managers needed to aid in reconstruction directly after the war, and the Ministry of Education established a committee to consider the establishment of a state system of Management education. Lyndall Urwick was named chair (it was partly in response to these duties that Urwick saw the need to find Management’s history). Urwick, as we have seen, was enamoured with the American’s pioneering works (of the “apparent bias” toward Americans in his History, Urwick (1956: xi) countered that this was “merely a matter of chronology... It was natural that after Taylor’s death, the ideas and skills which he had initiated should find their earliest and most widespread application among nationals of his own country”). He was similarly glowing about US Management education. Urwick’s views of all that was good about the American system are made clear in his Management Education in American Business (1954). Here he noted that “management development throughout the United States must be predicated on a well designed organization plan” (1954: 68), adding, citing Mooney, that this means “with basic management responsibilities properly subdivided, classified, grouped, distributed, related and defined”. The report of Urwick’s committee subsequently suggested a curriculum for a national Management certificate with “background subjects in economics, law and psychology, some ‘tool’ subjects such
as accounting; statistical method; work measurement and incentives; and office organization and methods" (Wheatcroft 1970: 89). Despite replicating the emergent American Business School approach, the “Urwick Report” is seen by historians as “a milestone in the development of management studies” (Child 1969: 242). The “Urwick Scheme” continued to be taught, albeit outside of the university system, for 15 years.

The Urwick Scheme, “the basic difficulty” with which was said to be “the attempt to get too many subjects into a course” (Wheatcroft 1970: 89), was superseded by a national Diploma in Management Studies. This was offered from 1960 to 1969 as a three-year program of nightcourses at a number of universities. In their base year, students took “applied economics, business law, finance and costs, human aspects of management [i.e., psychology and sociology], marketing, production, purchasing and statistics” (Mosson 1965: 165). The last two years were spent mainly on practical projects.

The period after the demise of the Urwick Scheme is defined as when “the real... ‘Management education revolution’ really started” (Wheatcroft 1970: 94). It was considered revolutionary because it was now that the first serious moves were made toward the establishment of schools modeled along American lines. Urwick (1950) had recommended as much, and a post-experience intensive course for managers had been taught at Oxford since 1953 (all its tutors were economics fellows). However, the establishment of such permanent schools was not seriously mooted until the 1960s. The first two came into being in the last years of that decade.

Despite being seen as revolutionary, these new schools offered a more refined version of what had gone before. The same as the Diploma, the same as the Urwick Scheme that the Diploma had grown from, and the same as American practice which the Urwick Scheme had grown out of. Wheatcroft (1970) claims the call for such schools
happened now as an increasing number of British businesspeople were attending courses at American universities. They came back asking: ‘why this sort of education was not available in Britain?’ and ‘why the USA had so many famous business schools while the UK had none’. A number of inquiries and reports into the provision of Management education were subsequently drawn up, and the consensus was that recommendations should be based upon “the best American practice [as] enshrined in the reports of the Ford and Carnegie Foundations” (Earle, in Whitley et al. 1981). Overviewing the establishment of French and British business schools, Whitley et al. (1981) saw their development as answering the needs of the “Chandlerian organization” and reproduced Chandler’s figure defining organisation from *The Visible Hand* (see Figure 24, pg. 207) to demonstrate the new sorts of skills that British business schools would seek to provide.

The first postgraduate Management programs were established in London and Manchester, and a Bachelors degree in Management Science began at Warwick University in 1969. Despite claiming to be multi-disciplinary, Warwick's program was primarily “designed to train students in the basic disciplines fundamental to management - economics, quantitative methods and the behavioural sciences” (Wheatcroft 1970: 45). The Manchester MBA, which has remained largely the same since its establishment, provided instruction in: “accounting, finance, law, economics, psychology, sociology, organization behaviour, and quantitative methods... to bring everyone up to a basic level of knowledge of business functions and management disciplines” (Whitley et al. 1981: 50). LBS's orientation was narrower, with “a preoccupation with mathematics [that arose] from the Principal’s belief that it was a subject that was as much a necessary part of a manager's education as Latin had once been a gentleman's” (Aris, in Whitley et al. 1981: 52). By 1986, Forrester's (1986: 9) report into British MBA's found that the 48
programs that had now been established had "a basic common syllabi", including "managerial economics, quantitative methods, organizational behaviour, management systems, operational management, marketing, finance, accounting and business policy".

Management education throughout Europe in the 1960s and 1970s came to reflect already established American forms (Locke 1989): "In Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom", wrote Mosson (1965: 201), "American experience has been an essential building block in the structure of Management education". However, by the 1980s moves were afoot within the U.S. that might have seen this form reconsidered.

From the establishment of the standard curriculum of Management’s relevant contributing disciplines to the end of the 1980s, variations on Pierson, Gordon and Howell’s ‘foundation’ were only “flirted with” (McKenna 1989). However, in 1988 the AASCB sponsored another major review: Management Education and Development - Drift or Thrust into the 21st Century (a title uncannily reminiscent of Lippmann’s Drift and Mastery and one that a Freudian might make much of). It was written by two highly esteemed products of the education system established in the 1950s and 1960s: Lyman Porter and Lawrence McKibbin,26 and motivated by the “fact that the two most recent comprehensive studies of business school education (the so called Foundation studies) were now over a quarter of a century old” (Porter & McKibbin 1988: 4).

Despite seeking to take a fresh look, the report leant heavily on the logic developed in the Ford and Carnegie studies. While Porter and McKibbin (1988) wrote of how schools should be more practically minded and pay more attention to business ethics, internationalisation and communication in addition to the “adjacent relevant disciplines” (for Porter and McKibbin (1988: 326), these are still “economics,

26 Both gained their doctorates from prestigious universities (Yale and Stanford respectively, although Porter’s thesis was in Psychology). Both had been long serving members on the AACSB board in the 1970s and early 80s.
psychology and the like"), no mention is made of incorporating more history, for example, or anything else very removed from Management’s established branches.

*Drift or Thrust* also comments on the state of doctoral programs in Management, from whence most developers of Management thinking now came. They did not recommend a great deal of change in the *modus operandi* of these programs. However, they noted (Porter & McKibbin 1988: 326) that: “new doctorates are emerging who are in many cases unduly specialized and lacking a sufficient appreciation of the complexities of business problems that extend beyond the confines of their own discipline or functional area”. At the same time they added that: “this problem is exacerbated, of course, by the increasing number of faculty members trained in other disciplines who do not even have the benefit of a business school socialization process”. The upshot is that while we may talk of Management theorists being trained with too narrow a sub-disciplinary emphasis, it is at once seen as a problem that they are increasingly being trained by people from “unrelated disciplines” (who do not even have the “benefit of a business school socialization process” that would educate them as to ‘Management’s ways’), rather than the “adjacent relevant disciplines” of economics and psychology. In other words, while we may complain at the field’s increasing narrowness, Management’s line of the outside, established in the 1950s, must still be respected.

Indeed, Porter and McKibbin (1988: 80) noted a significant difference between the climate in Business Schools in the late 1980s and 1950s. “In marked contrast to the situation reported in the 1950s”, where there was a recognised need to establish the underlying subject matter of Management studies and standardise curricula, they “found no forceful push for systemic curricula change emanating from business schools themselves”. It seems that by this time, norms had established, a centralised order was
accepted and Management's educators were happy with the formula that had seen them established as a recognised member of the academic community.

In the 1990s the consolidation of what a Business School should be is now enabling a further global push. In the 1997 presidential address to The Academy of Management, Michael Hitt (1997: 221) outlined his vision of the future: "Essentially, management education and research will be globalized". Despite his claims that their will, by 2010, "a much stronger emphasis on multidisciplinary thinking" in Management, a recent development lauded by Hitt may see this prospect diminished. "In 1997", writes Hitt, "the AACSB was renamed the International Association for Management Education". However, that the Association's letterheads continue to refer to the AACSB, while people continue to refer to the organisation as such, indicates that this is a very American-Global corporation not unlike the Academy itself (see Figure 1, pg. 8).

This thesis is being written at a British school currently entertaining missions from the AACSB toward meeting their criteria for accreditation, an accreditation that will keep it, in its own words, at the 'cutting edge' and enable it to be globally ranked against its American counterparts. Indeed, "The AACSB", it is claimed, "is well advanced with overseas expansion, planning to assess 12 schools in... Japan, Hong Kong, Australia and Europe" (Bradshaw 1999: 14). In 1988, the same year as Drift or Thrust, Locke (1988) found that American pre-eminence had led Britain to be ignorant of alternative traditions and forms of management education present on the Continent, and that British management education was the lesser for this. The sort of globalisation that Hitt and Bradshaw refer to may mean that alternative local traditions will soon no longer be seen as relevant, even in the countries in which they originated. That even those alternative views that may have informed Britain in the 1970s and 1980s, and indeed did lead to
different forms of schools of management here, may soon be ‘confined to history’ by the American-Global model.

*Drift or Thrust* (1988: 342) concludes by stating that innovation is *the key* for the future of Management studies, and that Business Schools are “*the mechanism* for bringing about any innovations”. Subsequently, their very last sentences read:

Continuous innovation. In our opinion, if any single element of organization culture ideally should characterize the U.S. business school in the next decade, it should be an ingrained, embedded, and pervasive spirit of innovation. If this occurs, society will be the winner.

Yet, juxtaposed against their earlier quotations with regard to doctoral programs and other curricula, and against the now entrenched and tightly defined nature of what Management education should be, it is difficult to see how the Business School socialisation process that they commend would not work against this. Another, less influential non-AACSB sponsored survey concludes with a comment on the unlikelihood of innovation being furthered by the educational web thus formed:

As certain as this author is with regard to the above-mentioned need for adaptation and change and the nature of academic governance, he is equally convinced that an alternative model... is not likely to arise in the near future. Business schools across the US have long and glorious histories of conservative practices and faculty and administrators have vested interests in the maintenance of past behaviors. One scenario suggests that we may have become victims of our pasts... Innovation, adaptation, and change may not come in [such] organized, purposeful and systematic procedures (McKenna 1989: 54).

Without allowing the input of other traditions and disciplines, in order to relativise the established Management traditions, it is difficult to see how substantial invention can occur. On Feyerabend’s logic (see Chapter 5) incremental advancement is the best that can be hoped for. The next chapter examines the way in which this formation, the historical sermon of Management and the pulpit of the Business School, have blinkered the field’s view of the future.
Management's formation is doubled again by the nature of what is seen by the Business School gaze. In the 1960s and 1970s the view emerged that organisations were more like organisms than machines. However, informed as it is by Modernism, Management's conception of the organism was highly mechanised. In the 1980s, culture was seen to be the answer to organisational problems but only as it was linked to efficiency and viewed in a positivistic and unitary manner. In the 1990s, Management developed a Postmodern approach that was, unlike other fields' conceptions, strangely Modernist. Management, tightly bound by its singularly Modern historical conception of itself, lacks the ability to access other forms that might enable it to relativise this singular view and say anything substantially different.

8. PROPHESES - MANAGEMENT'S VISIBLE FUTURES

In a very real sense, these papers constitute a history of management written by those who made that history. They present it with vision, with vitality and with an authority that is beyond challenge... the principal directions in which management thought will develop in the foreseeable future have already been pointed out by the pioneer thinkers who provide the substance of this book. Merrill, Classics in Management (1960 & 1970).

While Merrill's statement may appear a simple self-promotional gesture, having outlined the visibility promoted by the institutions and historical configuration of Management, this chapter shows how, in a very real sense, those that constitute the history of Management not only give the field vitality or produce it but also repress and limit its view of the future. In the 1960s and 1970s, Management recognised that the mechanistic view of organisations was naive. Organisations, it was claimed, were like organisms - a very different visibility. However, given the Modern boundaries of the field, Management's view of the organism comes highly mechanised: a machine in sheep's clothing. In the 1980s, culture gained centre stage. However, again, rather than promoting
a substantially different view, culture was seen through the Modern apparatus of Management in a mechanistic and integrative fashion. In the 1990s, Postmodernism caught Management’s eye but it too became a distinctly Modern form. It seems that Management, as it is configured, can only see the Modern. Hence, it has been able to say little that is substantially different in the past 100 years.

I. Organism

Organization theory was locked into a form of engineering, pre-occupied with relations between goals, structures, and efficiency. The idea that organizations are more like organisms has changed all this. Morgan, *Images of Organization* (1986; 1997).

Morgan’s (1986; 1997) *Images of Organization* begins by claiming that “one of the most basic problems of modern management is that the mechanical way of thinking is so ingrained in our everyday conceptions of organization that it is often very difficult to organize in any other way”. As an antidote, Morgan advocates thinking of organisations using different images, ones that are better “suited” to current environmental conditions. Having outlined the machine view, Morgan’s first chapter that presents a different image is devoted to the organism metaphor. However, it is argued here that Morgan’s organism, representative of Management’s view of the organism, is underpinned by Modern, mechanistic assumptions. Subsequently, much that is presented as organic in Management should be acknowledged as an extension of mechanistic principles in kid gloves. The organism metaphor, as it has been developed, has not changed all things mechanical. In many ways it has concealed them, and in so doing, mechanistic principles have been further ingrained.

Morgan (1986: 21, underlining added) begins his chapter on the machine
metaphor by noting that the word organisation derives:

from the Greek *organon*, meaning a tool or instrument. No wonder, therefore that ideas about tasks, goals, aims, and objectives have become such fundamental organizational concepts. For tools and instruments are mechanical devices invented and developed to aid in performing some kind of goal-oriented activity.

Morgan is correct in tracing organisation to the Ancient Greek 'οργανόν (*organon*). However, his next sentence expands upon this idea through very Modern eyes. For the Greeks, an *organon*, a tool or an instrument could be much more than "mechanical devices performing some kind of goal-oriented activity".

In keeping with Ancient Greek's contextual and relativistic arrangement, the meaning of *organon* was wide-ranging. It could refer to any instrument, method or tool that helped an individual's living, making or performance. It could also refer to any being's form as an instrument for being. Further, it could refer to bodily organs as instruments of sense or faculty, to surgical or musical instruments or to an engine of war. In later periods, however, its meaning takes on particular emphases. The Latin *organum* came to refer primarily to a mechanical device, especially war engines, while Medieval Christian writers generally related the word to the musical church-organ.

The OED notes the use of *organons* in English from the 16th century. Here, as is often the case in the Renaissance, a more Greek manner of the word returns. It is used at this point in two main senses: its primary sense, which the OED distinguishes as 'naturalised' ("A bodily organ, especially as an instrument of the soul or the mind") and a secondary meaning that the OED terms 'alien' ("a system of rules or principles of demonstration or investigation"). The earliest uses of to *organise* (a phonetic rendition of *organons*), *organised* and *organisation* in English also appear during the Renaissance. They tend towards the Greek relation to 'naturalised' bodily meanings (e.g., "to furnish
with organs”; “that [which] is, or has been, endowed with physical life, as an animal or plant body”; “the structure of an organised body (animal or plant)”). The OED lists references of this sort dating from 1413, tapering off during the 18th century before disappearing altogether around 1870.

Using to organise in this sense ceases in the 19th century because a new variant, which first appeared at the end of the 17th century, has, by the end of the 18th, covered the bodily sense of the organon: this was the organism. Whilst organisation is decreasingly related to individual living organic beings, we find the rise of a meaning that focuses on a mechanistic and more general concept of ‘being organised’. Unlike the organism, ‘being organised’ was increasingly associated with applying external rules of co-ordination, standardisation and order toward efficiency.

In the Oxford Dictionary for the Business World (Issacs & Martin 1993) we find the resonance of the telling split that now exists between the two words once covered by one. An organism equals an “individual plant or animal” or a “living being with independent parts”. Organisation is, somewhat circularly, defined as “organizing or being organized” or an “organized body, system or society”. If one seeks further clarification, one finds that to organise is defined as “to give an orderly structure to”. And order is defined as “tidiness” (see also Johannsen & Page 1987; French & Saward 1983).

It is this etymological split that enables us today to take two words that were once one and use one as a metaphor for the other. One might expect that by so doing, by thinking of organisations as if they were organisms, we would recover the ‘naturalised’ understandings of other civilisations. However, the particularly Modern view of the organism, drawn upon by the theorists of the 1930s and reiterated in the 1960s, as described by Morgan, ingrains mechanistic assumptions as much as it offers a radical
alternative. This is not a view that could mean many different forms of instrument for particular purposes, nor one whereby every organism has a particular telos, as in pre-Modern times. It is rather a conception shaped by a belief in objective unitary laws governing the universe that all organisms are subject to. Where all organisms, following Descartes, have basic primary qualities and differences are secondary. Where, subsequently, all difference can be looked beyond to find the commonality of the whole genus. Where organisms are separate atomic entities characterised by having their parts connected up by a unitary logical mind. Where organisms can be seen as made up of separate functions that work according to standardised principles, taking inputs and turning them into outputs via some structured and predictable process.

It was this very Modern-mechanistic view of nature, which reached its zenith in the 17th and early 18th century, that initially prevented the need for the development of separate words for the organism and the organisation. In an age when logical positivism and the quest for a universal calculus saw little tolerance for ambiguity of meaning as Greek thinking was usurped, the organism and the organisation could be covered by the organon as both were seen as subject to the same mechanistic principles.

However, as the idea that all things could be seen mechanically dimmed, Man and other animals were regarded as different or more evolved from inanimate mechanisms, and the possibility of a word like the organon that stands for both an individual living being and the application of external objective principles diminished. Hence, the organism first appears in the English language at the beginning of the 18th century and becomes increasingly frequent in use during the 19th century (coinciding with what Foucault termed 'The Age of Man'). Thus, organisation and organism are now different words. However, the organism still carries with it a residue from the time when it was
both one with organisation and mechanistically conceived. This may be seen if one examines the layout of Morgan’s chapter on the organisation as an organism closely.

Morgan begins by claiming that “we can start this story [of the organism metaphor] with Elton Mayo”. Thus, a chronological development is shown from the mechanistic thinkers of the early 20th century he depicted in his previous chapter. Mayo, as we have seen, is listed with Munsterberg, Parker Follett and Barnard as the New Pioneers who focused upon the ‘other’ side of work, ‘the human side of the equation’ or “the incorporation of people-related variables into the core of organization theory” (Warner 1997: 3811). Indeed, the organic perspective simply overlays some organic characteristics onto the existing mechanistic foundations as the new pioneers overlaid some new ideas onto the established mechanistic foundations of Management. This is not surprising given prevailing views of the organism in Mayo’s time, a view illustrated by The Science of Life diagram of the human digestion system shown in Chapter 4 (see Figure 18, pg. 134). It is this view of the organism that Management builds with.

After introducing the new pioneers, Morgan moves on to present Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs - a triangle moving from base physiological things upward to mind things (see Figure 28). This ‘organism’ (?), with its hierarchical and clearly divided ‘mind over matter’ form, is, of course, a direct replication of the scientific separation of mind and body (see pg. 98) and Chandler’s historical object (see Figure 24, pg. 207), and a mirror image of Diderot’s Tree of Knowledge (see Figure 16, pg. 123).

Following Maslow is a discussion on organisations as open systems rather than as closed mechanistic input-process-output systems (Morgan does not diagrammatise this but one may illustrate the ‘new’ view with reference to another textbook’s depiction of it - see Figure 29). The advance Morgan describes is made by adding a feedback loop to the
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<th>TYPE OF NEED</th>
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<td>Creation of jobs with scope for achievement, autonomy, responsibility, and personal control.</td>
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<td>Work enhancing personal identity</td>
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**FIGURE 29:** THE OPEN SYSTEMS APPROACH. SOURCE: ROBBINS & Mukerji “MANAGING ORGANIZATIONS” (1990).

**FIGURE 30:** MORGAN’S ORGANIZATION AS AN ORGANISM. SOURCE: ORIGINAL BY KAST AND ROSENZWEIG (1973), REPRODUCED IN MORGAN (1986 & 1997).
standard input-process-output view of organisations in a manner similar to that of the 'process approach' whereby a loop was added to the Fayolian line of "planning, organising, leading and controlling" (see Figure 23 pg. 197). This brings the reader to the second diagram in Morgan’s organism chapter. In order to describe how an organisation can be seen as a “set of subsystems”, Morgan re-presents the diagram shown here as Figure 30.

This is the only picture of an organism in Morgan’s chapter (a picture with the same input-process-output characteristics as *The Science of Life*’s mechanistic organism - although Morgan’s organism looks less like an actual living being). It is a picture that would have been implausible prior to Modernity. Morgan’s organism is an ideal, a simulacrum - the mechanistic essence of all organisms. It is consequently hard to see how this organic depiction has taken the mechanistic view of organisation and, in Morgan’s words, “changed all this”.

Unfortunately, Morgan’s intention to think other than from the ingrained mechanistic perspective is undermined by his unwitting adherence to Modern lines of history. By viewing, with hindsight, the Greek *organon* from a Modern perspective; by taking aboard the idea that the machine view is the origin of Management; and by presenting of a chronological linear advancement of the field from this point, Morgan incorporates much under the banner of organism which ‘connects’ his presentation of organism to mechanism. Contrary to his stated aim, Management’s organism, founded as it is upon mechanistic views, further ingrains the Modern mechanistic model - a model which has, in the process, become more difficult to recognise and hence critique.

This ingraining ‘transition’ from machine to organism may also be seen in other
works. When Simon (March & Simon 1958: 12-22) criticised the Pioneers of Management’s ideas for fear that they “would transform a general-purpose mechanism, such as a person, into a more efficient special-purpose mechanism”, the view that organisations and their ‘components’ should be viewed mechanistically was carried forward. Man had been naively diagnosed as the wrong type of machine but he was still a machine. Simon (1957) still described people in organisations as “decision-making mechanisms” and maintained the line that “the fundamental criterion of administrative decisions must be a criterion of efficiency”.

When the field took to Barnard and others organic/systemic ideas, the definition of organisation that the field works with did not change substantially. A focus upon ‘the common explicit purpose’, the ‘coordinated system of specialised activities for the purposes of achieving common goals’, was overlaid upon the mechanistic division of labour basis. Below is Sheldon’s (1924: 286) 1920s definition that Urwick worked with:

Organization: the process of so combining the work which individuals or groups have to perform with the faculties necessary for the execution that the duties, so formed, provide the best channels for the efficient, systematic, positive and co-ordinated application of effort.

This can be contrasted with Schein’s (1965) later “the rational co-ordination of the activities of a number of people for the achievement of some common explicit purpose or goal, through division of labour and function, and through a hierarchy of authority and responsibility”; or, Robbins’ (1984) “a formal structure of planned coordination, involving two or more people, in order to achieve a common goal... characterized by authority relationships and some degree of division of labor”; or, the definition that Fineman and Gabriel’s (1994) study on textbook rhetoric sees as paradigmatic now - “a collection of individuals formed into a coordinated system of specialized activities for the
purposes of achieving certain goals over some extended period of time, even though individual membership may change" (Middlemist & Hitt 1988). The traditional Modern triangular visibility of organisation with the centralised core enabling decentralised divisions to operate more efficiently has not really been greatly altered by becoming more 'organic'.

Even the theorists who critiqued Weber’s bureaucratic ‘ideal’ and supported a more organic conception of organisation did so while reiterating, or taking for granted, bureaucratic dimensions (e.g., Gouldner 1954; 1957; 1959; Blau 1955; Blau & Scott 1963; Etzioni 1961; Burns & Stalker 1961; Hage 1965). Taking Weber’s dimensions of bureaucracy as a starting point, their research proved that some dimensions were not fundamental and others were, continuing to show that organisations must, as a general principle, evolve into more advanced (i.e., more efficient) forms of this singular mode. Critics after Weber did not show up the ‘strawman’ that their History had created by demonstrating that his ‘ideal organisation’ was not the only ideal form of organisation (which is what Weber actually said). They did not undermine the conceptual starting point of bureaucracy. What they did was refine it by disproving particular elements according to the criterion of efficiency.

Organic thinking was also seen as an advancement from the starting point of the original universal mechanistic organisational form (universal because it was the most efficient) to a contingency perspective whereby one can point to a narrow range of ideal organic forms, one of which will be best (i.e., most efficient) for a particular type of environment. Robbins (1990: 278), upon reviewing this literature, claims that while there is no universally agreed-upon framework for classifying organisations in this way, "Henry Mintzberg’s work probably gets closest to it". Mintzberg sought to get beyond
the standard 'boxes and lines' hierarchy by seeing all organisations as shaped by five elements that combine in five main ways to define five main species (see Figure 31). Thus, all viable species of organisation are based on the underlying genus of a strategic apex where decisions are made, a middle co-ordinating line and a broad operating base where action takes place. Mintzberg's forms are just more comfortable looking (or gloved) triangle hierarchies. While Mintzberg (1973) had earlier complained that Management was hampered by still speaking in terms of "Fayol's words of 1916, that managers plan, organize, co-ordinate and control", it appears unlikely that Mintzberg's own 'new' organisational visibility does not in some way perpetuate the triangular-hierarchical view and this way of articulating Management.

II. Culture

Overall economic performance depends on transaction costs, and these mainly reflect the level of trust in the economy. The level of trust depends in turn on culture. An effective culture has a strong moral content. Morality can overcome problems that formal procedures - based on monitoring compliance with contracts - cannot. A strong culture therefore reduces transaction costs and enhances performance - the success of an economy depends on the quality of its culture. Casson, *The Economics of Business Culture* (1991).

In the 1980s a new idea entered Management's mainstream: organisations are really cultures. In the early 1980s, Japan's success began to undermine the Modern Western belief in technology and structure being the only significant variables contributing to economic progress. While America might still boast technological supremacy, Japan was gaining economic supremacy. Authors like Ouchi (1981) and Pascale and Athos (1981) attributed this to Japanese culture. Pop Management writers soon applied this sort of thinking to particular corporations, drawing correlations between "excellent" or "strong"
cultures and organisational effectiveness (Peters & Waterman 1982; Deal & Kennedy 1982). Their findings seemed to show that the growth could not just be explained by the ethos of the individual "economic man" (Locke 1989: 279).

Despite indicating that organisational development could not be fully explained by the ethos of the economic man, once culture came to be an object in Management, it was viewed from a Modern economics perspective toward Management's foundational aim of increasing efficiency (thus having become a more tangible synonym for 'effectiveness'). Not long after Pop-Management gurus brought culture to the fore, more sophisticated surveys began to examine its 'causal links'. In 1983, Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) published "Efficient Cultures: Exploring the Relationship Between Culture and Organizational Performance", presenting a:

view of organizations that will help us link the concept of organizational culture to the economic efficiency of organizations... a utilitarian view... essentially a theory of transaction costs, suggest[ting] which governance mode will be most efficient (have the lowest transaction costs) under varying exchange conditions.

This perspective on culture was solidified in titles like: *Bringing culture to the bottom line* (Dennison 1984), *Finding the culture of productivity* (Akin & Hopelain 1986) and *The Confucius connection: From cultural roots to economic growth* (Hofstede & Bond 1988). In this way, rather than challenging the hold of economics, as one might think an emphasis on culture could do, culture came to reinforce it. The amorphous nature of culture did not change Modern methods of knowing. These methods shaped the way we understood culture. Management's 'end' of efficiency remained the same; culture simply provided an unexplored means for achieving it.

Many early writers on culture warned of treating it as a scientific approach might seek to grasp an object. Pettigrew (1979) argued against viewing cultures as static,
unified objects and for seeing culture as a loose "family of concepts", rather than seeking a unifying definition of it. Deal and Kennedy (1983: 503) warned of culture being subsumed into: "the dominant norm of the behavioral sciences [which] emphasizes definitions, operationalization, measurement and quantitative analysis". Peters and Waterman (1982: 107) wrote that we needed "a new language" to appreciate what they sought to describe. However, a new language did not eventuate. The object of culture was taken into Management's Modern apparatus and viewed in a Modern way so as to reinforce the field's established thinking. Management's traditional language was not comfortable leaving ideas like Peters and Waterman's "simultaneous loose-tight properties" to hang ungrounded. They had to be analysed, broken down, codified and causal links determined. The following paragraphs examine how Management sees, and hence shapes, the object of culture with very Modern predispositions.

When culture became part of Management's research agenda, when doctoral students and those who instructed them fixed their gaze upon culture and its vagaries, they set upon it with the instruments they had been trained to use. The armoury with which to know culture included economic logic, particularly the notion of the rational-economic atomic individual separate from others and her particular traditions, who could be quizzed as an individual but whose behaviour represented their organisation in microcosm; the idea that individual and organisational sub-consciousness could be known if one was rigorous enough; the Cartesian spirit of taking something complex and breaking it down into composite parts so as to make it easier to handle; the language of statistics; and the idea that the knowledge of an object would enable one to control or master it. However, the first thing to do, as in any scientific investigation, was to
determine a universal definition of 'what culture is'. Thus, organisation culture doyen Edgar Schein (1990; see also Bate 1990) complained that “the popular use of the concept [culture] had muddied the waters” with regard to arriving at an agreed objective definition. While he acknowledged that “culture is a complex phenomenon, and we should not rush to measure things until we better understand what we are measuring”, the underlying assumption is that we should be working toward definitions. Schein (1984; 1985) believed that in this way, and by applying scientific approaches, the “real” nature of organisational culture could be “surfaced”, “uncovered” and “deciphered”. Hence, Schein (1984: 15) thought that the way forward was “to study a large number of organizations using these methods to determine the utility of the concept of organization culture and to relate culture variables to other variables, such as strategy, organizational structure and ultimately organizational effectiveness”. 27

That this predisposition has stuck is evidenced in the textbooks of the 1990s. Such works usually conclude their chapters on culture with a questionnaire that can be used to ascertain the ‘type’ of a culture that the student is familiar with (e.g., Robbins 1993: 626-7: “Turn to page 718 for scoring directions and key”). Greenberg and Baron (1995: 574-5) preface their questionnaire with the following:

It is often difficult to recognize the culture of an organization without carefully assessing it. Typically, this is done by administering a questionnaire to large numbers of people working within an organization, and then averaging together all their answers. This simple questionnaire is designed to assess only a single aspect of culture - concern for people. More complex questionnaires would address several different aspects of organizational culture.

Two such “more complex” approaches are described below.

In Getting Value From Shared Values, McDonald and Gandz (1992: 64-7) argue

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27 Despite attempts to arrive at a “stringent conceptualization”, it should be noted that this, like Koontz’s quest for unity across the field, (see Chapter 6), appears to have foundered (Kreiner 1989).
that because "[a]n organization can turn shared values into competitive advantage... we need to develop values-measurement profiles". By doing so, they suggest that their approach might "establish implicit control and create a sense of belonging by building work environments that manifest shared values". Toward this aim they begin by asking:

why the application of hard science has not put such debates [with regard to the effects of culture] to rest. The answer lies in the abstract nature of the phenomenon. Tangible proof has been elusive as organizational scientists continue to search for reliable and valid measures of values.

McDonald and Gandz claim that "finding answers" to this means 'doing like they do', beginning via an empirical approach that focuses on asking "organizational practitioners" what they think values "relevant to the modern corporation" are. In this way, they claim that they "address the concept of shared values more objectively than has been done in the recent past". With questionnaires and interviews they firstly arrive at 24 values (e.g., "Humor", "Forgiveness", "Logic", "Moral Integrity") and then are able, via sophisticated statistical processes, to measure and rank the importance accorded to each value in a Company. A Company can then be placed onto a tableau of categories, decisions can be made as to whether this profile is what they are seeking and, if not, the Company can re-adjust itself accordingly.

Migliore and Martin's (1994) Use of a Corporate Culture Planning Index for Strategic Planning similarly "proposes a method to measure culture". They do so because "measuring anything helps us understand it better" and "closer examination of an organization's culture could assist it to adapt and be more effective". They claim that to "get to the root of culture, th[e] concealed or unconscious motivation behind... outward behaviour must be discovered" and propose 20 measurement categories (e.g., "Goals", "Ethics", "People") for doing this. These can be scored by participants from 1 to 5, and
can be added and averaged across the sample. This score then enables an organisation to “measure its culture against others” and highlight “weak areas that need improvement”. Implied in studies like this is the idea that there must be ideal forms of culture. The fervour with which researchers attempted to measure culture may be linked to the belief that some cultures could be correlated with effectiveness or efficiency. Such cultures were generally termed ‘strong’.

Deal and Kennedy (1983: 502) were typically adamant that “while every organization has a culture some are stronger than others”. As the traits of strong cultures were sought, strong became a pseudonym for “homogenized” or “unified” (Ouchi & Price 1978), or, in other words, “cohesive and tight-knit” (Deal & Kennedy 1983), “thick” (Sathe 1983), “congruent” (Schall 1983), “stable” (Schein 1984), having a high degree of “shared history” (Schein 1990) or “shared values” (McDonald & Gandz 1992).

The belief that this type of culture leads to greater effectiveness or efficiency may be traced back to Blake and Mouton’s (1972) differentiation between sound cultures that “stimulated efforts to produce” and unsound cultures where “beliefs and values bear little relationship to productive achievement or profit seeking”. At least since this time, sound cultures, or cultures described with pre-nomens like “strong”, “powerful”, “positive”, cultures that are “integrated” or “aligned”, as opposed to unsound, weak or negative cultures that are dispersive and disparate (Robbins 1993; Schein 1996b), have been believed to be linked to increased efficiency (Vaill 1984; Mitroff & Kilmann 1984; Dennison 1984; Pascale 1985; Stevenson & Gumpert 1985; Akin & Hopelain 1986).

While the strong culture hypothesis has now been questioned by some (Saffold 1988), the association of positive terms with unified homogeneous cultures, and of cultural aspects which do not contribute to efficiency with binary opposite negative
terms, continues to influence. The continued use of this language, even by critics of the 'strong culture hypothesis', indicates, firstly, that finding the cultural type that best leads to efficiency is the goal of Management with regard to culture. Secondly, it encourages the Modern view that there must be sets of superior (or more evolved) cultural traits, the set that best serves all organisations' ends (Martin & Siehl 1983; Stablein & Nord 1985). Thirdly, it suggests that cultures can be measured and differentiated into typologies based on this view. Finally, the continued association with positives ('strong' still sounds better than 'weak') implies that culture must aim for unity, or be the central stem that holds things together, and that normal individuals, whether they be nations, organisations or humans, should have a "single, unitary" stem (Saffold 1988: 547). Culture was seen first in Management as an "integrating mechanism" (Meyerson & Martin 1987: 624), a predisposition that still resides in our expressions.

In addition, codifying and measuring goes hand in hand with the development of categorical types that have assigned values. This enables objective grids for plotting particular cases. Further, just as the development from the machine to the organism saw a move from one ideal 'species' to a few, so it was with culture. Beyond the binary classification of strong and weak, other researchers have developed typologies, that while assuming foundational elements suggest a small number of discrete species of culture (e.g., Wilkins & Ouchi 1983; Schein 1996a; Quinn & McGrath, in McDonald & Gantz 1992; Sonnenfeld, in Hymowitz 1989). These typologies promote a contingency approach, similar in form to Mintzberg's organic organisations, which recognises that different circumstances and environments suit different cultures, allows different types of strengths and weaknesses to be identified for each species and prospective employees to be asked: What kind of culture fits you best? This enables "good employer-employee
matches” (or cultural homogeneity) to be gained (Robbins 1993: 626).

Finally, all of the above pre-dispositions encourage, and are encouraged by, a view of culture as something that an organisation ‘has’, a separate object, as opposed to something that an organisation ‘is’ (e.g., Deal & Kennedy 1983: 502; Greenberg & Baron 1995: 574; Robbins 1993: 605; Schein 1984: 5; Migliore & Martin 1994: 97) This encourages the view that culture can be ‘engineered’. These beliefs are manifest in titles like Gaining control of the corporate culture (Kilmann et al. 1985), Changing the company culture (Stevens & Gillespie 1988) and Culture: Software of the mind (Hofstede 1991), and Pascale and Athos’ (1981) and Peters and Austin’s (1985) description of “ambiguity” and “enthusiasm” as “good techniques”.

These ways of seeing and saying culture all rely upon Modernist assumptions. They are carried forward in the name of increasing efficiency and encourage an emphasis on the Apollonian, integrating dimensions, rather than difference, particularity, dissonance, heterogeneity and the ambiguities of culture. In Schein’s (1992: 15) words, “the concept of culture is most useful if it helps to explain some of the seemingly incomprehensible and irrational aspects of groups and organizations”. Culture subsequently comes to be seen by Management as it may help us explain away chaos.

However, given a different historical appreciation things may have turned out differently. If, for example, Weber’s founding role had been interpreted differently, culture may have been viewed differently by Management. One part of Weber’s project - the necessity of bureaucracy given a rationalising culture - is, as Chapter 6 made clear, regarded as a key foundation of Management. However, other aspects of Weber’s thinking were overlooked, including his concern for culture. Weber had a great deal to
say on this and given his oft-stated influence one might expect that his ideas would be
drawn upon. However, even contemporary institutional theorists, Weber’s most obvious
heirs in organisational analysis have, for the most part, neglected this message (Clegg
1992a). Particularly absent from Management’s memory is Weber’s view that any
analysis of organisations must be a cultural analysis of culturally diverse practices.
Management’s focus has been on how differences become eliminated within one
overarching cultural frame, theorising within a relatively restricted set of cultural
practices and looking for how organisations can achieve global best practices.

III. Postmodernism

And so we’ve come to postmodernism, which is a kind of
radical investigation into the classical language that
revives, simultaneously, every single period of Classicism.
That’s what’s so extraordinary. It revives all periods.

It is simply enough that one perceives modernity for what it
was, and to realize that ‘yesterday’s got nothin’ for me’.
Hetrick & Lozada, first line of their editorial for a special
issue of “The Journal of Organizational Change

Two quotations are presented above. The first is Jencks description of Postmodernism.
The second is a lyric taken from a popular song so as to illustrate what the reader of a
special issue of a Management journal on Postmodern approaches has in store for him, an
issue that claims to offer readers something quite different from Jencks’ conception.
Postmodernism is defined not as the reinvigoration of the past, but, in Hetrick and
Lozada’s words, as “an escape from traditional views”. Indeed, when Management views
Postmodernism, it is as an object quite different from other fields’ conceptions.
Management takes up the Postmodern in such a way as to promulgate many of the
Modern assumptions that others perceive Postmodernism as attempting to get beyond.
Postmodernism, in Management's eyes, promotes the new above the old and the revolutionary dismissal of tradition, either/or choices as to what most truthfully represents The Way Things Really Are (based on dichotomies between mind and matter, and subjectivity and objectivity) and, consequently, an anti-pluralistic stance that does not draw from many 'Classicisms' at all.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s Postmodernism was trumpeted as "a new approach to organizational analysis" (Hassard 1994: 303), "a new buzzword in the organization and management sciences" (Berg 1989: 201). It was described as about "ignoring traditional modernist values" (Firat 1992), "an antimodernist program... that involves the destruction of economic theory and reasoning" (Wendt 1992: 54), "something which is essentially based on the negation of the modern" (Featherstone 1988) or "something that succeeds the 'modern'... a break with, a shift away from or the rupture of the modern" (Berg 1989: 203). There was much excitement because Postmodernism was all new, indeed, "not only new but new in entirely new ways" (Yarwood 1994: 34).

In this manner, Postmodernism was seen as an approach that more realistically represented concrete changes. Hence, it is spoken of in terms such as "we are on the brink of a fresh mindset, one that will forever sweep away the established foundations of business" (Yarwood 1994: 34); "Managers must... accept that to speak of postmodernity is to suggest an epochal shift or break from modernity involving the emergence of a new social condition with its own distinct organization principles. Postmodernity addresses completely new challenges" (Cova 1996: 16).

Because "the world is less determinate in times past... old stories of how we came to know are no longer serviceable". Thus, 'old' Modernist thinkers are criticised as
retarding the field by "shortsightedly appli[ng] positivist epistemology", rather than "evolv[ing] to a state that is consistent with the dynamics that now surround us" (Despres 1995). Chia (1995: 594) outlines an:

impoverished state of affairs... whereby very few new insights are ever gained into the real nature of organization... the task of postmodern organizational analysis is, therefore, precisely to sift through these sedimented layers of abstracted concepts in order to make contact with the implicate organizational reality beyond.

Consequently, "much of the [modern] curriculum will have to be confined to history because so much of it is irrelevant to the changed conditions of postmodern organizations" (Clegg 1992b: 36). Modern approaches are hence destined to "slip quietly into the archives of obscurity... where they will keep silent company" (Despres 1995: 73).

Thus, Gergen and Thatchenkery (1996: 370) promote a "revolution" called Postmodernism, where "scholars willing to be audacious, to break the barriers of common sense [will] unseat conventional assumptions... by offering new forms of theory". "The way forward... for the consciously postmodernist... requires that the [Modernist] brick wall be demolished" (Carter & Jackson 1993: 100).

This revolutionary or empirical-evolutionary predisposition promotes an either/or realism illustrated via the construction of tables of binary opposite terms. Modernism is associated with the negative old approaches and Postmodernism with the new reality. Despres (1995) employs just such a table to demonstrate that an ethnographic approach it is "far more intellectually legitimate... [i]f the aim is to fathom a slice of culture". Yarwood (1994: 34) like-mindedly describes Postmodernism via a series of terms dichotomous to terms associated with Modernism under the heading "New Words for a New Age". Burrell (1989) presents something more academic but entirely similar, as do Amariglio (1992), Clegg (1990; 1992b), Willmott (1992), Boje and Dennehy (1993),

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Carter and Jackson (1993: 84) employ this sort of thinking in their work. Postmodernism, for them, is “conceptualized in contradistinction to modernism, which, it is held, it is now succeeding... However, it is not so clear whether postmodernism stands in opposition to modernism, or is the latest stage in the development of modernism”. Either way, the choice seen is between something that builds on Modernism or completely opposes it. In their own words, either “postmodernism is a late form of modernism or [it is] anti-modernism” (Carter & Jackson 1993). This either/or perspective enables Carter and Jackson (1993, underlining added) to say that Postmodernism signifies the “emergence of the pre-eminence of relativity over rationality, of the subjective over the objective”; and, subsequently, with hindsight, to see that because Vroom’s Expectancy Theory “introduces the voice of subjective understanding into the issue of motivation” it “can be characterised [as] an embryonic [or] prototypically postmodern theory” with “far superior explanatory power” than traditional “modern theorising”. Indeed, with a twist akin to Mooney’s history of Management, Carter and Jackson (1993: 99-100) state that Vroom in fact “failed to fully recognize the key element of his own argument, that of subjective rationality” and conclude that Vroom is “unconsciously postmodern” and was, subsequently, unwittingly “pointing the way forward”.

This privileging of the new over the old, and subjectivity as more realistically capturing reality, sees Postmodernism in Management turn out to be not particularly pluralistic or paralogical. Hence, despite Despres’ (1995) argument “for an non-reducible plurality”, he comes to tells us that a “positive methodology is misguided” and “flawed”, that it “will never achieve the subtlety, the unpretentiousness required to grasp the
natives' point of view” and, therefore, that “it is high time that we stop applying positive methods and unitary thinking to postmodern phenomena”. Despres (1995) even goes so far as to claim that the “integrity” of those he criticises is “compromised” by their mixing and matching epistemologies, methods and metaphors. Gergen and Thatchenkery (1996) similarly recommend replacing the “scientific emphasis on ‘the single best account’ with a multiplicity of constructions or, in short, totalitarianism is replaced by pluralism”. However, while claiming a world best suited to plurality they “advocate replacing modernist assumptions with postmodern ones that... are more consistent with the scientific and philosophical advancements of the late twentieth century”.

Given its Modernist formation, it is perhaps not surprising that Management should see Postmodernism in this way. The field is so imbued with a Modern revolutionary spirit that even Postmodernism must be looked at as a further extension of the avant-gardism and iconoclasm of Modernism. Further, within its frame of reference, with nothing prior to Modernity to draw upon, Postmodernism does, initially, look completely new to Management. However, it is not long before Postmodernism in Management is, by this same Modern criterion, dismissed as ‘superficial’ or ‘not new’. Reviewing Postmodernism in Management, Eastman and Bailey (1996) somehow identify similarities between “major elements within postmodern thought” and “Comte and his 19th century positivist movement”. From this view, Postmodernism may indeed be critiqued and dismissed for being “nothing new”. Further, Parker (1992b: 651) responds to Tsoukas’ (1992) criticism that Postmodernism, as earlier described by Parker (1992a), is “nothing new”, by accepting this and dismissing Postmodernism accordingly:

postmodernism [is] nothing more that a new phrase to capture the imagination of the jaded reader. The modern/postmodern couplet echoes many of the other dichotomies of control versus commitment, Taylor versus Mayo, formal versus informal, mechanistic verses organic and so on, but adds little that is new. There

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seems no reason, apart from academic fashion, to introduce [such] a term.

Indeed, this dismissal as nothing new and therefore unworthy is perhaps inevitable given a continued adherence to time and history as linear and progressive, and with Management and its contributing disciplines employing a further Modern distinction to break down and understand the Postmodern. With a Cartesian division between "postmodernity" as "historical periods within particular discourse communities which occurred after the historical period known as modernity" and "postmodernism" as "social, political, and aesthetic movements occurring within this" (Goodall 1992: 26; Parker 1992a), Management seeing Postmodernism as a recovery of pre-Modern approaches alongside the Modern did not stand much chance.

Even when Management does attempt to articulate a pre-Modernism, it does so with a relatively narrow frame. Carter and Jackson (1993: 87), for example, table pre-Modern, Modern and Postmodern thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Premodern</th>
<th>Modern</th>
<th>Postmodern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meta-theory</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationality</td>
<td>Transcendent/ Dogmatic</td>
<td>Transcendent/ Objective</td>
<td>Subjective/ Rhetorical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear that a particular type of 'Premodernism', one quite different from that put forward in Chapter 5 of this work, is used here. It is a Premodernism that equates to what is often referred to in Management History as "the pre-industrial period", a period of "superstitious dogma" and "blind Judeo-Christian theology" (Wren 1994). With a view of pre-Modernism as incorporating the Ancient Greeks (or, for that matter, almost any Ancient society), the answer to the 'meta-theory' box for Premodern might have been 'yes and no' rather than just 'yes'. Moreover, with a greater degree of self-reflection, the authors of this table may have recognised that even an argument for Postmodernism relies
upon at least the partial acceptance of some meta-theoretical belief. Hence, 'yes and no' would have appeared under the Postmodern heading as well. Looking in this way, Management might, as fields like those described in Chapter 5, see Postmodernism as in some sense a recovery.

However, perhaps the most obvious reason why Postmodernism may not be seen as the resurfacing of many different classicisms is that Management, given its wholly Modernist historical understanding of itself, generally has only one classicism that it can recognise: Modernism. Indeed, although it is marginal there is some talk of Postmodernism as a recovery in Management, but it only occurs in those unusual instances where the author is influenced by a broad historical understanding that allows them to relativise their subject. For example, Chia (1995) draws from Ancient Greek and Chinese thought, theoretical physics, linguistics and poetry to see the Modern as "a momentary lapsing into forgetfulness of its necessary postmodern origin" and Postmodern Management as about "elaborating the 'initial forgetting' brought about by the 'modernist turn'". Similarly, Tsoukas (1992: 643-5), with reference to the philosopher Castoriadis and the pre-Socratics, points out that the social world or any system of being or thought must always have:

both the features of cosmos without which human thought would have been impossible; and also, at its roots... chaos - a void nothingness, apeiron as Anaximander put it - without which socio-historic creation would have been impossible... It is the interdependence of chaos and cosmos, well understood by pre-Socratic Greek philosophy, that makes social life patterned yet indeterminate, and enables the human mind to account for it, though in an irremediably incomplete way.

While he sees little point in going over the ground covered by Management in the guise of Postmodernism, Tsoukas does not see returning to the Ancients in the same light. In fact, he (1992: 648) appears to believe that this, while nothing new, may be a good way to
challenge "the cognitive monopoly of an omniscient subject-centred rationality".

It is debates like these that demonstrate Management’s generally narrow historical awareness. Unfortunately Parker (1992b: 652) finds it hard to see the things that Tsoukas writes of as “a central element of the ‘Greco-Western cultural tradition’”. This is hardly surprising, given that in Modern education (and Management education within this), Ancient Greece, when it is broached, is generally only seen as the origin of the triumph of rationalism. It may only be through more than just a few writers embracing a broader historical understanding that Management can develop in ways other than incrementalism, appreciate Lyotard or Jencks’ Postmodern approach or operate with the ‘ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives’ that Feyerabend saw as crucial for the development of knowledge at the end of Chapter 5.

**IV. Nothing new**

It is essential for [a field’s] future development as well as for giving content to the theories that it contains at any particular moment [that] the history of a science becomes an inseparable part of the science itself. [And that this history should not be] a series of self-consistent theories that converge towards an ideal view. Feyerabend, *Against Method* (1993).


Management has a problem with regard to invention. It is a problem to do with its history. However, because Management does not pay history much mind, it is a problem that Management does not recognise and unwittingly perpetuates. In keeping with his ideas with regard to invention (see Chapter 5), Feyerabend argues that substantive development can only come from a history that contains within it different traditions that can be combined. Management’s history only contains one way of seeing and speaking
the world. Hence, the organism, culture and Postmodernism were seen by Management in a Modernist fashion, realighting established conventions.

Consequently, when one places Management's most popular new theory of the past decade, Hammer and Champy's *Business Process Reengineering* (BPR) against Taylor's work from one hundred years earlier, one sees that it accentuates more or less the same things. They both dismiss tradition. Taylor (1911: 15-6) wrote of overcoming "the inefficient rule-of-thumb methods which are in common use", Hammer and Champy (1993: 17, 49) of "rejecting the conventional wisdom and received assumptions of the past" and of how "tradition counts for nothing". Both claim universal validity: "The fundamental principles of scientific management are applicable to all kinds of human activities"; "Reengineering... applies to any organization in which work is performed" (Taylor 1911: 7; Hammer & Champy 1993: 5). Further, both reiterate the same visibility of organisation - the triangle with the man at the top of the central column best placed to see "All of the planning [must] be done by management in accordance with the laws of science; because even if the workman was well suited to the development and use of scientific data, it would be physically impossible for him to work at his machine and at a desk at the same time"; "Reengineering must come from the top of the organization [as] people near the front lines lack... broad perspective" (Taylor 1911: 38; Hammer & Champy 1993: 208). Both are fired by a revolutionary zeal: "scientific management involves a complete mental revolution" while "Reengineering rejects the assumptions inherent in Adam Smith's industrial paradigm [and] is to the next revolution of business what the specialization of labor was to the last" (Taylor 1947: 27; Hammer & Champy 1993: 49, 30). However, despite its claimed revolt against Smith's taking apart and simplifying work tasks into "meaninglessly thin slices", what reengineering offers, it
must be remembered, is only the taking apart and simplification of processes (Hammer & Champy 1993: 51). Across the century, moreover, the aim of promoting increased efficiency goes largely unquestioned, organisations will simply be reconfigured, triangularly, in terms of efficiency of processes rather than efficiency of tasks. Both Scientific Management and BPR have the same end: efficiency or, as Hammer and Champy (1993) say, “doing more with less”.

What these examples show is that Management, in its Modernist quest to be at the cutting-edge and established on what are perceived to be legitimate and solid foundations, or to be continually producing the new while dismissive of the past to such an extent that it has no time for ‘incorporating a history of its science into itself’ as Feyerabend recommends, has found it hard to create - apart from incrementally. In a very real sense, to quote Merrill (1970), the field has developed the foreseeable future in line with what is pointed out by the murmur or background of the pioneer thinkers. In its rush to publish of the new, very little critical historical understanding is incorporated into the consideration of Management’s development. Hence, the field tends to unwittingly reproduce, or just add complexity to, its established foundations without changing its underlying way of seeing and speaking.

One may illustrate this by reviewing mainstream management of change theories. In 1985, an Academy of Management symposium on organisational change encouraged a meeting of academic minds and practical business experience toward the development of new theory (Pfeffer 1987). A “dramatic expansion” in the number of attempts to develop theoretical frameworks for guiding the management of change has occurred and it has been claimed that this effort has led to “more successful examples of organizational change than ever before” (Nadler & Tushman 1989). However, despite an ‘explosion’ in
numerical output, a review reveals a certain sameness among the many authors who have applied themselves to this issue. This can be seen by the way in which Kotter’s (1995) recent framework of eight linear steps (establishing a sense of urgency; forming a powerful guiding coalition; creating a vision; communicating the vision; empowering others to act on the vision; planning for and creating short-term wins; consolidating improvements; and institutionalizing new approaches) easily encapsulates other experts’ recent contributions.28

One reason behind this homogeneity becomes clear when one is cognisant of the common heritage that these theories, perhaps unwittingly, draw upon. While the 1985 symposium called particularly for theoretical frameworks for guiding the management of change based upon the examination of practice and experience, the view of these authors had already been influenced by their uncritical awareness of earlier theories of change. While the object of change in Management “lacks a long history of theory and research” (Smither 1994: 407), it does stretch back further than 1985. The points of origin paid homage to are the science of psychology and Lewin’s (1951) identification of the “three basic steps that summarize what’s involved in the process of changing people” (Greenberg & Baron 1983: 635). These steps - unfreezing, moving and refreezing - were reconfirmed by other authorities in the 1950s and 1960s (Schein 1968). Since this point, Management’s theories of change have built, often unwittingly, upon Lewin’s foundations.

28 Identifying a compelling need for change and creating a sense of urgency is seen as crucial by Beer (1987), Johansson et al. (1993), Tichy (1993; Tichy & Sherman 1993), Nadler and Tushman (1988; 1989), Stace and Dunphy (1994) and The Price Waterhouse Change Integration Team (1995). All of these sources and others (Beck 1987; Chen 1994; Larkin & Larkin 1996; Price Waterhouse 1990) emphasise the need to develop, effectively communicate and empower others to work towards a vision of a future organisational state. We are reminded of the particular importance of being aware of the politics at work in an organisation, gaining commitment and forming a guiding coalition by Price Waterhouse (1995), Johansson et al. (1993), Tichy (1993), Tichy and Sherman (1993) and Nadler and Tushman (1989), while emphasising short-term wins and other means of consolidating improvements, integrating and institutionalizing new approaches and forming a platform for further change are highlighted by reengineering exponents like Cross, Feather and Lynch (1994) and most of the above.
Kotter (1995)

Establish sense of urgency | Form a guiding coalition | Create a vision | Communicate vision | Empower others to act on vision | Plan/create short-term wins | Consolidate improvements | Institutionalize new approaches

Tichy & Devanna (1990)

Recognizing the need for revitalization | Create a new vision | Mobilize commitment | Transitions | Institutionalizing change - social architecture - new beginnings

Blake & Mouton (1964)

Structured learning laboratory | Team building | Goal setting for the organization | Goal implementation | Stabilization of changes - monitoring of progress

Planned Change Model (1965; 1977)

Assess need for change/Contact change agent | Identify goals | Begin diagnosis | Present findings | Develop plan for change | Institute planned change | Evaluate intervention against goals

Lippet et al. (1958)

Develop need for change - (unfreeze) | Establish change relationships | Work toward change - (move) | Stabilize change - (freezing) | Achieve terminal relationships

Levin (1951)

UNFREEZE | MOVE | FREEZE

**Figure 32: The Repetitive Evolution of Modern Theories of Organisational Change.**
Figure 32 places Lewin’s model and those who built upon him alongside the more recent approaches of Kotter and Tichy to demonstrate how Lewin’s original view has been carried forward, albeit with a variety of ‘trim’ added. Lippit et al.’s model seems an obvious extension of Lewin’s, with two more ‘mezzanine’ steps simply being inserted into Lewin’s original three. In the 1960s and 1970s a number of authors (Schein & Bennis 1965; Froham & Sashkin 1970; Kolb & Froham 1970) developed Lippit et al.’s model to create a “seven-step process” (Smither 1994: 409), while Blake and Mouton’s studies of also resulted in a change management prescription of “six phases” similar to what went before it. Kotter and Tichy, in this historical light, really only harden the establishment.

The continuity in Figure 32 indicates a number of unquestioned Modern assumptions: a view of time as linear and a view of development as progressive, incremental and cumulative over time (see also Tushman 1974; Greiner 1972); a view of organisation as an input-process-output system (although some later models incorporate a feedback-loop as was the case with the development of the organic approach upon the mechanistic); and a tendency to focus on changing tangible, material things. One can only speculate as to what might have come to the fore with a broader historical appreciation. Perhaps a ‘spiral’ view of time with past, present and future seen as intermingled (Cummings & Brocklesby 1997) or an emphasis upon the creative power of myth in carrying past and present into the future as expressed in Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy* for example. After a summary of Part Three, Chapter 9’s task is to investigate the extent to which working with a critical eye on the accepted history of Management, while at once re-thinking it, may enable Management to see and to speak differently.
REVIEW OF PART THREE

But, after all, this was the proper task of a history of thought, as against a history of behaviours or representations: to define the conditions in which human beings 'problematize' what they are, what they do, and the world in which they live. Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure* (1984).

This thesis has sought to investigate how being has become a Management problem, why it now seems obvious or natural that much of life should be judged on or subject to the principles of 'good Management'. Reviewing the material covered in Part Three, from the Foucauldian perspective developed in Part One, against Part Two's grid, we may begin to develop some reasons as to why this is.

Chapter 6 demonstrated how the history of Management was constructed as Management sought to establish itself as a field to be taken seriously in the middle of the 20th century. This history took the post-Enlightenment thought-world, the industrial conditions of the 19th century and key scientific 'discoveries' made by engineers in the first decade of the 20th century as its crucial points of origin. Beyond these points, Management looked to the ancient past to grant itself further gravity but only from a viewpoint that confirmed its present understanding as an advance. In other words, this history reflected a conception of Management, and Management's conception of organisation, that duplicated the key moments that define Modernism as the moments that defined it.

This may be better illustrated by returning to and adapting Deleuze's (1988) Foucault diagram with which Chapter 2 closed (Figure 4, pg. 57). Management, thus
conceived, fits Modernism as hand in glove. Consequently, Management’s strata of ways of seeing and saying is largely one with Modernism. Its arboreal, triangular, hierarchical, centralised-specialised way of viewing the world (a replication of the Modern scientific gaze, the Tree of Knowledge, the founding principles of economics, Darwin’s Tree of Life and the Panopticon) encourages speaking in terms of kosmos; in terms of directing, planning and controlling, co-ordinating or unifying, and directing; in terms of revolution and either/or choices; in terms of organisation as the triangular division of specialised labour. Furthermore, the extent toward which one is making progress with regard to all of these terms is judged by the criterion of increased efficiency.

For this reason, Management is in a position where it seems normal that its principles should be applied, for example, to hospitals, forestry and gymnasia, whereas it would appear odd if the principles of the disciplines that are traditionally regarded as underpinning those institutions were used to evaluate other subjects. By defining,
alongside Modernism, the line of the outside for life in the 20th century, Management's principles may be applied to almost any subject's operations within this period. Whereas other fields of knowledge are seen to be concerned with specific 'branches', Management is general - it sees the 'tree' as a whole. The language of Management is thus all-encompassing.

Just as Part Two showed Modernism to be a particular mode of thinking, Part Three demonstrated that Management's particular strata of forms is specific. They are based upon a historical appreciation that turns contingent political happenstances into grand scientific origins and adapts the rest of thought to confirm the viewpoint and boundaries that stem from these. However, within the sphere of Modernism, a sphere that has solidified over the past few centuries to give the appearance of universality, Management's visibility appears anything but specific. Modernism's general web of power-knowledge shields Management's particularity. It makes Management appear both normal and general.

In addition, Management has developed a web of its own. The institutions of Management's history, the particular understanding of organisation that became Management's key object, and the specific form that would become the model Business School, all of whose views reinforce and re-align the others, come together in the middle of the 20th century (see Chapter 7). This co-formation enabled the subject of Management or 'Management knowledge', to augment the more obvious aspects of its 'grubby' technical engineering background and gain a credence that it had struggled to achieve in previous decades - a formation that appeared solid, and seemed, at the time, to speak a sense that was difficult to challenge. In addition, the historical assumptions upon
which these institutions are based continued to redouble this web by repeating and restating Management’s accepted history to a point where it almost no longer needs to be written or read to be understood. It is ‘background noise’, too obvious to question.

Management’s fit into Modernism is made complete by it becoming a ‘science’ that appears capable of solving one of Modernism’s major problematisations: the determination of general human ends by which different activities can be judged objectively. Management emerges as the field that investigates the solution once thought to offer the greatest means to close the gap that Modernism created by dismissing a reliance on particular custom and individual *telos*: ‘performative efficiency’. Thus, Management has become a subject greatly suited to meet Modernism’s needs. Modernism and Management come together to promote efficiency as the benign meta-narrative that can be applied to judge almost any kind of performance, as the demonstration that there can be a universal human end, and which subsequently provides some sort of closure on, or makes sense of, all of the parts of Modernism’s complex system. Further, speaking in terms of efficiency, it reinforces seeing in terms of unified-specialisation and hierarchies of control (cf. the ‘maturation’ of American democracy under Teddy Roosevelt described in Chapter 6). For this reason, Management, as the study of efficiency, has spread further and faster than any other field in the 20th century. The diagrams of Management and Modernism form a ‘double knot’ that protects them from other perspectives that might threaten their ‘righteousness’.

Management’s bringing together of Modernism’s ‘loose ends’ may also be illustrated with reference to the diagram that began Chapter 2, Noujain’s (1987) depiction of Foucault’s history of psychoanalysis (Figure 2, pg. 26). Management, as the formation of the subject of Management, its object the Organisation, the institution of the Business
School and the history of Management, provides a conduit that brings together Modernity’s desire for general human ends and bureaucracy, its general form of organisation (these two aspects may be related to Foucault’s (1977a) prongs of Modernism’s power: ‘normalisation’ and ‘surveillance’). It does so by inciting the language of efficiency, a language that at once underpins bureaucratic rationality and provides a general end. It was able to do so with great force and hence successfully in the 1950s. Here, the form of economics and, to a lesser extent, other human sciences, are such that Management may ‘base itself’ on these established subjects in a manner that enables it to become accepted at the premier knowledge institutes of our century (themselves based on arboreal bureaucratic logic) and speak to business in a more agreeable way than business’ earlier association with economics. Subsequently, Management not only links and empowers Modernism’s way of seeing, it becomes the hub linking two of Modernity’s key institutions - the hitherto separated ‘capitalist business’ and ‘university system’ - a further reason for its power today.

While this formation gives Management great strength within Modernism, it should also be recognised as a formation that limits as much as it produces knowledge.
This was demonstrated in the discussion of how Management views 'new' objects in Chapter 8. The manner in which Management is limited in this respect may again be illustrated with reference to Deleuze-Foucault diagram drawn on page 305. Management's 'line of the outside' (which exists as a double of Modernism's boundary) makes it difficult for anything other, with which it might relativise its current way of thinking, to enter into the subject. It makes it difficult, for example, for the ways of pre-Modern thinking (symbolised at the end of Chapter 3) to enter with those forms of Modernism (drawn at the end of Chapter 4) so as to enable 'thinking differently'. Thus, even though Management may alight upon 'new' objects, it sees them through the same old 'architecture' and speaks them in Modern terms such as 'efficiency', 'universal units', 'essential unity', 'species', 'specialisation' and 'either/or', thereby further invigorating its own preconceptions. As Management's diagram continues to latch on to Modernism, to activate the 'double knot' described earlier, this becomes an issue of wider concern. As life becomes increasingly subject to Management, it may become more difficult to think differently, not just in Management, but at a more general level as well.

Management, it is argued here, is a much more recent invention than it might seem. Rather than a universal or normal way of judging being, it is a formation that is based on singular conceptions and political expediencies. It is also a formation that limits as much as it produces knowledge. It should not, therefore, be respected or go unquestioned to the degree that it currently is. Part Four begins to examine the extent to which one might begin to think differently by working with a counter-historical awareness of this formation, while at once failing to respect it.
PART FOUR: DISCUSSION

The more insight we possess into an origin the less significant does the origin appear. Nietzsche, *Daybreak* 44.

The object was to learn to what extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently. Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure* (1985).

Part Three demonstrated how the accepted history of Management contributes to a formation that both produces and limits what the field sees and says. Management's diagram of power/knowledge maps neatly onto the diagram of the Modern episteme so as to double a line of the outside that has difficulty incorporating non-Modern forms into its strata. Thus, the diagram of Management and its visibility draws great strength from Modernism and in turn sustains Modern ways of viewing and speaking the world. However, Part Three also demonstrated that Management's formation is largely based upon a singular view, inspired by contingencies and specific expedients. These are now overlooked, but only because a web of re-iteration has converted them into grand immutable origins along a linear continuum that appears so regular that it goes without question.

In so doing, Part Three provided answers to the questions that were posed in Chapter 1. Firstly, how does Management come to have such force, a force that is as pervasive as it seems unobtrusive? Through its formation being perfectly integrated into the 20th century's prevailing way of speaking and seeing - Modernism. Secondly, why
does Management have difficulty in seeing Postmodernism as other subjects see it? Because its historical understanding of itself is so tightly bound by Modernist ways that it, unlike fields such as art, architecture, philosophy and physics that refer to more wide-ranging histories, incorporates little with which to relativise its one and only classicism - Modernism. Thirdly, why is so much in Management presented as new while appearing similar to what has gone before? Because Management, being Modern, is driven by an avant-garde, iconoclastic and revolutionary will to speak of new and configured in such a way that it finds it difficult to incorporate the ‘ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives’ that enable substantive invention. Management is only able to develop incrementally by the principles of the ‘expert’s homology’. Hence, new names, same logic.

Having demonstrated this limiting effect, while having demonstrated the dubious nature and hence the insignificance of the historical points of origin that define Management’s formation, we may now return to what Foucault ultimately recognised as his telos: to play a part in the process of subjectivation by re-thinking a subject’s history, so as to free it from what it unquestioningly assumes about itself, so as to enable it to think differently. So as to enable, in this instance, Management to be ‘re-styled’.

While space precludes attempting this here in any great detail, Chapter 9 illustrates how one might undertake such a task by taking two relatively straightforward aspects of Management that have recently been problematised by its prevailing formation. By firstly being conscious of the contingent historical assumptions that shape the field’s views in these instances, and then incorporating a broader historical conception so as to bring other ways of saying and seeing into the subject, these two examinations attempt to think differently about Strategic Management and Business Ethics (see Cummings (1995))
and Cummings & Brocklesby (1997) for similar exercises in re-thinking history to re-
think Management with regard to centralisation and decentralisation and organisational
change). Chapter 10, the concluding chapter, then discusses the impact of the particularly
Modernist formation on life in general and outlines areas for further research.
Having identified Management's tight-knit Modernist history as limiting, one may begin to think differently by taking a wider historical view and connecting to un-Modern ways of seeing. Two aspects problematised in Management over the past decade are broached as examples: whether strategy is about 'top-down' design or 'bottom-up' emergence; and why business ethics seems to have little impact on decision making. With a broader historical conception of Management, the first problem, based on a triangular hierarchical view of organisation and the idea that one must represent the way things are without logical contradiction, would not be framed: strategy may be seen as both emergence and design. The second problem might be differently addressed by questioning the Modernist assumption that business ethics must be about the provision of general codes.

9. THINKING OTHERWISE: RE-FRAMING HISTORY, RE-VIEWING MANAGEMENT

I. The 'what is strategy?' crisis

Something is amiss, either the practitioners cannot keep up with theorists frequent changes of mind or the theorists still cannot decipher the practice. Were the many decades of vigorous development wasted? Does anybody at least know what strategy, strategic planning or strategic management are?

In 1997 Strategic Management (SM) was in crisis. Two schools of thought were certain that their opposite understandings were correct. The Design School, headed by Igor Ansoff, asserted that strategy was about rational planning, about those at the head of the corporation determining how the company would seek to match or fit their environment.

The Emergence School, with Henry Mintzberg at the forefront, argued that Design "got the notion of strategy all wrong, 'the wrong way around'" (Zeleny 1997: 77), strategic direction emerges through experience and expediency, without or despite purposeful
planning or forecasting. These "tectonic debates" raged through the late 1980s and 1990s (Pascale 1996), with prominent academics like Stacey (1990), Rumelt (1996) and Hamel (1996), coming in behind Emergence, and Porter (1996), Goold (1996) and de Kare-Silver (1997) fighting back for Design. It is this situation that Zeleny describes as "amiss". How this impasse was arrived at can be better understood if one is aware of the accepted history of SM within the history of Management described in Chapters 7 and 8.

The clear consensus in SM is that interest in the field began in the 1950s (Ansoff 1969) and that the subject was "born" in the 1960s as "strategic planning" (Ansoff 1994; Mintzberg 1994a; Goold & Luchs 1993; Whittington 1996). Influential early works usually listed include: Drucker's (1959) Long-Range Planning; Chandler's (1962) Strategy and Structure (Chandler's view of SM as 'the determination and achievement of the basic long-term goals of an enterprise', is seen as the "classic definition" (Weick 1987)); Andrews' (1971) Concept of Corporate Strategy; and, above all, Ansoff's (1965) Corporate Strategy. Ansoff is listed as primary among those who "applied the concept of strategy to management" and defined the "basic concepts of strategy" (Hamel & Prahalad 1989). His concepts are regarded as "the basic premises of strategic management" and form the basis of the Design School: "the classical... oldest and still most influential" view (Mintzberg 1990: 171; Whittington 1993: 3; Tsoukas 1994; Stacey 1990).

Consequently, SM is conceived as Management's history was being recorded and soon after what Management was about was clearly defined. Ansoff (1965: viii) accordingly pays tribute to "pioneers like F.W. Taylor, Elton Mayo, and Henri Fayol beg[inning] to apply science to management" (although Ansoff claims that because they began with problems of individual productivity within the organisation while he was
concerned with the external problems of the firm’s fit with its environment, “historical progress [in the field had] been from the ‘inside out’”). SM emerged as the recommendations of the Ford and Carnegie reports were taking effect, as Chandler was outlining the evolution toward the multi-divisional structure and when economics was found to be Management’s ‘only theoretical framework’. As a result, SM comes to be largely encased by Modernism.

The Design School and the basic concepts of SM ‘arrived’ as Ansoff (1969: 11ff.) realised a problematic gap between reality and theory. The supposed increasing complexity of business-environments in the 1950s and 60s, compounded by increasingly predominant multi-business firms (in keeping with the evolution described by Chandler), was creating a desire for foresightful ways of positioning companies in order to exploit environmental change. However, at that time current theory included only a business policy approach that assumed a company could stipulate what it would do on any given occasion (i.e., that assumed simple, stable environments) and the prevailing micro-economic theory of the firm. This saw organisations as simply turning resources into outputs through a production function and assumed that managers merely manipulated the factors under their control (e.g., wages, quantities manufactured, prices) so as to maximise profits. This model provided for no differentiation between firms behaviour and offered managers little decision-making guidance. Ansoff sought to fill this gap.

Ansoff (1965: 118ff.) saw the promise provided by Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Game Theory. Explaining that the concept of strategy is “relatively new”, Ansoff goes on to tell us that:

Its historical origin lies in the military art, where it is a broad, rather vaguely defined “grand” concept... Strategy is [here] contrasted to tactics, which is a
specific scheme for employment of allocated resources. The bridge to business was provided in 1948 by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in their now famous theory of games. The concept of strategy is [here] given two meanings. A pure strategy is a move or a specific series of moves by a firm, such as a product development program in which successive products and markets are clearly delineated. A grand or mixed strategy is a statistical decision rule for deciding which particular pure strategy the firm should select in a particular situation.

Influenced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, Ansoff (1969: 10ff.) defines strategy as a rule for making decisions pertaining to a firm’s match to its environment and set out to “enrich [the] theoretical conception of the firm”.  

Simply speaking, Ansoff added a layer on top of the traditional mechanistic economic model of “resources → logistic processes → outputs” called “management process” (see Figure 33). He then outlined three distinctive action or decision areas: administrative or tactical, operational and strategic. Administrative action related to establishing the central stem of Management and logistic processes. Operational action related to the maximisation of operational efficiency within the process parameters set by the administration. Strategic action related to establishing the organisation’s relationship to the environment and this was carried out by the ‘men at the top’. Strategy imposed operating requirements. The administrative structure must provide the climate for meeting these. The operational level then fulfills the plans provided from above (Ansoff 1965: 7). The Design School thus perceives strategy as separate from, overseeing and proceeding, organisational action in a linear-hierarchical manner. The influence of Ansoff’s divisions can be seen in texts that speak of a hierarchy of strategy from corporate to business to functional levels (Andrews 1971; Wheelan & Hunger 1990; Pearce & Robinson 1991), of a hierarchy of control from strategic to tactical to

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29 Thus, when the OED looks back at the development of Strategy as it relates to Management (its meaning in this context defined by the OED as “a plan for successful action”) it attributes its first use to Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) (“strategy is a set of rules for making decisions”), the second to a 1954 psychology journal (“a strategy is a set of personal rules”) and the third to Ansoff’s (1965) Corporate Strategy.
**FIGURE 33:** ANSOFF’S DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGY UPON THE INPUT-PROCESS-OUTPUT THEORY OF THE FIRM.  
**SOURCE:** ANSOFF “BUSINESS STRATEGY” (1969). LEVELS SUPERIMPOSED.
operational levels (Lorange, Morton & Ghoshal 1986), and of the importance of recognising the difference between strategy and tactics (Rock 1987).

SM's underlying visibility is thus the same as the Chandlerian form and the formation “enshrined” in the Ford and Carnegie reports. Indeed, even in his theoretical development, Ansoff's (1965: viii) view was obviously triangular and hierarchical, his stated aim to “synthesize and unify... into an overall analytic solving the total strategic problem of the firm [the] partial analytical insights into strategic business problems [developed] over the past ten years”. The Design School’s visibility is the panoptic view of Modernism.

Correspondingly, the Design School speaks in Modern terms. For example, that SM is termed as about the “matching” of organisation and environment assumes that these are separable objects about which the truth can be objectively known. Also, in order to master the complex whole of the SM ‘problem’ it is broken down into constituent parts. While Ansoff (1969: 14) acknowledged that a theory that was useful for analysing real world behaviour would “have to integrate and interrelate the three major decision areas” (operational, administrative and strategic), he stressed that “to reduce the theory-building task to manageable proportions”, we should begin by “study[ing] each class of decisions separately”. SM’s ‘Cartesian’ separations inspired a language that spoke of the strategic mind as separate from and above operational matter.

Despite the separation of SM above and beyond the input-process-output of operations, and his claim that the theory of the whole firm would ‘have to integrate and interrelate the three major decision areas’, after breaking the firm down, Ansoff’s modeling ultimately fell back upon the language of efficiency that was seen to underpin operations. Ansoff (1965: 31) explained early on that while firms had “traditionally and
historically" been regarded as solely economically motivated toward the purpose of increasing ‘return on investment’, and toward this ‘end’ had “developed a measurement of efficiency - profit - common and unique to [them]”, this had recently been the subject of much debate. However, having identified that the object at the operating level of a firm is always “to maximise the efficiency of the firm’s resource conversion process”, Ansoff (1965: 208), when finalising his model of the firm, concluded:

[given that] there is no general agreement on a proper philosophical basis for business objectives... our framework for formulating objectives was made adaptable to a variety of different management attitudes, so long as the underlying concept of the firm is that of an efficiency-seeking organization which meets the objectives through the mechanism of making and selling goods and/or services.

This perspective encouraged the idea that SM could be spoken of mathematically and as an engineering problem. Ansoff (1965: 5-6, 44) explained that “the strategic problem is concerned with establishing an ‘impedance match’ between the firm and its environment”, and accordingly explained that SM has generic properties that can be abstracted out of their local contexts, correlated with other generic organisational properties and used to recommend actions, once such correlations have been determined, “at 0.05 or better confidence level” (Ansoff 1991: 459).

This way of saying and seeing enables SM to neatly latch onto the established view of Management. SM is defined as the “planning, directing, organizing and controlling of a company’s strategy related decisions and actions” - the achievement of Management’s principles but at a higher level and for the long-term, so as to integrate the divisions of Modern organisations (Pearce & Robinson 1991: 3). The basis or Classical view of SM thus defines strategy by its not being administration or tactics or operations or processes. This, combined with the view of SM as about thinking and operations as

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30 An impedance match adjusts a load impedance to match the source impedance with a transformer or a network, so that maximum power is received and there is no reflection loss due to mismatch.
about doing, combined with a view of organisations as hierarchies where the further up one is the more thinking and less doing one does, meant that SM was seen as the preserve of senior managers at the top (those at the bottom lack the ability to detach themselves from everyday tasks) - and a detached, objective and logical process (Ansoff 1965: ix). The view is that SM means executives, crucially staying above the action, carrying out a rational planning process resulting in the provision of simple explicit plans for operational action (Tsoukas 1994). This view of SM enables Modern English’s need to associate terms with positive objects to be satisfied. Strategy equals a firm’s explicit long-term plans.

This view of strategy came under attack in the late 1980s. Among those opposed was Henry Mintzberg, who had gained a reputation investigating ‘what managers really did’, rather than what academics said they did or should do. He now applied his approach to SM. The view associated with what Mintzberg concluded is known as the Emergence School. This saw SM as the opposite of what the Design School prescribed.

Mintzberg’s argument was based upon his empirical research indicating that the Design School’s position was dependent on “the fallacy of detachment”, the belief that thinking and doing are separate (Mintzberg 1994a: 13-16). Managers were not rational, logical, ‘clean-sheet’ forecasters and positioners, but influenced by politics and historical or cultural patterns of traditional behaviour. Hence, Mintzberg argued that the notion that “strategy making could be reduced to a series of steps proved to be reductio ad absurdum”, that “everyday thinking almost never presents a series of steps [and] even if people tried to implement [using such steps], they would find them foreign to what they are trying to do”. In addition, Mintzberg claimed that environmental turbulence and
decision-making complexity are such that forecasting the future environment, in order to set plans to determine positioning for the future, is an impossibility. In any case, Mintzberg (1987; 1989; 1991) argued that truly creative strategies are the result of the opportunistic synthesis of different ideas and aspects rather than detached analytical thinking within a set of constructs. Thus, real SM stems from a direct knowledge of local contexts and there can be no "formal techniques" for strategy.

Consequently, Mintzberg found that the interaction between 'organisation' and 'environment' crucial to strategy does not happen between top executives and the environment. Rather, it occurs where frontline employees react to and anticipate customer needs and wants, or spot gaps and opportunities. Over time, actions may create patterns of behaviour that may filter up to be formalised into plans, but these plans did not originate at the top. Strategy happens "bottom-up" (Pascale 1984, see Figure 34).

Given the above conditions, firms must be flexible so as to take paths that unexpected opportunities may lead to. Moreover, given that "the purpose of a plan is to render things inflexible", and that "a 'flexible plan' is thus an oxymoron", planning turns out to be positively the opposite of real SM (Mintzberg 1994a: 14). Mintzberg (1991) claims that only now recognising this "points to the poverty of [Management] at the game of research".

Finding opposing schools of thought is problematic for any field seeking to develop as a Modern science (Kuhn 1962). However, this problem is overcome if an evolutionary chain can demonstrate how schools have built on one another toward a view closer to the truth. A good example of SM seeking to make sense of development in this manner is provided by Chaffè's (1985: 95-6) review. Here the un-scientific existence of
Figure 34: The Emergence School’s Alternative Vision of Strategy – Strategy actually emerges from the ‘bottom-up’. Senior managers take this strategic thinking and turn it into ‘top-down’ planning or ‘the opposite of true strategy’.
different schools is seen as due to the "evolution of the strategy construct proceed[ing] sequentially through [a] hierarchy, beginning at [a] machine level". "During the past 20 years, the strategy literature has greatly evolved. Today, in fact, it has almost arrived at the point at which it is capable of reflecting the actual level of complexity at which organizations operate". On this logic, the Emergence paradigm would come to be categorised as a superior, more representative, view of how SM really is. It was at the cutting-edge.

Mintzberg's (1987; 1988) early attempts to conceptualise an alternative view to Ansoff's incorporated planning. Here he argued that strategy happens as a potter makes a pot - with an initial plan of action, but also reacting to the particular nature of the clay and what takes form during the process to arrive at something quite different from what was originally pictured. He called for an "opening up [of] the definition of strategy" to include patterns, perspectives and ploys, in addition to planning and positioning. However, later Emergence rhetoric is wholly damning of Design. Convinced that their approach was more evolved and representing the way the world really is, the writing of Emergence theorists comes to be loaded with revolutionary zeal, thus polarising the debate.

Stacey (1990: 14-15) begins his Dynamic Strategy for the 1990s, by criticising the traditional view of strategy (analogous, writes Stacey, to a "general who deploys his forces tactically within a grand war strategy"), explaining that he: uncompromisingly rejects the conventional strategic management framework, with its trite future-mission statements and flimsy strategic plans, as unrealistic, impractical and essentially static. I... propose more appropriate ways. The real cutting edge of strategic management lies in handling the unknowable, and the cast of mind generated by the conventional approach is a positive hindrance to such an endeavour... in the dynamic business world of the 1990s it is totally inappropriate.

31 Chaffe writes before the "emergence school" has been termed as such. However, the school that she sees as most advanced, which she terms "interpretative", maps neatly onto emergence views.
Stacey’s (1990) back cover ‘blurb’ speaks of his work “rendering traditional long term-planning, the grand design, redundant”.

Hamel’s (1996) *Strategy as Revolution*, starts out arguing that “top-down and bottom-up are not the alternatives” but still conforms to a Modern way of speaking. Hamel suggests that what is required “is not a little tweak to the traditional planning process but a new philosophical foundation: strategy is revolution; everything else is tactics... strategy must be revolution”. To add weight to his claim, Hamel invokes: “Galileo [who] challenged the centrality of Earth and man in the cosmos. The American colonists [who] challenged the feudal dependencies and inherited privileges of European society. [And] Picasso and other modernists [who] challenged representational art”. Hamel tells us that we must “cast off industrial conventions” and presents an instructive dichotomy. In “Column A” is the old approach to strategy that must be overcome: “Ritualistic, Reductionist, Extrapolative, Positioning, Elitist, Easy”; while “Column B” outlines the new way (or the opposite of the old way): “Inquisitive, Expansive, Prescient, Inventing, Inclusive, Demanding”. “The essential problem in organizations today”, concludes Hamel (1996: 71), “is a failure to distinguish planning from strategizing”.

This echoes Mintzberg’s (1994a: 19) own later conclusions, that “strategic planning has never been strategy making” and that “[u]ltimately the term ‘strategic planning’ has proved itself to be something of an oxymoron”. Indeed, Mintzberg’s (1994b: 1) book, entitled *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, begins by stating that this “history book of sorts... trace[s] the story of that concept [strategic planning] from its origins around 1965 through its rise to prominence and its subsequent fall”.

Despite these refutations, Design was not overthrown and consigned to history. It held its ground. Ansoff (1994: 31) criticised Mintzberg’s use of single case studies,
claiming that they made it “difficult for Henry to claim universal validity for his emerging strategy model”. Mintzberg’s descriptions of the environment as an unpredictable force were met with Ansoff’s (1991: 455) claim that his: “cryptic statements beg all kinds of questions: whose environment is being discussed; what kind of influence does the force exert on organizations; under what circumstances is it exhorted; what impact does it have on strategic behavior, etc.”. Moreover, Ansoff (1994: 31) compared Mintzberg’s notion that planners cannot manage complexity to “a child’s perception of the adult world”. For a descriptive statement to be valid, Ansoff (1991: 455-6; 1994: 31) remarked, “it must be an accurate observation of reality”, and the Design School’s views hold up because his studies show that “modern versions of planning are alive and well”. Further, his (1991: 459) tests continue to prove that: “[t]he levels of success in organizations which are aligned with the environment were substantially higher than in organizations that were out of alignment”.

More recently, Michael Porter (1996) has entered the fray in his What is Strategy?, which argues for a “reconnection” with the classical assumptions. The “new [Emergence school] dogma” has, according to Porter, short-sightedly rejected positioning - “once the heart of strategy”. This has led to a number of problems, the root of which is “the failure to distinguish between operational effectiveness and strategy” and a subsequent lack of focus on real strategy, due to the mistaken belief that strategy happens “further down” organisations. “Operational effectiveness”, writes Porter (Ansoff termed it “operational efficiency”), relates to “practices that allow a company to better utilise its inputs”. This should be taken as a given from a strategic point-of-view.32 Why SM must

32 Porter levels a good deal of the blame for this distraction on the recent emphasis on the success of Japanese companies. In a clear rejection of Hamel and Prahalad’s (1989) and others’ attempts at “remaking strategy” by incorporating the more Eastern or Japanese conception of strategy as about “intent”, Porter tells us that Japanese
be about positioning, and not, for example, about patterns, is not justified by Porter, unless one counts statements such as “fit is one of the oldest ideas in strategy” or even “the essence of strategy”, and that those at lower levels of the organisation cannot do strategy because they lack the “perspective”, or “vision of the whole”.

Thus, we come to what is seen as the ‘what is strategy?’ crisis. As has likely been recognised, this crisis, the stalemate between Emergence and Design, is founded on the Modernist views that SM’s history associates itself with. The two schools reflect two of the great Modern debates: that between an existentialism that sees humans as free to determine their position and a structuralism that sees our paths as shaped by that which goes before us; and that between a rationalism that looks to the logical mind for best approaches and an empiricism that looks to ‘matter’ instead. In addition, the idea that there should only be one prevailing school of thought; the idea that there can only be one view at the cutting edge; the notion that this school is the one that most closely represents reality; and, the idea that reality must be represented and understood without logical contradiction, have seen the debate polarise into an either/or choice as to whether SM is positively about planning, or positively not. Furthermore, this either/or is seen in terms of Modernism’s triangular hierarchy. For the Design School strategy happens “top-down”. The Emergence School, by unquestioningly adopting the accepted foundations of SM, is obliged to counter this in like-minded language. Consequently, for them, strategy happens from the bottom of the triangle up. In keeping with Management’s historical understanding of organisation and the Business School’s standardised curricula (as a leading SM guru explained, “the establishment of Business Schools provided the basis for companies in actual fact “rarely have strategies”. This is because, in Porter’s (1996) own words, “Japanese companies rarely develop... strategic positions of the kind discussed in this article”.  

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the education of strategic managers and the divisionalized structure of organizations provided the form for them to work within" (Andrews 1969)), the view of the triangle still remains as the shape of organisation. A different approach to the history of SM would likely not have encouraged the emanation of a debate in these terms. By re-tracing the etymology of strategy we may see alternative ‘origins’ and, consequently, ways of thinking differently.

The word ‘strategy’ derives from the Athenian position of strategos, a title coined in conjunction with the reforms of Kleisthenes of 508BC. Kleisthenes instituted ten new tribal divisions as military and political sub-units of Athens. Each was to be commanded by an elected strategos. Kleisthenes developed the title by compounding stratos, which meant an army spreading out over ground (in this way stratos is allied to stratum), and agein, ‘to lead’. Its advent paralleled increasing military complexity. Warfare had developed to a point where sides increasingly relied upon the connection of many units fighting either in close formation or on several different fronts, depending on particular circumstances. The proliferation of naval forces, mercenaries and political alliances at this time further multiplied the variables that commanders had to consider. The ten incumbent strategoi formed a council that made policy recommendations to the general assembly when resident in Athens and was given command of the armed forces when these were abroad.

Hence, the organisational visibility influencing the conception of strategy incorporated hierarchical elements, as it was primarily associated with leadership, but it was at once different from the Modern triangular view. Strategy here was about detached long-term planning for the whole corporation. However, as the frontlines were believed to
be the best place from which to read the mood of events, to implement plans or to adapt and change plans as events unfolded, Strategoi were expected to be present in the thick of battle (Xenophon (Mem. 3.6) described the most important attribute for an aspiring strategos simply as "to know the business which you propose to carry out"). Thus, strategy also happened at the front. Furthermore, given that the organisational form operated on many different fronts at once, depending on particular circumstances, strategy here 'spread out' according to the particular form that the organisation took at a particular point in time. Hence, strategy occurred, for the Greeks, at all levels and parts of what we might see as a Modern organisational hierarchy as a blend of what we call strategy, tactics and operations (Whitehead 1986; Cummings & Brocklesby 1993). However, it is perhaps more correct to say that they operated with a visibility more like that expressed in Chapter 3 (pg. 88) than the Modern triangle.

For the Athenians, given this formation and a way of thinking that did not detach thinking from doing or chose between structuralism and existentialism or differentiate strategy, tactics and operations, strategy was about both Design and Emergence.

The Ancients zealously discussed what made a great strategos. For the Athenians, it lay in appreciating the paradoxes of strategy. In the ability to meld past, present and future. In the ability to oscillate between detached simplistic plans and practical
expedients and opportunities on particular fronts, and being able to go in any direction as
opportunities emerged. In this way, strategy is about planning, forecasting and
positioning (such aspects are helpful to provide impetus, coherence and understanding)
and about breaking plans, opportunism, emergence, patterns, ploys and expediency
(which are helpful given that there is always some chaos, some void in understanding that
makes the future impossible to forecast in detail). Indeed, it is this chaos, this lack of
predictability, that enables those with impetus to change tack, subject themselves to
different elements and enable innovative strategies to spring. Strategic ability came from
an awareness that human travels are shaped both by the order of things, the actions that
one's traditions and experiences inspire from within (to paraphrase Aristotle's
Metaphysics 1075a) and an ability to shuttle from ordered detachment to chaotic reality,
and from traditional frame to frame as need be in one's particular strategy making
process. Not surprisingly, given this visibility (clearly based on an appreciation of metis
- Plutarch Them. 2), the most common metaphor used by the Greeks to describe a skillful
strategist was a kubernetes, the helmsperson on fighting ships that surfed inshore
currents. This view encouraged an appreciation of how strategy was not about starting
with a 'clean-sheet', but about working to incorporate corporate direction while working
with prevailing patterns and conditions.

Hence, the Ancient's definitions of the work of the strategoi were suitably
'ample', and to a Modern way of thinking often implausible. Aineias' 4th century BC
How to Survive Under Siege, saw strategy broadly as about exploring how "human ability
and other resources might deployed to best advantage" (Whitehead 1990: 17). His
thinking is expanded on by Frontinus (Strat. I) who defined strategy as "everything
achieved by a commander, be it characterised by foresight, advantage, enterprise, or
resolution". However, perhaps the best known description of what it took to be a great strategist in this age comes from Xenophon (Mem. 3.1). The strategist, he claimed:

must be ingenious, energetic, careful, full of stamina and presence of mind, loving and tough, straightforward and crafty, alert and deceptive, ready to gamble everything and wishing to have everything, generous and greedy, trusting and suspicious.

The Ancients' approach to educating strategoi followed this type of 'ill-defined' thinking. They recognised that there was no transferable universally prescriptive and logically consistent approach that could be developed to represent reality (cf. Alexander's statement to Aristotle on how he could never say what he would certainly do in a particular situation until that situation arrived (see Chapter 3); Themistocles' greatness was similarly said to simply be due to his ability to "do precisely the right thing at precisely the right moment" rather than any particular technique (Thucydides 1.138)). Consequently, the Greeks favoured story-telling as a means of "refreshing the vision" and firing each strategists unique dasein without "forming his character by mere imitation" as expressed by Plutarch in Chapter 3 (pg. 77). Perhaps the greatest stories were those of Pericles.

Pericles attributed his success to his ability "to see what must be done and be able to explain it in such a way that people could understand what this meant for them" (Pericles, in Kagan 1991: 9; Thucydides 2.60). Indeed, ancient historians claim that the most striking proof of Pericles' greatness lay in his ability to persuade the sovereign Athenian citizenry to adopt strategies from above that on first glance seem so hard to grasp (Delbruck 1975). (Or, in Stacey's dismissive terms, reducing complex dynamic circumstances into "trite future-mission statements" and "flimsy strategic plans"). However, in so doing, Pericles was a master at making people see an organisation's past,
present and future as intertwined rather than designing an ideal future as if upon a clean slate, a skill perhaps most obviously manifest in his well-known ‘funeral oration’ (Thucydides 2.35-46). Hence, Plutarch (Per. 15, 33) often speaks of Pericles’ “using people’s hopes and fears as if they were rudders”, like a great *kubernetes*.

Correspondingly, Pericles was renowned for being methodical in his “making plans and then going forward” (Delbruck 1975; Plutarch Per. 18) and being unimpressed by placing faith in fortune, luck and “reckless impulses” (Plutarch Per. 10), but he was also regarded for recognising the disadvantages of following plans. Thus, Pericles was just as renowned for his recognition that competition creates crucial situations that must be exploited with bold courage (Plutarch Per. 10, 20), his unpredictability (Frontinus *Strat.* 5.10) and for the maxim “opportunity waits for no man” (Thucydides 1.142). This preparedness to disregard plans as much as make them, appears to have been based on a number of assumptions. On the one hand, goals made in advance of events could never be realised exactly, and that “there is often no more logic in the course of events than there is in the plans of men, this is why we blame our luck when things happen in ways that we did not expect” (in Thucydides 1.120, 1.140). On the other, adherence to plans made prior to action could stifle the potential gains provided by the sort of opportunistic creativity that can only occur as events, problems and contingencies unfold (as Thucydides (2.64) records “To face calamity with a mind as unclouded [by preconceived plans] as may be, and quickly to react against it - that, in a city and in an individual, is real strength”). It seems that strategy, for the Ancient Greeks, was about the coming together of Design and Emergence, in the same way that *metis* required working with both *kosmos* and *chaos*.

Ancient views of strategy such as these could well ‘refresh the vision’ of SM.
However, hemmed in by a Modernist historical gaze, SM now seems unable to recognise alternative aspects like those of the Greeks. Ansoff (1965: 118ff.) notes strategy's older military background, but only because he claims this provides the crucial distinction between strategy and tactics. Otherwise he appears to dismiss this background as simplistic. In a paper describing what he believed to be the true nature of SM, an approach that at this point actually shared much with the Ancient Greeks' broader view of the concept, Mintzberg (1987) bemoans strategy's Greek military origins as encouraging the view of SM as an exercise in detachment and rational planning (it seems that Mintzberg has assumed Ancient military thinking to just be a more basic form of Modern military thinking). Stacey (1990) is also dismissive of strategy's military associations as he sees them as promoting a top-down Design approach.

Typically when SM 'does history', it does so in such a way as to see only that which relates to the latter understanding. Ghemawat (1999), for example, prefaced his "Origins of Strategy" chapter with quotations from Barnard and Chandler, stating that a historical perspective is important to provide a stable basis in an environment where "a rash of manifestos continue to emerge that purport to redefine the term", and begins:

"Strategy" is a term that can be traced back to the ancient Greeks, who used it to mean a chief magistrate or military commander-in-chief. Over the next two millennia, refinements of the concept of strategy continued to focus on military interpretations. Carl von Clausewitz's attempted synthesis in the first half of the nineteenth century is a particularly notable example: He wrote that whereas "tactics... [involve] the use of armed forces in the engagement, strategy [is] the use of engagements for the object of the war." (underlining added).

As we have seen, for the Greeks strategy was conceived quite differently from the picture that Ghemawat typically promotes. However, and unfortunately, Ansoff, Mintzberg and other 20th century strategists' views of the past are coloured by a particularly Modern perspective. A view that is shaped by a particularly Modern
understanding of the language involved. It is as if our Modern visibility has encapsulated
strategy in such a way as to preclude us from recognising the pre-Modern as anything
other than a simple precursor to the Modern form. A further etymological review may
illustrate the singularity of view that SM applies.

When *strategoi* emerged into English in the 15th century as *strategem*, it still
meant either any "operation or act of generalship", or any act in "devising expedients,
artifice or cunning" in keeping with an Ancient vista. By the middle of the 17th century,
Boyle *(OR)* will still note that "strategems are as Lawful as Expedient". However, as the
word *strategy* arises in the middle of the 19th century the OED makes it clear that it
emerges as "distinguished from tactics, which is the art of handling forces in battle or in
the immediate presence of the enemy". As the shift takes place, there is some ambiguity
of meaning. However, by the turn of the century, what strategy is becomes clearly
established as relating to the thinking and planning that goes on "before hostile armies or
fleets are brought into *contact* (a word which perhaps better than any other indicates the
dividing line between tactics and strategy)" *(Mahan 1889)*. By 1901, Hornung found it
remarkable that "Raffles was both strategian and tactician, [because] we all now know the
difference between the two". 34

Consequently, we may relate the changes in the meaning of strategy over the past
three centuries to two specific temporal events. Firstly, Modernity's particular separation

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33 For example, James *(1810)* tells us that "strategy, something done out of the sight of the enemy, differs materially
from *tactic*; the latter belonging to the mechanical movement of bodies, set in motion by the former", while Gilbert
*(1825)* explains that it relates to "bringing the mass of one's forces as rapidly as possible on the decisive point the line
of operation" and MacDougall *(1856)* writes that "every point on the theatre of war is a strategical point".

34 This distinction between strategy and tactics is made by the Ancient Chinese writer Sun Tzu, who noted *(in Hamel
& Prahalad 1989)* that: "all men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of
which great victory is evolved". Despite their lack of knowledge of the Greek's approach to strategy, Modern SM
gurus gladly associate with Sun Tzu.
of mind and body, thinking and doing, a separation that became commonplace in the West as the words linking back to *strategos* shifted emphasis. Secondly, technological developments and the increasing size of military organisations. Weapons and information technology had increasingly enabled commanders to see the advantages of removing themselves from the operations of war outweighing those of being at the frontline, enabling *thinking* and *planning* to be increasingly removed from *doing* or *action*. This, combined with the increasing size of armies, promoted hierarchical, bureaucratic military organisations requiring mechanistic universal rules and procedures, to ensure control and co-ordination. As labour was specialised and divided, strategy became a top management task associated with planning in advance of action, differentiated from the tactics and operations conceived as taking place further down the hierarchy, toward the frontline. Hence, the etymological change of meaning is dependent on the emergence of Modernism’s particular triangular-hierarchical way of viewing and it is this way of viewing that makes it difficult for SM to recognise the Ancient’s different approach unless it can be made to fit a stream of development that flows directly to present concepts (hence, even if SM did recognise the Ancient views described above it would likely not see them as ‘proper strategy’). SM, thus formed, lacks the ability to recognise any other classicisms apart from Modern ways of speaking and seeing.

This seems an unfortunate limit. Especially as more recent technological trends are making the Chandlerian form, upon which this singular view of SM is based, much less of a given. For example, Evans and Wurster (1997) see current developments in information technology driving a shift from hierarchy to ‘hyperarchy’ (see Figure 35). If we assume a world where organisations and environments can be seen in a rhizomatic form as easily as a triangle, a world where there is no clear-cut unitary organisational
FIGURE 35: FROM HIERARCHY TO HYPERARCHY,
object (indeed with this view the distinction between firm and environment, that much Modern SM is based upon, becomes increasingly blurry), then Ancient ways of seeing strategy may be at least as insightful as following Management’s Modern gaze.

In any case, this reframing of SM’s history enables our Modern vision to be refreshed and relativised, increasing the likelihood of thinking differently. It could be argued that recent years have seen some theorists arrive at a vision uncannily similar to the Athenians without undertaking a historical revision (e.g., Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; de Wit & Meyer 1998; Mintzberg 1998; Pascale 1996: Pascale’s conception of “strategic agility” is effectively metis). However, such an exercise in historical awareness may at least make us question why fifteen years were spent debating whether strategy was planning or emergence? It may also prevent us placing these theorists at the ‘cutting-edge’. For setting them up in this way would likely only create another either-or Modern representational battle, as was the case when Emergence was conceptualised as above Design. The pre-Modern view explored here may add to the Modern triangular perspective. It should not dismiss it. Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari might say, those concerned with strategy today still have the traditional triangles and trees in their heads. It would be foolhardy to not recognise the worth and effect of these Modern forms, not as the only tools but as useful tools among many.
II. The limits of business ethics

It is necessary to move beyond a preoccupation with the development and implementation of codes of conduct if the theory and practice of business ethics is not to be brought into disrepute. Kjonstad and Willmott, Business Ethics: Restrictive or Empowering? (1995).

A general re-emergence of concern in ethics (Harvey 1990), and the growth and spread of Management over the past three decades, have combined to fuel a new field of study: Business Ethics (BE). It is a subject that many have hoped would increasingly influence organisation’s strategic initiatives (Donaldson 1982; De George 1986). However, it is claimed, by writers such as Kjonstad and Willmott, that this has not been the case.

If one looks far enough two approaches to ethics are discernible: "codes of behaviour" and "forms of subjectification" (Johnson 1996: 30). Codes of behaviour refer to collective rules of conduct that exist over and above actors, meta-narratives in other words. These may be used to prove independent actions right or wrong and thus provide the means to channel individual behaviour in a common, normal or ideal direction. Forms of subjectification refer to individuals constituting or rejuvenating themselves as subjects of moral conduct, through the development of relationships for self-examination and according to self-delineated, rather than externally imposed, criteria (Gardiner 1996: 28). These two modes may be alternatively seen as "deontic" and "aretaic" (Werhane & Freeman 1997: 53-6). Deontic from the Greek deos, meaning "duty", referring to approaches that view ethical questions with appeal to some external code of rights and responsibilities toward others. Aretaic, from the Greek arete, meaning virtue or personal excellence (Urmson 1988). Systems of morality generally comprise both modes, but in some instances the emphasis is on the former, in others it is on the latter.

However, The Economist's (1994) encyclopedic review of strategy tells us that
ethics is about the “question of what is right and wrong in everyday behaviour” and that BE is subsequently about “the codes of behaviour over and above this that professional and business people agree among themselves constitute the proper way to deal with the general public and each other”. The Blackwell Encylopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics (Werhane & Freeman 1997: 51) explains that what managers need from BE is “an orderly way to think through the moral implications of a policy decision - a perspective and a language for appraising the alternatives available from an ethical point of view”, or an objective view above particular problems. This demand has been met by the publication of works such as Manley’s (1991) Executive Handbook of Model Business Codes. BE is thus seen as about codifying principles, about the study and development of collective charters that provide rules enforceable by independent bodies for individual business people, organisations, industries, and professions to act according to. Codes that reassure existing or prospective suppliers, customers, employees and regulators that they are dealing with a company that can be trusted by the ‘outside world’ to operate according to predetermined principles (Waters et al. 1992; Robertson & Schlegelmilch 1993). Codes that provide routinised means of rationalising areas identified as potentially problematic and managing or restricting behaviour accordingly. This is now most obviously manifest in what is called ‘stakeholder theory’, whereby an organisation’s duties to those identified as having a stake in their future development are listed (Freeman 1984; Hill & Jones 1992).

BE has emerged as an “industry largely devoted to codifying what is ‘ethical’” (Kjonstad & Willmott 1995: 445). Ethics here is nothing to do with arete or subjectification. Indeed, we are told by prominent texts that subjects cannot “create their [own] morality” (Beauchamp & Bowie 1993). Which brings us to the crisis that the
quotation that began this section referred to. BE is all about general codes. That these codes are seen by most companies to have little practical application with respect to the development of individual strategy is bringing the field into disrepute. Aretaic approaches might offer some means of thinking differently, but BE does not recognise them as part of its domain. The emergence of this problem, and a way of thinking otherwise, may be gained by reflecting on the formation of BE’s historical origins and influences.

Blackwell’s Encyclopedia tells us that while the “field of business ethics is at least as old as commerce itself... in the modern period [and it is from here that their discussion begins] we can date it from the industrial revolution”. A further entry situates another origin at that crucial Management juncture of the 1950s and 1960s “with Baumhart’s revealing 1961 study”. Replicating this period’s prevailing view of organisations, we find that Baumhart’s was the first study that “showed that ethical issues and problems were [important because they were] found in every industry, in most companies, and on all levels of the managerial pyramid”. BE is another aspect of Management enclosed within a Modern way of seeing by its assumed heritage.

In Modernity, the word moral is usually only used pertaining to what is generally right and wrong, what is good conduct and what is bad, and ethics defined as the science, study, or philosophy of morals, or “about how we ought to live”, with an emphasis on the collective ‘we’ (Singer 1994: 2). It has been about developing codes with the capacity to “adjust to every possible case and to embrace every area of behaviour”, toward the provision of general ends seen as so crucial in Modernity (Thacker 1993: 14). It is about common codes appealing to one general view of what it is to be moral (hence Migliore and Martin’s and McDonald and Gandz’s culture indexes had no difficulty in using
“Ethics” and “Moral Integrity” as objective measurement dimensions – see Chapter 7). It is no surprise that the establishment of BE, given its historical appreciation, is seen to have “piggybacked” upon this “post-Enlightenment moral tradition” (Starling 1997: 9).

This tradition is largely shaped by the triangular-hierarchical way of seeing the world and the assumptions that contribute to it. As described in Chapter 4, Modernism solved the problem of the entry of the individual into the field of knowledge by establishing universal backdrops or measures and tableau comprising general categories. It put difficult to measure individual characteristics of particular humans to one side, seeing them as secondary to the judgment and treatment processes. It abstracted, or triangulated out, essential human norms. It then used these essences to establish meta-narratives, objective ways of looking down upon particular cases from atop the triangle against a universal backdrop. Humans were thus separate entities, but subject to common underlying or over-riding norms. These steps made it possible to treat humans as any other scientific object, and to develop general theories. Codes of normal, general or ideal behaviour were greatly encouraged by these developments.

Moreover, given Modernism’s dismissal of the influence of ‘surface’ traditions and the belief in liberty and equality, general codes of conduct were a necessary component for sustaining Modernity. Without recourse to the guidance of tradition, there had to emerge a belief in some over-riding restrictions or rules of practice, otherwise chaos, detrimental to progress and production, would have ensued. Ethical codes were deemed necessary to adjudicate between rival ‘self-interested’ individualistic claims and to ensure stability. In addition, while the new sciences of the individual and the bureaucracies that developed them added to the cause of liberty (by enabling emancipatory knowledge), there was at once a tension between the deterministic
application of analytical frameworks based on objective human norms and a belief in an individual’s right to control his or her own destiny. Hence, in addition to codes of normality, codes of practice outlining patients rights, doctors responsibilities, criminals rights and so forth, became commonplace in the 18th and 19th century. These would order the tension created by the juxtaposition of Cartesianism and humanism against liberal individualism, or ensure the latter given the former.

In addition, the bureaucratisation of the West in the 18th and 19th centuries was matched by optimism with regard to the creation of a science of ethics. Medical Science founded its objective tableau upon the Modern bureaucratic hospital and the Modern legal system drew on the Modern prison. A whole society founded on similar principles - where individual behaviour could be isolated and judged against general procedures, where the common norms or ideals for all operations in society could be specified in advance - could support a ‘science’ of ethics. Modernism’s triangular way of seeing, with objective norms and a vantage point seen as above particular cases, encouraged thinking of ethics as about the perfection of general codes as opposed to arete. Indeed, from a Modernist perspective, with its Christian influence and lack of appreciation of the individual following his own telos, aretaic approaches were seen as selfish and unethical. BE followed suit.

Unable to determine a universal moral code, Modernism eventually drew upon utilitarianism, economics and efficiency to give it a way of speaking with recourse to a supposed objective meta-narrative or end. And, given its heritage, BE in turn draws from the popular ethical languages of the industrial age to articulate ethics. Stakeholder theory is based on the idea of maximising the utility of all concerned. In “interest-based
reasoning”, a branch of deontism and the “most popular and highly developed approach” to BE, we find that “moral common sense is... disciplined by a single dominant objective: maximising net expectable utility”; and that this generally “manifests itself as a commitment to the social value of market forces” (Werhane & Freeman 1997: 55).

Primeaux and Stieber’s work (1994; 1995; 1997a, 1997b; Stieber & Primeaux 1991; Primeaux 1997) appears exemplary in this regard. They advocate identifying the “principles of business itself” as firm foundations upon which “the ethics of business should be drawn”. These “principles” turn out to be “defined in terms of neo-classical economics”, because “the firm’s ethics should be economically determined” (Primeaux & Stieber 1994: 289; 1997b). Unsurprisingly, the principles or foundations of BE turn out to be: “economic efficiency”, “profit maximization” and “opportunity cost”. Consequently, to find a “common ethical language”, Primeaux and Stieber argue that we must understand profit “as a means of representing human achievement and social good”, consider how “profit can be ethically maximized”, and define the “inherent ethical absolutes of business in terms of economic efficiency”. Thus we may situate “ethical decision making for business within opportunity-cost decision making”, and “reserve judgment, in the final analysis, to the market”. Or, in other words, “accept profit maximization and the efficiencies of profit maximization as the primary standard of judgment”. By this logic, Primeaux and Stieber claim that inefficiencies are unethical because they violate the principles of good business (“When business men and women profit maximize, i.e., allocate resources efficiently, people have more of the things they want, and that is good. When they do not profit maximize, i.e., allocate scarce resources inefficiently, people have less of the things they want and that is bad - Primeaux & Stieber 1994: 289). Furthermore, despite an avowal of religious ethical principles in
favour of the objective foundations of "business itself" they, like Benjamin Franklin (see Chapter 4), are not shy of giving their views credence via determining the religious origins of their principles:

The origins of profit maximization, with its own ethical considerations and its own tenets, originated in antiquity. When Adam and Eve were evicted from the Garden of Eden they discovered how once upon a time, in illo tempore, inside the garden they had limited resources. They could have anything they wanted. Evicted from the garden they discovered that resources were scarce and that survival and prosperity demanded efficient management of these scarce resources. Because they survived it is safe to assume that they had learned the basic tenets of profit maximization (Primeaux & Stieber 1994: 289).

BE's historical understanding has thus set it on a path where it is seen as the provision of general codes to be applied from above and spoken in the Modern terms of maximising 'profit', the 'utility of all concerned' or 'efficiency'. Unfortunately, BE, thus formed, offers very little practical guidance to organisations and those within them with regard to developing strategy. Firstly, Primeaux and Stieber's approach takes us back to the micro-economic theory of the firm that Ansoff sought to overcome. It offers nothing other than common assumptions about the way that capitalist economies work. Secondly, the proliferation of information technology, mobile populations, multi-national corporations and so on, has brought about an environment where different cultures and traditions wash across and relativise one another, resulting in the disintegration of the homogeneous socio-cultural canvas and the triangulation of objective views that Modernity strived for and with which codes work best (Gardiner 1996). In other words, a Postmodern condition of growing incredulity toward meta-narratives (MacIntyre 1981). In keeping, many now doubt the notion of general best strategies that can satisfy all, and see stakeholder ethics as "fundamentally misguided [and] incapable of providing better governance" (Steinberg 1997). The increasing acceptance of incommensurably of
diverging interests and the recognition that measuring stakeholder utility is impossible, makes balancing stakeholder benefit an unworkable and ultimately frustrating objective.

At a general level, this situation in BE is indicative of calls encouraging a search for alternatives to “metaphysical ethics, to the ethics of rules, to the foundationalist project” (Caputo 1989: 55). Its fate is quite similar to that of Modern art, as described by Eco in Chapter 5. Many now regard the codes that BE produces as so general, bland and devoid of meaning for particular organisations, as to be little use as guides to practical action. The search for the underlying ethical essences has resulted in blank white canvas.

It would seem that the one obvious way of thinking differently about BE would be to explore aretaic approaches. That BE has refrained from doing so to any meaningful extent is, once again, due largely to its historical understanding of itself ruling alternative visibilities out-of-bounds. In keeping with Modernity's dismissal of an 'internal' self-generated ethics, Blackwell's entry on MacIntyre's promotion of an Aristotelian virtue approach explains that:

> It is not clear... that any kind of business could fit the virtue model developed in MacIntyre. He distinguishes between the internal and external good of practices. The virtues help us to achieve the internal good of a practice (e.g., effective teaching in academia); external goods such as wealth, inhibit the development of those virtues. Business necessarily involves a focus on the external good of wealth, and so precludes the virtues.

However, if we recognise these boundaries as historical and contingent, and consequently respect them less, we may see fruitful avenues for re-thinking. The remainder of this section explores an approach beyond the Modern predilection toward codes by drawing upon the Ancient Greek's forms of subjectivication, as seen by Aristotle, Foucault's last histories, Nietzsche's aesthetic notions and Deleuze's interpretation of Foucault's last works.
For the Ancient Greeks, the aspiration to live a virtuous life was characterised by a search for an individual ‘ethics of existence’, or “an effort to affirm one’s liberty and to give one’s own life a certain form in which one could recognize oneself, be recognized by others, and in which even posterity could find an example” (Foucault 1989: 311). This predilection may be shown via a number of particular examples. However, it is most clearly expressed in the Athenian’s most popular saying, *gnwrei seauton*: ‘know thyself’.

Aristotle’s teleological ethics (involving the three elements of untutored human nature, the individual-as-they-could-be-if-they-realised-their-*telos*, and the moral precepts that allow one to pass from one to the other) was well suited to such a world view. Once one was aware of their particular *telos* (an awareness that could only come from self-reflection on one’s tradition and place in one’s world), ‘is’ could imply ‘ought’, and moral statements could be statements of fact. By the same token, ‘knowing thyself’, would enable one to know what one must do in order to be true to one’s self - one’s tradition and community of relationships. (Of course, all of this hinges upon the second of the Aristotelian elements’ individualistic and custom-shaped nature, precisely what the Modern human sciences sought to be above - thus, by contrast, Modernity would make knowing one’s condition not about self-reflection, but the preserve of objective experts.) Consequently, from an Aristotelian perspective, excellence or vice could not be adequately specified independent of circumstances. Principles could only be related to specific situations by means of the sort of perception born of a *metis* that comes from a

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35 For example, Epicurus’ view that it was never too early or too late to occupy “oneself with one’s self”, for this is what philosophizing should be. The Therapeutae’s practices revolving around their principle task of “the concern for oneself”. Socrates’ claim that one of his central tasks as a philosopher was to make sure citizen’s occupied themselves with themselves, which would at once lead them to concern themselves with their city by making them conceive of the way they related to their community. And, Socrates’ famous self-defence (Plato *Apol. 29e*) via the claim that his prosecutors were “not ashamed to care for the acquisition of wealth and for reputation and honour”, but did not concern themselves with themselves, or the “wisdom, truth and the perfection” of one’s self.
familiarity with analogous situations, and a reflective understanding of one’s telos. We cannot simply follow general abstract moral dictates, as different situations and different communities might reasonably support different values.

Thus, unlike Modern utilitarians, Aristotle rejected the notion of the commensurability of all goods. Unlike Modern economists, Aristotle did not presuppose psychological egoism as a general underpinning. Unlike Modern emotivists, Aristotle did not identify all happiness with the fulfillment of desire. Aristotle saw no general essence that could be the starting point for a universal code. Indeed, perhaps the most obvious absence from Aristotle’s Ethics for a Modern reader is that there is little mention of rules. For Aristotle, prudence and individual metis had to play “an indispensable role in the life of the virtuous man which it does not and could not have in, for example, the life of the merely law-abiding or rule-abiding man” (MacIntyre 1981: 144).

Given this view, Aristotle used stories of virtuous people making particular decisions in his ethical works rather than general prescriptions. Moral education came, as from Plutarch, by hearing the stories of others who left a good example, connecting these examples to one’s own experiences and traditions, and learning not by imitation but by inspiration and comparison (Tsoukas & Cummings 1997). On this view, one’s life-task was to make his or her story or journey as good or pleasing to the eye as it could be through the everyday act of living, in order to enable a happy ending and the leaving of good memories (Herodotus 1.32).

It was to this type of ethics that Foucault turned in his last works. In The History of Sexuality - Vol. 1, Foucault highlighted how ethical relations in the Modern West were almost exclusively defined in terms of codes, and how these codes were intertwined with
prevailing structures of power, structures that subject people to unrecognised, and not necessarily fundamental, normalising pressures. To be good was to passively accept the dictates of a general morality, unwitting internalise extant norms, ideals and values and, hence, be normalised and integrated into a general apparatus of power/knowledge (Gardiner 1996). This brought Foucault into contact with the study of ethics and the way in which humans constitute themselves as subjects.

In his works after Volume 1, Foucault (1991) sought to question this "search for a form of morality acceptable to everybody, in the sense that everybody should submit to it". He found that the forms of experience and subjectivity that human beings claim to have are possible only if we are capable of developing what Foucault (1985: 334-8) termed a "modality of relation to self". Such a modality "constitutes human beings as social and juridical subjects; it is what establishes the relation with oneself and with others, and constitutes the human being as an ethical subject". Adopting a Nietzschean opposition between aesthetic forms of subjectification and general moral codes, Foucault saw two distinct modalities of ethical constitution of the self retrievable today: one could either judge, define, and shape the self according to external meta-narrative codes: or according to some individual aesthetic or sense of style.

Foucault was motivated to explore this latter means by his overarching concern for thinking differently, and by his view that our time was witnessing a collapse of the moral authority of formal codes. This gave the individual a heightened moral authority, and decisions involving ethical dilemmas and choices a more immediate and personal relevance (Gardiner 1996). With the "idea of a morality as obedience to a code of rules... now disappearing", and with the Postmodern view that an essential self may not be a natural given to us, "only one practical consequence" lay open - we had to "respond
[with] an aesthetics of existence... to create ourselves as a work of art" (Foucault 1989: 311). “One this is needful”, wrote Foucault (in Rabinow 1984: 342):

to ‘give style’ to one’s character - a great and rare art. It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason, and even weakness delights the eye... through long practice and daily work at it.

However, the Western world had lost touch with forms of aesthetic self-subjectivication that may have provided a useful spur for thinking like this. Foucault (in Rabinow 1984: 350) noted that:

art has become something which is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life. Th[is] art is [now] something which is specialized or which is done by experts who are artists, [but c]ouldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life?

Like Nietzsche, Foucault (1985: 12) argued that such “arts of existence” had lost importance as Christianity and then Modernism took hold. Modernity, with its humanistic focus on commonality emphasising the downplaying of the difference of the self, could only equate a self-aesthetics with self-absorption, self-centredness and irrationality. His own times’ lack of touch with aesthetic self-subjectification led Foucault (1989) to look elsewhere. A particularly important moment for his inquiry appeared to be the Greek “discovery” of the doubling or relation with oneself and the nurturing of this relationship (Deleuze 1988: 101-2). After the discovery of the relation with oneself and before the Christian beginnings of the path to Modernity, how had personal regimens of truth been elaborated? Foucault’s (1985; 1986) last two books set out to explore modes of subjectivication present in Ancient Western societies, as a way of “thinking differently” and challenging the dominance of proscriptive moral codes.

Foucault found that the lack of normalising rule-codes in Ancient times enabled
greater latitude with regard to ethical subjectification. He wrote of the Stoics that:

I don’t think one can find any normalization in [their] ethics [because] the principal aim... was an aesthetic one. First, this kind of ethics was only a problem of personal choice [and t]he reason for making this choice was the will to live a beautiful life... to leave to others memories of a beautiful existence.

Of the Cynics, Foucault noted that for them a “person is nothing else but his relation to truth”, and that this takes “shape or is given form” only in a particular “life”. Here the good could only be embodied - never be handed down in the form of commandment, prohibition, or law (Foucault, in Miller 1993: 345, 360-1). Foucault (1985: 12; 1986) termed what he found instead of a dominance of codes, an “aesthetics of existence”. In contrast to an approach to ethics that provoked the self to define itself in terms of a system of rules posited as universal, this was an attitude that enjoined a commitment to the elaboration of an “oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria”, that encouraged the self to see the development of a unique personality as the telos of its own individual existence (Foucault 1985: 10). Hence Foucault’s liking for the term self-aesthetics, as it implied that standards for ethical behaviour were not located in some abstract ideal of reason or a conception of collective well-being, but in a pragmatic, narrative and idiosyncratic interpretation of attractiveness. The individual would seek the satisfaction of a good life by subjecting one’s self to a process of shaping and re-creating according to personal standards.

It is important to note that this self-focus was not, for the Greeks, ‘selfish’ as Modernism might conceive it so. The individual always implied a series of relationships - with friends, family, work-mates, and the community at large - and the traditions

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36 Although he rejected the notion, unlike Nietzsche, of a return to an archaic “Golden Age” (Foucault 1985: 346), it should be noted that Foucault did see ancient Greek society through rose-tinted spectacles to an extent. Although there was less emphasis on deontic codes, there were clearly codes of behaviour in the Greek world, particularly with regard to sexual practice (Halperin et al. 1990; Winkler 1990; Cohen 1991).
embodied in these. The conceptions that Foucault (1985: 51) investigated did not see the individual *other than* inter-subjective relations and communities, hence their: “activity devoted to the self constituted a true social practice”. For the Ancient Greeks, each person was conceived as a dynamic constellation that could be worked upon and refashioned. Instead of Modernity’s “double-bind” of “individualization and totalization” (Visker 1995: 101) or its approach that “separates the individual [and] breaks his links with others” (Foucault 1983: 211), the Ancients took for granted a view of the self not as something pre-given to keep pure and un-sullied (as in the Christian conception of soul or a Modern material object), but as constituted by one’s *developing community of relationships*. In keeping, Foucault (1991: 8-10) noted that “the pleasures of the other” must be seen in conjunction with the pursuit of a self-aesthetics, concluding that the “practices of self” are not “something that the individual invents by himself. They are patterns that he finds in his culture”. The individual must work with these aspects.37

Indeed, for the Greeks, the purpose of an aesthetics of existence was not self-aggrandisement, but to secure the recognition of others. For them, *ethos* was about individual deportment, about finding a way of ‘carrying oneself’ in a manner that was distinctive enough to enable others to recognise them *and* think them exemplary in their difference (Foucault 1991). Ethics was at once about being different, so as to stand out and be remembered, but also complimenting a community so as to be remembered favourably. While one could not expect to be seen as good by all ‘stakeholders’ with their multifarious interests and irreconcilable differences, it was important that one had a

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37 Foucault’s self-aesthetic perspective has been met by a number of criticisms that miss this point by judging his writings on Modern term. For example, it is claimed that “it denies th[at] inter-subjective relations are ontologically primary” (Gardiner 1996: 29). That it fails to realize that at the heart of the social world exists a “group of interrelated, interacting beings, and also an environment of objects with which the active, communicating beings in the group are engaged” (Burkitt 1994: 14). That because “there are only scattered references to our relations with others [it] is necessarily premised upon an extreme individualism” (Gardiner 1996: 29, 38, 42). Or, that it promotes a self-centred view that advances existing patterns of self-absorbed consumerism and possessive individualism.
positive impact upon those that one thought it important to relate to. To be ethical on this view was to leave a strong or clear impression.

Bearing in mind that ethical concepts may not mean the same things when applied to corporations rather than individuals (Honderich 1995: 111), we may use this alternative approach as an analogical tool to think differently about BE. By applying the view described above we may begin to ask questions like: why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not an organisation?; why should we not seek to ‘give style’ to our organisations, surveying all the strengths and weaknesses of their particular nature and fitting these into an artistic profile? Furthermore, could these conceptions not act as an ethos that might guide an organisation’s strategy?

This aretaic approach would entail key differences of approach in contrast to code-based BE. The Modern Western emphasis on turning to detached and objective experts to know what one ought to be and do is problematised at the outset. With regard to an individual’s life, Modernity’s experts include the scientist, the doctor, the lawyer, the therapist, the financial advisor, and the councilor. In keeping, Modern organisations turn to detached and objective consultants for similar advice. These consultants are considered expert because they have performed similar tasks across a large number of organisations. This leads to a normalisation which is manifest, for example, in mission statements where an organisation’s name is sandwiched into a coating of bland, well-meaning axioms that could apply to any organisation, and best-practice approaches where corporations isomorphically seek to imitate each other (Campbell et al. 1993). Alternatively, a self-aesthetic view would begin with a desire for those within the organisation to know ‘its-self’. Such knowledge may be sought in reflection upon: the
organisations traditions and history; key defining crises faced in the past and how it responded to these; how it consequently does things in the present; its historical relations with others and how these shape its make up; its view of what it expects of itself; and, how others recognise it as opposed to others.

The reflection outlined above is meant to be an individual reflection. Foucault’s aim, after all, was to see how subjectification could be taken out of the hands of objective experts bearing meta-narratives and ‘benchmarks’. Consequently, the knowledge that emerged would constitute an individual profile of the organisation in question. Nietzsche (in Miller 1993: 366) once remarked, drawing on the Cynic Diogenes, that “what is truly irrefutable” in any philosophy is what is “personal”, and that “with three anecdotes, it is possible to convey the image of any individual”. Perhaps a suitable way to record an organisation’s ‘ethos’ would be in such a set of anecdotes. Such a profile would work as does a novelist’s preliminary sketch of a character, incorporating that character’s key historical relationships with other characters so as to enable an author to begin with a knowledge of the range of reactions a character could plausibly have to situations that emerge as the narrative unfolds.

This aesthetic or aretaic analogy brings us back to a narrative understanding of life and Aristotle’s view of being as a temporal unfolding, where no human activity can be understood without a conception of being-unto-telos or throwness. Humans and organisations are here thrown by the past into the world, unfolding into the future in unique and historically influenced directions. It is this unfolding that gives every individual a unique point of view, a unique collection of situations to be confronted and particular right and wrong ways of confronting them (which cannot, as Alexander said to Aristotle, be said until situations occur). Hence, the individual aesthetic or aretaic
organisation is required to develop its own personal excellence, to use *metis* and be prudent, rather than just following codes. This view of ethics forces an organisation to recognise its unique past in order to know and work on its-self in the present, in order to develop its-self into the future. Moreover, it should lead us to be cautious of seeking to transplant approaches from one organisation to another.

Such an approach might be given more structure by organisations applying the same analogical framework that this thesis' investigation has drawn upon: Deleuze's (1988) summary of Foucault's investigations (pp. 56-62) or what Deleuze terms the four "folds of subjectification". These folds are shaped differently by each subject, be it a society, field of knowledge, organisation or individual.

The first fold, which is related to the *strata*, concerns the material part of ourselves which is to be surrounded and enfolded: for the Greeks this was the body and its pleasures, the 'aphrodisia'. For Christians it became the flesh and its desires, or 'desire' itself, and was thus treated very differently. An organisation might question itself here along the lines of: what is the material core of this organisation around which everything seems to hinge?; what are its key resources?; how are these to be spent and restrained?; what does this core need to do or achieve to satisfy and sustain itself?

Next is the fold of the *relation between forces*, or the zone of *power/knowledge relations*, the rules that one follows, for it is always according to a particular rule that the relation between forces is "bent back" in order to become a relation to oneself. It makes a difference whether one's chooses to see oneself in terms of natural, divine, scientifically rational, or aesthetic values. Here an organisation may ask: what 'rules of living' are we bound by? What codes do we look up to and wish to evaluate ourselves against? What rules are applied for making decisions about our direction? (That general codes are useful
here indicates how this approach does not seek to dismiss codes - rather the aim is to add to the ethical folds that may be related to and make determining "which code?" a more individual choice).

The third fold is the fold of knowledge upon the zone of subjectification, the fold of truth in so far as it constitutes the relation of truth to an individual being - i.e., how does an individual seek the 'truth' about him or herself? This serves as the formal condition for any kind of knowledge. For the Greeks this was primarily through a series of multifarious relations with various friends, gods and others; for Christians it was more likely dependent upon one's relationship with God; while Moderns find the truth of the self in the human sciences. Of this fold the organisation may ask: what relationships are particular important to us in defining our self?; whose reactions to us allow us to see our self reflected?; or, what types of research allow us to know about us and how we are seen by others?

The fourth fold is the line of the outside. It is this that constitutes an 'interiority of expectation', from which the subject sees itself as different from others and hopes for immortality, eternity, salvation, freedom or detachment. For the Greeks this fold provoked a striving for a unique, well-proportioned and aesthetically pleasing life-story. Organisations here might ask: how will we be detached from and connected to others?; how will we be different, and how will this difference in the way that we carry ourselves enable us to be recognised?; what is our place relative to significant others?; what do we see as our telos?; how do we want to be remembered?; or, in other words, what is this organisation's style?

An aesthetic approach to BE would encourage organisations to base action not on ethical questions like 'what is expected of us?', 'how can we conform?', 'how do we act
in accordance?'; but rather 'who are we?', 'how and why are we different?', and, consequently, when faced with a particular set of circumstances, 'how must we act in order to be true to our self'? Organisations, on this view, may replace slogans like 'we care because you do' and 'everything we do we do it for you', with 'we do what we do because we are this which is different from some other organisation'. Ethical actions would not be scrutinised on the basis of their effects upon others, but on the degree to which they flow from or reinforce a virtue or positive character trait. Hence organisations can re-style their ethos but they cannot change at will - they have to reflect some consistency of action with past behaviour. Individuals may then choose whether they wish to relate more to this corporation or another.

It is argued that this approach would allow an organisation to develop an ethical perspective more useful for influencing corporate strategy. Particularly in environments where people have less faith in products or services that can satisfy all people, or plans that can satisfy all potential stakeholders at once. Environments where organisations, like people, cannot be 'best friends' with everybody.

It may appear that this aretaic-aesthetics gives corporations free license to do as they feel and still claim to be ethical. However, it should be borne in mind that the views of the Greeks were premised on the idea of a public community, of which an individual would have at least attract a portion in some way. Recent cases indicate that developments in information technology may now be exercising an influence similar to that of the public communities within which Aristotle thought. Lyotard (1984: 67) concluded The Postmodern Condition by claiming that there were two directions that "computerization" could go. It could become the "dream instrument" for controlling and regulating the market system extended to include knowledge itself and governed
exclusively by the performativity principle. Conversely, it could give the public freer access to information that they would otherwise not have, allowing greater transparency, greater debate and enabling divergent views to have more influence. This would make language games less “non-zero-sum games”. Lyotard’s Postmodern preference is clearly the latter. Recent developments concerning internet activity appear to offer a glimmer of hope, and may be related to the possibility of an *aretaic* ethics now. Influenced more by what might be called community-discussions on the internet than by protests carried out via traditional legal channels and codes, several prominent companies have recently had to be seen to be “adapting their personalities”. Nike and McDonald’s are perhaps two most prominent examples of organisations who have not completely changed their make-up (it is impossible to change a personality in an instant), or sought to satisfy all stakeholders at once, but have re-evaluated and re-styled their “virtues” to an extent (Melville 1997; Jones 1998; Saporito 1998).

Despite BE’s Modern heritage, encouraging viewing ethical organisations as impersonal beings applying general codes dispassionately, researchers are beginning to see that people may have always continued to relate to organisations as specific human individuals rather than lists of responsibilities. Thus, one recent survey (Snoddy 1998) found that of British terrestrial television channels one stood out as having no ‘personality’, while the other four tended to be seen by people as Queen Victoria, an eccentric but likable professor, Arthur Daley and Richard Branson. While these four channels could incorporate these personal associations in their strategy and programming (directions and programmes that would be quite different given the different values or ethos of these four individuals), the one with no ‘personal affinity’ appeared to have little definition or strategy at all. People could not relate to it, could not attach any positive
associations with it, and the organisation was withering accordingly.

While it must be re-iterated that the argument put forward here does not seek to dismiss general codes (this would be naïve given that Modernist beliefs are now a traditional part of life’s mix), it does aim to activate a way of thinking BE differently. However, an aretaic or self-aesthetic ethics, by encouraging organisations to develop and promote “their legitimate strangeness” (to appropriate one of Foucault’s favourite poets, Rene Char), rather than following the same idealistic general rules, may prove useful for guiding particular organisational strategies in ways that code-based BE has not.
Management comes to have such a powerful yet unobtrusive presence in Modern times because its particular formation, its ways of seeing and speaking replicate Modernism’s beliefs and are well suited to providing answers to Modernism’s key problematisation: the determination of general non-personal ends toward which progress may be objectively measured and through which control may be maintained without recourse to subjective traditions. However, the other side of this productive capacity is that Management is so well cut to fit Modernism that its historical formation cannot incorporate anything other than Modern forms. This disables its ability to think differently which is why much of what is presented as new in Management appears similar to what it has said before. The similarity of their formations means that not only are Management’s singular forms maintained and shielded by Modernism, but that Modernism’s singular perspective is shielded and maintained by Management. Thus, re-framing the history of Management, apart from enabling Management to think differently, may go some way toward challenging Modernism’s hold on our world. In light of this, areas for future research toward dimming the limiting influence of Management and Modernism’s specific diagram are highlighted.

10. CONCLUSION

To live in the present, within a single culture, does not suffice as a universal prescription: too many people of utility who cannot breathe properly would die out. With the aid of history one can give them air. Nietzsche, Human All Too Human 188.

The counter-history presented in the previous chapters has demonstrated how the diagram of Management tightly re-presents that of Modernism. This forms a dense line of the outside that protects their singular modes of seeing, saying and judging being from alternatives and makes them appear to offer universal prescriptions. While this makes Management the 20th century’s fastest spreading and perhaps most influential new field of knowledge (Locke 1988), it stifles its inventive air. Furthermore, the coat that Management’s seeing of arboreal hierarchies and saying of performative efficiency layers on to the Modernist diagram limits life in general in the Western world.

This thesis began as an investigation into why most of what was presented as Postmodernism in Management fora appeared very different to Postmodernism as it was
expressed in other spheres. It seemed to repeat the predispositions of many of Management’s previous ‘buzz-words’. This then led on to seeing, at a more general level, that much of what is presented as new in Management appears an unwitting representation of Management thinking throughout the 20th century. An investigation into this phenomenon took on an even wider scope when two versions of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, one from the turn of the 20th century and the other from the middle, were juxtaposed. This highlighted how Management’s repetitive thinking was either synchronised with or influencing the times to the extent that, by the middle of the 20th century, its language seemed to be seamlessly pervading aspects of life, culture and being in a manner that had not been the case a few decades earlier. Thus, this thesis’ objective came to be the investigation of three questions: ‘Why does Management have difficulty in seeing Postmodernism as other subjects see it?’, ‘Why is so much in Management presented as new while appearing similar to what has gone before?'; and, ‘How does this similar line of thought come to have such influence or a force that is as pervasive as it seems unobtrusive?’

The work of Michel Foucault was found to harbour the best method of investigating questions such as these. Chapter 2 developed a method influenced by all of Foucault’s varied counter-historical studies, but drew particularly from Foucault’s (1985) attempts to connect his previous works in *The Use of Pleasure*, and Deleuze (1988) and Dreyfus and Rabinow’s (1983) interpretations. This method required developing a dispositif or normative grid that attempted to isolate the particular arena within which the mode of thinking this thesis was concerned with was enacted and at once highlighted the possibility of other ‘thought-worlds’ or episteme where one might think differently. Once this was established, it could be used as a particular tableau against which the specific
forms and ways of saying and seeing that Management’s historical understanding of itself
privileges; the corresponding boundary line that the subject develops so as to determine
what it incorporates; and the formation or power/knowledge web of the different
institutions of Management that emerges to maintain these ‘folds’, could be analysed.

Part Two’s dispositif outlined three normative episteme. Chapter 3 described the
Ancient Greek world-view as one where language was relativistic and contextual. Where
the architecture for seeing was based around a co-appreciation of order and chaos; around
particular subjective perspectives, traditions and connections; around the
interconnectedness of beings that later societies would separate through their co-
habitation seeming illogical: mind and body; past and present; individual and community.
Wisdom here was seen as metis, the ability to be resourceful enough to move quickly
between order and chaos or frameworks and particular contingencies, to be inventive
enough to combine different tools and approaches to combat particular problems.

Chapter 4 described Modernism as seeking to assert order over this ‘hotchpotch’
system through the development of universal grids and essences below, and apparatus
hoisting an objective viewpoint above, the plane of action. Modernism’s sights are thus
configured by a triangular hierarchy, with knowledge looked at from above, from an apex
provided by a centralised stem of knowledge or school of thought that may be
decentralised and applied to all branches of life on the ground. In keeping, it speaks
positivistically so as to objectively represent the objects of its inquiries. As it has sought
to do away with the particular teleological ends that gave meaning to life in the episteme
that preceded it, Modernism must also speak with recourse to universal, de-personalised
meta-narratives, normal measures and general ends against which things may be plotted
and toward which they may be aimed. Indeed, it must to so in order for its apparatus to
Chapter 5 examined Postmodernism as a third episteme. It presented it as a re-connection with the Ancient on two counts: firstly, by re-appreciating the forms and traditions of the past that 'crawl out' as Modernism's meta-narratives descend; secondly, by developing a style of thinking not unlike *metis*. However, while we can say that the Postmodern requires their recovery, this is not to say that the Postmodern episteme is the same as that of the Greeks. To think so would be to overlook Postmodernism's dependence on the re-appreciation of local tradition and spiral view of history. Postmodernism must recognise Modernism's influence now as such traditional influences can never be fully overcome. Hence, Postmodernism only seeks to 'rewrite' some of Modernism's aspects rather than 'consign it to history'. Correspondingly, its 'visibility' was depicted by a coming together of the Modern (pg. 136) and pre-Modern (pg. 88) symbols used to illustrate their ways of seeing, and its approach to knowledge was thus understood as an individual nomadic wandering across, and combination of, these forms (shown on pg. 180).

Part Three of this thesis then showed Management's historical conception of itself to have created a subject closely attached to Modernist forms. The boundaries and points of origin of the subject are drawn so as to mirror the key moments of Modernism. Moreover, when the subject does look beyond these boundaries it does so with a gaze that confirms the universality or solidity of its particular forms and sees its present state as an advance. Chapter 6 demonstrated how this historical understanding is largely based upon turning political compromises and particular needs into scientific achievements, and speaking as if the latter were the case so often that these political and contingent elements are not apparent.
Management’s contingent and singularly Modern way of seeing and speaking the world is maintained as ‘grander’ than this in two further ways. Firstly, by a formation of institutions that emerges simultaneously in the decades after World War II: a noble history; the confirmation of a particular view of organisation as the object of Management; and a specific form of Business School that provides a conduit that, partly through a newly transformed science of economics, brings together capitalist enterprise and institutes of knowledge. These forms connect together so as to reinforce the views of the others and gain solidity as these views are repeated and represented by ‘authorities’ (often ‘unconsciously’ thereby requiring mind-reading by Modern ‘ferrets’ like Mooney and George to show us what they really meant, cf. Chapter 6). Secondly, Management fits Modern needs so neatly that within a Modernist episteme, Management not only seems regular, it is exceedingly timely and useful. Modernism, as was shown in Chapter 4, required universal non-personal ends that could be objectively applied to solve the problem of control brought about by its dismissal of particular traditions and telos. In the first decades of the 20th century, after a century of attempting to determine general moral ends, economic logic and performative efficiency seemed the ends perhaps most capable of fitting Modernism’s ‘bill’. Management’s emergence as the ‘science of efficiency’ made it an interesting new field of endeavour. When, by the 1950s, a formation was in place that would see Management as not just useful from a technical perspective but an academic subject with a grand history, a subject that connected Modernism’s quest for general ends, its preferred form of organisation (bureaucracy) and its institutions of knowledge (cf. Review of Part Three), its standing and spread across Western life was assured.

This analysis enables this thesis’ primary question to be answered. How does
Management come to have such influence, or a force that is as pervasive as it seems unobtrusive? This thesis argues that it is because Management appears to hold the promise of answers to a problematisation particular to Modernism, and its forms and formation and its ways of saying and seeing are neatly integrated into a Modern worldview. Its influence is correspondingly seen as both exceedingly useful and completely normal.

While its capability in this regard has given Management great productive ability in our times, later parts of this thesis have focused on how its close affiliation to a Modern way of seeing and speaking contribute to its greatest limitation. Management seems largely unable to think otherwise. Chapter 8 illustrated how Management’s historical appreciation represses as well as produces knowledge. The examples of the organisation as an organism, culture and Postmodernism in Management demonstrated the way in which objects new to the subject are formed by its specific gaze and language so as to merely reconfirm its predispositions.

This analysis enables this thesis to posit reasons for the other phenomena that it sought to investigate. So much that is presented in Management as new appears similar to what has gone before, because it is dependent on a singularly Modern conception of the world. Management has difficulty seeing Postmodernism as other subjects see it because unlike other subjects like ecology, physics, philosophy and architecture, whose Postmodern appreciations were noted in Chapter 5, Management has no historical understanding beyond Modernism. Management, in keeping with those subjects that it has related itself to: economics, sociology, psychology; can access no forms with which it might engage in paralogy or metis. Its line of the outside is such that it cannot access the ‘ocean of mutually incompatible forms’ that Feyerabend advocated or the wash of pre-
Modem symbols into the Modern illustrated at the end of the discussion on Postmodernism. Its history limits it to a largely homological or incremental form of development, of which 'Postmodernism' is but another Modern instalment (as were the objects of culture and the organism). While some theorists in 'related' disciplines, like Economics and Psychology, have begun to recognise this historical configuration as a problem for their fields (see Chapter 7), this does not appear to have been acknowledged in Management. Given the 'double knot' that joins Modernism and Management, at once producing and bounding both their ways of seeing, as described in the review of Part Three, Management's contingent and singular historical formation also affects and increasingly limits other subjects that we might consider removed from it, and even life in general.

Foucault claimed that the ultimate object of study such as this was to get to a position where one would be able to attempt to think differently by re-thinking history. Uncovering Management's 'ignoble origins' and singularity enables us to question the respect that people, often unwittingly, pay Management's formation. The conclusion of Chapter 8 illustrated this by showing how mainstream theories of Management and organisational change have largely replicated their predecessors as theorists have worked seemingly without an appreciation of what has gone before (indeed, Management often seems to lack a regard for history, perhaps by considering itself, like its 'parent discipline' economics, largely ahistorical). In the brief space left available, Chapter 9 sought to re-think two aspects of Management that have recently been problematised, strategy and business ethics, by highlighting how Modernist predispositions have shaped these problems and seeking to reconceptualise them by incorporating thinking from outside of Modernism into the subject.
Having concluded thus, it remains to restate the limitations with which this study worked and, in light of these, suggest areas where further research should be encouraged. As mentioned in Chapter 1, in order to explore a broad area in a confined format, this thesis had to simplify its object and present a relatively ‘arboreal’ (or Modernist) counter-history. Recognising this, and the irony in it given what has been advocated here, this thesis does not wish to be regarded as ‘a finished article’. It is hoped that its ‘exploratory questioning’ may spur others to question the formation of Management further, and encourage them to do so in different or more particular and in-depth ways.

There seem, at this point, many potential avenues for doing so. This work has left largely untouched the period between the two World Wars where the status of Management waxed and waned and was highly contested prior to the establishment of the formation described here. It would be interesting to explore how Management overcame its setbacks in this period. The role played by both Wars in encouraging a mind-set conducive to Management is also a rich seam. What role did World War I play in encouraging the spread of Scientific Management and what forces encouraged the republication of many of Management’s ‘classics’ after World War II? There is also much more to be said about Taylor and Roosevelt’s particular world than was able to be covered here. In addition to these examples, there remain many more counter-histories to be written on particular ‘pockets’ of activity that would add to the view put forward here. Furthermore, while this work, by re-tracing Foucault, has focused on the Ancient Greeks, this is not to say that they hold the only spurs for thinking differently. It is hoped that this work will encourage others to develop different perspectives of Management by exploring societies and cultures hence seen as beyond the pale. In this manner, different
classicisms, seen as so vital for a Postmodern approach, may be surfaced. The development of more counter-histories along these lines would likely show the formation of Management to be less straightforward than what it might appear on reading this thesis.

Finally, on a more general note, it is hoped that this thesis might encourage the development of theory in Management to be undertaken while mindful of the origins and events that have contributed to the theory production in that sphere, or, to paraphrase Nietzsche, to give air to ways of seeing other than the somewhat singular culture of Management with the aid of history. Such a historical awareness would make it easier to see whether the same ideas are unwittingly continuing to bind particular areas of the field, and more easily recognise the insignificance of origins previously regarded as beyond doubt, thus encouraging the taking of influences from outside the established line of power/knowledge into the subject and hence enabling greater invention.

Management, as it is presently conceived, has always (and only) been Modern. This has made it a tremendously powerful presence in a century that has striven for Modernist achievements. However, because Management finds it difficult to recognise anything other, or any alternative aspect with which it might relativise its self-fulfilling Modernist hegemony, it seems destined to continually re-produce Modern approaches. Foucault’s conclusion at the end of *The Order of Things* foresaw Man being erased, “like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea”, as the belief system that sustained the human sciences faded. While one may not be so bold as to suggest that Modernism will evaporate and take Management with it (indeed, Foucault’s later work led him to recognise that power/knowledge is such that a diagram never just vanishes), one can use
his or her foresight to outline the two paths left to Management if it does not begin to question its borders. Firstly, and less likely, should the forthcoming century see the diminution of Modern ways in favour of a more Postmodern mode, then Management, thus formed, will become increasingly irrelevant, unable to see and speak pertinently. Alternatively, should Modernism and Management stand firm, their co-determinate ability to limit thought in this world, through the application of their ‘singular culture’, will continue to spread. This will mean that an increasing number of subjects and situations shall be increasingly evaluated according to Management’s seemingly universal and benign principles. If this means that even those subjects that were used to show Management’s historical formation as uncommon, those subjects whose broader histories enabled them to think in a Postmodern manner, can have their activities increasingly and unquestioningly judged and stifled according to criteria such as ‘efficiency’ or ‘new-ness’ or ‘collective progress’, then we may have unwittingly limited an opportunity to begin the next century ‘thinking differently’.
REFERENCES

Original source material abbreviations used in text:

Aristotle: OCTB = On Coming to be and Passing Away
           OTS = On the Soul
Bacon: NA = New Atlantis
Boyle: OR = Occasional Reflections
Descartes: OM = On Method, Optics, Geometry and Meteorology
Frontinus: Strat. = Strategems
Galen: EATH. = The Elements According to Hippocrates
Galileo: Dia. = Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems
Heidegger: BPP = Basic Problems of Phenomenology
           BT = Being and Time
           ID = Identity and Difference
Heraclitus: frag. = The Fragments
Hume: Enq. = Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and
           Concerning the Principles of Morality
Marx: GI = The German Ideology
Milton: OE = On Education
Newton: Opt. = Opticks
Nietzsche: GS = The Gay Science
Parmenides: frag. = The Fragments
Plato: Theaet. = Theaetetus
Plutarch: Per. = The Life of Pericles
           Them. = The Life of Themistocles
Protagoras: frag. = The Fragments
           Refl. = Reflections
Sextus
Empiricus: ATM = Against The Mathematicians
Simplicus: CoOTH = Commentary on ‘On the Heavens’
Sophocles: Ant. = Antigone
Xenophon: Mem. = Memorabilia
Wittgenstein: OC = On Certainty


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