THE DYNAMICS OF TRIANGULAR INTRA-ALLIANCE

POLITICS: Political Interventions of the United States and Japan Towards South Korea in Regime Transition 1979-1980

by

SUN-WON PARK

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Studies

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK

January 2000
CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS viii
DECLARATION x
ABSTRACT xi
ACRONYMS xii
A NOTE ON TEXT xiii

Ch. 1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 1
1.2 THE METHODOLOGY 3
   1.2.1 A Macro-Historical Perspective 3
   1.2.2 US Sources 4
   1.2.3 Japanese Sources 5
   1.2.4 South Korean Sources 7
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 7

PART ONE
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 13

Ch. 2 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: INTRA-ALLIANCE POLITICS AND POLITICAL INTERVENTION 14
INTRODUCTION 14
2.1 A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TOWARDS AN ALLIANCE MODEL 15
2.2 THE TRIANGULAR ALLIANCE SECURITY SYSTEM (TASS) 19
2.3 THE SOURCES OF FLUIDITY OF ALLIANCE RELATIONS 23
   2.3.1 The Endogenous Factors: Gaps in National Power and Strategies 23
   2.3.2 The Exogenous Factor: Direct and Immediate Challenge 28
2.4 THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF THE TASS AND "DISSIMILAR-
INTEGRATIVE" TYPE INTERACTION

2.5 THE ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES OF THE US AND JAPAN ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

2.5.1 The Political Intervention

2.5.2 The US Flexible Status Quo

2.5.3 The Japanese Rigid Status Quo

CONCLUSION

Ch. 3 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE TRIANGULAR ALLIANCE SECURITY SYSTEM (TASS), 1964-1978

INTRODUCTION


3.1.1 The US Logic and Benefits

3.1.2 The Japanese Logic and Benefits

3.1.3 The South Korean Logic and Benefits

3.1.4 A New Start for Japan-South Korea Relations, 1965-68

3.2 THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, 1969-74: FROM VIETNAM TO DETENTE

3.2.1 US-Japan Relations during the Nixon Administration, 1969-74

3.2.2 US Policy Towards South Korea: The Impact of Détente, 1970-74

3.2.3 The Strained Relations between Japan and South Korea

3.3 THE FORD ADMINISTRATION, 1974-76: RESTORATION OF CONVERGENCE

3.3.1 The Collapse of the South Vietnamese Government

3.3.2 US Commitment to the South Korean Security

3.3.3 The Role of Japan As a Mediator

3.4 THE FIRST YEARS OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, 1977-78

3.4.1 Japan, the Cornerstone; South Korea, a Trouble Spot

3.4.2 The Influence of Japan on the Reversal of the Withdrawal Policy

3.4.3 The Enhanced Japanese-South Korean Relations in the Political and Security Areas

CONCLUSION
PART TWO

INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 94

Ch. 4 US POLICY FOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUTH KOREA 99
INTRODUCTION 99
4.1. THE SHIFT IN US-SOUTH KOREA POLICY IN EARLY 1979 AND THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH KOREA 100
4.2 POLITICAL FRICTION AND THE SUMMIT MEETINGS 103
4.2.1 The US Approach to the Summit Meetings and the Reaction of the Park Regime 103
4.2.2 The Carter-Park Summit Meetings, 29 June-1 July 1979 106
4.3.1 The Domestic Challenge 110
4.3.2 The Diplomatic Strains with the Carter Administration 113
4.3.3 The Pusan and Masan Uprising and the Demise of the Park Regime 116
CONCLUSION 118

Ch. 5 JAPANESE DEFENSIVE INTERVENTION 121
INTRODUCTION 121
5.1 JAPAN'S VIEW ON THE SOUTH KOREAN POLITICS AND THE LIMITS OF POLICY SHIFT 122
5.1.1 The Disjunction between Economic Development and Political Democratisation in South Korea 122
5.1.2 The Limits of Policy Shift Towards the Korean Peninsula 123
5.2 JAPANESE DEFENSIVE INTERVENTION 125
5.2.1 Political Co-operation with the Park Regime 126
5.2.2 Human Exchanges in the Defence Sector 128
5.3 THE CARTER-PARK SUMMIT MEETINGS AND THE OHIRA CABINET: A SYSTEMIC INTERPRETATION 133
6.3.2 The Clashes in Kwangju and the US Actions

6.4 THE US PRESSURE ON THE NEW MILITARY REGIME

6.4.1 The Initial Measures for Long-term Pressure

6.4.2 The Wars of Nerves between the Carter Administration and the Chun Regime

6.4.3 The Chun Regime and the New Republican Reagan Administration

CONCLUSION

Ch. 7 THE JAPANESE INTERVENTION IN THE SOUTH KOREAN REGIME TRANSITION

INTRODUCTION

7.1 US-JAPAN RELATIONS, NOVEMBER 1979-MARCH 1980: POLITICAL DIPLOMACY

7.2 THE INITIAL ACTIONS OF THE OHIRA CABINET IN RESPONSE TO THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT PARK

7.2.1 Japan’s Alliance Management of South Korean Politics: Continuity and Stability

7.2.2 The Initial Actions

7.2.3 The Lack of High-Level Policy Co-ordination between the US and Japan

7.3 THE 12 DECEMBER COUP 1979 AND JAPAN

7.3.1 Japan’s Focus on General Chun Doo-hwan

7.3.2 The 12 December Coup And The Ohira Cabinet

7.4 ANTI-KIM DAE-JUNG CAMPAIGN AND JAPAN

7.4.1 The Japanese Response to Kim’s Political Roll-Back, December 1979

7.4.2 Japan’s Co-operation with Chun’s Anti-Kim Dae-jung Campaign, March-June 1980

7.5 JAPAN’S SUPPORT FOR CHUN DOO-HWAN

7.5.1 Japanese Provision of Intelligence Before and After the 12 December Coup 1979

7.5.2 Japanese Provision of Intelligence Before the 17 May Coup 1980

7.5.3 The Ohira Cabinet and the Carter Administration in Late April
and Early May 1980

7.6 THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY
JUNTA LED BY CHUN

7.6.1 The Visits of Japanese Diplomatic Missions
7.6.2 Ryozo Sejima’s Meetings with the Leaders of the Military Junta

7.7 THE SUZUKI CABINET AND THE KIM DAE-JUNG TRIAL, JULY
1980-JANUARY 1981

7.7.1 The Pressure from the Suzuki Cabinet to Commute the Death
Sentence
7.7.2 Alliance Management and the North Korean Question

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION TO PART THREE

Ch. 8 CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

8.1 INTRA-ALLIANCE POLITICS AND THE TRIANGULAR ALLIANCE
SECURITY SYSTEM (TASS)

8.2 THE POLITICAL INTERVENTIONS OF THE US AND JAPAN:
A SYSTEMIC APPROACH AND ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT

8.3 A PROSPECT FOR THE TASS: OLD BOTTOM LINES AND NEW
ARRANGEMENTS

8.4 THE LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF THE
RESEARCH

APPENDIX: THE LISTS OF ARCHIVAL SITES AND INTERVIEWEES

BIBLIOGRAPHY
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLES

Table 2.1 The Asymmetric Spheres of Influence of the US, Japan and South Korea 24
Table 2.2 Power Capability Rankings (1980) 25
Table 2.3 Four Types of Interactive Patterns in a Sub-system 33
Table 5.1 Political Exchanges between Japan and South Korea, April-May 1979 131
Table 5.2 The Exchanges of Military Officers Between Japan and South Korea, 1974-1978 134
Table 7.1 The Japanese Provision of Intelligence about North Korean Military Moves to the Chun Group 237
Table 7.2 The Suzuki Cabinet and the Chun Regime on the Kim Dae-jung Trial, November–December 1980 261
Table 8.2 A Comparative Summary of the Political Intervention of the US and Towards South Korea 276

FIGURES

Figure 2.1 The Triangular Alliance Security System (TASS) 21
Figure 7.1 The Political Risk Index of South Korea, 1972-83 245
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to a number of individuals and institutes for their useful comments, suggestions, encouragement, and assistance. First of all, to Dr. Peter Ferdinand, who has most patiently supervised my Ph.D. and always encouraged me to enhance my arguments and refine theoretical propositions, I wish to express my deepest gratitude. Unless he admitted me as his student, this provocative but revealing new research would have never been submitted. Dr. Chris Hughes, my second supervisor, has also been second-to-none in helping me to develop the central arguments of the thesis, especially in the chapters dealing with Japan.

I should also like to thank the following individuals who have contributed to the progress of my thesis in various ways: Professor Lee Jung-hoon (Yonsei University), whose warm encouragement has been greatly appreciated; Professor Kim Yong-ho (Hallym University), who first stimulated my interest in a theoretical perspective on US-Japan-South Korean political dynamics; Professor Akihiko Tanaka (Tokyo University), who kindly invited me to participate in the Third Pan-European International Conference in Vienna in September 1998, and who also offered me the opportunity to spend a year as a foreign researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Tokyo University in 1999. In spite of the inevitable sensitivity of my research topic in Japan, he generously provided me with his insightful comments and perceptive criticisms.

My research was greatly facilitated by the libraries of the Institute and the Faculty of Law, Tokyo University. Professor Bruce Cummings offered valuable comments on the verification of the US National Security Council document concerning the PRC meeting on 22 May 1980. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all Japanese and South Korean interviewees, including Mr. Ryozo Sunobe, Mr. Hisahiko Okazaki, Professor Masao Okonogi, Mr. Kenichiro Hayashi, Dr. Hideshi Takesada, Dr. Lee Tong-won, Professor Lee Mun-young, Mr. Kim Kun-tae, Mr. Huh Hwa-pyung, and others who wish to remain anonymous. Mr. Kim Min-seok helped me arrange interviews with South Korean diplomats.

While I was in Tokyo, I benefited much from the facilities of the National Diet Library, the Information Centre of Kyodo News Agency and the Library of the Japanese National Academy for Defence. My two friends, Mr. Yeo In-man and Dr. Sun Jae-won in the Faculty of Economics, Tokyo University, were earnest to help me interpret the contents of interviews: all the more, they spared some precious time to accompany me for several interviews. The 5.18 Institute, Chonnam National University, Kwangju provided me with the opportunity to present a research paper, and the 5.18 Commemorating Association kindly made available to me declassified US sources for research purposes. My dearest senior friend, Mr. Bae Kyu-sik, with enormous generosity and patience, allowed me to fully utilise his printing facilities whenever necessary.

For financial assistance which supported my research, I am grateful to the British Foreign Office (the Chevening Scholarship). The Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick met the expenses of my research visits to Tokyo and Seoul.
Professor R. Drifte and Dr. D. Carlton were kind enough to accept my request to act as examiners.

Finally, I would like to express gratitude to my respectable parents–in-law (Mr. Cho Sung-koo and Mrs Min Woo-soonho) and my mother (Mrs. Han Young-ja) for their unfailing financial and spiritual support, encouragement and love. Last, but not least, I offer my heartfelt thanks to my lovely wife, Eun Kyung, and two sons, Ji-ho Park and Jun-ho Park.

This thesis is dedicated to the victims—but now the protecting spirits—of South Korean democracy: the Kwangju Democratisation Movement of May 1980.

(Sun Won Park)
11 January 2000
DECLARATION

This thesis is presented in accordance with the regulations for the degree of doctor of philosophy. The work described in this thesis is entirely original and my own, unless otherwise indicated. The author also confirms that this thesis has not been submitted for a degree at another university.

---------------------------
(Sun Won Park)

11 January 2000
ABSTRACT

The focus of this study is the political dynamics of the alliance relations between the United States, Japan and South Korea during the Cold War period. It proposes the concept of "triangular alliance security system" (TASS) as a new theoretical framework for the understanding of intra-alliance politics in Northeast Asia.

It identifies the different perspectives on regional relations of the US, Japan and South Korea and it argues that the main operational principle of the US in its dealings with Korea at that time was active intervention to democratise the latter's polity, whilst the Japanese imperative was defensive intervention to preserve stability and the status quo.

It also presents a new body of empirical facts concerning the US and Japanese interventions in South Korea's regime transition during 1979 and 1980, utilising primary materials from US, Japanese and South Korean sources and in-depth interviews with diplomatic actors and policy-makers. The empirical findings concerning Japanese intervention in the South Korean regime challenge conventional views of Japanese foreign policy. They suggest a much more active role for Japan in the emergence of the regime of Gen. Chun Doo-hwan, whilst the Carter administration was increasingly preoccupied with the Iran hostage crisis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSADF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NODIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCNSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A NOTE ON THE TEXT

In line with Korean convention, all Korean names in the text and notes are given with the family name first followed by the given name. In the case of Japanese names, the family name follows the given name. Macrons are not used.

As far as the footnote notations are concerned, this thesis uses a shortened form by citing the author, year, and pages. Due to the word limit, an abbreviated type of citation will also be used. For example, the US Department of State Bulletin will be noted as USDSB, and Foreign Relations of the United States are shortened to FRUS. In the case of telegrams between US Department of State and US Embassy in Seoul, South Korea, 1979-1980, notations provide serial numbers and dates.


The list of interviewees and dates of interviews are provided in Appendix I, therefore the name of interviewees will only be cited in footnotes.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

The central purpose of this study is to analyse the political dynamics of the alliance relations between the United States, Japan and South Korea during the Cold War period, when the three states joined together to deter the perceived communist threat in Northeast Asia. More specifically, the research aims, first of all, to contribute to the development and refinement of a new theoretical framework for the understanding of intra-alliance politics in Northeast Asia. Secondly, the research seeks to reveal new empirical data concerning the US and Japanese interventions in South Korea’s regime transition between 1979 and 1980.

In terms of the first of these aims, it must be stressed that hitherto the dynamics of intra-alliance politics have not received adequate attention in the study of Northeast Asian international relations. This thesis presents the case for employing a systemic approach to the analysis of US-Japan-South Korea relations, which are seen to constitute one of world’s major sub-regional systems, and adopts an alliance model to investigate the triangular patterns of interaction. This framework is intended to cast light on four major issues: the key structural features of US-Japan-South Korean relations at this time; the
factors that determined the degree of cleavage and cohesion within the alliance; the most distinguishable characteristics of the political interventions of the US and Japan in South Korean politics; and the crucial role of Japan as the middle member of this asymmetric triangular alliance system.

In employing an alliance model to explain the political interaction between the US, Japan and South Korea, this study argues that the changing political landscape of one member state directly or indirectly affects the security of the other members. It seeks to show how the US and Japan evaluated the unfolding political events in South Korea between 1979-1980, and to identify the ways in which the two countries implemented a range of actions and leverages. In particular, attention is given to the way in which Japan interpreted the East Asian policies of the Carter administration, and the reasons why Japan supported the emergence of a new military regime in South Korea.

In terms of the empirical contribution of this study, the whole question of US and Japanese intervention in South Korean politics has previously been neglected. There have been some studies of the US role, but their depth of analysis has been limited. Indeed, a full understanding of that role was not possible until important documents were declassified in 1996, and former South Korean Generals-turned-Presidents, Chun Doo-hwan and Rho Tae-woo, and their subordinates were interrogated and brought to trial in 1996-1997. As far as Japanese intervention is concerned, there has so far been no systematic academic study. In this respect, the present analysis seeks to fill a major gap.

---

1 See Fowler (1999).
2 The author investigated research papers and articles published in academic journals in Japan and South Korea between 1979 and 1999, and failed to discover any study of Japanese intervention in the South Korean regime transition. In Japan, some critical articles have appeared in party papers such as Gekkan
1.2 METHODOLOGY

This thesis employs a macro-historical comparative and systemic approach to the analysis of US and Japanese interventions in the South Korean regime transition. It makes extensive use of recently declassified US sources and undertakes the first comprehensive investigation of the political role of Japan as the middle member of the triangular alliance security system (TASS).

1.2.1 A Macro-historical International Relations Perspective

In its analysis of inter-state behaviour and interaction among the three states, with special reference to the political interventions of the US and Japan, this study employs a macro-historical international relations perspective. The historical dimension requires a careful examination of recently declassified primary sources (see Sections 1.2.2, 1.2.3 and 1.2.4), and Japanese National Diet records and interviews. The aim is to unearth relevant information, especially concerning the events surrounding the South Korean regime transition of 1979-80. The international relations dimension draws upon social-scientific understanding of general patterns of alliance relations and alliance management in order to search for a wider logic and explanation. The study places the

Shakaito (Monthly Policy Paper of the Japanese Socialist Party later Social Democratic Party of Japan) and Akahata (of the Japanese Communist Party) and progressive current affairs magazines. Research in South Korea did not reveal a single relevant article.
trilateral interactions between the US, Japan and South Korea within the context of a systemic framework, seeing these interactions as constituting a sub-system of a broader "American system".\(^3\)

The main research methods employed in this study are archival investigation, interviews, and an analysis of international relations theory. In terms of archival work, the problem has to be faced that many documents relating to the period 1979-80 remain inaccessible because they have not yet been released for public inspection. However, as the next three sections will show, this research was able to utilise valuable primary materials from US, Japanese and South Korean sources, and to undertake in-depth interviews with diplomatic actors and policy-makers (referred to Appendix I).

1.2.2 US Sources

Recently, the Clinton administration has declassified several thousand telegrams between the State Department and its embassy in Seoul for the period 1979-1980. These primary sources contain valuable detailed information about US rationales, motivations and actions with respect to the South Korean regime transition. Other important US sources examined for the purpose of this research include US governmental and Congressional papers, such as *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1968*, *The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, *The US Department of State Bulletin*, and *The Congressional Records, 1978-1981*.

\(^3\) The American System refers to the definition of Gilpin, the system which incorporates "the political understandings, military alliances, and economic agreements that the United States has entered into with its principal allies since the end of the Second World War." (Gilpin: 1989): p. 3.
1.2.3 Japanese Sources

Existing analyses of Japanese foreign policy have tended to rely upon US governmental sources, since there are formidable obstacles to accessing Japanese governmental materials relating to foreign and security policies. It seems unlikely that this restriction will improve significantly in the near future. The Japanese Government passed a Freedom of Information Act in the spring of 1999, but the new law will not be applied until 2002. Moreover, public access to materials relating to security and foreign policies will continue to be prohibited. Accordingly, researchers must base their analysis of those policies mainly on US papers. In order to overcome this limitation, the present research undertook extensive interviews with diplomatic actors and other related researchers and officials to obtain first-hand data, to check the reliability of the conventional wisdom, and to develop new perspectives. Unfortunately, many of the key individuals involved in Japanese policy-making towards South Korea in 1979-80, including former Prime Ministers, are deceased. On the other hand, one of the key features of Japanese foreign policy-making is the influence of middle-ranking officials, non-career researchers and experts working in governmental institutes as public servants. Thus, unstructured and in-depth interviews with such individuals are potentially of great value to the researcher. For the purpose of this study, the author interviewed four individuals who were middle-ranking officials in 1979-80: one in charge of international information within the Japanese Defense Agency, two in charge of Korean information within the Japanese Cabinet Investigation Agency, and the then
Japanese Ambassador to South Korea. As far as non-career specialists in the subject are concerned, interviews were conducted with members of two research groups dealing with Korean issues: *Josei Kentokai* (the Situation Review Study Group) and *NK-kai* (the North Korean Study Group). In addition, a former private adviser to Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira provided extremely useful information.

The new findings collected from these interviews, in spite of their importance and reliability, have also been verified by the scrutiny of the official governmental policy lines at this time. To that end, another major but often forgotten source, the Japanese Diet Records, has been extensively analysed. Often, studies of Japanese foreign and security policies tend to quote from newspaper reports of debates in the Diet without studying the original voluminous records of Diet proceedings. The author therefore spent a great deal of time studying the Diet Records, and this revealed a lot of useful data. In addition, the various magazines and newspapers published by Japanese political parties, and official government sources such as the *White Paper on Defense* and the *Blue Papers on Diplomacy* were studied. The author tried, without success, to gain access to documents and records of the Policy Investigation Council of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, but a major fire at the party headquarters in 1981 had led to the loss of most of this material. As far as the records of the Japanese Socialist Party was concerned, it is not known the storing location after the party has been taken over by the new Japanese Democratic Party in the mid-1990s.

---

4 Interview with Professor M. Okonogi, Keio University.
1.2.4 South Korean Sources

In the analysis of the South Korean regime transition, it is essential to start with South Korean sources. This research draws upon previously unavailable materials, for example the records (November 1995 to March 1996) of the interrogation of former South Korean Presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Rho Tae-woo, and others accused by the Seoul District Local Prosecutors Office. One of the key sources for confirming the extent of Japanese intervention, *The Analysis of the Intelligence Report from the Japanese Cabinet Investigation Agency* (10 May 1980) is also given careful consideration. Valuable data were derived from interviews with South Korean diplomats who were in charge of the Asian Section of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and were responsible for political contacts with their Japanese counterparts. Interviews with a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Lee Tong-won, on the subject of South Korea’s relations with the US and Japan, and with Mr. Huh Hwa-pyung, a key player on the emergence of the new military regime were also extremely helpful. In all cases, the facts and findings gathered from interviews were systematically checked with one another and of course with published materials. Purely speculative information, however interesting, was excluded from the main body of the thesis.

1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The period 1979-1980 was a particularly crucial juncture for the US, Japan and South Korea. For Japan, it was a time of vigorous public debate over the country’s new role in world affairs —especially in respect of the security relationship with the US—after two
decades of economic success. If Japan had to rely less unconditionally upon the US, the
question of the posture it should take in the international sphere was clearly of vital
importance. In South Korea, 1979 saw the demise of the Park Chung Hee regime and a
military coup led by General Chun Doo Hwan. Given the US concern at this time over
human rights issues in international affairs, the response to this coup on the part of the
Carter administration was problematic, particularly after the Kwangju massacre in 1980.

During the last two years of the Carter administration (1979-1980), the ineffectiveness
of US South Korean policy was one of the most significant catalysts which led to a
deterioration of South Korea’s domestic situation, the coherence of the trilateral alliance
structure, and the Northeast Asian security environment more generally. The Carter
administration succeeded in bringing about the demise of the authoritarian Park Chung-
hee regime, but could not effectively engineer the establishment of a broadly based
civilian government in South Korea. Although it reluctantly acquiesced in the
emergence of the Chun Doo-hwan military group, the Carter administration did not
grant the group formal recognition. By contrast, the Reagan administration did
recognise the Chun regime and made an early decision to invite the new South Korean
President to Washington in January 1981.

At several critical points of the South Korean power transition after the assassination of
President Park, Japan intervened effectively to encourage the establishment of a new
military regime. Unlike the US, the Ohira Cabinet exerted its influence in an attempt to
stabilise the political situation in South Korea by deliberately supporting the most
powerful group, the new military leadership led by General Chun. Subsequently, the
Suzuki cabinet successfully put sustained pressure on the new regime to commute the death sentence against Kim Dae-jung who was one of the most prominent political rivals of President Park.

The thesis consists of an Introduction (Chapter 1); three main parts, each of which contains two chapters; and a Conclusion (Chapter 8). Part One develops the study’s analytical framework and historical overview of the political interactions between the US, Japan and South Korea. The thesis examines the operation of the Triangular Alliance Security System (TASS, referred to Ch. 2) and its interaction with the domestic political circumstances of the three member states. There is a particular focus on the differences between the roles of the US and Japan within the TASS.

Chapter 2 presents the key concepts, analytical framework and hypotheses that guide the rest of the study. Among the key concepts, particular emphasis is placed on the following: “the alliance model”, “the triangular alliance security system (TASS)”, “intra-alliance politics”, “alliance management”, the “direct and immediate challenge” facing a member country, “the US flexible status quo policy” and “the Japanese rigid status quo policy”, and the difference between US “offensive intervention” and Japanese “defensive intervention”.

Chapter 3 discusses the formation and evolution of the East Asian Triangular System of Alliance Security (TASS) from 1965 to 1978, using the key concepts and analytical framework developed in Chapter 2. There is a focus on the ways in which new immediate and direct challenges facing the US affected the cohesion of the TASS; and
on the responses of Japan and South Korea to US demands relating to the American war effort in Vietnam. The research seeks to provide an extensive inventory of the mechanisms that generated difficulties for the trilateral relationship and the various bilateral relationships in play within the East Asian anti-communist alliance system during the period under review. The chapter seeks to show how the TASS was transformed from a latent war-community into a low-level political community on the basis of continuous consultation and debates related to military security and political stability in the region.

Parts Two and Three examine the US and Japanese interventions in the South Korean regime transition during 1979-80, and the related political turmoil. Part Two focuses on an investigation into the goals, means and effectiveness of the US and Japanese political interventions between January and October 1979 in terms of their respective strategies of offensive intervention and defensive intervention. In Chapter 4, the inter-relationship between the demise of the Park regime and mutually exclusive US policies, represented by the suspension of the troop withdrawal policy and the human rights drive, is examined in order to determine why and how the Park regime came to an end.

Chapter 5 covers the period from January to October 1979. The discussion begins with an analysis of the Japanese evaluation of US-South Korea policy, and the rationale and methods of Japan’s exertion of influence on South Korean politics during the regime transition. Japan’s independent views and assumptions about the US management of South Korean politics are investigated as key factors underlying the distinctive policy decisions taken by the Japanese towards South Korea.
Part Three spans the period from November 1979 to January 1981. Chapter 6 discusses the reasons for the American failure to establish a broadly based civilian government in South Korea. It investigates the shift of American policy priorities in the critical junctures of the regime transition, and the US intervention strategy after the demise of the Yushin System. The main emphasis is on the rationale behind American self-restraint towards the first coup led by General Chun Doo-hwan, a loyal follower of the late President Park Chung-hee. An effort is also made to show why and how the Iranian political crisis affected the South Korean policy of the Carter administration.

Chapter 7 examines how Japan became involved in the rise of General Chun as a power holder of the military through the 12 December Coup 1979, and how Japan sought to protect Chun from the efforts of the Carter administration to make him take military retirement. Then attention turns to another critical juncture—the emergence of a new military regime—when the Chun group became the main target of opposition and dissident forces. The complicity of the Ohira Cabinet in the second coup of 17 May 1980 is also discussed. Then the chapter turns to consider the actions and measures taken by Japan to promote the formal recognition and consolidation of the new military regime. The Kim Dae-jung issue is dealt with in the last part of this chapter. Each chapter of Part Three, as an extension of the contrast between the offensive and defensive interventions of the US and Japan respectively, compares the US flexible status quo policy and the Japanese rigid status quo policy in order to explain the operational principles of the two states in relation to the South Korean question.

---

6 The South Korean political system under the Yushin Constitution adopted in October 1972 which gives predominant power to the President over any other institution including the National Assembly (see Ch.3
Chapter 8, the Conclusion, summarises the main arguments of the thesis and emphasises the validity of the analytical framework. The implications for other related studies in Asian security, democratisation and regionalisation are also considered, and attention is given to significant research limitations and possible directions for further work.

PART ONE

THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE TRIANGULAR ALLIANCE SECURITY SYSTEM (TASS)

Part One contains two chapters: Chapter 2 presents the analytical framework of the research, and Chapter 3 develops an interpretation based on this framework of the historical evolution of the trilateral relations between the US, Japan and South Korea.

Chapter 2 discusses the need for a systemic approach to the analysis of the political interactions between the three countries. For the purpose, the concept of a Triangular Alliance Security System (TASS) is formulated and explained. There is a particular focus on the process of alliance management as a key aspect of intra-alliance politics. The rationales behind the contrasting political actions of the US and Japan towards South Korea are explained in terms of the distinction between the "flexible status quo" orientation of the US and the "rigid status quo" orientation of Japan.

Chapter 3 is devoted to an interpretation of the evolution of US-Japan-South Korean relations and the formation of the TASS. It seeks to show how the "de facto" alliance, established as a latent war-community, was transformed into a low-level political community through the experience of continuous consultation and debates related to military security and political stability issues in the region.

---

1 Snyder and Diesing (1977) define the interaction of states as a "behavioral process, the actual encounters or communicative exchange between states." These include any behaviour that "affects others in some way, including their expectations of the actor's future behavior, and/or which is influenced by expectations of others' responses."
CHAPTER 2

THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: INTRA-ALLIANCE POLITICS IN THE TRIANGULAR ALLIANCE SECURITY SYSTEM (TASS)

INTRODUCTION

This chapter seeks to develop an analytical framework for the study of intra-alliance politics among the US, Japan and South Korea during the Cold War period with particular reference to the regime transition in South Korea during 1979-80.

Existing studies of the South Korean regime transition are inadequate because they do not examine the intervening role of Japan in shaping US strategy towards that transition and its management. The focus of the existing literature tends to be on the primacy of the US role behind the emergence of the Chun Doo-hwan military regime after the demise of Park Chung-hee’s Yushin System; and usually democratisation theory is applied to explain how the US failed to promote democracy and ensure a smooth transition from an authoritarian regime to a more liberal government. These studies tend to overlook the

2 Fowler (1999) criticises existing accounts of the regime transition in South Korea in 1979-1980, utilising recently declassified documents. Unfortunately, however, his study is unsuccessful in unveiling the rationales of US intervention and investigating the reasons for the failed promotion of democracy. The absence of any attention to the role of Japan is also a weakness of his research. On the application of systemic approaches to Middle East international relations, see Gause III (1999).
contribution of Japanese intervention and the broader trilateral political interactions between the US, Japan and South Korea. In order to overcome these limitations, the single most important question at the outset concerns the choice of an alternative analytical framework. In order to accommodate a general view of the trilateral relations between these countries, systemic alliance management theory is applied in this study as a particularly useful theoretical framework.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the need for a systemic approach, and presents the concept of a Triangular Alliance Security System (TASS) to characterise the US-Japan-South Korea alliance structure. Then the focus turns to the question of the interactive features of the three countries. A contrast is then drawn between the basic operating principles of the US and Japan in dealing with the South Korean question, so that the different political interventions of the US and Japan towards the South Korean regime transition of 1979-1980 can be better understood.

2.1 A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TOWARDS AN ALLIANCE MODEL

Bilateral explanations of the international relations between the United States, Japan and South Korea cannot fully reflect the complexity of these states' closely interwoven trilateral interdependence and interactions in the security area. This is because the system as a whole is more than the sum of its constituent parts. As Waltz puts it, “If the organization of units affects their behavior and their interactions, then one cannot predict outcomes or understand them merely by knowing the characteristics, purposes, and
interactions of the system's units." For instance, in discussing US-Japanese security relations, the broader security environment in the Korean peninsula and the changing political situation within South Korea are clearly of immense significance and cannot be ignored. By the same token, the discussions of US-South Korean security relations must pay attention to the functions of US military forces stationed in Japan and the scope of Japan's own security involvement. Similarly, studies of Japan-South Korea relations must take into account the nature and scope of US security commitments to both countries.

Even though there have been increasing demands to develop a new analytical approach reflecting the unique traits of Northeast Asian international politics, hitherto there has been no systematic attempt to develop a comprehensive trilateral framework. As a result, empirical and theoretical studies of the dynamics of political interaction between the three countries in the security area have not yet reached the stage where they can offer a convincing explanation of the past, an understanding of the present, and a prescription for the future. One of the main purposes of the present research is to fill this gap and build a new systemic perspective that is capable of revealing the complex reality of interdependence among the US, Japan and South Korea. However, two major factors have hindered the development of such an approach in this particular case: the absence of a formal, collective security organisation among the three countries; and the ideological

---

3 Waltz (1979): p. 39. For an extended review of literature about the concept of international system, see Brecher and James (1986): pp. 3-12.
4 Yamamoto (1997).
5 The series on US alliance relations in East Asia published by the Institute for International Studies, Stanford University clearly exposes this problem because of its lack of a systemic approach, although the studies do employ alliance theories. For more details, see the list of research papers published in 1997-8 at the following website: http://www.stanford.edu/group/APARC/.
attacks of communist countries on all efforts to enhance trilateral defence readiness. In this chapter, the focus is on how the first of these constraints can be overcome. The second constraint will be discussed in more detail, with relevant examples, in Chapter 3.

Waltz defines "system" as a set, rather than a mere collection, of interacting units. In terms of its analytical utility, he argues, any approach or theory, if it is rightly termed "systemic", must show how the system level, or structure, is distinct from the level of interacting units, how it affects the interacting units, and how they in turn affect the structure. On the question of identifying the boundary of a certain system, Waltz emphasises the subjective sense of the belongingness of "self-regarding units". In the case of the US, Japan and South Korea, their common threat perception and interests of their policy elites provide the basis of this subjective sense of belongingness and interdependence. In terms of its objective characteristics, according to Brecher and Yehuda, an international system can be identified when "a set of actors who are situated in a configuration of power (structure), are involved in regular patterns of interaction (process), are separated from other units by boundaries set by a given issue, and are constrained in their behaviour from within (context) and from outside the system (environment)." In the Northeast Asian sub-regional system, therefore, the systemic boundary can be identified by observing the relatively exclusive, continual interaction of units among themselves.

---

6 Waltz (1979): p. 40. In Buzan's terms (1991: p. 193), "a system" is "the overall seamless web of security interdependence" which has "relative indifference" from other states or international actors and which accumulates "patterns shaped by the different intensities of the lines of amity and enmity."
8 Ibid.: p. 91.
If we apply these conceptions of a systemic approach to the Cold War era, as Gilpin suggests, there are good reasons for describing it as "the American system," incorporating "the political understandings, military alliances, and economic agreements that the United States has entered into with its principal allies since the end of the Second World War."10 In order to maintain the American system in the Cold War era, it was essential for the US to attain agreements on objectives and actions to increase cohesion within and among allies and to meet various challenges from the Communist bloc. To that end, the American system needs to be examined as the ensemble of distinct regional sub-systems with various forms of alliance structure.

The American sub-system of linkages with non-communist states in East Asia during the Cold War era was not exactly the same as the sub-systems in Western Europe or other regions. With regard to the variety of sub-systems, Yahuda suggests that "Such arrangements allowed for significant variation within the region as to how the links or junctions between the global, regional and local levels could apply at any given time."11 Therefore, the discussion now turns to the structural features of the Northeast Asian sub-system, within which the US, Japan and South Korea as components have accumulated continual interactions in pursuing their common interests in the security area.

2.2 AN ALLIANCE MODEL: THE TRIANGULAR ALLIANCE SECURITY SYSTEM (TASS)

This study argues that common security interests and concerns have been the key factors directing the systemic political interactions of the US, Japan and South Korea; and that the alliance model is the most suitable framework for analysing these interactions. Some scholars, in analyzing alliances, are concerned only with formal "legal" mutual commitments.\textsuperscript{12} In the defence field, however, various types of alliance have been identified. For example, Singer and Small distinguish between three distinct alliance forms: defence pacts, which oblige some form of military intervention; neutrality or non-aggression pacts, which avoid participation in conflict by some signatories; and ententes and alliances, which are commitments where partners agree to "co-operate in a crisis."\textsuperscript{13} Walt defines an alliance in a broad sense as "a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states."\textsuperscript{14} Many contemporary states, S. M. Walt argues, are reluctant to sign formal treaties with their allies, and as a result precise distinctions—for example between formal and informal alliances—tend to distort rather more than they reveal. Thus, to Walt, an attempt to employ a strict typology of alliance commitments can easily be misleading because the precise meaning of either formal or informal arrangements is likely to vary from case to case. Thus, he claims, the emphasis should be on "changes of behavior or of verbal statements, not of the rewriting of a document [i.e. treaty]" as a sign of a changing security commitment.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.: pp. 12-14.
Based on Walt’s broader definition, the plausibility of the alliance model in the case of US-Japan-South Korea relations can now be considered in general terms. When we discuss a set of countries as constituting a system or sub-system, two preconditions are essential: geographical proximity and the recognition of a common issue requiring action. In terms of the latter precondition, this was met by the US aspiration for the building of a collective security pact with Japan and South Korea. Within a few years after the end of the Korean War (ended in mid 1953), the US sought to establish a collective Northeast Asian security system with Japan and South Korea. In addition, during the Cold War, physical proximity bound the three countries together to deter the military threat from the Communist bloc. The question of geographical proximity is more complex because of the vast distance between the two Asian allies and the United States. However, due to the absence of any other substantive power in the Pacific Ocean, and the geopolitical importance of this part of the world to the US, the US, Japan and South Korea were still able to use their common security and defence interests to work together.

However, a truly collective security system could not be realised due to the Japanese constitutional constraint represented by Article 9, and the strong domestic opposition in

---

16 Brecher and Yehuda (1985): p. 17; Brecher and James (1986): p. 7-10. Brecher and James, even though they accept that a subsystem has two strands of geographical proximity and issue, argue that “international systems do not require the physical proximity of actors.” (p.10)
18 In mid-1960, the US embassy in Tokyo re-emphasised the position of Japan as a “key to the Western Pacific island chain” (FRUS, 1958-1960 Vol. XVIII: p.383). Buzan defines “region” in security terms as a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations that exists among a set of states which have been locked into geographical proximity with each other. A step further is to have “shared characteristics, patterned interactions, and shared perceptions.” The density and significance of interaction determine a region as a unit of an analysis (Buzan, 1991: p. 288; 1998: pp. 68-74).
19 Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, adopted during the US occupation, renounced war as a sovereign national right and rejected the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes as follows: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on Justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
Japan to such a strategy. Therefore the US built a system of alliance security in which “groups of states allied with each other, principally against possible external threats.”

Figure 2.1 The Triangular Alliance Security System (TASS)

The United States

Hub-spoke 1

Hub-spoke 2

Japan

South Korea

Connection of the two spokes

Initially, the United States set up a series of “hub-spoke” arrangements with Japan and South Korea (see Figure 2.1), through which it conjoined non-communist countries to enter into a tight web of bilateral treaties as one of the major sub-systems of the American system in Northeast Asia. The first “hub-spoke arrangement was expressed in the Security Treaty between the US and Japan signed in Tokyo on 28 February 1952 and revised in the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security signed in Washington on 19 January 1960. The second hub-spoke arrangement was formed in the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty between the US and South Korea. From the American viewpoint, these two treaties constituted “formal recognition of [US] responsibility for the peace and

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not recognized.” (Nonaka 1993): p. 114.

20 A. Roberts defines collective security a system, regional or global, in which each participating state accepts that security is the concern of all, and agrees to join a collective response to aggression. (1996): p. 310).

security of the Far East assumed during World War II and its aftermath."22 Despite the
two "hub-spoke" arrangements, the linking of the two "hub-spokes" was imperative and
realised with the Treaty on Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan
signed in Tokyo on 22 June 1965 (the necessity and logic of the treaty will be explained in
Chapter 3).

With respect to the strategic significance of the South Korea-Japan diplomatic
normalisation, South Korean President Park Chung-hee declared after the conclusion of
the June 1965 treaty: "South Korea and Japan—as free states in the Far East—are
walking on the path where we share the same destination [in security and prosperity]."23
In September 1964, the Japanese Cabinet Investigation Office expressed its positive
evaluation of the interconnection of security concerns between Japan and South Korea:
"Japan is an indispensable base for the defence of South Korea. Conversely, South Korea
controls the entrance to the Japan Sea and is extremely important for the security of
Japan."24 The diplomatic normalisation treaty was "a framework of the international
system" among Japan, South Korea and the US in the region, and was "actually a
trilateral agreement in which the US was the unspoken partner, as the crucial military ally
of both countries."25 Thus, following Keohane's argument that "to develop a systemic
analysis, abstraction is necessary,"26 this sub-system can legitimately be termed a
Triangular Alliance Security System (TASS) which comprises two "formal" defence
pacts, and one "implicit and informal" alliance, or at least entente, relations.27

---

23 Cited in Okonogi (1985).
27 Based on Waltzian structural realism, Wriggins argues that "the states in each region can be seen as
2.3 THE SOURCES OF FLUIDITY IN ALLIANCE RELATIONS

The question of how alliance relations operate deserves careful examination. Regional or sub-regional systems produce distinct patterns of interactions based on their own unique forms of co-operation and conflict. Within an asymmetric alliance composed of one superpower, one regional power, and one local power, the national interests of the three countries inevitably differ due to gaps of national power, national strategy, and the unequal geographical distance from the threat. In the case of the TASS, as will be seen in Part Two and Three, these factors led to contradictory policy outcomes based on separate assessments of the global balance of power and the specific security environment in East Asia, and this in turn resulted in problems of mutual credibility between the weaker and the stronger states. Additionally, as an intervening variable affecting the coherence and cleavage of an alliance, this research employs the term “direct and immediate challenge” for the heuristic purpose of explaining how the priority of a member state fluctuates even though the structural national interests of the alliance members remain the same.

2.3.1 Endogenous Factors: Gaps in National Power and Differences in National Strategies


23 This study uses "regional power" and "major power" interchangeably, as is the case with "global power" and "superpower".
Part 12 Analytical Framework

highlights “the points of junction and disjunction between the global, regional and local level of politics.” This is of great significance in the case of the TASS, given the alliance’s “multi-layered power structure” consisting of one superpower (the US), one regional power (Japan) and one local state (South Korea). The asymmetric spheres of influence of the three countries in the security area, reflecting different national powers and strategies, results in different perspectives in foreign policy-making that distinguish the US from Japan and from South Korea.

Table 2.1 Asymmetric Spheres of Influence of the US, Japan and South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sphere of Influence</th>
<th>Predominant Security Interests</th>
<th>Military Concerns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Global stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Regional stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>National survival and Territorial integrity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* ↓ indicates the direction of the active priorities of the country in question.

The US, Japan and South Korea shared the primary Cold War objective of deterring the threats of communist adversaries. However, the primary security interests and military concerns of the three countries were not identical. As indicated in Table 2.1, in the case of a global challenge, the interests of all three countries would lead them to work together under the leadership of the US. In the case of a regional challenge, Japan and South Korea would co-operate, but the US might not do so if it did not consider such action to be vital, or if it faced more pressing concerns in other parts of the world. In the case of a local challenge, the US and Japan would be active provided the challenge seemed to be vital, and there were not other more pressing concerns elsewhere. In order to understand this

idea of different spheres of influence, it is necessary to investigate the gaps in the national power parities of the three countries.

The measurement of a nation’s power parity is a complex task. Table 2.2 brings together some commonly used indices, from a range of sources, relating to the situation of the US, Japan, South Korea and the USSR in 1980.

Table 2.2 Power Capability Rankings (1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GNP Rank Norm</th>
<th>Cline Rank Norm</th>
<th>Singer Rank Norm</th>
<th>German Rank Norm</th>
<th>Nuclear Warheads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.Korea</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1509</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Adapted from Taber (1989): p. 36 (with regard to the components of each index, see pp. 33-4) and Kugler and Abertman (1989): p. 77 (nuclear warheads).

Disparities of national power cause strains in alliance relations because they lead each member country to perceive specific threats differently, and affect the scope of the alliance activity, even though the existence of strains and stresses is one of the inevitable dynamics of any alliance system. They have a direct impact on the shaping of national strategies of each country, and on the objectives of alliance policy.

Because of the predominant influence of the US in the TASS, a brief summary of US
national strategy needs to be made at this point. US strategy in the post-World War II era, according to National Security Council (NSC) Memorandum NSC-68, on 14 April 1950, was designed "to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish." This core objective is to be achieved by embracing "two subsidiary policies." First, there was "a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community", which must be pursued "even if there were no Soviet threat." Then, the policy of "containing the Soviet system" followed, which became "the most durable foreign policy priority" and "a national fixation." The memorandum asserted that "These two policies are closely interrelated and interact one another." Here, the raison d'être of American unilateralism, coupled with the US global sphere of influence (Table 2.1) and its superpower capability (Table 2.2), led to the core aim of protecting the American system as the single highest priority in US foreign policy. The clear implication was, and is, that this ultimate goal will not be discarded as long as the US retains its status as a superpower. From the start, the US insisted that its Asia policy should be subordinated to this line (in NSC 48/5 adopted on 17 May 1951):

United States objectives, policies and courses of action in Asia should be designed to contribute toward the global objective of strengthening the free world vis-à-vis the Soviet orbit, and determined with due regard to the relations of United States capabilities and commitment throughout the world.

While the US attached priority to security concerns, Japan placed a higher value on economic rehabilitation, insisting on the principle of the "separation of politics from

---

32 Ibid.: p. 252.
33 *FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI*: p. 34.
economics (seikei bunri).” As a result, there had remained significant differences in the national strategies of the two countries, despite the treaty and continual dialogues and exchanges of ideas.  

However, this does not necessarily mean that the alliance relations between Japan and the US have been a simple “marriage of convenience.” It must also be appreciated that there have inevitably been variations in American and Japanese national policies. Gaddis classifies various levels of containment policy towards the Soviet Union: overthrowing the regime; confining Soviet influence within the boundaries of the USSR; competitive coexistence; co-operative coexistence and changing the USSR’s internal structure. When the US pursued the fourth and fifth of these aims, its allies regarded it as a retreat into isolationism, sometimes under the banner of détente, and sometimes in the name of moralistic leadership emphasising human rights objectives. Japan has also exhibited one major variation from seikei bunri strategty in accepting US demands for burden-sharing. These variations suggest that there has been some room for the reconciliation of differences in national strategies between the US and Japan. By contrast, as indicated in Table 2.1, South Korea, at least during the Cold War era, had no alternative but to stick to the security-first policy against the North.

With regard to the differences of objectives of alliance policy, Morgenthau classifies alliances into two types: the alliance versus world domination, and the alliance versus a counter-alliance. A scrutiny of these two broad categories reveals two added dimensions: an alliance built upon the strategic consensus emerges from the first type,

34 Gilpin (1987: pp. 3-8, 10) stresses the potential for conflicts because of “the fundamentally differing attitudes of the two countries toward their relationship” which might lead to “a serious breakdown in American-Japanese relations.”


and an alliance built upon the counter-balance in a particular condition emerges from the second type. Relating these propositions to the characteristics of the North-East Asian asymmetric alliance structure, it seems that an alliance versus world domination was the goal of US alliance strategy at the global level, since this strategy targeted at an adversarial superpower, the Soviet Union. This principle has continued to underpin American interests in the post-Cold War era, even though the Soviet Union collapsed. By contrast, the strategies of Japan and South Korea fit into the pattern of an alliance versus a counter-alliance. In the former case, the aim is to achieve defence against a regional security threat; in the latter case, the aim is to achieve a local level of deterrence against North Korea.

The differences between their national strategies of the three countries remained fairly constant throughout the Cold War era. In consequence, the political dynamics between the three constituent nations of the TASS have resulted in a definite fluidity of the alliance’s internal structure.

2.3.2 The Exogenous Factor: Direct and Immediate Challenge

Coupled with endogenous factors, external stimuli to the cohesion of the TASS must also be taken into account in order to explain the dynamics of alliance relations. For heuristic purposes, these factors, as an intervening variable, will be referred to by the term “direct and immediate challenge”. In particular circumstances, a state confronts a “challenge”

---

39 It is necessary to distinguish a “direct and immediate challenge” from a “crisis”. J. M. Roberts (1988: pp. 9-10) summarises the difficulty of defining “crisis”: “It is because definitions are either too specific and
that directly threatens its vital interests, value systems, international prestige, and the continuing existence of the incumbent administration by testing its legitimacy. Such threats are exacerbated by their dominating presence in the mass media and their consequent elevation to the status of major public interest issues. Such direct and immediate challenges tend to be abrupt and unpredictable, which obstructs their effective resolution. In some instances, on the other hand, a threat may not be regarded initially with sufficient gravity and seriousness. These characteristics imply that situation-assessment and response decisions must be enacted in highly volatile and unpredictable circumstances under which a joint, optimally effective reaction among member countries of an alliance is quite difficult.

As a direct and immediate challenge gains and loses momentum, cleavage or cohesion within an alliance is prone to appear. Each challenge is likely to be assessed in different ways and allocated a different priority by the member states of the alliance. Considering the fact that the TASS is asymmetrical and hierarchical, and includes three uneven members, the types of challenge confronted by the US are particularly significant in maintaining the overall coherence of the system. As junior partners of the US, Japan and South Korea have on occasion sought to exploit events and circumstances to their own advantage. Sometimes, however, they have voiced protests and antagonised the senior partner at the risk of generating cleavage within the alliance. Therefore the kinds of direct and immediate challenges that individual member countries face offer an important starting-point for analysing the state of convergence and divergence in the TASS at

---

therefore not applicable to a variety of situations, or so broadly inclusive as to blur distinctions between crisis and non-crisis.” The word “crisis” comes from the ancient Greek medical analogy of “a turning point”, which suggests that “in a disease … the outcome is to be recovery or death.” In other words, the outcome may be favourable or unfavourable.
different times in the alliance's development (The reliability of the term “direct and immediate challenge” will be discussed in Chapters 3, 5 and 7).

In general, as Morgenthau observes, “a typical alliance is imbedded in a dynamic field of diverse interests and purposes,”\(^{40}\) with the central concerns being the mutual benefits in the security area. At the same time, alliance durability has been rooted in the self-restraint of the three countries, therefore, the members have a strong tendency not to terminate an alliance by excessive pursuit of adverse policies. Put differently, members of an alliance continue to keep changes “below the threshold of reversibility.”\(^{41}\) In case of the TASS, the national strategies of the three members states have remained relatively constant. This makes possible the task of extracting distinctive patterns of interaction among the three countries.

2.4 THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF THE TASS AND “DISSIMILAR-INTEGRATIVE” TYPE INTERACTION

Alliance relationships during the Cold War era were rigidly structured. A “corresponding” and “regular” interaction process in a certain system,\(^{42}\) reflecting “a set of mutual expectations among members regarding the behavior of the other partners,”\(^{43}\) emerged in the rigid structure of the bipolar world. In conjunction with an understanding of the sources of internal fluidity, it is also essential to know why an asymmetric alliance


\(^{42}\) Ibid.: p. 17.

can, as in the case of TASS, work reasonably well for several decades. In other words, the limits of intra-alliance conflicts need to be determined.

As discussed in Section 2.3, there have been persistent differences in national strategy, which reflect and determine individual interests, threat perceptions, assessments of the global and regional balance of power and the security environment, between the US, Japan, and South Korea. As a result, as Simmons puts it, "One state may view a bonding relationship as being one type of alliance, while another will perceive the linkage in a different light. This asymmetry of expectations by alliance partners will lead to unbalanced demands and commitments." In the case of the TASS, some of the alliance's basic features have placed limits on the extent of intra-alliance conflict. The fundamental basis of the TASS is the US military presence in Japan and South Korea. US combat forces in South Korea are of particular significance in that South Korea is a projected force that shares a geographical border with hostile forces (in North Korea). Due to geographical proximity, US forces in South Korea, as a "trip wire" triggering automatic American military intervention in any military dispute with North Korea, are a tangible expression of the US security commitment to Japan. Thus, the self-serving interests the

---

46 Although the United States-South Korea defence treaty did not obligate the US to station its combat troops on South Korean soil, successive US administrations continued to maintain the constant level of military strength in the Korean peninsula during the Cold War era. From the earliest stage -- before the Korean War -- the role of the US combat forces was not solely confined to the external and internal security of South Korea and the US national interest there, but also had to consider the repercussions on the US position in Japan, the Soviet Union, and China. (*FRUS, 1949, Vol.VII: pp. 942-52, 969-78*). In addition to its effective deterrence of North Korea's possible aggression, the other purposes of US military policy in South Korea can be summarised as follows: (1) to avoid hegemony by any major power in the Korean peninsula; (2) to exert a restraint on South Korea's unilateral military actions; (3) to provide an umbrella for South Korea's continued economic expansion; (4) to give tangible assurance of US support for South Korea's peaceful initiatives toward North Korea; and (5) to serve as a symbol of America's continuing interest in the overall stability of the region, especially with regard to Japan. (Lee and Sato, 1982): p. 102.
US have been turned into overriding common interests between the three countries. At the same time, any change to the status of the US military presence has been regarded as one of the most serious sources of disruption to the cohesion of the alliance.

In order to examine the established patterns of interaction with the TASS that have led to reasonable alliance stability, the comment of Hermann is pertinent: “critical variables must be maintained within certain limits or the instability of the system will be greatly increased” (emphasis added). As long as a certain grouping of states is called an alliance, there are inevitably spoken or unspoken limits to divergent interests and the disruptive actions that members can initiate.

Table 2.3 Four Types of Interactive Patterns in Sub-systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Similar-Integrative</td>
<td>Homogeneity in religion and culture facilitates negotiations and compromise among actors in a system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar-Disintegrative</td>
<td>The presence of ethnic minorities of similar origin in contiguous states increases turmoil and the tendency to hostile behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilar-Integrative</td>
<td>Economic and technological heterogeneity among actors leads to increasing interdependence, specialisation and mutual co-operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilar-Disintegrative</td>
<td>Political regimes with different ideologies induce competition for leadership and sphere of influence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Brecher and Yehuda distinguish between four different types of interactive patterns in a system, and their typology is based on a variety of factors—economic, military, social, political and cultural—all of which can contribute to a system’s heterogeneity or homogeneity. The case of the US-Japan-South Korea alliance, matches the third

---

Part 12 Analytical Framework

("dissimilar-integrative") type (see Table 2.3). The US has provided Japan and South Korea with a strategic defence capacity through its military presence and nuclear umbrella. This US security commitment is the fundamental foundation of the TASS. In response, Japan had supplied material facilities and economic support. South Korea, standing on the front line against communism, has shouldered the biggest cost (i.e. the risk of total war in its own territory) and provided manpower readiness. In terms of economic capacity, the US and Japan, as global leaders, may be regarded as homogeneous, but South Korea’s level of development introduces a degree of heterogeneity into the triangular alliance. In terms of military capability, due to its possessions of nuclear weapons, US enjoys a superior position, and thus the alliance is characterised by heterogeneity. Both Japan and South Korea depend on the US security commitment and military presence in their countries. In a sense, they share a homogeneous perception of their own insecurity. This is reinforced their geographical proximity and cultural homogeneity, which lessens miscommunication between Japan and South Korea. The question of politics, the central theme of this research, is more complex. The US and South Korea could hardly be more different, with the former having a liberal democratic political system and the latter being subject to authoritarian rule until the end of the Cold War era. Between these two extremes, Japan has the characteristics of both a Westernised democratic state and a regime based on one-party dominance (Chapter 5 will investigate how the close cultural and political homogeneity between Japan and South Korea affects their alliance interests positively). The most important observation here is that Japan, as a middle member and the rear base of the alliance, has played the role of cementing the relationship between the US and South

Korea when political obstacles to the enhancement of alliance goals have emerged. In general, despite the differences between them in terms of national power parity and strategy, the US, Japan and South Korea have secured sources of interdependence as a systemic unit.

2.5 ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES OF THE US AND JAPAN ON THE KOREAN QUESTION: THE FLEXIBLE STATUS QUO AND THE RIGID STATUS QUO

The contrasting intervention strategies of the US and Japan in relation to the regime transition in South Korea (1979-80) can be explained in terms of the fundamental difference between the two countries’ basic orientations: while the US followed a flexible status quo policy linked to offensive intervention, Japan followed a rigid status quo policy in accordance with defensive intervention.50

2.5.1 Political Intervention

One of the key tasks of diplomacy is to contribute to order and change in foreign countries,51 and an alliance is one of the main diplomatic tools used by large nations to control and dominate smaller alliance partners, and by smaller allies to manipulate larger

---

50 For one classic example revealing the different views of the status quo among members of an alliance, see Morgenthau (1985): pp. 484-5. He compares the British interpretation with others such as the Austrian, Prussian, Russian and French in the Holy Alliance in the early nineteenth century. Unlike the British interpretation, the latter countries understood that they could intervene in the internal affairs of all nations in which the institution of the absolute monarchy seemed to be in danger.

alliance partners. An alliance security system is created to provide an order and an environment in which the alliance leader is safe and secure. In order to maintain the equilibrium of alliance objectives, the leader controls and restrains the behaviour of allies. In practical terms, the US has taken account of the disruptive pressures in the TASS, both internal and external, and tried to resolve them in its favour. Employing various means to prop up a friendly regime or undermine a hostile regime by the secret channeling of funds, arms, and organising a military coup against the opposition falls certainly into the category of intervention. In contemporary international relations, intervention is a fact of life, for a feature of the international system is that it creates a self-perpetuating web of interdependence. In the political sense, Surhke suggests that intervention means "an act aimed at the political structure of the target nation, and one which departs from existing policy of the intervening nation." From the vantage point of a leading state in an alliance, continuous political interactions among allies can be called "alliance management" because of "an acute awareness of the many risks of sharing their fate with allies." In terms of the rationales for intervention in an alliance, Kegley and Witkopf argue that states "must control the behavior of their own allies" in order to "ensure that allies' commitments to one another are faithfully honored," "discourage each member from reckless aggression against its enemies" and "deter defection from alliance." Thus, in an asymmetric alliance a leading country sometimes intervenes to secure the optimal state of the domestic politics of the junior ally that will serve the maximum interest of the major partner in an alliance system. The contents of the optimal state are inevitably different from one member state to another in a multilateral security

53 Ibid.: p. 90.
Part 12 Analytical Framework

system, and the actual types of intervention are also not identical. In particular, as Said, Lersche Jr. and Lersche III point out, the defensive and offensive forms of intervention need to be distinguished:

Defensive intervention aims at the preservation of a particular regime or system, whereas offensive intervention is directed at altering a particular regime or a system. Defensive intervention has most frequently been based on the assumption that a state, particularly a great power, cannot permit the distribution of power in the system to be materially changed to its disadvantage by another state’s change of government policy. Offensive intervention is expansive and has been used to bring about a change of policy or government in another state or to eliminate its independence completely.\(^5\)

In general, the interests of the US and Japan in South Korea has run parallel in reducing North-South tensions and in preventing a renewed large-scale military conflict in which either of the two countries could become involved.\(^5\) The two countries had a common interest in the emergence of a strong Korean buffer state. In this sense, they shared an emphasis on securing the status quo in the Korean peninsula. Consequently, both countries generally intervene in South Korean politics in a defensive and also friendly way. Sometimes, however, as will be explained in Parts Two and Three, US intervention became offensive. The US and Japan did not base their interventions on the same commanding principles,\(^6\) and the substance of the status quo did not have the same

---

\(^6\) About a month after General Park Chung-hee’s military coup, which toppled the civilian leadership in South Korea, Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi told US President J. Kennedy (on 20 June 1961 in Washington) that: “The record of Japan’s long history testifies to the fact that the security of Korea is, in effect, a domestic problem for Japan. Japan has a very vital stake in Korea. Japan is willing to accept even the present regime since it is anti-communist. Although it is important to bring about an improvement in the present situation, it is even more essential to prevent a communist takeover of South Korea.” (FRUS,1961-1963, Vol.XXII: p. 490)
implications for the two countries. The maintenance of the status quo, as Buzan argues, means that “the essential structure of the local complex — its distribution of power, and pattern of hostility — remains fundamentally intact”, but “for this outcome to occur does not mean that no change has taken place.”\(^{61}\) In this study the term “flexible status quo” is used to denote the imperative of US policy towards the Korea, while the term “rigid status quo” denotes the imperative of Japanese policy.

2.5.2 The US Flexible Status Quo Policy

The US has continued to place an enormous emphasis on the value of South Korea for its national interest. During the Cold War era, only the US has had the capability and will to provide South Korea with assurance and assistance necessary for its security and defence.\(^{62}\) However, the US security commitment has not been unconditional.\(^{63}\) From the start, the US made it clear that its policy towards the Korean peninsula and South Korea in particular would be determined by the state of the changing pattern of US-Soviet structural rivalry and other related issues.\(^{64}\) It meant that US-South Korea policy has never been based entirely on the need to deter aggression by North Korea. The value of South Korea to the US national interest has tended to fluctuate according to changes of American global strategy. In order to ensure that South Korea serves US strategy, the US

\(^{61}\) Buzan (1991): p. 216. Similarly, Oran Young was precise in defining stability both statically and dynamically. “In static terms, stability refers to the continuance of the essential variables of an international system (i.e. actors, structure, processes, and context) within the bounds of recognizability over time. Stability in this sense implies, therefore, an absence of qualitative changes. In dynamic terms, stability can be thought of as the tendency of a system to move in the direction of equilibrium following disturbances.” Cited in Brecher and James (1986): pp. 14-5.


tends to impose external pressure when South Korea is not ready to follow the changing focus of US foreign policy. It is occasionally extended in an attempt to force changes in the South Korean political system, it combined a flexible status quo orientation and a strategy of offensive intervention. From the US point of view, the political unity of South Korea has been a crucial requirement as a basis for its alliance strategy.

For South Korea, the reliance on the US for security has been of critical importance in ensuring the survival of South Korea as a state. In such conditions, as Walt notes, "The ability to attract and maintain allied support can be a formidable asset, prudent leaders will pay close attention to the forces that bring states together or drive them apart." South Korean governments have been very sensitive to even small changes in American foreign policy and domestic politics, especially in relation to the status of US forces in South Korea. Any reduction of US forces in South Korea, let alone possible withdrawal, has been regarded as abandonment. As Surhke observes, in order to assume a strong position for obtaining the alliance leader’s economic assistance, political support and military commitment, "the smaller partner must maintain internal order, fulfil alliance obligations, and isolate domestic conditions from the external functions of the alliance."

In an asymmetrical alliance, the leader must continuously manage the followers’ foreign and even domestic policies, and the weaker state will seek to realise its national interests through constant exertion of its own influence towards the leader. The weaker state cannot afford to rely totally on the other party’s good will. The position of South Korea

---

within the TASS can be defined as that of a "projected state" located next to its communist adversary, and supported by US air and army bases. Standing in the front line against a possible North Korean attack, South Korea has been able to exert disproportionate influence within the alliance above the actual level of its material power.

Under such conditions, Morgenthau's definition of political power is helpful for explaining the political dynamics within an alliance. He defines political power as "a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised. It gives the former control over certain actions of the latter through the impact which the former exerts on the latter's minds." Since, in alliance relations, the exertion of the leading state's influence is confined to less coercive means, the leader's political power implies the followers' voluntary loyalty to the leadership (See the discussion in Chapter 6). Snyder and Diesing observe that there is an essential tension, "due to the lack of realignment options," between the asymmetry of power dependence between superpower and ally and the virtual certainty that the superpower will defend the allies. J. M. Roberts develops this argument as follows:

The allies can be controlled, but also they can be adventurous if they want. The point is that the ally knows that the superpower has an interest in defending it ... Similarly, the degree of control that a superpower has over an ally depends upon how much the superpower

---


69 Morgenthau (1959).

70 Morgenthau (1985): p. 30. As a superpower, the US, in order to maintain the American system, had to implant the confidence and complete conviction in the minds of its allies that "U.S. strategy and policy serve their security as well as its own, and that the United States is committed to their defense and possesses the capability to fulfill that commitment."(FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol.XIX: p. 293)

needs that alliance member. The more it needs a particular state, the less its control over that state.  

Thus, any change of internal order in South Korea have been seen by the US as dangerous if they threatened to contradict the goals of the alliance. In turn, this proposition suggests that there was always the possibility that the US, as a superpower, would acquiesce in military take-over in an ally as long as the newly emerging military power in a strategically valuable location was anti-communist.

The US-South Korea alliance is a two-way alliance in which both countries make strategic gains, but in different ways. This reciprocity has to some extent restricted the unilateral freedom of action by either side. Furthermore, the long-term interaction among allies tends to make relations more complicated. As observed by Suhrke, “One well-known tactic is to exploit internal dissent within the larger state. This requires some familiarity with the political processes of the larger power and a willingness to take the risk of associating oneself with the political fortunes of particular domestic factions in the larger state.” In a sense, therefore, alliance management is a delicate and uneasy task to implement, and in particular, it is difficult to achieve a specifically designated goal.

2.5.3 The Japanese Rigid Status Quo Policy

Kegley and Witkopf define the relentless pursuit of the junior or second-tier alliance partners’ independent spheres of activities as bi-polycentrism: “Although the

---

superpowers remained dominant militarily, this less-rigid system allowed other states to perform new foreign policy roles, other than simply aligned or nonaligned." This principle can be applied not only to the relations between a junior member of an alliance and a superpower of the other alliance (e.g. in US-Romanian relations and Soviet-French relations) but also to the relations between junior partners within an alliance when they have their own intrinsic common interests or face common threats. It is not easy to compare the degree of US and Japanese vital interests in the Korean Peninsula. Certainly, the level of Japanese interests has never been less than that of the US\(^7\) (see Chapter 3); but at the same time the level of US interests has tended to fluctuate, especially during the Carter administration, when South Korea was no longer perceived as a "vital" interest.

Referring to the sources of conflict and strain in an alliance, J. M. Roberts argues that: "Each ally has different interests, and may feel threatened in different degrees from different quarters as a result of geographical locations and particular conflicts with different members of the other alliance."\(^7\) In this respect, the US and Japan have not shared the same perception of insecurity of South Korea, and accordingly there has been no agreement between the two countries on the best way to introduce a politically desirable system to South Korea. From a Japanese perspective, the prospects for the Korean security have depended largely on what the United States is prepared to do. Because of their different status quo orientations, the US and Japan have developed


\(^{76}\) Nuechterlein (1979: p. 85) suggested that vital interests could be categorised into value and cost/risk factors. The former are proximity of danger, nature of threat, economic stake, sentimental attachment, type of government, effect on balance of power, national prestige at stake, attitude of key allies; while the latter consist of economic costs of military hostilities, estimated casualties from hostilities, risk of protracted conflict, risk of enlarged conflict, cost of stalemate or defeat, risk of public opposition, cost of UN opposition, cost of Congressional opposition.

different attitudes to the presence of US forces in South Korea, the understanding of the South Korean political system, and the treatment of North Korea. Thus, Japanese discussions of Korea's future have tended to become debates about US policy, and Japan has inevitably viewed US policy toward Korea as an indicator of the strength of the US commitment to Japan itself. At the same time, Japan has seen the Korean peninsula as a source of potential insecurity, and, not unnaturally, Japan has sought to limit the emergence of hostile forces and to establish its own influence in South Korea no less deeply and directly than the US does.

Reviewing the past experience of the TASS (see further the discussion in Chapter 3), there have been many occasions when common general interests among the US, Japan and South Korea prevailed. At the same time, it is also discovered that Japan and South Korea have their own particular interests separated from general interests common with the US within the TASS. Because of the geopolitical proximity between Japan and South Korea, and the South Korean position as a projected state confronting the communist threat, any distinction between the strategic value of South Korea and Japan to the United States would have been meaningless. Japan's role in the TASS can be explained in terms of particular interests with South Korea and/or threat perceptions. In that sense, Japan and South Korea have had particular interests which have not always been identical with American national interests. Japan and South Korea, as non-communist states in Northeast Asia, have shared a common feeling of insecurity because of their geographical proximity to the sources of threats and the American policy of support at a distance. At

---

79 Snyder and Diesing distinguish between two categories of interests: (a) particular interests (strategic or intrinsic); and (b) general interests (interests with respect to the power configuration in the system) (1977: p. 424).
the same time, there has been a clear difference between the two states’ feelings of insecurity: South Korea perceives “a defined threat, a visibly prepared aggression,” mainly from North Korea, whereas Japan perceives that “the mere imbalance of forces” can “create insecurity.” It is the central root of the rigid status quo policy of Japan towards the Korean peninsula. These shared but somewhat different sources of insecurity tied the two countries together in the defence area during the Cold War. Any conflict with a hostile communist power on the Korean peninsula would have an immediate and direct impact on Japanese security. This dilemma extends to the role of Japan towards internal conflicts in South Korea. Thus, it can be said that the gap between the national strategies of the US and Japan is significantly wider than that between those of the US and South Korea. At the same time, the geopolitical proximity of Japan and South Korea has compelled these countries to overcome the gap in their national strategies.

Japan’s version of the status quo has allowed very limited room for flexibility to cope with the changing international and regional security environments because of its limited military capability. The emphasis is placed on minimising the changes in the Korean peninsula in an effort to avoid dismantling of the existing balance of power in the Northeast Asian region. In other words, Japan seeks to shield the Northeast Asian region in general and the Korean peninsula in particular from the negative impact of changes in global power parity. It also included a desire to minimise the changes in South Korean politics and, if necessary, to respond accordingly to the fluctuation of US containment policy towards the Soviet Union, and of its East Asian policy.

---

80 Schuman observes that: “The feeling of insecurity is not always due to a defined threat, a visibly prepared aggression. The mere imbalance of forces that is maintained by the stronger and not compensated for by serious international guarantees in favour of the weaker suffices to create insecurity.” Cited in Grosser (1978): p. 154.
To sum up, Japan plays a significant role as the middle member between the US and South Korea in seeking to maintain the alliance’s equilibrium at times when changes of US policy towards East Asia and the Korean peninsula in particular have threatened to upset the balance. In fact, Japan played three different roles as mediator, facilitator and initiator. The role of mediator involves in settling disputes between two or more international entities in a belief that the actor benefits from the absence of conflict between parties in the dispute in the international system. As will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, the main Japanese role in the TASS has been that of mediator, trying to ensure that the US has continued to provide its security commitment to South Korea. As long as Japan has benefited through the settlement of disputes between the US and South Korea, it has tended to, as a facilitator of the TASS, increase its defence burdens in military, economic and political terms (see Chapter 3). The role of initiator has involved redirecting US policies towards East Asia and South Korea (see Chapter 5 and 7).

CONCLUSION

Hitherto studies of the political dynamics between the US, Japan and South Korea have remained underdeveloped because of the complexity of the issues involved and the lack of reliable analytical tools: a new analytical framework is necessary which combines a systemic approach and alliance theory. In particular, the aim is to overcome the limitations of previous democratisation approaches to the South Korean regime transition of 1979-1980.

In order to explore and explain the contrasting US and Japanese policies towards South Korea, and the resulting responsive measures taken by South Korea, the following chapters will closely investigate the member states' changing attitudes to the TASS, major policy changes, the issue of the US military presence in South Korea, the limits of alliance management of the Korean question, and patterns of intervention by the US and Japan in South Korean domestic politics, including contacts with North Korea over the heads of the South Korean leadership. The rest of the dissertation is devoted to showing precisely how the fundamental basis of the TASS and the limits of intra-alliance conflicts have emerged and shifted to reflect the changing agenda of political interaction among the three countries.
CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRIANGULAR ALLIANCE SECURITY SYSTEM (TASS), 1965-1978

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to trace the evolution of the TASS since its formation and to investigate how the modus operandi of the alliance has been established. In particular, the chapter seeks to show how the TASS evolved towards a low-level political community through the experience of continuous consultation and debate related to military security and political stability issues in the region. This perspective is then developed in the following chapters into an analysis of the political interventions of the US and Japan in the regime transition in South Korea during 1979-80.

Kupchan identifies three behavioural patterns of co-operation in an alliance: consultation, facilitation and compensation. Interaction is a dynamic feedback process of actions and expectations. In reality, therefore, the inter-state patterns of behaviour in an alliance inevitably consist of both co-operation and conflict, reflecting differences of national powers and strategy, and the distribution of benefits. In terms of US-Japan-South Korean relations, especially in the security area, the dominant pattern has been that of co-operation. At the same time, as this chapter seeks to show, relations have sometimes been
The chapter presents a systemic analysis of the political interplay between the US, Japan and South Korea between 1964 and 1978, a period which covers the two waves of fluctuations in the cohesion of the alliance: from the Johnson administration to the Nixon administration, and from the Ford administration to the first years of the Carter administration. Section 3.1 deals with the evolution of the alliance during the Johnson Presidency, and the loss of momentum during the Nixon administration (Section 2). Section 3.3 concentrates on the regaining of cohesion during the Ford administration, and Section 3.4 examines the return to friction during the first half of the Carter administration. Throughout these phases, Japan played a crucial 'third party' role in the triangular alliance security system.


Despite its failure to bring Japan into a collective security arrangement, the US succeeded in building the triangular alliance security system (the TASS) in East Asia as a counter-alliance by leading Japan and South Korea to normalise their diplomatic relations in 1965. The Johnson-Sato-Park years, between 1964 and 1968, saw an underlining of the basic structure of the TASS. The Vietnam War—an immediate and direct challenge to the vital interests, values and international prestige of the US—had a great impact on the initial formation and consolidation of the TASS.²

² On the various factors involved in alliance formation, see Walt (1988).
3.1.1 US Logic and the Anticipated Benefits from the TASS

The escalation of US intervention in Vietnam heightened the importance of strengthening the US alliance structure to promote the effective mobilisation of Japanese and South Korean support. Prior to 1965, US security treaties in East Asia were generally based on bilateral agreements, e.g. with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan. Although these treaties covered the major "rims" around the Sino-Soviet bloc in the region, the Johnson administration decided to add two important bilateral "spokes" with Japan and South Korea (refer to Table 2.1) in order to mobilise the support of those two countries more effectively when the US became deeply engaged in the Vietnam War and received what it perceived to be inadequate support from its European allies. Consequently, policy-makers in the State Department and the White House began to re-emphasise the importance of South Korea-Japan diplomatic normalisation for strengthening free world unity in Northeast Asia. Hence there was unprecedented US pressure on Japan and South Korea to achieve normalisation before the end of 1965. On their part, the Japanese and South Korean governments welcomed US involvement, for they were both anxious to stem the tide of militant protest by their political opponents. After the conclusion of the normalisation treaty in 1965, President Johnson sent congratulatory messages to both Sato and Park, who in turn released the messages to the press and expressed genuine appreciation of America's contribution. The ratification exchange ceremony between Japan and South Korea was held in Seoul on 18 December

---

5 Even before the conclusion of the diplomatic normalisation treaty, the US could in part forestall trouble between Japan and South Korea through the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) (FRUS, 1955-1957 XXI: pp. 225-6). For American public opposition to the US war effort in Vietnam, see Andrews (1976).
1965, thus effectively marking the creation of the TASS.

Through the 1965 normalisation treaty, the Johnson administration succeeded in mobilising two key Asian allies to support its war effort in Vietnam. The US rearranged its Northeast Asian alliance system by providing human and material resources, and strategic leadership, and was able to move towards reducing the mounting cost of its total defence effort in South Korea. At the same time, Japan provided an indispensable logistics centre together with political and moral support; and South Korea provided the US with essential manpower. In terms of systemic interdependence and the spillover effect of the treaty, a framework was established for South Korean military participation in Vietnam, Japanese economic expansion into South Korea, and the integration of Japan and South Korea into the overall US military strategy for Northeast Asia. From then onwards, security concerns became inextricably linked with the three states’ broader economic and political interactions.

### 3.1.2 Japanese Logic and the Anticipated Benefits from the TASS

For Japan, the Vietnam question was exceedingly complex. The Sato administration’s view of the roots of the conflict in Vietnam was not the same as that of the US: from the Japanese perspective, the main problem was the political fragility of the South Vietnamese government. The Japanese government was also concerned that America’s intervention in Vietnam was extremely unpopular with Japanese people. For these

---


reasons, the Sato cabinet’s active role in supporting the US war effort requires careful explanation.

In spite of the critical importance of Japan’s logistical support to US military operations, American expectations extended further to moral support and political, diplomatic and military co-operation. In responding to US demands, the Sato government had to consider four main factors: the domestic political landscape in Japan; the need to maintain a good relationship with the USA; the importance of not exacerbating problems in relations with the People’s Republic of China, which had successfully conducted nuclear tests in October 1964; and Japan’s claim to sovereignty over the Okinawa Islands. The Sato cabinet’s chosen strategy was, first, to emphasise the second of these factors by lending moral and diplomatic support to the US (while refraining from sending Japanese manpower to the South-East Asian battlefield), thus avoiding a repetition of the political misjudgment of the Kishi cabinet when dealing with the revision of the US-Japan security treaty in 1960. Secondly, it was decided to press for a restoration of the Okinawa Islands to Japanese jurisdiction. Inevitably, however, one consequence of these decisions was that Japan’s relations with the PRC deteriorated, even though Sato repeatedly denied that his government viewed the PRC as a “hypothetical enemy.” In other words, the US succeeded in keeping its key Asian ally from defecting to the opposing camp.

---

10 Kim Hong-nak (1973); Powell (1965).
11 Emerson (1969): p. 357. After the revision of the security treaty with Japan in 1960, the US wanted Japan to be “military counterweight to the rising power of Communist China” (FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XXII: p. 354). The Johnson-Sato communiqué on 13 January 1965 endorsed the US view that the regime in Taiwan was the legitimate government of the whole of China. The November 1967 joint communiqué confirmed Japan’s anti-PRC policy.
Japan’s willingness to lend support to American intervention in Vietnam was compensated by the US. Relying on a close personal relationship with President Johnson, and in response to the growing popular opposition to Japan’s support of the US war efforts in Vietnam, the Sato administration judged that the US would be receptive to its claim to regain sovereignty over the Okinawa Islands as a symbol of the completion of Japan’s “independence”. The US perceived that the growing nationalistic mood in Japan might hinder the extension of the security treaty between the US and Japan, and a compromise was thus regarded as inevitable. The joint communiqué issued on 15 November 1967 in Washington represented official US recognition of the Japanese claim to administrative rights over the Islands in exchange for Japan’s “full” support of US policy in Vietnam. This helped Sato to avert a political crisis during the subsequent discussions on extending the US-Japanese security treaty in 1970. Without committing itself to direct intervention in the war, Tokyo turned US involvement in Vietnam to its own advantage in both economic and politico-diplomatic terms.

3.1.3 South Korean Logic and the Anticipated Benefits: Political Legitimacy and the Deployment of Troops to Vietnam

For the Park regime, diplomatic normalisation with Japan presented both dangers and opportunities. Park’s greatest fear was the possibility that, as a result of the treaty with Japan, US commitment to South Korea would be downgraded in favour of greater

---


15 Japanese industries earned at least $1 billion a year by providing goods and services to the United States and South Vietnamese forces (Havens, 1987): p. 5.
security responsibilities for Japan. On the other hand, Park’s greatest hope was that he would succeed in gaining Japan’s voluntary economic and security support while at the same time retaining American political support and commitment to South Korean security, with its concomitant economic advantages. Such developments could only enhance the domestic legitimacy of the Park regime.

The US respected Park’s desire. Dean Rusk visited Seoul in January 1964 and in April 1965. The key issues were threefold: the earliest diplomatic normalisation between Japan and South Korea; American political support for the Park regime; and the continuation of basic US policy for the maintenance of the security commitment to, and the provision of economic assistance for development in, South Korea. Similar confirmations and assurances continued to follow in the form of presidential letters and summit talks between Johnson and Park. In December 1964, Johnson assured Park in a letter that American forces stationed in South Korea would not be withdrawn without prior consultation with the South Korean government, and that the United States would pay the cost of maintaining South Korean troops dispatched to Vietnam. At the Washington summit meeting in May 1965, President Johnson told Park that the US military and economic assistance to South Korea would not be affected by the normalisation of South Korea-Japan relations. Soon afterwards, in July 1965 in Seoul, General Dwight E. Beach, Chief of UNC in Korea, and Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown jointly confirmed that there would be no reduction in US force levels without prior consultation with the Park regime. The next year saw a renewal of these strong commitments when US Vice-

---

President Hubert Humphrey visited Seoul in February. Furthermore, when President Johnson visited Seoul in November 1966, he reaffirmed in the joint communiqué with President Park "the readiness and determination of the United States to render prompt and effective assistance to defeat an armed attack against the Republic of Korea."

The Park regime deployed its combat forces directly to Vietnam, enhanced its diplomatic leverage, enjoyed double patronage; and was able to strengthen its political legitimacy. After obtaining repeated assurances of the US security commitment, Park then refused US requests for an increase in its South Korean troop levels in Vietnam. On the other hand, the regime sought to ensure that the US would reject any peace settlement that could be regarded as a sign of appeasement towards the Viet Cong. Thus, the Park regime could be seen to exhibit a characteristic tendency of an alliance game by striving to expand its benefits and reduce its obligations.

US-South Korea relations entered a particularly crucial phase in January 1968. On 21 January, a 31-member commando team from North Korea attacked President Park's official residence in an attempt to kill him. Just two days later, North Korean forces captured the US intelligence ship Pueblo. Stunned, the Park regime tried to persuade the United States to launch an air strike against North Korean military installations. However, the US was not at all willing to open a second front in East Asia. From the outset, it was impossible for South Korea either to lead the US to join in a combined offensive or to gain American support for South Korea's unilateral military retaliation against North Korea. Instead, two compensatory measures—a $100 million aid package for South

---

Korean military modernisation and the establishment of the annual US-South Korean Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) at ministerial level (commencing in May 1968)—were taken. However, these could not prevent a heightening of South Korean suspicion towards the US at a time when US involvement in Vietnam was drawing to a close. The reversal of America's escalation policy threatened to weaken the bargaining power secured by South Korean military participation in the war. Moreover, the US began to see divided Korea itself as "another Vietnam", with a communist northern territory and a southern regime whose legitimacy was questionable.

3.1.4 A New Start for Japan-South Korea Relations, 1965-1968

From a systemic point of view, Japan could have avoided US pressures to join direct military operations in Vietnam by passing this responsibility on to South Korea. In so doing, the Sato cabinet could have placated its political opponents, who had accused the government of integrating Japan with South Korea under the umbrella of American military strategy towards Northeast Asia. At a broader level, during the Vietnam War Japan became deeply involved in regional politics. The difficulties confronting the US in South-East Asia reminded Japan of the fact that South Korea, as a buffer zone and forward base, the projected state, played a vital role in defend Japan from Northeast Asian communism.

Bilaterally, after diplomatic normalisation with Seoul, Japan offered economic assistance and diplomatic, but not military,\(^{20}\) support to facilitate the security of South Korea. By

\(^{20}\) In substance, Japan developed a *de facto* security cooperation scheme represented by the Three Arrow Study (*Mitsuya Kenkyu*), whose contents went far beyond the Guideline revised from 1996 onwards, final
1967, within two years of diplomatic normalisation, Japan had overtaken the US as the primary trading partner of South Korea. In South Korea's First Five-Year Plan (1962-1966), the Japanese contribution constituted 29 per cent of South Korea's total foreign capital requirement ($630.3 million). In the Second Plan (1967-1971), this dropped to 19.3 per cent of the substantially enlarged total capital requirement ($2,858.9 million). As a result of this economic contribution, Japan was able to exert an increasingly significant influence on South Korea in the spheres of security and defence. This was evident from the rapid growth of official contacts between the two countries. These co-operative efforts led eventually to the establishment of annual ministerial meetings in 1967, prior to the US-South Korean Security Consultative Meeting in 1968. Other organisations and networks embracing members of the top political and business circles in both countries were also established, and many of them lobbied for policies favourable to South Korea's interests in both Japan and the US.

The strengthening of diplomatic and economic ties between Japan and South Korea was accompanied by the reaffirmation of a shared strategic outlook. In August 1968, the Second Annual Ministerial Meeting declared that “the security and prosperity of [South] Korea have an important influence on that of Japan,” a statement which underlined the Korean Clause in the Nixon-Sato Communiqué of November 1969. The declaration revealed a key element of interdependence in the security sphere between Japan and

Guideline bill presented in 1997, passed in 1998, in terms of military cooperation with the US and South Korea. In late June 1963, the Japanese Defence Agency completed its proposal regarding the security interconnection of the three countries. According to the study, Japan would be an integral part of the US strategy in the Far East and serve as the base for US operations, and the Self-Defense Forces would be involved in joint or combined operations with US forces (Hughes, 1999): p. 113.

23 Ibid.: p. 31.
South Korea, even though this was a symbolic gesture signifying that Japan was prepared to assume more responsibility in regional politics as a prerequisite for the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. In this sense, Japan’s enthusiasm for South Korean security served primarily as a diplomatic lever to influence the US.

In summary, the US-Japan relationship, like that between the US and South Korea, solidified during the period of escalated American military intervention in Vietnam under the Johnson administration. Within the structure of the TASS, the normalisation treaty was particularly important as a mechanism for reordering alliance relationships and the division of labour between the US, Japan and South Korea. The US was undoubtedly the pivot of East Asian security, an irreplaceable strategic military resource, the source of the nuclear umbrella, and hence the final guarantor for the defence of Japan and South Korea. Japan played a key role in providing logistical support, while South Korea, as a front-line state, shouldered a heavy burden not only in terms of manpower readiness but also in allocating a very high proportion of GNP to defence expenditure. In exchange, South Korea wanted the US and Japan to stand firm on the side of the South, while at the same time promising non-interference in the South’s internal politics. The fundamental basis of the TASS, the US military presence in South Korea, was never seriously shaken during the Johnson-Sato-Park phase, and the ideological solidarity and joint involvement of the three countries in the US war effort in Vietnam, as well as two military disputes with North Korea, kept the US and Japan from opening direct channels with North Korea without the approval of the Park regime. In general, therefore, from 1964 to 1968, the cohesion of the TASS remained intact.

24 During the Cold War era, on average, South Korea spent about 6% of GNP for defence expenditure while Japan constantly kept about 1%. The US spent about 3% of GNP for the defence expenditure.
3.2 THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, 1969-1974: FROM VIETNAM TO DÉTENTE

The overriding factor in the dramatic changes in US foreign policy during four consecutive administrations was the defeat in the Vietnam war. The problem was, as McCormick argues, that the lessons of the war were viewed in different ways by different American leaders: “While some believed that Vietnam heralded the decline of American hegemony and the need for the United States to accommodate to changing circumstances, others thought that Vietnam dramatised the need for the US to increase its military strength in order to regain its hegemonic position.”25 The former conclusion was dominant in the Nixon era; the Reagan Presidency embraced the latter view; and the Ford administration’s foreign policy fell somewhere between the two extremes. President Carter, who questioned the entire post-war policy of his predecessors, returned to the first view. The radical redirection of US foreign policy away from the rigid containment strategy which, “had projected America into the front line of every international crisis,”26 began during the Johnson administration. “No more Vietnams”, “Asia for the Asians” and “negotiation, not confrontation” were rapidly emerging as key slogans in the debates on post-Vietnam foreign policy.27

The implementation of a policy of assistance from a distance weakened US relations with its Asian allies, especially Japan and South Korea. During the Nixon administration, it became evident that when the global design of the US assumed primacy, it increasingly diverged from the Northeast Asian regional policy. More specifically, when the scope of

26 Kissinger (1994).
US foreign policy extended beyond the scope of the East Asian regional level, the divergence of interests among the three members of the TASS increased. During the Nixon presidency, the degree of systemic cohesion rapidly declined as the member states attempted to follow their own independent paths. This section examines how shifts in US foreign policy affected the convergence of the TASS, and how Japan and South Korea attempted to cope with these changes during the Nixon Presidency. The issue of America's China policy is dealt with in terms of its impact on the cohesion of the TASS and on the incumbent governments of Japan and South Korea.

3.2.1 US-Japan Relations during the Nixon Administration, 1969-1974

The new Nixon administration redirected foreign policy beyond the limits of the TASS, which no longer had the same significance for the US following the defeat in the Vietnam War. A dual-track Asia policy was developed in 1969 on the basis of disengagement from Vietnam: one track, aimed at the Asian junior allies, was unveiled in the Guam Doctrine; and the second track, seeking to tilt the balance to US advantage by inviting the PRC into international society, was revealed in the Shanghai Communiqué. On the surface, in the first track, the role of Japan was elevated to a higher position than in the Johnson administration's foreign policy. However, in the second track, Japan had to yield its position of strategic importance to the PRC in the eyes of the US.

---

28 The main theme of the Guam Doctrine is as follows: "The US would provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival to our security. ... In a case involving non-nuclear aggression, the US would look to the nation directly threatened to assume the responsibility of providing the manpower for defence." Meanwhile the Shanghai Communiqué stated that: "Progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the US is in the interest of all countries; both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict; neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region; each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony." (Kissinger, 1994): pp. 709, 729.
Before its rapprochement with the PRC, the Nixon administration urgently sought to settle the question of disengagement from Vietnam. The disengagement process required the US to adjust the allocation of responsibility for East Asian regional security with Japan in exchange for the reversion of the Okinawa Islands to Japanese sovereignty. At last, on 21 November 1969, President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato issued a long joint communiqué. Three important points were agreed: the reversion of Okinawa to Japan by 1972; the increased responsibility of Japan in the security area; and the renewal of the US-Japan security treaty and its further automatic extension every ten years as long as both parties were agreed. The first outcome clearly favoured Japan; the second favoured the United States; and the third was to their mutual advantage. As far as the Korean question was concerned, the Japanese Prime Minister stated that “the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan’s own security.” In addition, he reconfirmed his position on the China question: “The maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan”. Sato wasted no time in utilising this accomplishment for the enhancement of his political career. Soon after his return to Japan, he dissolved the Diet and called a general election for December 1969. The ruling LDP gained a resounding victory. “A significant proportion of the electorate welcomed the joint communiqué and supported the U.S.-Japan relationship on security issues.” The first year’s dealings with the Nixon administration were quite promising. The US-Japan Security Treaty, which was to expire on 22 June 1970, was approved by the Diet without serious difficulty. However, considering the undercurrent of movement toward rapprochement between the US and the PRC in 1969, the Nixon-Sato

communiqué in 1969 went too far in standing firm in diplomatic recognition terms with the Republic of China. Indeed, the communiqué was criticized by the PRC and North Korea when Chou En-lai and Kim Il-sung met at Pyongyang from 5 to 7 April 1970. Tokyo did not seem to take the criticism seriously, but expressed its willingness to assume responsibilities in the lessening of international tension and in the creation of a new order for world peace.

While these developments were taking place, the diplomatic rapprochement between the US and the PRC proceeded rapidly. At 10:30 p.m. on 15 July 1971 (11:30 a.m. on 16 July in Japan), President Nixon announced that he would visit China before May 1972. The news reached the Japanese Prime Minister’s residence at 11:27 a.m., when Sato was reviewing the draft of the next day’s opening speech before the Diet. In that speech he emphasised the continuity of his foreign policy: “It is most important for our country to maintain and promote friendly and amicable relations with the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, and other neighbouring countries.” Japan’s pro-Taiwan policy had repeatedly been reiterated at summit meetings with American Presidents up until 1970. Therefore, Japan regarded the Nixon administration’s approach to the PRC as “diplomatic betrayal”, “a severe blow”, and “a slap in the face.” The unilateral US approach to the PRC gave the impression that the US did not treat Japan as an ally, and that American interests did not always coincide with those of Japan. Suddenly, the Sino-

32 Ibid.: p. 1035.
American rapprochement overshadowed the diplomatic achievements of the Sato cabinet. This turn of events directly undermined Sato’s political legitimacy and decisively dismantled one of the staunchest pro-American cabinets in Japan.

On the face of it, Japan’s *seihei bunri* principle (separation of politics from economics) was more compatible with a good relationship with the PRC than US containment policy was. Therefore, the US-PRC rapprochement did not necessarily narrow the range of Japan’s diplomatic activity. However, the Japan-PRC rapprochement demanded the change of Japanese cabinet. As soon as new Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, came to office on 6 July 1972, the movement towards diplomatic normalisation between Japan and the PRC gathered pace. Within only a few months, on 25 September 1972, Tanaka visited Peking with his Foreign Minister, Masayoshi Ohira, and terminated “the state of war” by the normalisation of relations between China and Japan. The speedy normalisation ostensibly reflected the extent to which the Japanese public viewed the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations as a counterblow to the US. Moreover, it also confirmed that normalisation was in accordance with the framework of Japan’s overall Cold War strategy.

3.2.2 US Policy Towards South Korea: The Impact of Détente, 1970-1974 - The Nixon-Park Phase

As the weakest member of the TASS and a projected state, South Korea’s scope for autonomous diplomacy was considerably restricted when the US shifted from
confrontation to détente. This sub-section examines the political impact on the Park regime of that shift.

Shortly after Nixon became President, North Korea, on 15 April 1969, shot down an unarmed reconnaissance plane with 31 men on board. The Nixon administration chose not to respond with any military means— a decision which seriously eroded South Korean confidence in the strength of the US commitment to South Korea. Furthermore, a review of the presence of American ground forces on the Korean peninsula, which the Park regime had desperately wished to avoid following the Guam Doctrine, reached a conclusion in 1970. This was when more than 50,000 South Korean combat troops were fighting in Vietnam. President Park thought that South Korea had secured a “special relationship” with the US through South Korea’s military participation in Vietnam. The unilateral US decision to reduce its military presence in South Korea caused Park to panic, and led him to protest bluntly to US Ambassador William Porter that the United States had no right to remove its troops in this way. The Seoul government proceeded to take several extraordinary actions, and demanded a return to the normal state of the US security commitment as established during the Johnson administration. When Vice-President Agnew visited Seoul in August 1970, President Park called unsuccessfully for a written guarantee that no additional American troops would be withdrawn. Eventually the US did withdraw its Seventh Infantry Division in line with the Guam Doctrine, some 22,000 men out of 63,000 troops stationed in South Korea, in March 1971. After this withdrawal, in August 1971 another decision was made to reduce the Second Infantry

39 For example, the government threatened to leave a portion of the DMZ unmanned, hinted at South Korea’s disengagement from Vietnam, and advertised against US troop withdrawal in The Washington Post (25 September 1970).
In December 1971, Park concluded that the situation amounted to a national emergency for South Korea. He accordingly adopted three main policies: (1) influence-buying activities to attract US attention in the security area; (2) a self-reliance strategy of accelerating the development of heavy and chemical industries and procuring substantial amounts of new weaponry systems; and (3) a controlled reduction of tension with North Korea to a desired level. However, the first option could not reverse the reduction of the US army presence in South Korea, and in the end became one of the most serious sources of US-South Korea diplomatic strain. The second policy could not achieve tangible results in the short term. From the outset, the third option could not possibly bear fruit: the legitimacy of both authoritarian regimes (in the North and the South) relied on the continuation of the military confrontation. Therefore, the Park regime’s proposal for dialogue with the North was little more than an expression of frustration following the United States’ reduction of ground forces in South Korea and the consequent diplomatic isolation of South Korea.\footnote{Lee and Sato (1982): pp. 102-3.}

The US departure from Vietnam thus inevitably led to a substantial weakening of the Park regime’s political basis, and this called for a domestic resolution. Democratisation may have been considered, but it was certainly not a viable solution for the authoritarian Park regime from the beginning. In due course, frustration in dealing with America’s shifting foreign policy forced President Park to undertake a risk-laden political adventure: in October 1972 he introduced martial law, and the following month he promulgated a new \footnote{See Sohn (1989): pp. 24-28.}
constitution to ensure the perpetuation of his dictatorship. The new Yushin Constitution empowered the President to appoint one-third of the National Assembly members. He rushed to enact the National Emergency Measures—which became the symbol of his iron rule—through the National Assembly in December 1972. Under the new constitution, the President was to be chosen indirectly by an electoral college, and Park was duly able to commence his fourth term in December 1972. From then on, he had irresistible coercive power backed by his full control of the armed forces.

This repressive power could not be challenged as long as economic growth was sustained and support from the major allies continued. In other words, when the US observed the bottom lines of alliance management, i.e. by abiding by the principles of non-interference in South Korean domestic politics and restraining from all direct dealings with North Korea over the heads of the South Korean regime, the latter’s political legitimacy was not seriously damaged. In that sense, the Park regime benefited from the realism adopted by the Nixon administration in its apparent tolerance of human rights infringements in South Korea.

3.2.3 Japan’s Policy towards South Korea, 1969-1974: The Sato/Tanaka-Park Phase

US exploitation of the rift between the Soviet Union and the PRC was bound to have a negative effect on US-Japan relations, and this in turn damaged Japan-South Korea relations. Japan’s adoption of the Korean clause in the Nixon-Sato joint communiqué of November 1969—a clause that officially endorsed Japan’s commitment to South Korean

---

security—seemed to be promising to the Park regime. Sato reaffirmed the security nexus between Japan and South Korea in a speech at the National Press Club after the summit meeting:

If South Korea or Taiwan came under attack, Japan would regard it as a threat to the peace and security of the Far East, including Japan, and would take prompt and positive measures in order that the United States could use its military bases and facilities within Japan (which would include Okinawa after 1972) to meet the armed attack, mainly from North Korea. 43

These sentiments were later reiterated by Sato in a speech in the Diet in February 1970.

The Korean Clause amounted to one of the most significant adjustments of the role of Japan within the TASS: “the most precise public expression” of Japan’s commitment to the South Korean regime. 44 From then onwards, the Korean Clause, coupled with Japan’s public recognition of the existence of a military threat from the North against the South at the ministerial talks between the two countries, came to be regarded as one of the most useful barometers by which security interdependence and the general state of bilateral relations could be measured. It was certainly as significant as America’s own Korean clause, with its reference to “prompt and effective assistance” (see Sub-section 3.1.3).

Despite the significance of the introduction of the Korean Clause for the TASS, it was in essence Japan’s “Korea card”—a product of diplomatic expediency—designed to reinforce Japan’s position vis-à-vis the US. Because of this expediency, the Japanese position fluctuated. In fact, the Sato cabinet raised the issue of the reconsideration of the

---

Korean Clause in 1971 and 1972. Only one month after the Nixon shock of the US-PRC diplomatic contacts of July 1971, the fifth Japan-South Korea Joint Ministerial Conference omitted any reference to the close relationship between the security and prosperity of the two countries. In a month, Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda advocated a revision of the Korean Clause at the Japanese-American ministerial meeting. At last, on 8 January 1972, Prime Minister Sato himself also raised this question at a news conference in Tokyo. The Japanese Foreign Minister officially stated in the Diet on 16 May 1972 that the Korean Clause had in effect lost its validity because of the newly stabilised situation on the Korean peninsula. The rapidly changing posture of the Sato cabinet was directly related to its relationship with the US and its attempts to normalise relations with the PRC, higher priority of Japan’s foreign policy compared with its relations with South Korea.

The pro-PRC policy of the new Japanese Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, further weakened security relations with South Korea. During the term of the Tanaka cabinet, the Korean Clause was generally utilised as an indicator of where Japan stood in relation to East-West rivalry and in the confrontation between the two Koreas. Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura claimed, on 29 August 1972, that there was no need for Seoul to fear a North Korean invasion; and on 5 September he denied that the South Korean regime was the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula. This attempt to adopt an equidistant approach to both Koreas—one of the prerequisites for Sino-Japanese rapprochement—was viewed by the Park regime as evidence that Japan had renounced the basic principle enunciated in the South Korea-Japan normalisation treaty, namely that

---

Japan regarded the Republic of Korea as the only legitimate government on the peninsula. Once estrangement had commenced, Japan-South Korea relations deteriorated even further during the later part of the Tanaka premiership as a result of two incidents: the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung by the Park regime from a hotel in Tokyo on 8 August 1973, and another attempt to assassinate President Park in August 1974. The kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung was politically resolved when the Park regime guaranteed the dissident’s freedom and promised that he would not be tried for any action he had taken in Japan, and the Japanese government agreed to drop the issue. The Kim Dae-jung incident gravely damaged the image of the Park regime among a large proportion of the Japanese population, in particular among intellectuals, and became one of the most important political issues underpinning relations between Japan and South Korea. The second incident occurred in August 1974. Mun Se-gwang, a second generation pro-Pyongyang Korean living in Japan, attempted to assassinate President Park, who was delivering a message commemorating the anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japan. Park survived the bungled assassination attempt, but the first lady, Mrs. Young-soo Park, was shot dead.

Only the mediation of the US, through the Ford administration, could bring the two sides together again, and on 19 September 1974 the Japanese government dispatched Etsusaburo Shiina to Seoul to convey two statements of regret. As a result of these incidents, however, the Japanese government, for the first time, suspended ministerial talks with South Korea and subsequently reduced official economic development.

---

49 On the political implications of the incident of the death of Mrs. Park between the Park regime and the Japanese cabinet, see Lee Chong-sik (1985): pp. 84-5.
assistance. Attempts to reverse Japan’s recognition of the interdependence of Japanese and South Korean security illustrate how easily an alliance can lose its cohesion when the members change their perceptions and discover their divergent national interests.\textsuperscript{50}

In summary, the Nixon-Sato-Park relationship, for a brief period between 1969 and 1972, revealed clearly the weak basis of the TASS. The first year of the Nixon-Sato-Park phase saw an epoch-making enhancement of the TASS thanks to the Korean Clause of the Nixon-Sato communiqué, which expressed Japan’s willingness to make an overt commitment to South Korean security. The movement became a useful lever whereby Japan could regain sovereignty over the Okinawa islands. Thus, the Korean Clause was, from the beginning, a product of expediency and could just as easily be discarded according to the changing dynamics of US-Japan relations. The Nixon administration succeeded in leading the US from passive defeatism after the Vietnam War to active manipulation by transforming the bipolar global system into a trilateral balance-and-check system. The achievement of this goal damaged the relationships of the US with its junior allies in East Asia. As Spanier observes, “In the era of détente, the various nations were no longer so willing to give priority to alliance interests.”\textsuperscript{51}

After the Tanaka cabinet emerged in 1972, the Nixon-Tanaka-Park phase revealed how the junior alliance members, Japan and South Korea, were making efforts to establish direct communication with the PRC. Even though the momentum of American policy changes increasingly bewildered Japan, Japan could catch up on the path the US explored.

\textsuperscript{50} Tanaka had four policy speeches in the Diet (once in the 70\textsuperscript{th}, 71\textsuperscript{st} sessions and twice in the 72\textsuperscript{nd} session) but the name of South Korea or Republic of Korea never appeared other than in reference to the Korean peninsula.

As Buckley observes, "the Tanaka cabinet simply went into China through the door left ajar by the United States." While Japan adapted to the shifting American diplomacy, the Park regime failed to do so and became isolated by the new regional trends. In consequence, the regime had to seek a strategy of survival domestically. This was the rationale behind the Yushin Constitution.


1974 saw the resignations of both President Nixon (in August as a result of the Watergate scandal) and Prime Minister Tanaka (in November after the Lockheed scandal). Coinciding with the emergence of the Ford Presidency, the Cold War mood gradually revived. The Ford administration sought to deal with the Korean question linked to Japanese security. As a result, from late 1974 onwards the cohesion of US-Japan-South Korea ties recovered very quickly. The collapse of the South Vietnamese government in April came as a major shock to the three countries. The summer of 1975 was one of the most crucial junctures in the history of triangular interaction in the security area. The fall of Saigon forced the US, Japan and South Korea to recover their strained relations during the Nixon-Tanaka-Park phase, and the security of South Korea became a key issue in bilateral talks (at various levels) between Japan and the United States.

3.3.1 The Collapse of the South Vietnamese Government and its Impact on the TASS

In April 1975, North Vietnamese troops destroyed the South Vietnamese army, entered Saigon and unified the country under communism. Shortly afterwards, communists took over Cambodia and Laos. President Ford chose Japan and South Korea as his first destinations for presidential visits in November 1974. In return, Prime Minister Miki paid a visit to Washington and had summit meetings with President Ford on 2 August 1975. At the news conference, the two leaders stated that their countries had reached an agreement to discuss the contents of concrete co-operation at the Security Consultative Meetings. In addition, they revived the Korean Clause in the joint statement on 6 August which stated that “the security of the Republic of Korea is essential to the maintenance for peace on the Korean peninsula, which in turn was necessary for the peace and security in East Asia, including Japan.” The Korean Clause in the Nixon-Sato communiqué in 1969 was adopted at a time when the US intended to depart from Asia by encouraging Japan to assume responsibility for regional security. The inclusion of the Korean Clause in the Ford-Miki communiqué was a clear sign of a US rollback in Asia, and this did much to assuage the apprehensions of South Korea and Japan. Subsequently several further actions to restore security co-operation were taken by the three countries.

Immediately after the Ford-Miki summit meetings, US Secretary of Defense Schlesinger visited Japan and had talks with Director of the Japanese Defence Agency (the JDA), Michita Sakada, on 29 August. Once again, South Korean security was a key agenda item. Sakada formally demanded that “American troops in South Korea be maintained on a

long-term basis." Schlesinger accepted the request. In exchange, Sakada reconfirmed that in the event of any direct threat to South Korea's security, the US would have "continued use" of bases in Japan, and he pledged to strengthen Japan's self-defence capabilities. A further step was Prime Minister Takeo Miki's expression of his apprehension to Schlesinger: "The Korean problem is unique given the nature of confrontation there. ... The security of the ROK and peace on the peninsula are important to Japanese security. We feel it in our bones." Responding to Miki's proactive approach to the security issue, the US assured the Japanese cabinet that the level of US ground forces in the Korean peninsula would not be significantly reduced, even in the future. Then, in a news conference in Tokyo on 29 August, Schlesinger stated that "Japan already is playing a role in South Korea's defence. The capacity of the Japanese air-defence forces is exerting influence on the defence of Korea." The military integrity between Japan and South Korea was confirmed.

Just a few months later, on 7 December 1975, Ford declared "A Pacific Doctrine of Peace with All and Hostility Toward None" that:

The preservation of our Asian friends and allies remains a paramount objective of American policy... In Korea tension persists. We have close ties with the republic of Korea: and we remain committed to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, as the presence of our forces there attests.

---

The declaration was backed up by an increase in American defence spending -- the first since 1969. At the same time, Ford's new Asia policy urged Japan to increase its defence posture. Burden-sharing now emerged as one of the most important issues on the agenda of US-Japan relations. As a result, in the second half of 1976, the Miki cabinet approved the National Defense Programme Outline (NDPO), designed to upgrade the Japanese Self-defence Forces (JSDF) in order to meet and repel a "limited and small-scale aggression." The basic assumption of the NDPO was that there would be no significant change in the global and regional security environments. In order to facilitate the military capability of the TASS, Japan was allocated its share of responsibility.

3.3.2 The US Commitment to South Korean Security, 1974-76: The Ford-Park Phase

The decline of détente caused the US to return to the issue of South Korean security in the Ford administration. In November 1974, three months after assuming office, the new President paid a two-day visit to Seoul in order "to dispel South Korea's fear of a further application of the Guam Doctrine." The phrase "prompt and effective assistance" in the event of an armed attack by the North reappeared in the Ford-Park joint communiqué. In

---

60 Between the fiscal years 1969 and 1975, while US spending declined by about 3 per cent per year in real terms, Soviet defence spending increased by an equal amount. During his term of office, Ford tried to reverse those trends in a dramatic fashion. He sought to increase US defence spending from $86 billion in the fiscal year 1975 to $150 billion by the fiscal year 1980, an increase of 74 per cent over five years. (Korb, 1979): pp. 422-3.


62 The NDPO made the following assumptions: (1) The US-Japan Security Treaty would continue to be effectively maintained. (2) The US and the Soviet Union would continue to avoid nuclear war and large-scale conflicts that could escalate into nuclear war. (3) Even if there was a partial improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, this would not lead to a resolution of the fundamental conflict. (4) There would continue to be moderation in Sino-US relations. (5) A large military conflict would not break out on the Korean peninsula. (Defence of Japan 1994): p. 260.

addition, the US promised to support South Korea’s military modernisation programme and defence industries. The renewed security commitment from the Ford administration in late 1974 was confirmed immediately after the Vietnam debacle in early 1975 by a symbolic increase in the level of the US military presence.

At a news conference in May 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger stressed that there was no ambiguity about the US commitment to South Korea or East Asia in general: the US would never withdraw its support. A week later, he warned North Korea not to make the mistake of testing the US security commitment to South Korea. Then, in June, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger pledged to repel North Korea’s armed aggression with massive retaliation, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. The Ford administration fully recognised the security nexus of Japan and South Korea. Kissinger, in a speech before the Economic Club of Detroit on 24 November 1975, reiterated that US-South Korean relations were “a bond forged by common sacrifice in war” and that the security of Japan was “directly linked to the security of Korea.” Therefore, “we will resist with determination any unilateral attempt to change or upset the equilibrium on the peninsula.”

It was not long before North Korea decided to challenge these commitments. On 18 August 1976, a group of North Korean army guards killed two US officers in the joint security area, Panmunjom. The US reacted immediately by deploying an aircraft carrier, fighter aircraft, and bombers (based in Guam) to South Korea. The timely military moves

---

forced Kim Il-song to express regret over the incident. Thus, US action had confirmed the reliability of the "prompt and effective assistance" pledged in the Ford-Park joint communiqué.

In line with the reinforcement of the fundamental basis of the TASS, the US military stationing in South Korea, and the guided retaliatory measures to the killing of two American soldiers, the Ford administration did not make an issue of the human rights situation in South Korea, even though there was a growing sense in the US that President Park’s repressive regime might turn South Korea into a South Vietnam-type internal conflict. To sum up, during the Ford administration US-South Korea governmental relations returned to normalcy, restoring the fundamental military basis of the TASS (by assuring the status of US combat forces in South Korea) and observing the two bottom lines, non-interference by the US in South Korean domestic politics and no direct dealing with North Korea.

3.3.3 The Roles of Japan as Mediator within the TASS

The feeling of insecurity prevalent in Japanese society led the Miki government to play an active role in the revival of the TASS, which had been seriously strained during the Nixon-Tanaka phase. Upon coming to office, in early 1975, Miki dispatched Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa to Washington to ascertain US intentions regarding the Korean peninsula. Miyazawa sought to impress upon the US the continuing validity of the Korean clause in the Nixon-Sato communiqué. In early May, Tokyo invited South Korean Premier Kim Jong-pil for a series of talks with Miki and Miyazawa. Miki affirmed on this occasion that South Korea’s security was essential to that of Japan and expressed his
willingness to re-open the ministerial talks that had been cancelled in the last year of the Tanaka premiership in 1974.\textsuperscript{68}

Japan’s increasing economic investment in South Korea (Japan became the top-ranking foreign investor in 1974) and the impact of post-Indochina events compelled the new Miki government to restore relations with Seoul to the level obtaining before the Kim Dae-jung affair.\textsuperscript{69} The South Korean-Japanese Friendship Association (\textit{Nikkan Giin Konshinkai}), whose central objective was to exchange ideas over Asian security, peace and prosperity,\textsuperscript{70} was replaced in June 1975 by the Japan-South Korean Parliamentarian League in order to strengthen the ties of the two countries in response to the communist victory in Vietnam and the explicit North Korean intention to militarily liberate South Korea.\textsuperscript{71} The new organisation included more than 170 LDP Dietmen and all Democratic-Socialist Party (DSP) legislators. The mutual security concerns enhanced the need for systemic thinking by the US, Japan and South Korea. Almost every statement and presentation about security made it clear that Japan and South Korea ought to recognise the alliance’s inseparable common security interests, share a common sense of crisis, and commit themselves to full-scale co-operation to deter any recurrence of hostile action by North Korea. The League decided to send its joint statement to Japanese Prime Minister Miki, South Korean President Park Chung-hee, US President Ford and the Speakers of the US Senate and Congress.\textsuperscript{72} This uncharacteristically proactive strategy of the Miki government extended to the removal of a political impasse when Japanese

\textsuperscript{68} Watanabe (1999).
\textsuperscript{70} Nikkan Giin Renmei (1992): pp. 74-80.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.: p.96.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.: pp. 106, 108.
Foreign Minister Miyazawa declared in the South Korean-Japanese foreign ministerial talks on 23 July 1975 that the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping incident was resolved. In the area of economics, Japan promised continued co-operation and support, with aid, loans and investment activities, to South Korea.

There were, however, some clear limits to the recovery of Japan-South Korea relations. Despite the re-consolidation of Japan-South Korea security ties, the Miki cabinet did not aim at the direct enhancement of Japan's military co-operation with South Korea. In essence, Japan's efforts were diplomatic manoeuvres designed to recall the US to East Asia. Once this goal was accomplished, the Miki government wanted to consolidate the diplomatic achievements of the Tanaka cabinet in its dealings with the PRC and the continuation of lukewarm contact with North Korea. This basic approach would subsequently be developed into the omni-directional diplomacy of the Fukuda cabinet.

An overview of US-Japan-South Korea relations during the Ford-Miki-Park phase (1975-76) shows that there was little misperception among the three countries. The US government recognised the counterproductive outcomes of any intervention in its allies' internal politics and the importance of non-separation the security of Japan from that of South Korea. 73 At his last address to the US Congress, on 12 January 1977, President Ford evaluated positively his achievement with East Asian allies: "In my two trips to Asia as President, we have reaffirmed America's continuing vital interest in the peace and security of Asia and the Pacific Basin, established a new partnership with Japan, confirmed our dedication to the security of Korea, and reinforced our ties with the free

nations of South East Asia. At the same time, the role of the Japanese government was conducive to the increasing cohesion of the TASS. Even though the sense of crisis reached a peak in the middle of 1975, the Park regime was able to enjoy the joint patronage of the US and Japan. When the Japanese government reassured South Korea of its readiness to offer further support, including economic assistance, the US reconfirmed its security commitment through the continuation of its military presence in South Korea.

While the Ford administration made strenuous efforts to minimise the aftermath of the debacle of the South Vietnamese government, the full scale re-direction of the realist Republican foreign policy gained momentum. This paved the way for the Carter administration's completely new approach to coping with the domestic and international crises faced by the US. As a result, the strengthening of the cohesion of the TASS during the Ford administration did not endure.


When the Carter administration came into office, US foreign policy did not merely turn to isolationism. The administration intended to transform the fundamental basis of the East Asian security environment, thereby removing the necessity for a US military presence in South Korea. Apart from the traumatic defeat in the Vietnam War and the political turmoil of the Watergate scandal, the PRC-Soviet Union split in the Communist bloc also led to a re-thinking by the Carter administration of America's global strategy. In particular, Carter

believed that the US would no longer need to confront the Soviet Union through a head-to-head posture. Moscow was treated both as a potential partner in an ambitious arms control initiative and as an object of American human rights policies. As a result, Carter downplayed the Soviet threat, and this perception effectively devalued the military importance of America's East Asian allies. Rather, South Korea was viewed as nothing but a trouble spot similar to Vietnam. Accordingly, the new American administration initiated the policy of the withdrawal of US ground forces from South Korea. The emphasis was now placed on cultivating the security environment by relieving military tension in the Korean peninsula by encouraging the development of political liberalization in the South. From the US perspective, the North-South dialogue had not resulted in any tangible outcomes because of the North Korean denunciation of the dictatorial Park regime. Carter's new approach clearly implied the dismantling of the fundamental basis of the TASS and the breaching of the key US commitments to non-interference in South Korean domestic politics and no direct dealing with the North.

Not surprisingly, a serious cleavage within the TASS emerged, and in these circumstances the role of Japan as a facilitator of sound trilateral relations was increasingly demanded. This section will discuss the rationale of the US withdrawal policy and the human rights drive towards South Korea, the response of the Park regime, the Japanese attempt to reverse the withdrawal policy, and the remarkable increase of political interaction between the Fukuda cabinet and the Park regime.

---

3.4.1 The Basic Assumptions of East Asian Policy under the Carter Administration: Japan as a Cornerstone and South Korea as a Trouble Spot in the Asia-Pacific Region

As one of the vital elements in the transformation of the TASS, the Carter administration attempted to distinguish between the strategic value of Japan and South Korea to the US. Japan was elevated to the status of the “primary Pacific ally” and “a cornerstone” in East Asian policy, while South Korea was regarded as “a dangerous trouble spot” and treated as “a pariah state.” Following the promulgation of the Yushin Constitution in 1972, the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung in 1973, and the exposure of influence-buying activities in the US, the Park regime was abhorrent to most Americans. The US therefore increased its intervention in South Korean politics with explicit and open criticism of the authoritarian rule of the Park regime. South Korea now had less opportunity to discuss directly the vital issue of the withdrawal question with the US. Paradoxically, this discrimination expanded the room for Japan to exert its influence on US-South Korea policy.

In terms of alliance management, the aims of the US-South Korea policy initiated by President Carter, who believed that the Vietnam War was the end product of the realist approach to US foreign policy since the Truman administration, was to uproot the

---

76 Vance (1983): p. 449. Harkavy (1977) defines pariah states as those characterised by “extreme diplomatic isolation and widespread, obsessive and unrelenting global opprobrium, directed against them for reasons other than economic status or the nature of their economic systems.” These states tend towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons because of weak, declining or nonexistent security guarantees from major powers. Harkavy cites examples in the late 1970s of pariah states such as Israel, South Africa, Taiwan and South Korea. He himself rated the possibility of South Korea becoming a nuclear power as relatively high, and predicted that a further decline of US support might encourage further nuclear proliferation. (pp. 623-5).

77 Lee and Sato (1985)

tripwire which might drag the US into another land-war in Asia by establishing a broadly based civilian government in South Korea. At the peak of the presidential election campaign, on 8 September 1976, Carter made clear his intention to adopt the troop withdrawal policy as a way of influencing America’s allies to move towards greater domestic political freedom:

There are those regimes, such as South Korea, which openly violate human rights, although they themselves are under threat from communist regimes which represent an even greater level of repression. Even in such cases, however, we should not condone repression or the denial of freedom. On the contrary, we should use our influence to increase freedom in those countries that depend on us for their very survival.79

Carter explicitly declared the US strategy of aggressive intervention. The withdrawal of US ground forces from South Korea, after the election, the new US President still believed, would not affect the military balance if enhanced air cover and security assistance were provided to improve South Korea’s own military capability. Shortly after his inauguration, at a press conference on 23 February 1977, President Carter expressed his concern about political prisoners in South Korea.80 Two weeks later, on 9 March, he announced the removal of travel restrictions on American citizens who wanted to go North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba or Cambodia. At the same time, he reiterated his commitment to withdraw American ground troops from South Korea.81 South Korean Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin had to experience the bitterness of the policy shift at his first meeting with Carter on that day. Carter spent most of the time talking about human rights violations in South Korea, but was not willing to discuss the issue of US troops

79 Ibid.: p.147.
withdrawal. At a press conference on 26 May 1978, Carter explained that there had never been a policy for the permanent placement of ground troops in Korea, and the time had come for “a very careful, very orderly withdrawal over a period of 4 or 5 years.” The decision to withdraw 6,000 men by the end of 1978 and the remaining troops by 1981 or 1982 was final: “A decision has been made. President Park has been informed.”

One possible course open to the Park regime in order to remedy the likely damage of the withdrawal plan was a strategy of self-reliance. However, that strategy seemed to be inadequate in the face of the wholesale dismantling of the fundamental basis of the TASS. The South Korean regime could not cope with this challenge alone. That is why it was anxious to encourage Japanese intervention in the bilateral conflict between South Korea and the US.

### 3.4.2 The Influence of Japan on US Withdrawal Policy, 1977-1978: The Carter-Fukuda Phase

In contrast to President Carter’s optimistic assessment of East-West rivalry, Japan’s 1977 White Paper on Defense stated that the Soviet Union’s armed strength had for the first time surpassed that of the US, and that the safety of the sea and air lanes of Japan was being jeopardised. This apprehension prevailed not only within the Self-Defense Forces, the Defense Agency and the Foreign Ministry, but also among a large section of the public. The source of Japan’s sense of insecurity in the late 1970s and the early 1980s was not only the increase in Soviet military power but also the oscillation of US foreign

---

84 The US also intervened to restrict the independent promotion of South Korean military capability. In particular, the US was extremely sensitive to the nuclear development programme of the Park regime.
policy towards Asia. The presence of the US army in South Korea was widely regarded as a necessary guarantor not only of the status quo in the Korean peninsula but also of the broader stability of the whole East Asian region. The withdrawal of American troops implied that there would be no tripwire forcing the US to intervene automatically in a military conflict in the peninsula. The removal of a front-line bulwark would dismantle the whole basic assumptions of the National Defense Programme Outline (NDPO), adopted only a year previously at the recommendation of the Ford administration. The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) made it clear that it would “carefully monitor” the situation in the Korean peninsula after the withdrawal policy was implemented.\textsuperscript{85}

From the Japanese point of view, US policy towards South Korea represented by the withdrawal plan and human rights pressures had to be reconsidered. At the same time, the Park regime relied on the Japanese role of mediator to support its own interests. In terms of the \textit{modus operandi} within the TASS, the role of Japan during the Fukuda administration was far more extensive in seeking to reverse America’s withdrawal policy. Explaining how Japan and South Korea collaborated to reverse the policy of withdrawal, Masataka Kosaka observes that “South Korea and Japan made persistent efforts quietly to change the mind of President Carter and, with the help of a number of Americans, succeeded.”\textsuperscript{87} Japan was now able to use its enhanced status as America’s “primary Pacific ally” as one of its most powerful levers of influence. The Carter administration repeatedly emphasised the importance of prior consultation and close co-operation with Japan. This emphasis restrained the US from bulldozing the implementation of the

withdrawal plan. Various actors inside and outside the Japanese government worked ceaselessly to stop the progress of the withdrawal plan, since the presence of US troops in South Korea was vital to the security of Japan. The JDA was worried that Japan's strong opposition to the withdrawal policy might lead the US to criticise Japan as a security free-rider and to demand that Japan should itself assume more responsibility for the security of South Korea. The Japanese leadership, however, attached more importance to its own insecurity than to the possibility of a negative American reaction.

On 31 January 1977, the day before US Vice President Mondale's visit to Tokyo, Prime Minister Fukuda emphasised the importance of not changing the international structure which had buttressed the security of the East Asian region. The Japanese Foreign Minister added in an interview: "If you look at history, it is a fact that the war occurred in Korea because of the withdrawal of US troops there. Hence, our anxiety." On the following day, Fukuda expressed his ideas to Mondale about human rights and the presence of US forces in South Korea:

Japan, as a neighbor, understands ROK problems although it knows that the Park government has probably gone too far...[However] the allied military posture in the South is a totally separate problem and should not be linked with human rights.

This remark testifies to the political and cultural homogeneity of Japan and South Korea within the framework of the TASS, a factor that strengthened Japan's capacity to redirect the withdrawal plan. The outcome of the Fukuda-Mondale talks was in some respects

---

89 Mainichi (17 January 1977).
90 Tanaka (1999).
quite positive. Mondale, in a news conference statement in Tokyo on 1 February 1977, stated that “I emphasized the fact that the Administration does not intend to turn its back on Asia. We should and will remain an Asian-Pacific power...[W]e will phase down our ground forces only in close consultation and cooperation with the Governments of Japan and South Korea.” At the same time, a draft of guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation was delivered to Japan.

Two months later, Fukuda, before a summit meeting with Carter on 21 March in Washington, proposed that the joint communiqué should use the word “reduction” instead of “withdrawal”. However, Carter was adamant in standing by the pledge that he had made during his election campaign. At the same time, he admitted that “[H]is basic foreign policy can be expressed, as he said; that’s the ‘duck’ diplomacy—everything is very calm on top, but paddling like mad underneath.” The joint communiqué dealt with the Korean question as follows:

The President and the Prime Minister noted the continuing importance of the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula for the security of Japan and East Asia as a whole. They agreed on the desirability of continued efforts to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula and strongly hoped for an early resumption of the dialogue between the South and the North. In connection with the intended withdrawal of United States ground forces in the Republic of Korea, the President stated that the United States, after consultation with the Republic of Korea and also with Japan, would proceed in ways which would not endanger the peace on the Peninsula. He affirmed that the United States remains committed to the defense of the Republic of Korea.

---

96 Ibid.: p. 480.
After the Japanese opposition to the withdrawal plan was made clear, the disagreement within the Carter government represented by the Singlaub protest\(^97\) in May 1977, impelled President Carter to press ahead with his campaign pledge. On 24 May, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Philip Habib and Chairman of the JCS Gen. George Brown visited Seoul and Tokyo with the intention of underlining the President’s firm resolve to implement the withdrawal policy.\(^98\) However, Japan did not abandon its own resolve, and its own variation of “duck diplomacy” was asserted when Fukuda met US Defense Secretary Brown in Tokyo in July 1977.\(^99\) On 14 September, Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka was given an explanation of the US withdrawal policy by National Security Advisor Brzezinski. In response, within a week, the US-Japanese Parliamentary Conference on the Korean question was held in Washington. Forty-seven hawkish members from both countries expressed their support for the peaceful unification of Korea.

As the year 1978 began, Carter’s adherence to his election pledge was unexpectedly weakened because of an increase of the Soviet military capability in the Far East. The Fiscal Year 1978 Foreign Relations Authorization Act instructed the President to implement a “gradual and phased reduction” of US ground forces in a way which was consistent with the security interests of South Korea, the US and Japan. The 1978 State of the Union Message given by Carter avowed to implement the Act in principle.\(^100\)

---

\(^97\) On 19 May 1977, President Carter instructed the Secretary of Defense to order Major General John Singlaub, Chief of Staff of the US Forces in Korea, back to the US to report to the President after the General had publicly voiced his disagreement with the withdrawal policy. Singlaub was subsequently transferred to another position. (Ibid.: pp. 1018-21 and 1030.)


\(^99\) NYT (28 September 1977).

\(^100\) PPPU, Carter 1978-I: p. 122.
re-adjustment of the withdrawal plan in late 1978, the leak of new intelligence data concerning North Korean military strength in January 1979, which indicated that North Korea excelled in almost every category over South Korea, cast serious doubts on the feasibility of the whole withdrawal policy.

Even though it is not easy to gauge exactly the extent to which Japan was instrumental in achieving the suspension of Carter's withdrawal plan, there can be no doubt that the Fukuda cabinet played an important role challenging the plan explicitly and implicitly from the initial stage of the Carter Presidency. In fact, American politicians were more attentive to Japanese views on Korea than the self-serving views of the South Koreans. The Carter-Fukuda phase reveals the novelty of the Japanese government intervening directly to persuade the Carter administration to reconsider its withdrawal policy and to reduce the political pressure on the Park regime concerning the human rights issue. This marked an important new stage in the US-Japan relationship, with Japan now beginning to take a more active part in the triangular alliance. Japan's role as mediator demonstrated the high degree of common interest between Japan and South Korea which arose out of their respective relations with the US. However, the opposition to the withdrawal policy, from Japan's point of view, could not be carried forward without cost. The Fukuda cabinet introduced the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation in November 1978, only two years after the adoption of the National Defense Programme Outline (the NDPO).

---

101 Ibid.: p. 768.
3.4.3 The Enhancement of Japan-South Korea Relations in the Security and Political Areas: The Japanese Role as Facilitator

The stream of exchange visits of high officials and politicians from the ruling parties between Japan and South Korea continued throughout 1977-78. The purposes were multiple: to share information about US policy; to express Japanese interests in the continuing presence of US ground forces in Korea; and to strengthen the countries’ joint efforts to reverse the troop withdrawal plan. Soon after Mondale’s return to Washington, the Japan-South Korea Parliamentarian League, which included 243 Japanese Dietmen, expressed its concern that any reductions of US ground forces in South Korea would produce instability not only on the Korean peninsula but also throughout Northeast East Asia. Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin and Deputy Prime Minister Nam Duck-woo’s visit to Tokyo for the Ninth Japan-South Korea Ministerial Meeting in September, and Former Prime Minister Kishi’s visit to Seoul on the occasion of the Fourteenth Japanese-South Korean Co-operation Committee meeting in Seoul followed. Exchanges of information and co-operation over the troop withdrawal issue were high on the agendas of these meetings.

On 22 June, after Habib took trips to Seoul and Tokyo, former KCIA Chief Kim Hyung-wook, in a testimony before the Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee sub-committee on international organisation, exposed South Korean political bribery activities in Japan and the US, including the Kim Dae-jung affair. The next day, however,

---

104 Former Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil’s visit to Tokyo, 14-19 February 1977; the Japan-South Korea Parliamentarians League’s 6th general meeting in Tokyo 15 February; on 17-19 February, Korean Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin’s visit to Tokyo to talk with his Japanese counterpart; in early June, the LDP Dietmen’s talks with President Park. (Watanabe, 1999).
Prime Minister Fukuda asserted that the political settlement of the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping should not be influenced by this testimony. Japan’s role as a political shield in defending the Park regime did not stop at the implicit diplomatic offensive from Washington, which later inevitably prevented the Japanese cabinet from supporting Kim in the political regime transition after the death of President Park (see Chapter 7).

A similar pattern of co-operative visits continued in 1978. The Japanese-South Korean Parliamentary League held its seventh general meeting in Seoul in January; Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin stopped over in Tokyo on his way home from the US and Europe in February; and in late July the Fifteenth meeting of the Japanese-South Korean Cooperation Committee was held in Tokyo. The Fukuda cabinet’s expression of concern over South Korean security reached a climax with the statement by Shin Kanemaru, General Director of the JDA, at the National Politics Study Group [Kokumin Seiji Kenkyukai] on 31 July, that Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were a destiny-sharing community [unmei kyodotai]. The co-operative mood culminated on the last day of the Japanese-South Korean ministerial meeting, 4 September, when Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda conveyed Fukuda’s proposal for a summit meeting to President Park.106 One and half months later, the Japanese-South Korean Friendship Festival in Seoul gave further expression to this mood.

Standing firmly on the side of the Park regime on security and political matters, the Fukuda government had to face the denunciation by the Soviet Union that Japan had

106 The subjects of the meeting were (1) the state of international politics and the Japanese-South Korean bilateral relations; (2) the economic state of both countries and the Japanese-South Korean economic relations, and (3) other issues. The joint statement issued on 4 September 1978 revealed that: “the Japanese minister (Foreign Minister Sonoda)
effectively moved into a US-Japan-South Korea military bloc. Even the PRC, which planned to sign the friendship treaty with Japan, criticised the contents of the joint communiqué of the Carter-Fukuda summit meeting. At the same time, in defending the Park regime, the Japanese government minimized its political interaction with the opposition/dissident forces in South Korea.

CONCLUSION: AN APPRAISAL OF THE TASS, 1964-1978

Between 1964 and 1978, US foreign policy changed substantially through the course of four administrations, and this had a profound effect on US relations with Japan and Korea. In particular, the role and status of the two East Asian allies changed substantially.

During the Johnson-Sato-Park phase, the three countries' involvement in the military conflict in Vietnam opened up a wide range of mutual interaction. Both South Korea and Japan had helped the American position with military participation in the Vietnam War, and had done so to their own advantage. The Johnson administration strengthened its obligations to Japan, by asserting its readiness to counter any sort of aggression, including a nuclear attack by the PRC, and to South Korea by promising "prompt and effective assistance" in the case of a North Korean invasion.

Overall, the Nixon-Sato/Tanaka Park phase showed how easily and rapidly an alliance could experience the growing divergence of its members' national interests and the discarding of their treaty obligations. When Nixon's Asia policy became part of his

---

108 Ibid.: p. 112.
reformulation of global strategy, which concentrated mainly upon the Sino-Soviet antagonism, South Korea's role in the changing US policy was minimal, and indeed maintaining the security of South Korea became rather burdensome to the US. During the Nixon administration, however, there were no references to "prompt and effective assistance".

The Ford-Miki-Park phase quickly moved towards a recovery of coherence due globally to the decline of détente, and regionally to the debacle of South Vietnam in April 1975. The return to normality within the TASS progressed very quickly in August 1975. There can now be no doubt that in practice the outcome of US intervention towards junior allies in the Third World was "the establishment and defense of authoritarian political and social arrangements...as a support for the maintenance of international order and stability." The revival of the Korean clause in the Ford-Miki joint communiqué aimed at the preservation of the Seoul regime in the interests of the US and Japan.

After the fall of Saigon, US alliance management towards the Third World confronted a new challenge. But by the 1970s, popular mass movements were spreading against repressive political systems and the structures of authoritarianism and dictatorship began to crumble, above all, in US client regimes, with the result that a general crisis of elite rule began to develop in the Third World. This challenge was strong enough to introduce the issue of liberalisation or democracy promotion, but it was not sufficiently powerful to override the concern with national security. In consequence, the Carter-Fukuda-Park

---

Part I 3 Historical Overview

Phase was complex: the Carter administration discriminated between the strategic value of Japan and South Korea. However, when US relations with the Soviet Union became aggravated, the basis of US foreign policy experienced unprecedented oscillation and inconsistency, even though national security concerns were always of primary importance.

Unlike the declining relations between the US and South Korea, bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan improved on the basis of a new modus vivendi in the security area during the Park-Fukuda phase. Risking the possibility of US pressure on Japan to accept a heavier burden in the defence area, the Japanese government elected to raise a serious alarm bell over US's Korea policy. Japan was in a better position than South Korea to monitor the development of the withdrawal plan. As Sohn puts it, "It seems obvious that the Japanese government was kept closely informed of developments on the issue." At the same time, South Korea could obtain changes in the withdrawal policy via the Japanese government. It also needs to be stressed that the geographic distance between the US and South Korea and the close relations between the US and Japan resulted in a fundamental problem. American signals conveyed through the Japanese prism were not always identical with signals from Japan. To Japan, the key issue was whether the withdrawal plan should be implemented; while to the US, it was a matter of how to implement the plan. For Japan, as long as the US hinted at the possibility of a reversal of policy, this was enough; but the actual process of reversal was of great significance to the Park regime. As a result, when the US attempted to restore its relations

112 Almost every movement of the withdrawal programme was disclosed in advance by high-ranking officials of the Japanese government, especially those in the JDA. (Yomiuri (23 February and 15 March 1978)); also 26 March and 6 April 1979, cited in Sohn (1989): pp. 119-120.
with South Korea from the end of 1978, it was inevitable that the strains of the alliance game hindered the process of genuine recovery, led to insurmountable diplomatic and political frictions between the Carter administration and the Park regime, resulted in the collapse of the Park regime, and left a complex agenda of regime transition for both the US and Japan.

In the operational pattern of the TASS, it has been customary for the United States, the most influential member, to call the diplomatic tune, while Japan and South Korea have tended to follow. An example is the establishment of the “Cold War mindset”, signaled and initiated by the US and adopted by the other two members of the alliance. Internal tensions tend to arise, however, when the equilibrium is disturbed by the calling of a different tune, for example, when the US abruptly changed its China policy on 15 July 1971. It was difficult for the Sato cabinet to follow this new direction, and impossible for the Park regime, the weakest member of the group and the one occupying the most geo-strategically vulnerable position. The hierarchical nature of the TASS, the geographical distance of the two countries from defined sources of threat, and the gaps in national power parities were acutely exposed by these events. In consequence, it was therefore of the utmost importance for South Korea, as a projected force and an exposed state, to attract and strengthen the US commitment, and to follow up independently the changing basis of US foreign policy.

In addition, this chapter’s historical review of trilateral alliance relations suggests that the nature of the US-Japan relationship at any particular moment has determined the nature of the Japan-South Korea relationship. Thus, when Japan enjoyed a good relationship with
the US, as it did during the Presidencies of Johnson, Ford and Reagan, its relationship with South Korea was also amicable. In contrast, when Japan-US relations encountered difficulties, the Japan-South Korean relationship also showed signs of strain, as seen in the last years of the Sato cabinet and during the Tanaka and Suzuki governments. These characteristics highlight the importance of Japan’s role as intermediary, a role that has occasionally been extended to the role of initiator.
INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO

As discussed in the last section of Chapter 3, from late 1978 onwards, US policy towards South Korea seemed to be assuming a more traditional form. In particular, from early 1979 the Carter administration signaled the possibility of reconsidering the troop withdrawal plan, and of restoring relations with the Park regime. Most tentatively were arrangements for Carter-Park summit meetings in Seoul, 29 June-1 July 1979. Only in about four months after the summit talks, however, the Park regime had fallen. On 26 October 1979, President Park Chung-hee, who had stayed in power for eighteen years since 1961, was assassinated by Director of the KCIA, Kim Jae-kyu, at a dinner party. Kim had recently made many recommendations and suggestions, but because of the influence of Cha, the head of the Presidential Protective Force, the President did not accept them. There were a series of arguments between Kim and Cha.\(^1\) During the meal both President Park and Cha criticised Kim for his handling of political challenges from opposition party leader, Kim Young-sam and political riots in Pusan and Masan in late October 1979. Kim Jae-kyu had become embroiled in an argument with the head of the Presidential Protective Force, Cha Ji-chol, over how to respond to the political crisis represented by the uprisings in Pusan and Masan. Kim believed that the Park regime should pursue a policy of conciliation, while Cha argued it was time to suppress.\(^2\)

\(^1\) 79 Seoul 16369 (28 October 1979).
Part II

Part Two seeks to answer the following questions: (1) Why did the Park regime come to an end when the Carter administration’s Korean policy had changed so much in its favour, and what link can be established between the death of President Park and the Korea policy of US President Carter? (2) What were the roles of the US and Japan in the regime transition in South Korea? (3) How can we understand the whole process of the US and Japanese interventions through a systemic approach focused on the dynamics of intra-alliance politics? In order to answer these questions, it is first necessary to investigate the basic policy formula of the Carter administration towards the North-East Asian region in general and South Korean politics in particular. This is followed by a brief discussion of the Japanese perspective on US alliance management with South Korea.

Kwak and Patterson distinguish between the US short-range goal of “the protection of South Korea territorial integrity and political interdependence” and the US long-range goal of the “promotion of favourable conditions for Korean unification by easing tensions in Northeast Asia, particularly by creating an international climate conducive to inter-Korean détente.” Together, these American goals sought to keep South Korea (and a unified Korea) “oriented towards the United States” and “consistent with U.S. security interests.” In terms of alliance management, the US has pursued its long-range goal without endangering its short-range goal. Thus, the priority given to the territorial integrity and political independence of South Korea was consistent with the aim of easing tension in Northeast Asia. At the same time, however, the US did not always regard its long-range goal as subordinate to its short-range goal. In essence, the two goals were complementary and symbiotic. Thus, especially for the Carter

---

administration, the long-range goal of exerting pressure for liberalisation was intended to facilitate a better environment for the territorial integrity of South Korea by removing one of the key obstacles to the alleviation of tensions between the two Koreas.

The Carter administration’s approach ("the Carter formula") to managing South Korean politics, including the regime transition of 1979-80, embraced three inter-related dimensions: global, regional and local. First, the Carter administration sought to deter Soviet expansionism by inviting the PRC into the US global network of containment. Secondly, in terms of the regional dimension, the US attempted to increase Japan’s share of the defence burden. Thirdly, reliant upon these policies, at the local level, political reconciliation or the alleviation of tensions between the two Koreas was imperative for the stability in the region. To that end, the Carter administration’s plan was to attract North Korea to the side of both the PRC and the US by removing two major obstacles: the presence of US ground forces in the Korean peninsula and the dictatorial regime in South Korea. Even though the chances of establishing good relations with North Korea seemed to be slim, the Carter administration never abandoned that possibility. Furthermore, even after it was decided to suspend the withdrawal of US ground forces from South Korea, the US did not relinquish its pressure for the liberalisation of South Korean politics. On balance, this pressure was not merely based on the human rights issue or a Wilsonian idealistic approach but on a systematic concept of alliance management.

Japan’s main role in the security sphere was to make an indirect rather than direct

\[\text{Ibid.: pp. 700-701.}\]
contribution to the maintenance of the regional order. Japan, after enhancing its friendly relations with South Korea since the diplomatic normalisation of 1965, maintained limited contacts with North Korea. For Japan, the status quo in Northeast Asia meant "stability in the Korean peninsula" and the "security of South Korea." The first of these imperatives was mainly a reflection of the power correlation and of strategic alignment among the US, the Soviet Union and the PRC in the Cold War era; while the second was a matter of maintaining economic and political security within South Korea and deterring the military threat from the North. Thus, Japan's common interests with the South were much more important than its relations with the North. Put another way, the realisation of a rigid status quo in the Korean peninsula was synonymous with the pursuit of military, political and economic stability in South Korea. Because Japan did not develop any reliable means to leverage North Korean behaviour, it had to invest in human and material resources in the South. As a result, the interdependence of Japan and South Korea has deepened: the degree of sharing fate between them has increased.

When it comes to the discussion about the Japanese posture between the US and South Korea, as discussed in Chapter 3, the Japanese Fukuda cabinet had viewed the US foreign policy, and its moralist approach and human rights policy in particular, under the Carter presidency with scepticism. H. Abe, one of senior researcher of Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu-sho, the umbrella institute of the MOFA, criticised that the Carter administration's emphasis of the American value would bring about "unrealistic

---

5 Hook (1996).
and irrational" policies towards its allies. As far as the impact of the US-South Korea relations the US human rights policy caused was concerned, from the Japanese viewpoint, President Park’s deviant response to the US concerns about South Korean human rights issues were natural: Park told on 2 February 1977 that “the protection of the human rights in Korea is to defend 35 million South Korean people from the communist threat.” By the same token, the Ohira cabinet was sceptical to the Carter administration’s formula to induce North Korea to the dialogue with South Korea.

Part Two of the study considers US and Japanese political intervention towards South Korea in the last year of the Park regime given the argument that the US adopted a flexible status quo policy linked to a strategy of offensive intervention, while Japan adhered to a rigid status quo policy linked to a strategy of defensive intervention aiming at the preservation of the existing regime in South Korea. Part Two consists of two chapters: Chapter 4 discusses the way in which the US affected the decisive weakening and demise of the Park regime and covers the period between January and October 1979. Chapter 5 analyses the first term of the Ohira premiership, from January to October 1979. It discusses Japanese views about the dislocation of economic development and the political system in South Korea, and Japan’s discontent with the continuation of US pressure on the Park regime to undertake political liberalization. The “dissimilar-integrative” type of interaction introduced in Chapter 2 will also serve in each chapter as a useful tool explaining US-Japan-South Korean relations.

---

9 Ibid.: p. 554.
CHAPTER 4

US POLICY FOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUTH KOREA,
JANUARY-OCTOBER 1979: THE DEMISE OF THE PARK REGIME

INTRODUCTION

From mid-1978 onwards, the Republican Party's criticism of President Carter gained popular support, and the Carter administration recognised that it must seek to reduce public criticism of its human rights-oriented policies.\(^{11}\) One of the results was Assistant Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific Region, Richard Holbrooke's speech about US-South Korea policy on 6 December 1978 before the Far East-American Council and the US-Korean Economic Council that the "past problems" were "resolved or on the way to resolution."\(^{12}\) Most importantly however, this did not mean that the Carter administration would end US pressure for political liberalisation in South Korea "where an obvious security interest was at stake."\(^ {13}\) Rather, the administration wanted to secure gradual political liberalisation in South Korea in exchange for the suspension of its own withdrawal policy. To that end, the summit talks proved to be a highly effective device for expressing the US security commitment not only to South Korea but also to the Northeast Asian region as a whole, and for pressing the liberalisation of the Park regime. The visit of President Carter to Seoul 29 June-1 July 1979 was arranged as a

\(^{12}\) Ibid.: p.31.
symbol of "the passing of the severe strains" and "the return to normal relations."\textsuperscript{14} However, as this chapter seeks to explain, the reconciliation of the goals of the Carter Administration and the Park regime was not achieved.

The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 4.1 discusses the shift of US policy towards the Park regime in early 1979, and the regime's reluctance to change its ruling style. Section 4.2 considers the friction between the Carter administration and the Park regime before the summit meetings of 29 June-1 July 1979. Section 4.3 examines the domestic political confrontation leading to the death of President Park. Finally, the conclusion summarises the main points of argument developed in this chapter.

4.1 THE SHIFT IN US-SOUTH KOREA POLICY IN EARLY 1979 AND THE ROOTS OF DISCORD WITH THE PARK REGIME

For the previous two years, the legitimacy of the Park regime had been undermined substantially by two factors: the economic recession caused by the second oil crisis in 1978, and the Carter administration's refusal to offer unconditional support to the regime. The South Korean people lost their confidence in the capacity and legitimacy of the Park regime. The result of the National Assembly election on 12 December 1978, when the opposition New Democratic Party outpolled the DRP candidates by 1.1%, alarmed the Park regime.\textsuperscript{15} The opposition/dissident forces believed that they now had a springboard to launch a more aggressive struggle against the Park regime.\textsuperscript{16} The Carter administration interpreted the result positively: "the government had a lesson in

\textsuperscript{14} 79Seoul 01625 (3 February 1979).
\textsuperscript{16} 79 Seoul 01620 (2 February 1979).
humility without risking the loss of the government’s service.”

The Carter administration’s efforts to balance principle and power did not mark a complete return to the foreign policies of the Nixon and the Ford administrations, which had sought to distinguish clearly between international affairs and allies’ internal political concerns. The US goals and objectives for Korea in 1979 were twofold: the “prevention of armed conflict and reducing tensions” and the “promotion of greater political liberalization in the ROK without provoking a nationalist, regressive reaction.” If the recovery of strained relations with the Park regime could be achieved, the US believed, it would be possible to persuade the regime to move ahead towards political liberalisation by “friendly and unobtrusive counsel”.

The Carter administration first announced its intention to readjust the timing and rate of the withdrawal plan on 9 February 1979. The most pivotal issue, which caused serious deterioration in the bilateral relationship, thus seemed to be resolved. The administration believed that the existing global strategic parity was not disadvantageous to the US: the SALT II aimed to “provide reasonable, practical, and verifiable constraints” on the arms race. Moreover, Carter, who was already feeling a sense of humiliation about the troop withdrawal policy, was sceptical of the validity of the new

---

17 79 Seoul 01427 (31 January 1979).
18 79 State 04087 (17 February 1979). The telegram, entitled, 1979 U.S. Goals and Objectives for Korea, consisted of four parts; I. U.S. Interest; II. Key Policy Issues Facing the U.S. in the Next Two Years; III. Goals and Objectives; and IV. Explanation of Changes from the Last Goals and Objectives Statement. The core was the pursuit of “prevention of armed conflict and reducing tensions” and “promotion of greater political liberalization in the ROK without provoking a nationalist, regressive reaction” as a basis for the “development of long-range policy blueprint for U.S.-Korea relations in the post patron/client period.”
19 Ibid.
20 Chosun Ilbo (6 January 1977).
intelligence assessment concerning North Korea’s military superiority over the South.\textsuperscript{23} He was reluctant to embark upon a drastic policy change, even if it was necessary to make some adjustments. Instead, the US sought to utilise the withdrawal issue as much as possible to induce a process of liberalization in South Korea. In addition, the US President attempted to lessen the tension between the two Koreas by arranging tripartite talks between the US and the two Korea in the hope that the long-term presence of American soldiers in Korea would become unnecessary.\textsuperscript{24} Short- and long-term goals were pursued simultaneously. In consequence, diplomatic strains appeared in the pre-consultation period for the Carter-Park summit meeting and in the Park regime’s responses to opposition challenges within South Korea.

From the Park regime’s point of view, due to the new intelligence data concerning North Korean military strength in January 1979, the Carter plan for troops was stillborn. President Park wanted to retain US support without changing his ruling style in the belief that a consensus supporting the suspension of the withdrawal policy was building up in Washington. In his new year press conference on 19 January 1979, declaring the end of the “uncomfortable relations” of the past two years with the United States,” President Park proposed that there should be a summit meeting with President Carter, while at the same time he rejected the adequacy of “Western style democracy’ and refused to lift Emergence Measure-9 [EM-9, hereafter].\textsuperscript{25} Signs of a return to normal relations were seen in Washington with a series of visits by South Korean national Assemblymen.\textsuperscript{26} Most significantly, the visit of Korean Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin to Washington on 14-24 February 1979 was regarded as a successful pre-summit

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.: p. 105.
\textsuperscript{25} 79 Seoul 00751(19 January 1979); Emergency Measure 9 prohibited any kind of criticism of the Yushin Constitution. The maximum penalty for violation of this rule was death.
consultation. It can be seen, therefore, that from the outset the efforts by the US and South Korea to restore their relations involved muddled perceptions between the two countries' governments. This was a situation well captured in Neustadt's observation: “each friend misreads the other, each is reticent with the other ... each replies in kind. A spiral starts, and only when one bows low before the other's latest grievance does the spiral stop.”

4.2 THE POLITICAL STRAINS BEFORE THE SUMMIT MEETING OF 29 JUNE-1 JULY 1979

The recovery of relations between the Carter administration and the Park regime was not realized, and the outcome of the summit meeting was bound to be disappointing. There were three main sources of difficulty: President Carter's attachment to human rights; the Park regime's incapacity to further absorb US demands; and the strength of opposition/dissident forces in South Korea. The muddled perceptions inevitably led to disappointed expectations on both sides, and caused political strains. Unfortunately, the spiral did not stop until President Park was dead.

4.2.1 The US Approach to the Summit Meeting and the Reaction of the Park Regime

From the early stage of the pre-summit consultation, the war of nerves cast a dark shadow over the bilateral efforts to return to normal relations in 1979. In order to find an optimal way of balancing the issues of security and human rights, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke visited Seoul in mid-March 1979 and met President Park,

---

26 79 State 028864 (3 February 1979).
the Foreign Minister, the Director of the KCIA, and also some political dissidents. Foreign Minister Park called for the US to “leave the matter to the ROK so that progress could be made.” By contrast, the dissident groups emphasised that “if there were a summit, President Carter should raise human rights issues.”

The dissident groups were determined to utilise the visit of Carter to strengthen their struggle against the Park regime. The Park regime was clearly not happy with Hobrooke’s visit and especially his contacts with dissidents. Ten days after the visit, on 27 March, Foreign Minister Park complained to the US Ambassador about Holbrooke had conveyed President Carter’s letters to three dissident leaders, Yun Bo-sun, Kim Dae-jung and Ham Sok-hun, without giving notice to the regime.

This episode created the widespread impression that the summit talks would fail to achieve their goals. US pre-summit pressure for the improvement of human rights in South Korea had no significant effect. Therefore, the US Ambassador to Seoul, William Gleysteen, recommended that Washington should move towards “the close of a very unhappy chapter in U.S.-ROK relations.” He predicted that making South Korea “a pariah state” (see Chapter 3) would result in the weakening of US influence vis-à-vis South Korea, and that the latter would respond by treating its patron, the US, as a pariah too. However, Washington did not welcome this recommendation. Holbrooke continued to emphasise the desire at “the highest level” for human rights progress prior to the Presidential visit to Korea. On 10 April, Washington’s proposal for the summit was conveyed to South Korea:

28 On 17 March, after meeting President Park, the Assistant Secretary had talks about human rights with KCIA Director, Kim Jae-kyu. (79 Seoul 04547 (29 March, 1979)).
29 79 Seoul 04269 (3 March 1979)
30 79 Seoul 04144 (21 March 1979).
31 79 Seoul 0511 (7 April 1979).
32 79 State 086093 (7 April 1979).
(A) It is the president's belief that the major aim of the visit is to consolidate the US-ROK relationship and our cooperation in a wide sphere ranging from security and reduction of regional tensions to economics;
(B) The value of a summit meeting will obviously be affected by the atmosphere in which it takes place;
(C) It is the president's hope that internal development in Korea as well as bilateral matters between us will contribute to a constructive atmosphere.
(D) A visible gesture of ROK political liberalization could make a very important contribution to overall U.S.-Korean relations.33

The message was quite clear: the US President intended to consolidate US-ROK relations if there was clear evidence of political liberalisation in Korea. The requirements of Article (A) of the Washington proposal could only be met if Article (D) was respected. The roots of miscommunication and disappointed expectations were thus established in the pre-summit consultation. Washington expected the lifting of the draconian EM 9—which it saw as "greater than required to meet the threats" to Korea's security and stability34—as a visible gesture of South Korea's desire to return to normal relations with the US.35 However, this proposal was unacceptable to the Park regime.

In mid-June, only ten days before the summit, the Ambassador met Kim Jae-kyu, Director of the KCIA. At the meeting, Gleysteen spoke "in quite blunt terms" about "some further gesture to signify human rights progress." At the same time, he drew a red line "to avoid actions which would signify regression" before, during, and after the

33 79 State 089493 (10 April 1979). See also President Carter's meeting with editors and news directors on 13 April 1979, cited in PPPU, Jimmy Carter, 1979, Book I: p. 627.
34 79 Seoul 07654 (25 May 1979).
These demands met with a completely negative response, and indeed the South Korean government proceeded to confine about thirty dissidents to their homes in late June 1979.

4.2.2 The Carter-Park Summit Meetings, 29 June-1 July, 1979

The Washington Post described Carter’s visit to Seoul as “a delicate diplomatic mission of showing support for the country’s security without appearing to embrace a government that is persistently at odds with his human rights policy.” The summit talks dealt with three major issues: the US security commitment, including the status of the US combat forces in South Korea; the three-way official talks between the US and the two Koreas; and the human rights issue.

The joint communiqué of the summit meetings gave a guarded impression that the unhappy relations between the two countries had come to an end. Out of the communiqué’s 23 articles, 14 were directly or indirectly related to security. The communiqué offered an assurance to Park: “the United States will continue to maintain an American military presence in the ROK to ensure peace and security,” and “prompt and effective assistance” was promised in the event of an armed attack against South Korea. However, these pledges need to be viewed together with the unexpected and contradictory inclusion of the proposal for three-way official talks between the US and the two Koreas. President Carter attached so much importance to this idea because otherwise the policy of linkage between the human rights issue and the withdrawal plan

---

36 79 Seoul 09082 (20 June 1979).
37 79 State 161752 (23 June 1979).
would be broken. In a sense, the initiative was the outcome of the Park regime's political compromise. The resumed dialogue between the South and the North in early 1979 had reached deadlock by March. In American eyes, the Park regime did not want to improve relations with the North. Therefore, the acceptance of the three-way official talks initiative was regarded by the US as the Park regime agreed to follow the Carter formula for the making of East Asian security environment, the formula which intended the US military presence unnecessary. The Park regime clearly agreed to the three-way official talks in order to obtain the suspension of the US withdrawal policy and to avoid being pressurized further on the human rights issue. For its part, the Carter administration revised its withdrawal policy in order to get agreement on the three-way official talks. However, the hoped-for response from the Park regime on human rights was not forthcoming.

Behind the outward appearance of success was the reality that the summit meetings had not really achieved the desired goals of either the Carter administration or the Park regime. Carter was clearly unhappy about giving up the withdrawal policy, feeling that his hand was being forced, especially since the issue of human rights issue was still unresolved. The only chance for the US to press the Park regime further was in face-to-face talks between the two Presidents. In a two-hour meeting on 30 June 1979 Park was indifferent to the difficulties Carter was facing in the domestic political arena, while Carter resented Park's one-sided preaching on the issue of troops withdrawal and his refusal to enter into serious discussion of human rights. As Park continued his lecture, Carter passed a memo to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown: "If

---

40 Ibid.: p.1208.
Part II

he goes on like this much longer I’m going to pull every troop out of the country.”

Vance recollected Carter’s reaction in vivid terms:

We could almost feel the temperature in the room drop as Park continued, through an interpreter, his assault on the policy. Sitting between the President and Harold Brown, I could feel the contained anger of the President.

Carter was extremely annoyed: “Korean policy hung in the balance.” In contrast, Im Pang-hyun, Spokesman of the Blue House [the South Korean Presidential Office], stated that the first summit talks took place “in a very friendly atmosphere.” In fact, at the evening toast on 30 June, Park praised the Yushin system as the one which “best suits our actual circumstances” and is “the most effective in solving our own problems.” Apparently, Park regarded the outcome of the summit meetings as quite promising. From his point of view, everything was clear: North Korea was in essence opposed to any idea of peaceful unification, so the US should ally itself closely with the South.

The US response was immediate. The US President expressed his sympathy with opposition/dissident forces in meetings with South Korean church and opposition leaders. He actually spent more time with opposition party leader Kim Yong-sam than with the ruling party leaders. Kim revealed that: “Carter gave instructions to Ambassador Gleysteen to discuss various problems [such as the North-South dialogue and the democratisation of Korean politics] with me continuously.”

---

43 Ibid.: p.130.
46 Chosun Ilbo (1 July 1979).
48 Interview with Dr. Lee Tong-won.
49 Chosun Ilbo (3 July 1979).
50 Ibid.
administration transgressed one of the bottom lines of the triangular alliance.

The proposal for three-way official talks as a "realistic solution" was rejected by the North just ten days after the joint communiqué was issued. From the US point of view, the peace initiative in the Korean peninsula turned out to be a failure, but the issue of human rights was kept alive in order to facilitate the alleviation of tension for "the Carter formula" (as already referred to the introduction of Part Two).

4.3 POLITICAL UNREST IN SOUTH KOREA, US INTERVENTION, AND THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT PARK (26 OCTOBER 1979)

After the Carter visit to Seoul, the Park regime and the opposition/dissident forces sought to turn the outcome of the visit to their own advantage. The regime regarded the summit as President Park's personal political triumph and had the guarded expectation that Carter would not interfere in the internal affairs in South Korea. On balance, however, the combination of political challenges from the domestic opposition/dissidents forces and pressures from the US meant the Carter administration effectively "discarded" the Park regime. As explained in Chapter 2, the Park regime was not ready to serve US foreign policy objectives in East Asia generally, and in the Korean peninsula in particular, and this therefore prompted a US strategy of offensive intervention.

51 Chosun Ilbo, (12 July 1979).
52 Interview with Huh Hwa-kyung.
4.3.1 The Domestic Challenges

South Korean opposition/dissident forces had been inspired by the disintegration of the Shah's regime in Iran in early February 1979 to pursue the same goal in their own country. From their point of view, if the US did not wish to see a repeat of the Iranian situation, it should stop giving support to President Park. This belief led them to initiate more aggressive challenges to the Park regime, which itself drew its own lesson from Iran: it was costly for the state to make concessions to dissidents. Unlike Nixon and Ford, Carter had consistently threatened Park's political legitimacy by applying human rights pressure even after the summit meetings. No matter how indirect and mild the pressure might be, it was sufficient to weaken the regime's legitimacy and to provide leverage for the opposition/dissident forces to exploit.

Aggressive US intervention affected the readiness of opposition/dissident forces to struggle against the Park regime. In the escalating political confrontation during 1979, the central figure was Assemblyman Kim Young-Sam, one of the New Democratic Party leaders. His tough struggle against the Park regime was largely motivated by the prospect of the forthcoming visit of the US President to Seoul. After meeting with President Carter, Kim Young-sam attacked the Park regime vehemently. Rejecting President Park's suggestion of a meeting with other ruling parties' leaders, on 14 July Kim Young-Sam for the first time stated that only a change of government could help South Korea overcome its economic difficulties. On 23 July in the National Assembly Kim urged Park to make a "courageous decision" to prepare for a peaceful transition of power. He also emphasised that he was willing to meet Kim Il-sung to discuss the issue

53 Interview with Huh Hwa-pyung.
54 79 Seoul 02486 (17 February 1979).
of the peaceful unification of Korea.\textsuperscript{56}

After the suspension of the troop withdrawal plan until 1981 (announced on 20 July 1979), the level of US intervention in South Korean politics increased. The signals from Washington encouraged the opposition/dissident forces. On 23 July, Secretary of State Vance delivered an address before the National Urban League in Chicago in which he reiterated: “We promote our long-term interests – including our security interests – when we encourage democratic change and social and economic justice.”\textsuperscript{57} Even more significantly, a previously postponed visit to Seoul of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Issues and Humanitarian Affairs, Mark L. Schneider, was implemented from 24 to 31 July. He encouraged opposition and dissident forces: “The US would try to help by making its concerns known to the ROKG in a frank and visible manner.”\textsuperscript{58}

For the Park regime, the situation now steadily worsened and its tolerance of US policy reached the limit. When the US Department of State denounced EM-9 as inconsistent with international standards of human rights protection, on 8 August the MOFA protested strongly against such “interference in Korean internal affairs.”\textsuperscript{59} The US was just as firm: “If the US was to give credit for positive actions taken by the ROKG, it must also be expected to register its displeasure.”\textsuperscript{60} Also on 8 August, the YH incident occurred in Seoul: 200 female workers of the YH company were invited by Kim Young-sam to engage in a sit-in demonstration at the headquarters of the opposition NDP to

\textsuperscript{55} 79 Seoul 10620 (11 July 1979); 79 Seoul 10885 (16 July, 1979); 79 Seoul 11250 (23 July, 1979); Chosun Ilbo (24 July 1979).
\textsuperscript{56} Before Carter’s visit, Kim announced on 11 June his readiness to meet Kim Il-sung, General Secretary of North Korea, for talks on peaceful unification. This was in line with the US formula to transform the East Asian security environment and was a deliberate test of the Park regime’s reaction.
\textsuperscript{57} USDSB (September 1979): p. 8.
\textsuperscript{58} 79 Seoul 12003 (7 August 1979)
\textsuperscript{59} 79 Seoul 11841 (2 August 1979).
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
demand the right to manage the company by themselves. At 2 a.m. on 11 August, some 1,000 riot policemen stormed the NDP headquarters, resulting in the death of one female worker. More than 100 people, including NDP National Assemblymen and reporters, were injured, and about 200 others were arrested.  

Washington viewed this incident as an inexcusably “excessive and brutal” action, and the Park regime was blamed for the deteriorating situation. The Korean Ministry of Home Affairs rebuked this attack publicly: “interference in internal affairs deserves moral criticism.” Soon afterwards, the ruling DRP and Yujonghoe Assemblymen jointly denounced both the NDP and the Carter administration. The political strain between the Carter administration and the Park regime was now at breaking point. On 17 August, Gleysteen called on the MOFA to warn that: “[The Home Ministry’s] charge...might boomerang and seriously damage our relationship...A recent pattern of events might foreshadow a human rights clamp-down...[as an] aftermath of the Carter visit.” By contrast, Gleysteen’s luncheon meeting with Kim Young-Sam on 20 August seemed to fan the flames of the controversy, especially since it was covered in most major South Korean newspapers. President Park now retaliated directly against Kim Young-Sam by disqualifying him from the NDP Presidency, manipulating NDP intra-party fragmentation and thus plunging the party into chaos, and forcing Kim out of the National Assembly. On 8 September, the local court temporarily suspended Kim from the Presidency of the NDP. Two days later, Kim declared his intention to seek the

---

62 79 State 211446 (14 August 1979).
63 ibid.: p. 1.
64 79 Seoul 012520 (17 August 1979). An almost identical conversation took place on the same day in Washington between the Korean Ambassador to Washington, Kim Yong-sik, and Assistant Secretary R. Holbrooke, who said: “quietly we must keep the pressure on the ROKG to move in a constructive manner” (79 State 216349 (18 August 1979)).
65 79 Seoul 12586 (20 August 1979).
overthrow of the Park regime by all possible means.

4.3.2 The Diplomatic Strain with the Carter Administration

From September 1979, the confrontational line was drawn clearly between the Park regime and the US and domestic opposition/dissident forces. As the mutual suspicions and misperceptions of the two states increased, a spiral of tension quickly developed.\(^{67}\) On 13 September 1979, the State Department began to use the term “political turmoil” to describe the South Korean situation: “The time is ripe for a major confrontation with the government.”\(^{68}\) At this juncture the Carter administration stood on the opposition/dissident side. Ambassador Gleysteen, on 15 September, conveyed a “particularly important” US concern to President Park’s aide, Choi Kwang-soo: “the government [should] avoid heavy handed repression ... like the arrest of Kim Young-Sam or others who had been so recently associated with President Carter during his visit.”\(^{69}\) The direct impetus for the Park regime to attack Kim was his interview with The New York Times released on 16 September: “The time has come for the United States to make a clear choice between a basically dictatorial regime and the majority who aspire to democracy.”\(^{70}\) In response, the Carter administration endorsed Kim’s demand.

On 26 September in New York, about a week before the Park regime expelled Kim Young-Sam from the National Assembly, and one month before the death of President Park, Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin was given a stern warning by Assistant Secretary

---

\(^{67}\) R. Snyder (1999): p. 266.  
\(^{68}\) 79 State 2412112 (13 September 1979).  
\(^{69}\) 79 Seoul 14107 (15 September 1979).  
Holbrooke: “Additional arrests of religious figures and apparent harassment of Kim Young-Sam were most unhelpful. ...Recent developments [should] not seriously threaten our excellent progress together on so many fronts in the past year.”\textsuperscript{71} In the Foreign Ministerial talks, Vance made it clear to the Korean Foreign Minister that the US would not stand aside.\textsuperscript{72}

When Vance made a speech on US policy toward Latin America before the Foreign Policy Association in New York on 27 September 1979, it was clear that his words were applicable to the South Korean situation:

The competition between democracy and authoritarianism is far from over...but the currents are moving in favorable directions. The transition to more stable and open system is underway and gaining momentum. These moves toward more democratic and open societies in Latin America are distinctly in our interest. The great strength of democracy is its flexibility and resilience. It opens opportunities for broadly based political and economic participation. By encouraging compromise and accommodation, it fosters evolutionary change.\textsuperscript{73}

On the other hand, Vance assured that:

While the United States is ready to help nations making political changes leading to pluralism and respect for human rights, it would oppose efforts by the Soviet Union or Cuba to exploit hemisphere upheavals.\textsuperscript{74}

The clear message was that the US would guarantee external security when domestic political changes were initiated. President Park gave his response in two Presidential messages on the national commemoration days of 1 and 3 October. Without giving any appreciation of the role played by the US in defending Korea, he underlined that the

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{State 08026} (27 September 1979).
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{USDSB} (October 1979): p. 14.
Yushin system was "an independent and productive system suitable to our reality and situation." The expulsion of Kim Young-Sam from the National Assembly was now inevitable. On 4 October, the ruling parties passed the necessary resolution, accusing Kim of defamation of national prestige by inviting the intervention of a foreign country for his personal political advantage. When the Department of State spokesman, Hodding Carter, described the expulsion as "regretful", the DRP and Yujonghoe spokesmen responded by stressing that the matter was "none of US business." On 7 October, immediately after the expulsion of Kim Young-Sam, the Carter administration recalled Ambassador Gleysteen to Washington. Six days later, the NDP announced an en masse resignation of its 69 Assemblymen. Kim asserted that "Park should revise the constitution and hold direct presidential elections. ... If not, South Korea will see a student revolution as violent as that which toppled Syngman Rhee or that which ousted the Shah in Iran." At this critical juncture, seemingly, the Park regime sought to defect from the triangular alliance by entering into contact with the Soviet Union at the civilian level. It was unknown how much this gesture was counterproductive for the Park regime to stop the US pressure on political liberalisation, nonetheless it was unhelpful in trying to deflecting the pressure from Washington.

An even bigger American blow to the Park regime came from Tokyo. On 9 October, the US Ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, told reporters that "the Republic of Korea lies outside the US Pacific defense perimeter." Mansfield's remarks—were reported to every South Korean newspaper in detail near top front page—seemed to nullify the

74 Historic Documents of 1979: p. 714.
75 Seoul 15182 (4 October 1979).
76 Seoul 15291 (5 October 1979).
77 Seoul 15282 (9 October 1979); Seoul 15359 (10 October 1979).
78 Ibid.: p.2
79 The Hayashi Collection
Carter-Park summit meeting, since they apparently contradicted the statement of President Carter in Washington on the same day that the US would take every measure to counter the Soviet Union’s military expansion.\textsuperscript{81} The Park regime, unlike South Korean mass media which had strong critical postures towards the remarks, “has been low-key, limited in essence to a request for the facts.”\textsuperscript{82}

In terms of the linkage of security commitment with the human rights issue, the Departments of Defense and State issued a joint statement on 15 October: “If demonstrably positive trends do not soon emerge then recent events will create multiplying problems in many areas of our relationships.”\textsuperscript{83} On the same day, in a radio interview, President Carter added further weight to the demand that political prisoners in South Korea must be released before or after the SCM meeting.\textsuperscript{84}

\textbf{4.3.3 The Pusan and Masan Uprisings and the Demise of the Park Regime}

Throughout the period from early August to late October, in addition to being subject to strong US pressure, the Park regime was considerably isolated and had to face the combined opposition of the churches, journalists, intellectuals, and the student and labour movements. Student demonstrations became stronger and more persistent. Eventually, in Pusan, the second largest city and the political home of Kim Young-Sam, events took a dramatic turn. On 16 October, more than 5,000 students succeeded in

\textsuperscript{80} 79 Seoul 15356 (10 October 1979)
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.: pp. 3-4.
\textsuperscript{82} 79 State 268137 (13 October 1979).
\textsuperscript{83} 79 State 269523 (15 October 1979)
\textsuperscript{84} 79 Seoul 15591 (15 October 1979).
reaching the downtown area of Pusan, and their protest continued until well after dark.\textsuperscript{85}

One of the most conspicuous features of the demonstrations was the participation of ordinary citizens. As night fell, violence erupted. Two broadcasting stations, a newspaper building, and many police boxes were attacked and several police vehicles were damaged. Unable to prevent subsequent demonstrations, the Park regime declared martial law as "a final unavoidable step" in Pusan on 18 October. Under the provision of martial law, a total of 3,700 marines and special forces were deployed to Pusan on 18 October, the day on which the SCM opened. Such a hard-line measure, however, could not totally prevent further student demonstrations in Pusan. There was more violence, and it quickly spread to nearby Masan and Changwon. In response, the regime instituted a Garrison Decree, one step below Martial Law, in Masan and Changwon at 12.00 on 20 October.

At this critical juncture, arriving in Seoul on 18 October for the SCM, Defense Secretary Brown paid a visit to President Park with Gleysteen. After handing over President Carter’s letter and the list of political prisoners whose release was demanded, Brown gave a clear indication that the US security commitment to South Korea might be reconsidered:

\begin{quote}
It was not our intention to allow the current situation to affect our security ties with the ROK, but as a practical matter, it would be difficult for us if there were no return to the more liberal trend associated with President Carter’s visit to Korea.\textsuperscript{86}
\end{quote}

Gleysteen advised Park to move as quickly as possible to open opportunities for

\textsuperscript{85} Reportedly, a MOFA official indicated that "the South Korean government will check on the issue at the ROK-US SCM next week." (79 Seoul 15356 (10 October 1979)); 79 Seoul 15750 (17 October 1979).

\textsuperscript{86} 79 Seoul 15823 (18 October 1979).
compromise with the NDP. In response, after listening to the two US representatives, President Park made it clear that in his view the current political crisis was due in part to the public statements made by the Carter administration.

Following the imposition of Martial Law and Garrison Decree, the situation seemed to be under control, and many observers felt that the worst of the demonstrations had now passed. The last telegram from the US Embassy to the Department of State before the assassination of President Park described the mood at 08:34 EST on October 26: “Pusan and Masan remained quiet.” The news of the assassination of President Park, announced in the early morning on 26 October, therefore came as a great shock to the Carter administration. There could be no doubt that this event had brought the authoritarian Yushin system to an end.

CONCLUSION

Even though both governments wanted to bring the period of their unhappy relations to an end, the final outcome was grave failure. The Park regime, with wishful thinking, believed that US policy towards South Korea would shift its orientation from human rights to security. However, the political strains between the two countries continued to accumulate. After Carter’s visit, the US intervened in South Korean politics more deeply than ever before, and the strain resulted in a series of diplomatic moves and counter-moves. Just four months after the US President’s visit to Seoul, President Park was dead and his regime had collapsed.

88 The embassy diagnosed with caution that: “There remain expectations that demonstrations could recur at any time in any location.” 79 Seoul 16063 (23 October 1979)
89 79 Seoul 16299 (26 October 1979).
As explained in the introduction to Part Two, the internal political liberalisation of South Korean politics was one of the basic requirements for a sustainable security environment in Northeast Asia. Reviewing the whole process of US-South Korea interaction, between January and October 1979, it is noteworthy that US alliance management of South Korean politics showed a high degree of flexibility despite the emphasis on maintaining the status quo. The long-range US goal of political development in South Korea as a basis for unification was regarded as complementary to the short-range goal of maintaining the security of South Korea. In the process of pursuing this dual track policy towards South Korea, certain elements of crisis behaviour in intra-alliance politics emerged. These can usefully be analysed in terms of Neustadt's framework, which seeks to show how muddled perceptions can lead to stifled communications, disappointed expectations and eventually paranoid reactions: the spiral of conflict stopped only when one bows low before the other's latest grievance. 90 The Park regime did not and could not bow low before the US pressure, and misread the degree of American policy shift in its favour and believed that the US security commitment was guaranteed even to the extent of the US condoning the authoritarian regime in South Korea. On the other hand, Washington, in contrast to the judgement of the US embassy, insisted that the Park regime should demonstrate its political will by initiating a liberalization process, including the lifting of EM-9. When the Park regime refused to accept these US recommendations, the Carter administration took the decision to seek more actively to change the political structure of South Korea. This process in due course eroded the legitimacy of the Park regime, but it also revealed the ineffective management of alliance politics by the Carter administration. Put the other way round, the Park regime failed to attract and maintain American support, “a

formidable asset” in Walt’s terms. At least to the point of the demise of President Park, however, the position of “a projected force” and exposed state could not prevent the US pressure from the demise of the Park regime, as explained in the Introduction.

Considering the general issue of the degree of US influence in Korean politics, even though the US could not transform the Park regime’s authoritarian rule, there can be no doubt that the death of President Park was in part attributable to the mounting displeasure of the US with the regime. In this respect, whatever the process, the US did succeed in removing the authoritarian leader from office. However, the US aim of encouraging the gradual transformation of South Korea’s political system was not realised. In this sense, the US approach to alliance management was at best only a partial success.
CHAPTER 5

JAPAN'S PERCEPTION ON US-SOUTH KOREA POLICY AND POLITICAL INTERACTION WITH THE PARK REGIME, JANUARY-OCTOBER 1979

INTRODUCTION

As explained in the introduction of Part Two, Japan's operational principle was a rigid status quo policy which authorised a defensive intervention in South Korean politics through the support of the Park regime when the latter was challenged by both US offensive intervention and domestic political opposition. Chapter 5 contains five sections. Section 5.1 discusses briefly the Japanese perspectives on the link between economic growth and political development, and the limits to changes in Japan's policy towards the Korean peninsula. Section 5.2 considers the rationale behind Japan's return to a rigid status quo policy. Then, in Section 5.3 Japan-South Korea co-operation in the political and defence areas is discussed. Section 5.4 examines Japanese perspectives on US-South Korean political relations, and this will provide the basis for the later consideration (in Chapter 7) of the more direct intervention by Japan than before the death of President Park. During the course of this chapter's analysis, issues of alliance management, intra-alliance politics, the hierarchical nature of the TASS, the dissimilar-integrative character of alliance interactions, and the nature and scope of Japan's defensive intervention will be examined. The achievement and the limits of the role of mediator that Japan played will be discussed in the conclusion.
5.1 JAPAN'S VIEW ON THE SOUTH KOREAN POLITICS AND THE LIMITS OF POLICY SHIFT TOWARDS THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Japan had a very specific view of the disjunction between economic development and political democratisation in South Korea, and at the same time the scope for policy shift towards South Korea was limited, especially in terms of the improvement of relations with North Korea.

5.1.1 The Disjunction between Economic Development and Political Democratisation

Japanese apprehension towards US-South Korea policy dates back to the advance of the Yushin System in 1972. At that time, Japan viewed the attitude of the US Democratic Party towards the Park regime as problematic, since the regime was portrayed by the US Democratic Party as a more severe form of dictatorship than Hitler's National-Socialist state in Germany.¹ In the late 1970s, Japanese images of South Korea differed significantly from those endorsed by the Carter administration. This is one reason why the US and Japan disagreed about the most effective course of action for promoting stability in the Korean peninsula. The South Korean path to developmental dictatorship, through the co-existence of rapid economic development and an authoritarian political system, was not at all problematic for the Japanese government. It was similar in culture and polity between Japan and South Korea, and in line with the Japanese path of state developmentalism for the past decades. Indeed, Masataka Kosaka argued that, given the history of Korean government, the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee in the South was very natural.² Kamiya Fuji criticised the political pressures exerted by the Carter

¹ Interview with Tamaki.
administration on the Park regime in an even stronger tone:

The United States, which is deeply involved in Korea, has sometimes failed to grasp the basic facts concerning that country...It is inappropriate for Carter to expect the Koreans to practice democracy or to respect human rights as defined by the United States. Korean and U.S. standards simply are not the same.³

According to this view, the strong leadership of President Park was a key factor in maintaining the security of South Korea and the Northeast Asian region. By contrast, the dissidents' call for unification were highly questionable in that their appeals would clearly serve the interests of North Korea, which endorsed the confederation proposal drawn up by Kim Il-sung as a means of exploiting the perceived weakness of the South.⁴ In short, the Japanese leadership had no dispute with the Park regime.

5.1.2 The Limits of Policy Shift Towards the Korean Peninsula

The security environment in East Asia in early 1979 was complex. The new Japanese cabinet headed by Masayoshi Ohira, whose self-inflicted mandate was “how to pursue stability amid instability,”⁵ started its term with a relatively optimistic view. Even though destabilising factors like the tangible Soviet threat were increasing in world politics, the will of the US as a hegemonic power seemed to be reviving,⁶ and the US-South Korea relations were regarded as passing the “phase of restoration.”⁷ In his first official speech as Prime Minister, Ohira expressed a reserved optimism with respect to

³ Ibid.: pp. 2-3.
⁴ Ibid.: p. 49. With regard to the Japanese view on the role of the US forces in South Korea as: “the US military presence in South Korea has been strong deterrence against the southward advance of North Korea... In so doing, the US forces has become the forces defending the Park regime, thereby it has given confidence to South Korea in terms of security and stability, and has made it possible South Korea remarkable economic growth.” (Heiwa Anzenhosho Kenkyu-sho, 1979): p. 211.
⁶ Tanaka (1999).
Part II

Japan-South Korea relations.  

As discussed in Chapter 4, the Carter administration was committed to dialogues between North and South Koreas and a diplomatic settlement of the military tension around the demarcation line of the Korean peninsula -- a formula similar to the previous September's Camp David Peace Accords for the Middle East. Reflecting the policy orientation of the Carter administration, Sonoda, Japanese Foreign Minister, believed that if Japan could have productive partnership with the US, friendly relations with the PRC, strong solidarity with South Korea, and a relaxation of relations with North Korea, that would be one of the best ways to meet the emerging threat from the Soviet Union, as long as the security of South Korea was not adversely affected.

Inevitably, any attempt by Japan to relax its relations with the North provoked strong protests from the Park regime, even though it was President Park himself who proposed the unconditional resumption of the North-South dialogue in mid-January 1979. For example, the regime was angered by the Japanese MOFA's decision to permit delegates of the North Korean Workers Party to enter Japan at the invitation of the Japanese Socialist Party in late January 1979. The South Korean mass media criticised the Ohira cabinet for attempting to break the "taboo" of North Korea just a month after coming to office. Shortly afterwards, Sonoda told the Diet that Japan should not support the South one-sidedly. In late February and early March, the Japanese Foreign Minister expressed his concern that the large-scale US-South Korea joint military exercise might threaten the ongoing North-South Korean dialogues.

8 Ibid.
Nonetheless, the provocative remarks made sporadically by the Ohira cabinet were short-lived for two reasons. First, the North-South dialogue did not go smoothly, and reached deadlock, without any substantive outcomes, in late March. Secondly, the installation of Soviet military facilities in the claimed northern territory of Japan near Hokkaido began to receive wide media coverage from late February and enhanced the image of a Soviet threat. Thus, the most striking feature of South Korea-Japan relations in early 1979 was the continuation of co-operative mood in the political and defence areas.

5.2 THE JAPANESE DEFENSIVE INTERVENTION: POLITICAL CO-OPERATION AND MILITARY EXCHANGES

When US hegemonic leadership was under test and the Soviet threat increased, Japan had to decide how best to cope with the new situation. Ganri Yamashita, Director of the JDA, told the Diet that Japan should increase its military capability steadily and qualitatively to deter unpredictable contingencies. The rapid military build-up of the Soviet Union caused heated debate in the Diet, and from February 1979 the situation became extremely uncertain. The situation in the Korean peninsula and the Soviet military build-up in the Far East were the key issues. For Japan, close co-operation with the US to meet the new threat from the Soviet Union, and with the Park regime to maintain the status quo in the Korean peninsula were imperative. As a result, the scope

13 On 16 February 1979, the Soviet naval destroyer passed through the Tsuruga Strait between South Korea and Japan (Dai87kai Shugiin Yosan-inkai Dai13go (17 February 1979): p. 3). On that day, Foreign Minister Sonoda particularly emphasised autonomous information gathering capability from the US; Dai16go (21 February 1979): pp. 14-37; Dai17go (22 February 1979): pp. 42-45; Dai20go (6 March
of Japan-South Korea political and military co-operation was widened and deepened.

5.2.1 Political Co-operation

Prime Minister Ohira, one of the key negotiators in the Japan-South Korea normalisation process in 1963-1964, was well aware of the importance of having sound relations with South Korea. Ohira’s personal perception of the Park regime was somewhat complex due to President Park’s strong friendship with former Prime Minister Fukuda, Ohira’s political rival.14 External circumstances, however, forced the Ohira cabinet as a whole to co-operate earnestly with the Park regime. In late February, Prime Minister Ohira assured South Korean Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin, who was visiting Tokyo, that his cabinet had no intention of changing its attitude towards the Park regime, and he informed Park of the PRC’s reluctance to establish contact with South Korea. Late April and early May 1979 marked a turning-point when the Ohira cabinet decisively recovered its relations with the Park regime.

Table 5.1 Political Exchanges between Japan and South Korea, April-May 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Details of Political Exchanges and Venues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13-16 April</td>
<td>Yasuhiro Nakasone, former JDA Director and the then Secretary General of the ruling LDP conducted the second visit to Seoul since 1973.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April-2 May</td>
<td>The 1st Plenary Session of the Security Committee of the Japanese-South Korean Parliaments was held in Seoul to demonstrate a common position on US withdrawal policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May</td>
<td>Former Director of the JDA, Shin Kanemaru, visited Seoul; it was reported that a Japan-South Korea ruling party consultation body would be organised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>The 8th General Meeting of the Japan-South Korean Parliamentarian League—which delivered a letter to Prime Minister Ohira demanding that the North Korean delegates of the Workers Party should not be allowed to enter Japan—was held in Tokyo.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Nikkan Gihon Renmei (1992) and Tanaka (1999).

Part II

5 Japanese Intervention

From April 1979, a stream of important exchange visits bridged the gap caused by Japan’s efforts to expand its diplomatic links with the North (see Table 5.1). The central issues amidst this flurry of exchanges were twofold: the opposition to the Carter administration’s withdrawal policy, and Japan-South Korea co-operation in various sectors including defence. Resolutions, comments and remarks during the visits focused on these two issues, and there was a further reiteration of the Korean Clause of the Johnson-Sato communiqué. All these cooperative political efforts targeted the forthcoming Carter-Park summit meeting scheduled for 29 June-1 July 1979.

Since 1974, the Kim Dae-jung issue had been the subject of regular debates in the Diet. There were heated discussions in the Diet’s Committee on Foreign Affairs in late May and early June in 1979. Like its predecessor, the Ohira cabinet consistently claimed that there was no evidence of the direct involvement of the South Korean government. Therefore, political settlement of the problem should be unaffected for the sake of harmonious relations between Japan and South Korea.15 It was well known that the political influence of Kim Dae-jung was still very strong, as revealed in his role in the victory of Kim Young-sam (of the New Democratic Party) in the presidential election on 30 May. However, the Ohira cabinet continued to show strong support for the Park regime, and managed to prevent the Kim Dae-jung issue from being rekindled and aggravating the mood for the Carter-Park summit meetings.16

---

16 Until late May 1979 there were more than ten times when the Kim Dae-jung issue mattered in both Shugiin (the Japanese House of Representatives) and Sangiin (the Japanese House of Councilors). Dai87kai Shugiin Yosan-iinkai Dai88go (8 February 1979): pp.7-11. On this occasion in the Diet, the Ohira cabinet confirmed its same posture dealing with the Kim Dae-jung issue as the Fukuda cabinet; Dai 21go (7 March 1979): pp.19-21. See also Dai87kai Sangiin Gainu-iinkai Dai11go (22 May 1979): pp.14-16 & 22-30; Dai12go (24 May 1979): pp.2-10; Dai13go (28 May 1979): pp.23-31; Dai15go (6 June 1979): pp.1-3.
5.2.2 Military Exchanges

From the early spring of 1979, senior officials of the Japanese government raised on various occasions unequivocally the question of the Soviet threat and the necessity of an increase in Japan’s military preparedness.17 Prime Minister Ohira and the Director of the JDA, Yamashita, played an important role in reiterating these issues. Yamashita told the Diet on 21 February that since 1961 the Soviet Union had retained only border guards in the disputed islands, but from the summer of 1978 the Soviet Union had sharply increased its military presence, begun to construct military bases, and deployed combat forces.18 It was a qualitatively different issue from apprehension about the change in the US-Soviet strategic balance.

After officially commenting on 21 February that the Soviet military build-up in the Far East was a “potential threat” to Japan, Yamashita frequently repeated this statement in public.19 In early March, the Japanese Army Chief of Staff, Shigeto Nagano, made a speech before Japanese businessmen in which he stated that the Soviet Union, having finished its military build-up in the European theatre, was about to turn its attention to the Far East. However, the US, Nagano argued, had fixed its attention on the Middle East and would continue to do so. On 12 April, Yamashita gave a lecture to another group of business leaders to express his concern about Soviet plans to send new air-bombers and the aircraft carrier Minsk to the Far East.20 On 23 April, Ohira and Yamashita, at a meeting of senior officers of the Japanese navy, army and air force,

---

20 On 6 March 1979, the JDA revealed that the new Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk had left the Black Sea on 25 February for the Mediterranean Sea, but did not know exactly when it would be deployed to the Far
strongly reiterated the implications of the Soviet military moves to the security of Japan, and the need to strengthen Japanese military capability.21 Under these circumstances, Japan tried to increase the defence level of the NDPO,22 and the adoption of the Guidelines on 27 November 1978 at the seventeenth US-Japan Security Consultative Meeting, only one day before the Fukuda cabinet resigned, was regarded as timely.23 In line with the Guidelines, US navy, marine-corps and air forces in Japan participated in the US-South Korea joint military exercise, Team Spirit '79, and various facilities at the US bases in Japan were mobilised.24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Cases</th>
<th>No. of Officers</th>
<th>No. of Cases</th>
<th>No. of Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2 Exchanges of Military Officers between Japan and South Korea, 1974-1978

The perceived threat from the Soviet Union and US pressure to increase Japan’s defence burden-sharing resulted in closer co-operation between Japan and South Korea in the

---

23 Dai87kai Shugiin Naikaku-iinkai Dai11go (8 May 1979): p. 11. The Director of the JDA, Yamashita, stated in the Diet that the situation no longer corresponded to the assumption of the NDPO.
24 Dai87kai Shugiin Gaimu-iinkai Dai3go (28 February 1979): pp. 12-3. On this occasion, some of the US airforces deployed to Japan for Team Spirit '79 had a separate joint exercise with the Japanese Air Self-Defence Forces in Japan (Akahata, 5 December 1979). In fact, in Team Spirit '78, USFJ stationed in the
defence sector. The high-level contacts and exchanges of the defence establishments of Japan and South Korea attracted wide media attention in 1979. Table 5.2 shows that the number visits of military officers from Japan to South Korea gradually increased from 1974 to 1978, but the number of visits from South Korea to Japan was stable between 1975 and 1977, having already reached a high level. In 1978, the number of South Korean officers visiting Japan nearly doubled, mainly due to the need for information-gathering about US intentions concerning the troop withdrawal plan and the desire to communicate the South Korean position about the proposed Guidelines.

In 1979, human exchanges between the two countries reached their most senior level in the defence sector. On 5-10 February 1979, three Japanese officers of the Command of the JSDAF were invited by their South Korean counterparts to inspect South Korean air bases and facilities. The visit was significant in that the US-South Korean joint military exercise, *Team Spirit '79*, was forthcoming in March. The JSDF was involved in the US-South Korean joint military exercise, at least at the information-sharing level. On 4 April, the South Korean Chairman of the JCS, Kim Jong-hwan, visited the JDA and invited the Japanese Director of Self-Defense Forces, Ganri Yamashita, to Seoul in the summer of 1979. On 30 April-4 May, General Shigeto Nagano, Joint Chief of the Army, visited Seoul at the invitation of his South Korean counterpart. He viewed South Korean military facilities and met South Korean generals to exchange views on the East Asian security environment.

The climax of Japanese-South Korean human exchanges in the military sector was the visit by Ganri Yamashita, Director of the JDA, to Seoul on 25-26 July 1979. The talks
between Yamashita and South Korean Defence Minister, Rho Jae-hyun, were of particular significance in the history of the security consultations between Japan and South Korea. The two men exchanged direct and in-depth ideas and information about the security environment in East Asia, including North Korea's military capability and Soviet moves in the Far East, each country's defence policy, and the content of the US announcement of the suspension of the withdrawal policy. Reportedly, the South Korean side had a great interest in the role Japan would hypothetically play within the South Korea-US-Japan collective security system. Yamashita explained that Japan had constantly called for the US to be cautious about its withdrawal policy from South Korea. They agreed to arrange exchange port calls of naval ships in the following year. These visits of senior officials from the Japanese defence sector reflected the new position of Japan in contributing to the military balance surrounding Japanese territory.

Yamashita's visit was portrayed by South Korean opposition/dissident forces as reactionary move regarding to South Korean democratisation because it was arranged just two days after the NDP leader Kim Young-sam launched a full-scale anti-Park struggle in the National Assembly. Three former Directors of the JDA and the present Director all visited Seoul to discuss mutual interests in the political and security areas. It is also likely that uniformed officials from the two countries further expanded these contacts. What is more important is that a new generation of South Korean military staff was provided with opportunities to become familiar with Japanese politicians and military establishments. The unprecedented flurry of political and military co-operation

213)
26 Chosun Ilbo, 26 July 1979.
27 Boei Antena (September 1979): p. 41. For a more in-depth analysis for the strategic position of Japan and the limits of its military capability, see the article written by Okazaki (1982), who accompanied Yamashita's visit to Seoul in 1979.
and consultation between Japan and South Korea was clearly designed to enhance the Park regime’s political fortunes. At the same time, however, the political effect was sceptical about how far the Park regime could actually obtain benefits by using Japanese support to enhance its political legitimacy. Thus, both the possibility and limits of the Japanese role as facilitator within the TASS were highlighted.

Japan’s self-help efforts to increase its military capability, including the first combined military exercises of Japanese navy, army and air forces in late May 1979, were insufficient to meet the new challenges to Japanese security. Actually, in late May 1979, the JDA requested the US to deploy permanently two aircraft carriers around Japan in the same way that there was a rotation of six aircraft carriers of the Seventh Fleet as a necessary measure in response to the information that the new Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk would enter the port of Vladivostok. The unavoidable time lag between the emergence of unpredictable threats and military readiness necessitated enhanced Japanese co-operation with the US and South Korea as a matter of urgency. Another point to make here is that various exchange visits in the defence sector between South Korea and Japan were arranged just before, during and after the bilateral talks between the US and Japan. The timing was of significance in that the period of Japanese Army Chief of the Self-Defence Forces, Nagano’s stay coincided with Ohira’s visit to Washington. During the Park-Fukuda/Ohira phase, a triangular pattern of interplay was established based on a series of bilateral visits rather than a gathering of the three parties at the same table. Before going to Washington in order to discuss the military situation in the Korean peninsula and Japan’s own military build-up plan for coping with the

28 Interview with Kim Kun-tae.
29 Dai87kai Shugiin Hong-kaigi Dai27go (22 May 1979): p. 18.
changing security environment in East Asia, Nagano visited Seoul. Yamashita followed the same pattern, as did the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Japan and South Korea, and the US Secretaries of Defense and State. The accumulation of bilateral visits and consultations, in spite of its disadvantages, continued until the end of the Cold War in order to avoid the denunciations from of the Communist bloc. In short, therefore, the Ohira cabinet's close co-operation with the Park regime can be explained as an aspect of alliance management within the framework of intra-alliance politics.

5.3 THE CARTER-PARK SUMMIT MEETINGS AND THE OHIRA CABINET: A SYSTEMIC INTERPRETATION

The Carter administration wanted to leave official confirmation of the arrangements for the summit meeting until as late as possible. However, on 19 January *Tokyo Shimbun*, quoting a credible diplomatic source in Seoul, reported that President Carter would visit South Korea for summit talks with President Park. The Carter-Park summit meeting in Seoul became a *fait accompli* in Japan from early February, which weakened the US bargaining position not only in relation to the contents of the joint communiqué but also in terms of the US capacity to induce the Park regime to make concessions on the human rights issue during the pre-summit consultation between the two countries. In fact, the summit was announced simultaneously in Washington and Seoul on 20 April.

The Japanese government sought to persuade the Carter administration to visit Seoul by stressing the importance of seeing the Korean situation at first hand. These efforts by

32 Ibid.: p. 15.
33 See also *Dai87kai Shugiin Yosan-iinkai Dai6go* (6 February 1979): p. 12.
the Japanese were greatly appreciated by the Park regime. The Ohira government was well aware of the underlying tension between the Carter administration and the Park regime, and therefore welcomed the announcement of Carter’s plan to visit South Korea as a tangible shift of US policy towards South Korea. Japan was also willing to facilitate an atmosphere conducive to the restoration of the traditional friendship between the US and South Korea. It actively conveyed the on-going changes of US-South Korea policy to Seoul, particularly those related to the withdrawal issue. Of particular interest was the statement by the Japanese spokesman of the MOFA, Hideo Kagami, on 12 April, just a week before the announcement of the Carter visit to Seoul, that the Japanese Foreign Minister, Sonoda, had been officially informed by the Carter administration that further withdrawal would be postponed. This delivery of one of the most critical US decisions related to South Korean security through the Japanese channel confirmed the great importance of Japan within the TASS.

Before flying to Washington in late April, Prime Minister Ohira emphasised the importance of close Japanese military co-operation with the US, and the need to improve Japanese reconnaissance capability in response to the Soviet moves into Asia; and he further revealed that he would consult with Carter about the Korean question. In fact, the joint communiqué of the Carter-Ohira summit meetings in Washington in early May 1979 stated that:

The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed that the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is important for peace and security in East Asia, including Japan. The United States is firmly committed to the security of the Republic of

---

34 Interview with the then South Korean diplomat in the South Korean Embassy to Japan.
35 Interview with Sato. He told the author that the Ohira cabinet conveyed the information in late and early 1978 that the withdrawal policy had been substantially changed.
36 Chosun Ilbo, 13 April 1979; Dai87kai Sangtiin Gaimu-ininkai Dai8go (No.8, 24 April 1979): p. 23.
Korea. Its policy toward future ground force withdrawals from Korea will be developed in a manner consistent with the maintenance of peace and stability on the Peninsula.38

The article of the communiqué is made it fairly clear that a change of the US withdrawal policy was mainly due to considerations of Japanese security rather than the security of South Korea itself. The US appreciated the Japanese feeling of insecurity, and gave the impression that the issue of troop withdrawal from South Korea had already been discussed between the US and Japan, even though Gleysteen had recommended that there should first be consultations with the Park regime. There are two probable reasons why the US gave the impression that the suspension of the withdrawal policy was already being implemented. First, the Carter administration wanted to utilise the withdrawal issue to exert pressure on the Ohira cabinet to strengthen defence posture. Secondly, the administration viewed the TASS as a hierarchical arrangement and believed that the alliance leader had an obligation to notify its middle member first.

Nevertheless, the US-Japan joint communiqué was not tête-à-tête. By this time, the suspension, or at least a significant adjustment, of the withdrawal policy was already an open secret to the Park regime, which was in turn reasonably optimistic about the likely outcomes. In fact, President Park’s invitation to the former Japanese Prime Minister, Fukuda, on 19-23 June was an extension of such efforts to monitor the policy shift. On this occasion, President Park asked Fukuda to convey an invitation to Prime Minister Ohira and to play the role of mediator in explaining the basis of South Korean insecurity. On behalf of President Park, returning to Tokyo, Fukuda met President Carter on 28 June 1979. These developments testified to the dissimilar-integrative features of the TASS, as discussed in Chapter 2.

This process had both positive and negative sides. On the positive side, the Park regime benefited from Japanese involvement in the reversal of the withdrawal plan even before the US-South Korean pre-summit consultations. In short, the Park regime was able to read US intentions through Japanese channels. However, on the negative side, the Park regime failed to respect the seriousness of American demands for visible signs of improvement in human rights conditions. The information from Japan was filtered through the Japanese prism so that the Park regime tended to be optimistic regardless of the real intentions the Carter administration.

In June, President Carter had a very tight schedule, including summit meetings with the General Secretary of the USSR, Leonid I. Brezhnev, the leaders of the G7 countries, and President Park of South Korea. Despite domestic political difficulties, Carter was self-confident about the US role: “to guarantee... the security of our allies and to protect our interest.”39 This self-confidence in part stemmed from Carter’s own positive evaluation of his forthcoming meeting with Brezhnev. In Carter’s mind, the US would enhance its leadership role among its allies by guaranteeing security while gaining a momentum to control the arms race with the Soviet Union. In addition, the achievement of the Middle East peace settlement was an undoubted bonus for the US, and the Iranian situation was being managed reasonably well. In terms of the South Korean question, therefore, he was determined to press the Park regime further on the issue of political development while giving confirmation that the US would maintain the stability of the Korean peninsula. To that end, he did not hesitate to reveal that he would meet opposition and religious leaders in South Korea. On 12 April 1979, National Security Advisor Brzezinski encouraged Carter: “In 1980 [in the presidential election campaign] you

must be recognized as the President of *Peace and Resolve*. You should stress your role as Commander in Chief and can do so on the Korea trip." On the surface, however, the Park regime had enough justification for wishful thinking about the forthcoming Carter-Park summit meeting. Just one day before the departure of President Carter for Tokyo, an American high official told reporters that: “the US remains an active Pacific Power”, and on the following day *The Washington Post* reported that US JCS had formally recommended that President Carter suspend the withdrawal plan. It was therefore quite natural that the Park regime should pay much more attention to Carter’s comments about the withdrawal issue in the second Ohira-Carter summit meeting in Tokyo. On 28 June, just one day before Carter visited Seoul, he informed Ohira about the suspension of the withdrawal of US combat forces from South Korea. The news from Tokyo came as a great relief to the authorities in South Korea.

The contents of the Carter-Park joint communiqué were beyond Japanese expectations and convinced the Ohira government that the US really intended to return to Asia. The government expected that the political relations between the Carter administration and the Park regime should and would be relaxed, for the US withdrawal policy was implemented substantially by political motivation rather than purely military considerations. However, what Carter saw in South Korea was not the same as the Park regime and the Ohira cabinet expected. Their desire was that the American President should recognise the unique military confrontation between the two Koreas and the consequential necessity to sacrifice political freedoms in the South. In fact,

---

43 Ibid.: p. 103.
Carter strengthened his conviction that another war must be avoided through North-South dialogue, and that political liberalisation was necessary to that end. Later, the unilateral announcement of the suspension of the withdrawal policy on 20 July was portrayed by Japan as an expression of the Carter administration’s displeasure with the Park regime.\(^{45}\)

5.4 JAPAN’S EVALUATION OF THE US MANAGEMENT OF SOUTH KOREAN POLITICS

On the surface, the tight schedule of high-level mutual visits between the three countries demonstrated that the TASS was operating effectively. In substance, however, strained US-South Korean relations meant that the alliance was suffering and that Japanese efforts to bring the two countries together had only limited success.

When JDA Director Yamashita visited Washington in mid-August to meet Brown, Brzezinski and others, US policy towards Asia appeared to be reliable. On 16 August, Brown assured Yamashita that the US would strengthen its military preparedness around Japan, and would maintain its commitment to Asia, especially in relation to the increasing Soviet threat. Yamashita described his recent visit to Seoul as an achievement, and the Americans evaluated it as positive evidence of improving Japan-South Korea relations. Returning to Tokyo, Yamashita, referring to security relations with the US, asserted that the situation was very good and that Japan should consider the issue of security from a global perspective.\(^{46}\) In fact, when the Director of the JDA visited the USA, the Carter administration was exchanging verbal tit-for-tat with the Park regime. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Ohira cabinet, based on its predecessor’s

\(^{45}\) Sekai Shuho (17 July 1979), pp. 10-11.
efforts, was able to see the suspension of the US troop withdrawal policy towards South Korea. However, it did not necessarily mean that the Carter formula itself was changed. The Ohira cabinet could not achieve its aim of restraining the Carter administration from dismantling the political foothold of the Park regime.

The US Ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, made an important address in Tokyo on 9 October, when the US Ambassador to South Korea, William Gleysteen, was recalled to Washington: “the outmost limits of US defense in this region are Japan and the Philippines.” On 16 October, US Congressman Paul Findley applauded the Ambassador’s foresight and statesmanship in relieving “an emerging crisis of confidence in Japan and Southeast Asia over the credibility of the US defense guarantee.” By contrast, one of the key members of the General Chun group of the South Korean military responded to the Mansfield speech as follows: “The remark reiterated how vulnerable the South Korean position was. South Korean security was totally dependent on the US commitment. Therefore, the Park regime should follow US advice. Otherwise, the suspension of the withdrawal policy would be reconsidered.” In Japan the government and commentators also did not see any merit in the speech owing to its comment on the Korean position; and the Ohira cabinet condemned Mansfield’s statement as “a serious interference in the domestic politics of South Korea.”

It was widely believed in Japanese conservative circles that the US action was making the Korean situation more volatile and unpredictable. A crucial question was how

---

48 Ibid.: p. 28523.
49 Interview with Huh Hwa-pyung.
50 Hasegawa (1980a).
51 Interview with Takesada.
Japan should exert its influence to restrain the Carter administration from harassing the Park regime. It must be stressed that this did not mean the Ohira cabinet approved of the Park regime’s expulsion of Kim Young-sam from the National Assembly. But what concerned the cabinet even more was the fact that US intervention was fanning the political turmoil in South Korea.

The main difficulty facing Japan was that there seemed to be no way of interrupting the political tit-for-tat between the Carter administration and the Park regime. The options open to the Ohira cabinet were very limited. Also, it had to focus on a general election campaign during September 1979, countering the criticisms of the political opposition in Japan. It therefore found itself severely hampered in seeking to perform the role of a mediator in the TASS. The season of summit meetings was over, and the Carter administration seemed to be determined to bring about a change in South Korean politics. At this juncture, it was evident that President Carter was not likely to listen to Japanese advice. The US local representative, Mansfield, was seemingly reluctant to convey Japanese apprehension to Washington. Moreover, it was President Carter himself who, after recalling Ambassador Gleysteen to Washington, stated on 12 October 1979 that: “When I visited South Korea, I told President Park that any prelude of infringement of human rights would cause serious damage to US-South Korean relations.” On 18 October President Carter instructed Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to convey the presidential letter to President Park with further demands that Park should change his method of rule. It was well known to Japan that Brown and Park exchanged strong words about their respective stances on South Korean politics.

52 Sonoda again made the provocative statement during the election campaign that Japan-South Korea relations should be reformulated.
54 Ibid.: p. 18.
CONCLUSION: THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS OF JAPAN'S ROLE AS MEDIATOR WITHIN THE TASS

The Ohira cabinet was certainly eager to play an active role in world politics. One of the expressions of such eagerness was Ohira's deliberate use of the word "ally," which suggested that Japan would give unstinting support to the United States. This seemed to be the only feasible strategy for Japan in the face of declining US hegemony and the emergence of the Soviet military threat. Even though two crucial programmes, the NDPO and the Outline, had been adopted in the past three years (from 1976 to 1978), they did not guarantee the security of Japan when faced with a nuclear threat. At that time, the US did not want Japan to increase significantly its practical defence capability.

When the scope of co-operation narrowed down to the regional level, however, Japan did not necessarily have to follow the American way, because Japanese national interests were directly affected either positively or negatively according to the contents of US foreign policy towards the region. As far as the Korean question was concerned, the range of strategic choices open to Japan was much narrower than that open to the US. The US had room for experimentation with various policy options, but Japan could not do so because of the lack of resources and the serious aftermath an ill-chosen policy line might cause. As a result, the Ohira cabinet adhered strictly to its rigid status quo orientation, and became involved in mediating to restore the traditional ties between the US and South Korea, and in co-operating with the Park regime in politico-military affairs. 55

The problem was that the Japanese involvement was only partially successful. The

Ohira cabinet succeeded in redirecting one branch of US foreign policy (towards the Korean peninsula), but failed to achieve a comprehensive reformulation of the Carter formula, which was designed to change the basic fabric of the East Asian security environment. To the Japanese attempt to change the whole package of America’s South Korea policy, the Carter administration responded by rekindling the Kim Dae-jung issue, which shook the ground of the political settlement between Japan and the Park regime, and by the initiative for three-way official talks between the two Koreas under the sponsorship of the US. The Carter administration was reluctant to yield on the human rights issue and could not explicitly return to the realist approach employed by the Nixon and Ford administrations.

Moreover, the Ohira cabinet itself did not have a strong political foothold within the LDP, and the political protest and challenges from the oppositions were stronger than ever before. The Ohira cabinet's active co-operation with the US, particularly in the military area, was frequently criticised by the opposition parties. Concerned about the Carter-Ohira summit meetings in early May, the JSP attacked the cabinet for transforming the US-Japan security system and thereby intensifying international tension in Asia and the world. It was also argued that the Ohira cabinet’s policy had further solidified the division between the two Koreas.56

Under these circumstances, Japanese co-operation with the Park regime was not so politically effective to a degree to which it could decisively recover the declining political legitimacy of the Park regime. The US was the guarantor of South Korean security through its military presence and nuclear umbrella, and Japan could not replace

the status of the US in South Korean politics. That was the limit of the regional power, which could not be fully committed to the security of South Korea in terms of military capability, regardless of the political will. Japanese overt political support to the Park regime was not sufficient to protect the latter from aggressive US political intervention, especially when the Japanese policy line was different from the US formula.
CONCLUSION TO PART TWO

In early 1979, it was discovered that the US had shifted its policy priority towards South Korea on the grounds of its shifting strategic and military interests. This shift was expressed in its export of state-of-the-art air fighters, the large-scale Team Spirit 1979 military exercise, Carter's visit to Seoul, the co-manufacturing of the F-5E, and the eventual suspension of the withdrawal policy. All these measures were nothing but sub-categories of the Carter formula. For the US, the internal change of the South Korean political system was the key element of the transformation of the East Asian security environment.

In terms of the interests of the TASS, from the American point of view, Japan under the Ohira cabinet showed its willingness to co-operate bilaterally to increase its defence burden, and to play an important supportive role in world politics commensurate with its economic status. Thus, the other junior ally of the TASS, South Korea, also needed to follow the new diplomatic tune of the US, for the Park regime as a projected state could not nullify the US-South Korea Mutual Defence Treaty as Brazilian Geisel regime did in 1977. The solution suggested by the Carter administration was the simultaneous liberalisation of the ruling style of the Park regime with the enforcement of US security commitment to South Korea. On the basis of this framework, President Carter intended to engage North Korea in exchange for a more liberalised South Korean political structure, which he deemed necessary if North Korea was to be persuaded to abandon its hostile posture towards the South.

In order to survive, the Park regime had to understand the significance of the pre-summit pressures from Washington and the implications of Secretary Vance's speech on
Latin American policy in mid-September (referred to Chapter 4:4.3.2). The Carter administration believed that it had quite clearly and sufficiently conveyed the message that the US security commitment to South Korea was conditional. Therefore, a visible measure of South Korean political liberalisation was the absolute precondition for any improvement of US-Korean relations.\(^{57}\)

In any event, the strong pressure exerted by the US on the Park regime, contributing to the death of President Park, increased instability in the security of South Korea and of the Northeast Asian region. The instability worsened so quickly that the Japanese cabinet could not intervene effectively in South Korean politics and had insufficient opportunities to persuade the Carter administration to change its approach. Japan had to play the role of initiator—not the role of mediator—in the South Korean regime transition.

\(^{57}\) 79 State 089493 (10 April 1979).
PART THREE

THE INTERVENTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN THE SOUTH KOREAN REGIME TRANSITION, NOVEMBER 1979-JANUARY 1981

INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE

Part Three is mainly concerned with the differences between the US and Japanese strategies of intervention in the South Korean regime transition between November 1979 and January 1981. In principle, the general interests of the US and Japan in South Korea were parallel. As Harrison puts it, "The governing interest of both Japan and the United States in Korea lies in reducing North-South tensions and in preventing a renewed large-scale military conflict in which either of the two countries could become even indirectly involved." However, the common interest of the two countries in the emergence of a strong South Korean buffer state was not matched by agreement on how to introduce a politically desirable system in South Korea on the front line of an anti-Communist alliance system. As discussed in Parts One and Two, the value of South Korea to the US national interest tended to fluctuate according to changes of American global strategy. In order to ensure that South Korea served the needs of US strategy at a time when it was not willing to follow the changing focus of US foreign policy, the US imposed external pressure, which occasionally included the effort to force changes in the South Korean political system. Thus, the US flexible status quo orientation was coupled with a policy of aggressive intervention.

On the other hand, the Japanese version of the status quo was both more consistent and more restrictive because the Japanese perspective was regional rather than global, focusing on East Asia and its military situation. The emphasis was on minimising the changes in the Korean peninsula in an effort to avoid any dismantling of the existing balance of power in the East Asian region. Put another way, Japan sought to defend the East Asian region in general and the Korean peninsula in particular from the negative impact of changes in global power parity. This also included a desire to minimise the changes in South Korean politics and, if necessary, to respond accordingly to the fluctuation of US containment policy against the Soviet Union and its East Asian policy. In other words, Japan stuck to a rigid status quo orientation and defensive intervention policy.

The combination of different national strategies and national power configurations led the two countries into different approaches towards the South Korean regime transition. In terms of intra-alliance politics, the US, as a leading country, and Japan, as a middle member of the TASS, saw things differently. In terms of political legitimacy, the demise of the Park regime showed the limits of the political benefit obtainable from Japan to a state in South Korea, when the US pursued to change the South Korean political system serving for the new policy for the Northeast Asian region. The close cooperation between Japan and South Korea failed to halt the rapidly declining legitimacy of the Park regime. So Japan decided to intervene more directly in the regime transition in South Korea after the death of President Park (See the discussion in Part Two).
After the demise of the Park regime, circumstances changed. Due to the Iranian hostage incident, US intervention in the regime transition in South Korea lost momentum and failed to realise the goal of establishing a civilian government to South Korea. (See the discussion in Part Two.) Indeed, the intervention of the middle member (Japan) proved to be more effective. The US succeeded in removing the authoritarian Park regime (see Chapter 4), but Japan succeeded in replacing the power vacuum with an arguably more amenable new military regime, an achievement reflecting Japan's different policy orientation from that of the US (This will be discussed in Chapter 7). Of course, this change was not due entirely to the Japanese intervention. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan alarmed the US into protecting its self-serving national interest in the Northeast Asian region and in the Korean peninsula, which resulted in inconsistent US management of the emergence of a new military regime.

Part Three consists of two chapters (6 and 7) that examine in turn US and Japanese rationales, policy priorities, and actions taken towards the South Korean regime transition bequeathed by the assassination of President Park from November 1979 to January 1981. Chapter 6 deals with the US management strategy, focusing on the unsuccessful employment of the "nudging" policy for the establishment of a broadly based civilian government. It covers the period from the death of President Park on 26 October 1979 to the establishment of a new military junta in late May 1980 after the suppression of the Kwangju democratisation movement on 27 May 1980, the Kim Dae-jung trial in late 1980, and Chun's visit to Washington in January 1981.

There were three main factors which hindered the transformation of the South Korean political system: (1) the actions of a new, emergent military leadership, risking the
security of South Korea; (2) the deep American engagement in the Iran hostage incident, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and (3) Japan’s intervention in the South Korean regime transition, which contradicted American intentions. So, Chapter 7 deals with the Japanese intervention in South Korean politics during the second term of the Ohira Cabinet from November 1979 to June 1980. This chapter also covers the initial period of the Suzuki premiership from July 1980 to January 1981. This chapter seeks to shed light on the Japanese view of US management of the South Korean political situation following the death of President Park, and the resulting decision by Japan to implement its own strategy of intervention. It also examines the ways in which the Suzuki cabinet intervened to prevent the execution of Kim Dae-jung by the new Korean military regime, when the Carter administration had lost its influence in South Korean politics.
INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the dynamics of US intervention in the regime transition in South Korea against the background of a rapidly changing world politics and the emergence of a new military leadership in South Korea.

At five o’clock in the morning of the 27 October, South Korean radio announced that President Park had been dead through an accident, and that Prime Minister Choi Kyu-Ha had taken over control of the government. Martial law was immediately imposed across the whole country with the exception of Cheju-Do, and Army Chief of Staff Chong Sung-hwa became martial law administrator. The announcement stated that universities would be closed and assembly prohibited. The nation-wide curfew was extended to 2200 to 0400 from the normal 2400 to 0400. In due course, troops were deployed throughout Seoul and other major cities. The US State Department issued a statement at 4:30 p.m. on 26 October [EST] stressing that: “[The US] will react strongly in accordance with its treaty obligations to the Republic of Korea to any external

\[2\] The exclusion of Cheju-Do from martial law was of great significance, allowing the civilian government to remain in command.
attempt to exploit the situation in the Republic of Korea.”³ The statement was immediately delivered to Moscow, Beijing and Tokyo. As indicated by the Vance speech before the Foreign Policy Association on 27 September 1979, just one month before the death of President Park, South Korea’s external security was guaranteed by the US, and accordingly the issue of South Korea’s internal political development now required serious attention.

In terms of leading South Korean politics towards political liberalisation, thereby producing a security environment in the Northeast Asian region that would not necessitate an American military presence, the death of President Park was not in itself a negative outcome for the US. However, there were various intervening factors obstructing the US “nudging” policy from realisation, the policy which aims at: “urging the government move ahead with political liberalisation; advising the military to remain unified and refrain from crude intervention in politics; and pressing the opposition to be patient to reduce the prospects of a military counter lash.”⁴ Most importantly, this policy was obstructed by the zeal for power of the new military leadership loyal to the late President Park. Therefore, the main challenge for the Carter administration was how to keep the military out of civilian politics. The “nudging” policy was also seriously affected by the rapidly changing world political situation due to the Iran Hostage incident in early November and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979. Under these circumstances, the US administration did not pay much attention to political developments in South Korea. The two new challenges demanded a great deal

³ 79 Seoul 16346 (27 October 1979).
⁴ 79 State 312340 (4 December 1979); 79 Seoul 19044 (18 December 1979); 79 State 325655 (18 December 1979); 79 Seoul 19135 (20 December 1979); The core of the nudging policy was “the vital importance of unity within the Korean armed forces, maintenance of civilian rule, and progress toward the political goals enunciated by President Choi” 80 Seoul 00338 (10 January 1980).
of attention and considerable resources, and this made American policy increasingly unstable.

The first military coup led by General Chun Doo-hwan broke out on 12 December 1979: Chun controlled the military, but they still remained in their barracks. For the US, if a broadly based civilian government was to be established, the key problem was how to deter a final take-over by the Chun group. Even after the 12 December Coup, the US did not change the fundamental orientation of the “nudging” policy. The US assessment of the political movement within the Korean military was not consistent, and this resulted in the oscillation between the military and the opposition/dissident forces. There is no doubt that the “nudging” policy turned out to be a grave failure resulting in the massacre of many pro-democracy civilians.

This chapter investigates the main components of US policy towards South Korea in the post-Park era and examines how the emergence of a new military regime led to the unstable implementation of the “nudging” policy in terms of intra-alliance politics. Section 6.1 will briefly summarise the priority of the Carter administration managing the South Korean regime transition, the impact of the Iran hostage incident to it, and the occurrence of the 12 December military coup led by General Chun Doo-hwan. The US self-restraints and intrinsic deficiencies in disciplining the new South Korean military leadership will be examined. The following section (6.2) will discuss the assessments of the Carter administration on the South Korean politics after the 12 December coup; Section 6.3 and 6.4 will investigate the new military group’s advances towards the final take-over. Section 6.5 and 6.6. will discuss the US policy towards South Korea after the
17 May Coup and the failed Kwangju Democratisation Movements. The Kim Dae-jung trial issue will also be examined in terms of alliance management.

6.1 THE US EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE POST-PARK ERA

The Carter administration had no reason to mourn the death of President Park on 26 October,\(^5\) for his regime was perceived as having posed a serious threat to peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. His death presented the possibility of a new starting-point for the realisation of the Carter formula for a transformation of the East Asian security environment. The abolition of harsh restrictions on human rights and the cultivation of a new spirit of liberalisation were seen by the US as the first step to "a clear break with the past"\(^6\) and the introduction of a broadly based civilian government in South Korea. The aim was to move the caretaker civilian government and opposition/dissident forces toward a well planned, one-year political development timetable while ensuring that the military remained within their barracks. The implementation of this policy commenced with the visit of Secretary of State Vance to Seoul in early November 1979.

6.1.1 The Visit of Secretary of State Vance to Seoul, 3 November 1979

The Carter administration intended to change the South Korean political structure into a liberalised one, even though it perceived it difficult due to irreconcilable political forces in South Korea. As an extension of the policy orientation signalled by the speech of

---

\(^5\) Interview with Huh Hwa-pyung.

\(^6\) 79 State 285736 (1 November 1979): p. 3.
Vance on 26 September (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2), and in line with the statement the Carter administration issued on the occasion of the death of President Park, South Korean political actors were expected to promote internal political change, while the US took responsibility for external security. However, the first of these tasks was not at all easy. From the very beginning, dissidents and some churchmen suspected that the army would assume full control of the interim government. Therefore they wanted the US, standing alongside them, to prevent the military’s seizure of power with “direct, clear-cut US intervention,” because they thought the “ROK military are more open to US influence than Korean politicians.” Under these conditions, the US role was crucial in determining the future direction of the political system. In fact, the Carter administration recognised that “[T]he new situation clearly is an opportunity, but it also begins a period of great danger. ... Any mishandling would have direct and serious consequence for the United States.” The “nudging” policy demanded a delicate mode of delivery, high standards of statecraft, influential policy instruments, and the constant involvement of senior decision-makers.

The assassination of President Park meant that the institutionalised ruling political camp had collapsed, and the political confrontation line had now been changed. Two polarised non-institutionalised social forces, the dissident forces led by Kim Dae-jung and the most loyal faction of the military led by General Chun Doo-hwan, emerged. These two forces moved towards a final confrontation in the political vacuum bequeathed by the death of President Park. Nonetheless, the Carter administration did not pay as much attention as Japan to this dimension (On the Japanese view, see Chapter 7, Section 7.2).

7 79 Seoul 16874 (5 November 1979); 79 Seoul 16736 (2 November 1979); 79 Seoul 16750 (2 November, 1979).
8 79 Seoul 16750 (2 November 1979).
9 Ibid.: p. 3.
In fact, unlike Japan, the US did not know that the Chun Doo-hwan faction intended to launch a coup to arrest General Chong immediately after the death of President Park.\(^{10}\) The Carter administration believed that the US could monitor and control the South Korean military through the ROK/US Combined Forces Command and military liaison channels. "At some point," the ambassador reported to Washington, "we can be sure they will also seek our assistance in trying to keep the political opposition from being too impatient."\(^{11}\) This judgement revealed that the US thought it could exert proper influence on the military group led by Army Chief of Staff General Chong Sung-hwa, Martial Law Administrator.

Secretary Vance, visiting Seoul to attend the state funeral of the late President Park on 3 November, encouraged the caretaker government to move forward to submit "a timetable for a more democratic revision of the political structure" and "early human rights improvement."\(^{12}\) Concerning the caretaker government’s difficult position between the military and the opposition/dissident forces, the Vance team assured President Choi and Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin that no desire on the part of the armed forces to assume control was detected, and the US offered political support to help the acting government by counselling the opposition towards moderation.\(^{13}\) Vance authoritatively told the Foreign Minister: "You can count on us to give you realistic private advice."\(^{14}\) In exchange, the possibility of an early liberalisation including a constitutional amendment lifting EM-9 was hinted at by the caretaker government.\(^{15}\)

When Vance left Seoul, he was convinced that the South Korean military supported the

---

\(^{10}\) Interview with Huh.

\(^{11}\) 79 Seoul 16656 (1 November 1979).

\(^{12}\) 79 State 285736 (1 November 1979).

\(^{13}\) 79 Seoul 17060 (8 November 1979).

\(^{14}\) Ibid.: p. 3.

\(^{15}\) 79 Seoul 17091 (8 November 1979).
civilian government. No American delegates to the funeral ceremony could have predicted the hostage incident in Iran just two days later: Vance would never be able to visit Seoul again to manage the South Korean situation.

6.1.2 The Impact of the Iranian Hostage Incident on the Management of the South Korean Situation

The political development of South Korea was adversely affected by the occurrence of the Iran hostage incident on 4 November 1979. From that point onwards, senior officials in Washington were distracted by the Iranian problem. The top decision-makers were simply not available when the South Korean situation exceeded ambassadorial competence. In addition, rapid changes in world politics made the implementation of US policy towards political liberalisation in South Korea inconsistent.

The US was apparently inclined to press the Choi government to demonstrate visibly that democratisation was in progress. In order to press the government to move more quickly before the dissidents' patience ran out, on 21 November the Assistant Secretary instructed the Ambassador to meet Kim Dae-jung as soon as possible. In fact, on 24 November, acting President Choi held a series of meetings with religious leaders to explain his desire to promote democratisation in a cautious but steady manner. During these meetings, Choi hinted at the possibility of the release of EM-9 prisoners and even the eventual lifting of the house arrest of Kim Dae-jung. On 26 November, the National Assembly formed the Constitutional Revision Committee

---

17 79 Seoul 17091 (8 November 1979).
18 79 Seoul 17311 (14 November 1979).
19 79 State 302462 (21 November 1979).
20 79 Seoul 18028 (27 November 1979).
(CRC) to draft a new constitution. In general terms, the achievement of the first month of the post-Park era looked promising.

However, the US “nudging” policy encountered intrinsic difficulties when one of the two confronting political forces, the military and the opposition/dissident groups, showed that it was not willing to accept the other as a political partner. It was no easy task to maintain a proper distance between the competing forces while at the same time driving them to work together. American resolve was challenged by a series of disturbing events. To begin with, the first indoor political rally since the death of President Park was organised by dissident groups at the YWCA hall on 24 November in Seoul. Leaflets urged people to rise up and demonstrate in all major cities. In response, the Martial Law Command (MLC) arrested 96 organisers and many participants.21

The MLC stressed its intolerance towards all activities harmful to “national unity, order, and stability.”22 General Chong Sung-hwa appeared in front of the press on three consecutive days from 27 November. He stressed that the military were determined to prevent five developments: (1) Kim Dae-jung’s assumption of the Presidency and his direct control of military forces; (2) the NDP’s and its leader Kim Young Sam’s excessive political activities; (3) political interference by religious groups; (4) any demonstrations; and (5) the emergence of a strong National Assembly.23 A veto power had thus been proclaimed against democratic political development. General Chong denounced almost every political force except for the Choi government, and projected

22 79 Seoul 17063 (8 November 1979).
23 79 Seoul 18145 (29 November 1979).
itself as “a veto power.”^24 Ironically, this blinded the US from keeping an eye on the moves of the Chun Doo-hwan faction, which was preparing to arrest General Chong.

Even though the possibility of a military coup was considered to be “very unlikely”^25 by the US, suddenly the prospects for the “nudging” policy seemed to have worsened. For more than a month the US witnessed a total refusal of the South Korean government to remove any political restrictions. Gleysteen and General Wickham, the Commander of the US-South Korean Combined Forces, had urgent talks with General Chong on 30 November to press him further on the issue of political development, but there was still no response.^26 Thus, for the first time since the death of President Park, the US embassy requested Washington to provide a solution. However, as already explained, due to the Iran hostage incident, Washington was not able to devote its attention and resources to South Korea. Most senior figures—President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, NSC Advisor Brzezinski, and Secretary of Defence Brown—were totally absorbed in what was happening in Iran. Only Assistant Secretary Holbrooke was available.

After receiving the request from the Ambassador, Holbrooke talked privately with some Senators and Congressmen, including Nunn, Glenn and Wolff, about US strategy towards the Korean situation. The result was the telegram 79 State 312340 NODIS Korea Focus -- Nudging ROK Political Leaders dated 4 December [EST]:

We have their full support at this time. Their attitudes, like everyone else’s, are dominated by the Iranian crisis and, needless to say, nobody wants “Another Iran”—by

^24 Ibid.: p.2.
^25 79 Seoul 18150 (29 November 1979).
^26 79 Seoul 18324 (30 November 1979).
which they mean American action which would in any way appear to unravel a situation and lead to change on [sic] instability in a key American ally.27 (Emphasis added)

This telegram revealed that US Korea policy was not being decided only within the scope of the Korean situation itself, but within a broader global context. Following this opening remark, Holbrooke denounced “a relative handful of Christian extremist dissidents” as the source of trouble.28 He instructed Gleysteen to alert the Christian leaders that they should not automatically count on “the same degree of American support now” contrary to “a few months ago”: “We do not favor challenges to Martial Law at this delicate time.”29 By contrast, he asked the Ambassador to convey to the generals that: “provided they in turn carry out their commitments to liberalization...you are going to have to lean on the Korean leadership on these issues.”30 This instruction shook the basis of the “nudging” policy and lost the momentum in advance to watch the military faction loyal to the late President Park to launch a coup at a critical juncture.

As soon as his house arrest was lifted on 8 December 1979, Kim Dae-jung expressed his suspicion that the US might turn its back on South Korean democracy and tilt towards an emphasis on stability: “I am not yet sure where the US will go.”31 US Ambassador Glyesteen sent an official to Kim on 10 December and met him in person on the morning 12 December 1979. “Nudging” means to push activities of splinters into a certain direction. However, the delivery of the US position to “lean on the Korean leadership and the generals” gave a chance or a momentum to the Chun group to launch a coup, while Gleysteen’s reluctance of the giving the dissident forces a warning that

---

27 79 State 312340 (4 November 1979).
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 79 State 312340, (4 December 1979). An immediately following sentence is extremely difficult for the author to interpret: “The purpose of this approach, quite frankly, is to enhance U. S. credibility with the leadership on the eve of some tough decisions” (Ibid.: para 9).
the US would not automatically defend the political liberalisation did not lessen the complacency that the US would go along with the dissident forces.

6.1.3 The Military Coup of 12 December 1979 and the US Restraints

The fact that President Park died at the hands of his intelligence chief, Kim Jae-kyu, cast a shadow of doubt over higher officials within the Park government. As Chief of the Martial Law Combined Investigation Headquarters and Commander of the Defence Security Command, General Chun Doo-hwan had exclusive rights to interrogate anybody including acting President Choi Kyu-ha. Two of the most senior men close to the late President, Choi Kyu-ha and Army Chief of Staff General Chong Sung-hwa, gave cause for suspicion in the eyes of the loyalist faction of the military. As for General Chong, his appointment with Kim Jae-kyu near to the site of the assassination in the evening of 26 October 1979 gave the Chun group strong grounds for concern and added weight to the legitimacy of their coup. As for Choi, he had demonstrated indecision in not moving to arrest Kim Jae-kyu that night. Moreover, the US, represented by its embassy, was not able to quell totally the rumour of American involvement in the assassination of President Park. Such suspected complicity weakened the US embassy's influence over the camp loyal to Park. In addition, the Iran hostage incident raised a suspicion about the US power to realise its policy towards an ally.

31 Asahi (8 December 1979).
32 79 Seoul 17592 (19 November 1979). From the very initial stage of the post-Park era, the foreign press suspected the US must have had some involvement in the affair, as evidenced by the quick US response. (79 Seoul 1979 (27 October)).
33 One of weekly status reports drafted by the Korea Desk Officer R. Rich recorded that: "Several times in the past two weeks I have called the attention of the ROK political counsellor here to the public criticisms of Japan's action [Japanese comprehensive companies' purchasing of Iranian oil in higher price than the market price in late November 1979] and cautioned that the ROKG be careful in its dealing with Iran in search for needed oil. Meanwhile, our ICA posts in Korea have concluded that the cautious U.S. handling
Under the delicate condition that most of the key actors were suspected either collaborating in the murder (the Martial Law Administrator, Army Chief of Staff, General Chung Sung-hwa), or provoking it (the Carter Administration), or improper initial action to arrest the assassin (Prime Minister Choi), the partial implementation of Holbrooke’s instructions worsened the situation. While Gleysteen was reluctant to turn his back on Christian leaders, fearing the possibility of anti-American feeling in their circles, he conveyed the changed US approach to the government and the generals. On 7 December General Wickham met with General Lew Byung-hyon, and a US embassy officer met General Chun Doo-hwan. Gleysteen’s selective delivery of Holbrooke’s instruction to the acting government and the military did not function as a solution, but served only to exacerbate the problem.

On 7 December 1979, just one day before the lifting of EM-9 and the house arrest over Kim Dae-jung, General Chun, having been informed that the embassy was going to “lean on the Korean leadership,” had a meeting with his factional colleague General Rho Tae-woo in order to draw up a plan to arrest the Martial Law Commander General Chong five days later. By the early morning of 13 December, the military coup was completed with the victory of the pro-Park faction led by Chun:

Without prior approval from [President] Choi, Chung [Chong] was taken into custody and replaced as chief of-staff on the ground that he implicated in Park’s assassination. In the hours immediately after this coup de main, armoured units loyal to each army faction

of the Iranian crisis has diminished American prestige among other Koreans, who allege they see evidence of American impotence which has implications for the ROK reliance on U.S. security ties” (79 Seoul State 327362, 20 December 1979).

34 79 Seoul 18543 (7 December 1979).
35 Ibid.
moved threateningly towards each other on the outskirts of Seoul. However, after small-arms skirmishes at the army headquarters, Chung’s supporters halted their resistance and closed ranks with the successful rebels. Chun and his main supporters, many of whom were, like Chun himself, graduates of the 1955 or 11th class of the Korean Military Academy, seemed motivated by the wish to hold a reserve of power to make sure the political path South Korea followed did not deviate too far from that set by Park. 37

The South Korean military were now controlled by “the tough cookies.” 38 The insurgent group sacked more than 30 generals, and their senior members entered the Choi government, namely Defence Minister Chu Young-bok and Home Affairs Minister Kim Chong-hwan, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The timing of the arrest of Chong was of significance. When Chun Doo-hwan met General Rho to plan the coup, the lifting of the house arrest imposed on Kim Dae-jung was made public mainly because of American pressure on acting President Choi. At the very moment when Kim came back onto the political scene, the Chun group grasped control of the military. The US was surprised by “the speed of this power grab.” 39 The military coup further weakened the civilian authority and also loosened the traditional ties between the Korean military and the United States. 40 The Carter administration responded by issuing warnings to the new military leadership and also potential sources of external threat, including North Korea and the Soviet Union. Washington reconfirmed its security commitment to South Korea and delivered this message to Moscow and Beijing. Washington warned the Chun group that “Any forces within the Republic of Korea which disrupt this progress [of political development] should bear in mind the seriously adverse impact their actions would have on the ROK’s relations with

39 79 State 322555 (15 December 1979).
40 79 Seoul 18811 (13 December 1979).
the United States."\textsuperscript{41} The US stressed that three aspects of Chun's possible misconduct needed to be highlighted: the damage to the unity of the Korean military and, most importantly, to the Combined Forces Command Structure; the serious risk vis-à-vis North Korea by mobilising troops from the near DMZ; the negligence of the US.

No matter how angry the US administration was, it had no alternative but to exercise restraint. In reality, the White House, the Departments of Defense and State, and the CIA held several high-level meetings to discuss options to discipline the new military leadership soon after the coup. Various responses, including the adjustment, reduction or withdrawal of military aid, the suspension or the cancellation of the SCM, and partial or total withdrawal of US forces in South Korea were discussed. The State Department claimed that this was the best time to reconsider the suspension of the withdrawal plan. However, the White House and the Defense Department played a central role in rejecting any such strong actions. The basic attitude was that the US must pursue the simultaneous progress of democratisation and politico-military stability, and that the former consideration should not override the latter. The cancellation or suspension of the SCM in the view of the State Department was an attractive option because it would emphasise the US non-recognition of the coup without the serious consequences of the withdrawal of US forces. However, the Department of Defense was completely opposed to the idea of a linkage between US defence policy and South Korean democratisation. Economic sanctions were considered to be an ineffective option.\textsuperscript{42} The remaining possibilities were: to distinguish between US-South Korean common interests and Chun's action by expressing US displeasure directly to Chun Doo-hwan, and to extract a pledge from him not to topple the civilian presidency; and not to obstruct political

\textsuperscript{41} 79 \emph{State} 321049 (13 December 1979); 79 \emph{State} 322555 (15 December 1979).
liberalisation. In spite of its bitterness against the military coup led by General Chun, the Carter administration declined a counter-coup against the December 12 group when this was proposed by an anti-Chun faction. A counter-coup was far beyond the interests of alliance management.

The reasons for self-restraint by the US regarding the military coup need to be investigated further in terms of the general and particular characteristics of US-South Korea relations. The generality of the US-Korean relationship needs to be viewed from the perspective of alliance management in a bipolar system. In maintaining a bipolar system in the Cold War era, there was an essential tension in the asymmetry of power dependence between superpower and ally. As discussed in Chapter 2, junior allies can not always be controlled by the superpower, but can be adventurous. The degree of control of a leader in an alliance depends on the strategic value of an ally.

With respect to the coup carried out by the Chun group, this proposition explains the reasons for US restraint. Gleysteen stressed the fundamental source of US influence by stating that: "Ultimately our real influence is going to stem from Korean awareness that they are significantly dependent on the US in both the military and economic area." In principle, the possibility of American acquiescence in politically motivated insurgence in a strategically important state always exists as long as the newly emerging military power adheres to the ideology of anti-communism and not anti-Americanism. When internal security becomes an overwhelming issue in an ally, the US tends to make a firm security commitment, whereas the problem of actually tackling internal security is often seen to be beyond US influence. All that the US can do is to strive to transform an

43 Seoul 19389 (28 December 1979).
unsettled situation into a more stabilised one. In that sense, any contingency plan of the US for coping with an ally’s political upheaval has to review more complex conditions than would be the case with an adversary state.

As discussed in Chapter 2, US political power effectively demonstrates its competence when a junior ally maintains loyalty. Such loyalty to a superpower ultimately relies upon the credibility felt by the ally for the political support of the superpower when an incumbent leader in that ally state faces not only an external military threat but also domestic political difficulty. During the first years of the Carter presidency (1977-1978) the US lost credibility because of the US policy of withdrawal of ground forces from the Korean peninsula. Beginning in 1979, the situation improved slightly until the Carter-Park summit meetings of July 1979. As Gleysteen acknowledged: “The announcement [of July] that further withdrawals of US combat troops would be suspended until at least 1981 contributed enormously to Korean confidence in the US commitment.” As far as one of the most powerful military factions in South Korea loyal to the late President Park was concerned, however, US credibility was eroded substantially because of the pressure exerted by the US on the Park regime. On top of that, the alleged complicity of the Carter administration in the death of President Park made matters worse. Accordingly, diplomatic manoeuvrability proved insufficient. Diplomatic influence between allies is always conditioned by the recognition of mutual power assessment and credibility. When the elements of respect, credibility and loyalty are no longer sufficient to enable a superpower to control the range of an ally’s activity, the superpower is often left with no choice other than to acquiesce. Once the

---

45 Seoul 19389 (28 December 1979).
46 Credibility refers to j’s expectation that i is able and willing to execute the threats and to fulfil the promises that, according to j, seem to be involved in i’s behaviour. (Lieshout, 1995): p. 58.
47 Seoul 01186 (29 January 1980).
fundamental source of US influence towards South Korea—in Gleysteen's term, this was "Korean awareness" of their dependence on the US in both the military and economic areas—was eroded, the US lacked the leverage to deal with the South Korean situation. This was because, in an alliance game, military sanctions or punitive actions can not really be adopted. Consequently, the Carter administration had no choice but to acquiesce in the emergence of the Chun group. This was the case when Gleysteen met General Chun on 14 December in order to convey the extent of US concern "quickly, bluntly, and directly". The ambassador reminded Chun of Korean dependence on good relations with US military personnel and businessmen, who were deeply disturbed by what had happened. He then stated:

> Our interest was to ensure [the] development of a broadly based constitutional government under civilian leadership...the events of December 12 would jeopardise this progress, divide the ROK military, and increase the danger from North Korea.

Contrary to his resolve to nurture the relationship with the Korean General, the ambassador had to realise at first hand the diminished scope for US pressure. In turn, Chun raised a question about his suspicion of US involvement in the death of President Park. Gleysteen found himself having to defend his position: "I used this opportunity to again bluntly and forcefully deny any involvement on our part in the events of October 26 or any attempt to soften the justice due to an assassin." In consideration of the general US-South Korean alliance relationship, and the security of South Korea, the US was forced to refrain from putting further pressure on the Chun group and the Choi government.

---

48 79 Seoul 18885 (15 December 1979). Gleysteen cautioned that the meeting should not be regarded as implying US acceptance of the group's legitimacy.
50 Ibid.: p. 5.
51 Ibid.: p. 5.
Another key factor influencing the US approach to the Chun group—the hostage incident in Iran—prevented the Carter administration from paying sufficient attention to what was happening in South Korea. Holbrooke summoned Korean Ambassador Kim Yong-shik to convey US concern:

Despite the pressures of the Iranian crisis, the President [Carter] has been following the Korean situation very closely....The President and the Secretary both are concerned that there be no overthrow of civilian rule in Korea and that orderly progress toward broadly based political development continue. If the integrity of the ROK military command structure should become badly breached, this would offer a dangerous opportunity for North Korea.52

The Iran hostage incident, by directly and immediately challenging the US, threatened the implementation of the flexible status quo orientation and strategy of offensive intervention in the South Korean regime transition. When the situation in Iran merged into a broader political struggle against the Shah, the Carter administration did not seriously consider the possibility that strong anti-Americanism would arise in Iran. This was a key reason why the US stood firm in adopting a democratisation policy towards South Korea. US pressure, whether intended or not, resulted in the demise of the Park regime. The policy focus of the post-Park era was to nudge every spectrum of the political forces into the establishment of a broadly based civilian state. This policy, however, became ineffective. When anti-Americanism in Iran became prominent, culminating in the seizure of the US embassy in Teheran, a new driving principle was adopted. This change was also evident in South Korea policy. Worrying about the analogous impact of the Iran hostage incident, the US withdrew its support for the

52 79 State 326393 (19 December 1979). In this meeting, Holbrooke also informed Kim that the US had contacted the Soviet Union and China to express its concern that North Korea should not to try to exploit
Christian dissidents in South Korea and reconciled its opposition to the military. When a fundamental principle of foreign policy changes, there is inevitably a period of instability between abandoning the old principle and the assumption of the new. Taking advantage of this short period of instability, the Chun group succeeded in seizing power. Then the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 25 December 1979 added further problems to the American foreign policy agenda. In Brzezinski’s terms, “a major watershed had been reached in the American-Soviet relationship.”

6.2 US ASSESSMENTS OF THE SOUTH KOREAN REGIME TRANSITION

After expelling the old hierarchy of the military, the Chun group could not immediately topple the Choi Presidency due mainly to continued US pressure. In order for the new military group to attain full political power, two conditions were necessary: there must be an impending threat from North Korea, and internal politics must be in turmoil. Under such circumstances, it was believed that the US would lend support or at least acquiesce. For the time being, therefore, the Chun group continued to draw the limits of its tolerance, groping for the decisive timing of the final take-over, while fanning political turmoil and insinuating that the North Korean threat was real and even impending. At the same time, the basic policy line of the US towards South Korea did not change:

Neither the assassination of President Park nor the events of the December 12/13 have changed our basic interests in Korea, and all of them—security, political and economic—will be best served if there is stability and political evolution at a pace acceptable to a

the situation in South Korea. Moreover, he told Kim of the Defense Secretary Brown’s coming visit to Chine, with the Korean issue as one of the important pending matters. (Ibid.: p. 3)
majority of the Korean people. Our influence is greater than in recent years because most Koreans know they cannot make it without us internationally and, to a lesser extent, because they need us—at least for a while—to help bridge some domestic gaps.\(^{54}\)

This wishful prospect however confronted various obstacles, and became one of sources to fail to see the establishment of a broadly based civilian government established by the popular election in South Korea in 1980.

### 6.2.1 Washington’s Assessments On the South Korean Politics

The emergence of the new military leadership through the 12 December military coup—“a serious new element of instability in the Korean situation”—complicated US objectives.\(^{55}\) Assistant Secretary Holbrooke refined the “nudging” policy in order to prevent the disintegration of army unity, and to preserve the momentum toward a broadly based democratic government under orderly civilian leadership.\(^{56}\) On balance, in early 1980, the US policy towards South Korea was twofold, i.e., “the importance of stability and the maintenance of a civilian government.” Most crucial was that: “Stability, however, should not be used as an excuse by some to override the civilian government.”\(^{57}\)

On 16 January 1980, in Seoul, Holbrooke told President Choi that “We are totally committed to the idea of civilian control...[and] both the embassy and the US military

---

\(^{53}\) Ibid.: p. 429.

\(^{54}\) 79 Seoul 19392 (28 December 1979).

\(^{55}\) 79 Seoul 19442 (31 December 1979).

\(^{56}\) 79 State 323609 (16 December 1979).

\(^{57}\) Department of State Airgram A-003 (23 January 1980): p. 5.
[in South Korea] would support the President’s civilian government.” Then he urged President Choi unsuccessfully to outline a timetable of political reform. The period from January to early May was one of preparation for a full military take-over by the Chun group.

In early 1980, several important assessments of the South Korean situation were given in Congress by Secretary Vance, General Jones (US Chairman of the JCS), General Wickham (Chief of the UN Command in Korea), and Holbrooke (Assistant Secretary). There was a distinct optimism now that the authoritarian rule of Park was over. In Holbrooke’s view, thanks to the encouragement of the Carter administration, South Korea was a successful case of significant progress on the human rights front, without damaging other broad foreign policy goals including security concerns. This optimistic prospect needed to be backed up by economic assistance in order to remove “a major element of danger during a period of political transition with so many pitfalls” and to enhance the public impression in South Korea that “the US remained a close and concerned ally.” Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of the State Department, told a senior official of the Choi government on 19 February that “political liberalisation is essential to the US. If the timetable slips there will be serious repercussions which will harm economic as well as political confidence.” The optimistic assessment in Washington directly affected and reflected the assessment of the US embassy in Seoul.

---

58 80 Seoul 000652 (7 January 1980).
60 80 Seoul 01900 (13 February 1980); 80 Seoul 01807 (11 February, 1980).
61 80 State 04280 (19 February 1980).
6.2.2 The US Embassy's Assessments of the Moves of the Chun Doo-hwan Group

Washington's wishful thinking was reflected in US local representatives' assessments in Seoul. The Carter administration saw the continuing joint military exercises with South Korean armed forces as an opportunity to limit General Chun's steps towards a final take-over. As a result, the US embassy, losing sight of the steady advance of the Chun group, concentrated on the development of party politics, the rallies and campaigns of politicians, and the democratisation movement on university campuses.

In late January 1980, Ambassador Gleysteen had increasing opportunities to meet informally with some of Chun's colleagues to "emphasize our continuing concerns over their actions, the dangers of insubordination [and violations of the chain of command] and factionalism within the ROK army, our disinterest in trying to reverse changes in army leadership, our willingness to cooperate so long as the new army leadership group really lives up to its verbal assurances, and Korea's dependence on cooperation with the U.S. military officers and foreign confidence." After the meetings, he thought that: "a steady drumbeat on these themes is useful." On these occasions, the US Ambassador told South Korean generals that:

We are not trying to reverse the events of December 12, but unless those who were ousted are treated with compassion, the young turks of today will become the elders of tomorrow and pay for any blood that is spilled. The U.S. military and civilian leadership is united, and even though U.S. military officers were properly angry over the command violations of December 12, all of us are prepared to cooperate on the basis I had outlined.63

63 Ibid.: p. 2.
In short, from late January 1980, after the Afghanistan incident, the Carter administration hurried to return to normal relations with the new military leadership led by General Chun as long as Chun kept the assurance to stay in the military bulwarks. When Gleysteen and Wickham met General Chun’s cohorts occasionally to emphasise the “continuing US concern about the gross insubordination and violations of the CFC, and to deter them from intervening in civilian politics,” they clearly perceived through informal meetings with the generals that Chun had pronounced political ambitions. However, the introduction of a broadly based civilian government was still not considered to be an impossible mission. The US confidently anticipated a future “Seoul Spring”.

The US embassy acknowledged that it would be difficult to achieve the South Korean military’s withdrawal from politics. The possibility of a democratic coalition government composed of the moderate opposition, the democratic elements of the bureaucrats and the army was therefore rejected. The “great potential for mistakes and adverse repercussions” undeniably existed in the US management of the regime transition in South Korea. In the long run, however, even though another coup could not be entirely excluded, a broadly based civilian government was seen to be likely because the Chun group had not yet gained complete control of the army, and there was a clear division between hard-liners and soft-liners concerning the degree of control, timing and conditions of a military take-over. The strong anti-military mood among the public was also taken into account:

---

64 Ibid.: p. 4.
65 80 Seoul 01807 (11 February 1980).
66 80 Seoul 01787 (11 February 1980).
67 Ibid.
Virtually everyone agrees ... to scrap the Yushin Constitution ... Sentiment against a military government is very strong, with people talking of an all-out struggle if elements of the military try to seize power.\textsuperscript{68}

Consequently, a power seizure by the military was not expected for at least a few months. This view reveals American ignorance that the new military hierarchy had already been unified under General Chun’s control.

Several liberalisation measures by the Choi government led to a revision of the February assessment. Universities and colleges opened, and EM-9 expellees were reinstated. Kim Dae-jung was allowed to resume his political career. Reflecting on these developments, the assessment of 12 March was distinctly optimistic:

Granting that tougher tests lie ahead, the prospects for stability and democratic-mind through 1980 are not bad. The odds of dangerous disruption, such as a military coup or massive student/worker uprising do not seem high.\textsuperscript{69}

General Chun’s moves were alarmist, but, for the time being, he would remain in the military barracks as “a backstage mentor.”\textsuperscript{70} At least, a pre-election coup was unlikely. It would perhaps occur in the summer of 1981 at the earliest. From this calculation, a new US administration, either under the re-elected Carter presidency or a Republican leader, would be able to respond effectively to any such move by the military.\textsuperscript{71}

Seemingly there were other significant constraints on Chun: the complexity of the Korean economy and the delicacy of the country’s foreign relations, reflected especially

\textsuperscript{68} 80 Seoul 01807 (11 February 1980).
\textsuperscript{69} 80 Seoul 03039 (12 March 1980). At the end of the telegram, the sender reminded the addressees of the fact that: “General Wickham concurs in this assessment” and requested the State Department to pass it to Tokyo.”
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} For the nexus of coercive diplomacy including the use of force and the timing of US presidential election, see Auerswald (1999).
in US reluctance to support "an effort to upset the current equilibrium."\textsuperscript{72} Basically, the situation in South Korea seemed to be manageable.

The relaxed assessment of the moves of the Chun group in mid-March was partly reinforced by the American belief that the various joint military exercises between the US and South Korea would facilitate close monitoring of Chun's behaviour. Soon after the 12 December coup and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on the eve of Christmas, US forces in South Korea had independent military exercises. In January, US forces in Okinawa came to South Korea for mountain-area training. In early March, Team Spirit 80, the biggest ever US-South Korean joint military exercise, lasting 50 days, commenced.\textsuperscript{73} In addition, National Security Advisor Brzezinski expressed full support for the on-going process of political change in South Korea and opposition to the military's intervention in the political transition (in an interview with South Korean major newspaper, Donga Ilbo):

> The essential role for the Army, Navy and Air Force of any country, whether in a state of political transition or not, is to defend the country from outside interference. And any other activities tend to weaken this primary role, and may cut into civilian support for the military establishment. ... the use of the military as an instrument of political change is almost always a sign of a situation in which a country is moving away from greater political maturity. In Korea, where the problem of defense is so vital, your [South Korean] military establishment needs to focus clearly on its primary role.\textsuperscript{74}

The DSC censored this remark from the issue of Donga Ilbo on 2 April 1980, and the US National Security Advisor was extremely angry: the US embassy distributed the

\textsuperscript{72} 80 Seoul 03039 (12 March 1980).

\textsuperscript{73} "Team Spirit '80" spanned 50 days from 1 March to 20 April with three stages. The diary of each step of the exercise was as follows: The strategic developmental step (1-20 March)-US forces in Hawaii and abroad reached the Korean peninsula; the field exercise step (21 March-7 April); the return step (8-20 April)-expedited US forces returned to its normal loci. "Korea Report," The Hayashi Collections.
original script of the interview to the mass media, although it was still not reported in the Korean newspapers.\textsuperscript{75} From April, it became obvious that expressions of American displeasure had little effect on General Chun’s political ambitions, and he proceeded, despite legal prohibitions, to assume the post of Director of the KCIA. In response, Gleysteen expressed surprise, and in early May he admitted indirectly that his March assessment had not been correct.\textsuperscript{76}

When South Korean politics became heated from mid April, the Carter administration was deeply involved in the Iran hostage crisis. Its diplomatic attempts to resolve the crisis had not achieved any breakthrough during the previous five months. The situation therefore continued to challenge the resolve of US foreign policy and threatened to dominate the forthcoming presidential election. On 7 April, President Carter announced retaliatory measures against Iran.\textsuperscript{77} In an attempt to maximise the effectiveness of the sanctions, it called upon its allies to lend their strong support.\textsuperscript{78} On 10, 16 and 17 April, Carter hinted that military forces might have to be used to resolve the crisis.\textsuperscript{79} On 11 April, Brzezinski devoted most of a speech to rebuking America’s allies. Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, revealed that the administration had delivered two specific deadlines to the allies: 12 April 1980 for the start of joint economic sanctions; and 17 May for allies’ diplomatic severance with Iran.\textsuperscript{80} Inevitably, these trends had a negative effect on the US “nudging” policy towards South Korea.

\textsuperscript{74} Brzezinski (1980): pp. 6-7.  
\textsuperscript{75} Asian Wall Street Journal (10 April 1980).  
\textsuperscript{76} 80 Seoul 05787 (7 May 1980).  
\textsuperscript{77} NYT (8 April 1980): Keesing’s: p. 30528  
\textsuperscript{78} NYT (8 April 1980).  
\textsuperscript{79} NYT (16 and 18 April 1980).  
\textsuperscript{80} NYT (13 April 1980).
6.2.3 Chun’s Challenge to the US

Preparing for US-South Korean foreign ministerial talks in Washington in April, the US embassy emphasised three policy issues: the American interest in South Korean political liberalisation; the empowerment of Ambassador Gleysteen and General Wickham to deal with the Chun group; and details of South Korean support for collective sanctions against Iran. At the talks on 14 April, Secretary Vance stated to his Korean counterpart, Park Dong-jin, that the Iran hostage incident was the most frustrating problem he had ever faced. Thus the US called for allied support in economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iran. Without conceding the difficulty caused by South Korean dependence on Iran for oil, Vance nevertheless stressed that South Korea should support the US by cutting imports and severing diplomatic relations with Iran by mid-May. In this meeting, no empowerment to Gleysteen and Wickham was successfully realised by Vance. In fact, it was Foreign Minister Park himself who “pointedly” urged Gleysteen to normalise relationships with the ROK military and in particular to establish ties with Chun Doo Hwan, just three days before Chun assumed the post of KCIA Director.

On 15 April 1980, having consolidated his standing within both the military and governmental spheres, General Chun Doo-hwan assumed the office of Chief of the KCIA concurrently with that of Commander of the DSC. This unprecedented joint appointment gave him complete control over national security, which suddenly

---

81 80 Seoul 04357 (14 April 1980)
82 80 State 100417 (16 April 1980).
83 After listening to the Foreign Minister and others, Gleysteen emphasised that the Korean side needed to make more efforts: “With General Wickham’s concurrence, I had spoken to all senior U.S. military commanders and urged them to develop and sustain good relations with their ROK counterparts. Having done on our side, I asked that the ROKG do the same thing on its side: specifically a high level ROKG official.” (80 Seoul 04565 (11 April 1980))
84 Keesing’s: p. 30605.
heightening fears among students and politicians of the unwillingness of the military to go along with the people’s demands.

Two days later, Kim Dae-jung took his campaign for accelerated democratic reform to the people with a rally attended by tens of thousands of students and workers at a Seoul university. Although the meeting was technically in breach of the martial law ban on public meetings, no action was taken and Kim’s supporters followed up with a similar campus rally two days later. Around the same time, the peaceful demonstrations taking place in many universities began to focus on political rather than purely campus issues, with Chun himself already a key target for protest.85

On 23 April the Carter administration suspended indefinitely the SCM as an expression of US disapproval of Chun’s directorship of the KCIA. At the same time, the US Ambassador attempted to meet Chun promptly “to state [the US] position directly” in exchange for “our willingness to deal with him as a major leader.”86 However, Chun delayed his reply until his completion of a detailed scheme to abrogate civilian politics by 9 May.

From late April, the new military group became more vocal and extreme in advancing its ambitions. In particular, Chun replied to American dissatisfaction at a press conference on 29 April:

86 80 Seoul 04927 (18 April 1980).
There is no reason for our staunch ally, America, to interfere in Korea’s domestic affairs and destroy trustworthy relations by expressing dissatisfaction over our presidential right to give a new assignment to any person concerned.\(^{87}\)

Chun insisted that the US must respect the bottom line not to interfere the domestic politics in South Korea. Gleysteen described the press conference as “a very political act” and stated that the US had been “barbed.”\(^{88}\) The next day, Chun summoned a meeting of the senior commanders of the entire armed forces. The resulting statement expressed the military’s intolerance of the use of university campuses by politicians for political purposes (this was a warning to Kim Dae-jung), and labour disputes that violated stability and order and would ultimately send misleading signals to North Korea.\(^{89}\)

At the same time, going over the heads of US local representatives, Chun sought to open direct channels with high-officials of the defence establishment in Washington, while the American ambassador sought a meeting with Chun in person. The Chun group attempted to exploit internal dissent within the Carter administration. It wanted to identify any significant disagreements in the Carter Administration related to political development in South Korea and the postponement of the SCM.\(^{90}\) The response from the administration was not warm. Actually, on 29 April, Holbrooke informed Korean Ambassador Kim of the continuity of US foreign policy. He also expressed his

\(^{87}\) 80 Seoul 047205 (29 April 1979).
\(^{88}\) 80 Seoul 05433 (30 April 1980).
\(^{89}\) Ibid.
\(^{90}\) In fact, another article of NYT, 20 April, entitled “Boiling Point: Military Risk Divides the Iran Experts In Washington,” unveiled the differences about the military actions between agencies of the administration.
displeasure at the difficulties Ambassador Gleysteen had encountered in trying to see General Chun. 

However, two days later, the Assistant Secretary informed Gleysteen that Chun’s two messengers, retired Generals Johnny Sohn and Choi Kyung-nok, reported to Chun that the two US local representatives in Seoul were not likely to represent “real” US policy. There were unsettled loopholes in the coherence of US foreign policy after the abortive rescue mission. Even though the Chun group did not succeed in attaining a definite promise of support from the Carter administration, it was a situation that the Chun group was determined to exploit.

6.2.4 The US Approval of the Contingency Plan for the Combat Force Movements

From late April, it appeared that the willingness to compromise among the mutually distrustful protagonists—those seeking rapid dismantling of the Yushin System and those seeking restoring and counselling caution—was exhausted. When the political confrontation reached a critical phase in early May, the US could not manage it effectively. Despite various expressions of displeasure with General Chun, including Brzezinski’s interview, the postponement of the SCM, the rejection of the request to South Korean General Lew to call on the Secretaries of State and Defence in late April, the Carter administration could not one-sidedly defend the dissident forces led by Kim Dae-jung. Before the meeting with Chun, Gleysteen telegraphed to Holbrooke about this impression to the situation as follows:

---

91 80 State 113399 (30 April 1980).
92 80 State 117573 (3 May 1980).
Like you, I am more anxious than I was before Chun's latest move and worrisome student/labour unrest. Yet, while more pessimistic than I was six weeks ago, I am no more pessimistic than I was on October 27. Nor would I be inclined to describe the present situation as the beginning of a "disintegrative process." 

Once again, the "nudging" policy hung in the balance. The urgent problem in early May was how to achieve the degree of political relaxation necessary to ensure political stability. To that end, the US urged every major political element to calm down and called for the Choi government to resolve the crisis.

More specifically, with regard to the military, the US wanted a deal: the approval of a contingency plan for the South Korean military and the conveyance of a US message expressing "authoritatively and without distortion" its opposition to the military takeover. On 7 May, two days before the Gleysteen-Chun meeting, the US embassy and the UNC approved the MLC's request for the movement of special troops on 8 and 10 May to Seoul and other major cities "for temporary duty." There was no doubt that both the UNC and the US embassy in Seoul were aware that the "temporary duty" of the Special Forces might be expanded to "extinguish student rallies." In fact, these special forces were put into a military exercise called "Olympic Game" in central Seoul and other cities on 10-13 May 1980.

After his long-awaited meeting with Chun on 9 May, Gleysteen evaluated it as successful:

I got my points across without souring the atmosphere or engaging in any argument with him...I feel the authorities [both of Korean military and government] have adopted a

---

95 80 Seoul 05787 (7 May 1980)
sensible, prudent approach to the student problem. They have given it a good deal of thought and they are very aware of the danger of over reaction and use of military force.

In fact, however, his explanation of the US position was managed to deliver with his sympathetic attitude with Chun’s elucidation of the security situation.97

After the meeting with Chun, the US Ambassador met the chief of the Presidential aides in the belief that: “President Choi is also very at fault for adding to the general sense of suspicion rather than setting forth clearly what needs to be done.” It was now time for President Choi to stop the situation from turning into a rebellious mood. Gleysteen emphasised the importance of not using excessive force against the students and “the man in the street” (implying Kim Dae-jung). Instead, Gleysteen recommended that President Choi should issue a statement on political stability, setting out the various elements of the proposed political schedule “with greater clarity” and warning that this schedule could not be maintained if students or others took the law into their own hands.98 However, President Choi did not make public any significant proposal reflecting American recommendations, but he departed for the Middle East on 10 May, the day when fully-fledged student demonstrations were set in motion. In addition, the US embassy unsuccessfully attempted to persuade other political leaders, including Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Jong-pil, to be moderate towards the government and the military.

95 80Seoul 05907 (9 May 1980).
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
6.3 THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, THE 17 MAY MILITARY COUP AND THE KWANGJU MASSACRE

When political leaders and students forced the Choi government to sack General Chun and to lift martial law, the Chun group utilised the North Korean card in order to justify its direct intervention in politics by the expansion of the jurisdiction of martial law to the entire nation. It became known as the 17 May Coup. The Carter administration opposed it strongly until the demonstration in Kwangju, the political hometown of Kim Dae-jung, developed to the level of civil war, thus making it clear that US forces would have to protect South Korean territory and support the Chun group in extinguish the uprising.

6.3.1 The North Korean Card and the 17 May Coup d'Etat

From early May 1980, the Chun group formulated a strategy for Chun's assumption of absolute power by assigning special combat forces to appropriate locations with the approval of the US. In order to launch immediate actions, however, the cause of social unrest alone was considered insufficient. The perception of a tangible threat from North Korea had to be manipulated to justify direct military intervention in civilian politics. Therefore, on 12 May, Chun suddenly played his "North Korean card" by proclaiming, in an emergency cabinet meeting from which President Choi was absent, that a North Korean invasion was imminent. On that day, he completed plans for another coup: the expansion of martial law to encompass the entire country; the dissolution of the
National Assembly, to include the arrest of targeted politicians and the prohibitions on all political activity; and the establishment of a military junta. 99

After completing his plans for the coup, Chun visited US General John Wickham on 13 May to reiterate his position that Pyongyang was the “hidden hand” behind the student demonstrations, and to inform him that a North Korean attack on the South was imminent. Wickham reported to the Pentagon that Chun’s stress on danger from the North appeared to be a pretext for a move into the Blue House. 100 It was therefore urgent that the State Department should issue a statement refuting the idea of an imminent North Korean invasion. US embassy officials in Seoul also stated that “we have no confirming evidence of a North Korean military threat”. 101 The North Korean card meant that the Chun group was neither prudent nor sensible in its approach to the student problem. Gleysteen’s belief that the Chun group was “very aware of the danger of over reaction and use of military force”—was groundless.

In a broadcast on the evening of 15 May, Prime Minister Shin Hyon-hwack, in the absence of President Choi, appealed for order and promised that the government would “meet the people’s aspirations by shortening to the maximum extent what possibly can be shortened in the political schedule.” 102 The student leaders called off the demonstrations until 22 May, when the National Assembly planned to convene to lift martial law. The Chun group had no time to wait. Hurriedly returning to Seoul late at night on 16 May from his visits to the Middle East, President Choi was coerced by Chun and his cohorts to take stronger measures without reporting the aforementioned

101 Keesing’s: p. 30606.
102 Ibid.
meeting of senior military commanders scheduled for the following morning of 17 May.\footnote{103}

In the morning on 17 May, Gleysteen, armed with the knowledge that the senior military commanders were meeting to discuss the martial law issue, again met President Choi's chief of aides. On this occasion, he suggested more specifically that the government should announce a 15 June target date for the lifting of martial law.\footnote{104} At the end of the meeting, he asked the chief aide to convey a stern warning against the military's interference in the process of political development, including the arrest of Kim Dae-jung.\footnote{105} Nevertheless, in the afternoon, Chun threatened the President by saying that the entire military command had resolved that the President should take emergency measures to counter the present national crisis: the expansion of martial law, the dissolution of the National Assembly, the closure of universities and colleges, and so on.\footnote{106} At midnight, the government spokesman announced that martial law was being extended to cover the entire nation as of 24:00 hours, 17 May 1980 because of: "current North Korean movements and the likelihood of the occurrence of incidents of unrest across the ROK."\footnote{107} President Choi, in a printed statement handed to reporters in the afternoon of the following day, also cited "unspecified North Korean and Soviet military moves and international tensions in such places as Afghanistan and Iran" as justifications for stricter martial law.\footnote{108}

\footnote{104 \textit{80 Seoul 06262} (17 May 1980).}
\footnote{105 Ibid.}
\footnote{107 \textit{80 Seoul 06273} (18 May 1980).}
\footnote{108 \textit{NYT} (20 May 1980).}
Later that same night, Gleysteen found himself reporting the commencement of the 17 May Military Coup: “An all but formal military take-over ... in process.” He drafted a diplomatic note in strong tones to be read in front of President Choi and the martial law commander. The State Department, on 19 May, stated that it was “deeply disturbed by the extension of martial law throughout the Republic of Korea, the closing of universities, and the arrests of a number of political and student leaders.” The Department instructed Gleysteen to apply pressure on the military to return to normalcy, indicating a quasi-deadline: “Our judgement will be significantly influenced by whether the three Kims are freed from detention and whether the National Assembly is permitted to convene as scheduled on May 20.” Thus, at the very start of the coup, the US acted as if it could reverse the military take-over.

6.3.2 The Clashes in Kwangju and US Actions: the Policy Review Committee at the White House, 22 May 1980

On 19 May, the US embassy, observing the people’s reactions in Seoul, concluded that the opposition had lost the necessary momentum to organise an anti-coup campaign. However, the situation in Kwangju, Kim Dae-jung’s political homeland, was quite different: the anti-Chun struggle had begun in earnest. In the total absence of demonstrations elsewhere, one report from Kwangju to the US embassy in Seoul symbolically described the scale of atrocities: “Troops are being more ruthless than North Koreans ever were.”

109 80 Seoul 06264 (17 May 1980).
110 Ibid.
111 NYT (20 May 1980).
112 80 State 130472 (18 May 1980).
113 80 Seoul 06336 (19 May 1980).
Having observed that the bloody resistance in Kwangju had pushed the special combat troops out of the city, the US embassy appraised that “the December 12 generals obviously feel threatened by the whole affair.” Confronted with the determined resistance in Kwangju, and pressured by the warnings from the US, the Korean military authorities instituted a cease-fire on 21 May. The pendulum of power was in the balance. Anticipating the emergence of anti-Americanism in Korea because of the US approval of the military movement in early May, Gleysteen urged the Carter administration to take decisive action to moderate the situation just a few hours before a crucial decision-making meeting on the Korean situation in Washington (on 22 May):

The situation remains extremely serious; more and more people want to know the U.S. attitude; the Korean government wants us to make a statement; and most important, General Wickham and I have been assured by the military hierarchy that they will encourage distribution of the uncensored text and will not undercut us by taking forceful action in Kwangju for at least two days unless the situation goes completely sour. (emphasis added)

Nonetheless, the decisions of the Policy Review Committee (PRC) were quite different from those expected by the American local representatives. Its meeting was held at 3:00 p.m. on 22 May in the White House Situation Room. Most senior decision-makers, except for President Carter, attended. The overriding concern of the meeting was to

---

114 Ibid.
115 80 Seoul 06463 (21 May 1980).
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 80 Seoul 06525 (22 May 1980).
119 Vice President W. Mondale, Secretary of State E. Muskie, Secretary of Defense H. Brown, and JCS Chairman Gen. Jones, CIA Director Admiral S. Turner, and other working level officials took part in the committee meeting. Representing the White House, Z. Brzezinski and David Aaron attended the meeting, separately from NSC’s Asia Bureau Chief, D. Gregg.
prevent “a pattern of violence in Kwangju” from spreading to other cities, an eventuality that could endanger the “counter-North Korean mission of the joint command”\textsuperscript{120}:

The first priority is the restoration of order in Kwangju by the Korean authorities with the minimum use of force necessary without laying the seeds for wide disorders later. Once order is restored, it was agreed that we must press the Korean Government, and the military in particular, to allow a greater degree of political freedom to evolve.\textsuperscript{121}

The dominant figure in the PRC, Brzezinski, who had previously claimed that the Korean military’s primary role should be to defend the territory, summarised his own view: “In the short term, support, in the longer term, pressure for political evolution.”\textsuperscript{122}

On the question of what should follow short-term support, what the Committee concluded:

What we do depends in large part on how the situation in Kwangju is resolved. If the situation there is handled well, with little lose of life, we can move quietly to apply pressure for more political evolution. If the situation in Kwangju involves large loss of life, the PRC will meet again to discuss measures to be taken.\textsuperscript{123}

This conclusion was the core theme of US alliance management when negotiations between the Choi government and the leaders of the Kwangju Democratisation movement were underway.\textsuperscript{124} US aircraft carrier, Midway, having anchored in Yokosuka Naval base of Japan, departed towards unspecified location. Reportedly, the aircraft carrier headed for the East Sea (Sea of Japan), with another aircraft carrier, Corral Sea, stationed in Philippine.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.: p 2; \textit{80 Seoul 06525} (22 May 1980).
\textsuperscript{121} National Security Council (22 May 1980): p. 1.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.: p. 1.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.: p. 2.
\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Akahata} (24 May 1980).
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Akahata} (25 May 1980); Sankei (25 May 1980).
Before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on 6 February 1980, Holbrooke stated that: “Over the past 3 years in East Asia, we have made significant progress on the human rights front…without damaging or subordinating our other objectives.”¹²⁶ This rhetoric implied that the status of the human rights policy among broad foreign policy goals could or should be adjusted if it collided with other foreign policy goals. This was what happened in May 1980. The security concern had been the most crucial factor among various US interests in its relationship with Korea. With the rapidly changing international security environment and challenges from the Soviet Union and Iran, security relations with South Korea overrode other interests. The Chun group had exploited the national security issue for its own interests.

When General Chun played the North Korea card, Wickham was certain that Chun had his sights set on the Blue House under the pretext of maintaining national security. As a matter of fact, key units of the Korean army, the most powerful special combat forces, were moved from the front line near the DMZ to the south Seoul metropolitan area, and some forces were moved out of the Combined Field Area. Leaving the front line empty was an unimaginable action. However, the US did not push Chun or the MLC to return the moved troops to the demarcation line, but Wickham agreed to “release four South Korean regiments in the command for use in “crowd control and security work,” even though US Defense Department spokesman confirmed that there was “no evidence that North Korea may try to take advantage of the situation.”¹²⁷ Between the 17 May Coup and the suppression of the Kwangju democratisation movement, the US repeatedly reconfirmed its security commitment to South Korea: “As we affirmed on October 26,
1979, the US government will react strongly in accordance with its treaty obligations to any external attempt to exploit the situation in the Republic of Korea.”

On 23 May, Gleysteen, at a luncheon meeting with Korean National Assemblymen, changed his position, and took a very direct line: “we were convinced that the immediate task at hand was the restoration of public order.” Calling on new Prime Minister Park Choong-hoon, on the same day, he reiterated that “We are doing all we can to contribute to the restoration of order.” Then the US embassy began to evacuate American citizens from Kwangju. Supported by the Carter administration, the new military power group retook the city on 27 May 1980. The “nudging” policy was now doomed.

6.4 THE LONG-TERM PRESSURE ON THE NEW MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN JUNE 1980

After the suppression of the Kwangju democratisation movement, the question of “longer-term pressure” was set in motion. The US had no intention of attempting to nullify the military take-over. Nevertheless it was imperative to maintain an appropriate distance from the new military regime. The longer-term pressure would not result in desired outcomes. The new military regime was resolved to wage a war of nerves against American pressure. In addition, the Presidential election campaign in the US tilted the Korean situation in favour of the new military regime. The popularity of President Carter, the Democratic candidate, had fallen sharply since the failure of the

128 80 State 1304721 (28 May 1980).
129 80 Seoul 06607 (23 May 1980).
130 80 Seoul 06610 (23 May 1980).
131 80 State 135741 (23 May 1980).
132 80 Seoul 06869 (29 May 1980).
Iran rescue mission in late April, and the Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan, pledged to restore the strategic value of South Korea. All of these factors substantially weakened the effects of the longer-term pressures from the Carter administration.

6.4.1 The Initial Measures for Longer-term Pressure

As soon as Kwangju was re-taken, US longer-term pressure was imposed. On 30 May, the officials in the US Embassy in Seoul visited almost every newspaper companies in person—which was unprecedented—in order to make it clear that the US was not informed the 12 December Coup in 1979, the appointment of Chun’s KCIA directorship, and the 17 May coup in advance: in shorth, the Carter administration had, and would not support the military take-over.\(^\text{133}\)

President Carter confirmed the longer-term pressure policy by saying in an interview with the CNN on 31 1980 that “Democratization has been given a setback.”\(^\text{134}\) As far as the question of recognition for the new military junta was concerned, it was difficult for the Carter administration to move in this direction because the Chun regime did not heed the pressures emanating from Washington. When Holbrooke asked Gleysteen for his opinion about his planned visit to South Korea, the Ambassador opposed it because it might be seen as a sign of “recognition.”\(^\text{135}\) Moreover, The New York Times reported on 13 June that “US Ambassador William Gleysteen had told General Chun and other leaders that the US believed the direction they were taking was fundamentally wrong and would cause political instability and weaken the country internally and

\(^{133}\) Sankei (31 May 1980).
\(^{134}\) 80 State 152850 (10 June 1980).
\(^{135}\) 80 Seoul 07558 (12 June 1980); 80 Seoul 07559(12 June 1980); 80 Seoul 07707 (16 June 1980).
The report cited two quasi-sanctions: the control of visits by high-ranking Americans to South Korea and the suspension of economic assistance programmes. On 21 June 1980, at a time when the new military regime desperately needed US recognition, an instruction co-ordinated by the State Department, the Defense Department and the NSC, arrived at the US embassy in Seoul: “we seek to avoid over-identification with the present Korean regime.”

Apart from the impact of the Iran hostage incident upon US efforts to deal with the South Korean situation, it is also necessary to consider the general issue of alliance management in an hierarchical alliance system to explain the failure of US “nudging” policy. In a bipolar system, Snyder and Diesing argue, there is an essential “tension” in the asymmetry of power dependence between the two superpowers. J. M. Roberts develops Snyder and Diesing’s argument as follows: “The allies can be controlled, but also ... they can be adventurous if they want... The more the superpower needs a particular state, the less the super power's control over that state.” This was exactly the case in the relationship between the Carter administration and the Chun regime. The Carter administration resented Chun and his group’s “abusing [the firm security] commitment in ways that will undermine Korea’s long-term stability.” On 25 June, however, acting Assistant Secretary Mike Armacost testified before the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that:

The nature of the local military balance and the persistent risk of renewed conflict in Korea has required a continued US troop presence, a build-up of ROK military capabilities, and the development of an integrated command structure. Failure to maintain

136 80 State 156703 (13 June 1980).
137 80 State 163085 (21 June 1980). The possibility of the reconsideration of the suspension of the troop withdrawal was also raised as a card when “a more broadly based support is not visible.
139 80 State 175146 (2 July 1980).
these elements of deterrence could heighten the dangers of hostilities involving not only the two Koreas but also the PRC, the USSR, Japan and the US, with unpredictable but profound consequences for the East Asia power balance.\textsuperscript{140}

In that sense, the possibility that the US, as a superpower, might acquiesce in any military actions taking place in South Korea always existed as long as the newly emerging military power in practice guaranteed American strategic interest in South Korea. Otherwise, mature democratic social forces in the junior member state might have to be relied upon to establish a broadly based civilian government. The Carter administration’s nurturing of the new military regime towards political development also failed mainly because of Chun’s refusal to make any concessions in regard to the Kim Dae-jung issue.

\textbf{6.4.2 The War of Nerves between the Carter Administration and the Chun Regime}

The relations between the Carter administration and the new military regime remained poor,\textsuperscript{141} and the administration never publicly recognised the Chun regime.\textsuperscript{142} The suspension of the SCM remained intact. At the same time, it should be stressed that the Carter administration did not openly exert any pressure to commute Kim Dae-jung’s death sentence.

The new military leadership desired recognition from the US, but at the same time was not frightened to wage a war of nerves with the Carter administration. At the same time, it started to approach the Republican Party, whose Presidential Candidate, Ronald Reagan, recognised the strategic value of South Korea as a vital US national interest.\textsuperscript{143} During the last days of the Carter Administration, the new military authorities refused to

\textsuperscript{140} 80 State 167847 (25 June 1980).
\textsuperscript{141} Interview with Huh Hwa-pyung.
\textsuperscript{142} 80 State 167847 (25 June 1980).
receive the protest letters of US congressmen, sent soldiers armed with guns and bayonets to the US information centres in Kwangju, Taegu and Pusan, and organised a large number of South Korean soldiers to write letters to the US embassy protesting against US interference in South Korea's internal affairs. Under these circumstances, the Carter administration was not able to apply pressures on the Chun regime explicitly, and instead asked Japan to help prevent the Chun regime from executing Kim Dae-jung, in the belief that people in Kwangju and other adjacent cities would not take to the streets, even if the execution were carried out. Wickham implied the inevitability of recognition by saying that "If General Chun is going to be Korea's new leader, as expected, the US will support him." The State Department found it necessary to respond on 13 August that "Wickham's comment did not reflect U.S. policy."

One of most important things to make here is the Carter administration's dealing with the regime transition issue with Japan. As soon as the US Embassy in Seoul reported to Washington that General Chun would assume presidency after pushing out President Choi from the office, Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher telegraphed to the US Embassy in Japan as follows:

There have been a number of indications during the past several weeks that Gen. Chun Doo Hwan is moving swiftly to assume the presidency of the ROK... Yesterday we received information indicating that President Choi plans to resign on August 16 and that the National Conference for Unification (the presidential electoral college) was being assembled in Seoul on August 18 to elect a new president, presumably Chun Doo Hwan.
We have informed Japanese Embassy here [Washington] of the foregoing and will provide you [Mike Mansfield] with further information as available. We are actively reviewing the appropriate U.S. response to these imminent developments. For Seoul, please info CINCPAC and CINCPAC POLAD on messages reporting and analyzing political development.149

This telegram proves the validity of the systemic approach regarding the US, Japan and South Korea as one of relatively autonomous and separate sub-systems of the American system set out in Chapter 2. The channels between the US and Japan were working, especially after the Carter’s participation in the Japanese state funeral for the late Prime Minister Ohira in early July 1980, in Washington and Tokyo. At the same time, with respect to the policy co-ordination between the Department of Defense and the Department of State was seemingly well maintained as assumed in the last paragraph of the telegram.

The result of the “actively reviewing the appropriate U.S. response to the imminent developments” was Carter’s presidential letter to President-elect Chun Doo Hwan in late August:

Recent events in Korea have troubled us greatly...We regard free political institutions as essential to sustaining a sound relationship between our two countries... Mr. Kim’s [Kim Dae-jung] execution, or even a sentence of death, could have serious repercussions.... Nevertheless, I urge you take the earliest possible action to ensure the stability of the government through the development of popularly supported political institutions and greater personal freedom for your citizens.150

On 17 September, Kim Dae-jung was sentenced to death. In response, the US administration did not give any premature sign of intent to resume the annual Security

148 80 Seoul 10504 (03:32 14 August 1980).
149 80 State 215254 (22:02 14 August 1980).
150 80 State 230028 (29 August 1980).
Consultative Meeting, which might have symbolised *de facto* US recognition of the incumbent regime in South Korea. Consequently, the relationship between the Chun regime and the Carter administration became increasingly aggravated, and the US clearly failed to establish the declared objective of “a broadly based civilian government.” The visit of US Defence Secretary Brown on 13 December did not change the firm attitude of the Chun regime on the Kim Dae-jung issue.\(^{151}\)

As the quiet diplomacy to save Kim proceeded, in the United Nations there was a North Korean diplomatic effort to draft a resolution denouncing the Kwangju massacre and the Kim Dae-jung trial.\(^{152}\) If the Carter administration were to embark on strong and open criticism, it could not effectively block the North Korea regime from initiating the adoption of a resolution at the UN, which would consequently officially make the new military regime in South Korea illegitimate in international society. The Carter Administration had to consider the side effect of US public pressure on the Kim Dae-jung issue when North Korea attempted to exploit it in the international diplomatic arena. This is typical of the kind of alliance management dilemma posed by an illegitimate regime in a member state. Put differently, however, because of the North Korean exploitation of the Kim trial as a source of anti-South Korean propaganda, the issue had to be resolved in order to reduce the damage to alliance relations with South Korea.\(^{153}\)

---


\(^{152}\) *80 State 237970* (16 September 1980)

\(^{153}\) On the legitimacy in international politics, see Hurd (1999).
6.4.3 The Chun Regime and the New Republican Administration of President-elect Ronald Reagan

The 32nd National Convention of the Republican Party held in Detroit on 14-17 July 1980 approved the party’s policy platform for the forthcoming Presidential and Congressional elections, and chose Ronald Reagan as the party’s Presidential candidate and George Bush as vice-presidential candidate.\(^{154}\) The Republican Party’s policy platform—which criticised the Carter administration’s “lack of a coherent strategic concept to guide foreign policy”—was good news for the new military regime in South Korea. For the sake of restoring the American leadership, the Republicans proclaimed their slogan “peace through strength.”\(^ {155}\) The platform targeted the Soviet Union as a main adversary: “The premier challenge facing the United States, and the entire globe is to check the Soviet Union’s global ambitions.”\(^ {156}\) The Republican Party deliberately shifted the direct and immediate challenge from the Iranian hostage crisis to the Soviet Union. To that end, the platform revealed a significant shift of the foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region:

A new Republican Administration will restore a strong American role in Asia and the Pacific... Japan will continue to be a pillar of American policy in Asia. Republicans recognize the unique danger presented to our ally, South Korea. We will...recognize the special problems brought on by subversion and potential aggression from the North. We will maintain American ground and air forces in South Korea, and will not reduce our presence further. Our treaty commitments to South Korea will be restated in unequivocal terms and we will re-establish the process of close consultations between our Governments.\(^ {157}\)

---

\(^{154}\) *Keesing’s*: p. 30477.

\(^{155}\) Ibid.: p. 30477. See also KeVy Jr and Witkopf (1982).

\(^{156}\) Ibid.: p. 30477.

\(^{157}\) Ibid.: p. 30478.
As soon as the Republican Presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan came to office, the cohesion of the TASS was quickly revived. As soon as Reagan had gained his landslide victory over President Carter on 4 November 1980, the Chun regime actively approached the President-elect to make a deal—Chun’s state visit to Washington as a first national guest to Reagan in exchange for the life of Kim Dae-jung. The Chun regime sought to enhance its legitimacy by demonstrating the degree of external support, escaping from economic crisis, and stabilising its political foothold. Even in the last days of the Carter administration, the Chun regime did not give any indication that the execution of Kim could be avoided. It wanted a direct deal with President-elect Reagan. On 16 December, General Chong Ho-yong flew to Washington via Tokyo Narita Airport as a messenger of Chun to hold talks with Richard Allen, National Security Advisor-appointee to President-elect Reagan, about a possible agreement. It was only a few days after the visit of Brown of the incumbent Carter administration which had failed to secure a certain confirmation of Kim’s future from the Chun regime.\footnote{158 The Washington Post (14 December 1980).} When Chong Ho-yong stopped over at Narita Airport, one of the high officials of the JDA had talks with Chong for two hours.\footnote{159 “Korea Report,” The Hayashi Collection.} The Chun regime, utilising the fact that the Kim Dae-jung trial was regarded with “serious interest” by the US and Japan, strengthened its position. After the state visit to Washington and the restoration of relations with Japan, President Chun lifted martial law and proceeded with a presidential election in March 1981.
CONCLUSION

In summary, from early 1979, the Carter administration attempted to build a broadly based civilian government for long-term political stability. It succeeded in toppling the authoritarian leader, President Park, but this made the political landscape in South Korea more volatile. In order to facilitate political stability, the US employed a "nudging" policy towards the establishment of "a broadly based civilian government" for a political environment that could best serve US national interests. The Carter formula was not just a matter of principle, but asserted that US short- and long-term goals were complementary. However, if the Carter administration was forced to choose only one policy option between South Korea's political development and support for the authoritarian regime, not only in the context of the human rights policy but also in terms of alliance, it would choose the latter. Therefore, the failure of the Carter administration to establish a broadly based civilian government in South Korea can best be illuminated by the analytical framework of intra-alliance politics and alliance management.

The Carter administration certainly wanted liberalisation, but at the same time it preferred political stability, so the operational principle was the flexible status quo policy behind offensive intervention. The Carter administration did at least succeed in witnessing the demise of the authoritarian Park regime. In this context, US power was not really limited. South Korea was heavily dependent on the US security commitment, and whether a regime in South Korea has good relationship with the US or not directly affected its legitimacy. In the case of a projected force and exposed state, in particular one sharing a border with a hostile country as a forward base of US global strategy, the removal of security commitment means the abandonment of the regime in power. That
is the difference between the situation that the South Korean regime faced and that confronting Latin American regimes.\(^{160}\)

The Chun group risked not only the opposition of the US, but also national security by removing special troops and other key forces from the demarcation line between the two Koreas. In dealing with the emerging military power, the Carter administration faced major constraints in the implementation of its "nudging" policy: the impact of the Iran hostage incident, the absence of reliable leverage to prevent the Chun group from trespassing into politics, the lack of communication channels with the Korean military, and the loss of credibility. What made matters worse was the suspicion about the correlation between the sudden death of President Park and the influence of the US. On top of that, the US self-serving strategic interest in maintaining stability in South Korea overrode the declared goal of political development. The rationale of US support for the 17 May coup was the security imperative. When the balance between change and political stability was threatened, the Carter administration chose the latter. The repercussion of this shift gravely weakened US influence on the new military regime during the remaining part of the Carter presidency. More importantly, the US had to confront the emergence of widespread anti-Americanism in South Korea. Thus, the Carter administration's alliance management must be regarded as a grave failure in terms of America's relationship with both the Korean civilian population and the Korean military.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the core imperative of US international interventionism was to foster "a world environment in which the American system can survive and

\(^{160}\) For a critical analysis about the human rights policy towards Latin America, see Kirkpatrick (1982).
flourish."\(^{161}\) This US post-war strategy limited the range and scope of its offensive intervention and flexible status quo policy to change South Korean politics in two respects: to promote democracy and to protect the civilian government from a military coup. With respect to the first limit, as Robinson puts, the US has never intended to implant socio-economic democracy—which guarantees mass participation—to its junior allies in the Third World, but has promoted "polyarchy" or "low-intensity democracy."\(^{162}\) Concerning the second limit, as Andrew Hurell argues, the US has never acted to restore an overthrown government by military intervention in the Cold War era or even in the post-Cold War period (except in less strategically valued nations).\(^{163}\) These limits are evidently discovered in the US "nudging" policy towards South Korea. The Carter administration approved the movements of special forces in early May 1980, decided to support the Chun group to quell the uprising in Kwangju in late May, and did not exert pressure on the Chun group to return to the barracks.

In terms of external constraints, Brzezinski recalled that "The attention of the top decision makers, myself included, was riveted on the issues [of the Iranian Hostage Incident and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan] ...Our decision-making circuits were heavily overloaded."\(^{164}\) The formal rise to power of General Chun took place during April and early May 1980, the very time at which the attention of all participants in the US diplomatic and military decision-making structure was fixed on the Iranian issue. Because of these extraordinary circumstances, no secretarial visit to South Korea in the first half of 1980 was made and the contemporaneous US-Korea policy was


\(^{162}\) Polyarchy refers to "a system in which a small group actually rules and mass participation in decision-making is confined to leadership choice in elections carefully managed by competing elites." Robert Dahl used the term first. (Robinson, 1996): p. 49.


implemented mainly at the assistant secretarial level in the home country and at the ambassadorial level in the local state.

After the aborted Iranian hostage-rescue mission on 24 April, US foreign policy underwent a shift of principle. On 9 May 1980, Carter made a speech before the World Affairs Council in Philadelphia emphasising that foreign policy "must be based simultaneously on the primacy of ... human rights and on the preservation of an American military strength that is second to none." Brzezinski praised the speech as "the best statement of [a] balanced approach" for "a long-term objective of shaping world order" and the "application on the level of practical policy" as a new framework for foreign policy. It became obvious that US strategy was now shifting from human rights to security. As discussed already, it was Brzezinski who decided to approve the suppression of the Kwangju democratisation movement on 22 May 1980, even though he apparently opposed the military's political intervention in an interview in early April. During this short period, the strategic change of US foreign policy and the persistent deadlock of the Iran hostage incident inevitably affected the integration of the Carter administration in policy and decision-making. The relationships between the State Department and other agencies such as the Defense Department, the NSC and the CIA deteriorated, and the State Department began to lose its influence from late 1979, effectively being isolated after mid-April 1980. This disintegrative feature extended to coordination among US local representatives from different parts of the administration, which in turn weakened the authority of US foreign policies and made them ineffective. These factors had a negative effect on the implementation of US Korean

166 Ibid.: p. 459.
167 "Tendency for fragmentation or independent action between ministries or agencies necessarily places constraints on the central political control of foreign policy" (Barston, 1997): p. 9.
policy and resulted in "a series of habitual responses to events occurring in the international environment" rather than "a structured reaction to external stimuli." All these developments in the US between early April and May 1980 contributed to Chun's successful and overt assumption of political power.

Moreover, the hostage incident forced the Carter administration to press "pretty much the same" requests: no trading with Iran and the breaking of diplomatic relations by recalling the ambassador by 17 May. The administration promised to guarantee the supply of American oil to Japan in early May 1980. Without a similar guarantee to South Korea, President Choi left for the Middle East at the height of political tension in mid-May. Before his departure, the State Department pressed the Korean President to prevent the forthcoming turmoil with a balanced but firm political statement. At that critical juncture, however, there was no American attempt to call for the reconsideration of the Middle East Trip. It placed a higher priority on the mobilisation of a junior ally's co-operation in punishing Iran than on the imperatives of political stability by encouraging Choi on duty.

In terms of the levers the US could utilise to manage Korean politics, it is necessary to read the last sentence in Gleysteen's cable about the outbreak of the 17 May coup: "I regret to say at this point our influence appears disturbingly limited." The suspension of American economic assistance was not in itself sufficient to influence the Korean military's actions. The difficulties of employing proper punitive measures had already been exposed when the Chun group violated the CFC system in the coup of 12 December 1979. The Carter administration evaluated the coup as "a serious new

---

169 80 Seoul 06262 (17 May 1980).
element of instability”, but nevertheless the US merely gave “stern warnings” and expressed its dissatisfaction. The administration paid more attention to the impact on the existing US-South Korean Combined Forces Command System than on the direct repercussions on the timetable of political development. Probably any disciplinary action might encourage a splinter group within the Korean military to try to overthrow the Chun group. If this happened, the Carter administration would have to suffer the consequences of a devastating power struggle within an ally’s military establishment. For the military, the only available leverage was the annual security consultative meeting (SCM). After receiving the assessment of Korean political stability, on 13 March Holbrooke reminded Gleysteen of the possibility that the Ambassador could use the SCM. In fact, the US suspended the schedule of the SCM as a lever, but this move was ineffective. Rather, Chun forcefully reminded Washington that it must observe the bottom line not to interfere the domestic politics on 30 April.

In addition to the lack of leverage, the US faced another problem related to the weakness of the communication channel with the Korean military. When the new military hierarchy refrained from contacting their American counterparts between early February and late April, the US had difficulties not only in gathering information about the intended and actual moves of the military, but also in conveying US concerns to the new military leadership directly and authoritatively. This was partly due to the alleged complicity of the US, particularly the embassy, behind the death of President Park. General Chun suspected the involvement of Gleysteen in the 26 October assassination.

170 80 State66840 (13 March 1980).
By the same token, Gleysteen came to distrust Chun and eventually considered him “almost the definition of unreliability... unscrupulous... ruthless...a liar.”

However, it is still very questionable that only the mismanagement of the Carter Administration itself was attributed to the failure. In relation to this question, another factor—the intervention of Japan—will be discussed in Chapter 7 because undoubtedly Japan has played a critical role in facilitating the stability of the East Asian security environment.

CHAPTER 7

THE JAPANESE INTERVENTION IN THE SOUTH KOREAN REGIME TRANSITION

INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to analyse the nature and scope of Japanese intervention in the South Korean regime transition during the emergence of a new military regime from late 1979 to January 1981. In so doing, it seeks to open up a new chapter in underdeveloped area of Japanese studies, particularly on the political dimension of the Japanese foreign policy.

The Blue Paper on Diplomacy 1980 refers to the significance of developments in South Korea in the introduction to its survey of events in 1979:

The assassination of President Park, who had ruled South Korea for the last eighteen years, took place in the neighbouring country, South Korea. With the advent of this major variable factor within South Korean domestic politics, the trends in the political situation in the Korean peninsula once again drew attention.¹

By the same token, from the ruling LDP side, the 37th LDP annual convention of 23 January 1980 adopted that: "Japan should further develop the co-operative relations with South Korea in the new domestic political situation."² However, these bald statements allow no room in the officially published materials so far any reading of


²
Japanese actions in response to the regime transition. Indeed, the period from late 1979 to mid-1980 has been virtually ignored in research on South Korean-Japanese relations—a gap which the present research seeks to fill.

The primary objectives of Japanese intervention in South Korea were not in themselves different from those of the US: the enhanced security of South Korea and the stability of the Northeast Asian region. However, Japan’s chosen means of achieving these objectives—a “selecting” policy—was quite different from the “nudging” policy of the US. Japan intervened in three ways to support the Chun group: (1) through the supply of intelligence about hypothetical North Korean invasions of the South in December 1979, January 1980 and May 1980; (2) through the processing and exporting of an anti-Kim Dae-jung campaign to South Korea in March, April, May and June 1980; (3) by offering political side-support to the Chun group in late April and early May 1980; (4) by recognising Chun’s final takeover in the 17 May coup and further supporting the Chun group through a stream of visits of influential politicians, officials and emissaries to Seoul.

This chapter first briefly introduces US-Japan relations in the second term of the Ohira incumbency, from November 1979 to March 1980 (Section 7.1). The way in which Japan, as the middle member of the alliance, was able to exert a stronger influence than the US on the regime transition in a weaker member state (South Korea) is underlined. Then, consideration is given to the different and relatively independent role the Ohira cabinet played in the emergence of a new military regime in South Korea. In so doing, the means and postures of Japanese intervention are extracted (Section 7.2-7.6). Then

---

the various efforts of the Suzuki Cabinet to commute Kim Dae-jung’s death sentence are examined (Section 7.7). The entire period is analysed in terms of Japan’s “defensive intervention” strategy within the context of intra-alliance politics.

7.1 US-JAPAN RELATIONS, NOVEMBER 1979-MARCH 1980: POLITICAL DIPLOMACY

From the late 1970s, Japan was extremely concerned about the decline of US leadership and American unwillingness to commit itself to the East Asian theatre at a time when the Soviet Union was rapidly increasing its military capability, particularly in the Far East.¹ The late 1970s and the early 1980s saw a growing tension between Japan’s extended global sphere of interest and the limits of Japan’s military capability to protect it. As a result, the Ohira government sought to expand Japan’s role in world politics. The optimistic approach to world politics of Ohira’s first term did not prevail in the second term. Even before the Iranian hostage incident in November and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979, the strategic and political power parities between the US and the Soviet Union were increasingly unpredictable.

In the Japanese view, had the Iranian Revolution not happened, the Soviets would have refrained from invading Afghanistan.⁵ In conjunction with the massive buildup of conventional forces in the four northern territories (namely, Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan and Habomai) close to Hokkaido, these two incidents put the Japanese military

³ Compared with US “nudging” policy, the study uses Japanese “selecting” policy, the policy which picked up the most amenable political force and supported it to assume the power.
⁴ With regard to the Soviet threat, Brzezinski told Yamashita on 28 June 1979: “In military terms, East Asian security has been exacerbated due to the military build up of the Soviet Union in the Far East.” (Nojoe, 1980): p.15. As far as Japanese anxiety about US leadership, Kosaka’s article, “A Proposal for Encouraging America”(1980), is representatively recommendable to read.
and diplomatic establishments on full alert. At the same time, the Carter administration sought to use Japan to bring its Western European allies, which were not enthusiastic about supporting the US, into line.\textsuperscript{6} The Ohira cabinet faithfully echoed this call from the US. As a member of the Western camp, Japan fully supported the US in dealing with the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

However, the Japanese government was far from satisfied with the Carter administration's world leadership role. In particular, it was worried about US resolve to maintain an appropriate level of military capability to deter instability in the East Asian theatre. Japanese trust in the US announcement of the suspension of its withdrawal policy, and its promise to enhance the Seventh Fleet and the tactical US air force presence in the Far East (in late July and early August) was seriously undermined when, in mid-October 1979, \textit{The Washington Post} revealed that the US assumed that it would be able simultaneously to cope with one major war in the European theatre and one local war in the East Asian theatre. The so-called swing strategy revived the Japanese conviction that the US intended to depart from Asia.\textsuperscript{7}

The Iranian hostage incident and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan further reinforced this apprehension. On 23 January 1980, at the Foreign Correspondents Club in Tokyo, Foreign Minister Saburo Okita, made a speech emphasising “active diplomacy with a global perspective.”\textsuperscript{8} Prime Minister Ohira underlined the contents of active diplomacy—“taking responsibility to remove the sources of instability in international

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.: p. 504-7; interview with Hisahiko Okazaki; Informed the news of the abduction of the US ambassador in Iran, Ohira said himself that: “Something really worrisome has happened. Disorder is hardly the word for it.”(Sato, Koyama, and Kumon, 1990): p. 503.

\textsuperscript{7} Hisasumi (1979): pp. 4-5.

\textsuperscript{8} Asahi Shimbun (24 January 1980).
society”—in the 91st Diet session on 28 January 1980. At that time, a new source of insecurity arose. US Secretary of Defence Harold Brown testified in the Congress in late January 1980 that the US marine corps, and air and naval forces in Okinawa could be deployed as the situations in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean required. A couple of days later, the Japanese Prime Minister expressed his willingness to collaborate with the US if the redeployment was really necessary. However, the episode caused grave concern to the Ohira cabinet which believed that the USFJ in Okinawa might drag Japan into unwanted American war efforts in the Middle East when the Soviet Union drastically increased its military presence in the Far East.

US strategy has not been operated from the East Asian regional scope, but there was no military alternative available for Japan if the redeployment of the USFJ in Okinawa were to take place. Therefore, economic and political strategies for securing the balance of power in the world and in the Northeast Asian region, had to be developed immediately. As a method of achieving a “steady and significant increase” of Japan’s military capability, the Ohira cabinet promised financial support to the USFJ expenditures. Ohira announced on 18 April 1980 that Japan had committed $125 million aid to Pakistan and had offered $100 million in assistance to Turkey. He did
not conceal the obvious strategic and political purpose of these programmes, namely to support insecure regimes in vulnerable nations bordering on Iran and Afghanistan: "Our basic approach to these trials must be premised upon preserving the fundamental values of freedom, democracy and the open economic system." Coupled with the measures, ¥57 billion assistance programme to Thailand were seen as the first examples of Japan's "strategic assistance" approach. In fact, Okita told the Diet that: "Japan would never intervene in military terms because of the Peace Constitution and the Defensive Defence Policy. However, Japan should play a role in defending the free society with economic assistance." Looking at the Korean peninsula, the vacuum left by the demise of the Park regime in South Korea was so big that it could seriously threaten the security of Japan. The Japanese intervention in South Korean politics represented a shift from economic diplomacy to political diplomacy.

7.2 THE INITIAL ACTIONS OF THE OHIRA CABINET IN RESPONSE TO THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT PARK

The Japanese alliance management put continuity and stability as the highest priorities, while the US oscillated from change and democratisation to stability and security. It is well proved by the initial reactions of the Japanese government.

---

18 NYT (18 April 1980). According to "Report to Communist Party Politburo on Afghanistan," dated on January 1980, the Soviet Union viewed responses from the US, the PRC, and Japan as "a convenient pretext for a further rapprochement on anti-Soviet basis, to plan long-term measures to complicate relations between Washington and Beijing in the context of the development of relations within the bounds of the so-called triple alliance of the USA, PRC, and Japan" (Westad, 1997): p.324.
7.2.1 Japan's Alliance Management of South Korean Politics: Continuity and Stability

From the Japanese perspective, as discussed in Chapter 5, the priorities of the Park regime should have been to reinforce the country's economic position and emphasise military preparedness against a North Korean invasion as long as the peninsula remained divided into two adversarial camps. A strong state was essential. Even if this was not in accordance with the American concept of liberal democracy, alliance management should operate on the basis of this reality, and should not seek to dismantle the existing South Korean regime. From the earliest stage of the post-Park era, the Japanese approach towards the South Korean regime transition was noticeably different from that of the US. From the outset, the Carter administration's management of the regime transition in South Korea was questionable in the eyes of the Japanese ruling camp. According to this view, South Korean political instability should be settled as soon as possible through the establishment of another strong state similar to the Yushin system so that the Northeast Asian security environment could be maintained. The combination of declining US leadership and the emerging threat from the Soviet Union pushed the existing Japanese realistic approach to the Korean question in an even more conservative direction. The policy orientation of Japan was to select one of the political forces that seemed to guarantee the existing Japanese national interest. Continuity and stability were thus the key concerns of Japanese policy. More specifically, Japan's initial actions — in its relationship with General Chun and the 12 December Coup, and its attitude towards North Korean military moves — were not in any way identical to those of the US.

The Ohira cabinet's policy of selecting one of the most amenable political forces
(including the military) in South Korea for support contradicted the US "nudging" policy, which excluded the military as an acceptable political authority. Thus, the Ohira cabinet took clandestine actions and even mobilised the PRC to legitimise the "selecting" policy. In terms of alliance management, fearing a US response and lacking the means to actualise its own scheme for a South Korean regime transition, Japan, as a middle member of the TASS, occasionally sought to utilise external sources to enhance its position.

7.2.2 The Initial Actions

Just before the death of President Park, the Ohira cabinet perceived that South Korean opinion leaders supporting the President were trying to distance themselves from the regime and were anxious about the dangerous level of political friction between the regime and the Carter administration. The Japanese MOFA and the Japanese Embassy in Seoul shared a feeling of crisis before the 26 October incident, judging that the Park regime might not be able to survive the coming winter and spring seasons because of the increasingly widespread apathy of almost every social element. A wholesale reshuffle of the Park regime seemed to be urgent in order to escape from the political crisis. Japan certainly did not anticipate the demise of the regime by the assassination of President Park. Soon after the assassination, the Japanese embassy felt that the atmosphere among South Korean opinion leaders had shifted from a concern about US displeasure with the regime to an interest in where South Korean politics should go next.

To Japan, South Korea was not merely a neighbouring country, but was a stabilising influence in East Asia. Political instability in South Korea should be avoided because it might dismantle the balance of power in Asia and engender regional conflict. The South Korean regime needed to be stabilised as soon as possible, whatever its specific leadership, so that no serious consequences for Japanese security would result. Above all, an Iranian-style revolution should be avoided.\(^{25}\) Therefore Japan hoped that the policy changes by the next President in South Korea would be limited and moderate. A new President, even though he was bound to be aware of people's expectations of the government, should not compromise with the tendency of democratisation, because once a government made one concession, the people would demand two concessions, and political turbulence would follow: "Even if the next President takes most of President Park's policy, the South Korean people would absolutely not turn their backs on the new government."\(^{26}\)

After the death of President Park, Japan's MOFA found no reason to change its policy line. On the morning of 27 October 1979, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Section Chief of the Asia Bureau of the MOFA, and others gathered to review the situation in South Korea, and issued a statement which emphasised the need for stability in the Korean peninsula after the incident:

> Despite the incident, we hope that peace and stability will be maintained, with the settlement of the situation in South Korea as soon as possible. We also believe that Japanese-South Korean relations will be developed without change afterwards.\(^{27}\)


\(^{25}\) Sekai Henshubu (January 1980): p. 162-3. There are almost identically apprehensive voices from the Japanese business world about the political repercussions of the death of Park.


\(^{27}\) *Yomiuri Shimbun* (28 October 1979); *Dai98kai Sangiin Gaimu-inkai DaiIgo* (13 November 1979): p. 2. In this Diet session, the autonomy of information for the autonomous actions towards the South Korean politics was raised. (Ibid.: p. 5). According to *Akahata* (28 October 1979), Prime Minister Ohira, even
Prime Minister Ohira and Foreign Minister Sonoda confirmed that the policy line was agreed among senior officials of the Ohira cabinet. Contrary to the US view, their official statement and press conference did not mention any hope for political liberalisation and development. In other words, the Ohira government chose to emphasise order and continuity of the existing South Korean political system rather than change.

7.2.3 The Lack of High-level Policy Co-ordination between the US and Japan

The Choi caretaker government wanted the US and Japan to show their continued commitment to South Korea by dispatching high-level delegations to President Park’s funeral. On this issue, there was a conspicuous lack of policy co-ordination between the US and Japan. On the night of 27 October 1979, Prime Minister Ohira decided to participate in the funeral with Foreign Minister Sonoda and notified the South Korean side of the decision. However, at the last moment, the Japanese Prime Minister suddenly changed his mind because of the domestic political situation in Japan: his political rival, Fukuda, had launched a full-scale campaign for the party presidency. Just one day before the funeral, on the evening of 2 November, the MOFA announced that Prime Minister Ohira would not be able to attend. It implied that the planned Ohira-Vance talks in Seoul could not be taken place. Only Ambassador Sunobe, from the Japanese side, attended the funeral. The Ohira cabinet was thus able not to engage in consultation with the US.

though he re-confirmed that Japan’s policy towards South Korea would not be changed, was apprehensive to the repercussion of the demise of the Park regime to the existing Japan-South Korea relations. As far as the new political counterparts in South Korea was concerned, see the following section, 7.4.
7.3 JAPAN AND THE 12 DECEMBER COUP 1979

The Japanese intervention sought to remove external and internal sources of insecurity in South Korea: the North Korean threat and the domestic political challenges to a strong state. In effect, these were the same imperatives as those of the Park regime. It was no wonder, therefore, that the Japanese government gave its support to the most similar political force to the Park regime, the new military leadership led by General Chun Doo-hwan.28

7.3.1 Japan’s Focus on General Chun

One Japanese newspaper account of President Park’s assassination described it as “a miniature of the 26 February Incident [Niniroku Jiken]”, quoting from a source of the MOFA. This analogy implied that behind Kim Jae-kyu’s assassination of President Park was his expectation some of the military leaders would support his action.29 In fact, General Chun’s subordinates suggested that Chun should arrest the Army Chief of Staff, General Chong, on suspicion of complicity in the death of President Park, in the evening of 27 October 1980. However, the timing of such an action had to be considered very carefully because Chong had his followers within the military.30 By comparison, the US administration stated on 27 October that “[A]ny evidence to prove the involvement of the South Korean military with the assassination is not seen.”31 Rather, even though no evidence was provided, it was widespread in Japan that the

---

28 President Park Chung-hee was extremely obsessed with removing all anti-Park military factions, therefore, assigned one of the most faithful generals to the post of the DSC to control the unity of the military. On the other hand, he sponsored a kind of palace guard group called “Hanahoe [Association One]” with loyal members to him. Chun was the key man of the association. See Kakuda (1980): pp. 18-24.
29 Yomiuri Shimbun (29 October 1979)
Carter administration in any sense affected the action of Kim Jae-kyu to assassinate President Park.\textsuperscript{32}

Before the death of President Park, the Ohira cabinet paid careful attention to the moves within the South Korean military, and concluded that the military wanted to do something in order to resolve the political crisis that confronted the President. In fact, Major General Chun Doo-hwan, Commander of the Defence Security Command, had an appointment with President Park to report a proposal to deal with the crisis on 27 October 1979, just one day after the President’s assassination.\textsuperscript{33}

From the beginning of the post-Park era, the Ohira cabinet knew that real power was in the hands of General Chun, who led a military faction, \textit{Hanahoe} [Group One], sponsored by the late President Park. On 30 October 1979, \textit{Yomiuri Shim bun} reported that the Defence Security Command led by General Chun was emerging as a new centre of power, replacing Kim Jae-kyu’s KCIA.\textsuperscript{34} Furthermore, on 31 October 1979 \textit{Nihon Keizai Shim bun} reported that the MOFA was paying careful attention to the moves of General Chun Doo-hwan, who seemed to have real power as Chief of the Headquarters of the Combined Investigation of the Martial Law Command. In fact, on 28 October 1979, Japanese Ambassador Sunobe was at Chun’s press conference when the first announcement was made of the result of the interrogation of Kim Jae-kyu. On that occasion, Chun’s private secretary, Huh Mun-do, a former correspondent of a conservative South Korean newspaper, \textit{Chosun Ilbo}, and the then chief of press and public relations within the South Korean embassy to Japan, told the Japanese

\textsuperscript{31} Nojoe (1980): p. 15.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid. p. 17.
\textsuperscript{33} Huh Hwa-pyung, \textit{Wolgon Chosun} (February 1991).
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Yomiuri Shim bun} (30 October 1979).
ambassador that “a new system will be opened by the leadership of General Chun.”

Sunobe reported this to Tokyo. From then on, Huh Mun-do played a key role as a messenger of General Chun to the Japanese government. The Japanese Ambassador was informed that a powerful military faction led by General Chun was determined to assume political leadership. It was only a few days after the assassination, when the US was eager to stress the need for the establishment of a broadly based civilian government. American newspapers such as The New York Times did not fail to report on 31 October that General Chun was one of the key military leaders. However, the focus of attention in The New York Times was on the decision made in the secret meeting of South Korean military leaders on 29-30 October 1979. It was known to the US and Japan that an absolute majority of the participants of the meeting supported the view that the Yushin Constitution should be terminated. However, General Chun was known to the US and Japan as one of the minority who opposed such a termination. Because of this opposition, it was impossible for the military leaders to fix a date for the termination of the Constitution.

7.3.2 The 12 December Coup and the Ohira Cabinet

On 9-20 November 1979, just in a couple of weeks after the death of President Park, Muramatsu, Chief of the Defence Department of the JDA, visited CINCPAC in Hawaii to participate in developing a contingency plan countering military contingencies in the Korean Peninsula. In the meantime, On 13 November 1979, the new Japanese Foreign Minister, Saburo Okita, underscored the guidelines of his foreign policy:

35 Interview with Sunobe. One of the leading Japanese commentators on international politics, Keitaro Hasegawa, too, from early November 1979, was well aware of the fact that the Chun group was “the centre of the Military.” (Hasegawa 1980a): .13.

The economic prosperity of Japan, which has no military forces and lacks natural resources, depends greatly on the peace and stability of the world. On the political and diplomatic sides, too, it is essential that Japan should play a positive and constructive role commensurate with its international status. Regionally and globally there are non-divisible co-relations between economic prosperity and political stability. Therefore our country has to make efforts for the peace and stability not only of Asia, but also of the world.  

With regard to the possibility of popular presidential election, on the same day, Chief of the Asian section of the MOFA, Yanagiya, told at the Committee on the Foreign Affairs in Shugiin (House of representatives) that it would take some time to take shape: the situation was extremely fluid.

The Japanese Ambassador's agreement to meet General Chun near the Defence Security Command in central Seoul in late November 1979 was in line with the new Foreign Minister's policy outline. At this meeting, which has not previously been known to the public, Huh Mun-do, who accompanied General Chun, repeated that Chun would generate a new system. Chun informed the Japanese Ambassador of his plan to arrest General Chong Sung-hwa. He also asked for Japanese understanding of his planned coup, whereas the US Ambassador and the Commander of the US-South Korean Combined Forces Command met General Chong Sung-hwa in late November 1979 to convey US concern about possible military intervention in the coming political process to build a civilian government. Sunobe later stated to the author that Japan, unlike the US, had no military presence in South Korea and thus had no lever to control the South.
Korean military. Japan should therefore adopt a wait-and-see strategy. In fact, however, this was not what Japan actually did.

The role of the JDA in the Japanese intervention in the South Korean regime transition was extremely important. Even though there was no actual military clash between the two Koreas, the JDA kept a vigilant watch on every delicate move between the North and the South in military terms. It undertook sensitive operations such as the rapid delivery of new military intelligence to South Korea. At this juncture, the spokesman of the Command of the US-South Korea Combined Forces announced on 28 November that the joint military exercise “Eight Bells 79”, designed to counter the North Korean threat after the death of Park by directly linking Washington and Seoul, and scheduled to commence in early December 1979, would be cancelled indefinitely. It was no accident that soon after the Chun-Sunobe meeting, the JDA leaked the information that North Korea was making military moves to invade the South on 1 December. The Japanese government conveyed the intelligence to the KCIA under the control of General Chun. He reported it to President Choi, who soon afterwards chaired a national security committee within the government. The US cancellation of “Eight Bells 79” resulted in a lost opportunity to keep close vigilance not only on North Korea, but also on the prelude to Chun’s first coup, while the intelligence from Japan enhanced the role of the South Korean military within the caretaker civilian Choi government.

Visiting Beijing on 5 December 1979, Prime Minister Ohira discussed the Korean

---

41 Interview with Sunobe.
42 Hasegawa (1980a): p. 30; interview with Sato. In the economic side, Japanese experts on South Korean economy like Shinichi Nojoe viewed that South Korean economic leaders whose businesses had grown based upon political stability by the Park Chung-hee system were “extremely nervous” to the disappearance of the similar political shield. (Koria Hyoron, January 1980): p. 24.
43 Yomiuri Shimbun (30 November 1979).
question with PRC Premier Hua Guo-feng. While flying to Beijing from Tokyo, Ohira deliberately passed directly through the flight information region (FIR) of South Korea, not through the Japanese FIR, which was the normal route from Tokyo to Beijing via Shanghai. In so doing, Asahi Shimbun interpreted, Japan wanted to demonstrate the significance of its role in lessening military tension in the Korean peninsula. In his first summit talks with Hua, Ohira advocated that the PRC should exert its influence to restrain North Korean exploitation of the unsettled situation in the South. In response, Hua, rejecting the possibility of a North Korean invasion of the South, stressed that South Korea should be democratised, and “the real factor threatening peace in the Korean peninsular is the domestic political and social situation itself.” Ohira did not echo the necessity of democratisation in the South, but insisted that “the future direction of a country should be decided by its people independently.” The Ohira-Hua talks on 5-6 December 1979 produced a joint communiqué in which the first article stipulated: “The two leaders confirm that the two states will make efforts to maintain and secure stability and peace in Asia and in the world.” The article, together with their statement to build an international environment conducive to the unification of divided Korea, was in accordance with the Carter formula on the East Asian security environment—the formula which establishing an alignment relations with the PRC against the Soviet Union, expanding the Japanese role and military capability, and inviting North Korea to three-way talks while instituting a South Korean political system based on broad support of its people. Even though Japanese intervention to select a new military regime in the South was in direct contrast to the US “nudging” policy, Japan could camouflage

42 Asahi Shimbun (4 December 1979).
46 Asahi Shimbun (8 December 1979).
its policy as a partial complement to correct some problems with the Carter formula rather than a formal submission of a Japanese formula of their own dealing with the South Korean regime transition within the TASS. In effect, Japanese bi-polycentrism indicated in Chapter 2 was working.

Japan was informed of Chun’s planned coup, delivered information about a hypothetical North Korean invasion, and then asked the PRC to control North Korean adventurism without any suggestion of the necessity for democracy in the South. Just two days after coup, on 14 December, Yanagiya stated in the Diet that the situation was still fluid, and he paid close attention to who would be a new defence minister in South Korea. After witnessing the assignment of Airforce Chief of Staff Chu Young-bok to the defence minister, from the Japanese point of view, the unsettled situation was resolved by the coup. The Ohira cabinet never expressed any concern about the 12 December coup by the Chun group. As the former Japanese Ambassador Sunobe recollected:

At that time it was true that the US expected democratisation [in South Korea] and worked hard in that direction. Therefore US resistance was extremely strong when General Chong Sung-hwa was arrested. The incident was on the surface a coup to cleanse the military within. In the end, after the death of Park, the military believed that the military should be the new centre, but there was a remaining question about who or which group within the military should finally grasp the political power. The event on 12 December made it clear that...the Chun Doo-hwan group of the military decisively grasped power. To this event, the US response was very strong. I thought that the strong reaction from the State Department of the US reached a point that was not necessary.

The Chief of the Internal Bureau (Naikyoku) of the JDA, Hisahiko Okazaki, who accompanied JDA Director Yamashita on his visit to Seoul in late July 1979, confirmed

that: “We had a business-as-usual relationship with Chun Doo-hwan” after the arrest of General Chong.\textsuperscript{52} The Japanese government believed that the Chun Doo-hwan group had already achieved de facto control of the military and the Choi government.

James Young, Defence Attaché in the US Embassy in Seoul, recollected that:

In my impression, Japanese people in South Korea knew much more than I knew and excelled the Americans in terms of the capability of grasping the situation... I have seen a Japanese Defence Attaché, Colonel Hagino walk away from the barricades around the headquarters of the DSC to the Japanese embassy in the very early morning of 13 December 1980... I could have confirmed again that the Japanese secured really good providers of information, and they might know much more about the situation than us.\textsuperscript{53}

Chun’s then secretary, Huh Hwa-pyung, told the author that Japan understood South Korean politics with heart and feeling, while the understanding of the US was much more mechanical.

However, Chun Doo-hwan had several crises after the 12 December Coup 1979, most of them resulting from pressure applied by the Carter administration, particularly between 13 December 1979 and in January 1980.\textsuperscript{54} So it was necessary for Japan to protect the new military leadership under Chun from both domestic challenges and US pressures. Put differently, the Ohira cabinet recognised and supported Chun as a de facto leader from mid-December 1979 when Chun managed to resist US pressure to resign with great difficulty. Japan’s direct and indirect support of the Chun group came from various groups of Japanese society: within the government, the Cabinet Investigation Office, the MOFA and the JDA collaborated; within the Diet, the Japan-South Korea

\textsuperscript{52} Interview with Okazaki. See also Okazaki (1998): pp. 154-160.
\textsuperscript{54} Interview with Hayashi.
Parliamentarian League helped; and Japanese business leaders also gave their support.\textsuperscript{55}

7.4 ANTI-KIM DAE-JUNG CAMPAIGN AND JAPAN

Neither Kim Dae-jung nor Kim Young-sam seemed to suit Japan’s existing South Korean policy.\textsuperscript{56} Kim Young-sam of the NDP was discarded because he was supported by the US and struggled against Park. He was believed to want to weaken the Japanese vested interests, which were secured by a close relationship between major figures of the ruling LDP and the Japanese government, and the Park regime. Kim Dae-jung was a more complicated partner. The South Korean military believed that he was always behind Kim Young-sam’s excessive struggle against President Park. Four days before the 12 December Coup, Kim Dae-jung returned to public life with the lifting of his house arrest by civilian President Choi. The Japanese ruling camp knew how nervously the military, and the Chun group in particular, watched the moves of Kim Dae-jung, the most difficult political rival of President Park Chung-hee.

If he came to power, Kim Dae-jung might investigate the collaboration between the Park regime and the Japanese government on the kidnapping issue, which would damage the vested interests of Japan. Former Prime Ministers, like Kishi, Fukuda and Tanaka, were in some way involved with the political settlement of the kidnapping incident. Prime Minister Ohira himself was also involved, and, from the beginning of his incumbency, he rejected any possibility of reconsidering the political settlement and found it impossible to cultivate a good relationship with Kim Dae-jung.\textsuperscript{57} Kim also seemed to be supported by the US. Japanese Ambassador Sunobe did not regard such

US support positively: "[On the evening of the 12 December Coup], the American Ambassador even went to Kim's house. I felt this went too far. He did not have to go to that extreme at all." In short, the Japanese ruling camp shared virtually the same thoughts about Kim Dea-jung and therefore collaborated willingly with the Chun group's anti-Kim Dae-jung campaign.

7.4.1 The Japanese Response to Kim's Request to Reconsider the Political Settlement, December 1979

As soon as his house arrest was lifted on 8 December 1979, Kim Dae-jung expressed his suspicion that the US might turn its back on South Korean democracy and tilt towards an emphasis on stability: "I am not yet sure where the US will go." US Ambassador Gleysteen sent an official to meet Kim on the morning of 12 December. One of Japan's leading political commentators, Keitaro Hasegawa, recorded his impression of this matter:

On the eve of the 12 December coup, US Ambassador Gleysteen invited Kim to his office and had talks. From the beginning, the Defence Security Command of Chun had files on Kim's career and had a deep suspicion of Kim's ideological orientation, leaking its veto against Kim's presidency. Therefore, the Command would resist strenuously Kim's appearance on the political stage backed by American support.

In the afternoon of 12 December, the Japanese Political Counsellor to Ambassador Sunobe visited Kim and made an arrangement for Sunobe to invite Kim to his office on 17 December. Meeting with Sunobe, Kim Dae-jung conveyed a letter to Prime Minister

56 Interview with Sunobe.
59 Asahi Shinbun (8 December 1979).
Ohira which called for the re-investigation of his kidnapping from a hotel in Tokyo, the reconsideration of the political settlement about his kidnapping incident in 1973 (referred to Ch.3), and moral assistance for South Korean democratisation. As was customary, the Kim Dae-jung issue was debated in the Japanese Diet on 18 December. The new Foreign Minister, Saburo Okita, reconfirmed the existing policy: the kidnapping did not represent a South Korean interference in Japanese sovereignty, and therefore there was no need to reconsider it. With respect to Japanese foreign policy towards South Korea in the regime transition, Okita stated in the Diet:

Democracy in a very poor country is different from democracy in a rich country. In this context, we may expect changes in South Korea to some degree ... However the country has various social and historical backgrounds. Moreover, it is in a state of semi-war with the North. Conditions in South Korea are not the same as in Japan. We should judge each country's situation on a given basis ... I recognise that South Korean politics are at a delicate juncture. Our South Korean policy, however, should be considered in terms of the continuation of the existing policy.61

On 20 December, the reply from the Ohira cabinet reached Kim: the political settlement would only be reconsidered if any new facts about the direct involvement of the South Korean government in the kidnapping were revealed. The decision was conveyed not only in a letter written by Sunobe but also by a telephone,62 which was tapped by the DSC of Chun. The Japanese government reaffirmed its veto on Kim Dae-jung, as the Chun group intended.

On 22 December, Yomiuri Shim bun released information sent by an unidentified official of the US that the KCIA had planned to kill Kim Dae-jung in the East Sea (Sea of

Japan) without success. On the same day, the Ohira cabinet recalled Ambassador Sunobe to Tokyo to listen to his views on the state of South Korean politics. On 25 December, taking into account the Kim Dae-jung issue and the 12 December coup, Sunobe reported to Ohira that the imperative of Japanese policy on the regime transition was to encourage South Korea “to maintain stability.” With regard to the new military leadership in South Korea, Sunobe reported that “the event of the 12 December [led by Chun] is different from the previous coup [of 16 May 1961 led by Park Chung-hee]. Despite the event, the South Korean military will not intervene into politics.” Then he supported the Chun group, so no change was necessary on the Kim Dae-jung issue despite the American leak of new information a few days previously.

This raises the general question of the Japanese attitude to the Choi caretaker government. The US recommended the Ohira cabinet have summit talks with caretaker President Choi in order to have better relations with South Korea. However, the Ohira cabinet rejected this idea, which indicated that it did not really want to strengthen the status of the Choi government. Put differently, Japan had no other option but to work closely with Chun Doo-hwan.

7.4.2 Japanese Co-operation with Chun’s Anti-Kim Campaign, March-June 1980

The Chun group had made strenuous efforts to win Japanese support after the assassination of President Park. One of the messengers was Chun’s private secretary, Huh Mun-do, who visited Japan very frequently. In order to avoid being spotted by the

63 Yomiuri Shimbun (22 December 1979).
64 Asahi Shimbun (26 December 1979).
65 Yomiuri Shimbun (26 December 1979).
66 Interview with a South Korean diplomat who requested anonymity.
mass media, he traveled to Tokyo via Fukuoka, Osaka and other indirect routes.\footnote{Interview with Shigemura.} As a result, Japan’s conservative news media emphasised the inevitability of the 12 December coup and the need for a strong state:

Those who negate the Yushin System totally and defend premature democratisation were followers of the NDP and Kim Dae-jung. They would not admit the inevitability of “the 12 December Event”, and argue that Chun Doo-hwan and military leaders have no support from the people. On the contrary, those who evaluate Park’s achievement positively and admit the Yushin System would not approve rapid democratisation. Naturally, they don’t defend the NDP and Kim Dae-jung. They believe the 12 December coup was a necessity, and claim that the military leadership is receiving the support of the absolute majority of the people. The standpoints of them both are completely parallel, and no meeting point is seen. However, it cannot be denied that the reality is moving in favour of the latter.\footnote{H. Shibata (1980): pp. 16-7. For a theoretical notion to the power parity and violent political transition, see Benson and Kugler (1998).}

This viewpoint was widespread within the ruling camp of the Ohira cabinet.\footnote{Interview with Shigemura.} It was no longer a secret that the Chun group would not accept Kim Dae-jung as a Commander in Chief. Chun controlled the government and the military, and Kim enjoyed widespread popularity among the people. Chun knew that he must wage an image war against Kim. Chun’s DSC had already finished planning an anti-Kim campaign to manipulate Kim’s image as ideologically untrustworthy from early February 1980. To that end, Japanese co-operation was essential because the Chun group wanted to exploit Kim’s activities at the forthcoming National Congress for the Restoration of Democracy of South Korea and the Promotion of Korean Unification (NCDU) while he was in Japan during 1972-3.

Some Japanese conservative newspapers, including \textit{Sankei Shimbun}, spread suspicion...
about Kim Dae-jung based on the materials provided by Chun's DSC, and the Chun group imported these Japanese reports as if they were written according to Japanese sources and disseminated them to the South Korean mass media. The reports stressed that there was suspicion and caution among the military leaders and the South Korean intellectuals concerning Kim's political activities during the post-liberation period and the US occupation period, 1945-1948; therefore, there was much anxiety about Kim's intentions. Even before the 17 May Coup, the Japanese government was aware of the fact that Chun was plotting to destroy Kim Dae-jung. Nine days before the 17 May Coup, a former Korean expert of the JDA, Shigeo Matsumoto, returned to Tokyo from Seoul with materials provided by the Chun group which portrayed Kim as a communist. The materials consisted of two main parts: "The Moves of Kim Dae-jung" and "Kim Dae-jung and the NCDU (Hanminjong)." The former materials indicated Kim's involvement in planning the Kwangju uprising, and the latter alluded to Kim's ideological problem. This reveals that Japan did not merely remain at a distance from Kim Dae-jung, but was partly engaged in the removal of Kim from the political stage.

7.5 JAPANESE SUPPORT FOR CHUN DOO-HWAN THROUGH THE SUPPLY OF INTELLIGENCE

By joining in the anti-Kim Dae-jung campaign, the Japanese government was effectively contributing to the establishment of a new military regime in South Korea by

---

69 Interview with Sato. They had the similar perspective about Kim's ideological inclination.
70 Interview with Wada.
71 Sankei Shimbun (28 March 1980).
72 Sekai Seiji (25 July 1980): pp. 4-5; Fujishima (1981): pp. 41-3; Asahi (17 July 1980). Unlike Japan, the US Embassy in Seoul sent a long telegram, entitled "Kim Tae-Chung's Past Policy Positions" when it perceived Kim would be restored his civil right to come back to the political arena. The conclusion of the telegram was that: "If Kim sticks to his less-than-radical views, he may attract moderate voters but not the conservative military establishment ... [because] he was "weaker" on security matters than Park Chung-hee." (80 Seoul 2056 (19 February 1989)).
protecting General Chun from US pressures and directly assisting the Chun group to launch the second coup. While the US launched a strategy of *offensive and aggressive* intervention, the Ohira Cabinet conducted its own *defensive* intervention.

### 7.5.1 Japanese Intelligence after the 12 December Coup 1979

As well as offering assistance on the Kim Dae-jung issue, the Ohira cabinet supported Chun coming to power. Above all, Japan wanted the US to recognise the external source of military threat, and to stop harassing a faithful comrade seeking to enhance South Korean security and Northeast Asian stability.

#### Table 7.1 The Japanese Provision of Intelligence Concerning North Korean Military Moves to the Chun Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Timing</th>
<th>The Contents</th>
<th>The Alleged Original Sources</th>
<th>The Route of Conveyance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1979</td>
<td>North Korea would invade the South between Christmas 1979 and January 1980</td>
<td>A Defence Attaché in the PRC embassy in Tokyo</td>
<td>Director of the Department of Northeast Asia of the MOFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1980</td>
<td>The Soviet Union was enticing the North to invade the South</td>
<td>PRC Embassy in Tokyo</td>
<td>Chief of Managing Bureau at the Japanese Federation of Asian Exchange and Friendship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1980</td>
<td>North Korea would invade in February-March 1980</td>
<td>PRC Embassy in Tokyo</td>
<td>The Cabinet Investigation Agency (Naikaku Chosa shitsu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1980</td>
<td>North Korea would invade in May 1980</td>
<td>Correspondent of Xinhua News Agency in Tokyo</td>
<td>The Public Security Investigation Agency (Koan Chosa cho)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Ryukkun Jongbo Chamobu (1980): pp. 27787-27788.

As it had done in early December 1979, the Ohira cabinet provided military intelligence of an impending North Korean invasion more than five times in January 1980, when the US was still asking Chun to promise not to violate the CFC. The intelligence helped the Chun group to gain some respite from the political strain with the US. In fact, later,

---

73 Later, on 16 April 1980, JDA Director Hosoda had an interview with President of PRC *Xinhua News Agency*, in which he told that Japan might to block the Tsuruga Strait if the US demanded in order to prevent the Soviet naval ships' traffic from the Far East to the Indian Ocean (*Dai91kai Kessan-inkai*).
in an interview with a correspondent of AP, General Wickham revealed that he had dissuaded some South Korean generals from attempting to remove Chun. The American pressure, even though it was implemented in a self-restrained manner, was strong enough to compel the Chun group to announce that the military had no intention to intervene directly in civilian politics. The Ohira cabinet was well aware of the fact that the Chun group was under pressure from the US and provided a rationale to help reduce that pressure. The stream of intelligence provision in January ended when US Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Long visited Seoul on 23-24 January. Admiral Long had talks with President Choi, Prime Minister Shin and Defence Minister Chu. Of particular interest are the talks between Long, accompanied by General Wickham and Gelysteen, and Choi. When Long reviewed briefly “why the US had been so disturbed by the events of December 12 which violated the chain of command and threatened the unity of the ROK armed forces”, Choi assured Long that “all was now in order following the “regrettable incident.”

It is not known precisely how helpful Japanese intelligence delivery was to the decision-making process in Washington in dealing with the Chun group. However, the continuous reiteration by the Chun group of the threat posed by North Korea certainly reduced the probability of US pressure becoming excessive. Going one step further, the Chun group could reinforce its bargaining position with the US externally, remove any possibility of a counter-coup by the anti-Chun faction with or without assistance from the US, and could also strengthen its position within the government.

75 The then Mainich Shimbun Correspondent in Seoul, Shigemura viewed that it was “the most dangerous period” in Chun’s political life for about 90 days, from the 12 December Coup to early March (1980).
76 80 Seoul 1114 (28 January 1980).
77 Huh Hwa-pyung admitted that he heard about the intelligence from Japan in January 1980.
7.5.2 Japan’s Supply of Intelligence before the 17 May Coup

Various Japanese governmental agencies dealt constantly with information and intelligence concerning North Korean moves and the political situation in the South. These included Naikyoku (the Internal Section) of the JDA, many other intelligence sections and departments of the JSDF, Koan Chosacho (The Public Security Investigation Agency) of the Ministry of Justice, the Cabinet Investigation Agency of the Prime Minister’s Office, and other channels of the MOFA. Other research affiliates of the Japanese government, such as the Cabinet Investigation Agency’s Institute for World Politics, the National Institute for Defence Studies of the JDA, also monitored the Korean situation at that time. Due to the information barriers between governmental agencies, it was necessary for Japanese intelligence-related agencies to organise informal study groups with the participation of civilian specialists.\(^{78}\)

From early 1979, the two study groups monitoring the military and political situation in the Korean peninsula were Josei Kentokai (The Situation Review Group) and NK-kai (The Study Group in North Korea). Josei Kentokai was composed of non-career researchers of the MOFA,\(^{79}\) the MITI, the MOF,\(^{80}\) Koan Choshacho of the Ministry of Justice,\(^{81}\) and the Cabinet Investigation Agency (JCIA),\(^{82}\) and other Japanese experts on South Korean politics, including Toshimitsu Shigemura of Mainichi Shimbun, Katsuo Kuroda of Kyodo News Services, and Masao Okonogi of Keio University. In terms of policy orientation, the influence of non-career researchers working in governmental institutes as public servants was extremely important in formulating Japan’s foreign

---

\(^{78}\) Interview with Tamaki.
\(^{79}\) Former Korea Desk Officer and the then Advisor of Radio Press monitoring North Korean broadcasts, Shizuo Mitani
\(^{80}\) Shinichi Nojoe of Ajia Keizai Kenkyu-sho [Institute of Developing Economies of the MITI]
\(^{81}\) Kunisama Saito
policy. From late April/early May 1980, these study groups and other governmental organisations believed that a North Korean invasion was certainly possible.

In addition to the US opposition in late April and in very early May 1980, there was a delicate friction between the Chun group and the Choi civilian government. On 2 May, South Korean Prime Minister Shin Hyun-hwak, who had ruled out "democratisation without Yushin" in early March, agreed to accelerate the drafting of a new constitution, and students began to attack Chun directly. At this juncture, Japanese Ambassador Sunobe met Kim Dae-jung on 6 May, and he left for Tokyo some time after the meeting with Kim and before the 17 May coup. The timing of his stay in Tokyo for about a month raises suspicions about the purpose and role of Japanese intervention in the rise of the new military regime. The day after Sunobe met Kim, US Ambassador assessed the situation as "anxious" and "worrisome" but did not wish "to describe the present situation as the beginning of a "disintegrative process." The Ohira cabinet, however, judged that the most critical watershed was coming, and it needed to tip the balance in favour of the Chun group.

In the meantime, the Chun group dispatched two South Korean journalists from the extremely conservative newspaper, Chosun Ilbo, where Huh Mun-do had worked, to Tokyo on 6 May. They met officials in the Cabinet Investigation Office during the

---

82 Uchiyama, Chief of the Korea Section of the Cabinet Investigation Agency.
83 Interview with Okonogi.
84 80 Seoul 03075 (12 March 1980).
85 80 Seoul 05657 (3 May 1980).
87 Interview with Sunobe. Despite its great significance, he would not tell the author the exact date of his departure from Seoul. At any rate he did not use the word "recall" referring to his stay in Tokyo for about a month. He came back to Seoul in 11 June 1980 with Kiuchi, Chief of Asian Section of the MOFA.
88 80 Seoul 05787 (7 May 1980)
89 On the political atmosphere within Chosun Ilbo, see Shigemura (1980).
next two days. On 9 May, KCIA and the JCIA agreed that there was no way to justify the second coup without the North Korean card; and so they discussed how to disseminate information about the impending North Korean invasion of the South. The result was conveyed in the name of Kenji Yebisu, a working level officer of the JCIA, to Kim Young-sun, Second Deputy Director of the KCIA, in Seoul on 10 May:

North Korea has decided to invade the South between 15-20 May 1980, judging that it is the decisive momentum, considering the South Korean political situation. Kim Il-sung, accompanied by General Oh Jin-woo in his visit to the Yugoslavian state funeral of Secretary-General Tito, met Brezhnev and planned the invasion.

In order to enhance the quality of the intelligence, the Japanese side emphasised the fact that a Japanese high official (kōi kansū) had recently visited Beijing and had received intelligence from the government of the PRC. In fact, Yasuhiro Nakasone, former JDA Director and then Secretary General of the LDP, later the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit Seoul (in 1983), was in Beijing between 28 April and 7 May 1980. During the visit, Nakasone met Deputy Chief of the Army of the PRC, Oh Shui-chen, and discussed the proper level of Japanese military expenditure and other mutually significant issues, the suggestion from Oh was regarded by Japan as PRC initiative to break the taboo between Japan and the PRC. However, this study dismissed the idea

90 Interview with a senior journalist of Kyodo News Services, 3 July 1999. From early May in Japan, another rumour that the Chun group would make Kim Dae-jung as a scapegoat for the final take-over was spread. (Asahi Shim bun Janaru (30 May 980): p. 98.
91 Ryukkun Jongbo Chammobu (1980).
92 Later, Chun argued it was not fake given that the PRC conveyed the intelligence not only to the Japanese high official and the JDA but also to the USA (Chun, 1995): p. 558-9.
93 Yomiuri Shin bun (4 May 1980); With regard to the significance of the Nakasone visit to Beijing, see Sankei Shin bun (2 May 1980). Interview with Sato, Tamaki, Shigemura, and Uchiyama; Nakasone (1996): pp. 325-31. There was one piece of speculation that the real source was not the PRC, but Japan. Motoi Tamaki argues that Japan made a plot and exported it to an unidentified Japanese intelligence group, after being slightly revised, reverse-imported from China, disguising that the real source was the PRC government. (Tamaki, 1980: pp. 23-4.) He did not reject the involvement of Nakasone by saying that Kunisama Saito, a Korean expert in Koan Choshucho (The Public Security Investigation Agency) was very close to Nakasone, and Saito might be a channel between the intelligence organisation of the PRC and Yebisu of the JCIA. A Japanese journalist admitted this hypothesis, and told the author that it was true that some people in Tokyo tried to manipulate the North Korean threat. However, Sato emphasised
that the PRC had handed over intelligence gathered through its own channel. On this question, Okazaki defined the intelligence as "bogus", and Sato argued that the intelligence was collected through Japanese intelligent agents working in mainland China following the diplomatic normalisation with the PRC in 1978, and through the circle of Korean-Japanese who had pro-North Korean sentiments. One South Korean diplomat who requested anonymity also judged that the intelligence was basically the reflection of Japan's own evaluation and needs. 94 In terms of the timing, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Boriyanski, admitted in an address before the Foreign Correspondents' Club in Tokyo on 7 May 1980 that the Soviet Union has maintained the unit level ground forces in four northern islands close to Hokkaido in order to counter the anti-Soviet military moves between Japan, the US and the PRC. 95

The Intelligence Headquarters of the South Korean Army concluded that the date of the invasion was not entirely believable because there were no preparations near the demarcation line between the North and the South, and Kim Il-sung was attending a state funeral in a foreign country. 96 Nevertheless, on 10 May Kim Young-son, Second Deputy Director of the KCIA, reported to General Chun. Lacking any justifying cause for military action to implement his assumption of political power, Chun immediately summoned his lieutenants to an urgent meeting to discuss how best to utilise the intelligence. 97 In the emergency cabinet meeting on the evening of 12 May, Chun

Japanese independent information gathering through defence attaches and other intelligence agents who were deployed to the PRC and other intelligence agents attentive to moves of Korean-Japanese joined Chosoren, a pro-North Korean residential organisation in Japan. Thereby Sato denied Nakasone's involvement in any way, even though he accepted that such intelligence provision was one of the important devices to prevent Korean invasion in May 1980. Uchiyama, even though he denied emphatically his own involvement, admitted that Tokyo was in a mood that it would be not a surprise that anybody in the Ohira cabinet conveyed such intelligence to the KCIA.

91 Interviews with Okazaki, Sato, and a South Korean diplomat
92 Sankei Shimbun (8 May 1980).
reported the urgency of North Korean military actions, and strongly called for an agreement to allow the military deployment.\textsuperscript{98} He then justified the immediate implementation of his contingency plan at a meeting with John Wickam on 13 May. The intelligence provided by Japan gave momentum to the Chun group to enhance the level of military movement. Between 10 and 12 May, the MLC performed a preliminary military exercise, \textit{Olympic Game}, to seize key institutions and buildings in Seoul.\textsuperscript{99} During these days, uniformed soldiers were to be seen on the streets of cities. On 13 May 1980, the MLC extended \textit{Olympic Game} by the directive, \textit{The Enforcement Order of the Anti-Spy Operation State (The Department of Defence, No.49)}. This directive, covering the week 14-20 May, complemented the existing order imposed on 10 May 1980.\textsuperscript{100} The intelligence provided by Japan thus offered the most convincing rationale for Chun Doo-hwan to seize power. The full significance of the provision of information by Japan became clear when the Carter administration had doubts about the likelihood of a North Korean invasion of South Korea and concluded that it was simply an excuse to seize power.

On 18 May 1980, Chun Doo-hwan justified his second coup by referring to the information from the JCIA.\textsuperscript{101} The Korea Desk Officer of the JCIA, Uchiyama, denied all complicity informally, but did not make any formal protest to the KCIA. Rather, during the deadlock of the Kwangju democratisation movement in late May, the JCIA

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.: p. 642; \textit{Asahi Shim bun} 13 (May 1980). On 23 April 1996, former President Chun Doo-hwan stated in the Seoul Local Court that after having provided the intelligence about the alleged North Korean invasion, he ordered his subordinates, Col. Lee Hak-bong and Col. Kwon Jong-dal to make a draft to counter the political situation. (\textit{Yomiuri Shim bun Shim bun Database}, 19960423TYM05010).
\textsuperscript{100} \textit{5.18Sakon Susakirok}: p. 27794.
\textsuperscript{101} Interview with Uchiyama; \textit{Dai91kai Shugiin Yosan-iinkai Dai3go} (6 March 1980). Okazaki testified that "the objective of the US is to secure the safety of the free world. In that sense, Japanese co-operation serves for that interest. However, more specifically, the [Japan-US] co-operation in military terms is For the US to use Japanese military bases with the pre-consultation for the maintenance of Peace and security in the Far East." (Ibid.: p. 34)
sent two officials, Yebisu and one of Uchiyama’s two superintendents, to Seoul in order to watch and facilitate the second coup. At the same time, the JCIA dispatched one prominent Japanese scholar to Pyongyang in order to monitor the North Korean moves. 102

7.5.3 The Ohira Cabinet and the Carter Administration in Late April and Early May 1980

Behind the relatively autonomous intervention of Japan lay the Japanese perception of crisis in the South Korean political system and increasing concern about US leadership. Assessing the threat caused by the Middle East conflict to safety and peace in the Far East, Foreign Minister Okita stressed that the threat was not just military but economic, and that the Middle East was geographically distant from the Northeast Asia, so that conflicts in the Middle East should not necessarily be included in the concept of the range of the Far East. 103

According to one country risk report on South Korea by a Japanese consulting company, the country was seen to be experiencing a major crisis (see Figure 7.1). The level of risk has four categories; i.e., low risk (70-100); moderate risk (55-69); high risk (40-54); and the highest risk (0-39). Figure 7.1 indicates that the South Korean political risk index for 1980 was 49—the lowest index ever between 1972 and 1983, while the ten-year

102 Okazaki testified that “the objective of the US is to secure the safety of the free world. In that sense, Japanese co-operation serves for that interest. However, more specifically, the [Japan-US] co-operation in military terms is for the US to use Japanese military bases with the pre-consultation for the maintenance of Peace and security in the Far East.” (Ibid.: p. 34)
103 Dai9ikai Shugiin Gainu-inkai Dai2go (14 February): p. 6. The opposition parties were concerned that Japan might be linked to US global strategy and become involved in some overseas conflict. They continued to ask the government what it would do when US forces sailed to the Persian Gulf from bases in Japan (Okita, 1992): p. 57.
average index was 55.\textsuperscript{104}

The figure also reveals that the political risk index had begun to fall down drastically after the Carter-Park summit talks in mid-1979, and hit the bottom in May 1980, which implies the crisis feeling the Japanese government might have with regard to the South Korean regime transition. The sharply undermining Japanese confidence in the US—even though the Japanese Ohira government was the most fervent supporter of the US

in imposing sanctions against Iran and a boycott of the Soviet Union—accelerated the crisis feeling around in May 1980.

After the failure of the Carter administration’s rescue mission to liberate US diplomats captured by Iranian students, the Ohira cabinet did not hide its displeasure with the unilateral military action. With regard to the South Korean question, the Ohira cabinet expressed its serious concerns. In the Security Committee of the 91st Diet, Okita advocated that Japan should utilise both political and military deterrence to resolve international conflict. With the US-Japan Security Treaty and Japan’s self-defence capability, diplomatic efforts for the sake of world and Asian peace needed to be co-ordinated. Such efforts should include removing the possibility of large-scale military clashes in the Korean peninsula, and co-operating with the US and the PRC. General Director of the JDA, Hosoda stated in the Special Committee on Security on 26 April:

The military confrontation between the North and South is still continuing. In particular, North Korea has continued its military build-up considerably, more than 20 per cent during the 1970s ... The situation in the peninsula is unpredictable, so I plan to keep an eye on the situation from now on.

On the same day, the Special Committee on Security debated the possibility of an American war in the Middle East. According to an interview with Okazaki, the JDA was under full alert in late and early May 1980 because no US aircraft carriers had been seen in the Western Pacific for more than several days, and the Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk had left Europe for the Far East.


\(^{106}\)Okita perceived that after the abortive rescue mission, the Carter Administration became more patient, putting its hope in the joint measures adopted by Japan and the EC (Okita 1992): p. 92.

Under these conditions, it seemed natural for the Ohira cabinet to be apprehensive about the political turmoil in South Korea. Within three days, members of the Security Committee of the Japan-South Korea Parliamentarians had arrived in Seoul. On 30 April, members of the committee called on President Choi. By the same token, eight members of the LDP and JDSP, led by Matsuhei Mori, visited Seoul between 2 and 6 May. It was encouraging to Chun that pro-Park Chung-hee and conservative Japanese politicians were in Seoul to emphasise the necessity of stability. In fact, at his first press conference as acting Director of the KCIA on 29 April, Chun rebuked the Carter administration by saying that the US should not interfere in the internal affairs of an ally, having criticised Chun's concurrence of acting KCIA directorship. It is not yet known whether or not these Japanese politicians met General Chun. However, it is conceivable that the visits of Japanese conservative politicians were arranged for the political benefit of those who proclaimed stability as the first priority. In this atmosphere, the Carter-Ohira talks in Washington on 1 May 1980 were of great significance. At this meeting, President Carter raised the problem of Chun Doo-hwan's scornful rejection of US criticism as interference, stating that it was a cause for great concern that one man [Chun] controlled the military, intelligence and security. Ohira refrained from expressing any agreement with the US President. Soon afterwards, Brzezinski indirectly criticised Japanese Foreign Minister Sabuto Okita of Japan's pattern of diplomatic behaviour towards the authoritarian regime in South Korea.

On 8 May in the Diet, Chairwoman of the JSP, Takako Doi, criticised Prime Minister Ohira for not denouncing Chun in the summit meeting, as President Carter did. Foreign

---

108 Ibid.: p. 3.
109 With regard to a Japanese view on the relations of the Carter administration and the Chun group, see Sankei Shimbun (10 May 1980).
110 Yomiuri Shimbun (30 May 1980).
Minister Okita answered that:

It is not right to make public the contents of talks with the US President on international relations. It is true that the US and Japan have deep concerns about the South Korean political situation. There was an expression from the US side that they pay particular attention to the moves of the military. I want to avoid making any comment on this point.\(^{111}\)

Okita refused to answer a further question about his opinion on the South Korean situation: “I am very much interested in the political moves in South Korea. I had better not clarify the Japanese government’s opinion because it concerns a question of the internal affairs of another country.”\(^{112}\) The Japanese Foreign Minister, who told the Diet that “Japan must co-operate with the US 100 per cent to maintain reliable strength for security in the Far East,”\(^{113}\) did not follow the American line because the US was no longer omnipotent. He reiterated this policy orientation in the Diet on 13 May:

The United States may still be dominant, but its relative status has decreased. The USSR has steadily increased its military power, notably in the Far East, where one-third of its forces is deployed. Especially significant is the reinforcement of Soviet naval power in the region. Under such conditions, in what light should we consider the task of ensuring Japan's national security?\(^{114}\)

As far as the cancellation of the US-South Korean Security Consultative Meeting was concerned, Okita said on 15 May in the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Diet that:

I don’t know whether or not it was an expression of American displeasure with Chun’s appointment of the KCIA directorship…The present political situation in South Korea is very fluid. … There are many unstable elements, but no big change is taking place [towards democratisation]. In the case of South Korea, basically it is in a semi-war state,

\(^{112}\) Ibid.: p. 22.
confronting the North. Therefore, I wonder if the realistic route is something like a zigzag course.\textsuperscript{115}

Two days after the 17 May Coup, Prime Minister Ohira summarised his standpoint on the South Korean problem: (1) Japan had great interest in the stability of the Korean peninsula; (2) only South Korean people could decide the country's political future; (3) Japan expected that political development would proceed after the incident [the 17 May Coup].\textsuperscript{116}

7.6 THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY JUNTA LED BY CHUN

In early May 1980, Chun faced a major crisis as the labour sector, student movements, journalists, and even civilians in the Choi government began to turn their backs on the military regime. He and Prime Minister Shin were the main targets of political protests in Seoul and other major cities. Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam were re-united in a struggle against Chun and Shin. Intelligence from Japan in early December 1979 and January 1980 sought to strengthen the military position within the Choi government and to protect Chun from US pressure. Further intelligence in May signaled that Chun could go ahead. After the 18 May coup, confronting bloody resistance in Kwangju, Chun's second coup hung on the balance. Now it was critical to consolidate the military junta's position. To that end, just after the 18 May coup, a stream of visits from and to Japan began.

7.6.1 The Visits of Special Ambassador Maeda and Chief of Asian Section Kiuchi

Before the Carter administration’s Policy Review Committee meeting of the NSC on 22 May 1980 in Washington, the Ohira cabinet decided to dispatch Special Ambassador Toshikazu Maeda\(^{117}\) to Seoul (on 20 May), where he stayed for more than two weeks (21 May-5 June). His visit was exceptional in that other countries were very critical of the 18 May Coup and the subsequent massacre in Kwangju, and wanted to keep their distance from the Choi government and the military. For example, on 22 May the Policy Review Committee of the NSC decided that “No emissaries from Washington are needed at the moment.”\(^{118}\) Maeda met high officials of the Choi government, except for President Choi himself. The main message he conveyed was a concern that stability should be quickly restored in South Korea and order re-established in Kwangju. Meeting with Prime Minister Park Choong-hoon, Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin, and Deputy Prime Minister Kim Ki-chon, he was told that these goals would soon be achieved.\(^{119}\) After Kwangju was retaken, Maeda met General Chun on 28 May 1980. On the occasion, Chun placed emphasis on “consolidation of stability,” which was understood by the Japanese MOFA that the political development was conditioned by the degree of consolidated stability according to Chun’s judgement.\(^{120}\) By the meeting, Maeda became the first foreign diplomatic mission who met Chun after the 17 May Coup.\(^{121}\)

In Tokyo, on 25 May, Prime Minister Ohira interpreted the 17 May coup as a

\(^{116}\) Mainichi Shimbun (24 May 1980).

\(^{117}\) Maeda was born in South Korea and graduated from Kyungsong Teikoku University (later, Seoul National University) and had a number of alumni acquaintances in South Korea. He was a political counsellor to Japanese Ambassador in 1973 and was involved with the political settlement of the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping incident.

\(^{118}\) The NSC (22 May 1980): p. 3.

\(^{119}\) Mainichi Shimbun (29 May 1980).
legitimated measure by saying that: “Even though it is true that the military is moving, it is also the case that President Choi deals with the events within the legal framework. [I hope] the political reform the government bears in mind will be proceeded in a moderate manner.” When Haruki Wada and others visited the MOFA and met Administrative Foreign Vice Minister Masuo Takashima on the evening on 26 May to demand that diplomatic pressure should be exerted on the Chun group. Takashima explained that Japan and the US were not in the same position, and Japan could not offer strong criticism. The actual actions Japan had taken, as already discussed, sought to encourage and solidify the political basis of the new military junta. As soon as citizens and students struggling for democracy were suppressed, the Japanese special Ambassador had talks with Chun on 28 May 1980, without meeting President Choi. This fact was viewed as the first formal recognition of Chun’s takeover of power, while on the same day the US State Department issued a statement that due to the reverse course of democratisation in South Korea, a review was underway by the Carter administration to exert more pressure, including the reduction of military assistance. Ultimately, the combination of US approval of the action of the South Korean army to quell the Kwangju democratisation movement, and Japan’s support for the Chun group resulted in the consolidation of another military regime after the demise of the Yushin System. Given the US shift from short-term support to long-term pressure, which replaced the “nudging” policy for the establishment of a civilian government, the Japanese selecting policy, from the beginning to the emergence of the military junta, was fully implemented. Maeda witnessed the establishment of the Special Committee of

121 Mainich Shimbun (29 May 1989).
122 Sankei Shimbun (26 May 1989).
123 Interview with Wada.
125 Nikkei Shimbun (29 May 1980).
the National Security Measure (SCNSM) on 30 May and Chun’s inauguration to the permanent chairmanship of the committee the following day.

Returning to Tokyo, Maeda reported to Ohira that according to Chun: the political life of Kim Dae-jung had ended; Chun had grasped the power; and Commander of the UNC, Wickham had a flexible view of the Chun group.\textsuperscript{126} After the establishment of the Special Committee of the National Security Measures (SCNSM) on 30 May, the Japanese government knew that there would be no other military faction to challenge the leadership of General Chun.\textsuperscript{127} However, due to US pressure, the intrinsic lack of political legitimacy, and the on-going economic stagflation, the prospect of a new military regime was not so promising that the Japanese government could not stop supporting to the Chun group even after the Kwangju massacre. In reality, Maeda, after his visit to Seoul as Special Ambassador, reported to Tokyo that: "Now the situation in South Korea is in chaos. We need to watch what is going on during June and August 1980."\textsuperscript{128}

Soon after Maeda’s visit to Seoul, Asian Affairs Bureau Director General of the MOFA, Akitane Kiuchi, visited Seoul on 9-11 June 1980 in order to analyse the state of the South Korean political system and review the emergence of a new military regime.\textsuperscript{129} He met General Rho Tae-woo, Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin, and US Ambassador Gleysteen. After Kiuchi’s talks with Park Dong-jin, it was reported that: "[From the Japanese point of view], the present situation in South Korea has nothing to affect the friendly relationship between Japan and South Korea. There will be no changes in

\textsuperscript{126} Fujishima (1980): p. 182.
Japan's South Korean policy.\textsuperscript{130} The visits of Maeda and Kiuchi were regarded by the Chun group as confirmation of Japan's formal recognition of his actions.\textsuperscript{131}

7.6.2 Ryuzo Sejima's Meetings with Chun Doo-hwan and Rho Tae-woo

The formal Japanese recognition of the military junta was backed up by various types of informal assistance to consolidate the political power base of the new military regime. As already discussed, the Carter administration avoided identifying with Chun and Japan could read the intrinsic weakness of the South Korean military leadership: from the Japanese point of view, the Chun regime needed to consolidate its power base as early as possible for the sake of security. To that end, a stream of visits between the two countries Japan and South Korea significantly outnumbered the traffic between Seoul and Washington.

Of particular importance was the role of Ryuzo Sejima as one of the most reliable channels of communication between Japan and South Korea. He had visited South Korea numerous times during the Park period and had known Chun Doo-hwan for a long time. In November 1979, he gave a special lecture to high officials in the JDA on "Japan's Security in the 1980s". In the lecture, he emphasised situations in which, due to the instability of domestic politics, a system or regime in a certain country collapsed.\textsuperscript{132} He was therefore concerned that after the death of President Park, politics in South Korea had become more unstable and the tension around the demarcation line

\textsuperscript{130} Asahi Shim bun (12 June 1980).
\textsuperscript{131} Interview with Kim Tae-ji; Kamakura (1980): p. 40. For more details about the Chun-Ohira cabinet connection, see Tokyo Shim bun (30 May 1980) and Tokyo Times (30 May 1980).
between the South and the North had escalated.\footnote{Sejima (1995): p. 420.}

In March 1980, South Korean economic tycoon Lee Byung-chul, the founder of the Samsung Group, met Sejima to suggest that Sejima should visit South Korea, as a senior (sempai) of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, to encourage and offer advice to them.\footnote{Ibid.: p. 420. There is discrepancy between Sejima and his South Korean counterpart Kwon Ik-hyon. Considering the fact that Sejima’s autobiography was followed by Kwon’s interviews in 1995 and 1999, the study took Kwon’s detailed revelation as a more reliable source.} Sejima then prepared proposals concerning the Korean issue, Japan-South Korea relations, and the broader question of East Asian stability. After the suppression of the nation-wide democratisation movement, culminating with the Kwangju Massacre, the Chun Doo-hwan military regime suffered from a lack of legitimacy, so it struggled to be recognised by foreign countries.

Sejima, “representing the political and economic world of Japan”,\footnote{Sejima’s South Korean counterpart, Kwon Ik-hyon, in an interview with NHK in the spring of 1999.} accompanied by Noboru Kodo, visited to meet Chun in June 1980. He suggested that Chun should do three things after becoming president: “First, you ask Japan to share the defence burden with South Korea; second, you host the Seoul Olympics in 1988; third, you bid for EXPO.”\footnote{Kim Dong-hyon (1995): p.450. Kwon reconfirmed it in his interview with NHK, 1999 and the Park regime attempted to bid Seoul Olympic, but cancelled the plan in early 1979.} The explanation was that “Japan could not assist Korean defence expenditure directly due to the restrictions of the Japanese Constitution. However, if Japan supported South Korea’s socio-infrastructure costs, the South Korean government would be able to divert that support to the defence budget. Japanese economic assistance could help defend South Korean security and revive the economy. That was the backbone of the East Asian peace.”\footnote{Ibid.: p. 450.} Goto added that “I am a committee member
of the Nagoya Olympics Campaign in 1988. In my view, however, hosting the Olympics in Seoul will contribute to peace in East Asia.”¹³⁸ Kwon later evaluated as Sejima prepared the logic of the security-linked economic assistance “perfectly.”¹³⁹ Two months later, just before General Chun became President (in August 1980), the Japanese emissaries revisited South Korea at Chun’s invitation. Sejima asked Chun to explain the outline of the new constitution, and he himself provided ideas: to unite the Korean people; to revitalise the economy; to improve Chun’s image in Japan by extending an invitation to influential mass media leaders of Japanese opinion.¹⁴⁰ By this time, the Chun regime had succeeded in solidifying its power basis. As a matter of fact, the Chun regime successfully won the bids for the Seoul Olympics and the EXPO in Taejon in 1981. The security-linked loan negotiation started from early 1981 with the visit of Sejima, and Japanese mass media leaders visited Chun on 15 August 1981. In July, messengers from South Korea frequently traveled to Tokyo, and in August Japanese conservative leaders visited Seoul.

In late June two teams, one from the MOFA and another from KCIA, representing the new military authority visited Tokyo. South Korean MOFA Headquarters Ambassador, Mun Duck-ju, and Chief of the Asian Section, Kim Tae-ji, visited Tokyo from 21 to 27 June and had talks with former Prime Minister Fukuda, former Foreign Minister Okita and Administrative Foreign Vice Minister Takashima. On his return to Seoul, Kim Tae-ji commented that:

Due to the landslide victory of the ruling LDP in the general election, South Korea-Japan

¹³⁹ Kim Dong-hyon (1995): p. 450. Sunobe admitted that he heard of the security-linked loan project from Sejima in the evening of the day the latter met Chun (Interview with Sunobe, and also see Sunobe (1981)). This fact nullifies many studies about the security-linked loan negotiation.
relations will go smoothly. I could sense that the basic relations between Japan and South Korea will not be changed whoever is the Prime Minister in the post-Ohira era because they recognise that smooth South Korean-Japanese relations are the ground for the stability of Northeast Asia.\textsuperscript{141}

In late June, Deputy Chief of the KCIA Kim Young-son and Huh visited Tokyo and met the Director and other high officials of the JCIA. Kim stayed in Tokyo for about ten days and Huh stayed for about a month. Shortly, on 9-19 July, the biggest scale of the Japanese importation promotion mission under the auspices of the MITI visited Seoul to facilitate the staggering South Korean economy when the US would not assist until the new administration came to office.\textsuperscript{142}

Even when a delicate friction between the Suzuki cabinet and South Korea began to be seen from the mid-July, with the Kim Dae-jung issue attracting widespread interest in Japan, Japanese conservative political leaders visited Seoul to encourage and solidify Chun’s power assumption before and after the inauguration to the Presidency on 1 September. On 5-6 August, Susumu Mutsuka and Michio Tazawa had talks with Chun and Defence Minister Chu; on 13 August, there were visits by Shin Kanemaru and his colleagues; on 19 August, the DSP’s Kasuka and the LDP’s Nakamura were in Seoul; and former Prime Ministers, Kishi (1 September) and Fukuda (24 September) also made contributions.

\textsuperscript{141} Chosun-ilbo, 1 July 1980; The Hayashi Collection.

The South Korean regime transition did not simply end with Chun's coup on 17 May 1980. On 4 July, the MLC announced that Kim Dae-jung and 36 of his followers would be tried by a military court on charges of conspiring to overthrow the government and seize power. The statement accused Kim on four grounds: (1) he was an "ardent Communist"; (2) he had collaborated with North Korean sympathisers to found the National Congress for the Restoration of Democracy and the Promotion of the Unification of Korea (NCDU, Hamnintong) in Japan in 1973; (3) he had stirred up student disturbances in Seoul and in Kwangju on 18 May.\(^\text{143}\) The MLC Administrator, General Lee Hee-sung, justified the arrest of Kim as the removal of the major source of political instability. However, in the eyes of the Japanese public, the Kim Dae-jung trial tarnished the image of the new military leadership. The trial opened before a military court in Seoul 14 August. Kim was sentenced to death on 17 September. The hearing of appeals against the sentence opened on 24 October before a military appeal court. The death sentence had not been commuted at the appeal court on 3 November, and so the case went automatically to the civilian Supreme Court. If this court confirmed the death sentence, then President Chun would be required to approve the execution order.\(^\text{144}\)

In order to preserve South Korean national interests, the new military regime, which had already been widely projected as brutal and objectionable to the publics of the three countries, needed to improve its credentials. To that end, the US and Japan sought to apply pressure to commute the death sentence on Kim Dae-jung. This was undoubtedly the single most important obstacle preventing the Chun regime from gaining the

\(^{143}\) *Keesing's*: p. 30608.
recognition of other countries. However, the approaches of the Carter administration and the Suzuki cabinet were different: the “quiet diplomacy” of the US contrasted with the “public pressure” of Japan. While the US, especially after Ronald Reagan was elected President on 4 November, continued to have behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Chun regime, the Suzuki cabinet did not hesitate to raise its concerns publicly. The key issue in the context of the present study is to explain how Japan’s influence can be explained in terms of alliance management set out in Chapter 2.

7.7.1 The Pressure from the Suzuki Cabinet to Commute the Death Sentence

From mid-July to August, the Suzuki Cabinet, which succeeded the Ohira Cabinet in early July, emphasised the need to support the establishment of a new military regime, even though it also adopted a critical posture towards the Kim Dae-jung issue. On 7 August 1980, General Chun, in an exclusive interview with a Japanese conservative magazine, Shokun, stressed the importance of South Korea-Japan security interdependence and demanded close Japanese support and co-operation to deter the Soviet threat in Northeast Asia, given that the US did not possess sufficiently military capability over the Soviet Union:

Particularly regarding the peace in Northeast Asia in 1980s, the stability of Japan and South Korea is a very critical condition. The two countries have alliance-like relations that can never be separated. Therefore we have to co-operate closely from the economic area to the military sector...Both countries -- South Korea as a forward base and Japan as a rear base -- have to take responsibility to deter the advance of communist countries. To that end, Japan should not just pursue economic interests, but should grant military assistance to South Korea. Japan should co-operate in the true sense.

144 Keesing's: p. 30609.
146 Chun Doo-hwan (1980).
However, the Kim Dae-jung trial was regarded by Japan as a breach of an assurance given by President Park’s regime in 1973, after Kim’s abduction from Tokyo, that he should not be prosecuted for his political activities abroad, more particularly in Japan.¹⁴⁷ However, the Chun regime accused Kim of being a “confirmed communist”, and Kim’s alleged involvement with the NCDU (Hanmintong) in Japan¹⁴⁸ was the real basis of demanding the death sentence.

Furthermore, progressive intellectuals and opinion leaders, and the JSP and the JCP harshly attacked the Japanese government for conspiring to eliminate Kim Dae-jung and the emergence of a new military regime from early June.¹⁴⁹ The opposition took the case to the Diet debates. At the meeting of the Committee on the Cabinet in the Upper House (Sangiin) on 12 August, two days before the opening of the Kim trial before a military court in Seoul, opposition members asked for an explanation of the visits by Maeda and Kiuchi to Seoul in June, and large-scale economic mission to promote imports of South Korean goods on 9 July. There were further specific criticisms of the Suzuki government, as illustrated by the remarks of Takako Doi of the JSP and Hiro Tatsuki of the JCP:

Contrary to Western European countries, which expressed serious concerns and regrets, recently, the Japanese government enforced its co-operation [with the Chun regime] by encouraging the dictatorial military regime, assisting the denunciation of Kim Dae-jung, and expediting a large-scale economic mission. The attitude of the Suzuki government in

---

¹⁴⁸ It was formed on 13 August, and Kim was kidnapped on 8 August 1973.
¹⁴⁹ The JCP, Sekai Seiji No. 575: p.2; No. 576, p. 23; No. 577, pp. 2-4; Sekai (December 1980): p. 112. Shin Aochi, Ryo Shibata and Haruki Wada were leading figures in the campaign to rescue Kim. Takao Kamakura, the then Saitama University professor, denounced the Japanese involvement to assist the Chun group to come to power “the criminal role” of the Japanese government and business world. (Kamakura, 1980): p. 39.
emphasising “the development of friendly relations” with the Chun Doo-hwan fascist regime is even a challenge to the common sense of the world. It should not be allowed for it is connected with the reactionisation and militarisation of Japan. 150

The new Foreign Minister, Masayoshi Ito, stated at the meeting of the Committee of the Governmental Budget of Sangiin (Japanese House of Councilors) on 12 August that he hoped the South Korean government would be cautious in dealing with the issue because it would inevitably cause friction in Japan-South Korean relations, and there were increasing voices within Japan calling for a reconsideration of the political settlement if the death sentence was imposed upon Kim.151 Affected by this overwhelming mood in Japan, some LDP Dietmen, including Yohei Kono, claimed that the continuation of the present state of South Korean politics was not compatible with the basic goal of Japanese diplomacy, i.e. overall stability in Asia.152 Now, demands within the ruling camp for avoidance of over-identification with the Chun regime came to fore.

From mid-September, the Suzuki cabinet moved to press the Chun regime to commute the death sentence on Kim. Suzuki, appearing on the NHK (the Japanese public broadcasting company) TV programme on 22 September, commented that the South Korean government had been informed that if the death sentence were carried out, it would “adversely affect the economic relations between South Korea and Japan”, and that the Japanese Government would be “forced to impose restrictions on our economic assistance efforts.”153 When a JDA source revealed the visit of a South Korean naval ship to Yokotsuka on 2 September, the Suzuki cabinet cancelled it as an expression of

153 Keesing's: p. 30609.
Table 7.2 The Positions of the Suzuki Cabinet and the Chun Regime on the Kim Dae-jung Trial, November-December 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 November</td>
<td>The delegate of <em>Keidanren</em> had talks with President Chun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 November</td>
<td>PM Suzuki called in the Korean Ambassador to convey Japan’s serious concern over Kim’s life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November</td>
<td>The Chun regime reacted to the rebuke that PM Suzuki’s remarks represented interference by Japan in South Korean domestic affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November</td>
<td>The Deputy Minister of the Korean MOFA called in Muraoka, the Japanese Temporary Ambassador, to express displeasure with the statement of PM Suzuki.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29 November</td>
<td>Sejima, Goto, and Shigeo Nagano visited Seoul and had talks with President Chun. On 1 December, they reported to the Prime Minister the result of their talks about the Kim Dae-jung trial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November</td>
<td>Muraoka conveyed to the Korean MOFA the statement that the Japanese government had no intention to interfere in South Korean domestic matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 December</td>
<td>Ambassador Sunobe met South Korean Deputy Minister of the MOFA and they agreed to cool down the situation. Sunobe talked with Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Dong-hui, CIA Director, Yu Haksong, and Commander of the DSC, General Rho Tae-woo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 December</td>
<td>The Chun regime organised an anti-Japan rally of 35,000 people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 December</td>
<td>Secretary General of the new ruling Democratic Justice Party, Kwon Jong-dal, visited Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-13 December</td>
<td>General Secretary of the Japan-South Korean Parliament League, Kim Yoon-hwan, visited Tokyo as a secret emissary of Chun and had talks with Shintaro Abe, the Chairman of LDP Policy Research Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 December</td>
<td>Former and present presidents of universities in Japan issued a statement to call for more strenuous efforts by the Suzuki cabinet to rescue Kim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 December</td>
<td>Sunobe had talks with the Secretary General of new ruling Democratic Justice Party, and South Korean Foreign Minister Rho Shin-young.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Adapted from *Asahi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, Akahata*, and Watanabe (1999)
its concern over the Kim issue. Before and after the sentence of the military appeal court, in November, Japan’s concerns and pressures became even stronger. The opposition in Japan was particularly anxious about the advent of a Republican President in the US who advocated “peace with strength.” On 5 November, the opposition demanded that the Japanese government should take more direct action.

As can be seen from Table 7.1, the pressure from Japan resulted in increased diplomatic strains between the two countries. Due to Japan’s engagement, the Kim Dae-jung issue assumed international importance. Because of the Japanese intervention in part, the Chun regime could not avoid some kind of settlement because to do so would be to risk losing diplomatic recognition.

7.7.2 Alliance Management and the North Korean Question

In spite of its public efforts to rescue Kim, in practice the Japanese government used restraint in exerting pressure on the South Korean regime. Opposition politicians, such as Izumi Inoue, pushed the Suzuki Cabinet to deal with the Kim Dae-jung issue in terms of human rights and Japanese sovereignty. However, the logic of the Suzuki Cabinet, in spite of its public appearance, emphasised the importance of a rigid status quo approach to alliance management. On 28 November, Ito underlined the position of the Suzuki cabinet as follows:

Japanese expression of concern about the Kim Dae-jung trial does not have any intent to

154 Interview with Takesada.
155 The stream of human exchange between the two countries were rather exceptional in their contemporary history.
158 Ibid.: p.3.
interfere in internal politics, but shows an apprehension for the future of South Korea as a member of the Western camp....The isolation of South Korea is undesirable not only for Japan-South Korean relations, but also for peace in Asia. In this context, the Prime Minister’s expression of his concern [to Ambassador Choi on 21 November] was the expectation and hope as a friendly nation to South Korea.\footnote{Dai\textsuperscript{93}kai Shugiin Gaimu-iinkai Dai\textsuperscript{8}go (28 November): pp. 12, 17.}

In fact, the Suzuki Cabinet never used phrases such as “human rights”, “the violation of the political settlement”, or “Japanese sovereignty”. Rather, even when the cabinet expressed its concerns about the trial, the MOFA repeatedly stated that the death sentence against Kim did not infringe the political settlement of the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping incident. On the day after the NHK programme of 24 September, Suzuki reiterated Japan’s intention not to intervene in South Korean domestic politics but to strengthen relations between the two countries. By the same token, after conveying his concern to the South Korean Ambassador on 21 November, the Foreign Minister stressed that the visit was at the South Korean Ambassador’s suggestion.\footnote{Dai\textsuperscript{93}kai Shugiin Gaimu-iinkai Dai\textsuperscript{8}go (28 November): p. 5; Interview with Sato. The South Korean MOFA also confirmed this point (Woegyokukbang Wionhoi, 1980): pp. 1-2.} The Suzuki cabinet emphatically explained its interest in the Kim trial from the perspective of the continuity and maintenance of friendly Japan-South Korea relations.\footnote{}

By the same token, the Suzuki Cabinet did not attempt to have any direct dealings with North Korea. Nor did it push the Chun regime into any joint efforts with the Carter administration although it demonstrated that the Carter administration and the Suzuki Cabinet shared information and discussed optimal measures to deal with the Kim Dae-jung case. On 15 August, the MOFA leaked that the US and Japan often consulted each other about the Kim trial. On 19 September, Foreign Minister Ito Masayoshi traveled to Washington for talks with Secretaries of State and Defense, Muskie and Brown. The
issues of the Kim Dae-jung trial and Japan’s increasing of defence capability were the main agenda items. However, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa declined US-Japan joint pressures on the Chun regime.\textsuperscript{162} If the execution of Kim could be avoided, Japan was ready to restore its friendly formal relations with the Chun regime.\textsuperscript{163}

From the summer of 1980, North Korea activated its diplomacy to improve relations with the US and Japan in order to isolate the South Korea regime. The human exchanges between North Korea and Japan increased: the LDP’s Asia-Africa Study Group members’ visit to Pyongyang; the fifth JSP Delegate’s visit to Pyongyang; and North Korean Workers Party invitation of JCP delegates to its party convention. Kim Il-sung, the North Korean leader, told members of the Asia-Africa Study Group of the LDP in early October that: “I am going to nullify treaties with the Soviet Union and the PRC immediately, provided that the US and North Korea resolve to substitute a truce agreement for a peace treaty.”\textsuperscript{164} The other way round, Kim Il-sung then proceeded to denounce the Chun regime as even worse than the Park regime, and made it clear that he had no intention to enter into dialogue with it. Even though the JDA cancelled a planned South Korean naval ship visit to a Japanese port, it also sought to prevent the cabinet from improving its relations with North Korea. In late October, Hisahiko Okazaki, Chief of Naik-yoku in charge of international intelligence and information within the JDA, made a controversial remark that North Korea was also a potential threat to the security of Japan. Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa and Foreign Minister Ito expressed their muted agreement to this remark.\textsuperscript{165} The MOFA, if any improvement

\textsuperscript{161} Dai93kai Sangiin Naikaku-inkai Dai11go (27 November): p. 41.
\textsuperscript{162} Dai93ai Shugiin Gaimu-inkai Dai6go (5 November): p. 6.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.: p. 8.
\textsuperscript{164} Sekai Shitho (14 October 1980).
was necessary, was not prepared to go beyond economic and academic exchanges with the North.\textsuperscript{166} Even though Suzuki hinted to the South Korean Ambassador that there was a possibility of changing his policy towards North Korea (on 21 November), it was not realised in practice. By the same token, the Suzuki cabinet did not agree to the opposition parties’ claim that the Chun regime had no legitimacy.\textsuperscript{167} Rather, the Suzuki Cabinet decided to alleviate the South Korean rice shortage through the provision of 300,000 tons of rice, based on Japanese ¥ credit, in response to a request in late October.\textsuperscript{168} The differences between the Suzuki and Ohira cabinets in their approaches to the Chun regime are thus highly significant\textsuperscript{169} and can only be plausibly understood in terms of alliance management.

When it comes to the overall relations between the Suzuki cabinet and the Chun regime, they may be judged basically amicable despite some outward antagonism.\textsuperscript{170} The Chun regime, at least on the surface, did not heed to the pressures from Japan, and reacted with an anti-Japan campaign. In substance, however, the frequent exchanges of visits between Japan and South Korea (see Table 7.1) increased their mutual understanding, which is why the two governments were able to restore their relations within a short period after the commutation of the death sentence in January 1981. On 23 January 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki expressed his eagerness to rebuild good Japan-South Korean relations. A week later, the Japanese government agreed a ¥19 billion loan to

\textsuperscript{166} Dai93kai Shugiin Gaimu-ininkai Daig6go (5 November 1980): p. 5.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.: p. 3.
\textsuperscript{169} While Ohira advocated new thinking of Japanese foreign policy by emphasising “political diplomacy”, Suzuki, who started his political career as a member of JSP, was inclined to pay more attention to the harmony of Japanese domestic politics. In other words, Suzuki was attentive to the protest of Japan’s progressive wings to deal with the Kim Dae-jung issue. The new Foreign Minister Ito had a slightly different attitude towards North Korea from the posture of his predecessor, Okita. Ito, whose electoral constituency contained relatively larger number of pro-North Korean-Japanese, took a smoother approach to the North Korean issue than Okita did. (Interview with Wada and Oh Jae-hee)
\textsuperscript{170} Kown’s interview with NHK in the spring of 1999.
South Korea for the 1981 financial year. On 2 March, Foreign Minister Ito visited Seoul to attend the inaugural ceremony of President Chun. There he had talks with his South Korean counterpart Rho Shin-young. Proposals were agreed for an annual ministerial meeting for the improvement of bilateral relations. The next day, Ito conveyed a letter from PM Suzuki to Chun, on the basis of which it was agreed to hold a summit meeting. A month later, South Korean Foreign Minister Rho visited Tokyo at the invitation of Ito.

The commutation of the capital sentence to Kim Dae-jung was of significance in that the new military regime was compliant with the least norms of international society due to pressures from Japan and political deal with the US.\(^{171}\)

**CONCLUSION**

In summary, this chapter has mainly examined the distinctive approach of the Japanese Ohira cabinet to dealing with the regime transition in South Korea. Referring to US displeasure with the rise of a new military regime, Sunobe recalled:

> The US, and the Department of State in particular, expected obviously that democratisation would be proceeding well. Even if there are observations that the Department of Defence might be different, in my impression at that time in Seoul, US Forces in South Korea, too, had such a hope. And it was also the case that Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam could have got some brave resistance [against the Chun group].\(^{172}\)

Contrary to US expectations, Japan was aware of the rise of Chun at the earliest stage of the regime transition, and had a remarkably good relationship with the Chun group. Chun informed the Japanese Ambassador of his plan to arrest General Chong Sung-

---

\(^{171}\) Hurd argues that “All systems possess some rules governing the conduct of actors, be they laws, directives, or norms, and these rules vary in the degree to which they are followed and the reasons for compliance” (1999): p. 383.

Japan not only kept this secret from the US, but also gave side-support to Chun’s plan by providing intelligence about the North Korean military moves before 12 December 1979. Japan perceived that the fundamental confrontational structure of South Korean politics involved a tension between two non-institutionalised political forces of the Chun group and Kim Dae-jung and his followers, while the US supported a caretaker civilian government led by Choi and persisted with the existing official hierarchy of the South Korean military led by General Chung Sung-hwa. Japan had a deeper understanding and analysis of the South Korean situation than the US had. By keeping a distance from Kim Dae-jung, Japan chose stability as its first priority. Following the 12 December Coup, the Japanese embassy in Seoul met Chun when it was necessary, but did not share all resulting information with the US embassy in Seoul. In other words, Japan also needed to keep a distance from the US because of the obvious discrepancy in the two countries’ policy orientations. As a result, there were delicate strains over the issues of the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping and the assessment of the Chun group, as became clear in the summit talks between Carter and Ohira. The most important point to make, however, is that the US and Japan had a definite mutual interest in maintaining stability in South Korea and strengthening security in Northeast Asia. Therefore, the delicate friction between them never developed to the point of public disputes.

The new findings about the Japanese intervention towards South Korea in the regime transition are in accordance with the formal and official position of the LDP and the Ohira cabinet represented respectively by the resolution of the 37th party on 23 January

173 Interview with Huh Hwa-pyung.
174 Interview with Sunobe.
1980 and by the Comprehensive Security Policy Report on 2 July 1980.\textsuperscript{175} They also well fit the analytical framework of alliance management and also challenge conventional views of the behaviour of Japanese foreign policy. The empirical findings concerning Japanese intervention are considerably proactive. In articulating these provocative findings and the conventional wisdom emphasising passivity and inaction of Japan in the studies of Japanese international behaviours, it is useful to read an argument of Yonosuke Nagai. Nagai raises the question of Japan’s “incommunicability”, which is sometimes interpreted as “calculated inaction” or a “strategy of silence.” This incommunicability, Nagai argues, means that others cannot easily predict what Japan will do in the future. Furthermore, it tends to be seen as a sign of “abruptness” or even “aggression”.\textsuperscript{176} This indicates that the “American pressure-Japanese response” model does not correspond to the reality.

In Chapter 3, it was explained that, as an integral middle member of the trilateral alliance system, Japan has taken actions with regard to relations between the US and South Korea on the basis of one or more of three options: to step aside; to encourage cooperation between the other two member countries; or to assist the South Korean side. Chapter 5 investigated the novelty of Japanese action in redirecting the US policy of withdrawal of its ground forces from South Korea, and concluded that Japan here played the role of mediator within the TASS. At the same time, the analysis also examined the limits of Japan’s capacity to reverse the US formula to change the South Korean political system. The present chapter takes the analysis further by showing that

\textsuperscript{175} The resolution stated that: “Faced with the 1980s, we should counter the new volatile international situation accurately, particularly including the harsh protest against the Soviet invasion, and should advance again to contribute for the peace and prosperity of the world.” (\textit{Kekkan Ijya Minshu} (March 1980): p. 309. The report placed lots of emphasis on the autonomous role and contribution to the peace and security of the world.

\textsuperscript{176} Nagai (1980): p. 5.
Japan intervened in the South Korean regime transition very deeply and succeeded in putting the political forces most amenable to the Japanese national interests in place.\textsuperscript{177} Japan played the role of initiator when the US was confused between the priorities declared policy orientation for the establishment of a broadly based civilian government in alliance management. As the South Korean situation had been worrisome, Japan effectively intervened according to its alliance management approach. This is the central aspect of the political dynamics of the TASS.

\textsuperscript{177} Michael Minor submits different models of Japanese foreign policy making, i.e., 'routine', 'political,'
CONCLUSION TO PART THREE

The term of the Carter Presidency, 1977-1980, is of particular interest for it witnessed the decline of US hegemonic leadership and the promotion of Japan’s economic and political status. Thus, the Japanese formula for the Korean question was quite different from that of the US during the Carter administration. Japan was quite sceptical about the American initiative for tripartite talks between the US and the two Koreas. For Japan, it was imperative to maintain stability in the Korean peninsula and to support the Park regime. This Japanese formula resulted in a different approach to intervention in South Korean politics from that of the US.

As explained in Part Two, the US sought to establish a broadly-based civilian government through the adoption of a “nudging” policy in order to promote levels of security and democracy commensurate with South Korea’s economic achievement. By contrast, Japan adopted a “selection” policy to support the new military leadership, which it viewed as the most amenable social force, following in the tradition of the late President Park Chung-hee, because it served the Japanese national interest and its broad East Asian strategy. Of the two policies, it was the Japanese which achieved the most effective results, since it helped to bring about the establishment of a new military regime. However, despite the serious differences between the two countries, they did not develop into a fundamental US-Japanese diplomatic conflict because the US also had a self-serving interest in maintaining stability in the Korean peninsula and Japan also wished to maintain the fundamental objectives of the TASS.

and “critical” decisions(1985). Japanese intervention in the period of this research is somewhere between “political” and “critical” decisions.

178 Minister of International Trade and Industry, Kosaka, stated that peace and stability in the Korean peninsula was a vital issue to Japan (Dai87kai Shugiin Shokou-iinkai Dai9go, 1 April 1979): p. 19.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

This thesis has examined the dynamics of intra-alliance politics between the US, Japan and South Korea. In so doing, the aim has been to overcome the limitations of existing theoretical debates in the analysis of East Asian international relations. This concluding chapter recapitulates the central arguments of the research in order to extract the main theoretical and practical implications. First, the emphasis is placed upon the validity of the analytical framework adopted in this study for investigating the inter-state behaviour of the three countries (Section 8.1 and 8.2). The recent changes of the TASS will be followed for a prospect of the future stage of the TASS, then, implications of the research to the studies of democratisation, regionalisation, and intra-alliance politics (Section 8.3). Finally the research limitations and possible directions for further work are considered (Section 8.4).

8.1 INTRA-ALLIANCE POLITICS AND THE TRIANGULAR ALLIANCE SECURITY SYSTEM (TASS)

The need for an appropriate theoretical framework for analysing US-Japan-South Korea relations is one of the most urgent issues in the study of East Asian international relations. In order to develop an analytical tool, a systemic approach is necessary to
understand the dynamics of the triad game of inter-state behaviour. The crucial issue is to determine the key factors that have determined the shape of relations between the three countries. This study suggest unequivocally that the answer is common security concerns, and the theory of intra-alliance politics and the concept of alliance management provide a strong basis to comprehend the political interplay of the three countries. In terms of a systemic framework and the object of analysis, this research suggests the new term “triangular alliance security system (TASS).” The major benefits of an alliance security model are that, first of all, it has the capacity to explain the distribution of roles and the dynamics of political interplay within the alliance, and secondly it is able to furnish ideas more generally for the development of a regional security co-operation framework.

The TASS is a regional security system in Northeast Asia, consisting of the US, Japan and South Korea and created during the Cold War era. This system has experienced continuous and substantial changes towards a broader sense of political community, even though its content has not been fully developed. It was formed when the US confronted its most serious immediate and direct challenge, the Vietnam War, and consequently sought to mobilise its East Asian allies to support the American war effort on the basis of a clear division of labour. Since then, it has had important stabilising effects in East Asia, and has also evolved a high degree of regional cohesion which could be developed further as a sound basis for productive regionalisation in the Asia-Pacific region.

The uniqueness of the TASS is twofold: its multi-layered structure and the uneven distance of the member countries from the sources of threat. It consists of one
superpower (the US), one regional power (Japan), and one local power (South Korea). These multi-layered states, in terms of national power, are located at different distances from the sources of threat. South Korea, the weakest member, shares a demarcation line with its adversary, North Korea, so it can be defined as a projected force and exposed state (see Chapter 2). Japan, the regional power, stands close to the exposed state, thereby sharing a common threat perception with South Korea. The US, as a superpower, is located far behind the front line in military terms, and manages its Asian allies from a global perspective beyond the scope of the regional- and local-level viewpoints of Japan and South Korea about policy options for dealing with the new sources of threat. Therefore, the triangular political interplay within the TASS has been affected by these diverse characteristics, and it follows that the alliance management policies of the US and Japan towards South Korea will not always be identical. As a system, however, the convergence of the broad national interests of the three countries is the main feature, and in the long run the superpower controls the behaviour of the other two allies. At certain times, however, the influence of the US has encountered significant constraints.

As discovered in previous chapters, patterned interactions are not naturally given; some degree of trial and error is inevitable, even towards a more established level of inter-state behaviour among nations. Of course, no well-settled interactions can overcome all the sources of divergent national interests. On the contrary, the TASS, which is close to the “dissimilar-integrative” interactive type of alliance, in which economic and technological heterogeneity among actors leads to increasing interdependence, specialisation and mutual co-operation, has coped with a constantly shifting internal equilibrium. The record of the TASS confirms that the members’ motivation to form or
join the alliance was not based solely on considerations of expediency. The interaction between the three countries has been geo-politically constrained in terms of the freedom to choose other prospective allies. In fact, Japan and South Korea did not explicitly attempt to go their own way in the face of US policy orientation, while there were several occasions which this did happen in the Middle East and in NATO. Hence, the external framework of the TASS structure remained intact, if not completely monolithic, in the Cold War era. This distinguishing feature of the TASS reinforces the validity of a systemic approach in this study because the TASS has had a relatively stable basis of political interactions among the member countries.

The TASS model and the intra-alliance politics approach, as demonstrated in Part Two and Part Three, help to overcome the limitations of bilateral explanations of alliance behaviour, which cannot fully reflect the complexity of closely interwoven trilateral interdependence and interactions. At the same time, this approach also seeks to overcome the failure of attempts to apply the view that US anti-revolutionary strategy, based on a low-intensity conflict concept towards the Third World states in Latin America, to the analysis of the Korean situation in the late 1970s and early 1980s.


The case of the political interventions of the US and Japan in the South Korean political power transition (1979-1980) was selected for in-depth examination in order to identify the main characteristics and dominant factors which determined the different

---

2 The change of outlook of President de Gaulle drastically altered the role of France in NATO.
international behaviour of the two countries and their ultimate convergence in their common interests in alliance with South Korea. To sum up the empirical processes very briefly, there were four critical junctures in the emergence of the new military regime in South Korea. First, after the coup of 12 December 1979, the US restrained from applying excessive pressure, and the Japanese protective role was established. Secondly, in early May 1980, General Chun Doo-hwan wanted to justify his military coup by emphasising the North Korean threat. However, the US denied that there was any sign of an impending North Korean attack. In order to shorten the on-going political turmoil, Japan provided the intelligence that the Chun group desperately wanted. The third critical moment was in late May, when the military coup generals faced unprecedented protests in Kwangju. The Carter administration saved the Chun group by adopting a strategy of "short-term support, long-term pressure" on 22 May 1980, a decision which helped the military group to regain the momentum to retake Kwangju. In addition, Japan intervened by sending a special ambassador to Seoul. The fourth juncture was in June and July 1980, when the Carter administration avoided embracing the new military regime and exerted pressure on South Korea to move towards political liberalisation. The new military regime sought another source of recognition and assistance, and it was Japan that buttressed the new military regime by sending additional emissaries.

Table 8.1 A Comparative Summary of the Political Interventions of the US and Japan towards South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Principles</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural Modalities</td>
<td>Offensive Intervention</td>
<td>Defensive Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing Options</td>
<td>The Nudging Policy</td>
<td>The Selecting Policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8 Conclusion

In terms of the alliance management of the TASS, the characteristics of the political interventions of the US and Japan are outlined in Table 8.1. The Carter administration attempted to introduce a new formula for a stable regional security environment in East Asia (see Chapters 4 and 6) which would not necessitate a direct US military presence, thereby avoiding the possibility of the US being dragged into an Asian land war. The flexible status quo was the operational principle behind this formula. In order to bring about a change of policy and government, the US embarked upon offensive or aggressive intervention in South Korean politics. After the death of President Park, the US sought to establish a broadly based civilian government through the adoption of the “nudging” policy in order to promote security and political development simultaneously. However, this American prescription was not acceptable to Japan (see Chapter 5). As Table 8.1 shows, the Japanese imperative, as an operating principle, was a rigid status quo policy that resulted in the adoption of defensive intervention aiming at the preservation of a particular regime or system. This was because Japan could not permit the distribution of power in the system to be materially changed to its disadvantage. The Japanese Ohira cabinet supported the Park regime, and after the demise of the Yushin System, Japan adopted the “selecting” policy to support the new military leadership, which it viewed as the most amenable social force. Japan played a more definitive role in South Korean internal affairs, particularly during the period which saw the emergence of General Chun Doo-hwan as the new autocratic President in 1980.

These two contrasting sets of political interventions, however, converged into a set of common alliance interests in North East Asia, thus confirming the validity of the systemic approach. On the surface, two different external elements intervened in the
South Korean political power transition from opposite directions, and the Japanese approach succeeded in realising its policy goal, while the US failed to actualise the establishment of a broadly based civilian government. Japan's independent intervention, however, did not produce any serious frictions with the US. For example, there was an absence of US public protest about Japanese intervention. This was because the US had a strong self-serving interest in maintaining stability in the Korean peninsula and Japan also wished to maintain the fundamental objectives of the TASS.

The process summarised above suggests that the whole picture of the South Korean political power transition leading to the establishment of a new military regime can be fully understood within the selected analytical framework, provided the Japanese role within the TASS in terms of intra-alliance politics is taken into account. As we have tried to show, a bilateral perspective is not capable of explaining fully the complexity of the dynamic interplay between the three countries. Similarly, the two countries' interventions cannot adequately be compared through the application of democratisation theories. A systemic approach based on theories of alliance management, however, is capable of providing a clear, coherent understanding of those interventions and their motivations. The combination of different national strategies and national power configurations led the US and Japan into different orientations towards the South Korean power transition. In terms of political dynamics, it can be said that the US and Japan played a non-zero-sum game.3

The findings of this research reveal the following the key triggers of Japanese intervention in the political affairs of South Korea: (1) when the strategic focus of the

US had tilted in an isolationist direction; (2) when the attention of the US was distracted away from the East Asian region; (3) when a response to a more immediate challenge from another region was demanded and US involvement seemed less effective; (4) when existing US foreign policy failed to cope with unexpected contingencies arising in South Korea; (5) when the US failed to signal a shift in its Korea policy; and (6) when Japan had doubts about US commitment towards East Asian security. These findings are supported by the analysis in Chapters 5 and 7. At the same time, it must be pointed out that Japan's relatively autonomous intervention in the domestic affairs of the alliance's weakest member was possible because Japan also stood firmly by the strongest member – the US – in dealing with the latter's two immediate and direct challenges, namely the Iranian and Soviet situations. Moreover, in implementing its policy, Japan avoided any explicit criticism of the America's South Korea policy. It took a low-strategic posture by admitting the "Carter formula," which advocated that Japan should contribute to the creation of an international environment conducive to stability and peace in the Korean peninsula. In terms of alliance management, Japanese intervention was basically supportive of US interests in Asia.

Japanese involvement in South Korean politics tended to be of relatively short duration, and ceased immediately when the US political system showed signs of moving in a direction conducive to Japanese objectives. There were three main reasons for this. First, Japan wished to constrain its influence within clearly delineated boundaries. Secondly, the US would not countenance Japan wielding an influence greater than its own. Thirdly, no South Korean regime would welcome excessive Japanese intervention. In this context, Japan was supportive of US national interests by stabilising the unsettled political power transition in South Korea. One key point to bear in mind is that South
Korea, as an exposed state, enjoyed a leverage disproportionate to its general national power capability, and this allowed the Chun group selectively to accept or refuse US and Japanese interventions imposed on it before and after launching the coup. However, when it finally came to the need to secure political legitimacy, which it could not do on the basis of domestic politics, the new military regime earnestly sought formal recognition by the US in late 1980 and early 1981, and was willing to negotiate over the life of Kim Dae-jung.

8.3 THE PROSPECTS FOR THE TASS IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: OLD BOTTOM LINES AND NEW ARRANGEMENTS

During the first decade of the post-Cold War era, three potentially disruptive elements—the question of the US military presence in South Korea, the authoritarian political structure in South Korea, and the South Korean attitude towards the US policy of engagement with North Korea—have been settled or altered. The Bush administration decided that the status of the American military presence, the fundamental basis of the TASS, should not be changed in the post-Cold War period. Recently this view was conveyed indirectly to Japan and South Korea. At the same time, the South Korean political system has been transformed from authoritarianism to procedural democracy, thereby allowing mass participation in politics through popular elections. Since the beginning of the 1990s, no human rights issues have caused any diplomatic strains between the US and South Korea. In addition, for the first time, the Kim Dae-jung government has encouraged the US and Japan to have direct contacts with North Korea,

4 US Department of Defense (1992)
5 McVadon (1999). He stated that: “Foremost, the alliances with Japan and Republic of Korea and U.S. military presence are important elements of the American vision of a security framework in Northeast Asia, even after North Korea is no longer a threat.” (p.10)
in order to lead it to adopt a Chinese or Vietnamese form of capitalism. In other words, the engagement policy of the US and Japan is unlikely to cause any serious disruption in the cohesion of the TASS. Indeed, in 1999, the over-sensitive reaction of the US and Japan to North Korean ballistic missile tests caused considerable apprehension in the South. In general, the TASS has solidified its operations and strengthened its structural arrangements, even though it has not yet developed to a more institutionalised level, for example some form of collective security organisation. Various kinds of military cooperation, including the installation of working-level hot lines between South Korea and Japan, testify to the alliance's increasing integrity in practical terms. The US initiative to create a system of theatre missile defence (TMD) offers a further challenge to the cohesion of the TASS. Regardless of its real effectiveness, the TMD project has proved to be a political barometer of the willingness of Japan and South Korea to accept their complete integration into US battle management. Japan has already committed itself to the joint research project, which in turn, from a systemic point of view, will expand the Japanese security role in the region. At the same time, Japan will be deeply integrated, thereby, will be monitored its autonomous military build-up by the US. In this context, South Korea has no reason to oppose Japanese participation in the TMD initiative. However, so far, the Kim Dae-jung government has expressed its reluctance to join in, and for three main reasons: concerns about its practical effectiveness, the North Korean nuclear issue, and the government's foreign policy stance on the China question. It is too early to assess whether South Korean reluctance is in fact a strategic decision or a tactical posture, or whether a future South Korean government might show more enthusiasm. Nevertheless, it is surely significant that the TASS is now exploring a way of integrating its battle management structure. For the last three and half decades, the

---

6 Interview with Mr. Okazaki; the concept of early warning and battle management/command control.
alliance has been augmented mainly by bilateral initiatives—for example in reducing transaction costs, monitoring compliance, accumulating the habits of dialogue, and so on; but recently there has been a noteworthy increase in the number of trilateral joint meetings for the purpose of enhancing the reciprocal benefits and cohesion of the alliance. More than ever before, policy co-ordination and military co-operation between the US, Japan and South Korea has flourished since 1994. Recently the three countries have established an official forum for discussion and co-operation. Accordingly, it appears that the TASS is undergoing a gradual shift from a “dissimilar-integrative” type of interaction to a “similar-integrative” type in the political and security areas.

In general, during the post-Cold War period, the US has emerged as the only remaining superpower, there has been no alternative to the American system, and there is no evidence that the core themes of NSC68 (outlined in the objectives of US interventionism) and NSC 48/5 (the priority of US foreign policy from the global perspective), introduced in Chapter 2, have been changed. This means that, in terms of alliance politics, Japan and South Korea can be pleased that they have been on the “winning” side. By and large, the TASS in East Asia has proven to be highly durable under the “American system.” It is now going through a process of “transitional fine tuning,” and continuity is likely to be the dominant aspect of the TASS in the future.

The findings of this study cannot be fully or parsimoniously generalised to every communications (BM/C) is introduced to the TMD. (US Department of Defense (1999): 2).

7 The summit talks between South Korean Presidents and Japanese Prime Ministers have been relatively regularly held, and the bilateral contact channels have been comparatively formalised in the governmental level, and the dependence on the private or informal channels have been relatively decreased.

8 Gurtov (1993); Hughes (1996).


11 Interview with Prof. Moon.
regional security system. The prolonged alliance relations between the three countries have inevitably resulted in some patterned interactions and norms as the basis for the development of a political community out of a security community. Therefore, as long as one superpower continues to exist and there is also a regional power in a certain region, the three-layered inter-state actions and behaviours will continue to be common, and the logic and findings of this research will be applicable, to some extent, to other cases, such as US-Japan-Taiwan relations and the changing relations between Russia, the PRC and North Korea.

As this research has revealed, the role of the regional power, sometimes as a facilitator or mediator, but sometimes as an initiator and even challenger, deserves to be more deeply investigated in the political area, and not just in the military and security sphere. This suggests that the existing studies on Japan's international role can be furthered developed towards other countries.

A large number of countries are stuck in the initial phases of a democratic transition, and, as Georg Sørenson notes, in terms of the external influence to promote democracy, the negative job is easier for outsiders to prevent, hinder or block a process of democratisation than the positive role. This study has implications for the analysis of external influences on democratisation in the developing or less-developed countries with special reference to the motives and goals of external diplomatic and political intervention.

In addition, this research reveals how strategic concerns greatly affect regionalisation

---

based on security communities in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, the discussion of the TASS can be extended towards the establishment of a political or democratic community in Northeast Asia. The changing security environment since the end of the Cold War has highlighted the importance of regional security arrangements. The leading country of the TASS, the US, has suggested an embryonic response. The US Department of Defense's 1998 East Asia Strategy Report states: "Multilateralism in all its forms will become an important element of U.S. engagement in the region in coming years."\textsuperscript{14} This suggestion, in accordance with the emphasis on US alliances with Japan and South Korea, and on the US military presence in South Korea, does not mean that future US security arrangements will be based on a liberal approach, but they will be pursued as a goal which is ultimately similar to the liberal research agenda. Thanks to the increasing cohesion of the TASS, it might be able to move towards a kind of pluralistic security community in which the legal independence of separate governments is maintained as long as they possess a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions, mutual identity, loyalty, and a sense of "we-ness".\textsuperscript{15} As already discussed, the TASS is apparently moving towards a "similar-integrative" type of interaction from a "dissimilar-integrative" type. However, in order to accomplish this transition and thereby form the basis of a democratic community,\textsuperscript{16} the compatibility of core values will be decisive. Therefore, one of the priorities for further research should be to combine the structural realist factors in foreign policy decision-making and the liberal orientation of policy goals, and the constructivist approach to norms and other sociological endowments.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{13} Sorensen (1998): pp. 1 and 8.
\textsuperscript{14} McVadon (1999): p. 11.
\textsuperscript{15} Adler and Barnett (1998): pp. 6-7.
\textsuperscript{16} See Modelski and Thompson (1999)
8.4 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF THE RESEARCH

A study of alliance relations has intrinsic elements of a realist world-view in international relations theory. Balance of power theory, which should not be excluded as a basis for explaining the formation and dissolution of an alliance, has operated even in a bipolar world. Interaction means that there should be a seamless process of bargaining and compromising between more than two international actors. In this case, functionalism may be a suitable approach, and negotiation and bargaining theories can also be employed. Member states in an alliance or system tend to be like-minded, so that they have the nature of a plural group in which actors share some sense of community. In the course of protracted interactions, junior member states in an alliance tend to increase their homogeneity with the leader. In particular, a reduction in political heterogeneity implies the reduction of transaction costs in maintaining and pursuing the common goal of an alliance. In other words, the political democratisation of South Korea, represented by the Kim Dae-jung government, means the elimination of one of the main obstacles to smooth inter-state actions. As a result, the US and Japan are more conveniently placed to work together with a democratised South Korean government. In that sense, the influence of the South Korean government has now increased.

Various theories can explain the political dynamics in an alliance. Even though it is true that all theories have some significant limitations in explaining an international phenomenon, it is necessary to make it clear which theory is the basis for a particular investigation. The present research, even though it reveals various aspects of inter-state behaviour, has not yet presented a comprehensive configuration of the various aspects

different schools of international relations theory. This consideration highlights one of the limitations of this thesis and points to the need for further research in the future.

In reading and analysing recently declassified American documents, the researcher could not devote sufficient space to revealing how the US government mobilised international financial regimes and organisations to support the South Korean economy in recession. This tendency was regarded by liberal scholars as one of the most serious obstacles to the country's political development. The implications of US governmental restrictions on the high-profile visits of US business men, including influential figures from the US EXIM Bank and other international financial institutes to South Korea, are of significance to understand the liberal policy means and realist policy goals of international behaviour. However, this research could not deeply examine these aspects in theory.

From a methodological point of view, one major limitation of the research is that there were no interviews with American practitioners. At the same time, reflecting the customary obstacles to the study of Japanese diplomatic history, the researcher did not obtain the hard Japanese government sources which could reveal the exact ranks of officials, the details of meetings with the Chun group, and the actual drafters or decision makers who provided intelligence regarding the alleged impending North Korean attack on the South. In an interview, Okazaki stated that there are classified materials within the JDA about the intelligence concerning the alleged North Korean invasion in May 1980, but the archives will not be opened until 2005. Even then, it is not absolutely certain that the materials will be released in that year. In that sense, this thesis represents not the final word but rather the first effort to lay a foundation for understanding the
dynamics of US-Japan-South Korea relations.

Therefore, the further investigation of sources within the Japanese government and the more elaborate analysis of Japanese political intervention towards South Korea are priorities for future research; and this also points to the need for other research investigations which will reveal the nature and scope of Japan's deeper and more direct involvement in the domestic politics of other foreign countries.

In addition, this study did not devote much attention to exploring the intentions and actions of the PRC and North Korea towards the South Korean power transition. There are scripts of dialogues between Kim Il-song and the East German Secretary General E. Honecker in the early 1980s revealing the North Korean response to the emergence of the Chun regime. However, in order to concentrate on the US and Japanese rationales and actions, these materials were not utilised in the present research. This gap deserves to be filled in the future.

As mentioned above, this research did not consider the impact of external actors in promoting democratisation in a foreign country such as South Korea, and there is a clear potential for extending research to cover this area, mainly by utilising a comparative politics approach. Development studies are also in part related to the contents of this research, especially to the nexus of economic development and political democracy. Therefore, this research points to the value of adopting such a perspective in the future.

The differences in operational principles between the US and Japan, however, offer clear implications for understanding respective international behaviours in response to
the new international agenda of promoting democratisation in the former Third World. Regardless of unspoken rationales and hidden objectives, at least on the surface there is a contrast between US offensive intervention, emphasising the support for democratisation and human rights, and Japan’s relatively muted posture. There is obviously a potential to upgrade the support for liberal values in Japanese foreign policy-making and -implementation. However, at least so far, Japan has not tangibly demonstrated its positive role in the promotion of democracy other than the ODA declaration under the PM Toshiki Kaifu in 1991 on four ODA guidelines, to become in June 1992 part of the “Official Development Assistance Charter of Japan.”\(^\text{18}\) It is now perhaps time for Japan to find its own way between Asian values and more universal liberal values. The former demands the continuation of a strategy of defensive intervention, while the latter call for a Japanese version of offensive intervention in the promotion of democracy.

\(^{18}\) Comments from Prof. Drifte. For a Japanese critical observation about the limited role of the US in promoting democracy, see Takashi Inoguchi (1999): p. 181.
Appendix: The Lists of Archival Sites and Interviewees

(1) The List of Archival Sites

The Libraries of the University of Tokyo
   The Comprehensive Library
   The Library of the Faculty of Law
   The Library of the Institute for Social Science
   The Library of the Institute of Oriental Culture
   The Library of the Institute of Social Information
The Japanese National Diet Library
The Information Centre of Kyodo New Services
The Information Centre of Mainichi Shimbun
The Library of Japanese National Defence Academy
Japanese Institute for International Policy Studies
The Library of Institute of Development Economies
The National Library of South Korean National Assembly
The Information Centre of Monthly Chosun
The 5.18 Institute, The Chonnam National University
The Video Archives of the Korean Broadcasting System

(2) The List of Interviewees and Dates of Interviews

South Korean Interviewees

Mr. Huh, Hwa-pyung, the then secretary for President Chun Doo-hwan (21 June 1999)

Mr. Kim, Kun-tae, National Assemblyman and former Chairman of the Federation of South Korean Youths for Democratisation (21 June 1999)
Mr. Lee, Sang-jin, the then Political Counselor for the Ambassador to Japan, 1980 (18 June 1999)

Mr. Park, Suk-moo, the then leader of the Kwangju Democratisation Movement in May 1980 (19 June 1999)

Mr. Kim, Tae-ji, the then Chief of Asian Section of the MOFA, 1980 (23 June 1999)

Dr. Lee, Tong-won, former Minister of the MOFA, and the then National Assemblyman (20 July 1999)

Prof. Lee, Mun-young, former speech writer and political advisor for Mr. Kim Dae-jung, 1980 (15 June 1999)

Prof. Moon, Chung-in, Director of the Institute of National Unification in Yonsei University, Seoul. (14 June 1999)

And an indirect interview done between NHK and National Assemblyman Kwon Ik-hyon, then Mr. Sejima's South Korean counterpart, and other senior officials of the MOFA and journalists who requested anonymity

**Japanese Interviewees**

Mr. Sunobe, Ryozo, the then Japanese Ambassador to South Korea, 1978-1981 (2 June & 7 July 1999)

Prof. Wada, Haruki the then Assistant Professor in the University of Tokyo who led the Rescue Movement of Mr. Kim Dae-jung (25 May and 3 July 1999)

Prof. Okonogi, Masao, the then Keio University Professor and a member of *Josei Kentokai* (21 May 1999)

Prof. Sato, Seizaburo, the then Professor of the University of Tokyo and a core member of the inner circle within the personal advisory groups for former Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (10 July 1999)

Dr. Takesada, Hideshi, Research Professor of the Japanese National Academy (27 May 1999)

Mr. Hisahiko Okazaki, the then Chief of the Section of International Intelligence, the JDA, 1980 (23 June 1999)

Mr. Toshihiro Nohara, the then Intelligence Attache to Japanese Consular in Pusan, South Korea, 1980 (13 May and 7 July 1999)

Mr. Shigemura, Toshimitsu, the then Correspondent to Seoul of *Mainich Shimbun*,
and then a member of *Josei Kentokai* (12 July 1999)

Mr. Motoi Tamaki, Researcher in *Koria Hyoron* and the then member of *NK-kai* (3 June 1999)

Mr. Uchiyama, the then Head Desk Officer of the Korean Peninsula, the JCIA, then a member of *Josei Kentokai* (7 July 1999)

Mr. Kenichiro Hayashi, the then Correspondent to Seoul of *Kyodo News Services* (1 and 9 July 1999)

And others in journalism and academia who requested anonymity
BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. PRIMARY SOURCES

The United States

Congressional quarterly Inc. *Historic Documents of 1977*
___ *Historic Documents of 1978*
___ *Historic Documents of 1979*
___ *Historic Documents of 1980*

Department of Defense (April 1999) *Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options in the Asia-Pacific Region*


. 1949 *Vol. VII The Fareast and Australia, Part 2*
 1949 *Vol. VIII The Fareast; China*
 1949 *Vol. IX The Fareast; China*
 1951 *Vol. VI, East Asian-Pacific Area*
 1951 *Vol. VII Korea and China Part 2*
 1952-1954 *Vol. XII East Asia and the Pacific Part 2*
 1952-54 *Vol. XV Korea Part 2*
 1955-1957, *Vol. XXI East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos*
 1958-1960, *Vol. XVIII Japan; Korea*
___ *Bulletin, 1964-1984*

___ *The Collection of Telegrams between US Department of State and US Embassy in Seoul, South Korea, 1979-1980.* (All telegrams cited were released by the Department of State in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requested originally filed by Tim Shorrock and can be found in the Kwangju Documents Collection, Government Documents and Information Center, Mudd Library, Yale University).

National Security Council. 30 May 1980. “Summary of Conclusions [from the PRC on
Korea which was held on 22 May 1980] (8012087)."


Jimmy Carter 1979, Book I-January 1 to June 22, 1979 (PPPU-Carter 1979-1)
Jimmy Carter 1979, Book II-June 23 to December 31, 1979 (PPPU-Carter 1979-2)

United States of America Congressional Record, 1979-1980


South Korea


Seoul Jibang Gomchalchong [The Seoul District Local Prosecutors Office]. 1996. The
Appendix

Interrogation Records of Former Korean Presidents, Chun Doo-whan and Rho Tae-woo, and Others, November 1995 –March 1996


Japan


_Dai87kai Kokkai Shugiin-iinkai Kiroku_

_Dai87kai Shugiin Gaimu-iinkai Dai3go (28 February 1979): Dai6go (25 April 1979); Dai11go (22 May 1979); Dai 12go (28 May 1979); Dai 13go (30 May 1979); Dai14go (31 May 1979); Dai15go (6 June 1979)._

_Dai87kai Shugiin Hon-kaigi Dai27go (22 May 1979)._

_Dai87kai Shugiin Naikaku-iinkai Dai11go (8 May 1979)._

_Dai87kai Shugiin Shokou-iinkai Dai8go (10 April 1979); Dai9go(11 April 1979)._

_Dai87kai Shugiin Yosan-iinkai Dai6go (6 February 1979); Dai7go (7 February 1979); Dai8go (8 February 1979); Dai9go (11 February 1979); Dai10go (17 February 1979); Dai11go (17 February 1979); Dai12go (21 February 1979); Dai13go (22 February 1979); Dai20go (6 March 1979)._

_Dai89kai Kokkai Shugiin-iinkai Kiroku_

_Dai89kai Sangiin Gaimu-iinkai Dai1go (13 November 1979)._

_Dai90kai Kokkai Shugiin-iinkai Kiroku_

_Dai90kai Shugiin Gaimu-iinkai Dai3go (14 December 1979):_

_Dai91kai Kokkai Shugiin-iinkai Kiroku_


_Dai93kai Kokkai Shugiin-iinkai Kiroku_
Appendix

Dai93kaiSangiin Anzenhosho, Okinawa, Hoppo Mondai-tokubetsuinkai Dai3go (31 October 1980).


Dai 87kai Kokkai Sangiin Kiroku
Dai87kai Sangiin Gaimu-ininkai Dai8go (24 April 1979); Dai11go (22 May 1979); Dai12go (24 May 1979); Dai13go (28 May 1979); Dai15go (6 June 1979).
Dai87kai Sangiin Yosan-ininkai Dai2go (8 March 1979); Dai5go (12 March 1979).

Dai 89kai Kokkai Sangiin Kiroku
Dai89kai Sangiin Gaimu-ininkai Dai1go (13 November 1979).

Dai90kai Kokkai Sangiin Kiroku
Dai90kai Sangiin Gaimu-ininkai Dai2go (18 December 1979).

Dai91kai Kokkai Sangiin Kiroku
Dai91kai Sangiin Gaimu-ininkai Dai2go (4 March 1980); Dai10go (18 April 1980); Dai5go (8 April 1980); Dai6go (10 April 1980); Dai7go (24 April 1980); Dai8go (13 May 1980); Dai22go (15 May 1980).
Dai91kai Sangiin Kessan-ininkai Dai14go (15 April 1980); Dai15go (17 April 1980).
Dai91kai Sangiin Yosan-ininkai Dai14go (24 March 1980); Dai15go (25 March 1980).

Dai93kai Kokkai Sangiin Kiroku
Dai93kai Sangiin Naikaku-ininkai Dai1go (12 August 1980); Dai11go (27 November 1980).

(3) Other Official Publications


Appendix


(4) Political Party Papers of Japan


(5) Other Sources


2. MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS

The Washington Post
Appendix

The New York Times (NYT)
Newsweek
Times
Sekai Shuho (Weekly)
Asahi Shimbun
Mainichi Shimbun
Yomiuri Shimbun
Sankei Shimbun
Chosun Ilbo
Donga Ilbo
Hankook Ilbo
The Korea Herald
The Keesing's Contemporary Archives (Keesing's)

3. BOOKS/ARTICLES


Appendix


Appendix


Appendix


Appendix

Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.


Kotani, G. 1979. “Baku Daitoryo no Shi to Korekara no Kankoku: Ima Koso Nikkan Renkei o” [The Death of President Park and South Korea: It is time to have the Japan-South Korea Solidarity], *Gekkan Jiyu Minshu* (November 1979): 32-9.


University Press.


---


Appendix


Tatsuki, H. “Kin Dai-ju Gensho no Taishite”[About the Kim Dae-jung Phenomenon]. Sekai (September 1980).


