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‘The colonial development of concentration camps (1868-1902)’

The forced labour and extermination camps established in Europe during the Second World War gave the meaning to the term ‘concentration camp’ which it has for the general public today. But the practice of concentrating civilians in guarded camps or centres, specifically as part of a counter-guerrilla military strategy during wartime, long pre-dated and outlasted the Second World War. In the light of fresh research this article looks comparatively at the function of the camps in four different colonial arenas between 1868 and 1908. It emphasizes the different purposes between these exercises in civilian concentration and the ‘camp culture’ of the Nazi era in Europe and challenges the linkage between the two asserted by Hannah Arendt half a century ago and by many others since.

It has long been argued that the origins of concentration camps lie in the colonial arenas of imperial powers at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. It was in the context of the British camps in South Africa (1900-1902) that the term ‘concentration camp’ was first put into general currency in English – as Goering pointed out to the British ambassador to Berlin in 1938. But the phenomenon has usually been traced back to the Spanish-Cuban War of 1895-1898. Reference to (re)concentrados, however, occurred earlier in Cuba, during the Ten Years’ War (1868-1878) and the Guerra chiquita (1879-1880), though the term ‘concentration camp’ is rarely found in the Cuban case, where civilians were concentrated in towns and villages under surveillance by Spanish regulars and irregulars. The internment of civilians in guarded camps, under conditions which regularly resulted in high mortality, was also a feature of strife-torn Europe long before the Second World War. Yet it is the forced labour and extermination camps in Europe, between 1939 and 1945, which gave the common meaning to the term ‘concentration camp’ which it has today. Since in South Africa and Cuba the later Nazi associations of the term ‘concentration camp’ have been deliberately exploited, it is important to acknowledge distinctions when the same term is used
to describe widely differing phenomena in different contexts and eras. Historians tend to look for continuities, links and precedents and historians of modern Germany have had particular reasons for doing so. There is now a sizeable literature, in the German case, linking what took place in colonial contexts in Africa, between 1904 and 1908, and what occurred later in Europe. The camps established by the German military in South West Africa, during the suppression of the rebellion by the Herero and Nama (1904-1908), were not essentially part of an anti-guerrilla strategy but were rather ‘punishment’ and ‘pacification’ camps for an enemy who had already been defeated. They are therefore functionally different from the three cases considered here.

In this article, we focus on the establishment of concentration camps in colonial contexts as part of a military strategy against guerrilla warfare during colonial rebellions and we would argue that this differs, in fundamental respects, from the camps established in Europe by e.g. Italy, Germany and the Soviet Union before and during the Second World War as part of wider systems of terror and political repression. In the colonial context, in the camps established by the Spanish in Cuba, the British in South Africa and the Americans in the Philippines there was never any intention of the physical extermination of those interned in them. In this article we show that the main purpose of civilian concentration lay in ‘clearing’ the countryside of possible civilian support for an evasive enemy who had resorted to guerrilla warfare. Whilst our focus is on the two cases where we have done fresh research – the Spanish concentrados in Cuba (1895-1898) and the British camps in South Africa (1900-1902) – we also try, in the limited space of an article, to bring the American camps in the Philippines (1899-1902) into comparative view.
Civilians in colonial warfare:

The resort to ‘civilian concentration’ by colonial powers struggling to contain rebellions in situations of guerrilla warfare, illuminates the fragility of colonial regimes which often found it difficult to occupy effectively the territory over which they claimed sovereignty during the ‘high noon’ of imperialism. There were many further colonial contexts in which this forced concentration of civilians was to occur, as a military measure sometimes accompanied by enforced ‘modernization’, during the course of the 20th century and especially during the armed struggles which accompanied the process of decolonisation after 1945. In the period under discussion (1868-1902) the Spanish in Cuba, the British in South Africa, and the Americans in the Philippines were compelled to involve far more troops than had originally been envisaged in protracted conflicts with usually smaller numbers of guerrilla fighters. The rebellions in Cuba and the Philippines resulted in external (American) intervention and the end of Spanish colonial rule. In South Africa, the terms of the peace agreed with the Boers by the Treaty of Vereeniging in May 1902, replaced the earlier British insistence on ‘unconditional surrender’ in order to bring the war to an end.

In all these cases, a blurring of the distinction between combatants and non-combatant civilians occurred, as is usually the case when there is a resort to guerrilla warfare. In these cases civilian concentration has to be regarded as essentially a military measure, the purpose of which was to separate the guerrilla fighters from any support from the civilian population amongst whom they could merge so easily. As a counter-guerrilla strategy this has a long history and a clear military rationale, even if, in our cases, humanitarian claims were also made in terms of enabling these civilians or refugees to be concentrated in places where – amidst an accompanying ‘scorched earth’ policy – they allegedly could be
accommodated and fed. Preoccupied with fighting the war, the organization and administration of civilian concentration camps was never a priority for the military authorities. It takes a strong, developed, adequately funded administration to organize and run a concentration camps system – the contrast between the British and Spanish cases is most striking here – and the presence of a civilian government capable of taking over this task was, in the South African case, critical to reducing the mortality rate and improving the conditions within the camps. In all these cases, the ability of the metropolitan government to intervene, check and control the military authorities in time of war was of crucial importance, as was the role of public opinion in exercising its influence on the metropolitan government and compelling it to intervene in ways which it might otherwise not have done.

Both political and military decision makers were influenced by contemporary racial ideology and its accompanying Social Darwinist ideas and by the concept of a ‘civilising mission’ which was a recurrent feature of European colonial involvement with the non-European world at this time. For all the European colonial powers, fighting an enemy categorised as ‘uncivilised’ lowered the barrier against the resort to more extreme measures of warfare. The Spanish regarded the Cuban rebels – consisting predominantly of Afro-Cubans – as ‘savages’ beyond the pale of civilisation. In South Africa, the black population was not the enemy. Tens of thousands of native Africans were employed by the British army and many looked to a British victory to improve their lot. In areas under temporary Boer control, some paid with their lives for their British loyalty. Meanwhile Kitchener, exasperated by the failure of the Middelburg peace negotiations in early 1901, described the Boers as ‘uncivilized Africander savages with only a thin white veneer’ and proposed ‘getting rid of’ those still
fighting and their families by deporting them to Fiji or getting the French or
Dutch to take them in Madagascar or Java. In the Philippines, the paternalist
gloss given to the American take-over there by President McKinley was
accompanied, after his re-election in November 1900, by the declaration of
martial law and authorisation, by the Secretary of State for War, for use of the
tough ‘methods which have proved successful in our Indian campaigns in the
West’. US Officers regarded Filipinos as ‘by no means civilized’ and in
‘identically the same position as the Indians of our country have been for many
years’. Therefore, in their opinion, the Filipino insurgency ‘must be subdued in
much the same way’.

CUBA (1868-1898):

Spanish colonial rule in Cuba had been repeatedly threatened during the
second half of the 19th century. Frustrated political and organizational reforms for
the once ‘ever faithful island’ led, in October 1868, to a general uprising in
eastern Cuba. Rebellions usually began in the poorer, less developed and more
turbulent Oriente. In 1868, property-owners there ‘freed’ their slaves – to
encourage them to join the rebellion – and fought together with the cattle farmers
from Puerto Príncipe against Spanish rule. The Spanish army and voluntary-units
managed to keep the insurgency more or less out of the rich, western provinces.
Heavily dependent on slave labour, western planters feared not only economic
loss but also that this revolt against Spanish rule would result in social revolution
and a ‘race war’. Panic at the prospect of a ‘second Haiti’ was eagerly nurtured by
Spanish propaganda. However, while inhabitants in the east suffered from ruthless
guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare, the destruction of livestock, expropriation,
and forced resettlement – until the peace settlement of February 1878 – in western
Cuba sugar production increased.
During the Ten Years’ War a lively discussion had developed about how to deal with the insurrection in general and on concentration-policies in particular – even beyond military circles. Most of the operational plans (many published in the early 1870s) had in common prompt pacification, closely connected with the intense concentration of the rural population along military communication lines. In 1872, the medical officer Echauz y Guinart, for example, recommended a master plan which included the forced resettlement and ‘clearing’ of half the island. Although continuous changes in the high command in Havana and political transformations in Madrid prevented a unified and concerted military strategy, tens of thousands of deportees had merged with refugees in crowded cities like Puerto Príncipe and Ciego de Ávila, along the fortified military line between Júcaro and Morón. Mortality soared and internees begged for authorization to leave the points of reconcentration that lacked potable water and to escape disease. In eastern Cuba, this early experience of regrouping the rural population in wartime left deep memories.14

In the following years of peace, Spain proved unable to tackle her ‘last chance in Cuba’. When new uprisings occurred, in February 1895, these benefited from a broader social base and a party-system which was well organized, both on the island and from exile: the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (PRC) headed by José Martí. Socio-political preconditions seemed to favour not only an anti-colonial uprising but also a social revolution. Furthermore, Cuban exiles provided the Liberation Army: Ejército Libertador Cubano (ELC) with much needed supplies from the Florida Keys and other Caribbean islands. Charismatic veterans from the Ten Years’ War (Antonio Maceo, Máximo Gómez, Calixto García) returned to Cuba. Superiority in numbers, equipment, and funding seemed to give a big advantage to the Spanish army. But the ELC balanced some of these
asymmetries with greater mobility, better knowledge of the terrain and adaptation to the island’s climate together with widespread civilian support in Oriente. Spanish military power proved literally helpless in the face of tropical diseases: Of 44,389 fatalities during the war of 1895-98 only 3,996 died in combat; over 40,000 (of the more than 200,000 Spanish forces in Cuba) died from disease; yellow fever being the biggest single killer of the Spanish troops.\(^{15}\) Spanish military performance therefore depended on the support given by Cuban and Spanish-born irregulars whose anti-guerrilla units accompanied regular troops as flying columns and operated as local anti-guerrilla forces around towns and cities. With up to 60-80,000 such irregulars on Spain’s payroll (as volunteers, town militias, fire units) they clearly outnumbered the ELC, which never recruited much more than 40,000 men. But this high number of irregulars should not be mistaken for widespread support for Spain. Only a minority took part in actual fighting and joining the local anti-guerrilla units or working on Spanish fortifications were amongst the few ways to earn a living during wartime and get the family on the official rations list. Nevertheless, Cubans fighting in Spanish lines are an important indication of the degree of civil strife involved in this war, an aspect which has often been ignored in the nationalist historiography.\(^{16}\)

By January 1896, Spanish Captain-General Arsenio Martínez Campos had suffered serious set-backs and the ELC had managed to penetrate the rich sugar-districts of Santa Clara, Matanzas and Havana. The ELC developed a policy of economic warfare involving the deliberate destruction of crops and sugar mills, and attacks on towns and villages, the purpose being to make Cuba economically unrewarding to Spain. This triggered a massive refugee displacement and migration in the western provinces. Some Spanish historians have interpreted this movement as a first concentration of country folk in fortified centres. Historian
W. Millis argued that the ELC’s ‘scorched earth’ policy and ‘deconcentration’ – forcing farmers either to work in the ‘liberated territory’ or to move to the cities – began the radicalization of warfare which has usually been associated with Captain-General Valeriano Weyler. This view – that it was the insurgents who initiated ‘civilian concentration’ – has been strongly denied by P.S. Foner and Cuban scholars.17

Amidst this controversy, there is no doubt that the plight of civilians came low on the list of imperial Spain’s priorities. Facing the impending collapse of Spanish rule in Cuba, powerful pressure groups on the island and large parts of the metropolitan press demanded a tougher war effort. Unsurprisingly, in January 1896, Spain’s liberal-conservative government, under Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, decided upon the intensification and radicalization of warfare, sending General Weyler to Cuba. Already in 1891, Cánovas had told Congress that, in a future war in Cuba, those ‘who were willing to shed more rivers of blood’ would win.18 With the outbreak of the war in 1895, a broad consensus had developed – between Spanish liberals and conservatives – that the island of Cuba, ‘the pearl of the Antilles’, should be defended to the ‘last man and the last peso’.19 Cuba was considered as a matter of ‘national integrity’, especially amongst politicians and the armed forces. There was a long-standing fear that losing control of Cuba would lead to the breakdown of the metropolitan Restoration-government of 1874 and of Spain’s artificially implemented two-party system which had lasted since 1885.

Weyler was regarded as the man to do a ‘dirty job’. He was widely experienced in colonial anti-guerrilla warfare (Santo Domingo, Cuba, Philippines) and ready to ‘defend Spain’s honour in Cuba’. As anticipated, one of his first
decrees, in February 1896, ordered the concentration of the rural population of the eastern part of the island in Spanish held, fortified towns. In October 1896 and January 1897, the decree was extended to both the island’s western and the central provinces. With this measure – in combination with a ‘scorched earth’ strategy – civilian support for the insurgents was to be prevented. No intelligence, weapons, ammunition, clothing, medicine or new recruits should reach the Cuban guerrilla forces. Civilian concentration was an important part of Spain’s response to the insurgents’ irregular warfare. The physical separation of rebels and civilians seemed the only way to defeat an agile and often invisible opponent. In contrast to the U.S. policy of counter-insurgency in the Philippines, however, there was hardly any ‘offer of development’ in Cuba to win the civilians’ ‘hearts and minds’. On the contrary, many local civil governments were simply overwhelmed by the arrival of tens of thousands of concentrados. Meanwhile, Weyler was preoccupied with fighting the guerrillas and was reluctant to devote resources or organise rations for the destitute civilians. Many of the military regarded refugees and concentrados as disguised insurgents or sympathizers of the ‘Republic in Arms’. The local town elites considered concentrados as bearers of potential epidemics and diseases like smallpox as well as unwanted additional mouths to feed. Neglect contributed to the high mortality amongst the concentrados caused by inadequate housing and sanitary conditions, food shortages and subsequent epidemics. The ELC also contributed to this civilian catastrophe by blockading cities and towns from much needed supplies and by raids on so-called ‘cultivation zones’. After a few weeks on rations, concentrados were expected to grow their own food for subsistence. The concentration policy in Cuba during 1896-97 was ‘unprecedented at the time for its scale, intensity, and efficiency’. Recent research concludes that at least 170,000 civilian internees, about one tenth of the total
population, lost their lives in these concentration-centres.\textsuperscript{21} The forced
resettlement in towns and cities had a lasting social impact on the island. Families
were torn apart, women and girls forced into prostitution. The balance between
the urban and rural populations altered substantially.

Contemporaries estimated that during the war some 400,000-600,000 people were assembled in over 80 concentration-points, located predominantly in
the western part of the island. Some villages accommodated only a small number
of \textit{concentrados}, but in cities like Artemisa (Pinar del Río), with a normal
population of about 2,000 inhabitants, civilian internees amounted to 6,364 by the
end of November 1897; among them 3,244 children and 1,239 women. High
numbers of \textit{concentrados} and escalating mortality were reported from Matanzas
and Santa Clara. Numbers given by provincial civil governors between November
1897 and February 1898, although incomplete, enable us to reach an
approximation for the total civilian deaths during the Cuban war of independence:
Data shows that in Pinar del Río 50\% of 47,800 \textit{concentrados} died; of the 88,000
internees in Matanzas 25,977. Santa Clara province reported 140,000
concentrated civilians and 52,997 deaths, whereas there are no exact figures for
Havana, Puerto Príncipe and Santiago. The figures given above therefore
represent only single ‘snapshots’ at a particular time. Data from Santiago,
Matanzas, and Santa Clara, for example, show that civilian concentration was not
a static phenomenon. For these provinces we can detect important migration
movements in and out of the main cities, sometimes over a few weeks. The
number of \textit{concentrados} was not only closely related to specific military actions.
Even the announcement of forthcoming military operations was followed in
Puerto Príncipe by a civilian influx into fortified towns. But people also left
Trinidad (Santa Clara) in the spring of 1897, violating Weyler’s orders, in order to
flee from a smallpox epidemic. At Jovellanos (Matanzas) we know that many people left the town to work in the countryside during the months of the sugar harvest. In Matanzas province, a large exodus occurred when concentration was eased in November 1897 by the new decrees of Captain-General Ramón Blanco, who had replaced Weyler in October 1897.²²

In strictly military terms, Weyler’s concentration-policy achieved considerable success. By autumn 1897, the ELC was mainly confined to Cuba’s eastern provinces. In addition, General Camilo Garcia Polavieja – who had replaced General Blanco in the Philippines in December 1896 – asked Madrid whether he might resort to similar strategies as Weyler to subdue the Katipuna’s uprising after resistance to Spanish rule had broken out on Luzon in August 1896. But the Pact of Biak-na-bato, which brought the uprising to an end in mid-December 1897, was more the result of divisions in the Filipino revolutionary front than of successful Spanish anti-guerrilla strategies. In Cuba, however, Weyler’s methods of extreme warfare, regardless of civilian losses, made him unacceptable to the newly constituted liberal government in Spain. In the U.S.A., the massive number of civilian deaths which occurred under Weyler’s regime was regarded as a demonstration of Spain’s ‘uncivilized warfare’, and formed a major justification for the U.S. Army’s ‘humanitarian intervention’ in April 1898. The fragility of Spanish imperial rule was clearly revealed when Spain was seriously challenged by the combination of liberation movements in Cuba and the Philippines with the readiness of the U.S.A., as the emerging world power, to intervene and bring about the end of the Spanish Empire in both the Caribbean and the Pacific.

PHILIPPINES (1899-1902):
After the American take-over of the Philippines in December 1898, war broke out again in early February 1899. The insurrection was limited to a few areas in the scattered archipelago where the extreme geographical, social and ethnic divisions led U.S. imperialists to question the idea that the Tagalog and Ilocano forces led by Emilio Aguinaldo on Luzon constituted a ‘national’ movement. After his capture in 1901 and the fall of Miguel Malvar’s guerrillas in Batangas the following year, the war was, at least rhetorically, brought to an end in July 1902 with the presence of around 70,000 American troops and a ruthlessness which dismissed further insurrectional activity as banditry.23

At the beginning of the uprising in 1899, Filipino revolutionary leaders tried to wage conventional warfare and were reluctant to resort to guerrilla strategies. On the one hand this restriction was nurtured by the hope for acceptance amongst the ‘civilized’ nations; on the other hand there was the elite’s fear of loosing control, both over territory and over the majority of their forces which might slip from an independence movement into social revolution. In the wake of the first defeats against the U.S. troops, Aguinaldo had to take these risks and organize local guerrilla units all over the country.24 As the war continued, U.S. officers and soldiers demanded a tightening of military measures: Anti-guerrilla strategies included not only the confiscation of property, summary executions, massacres, deportations, and crop destruction, but also civilian concentration in designated areas. J. Franklin Bell’s concentration order on 8 December 1901 for Batangas province illustrates how extreme measures in anti-guerrilla warfare, targeting especially the civilian population, were gradually implemented.25 At the same time, in the ‘pacified’ towns and villages, American civil administrators tried to implement allegedly social ‘uplifting’ programs and economic development: new roads, schools, medical infrastructure, sanitation,
and ‘protection’ from the guerrilla forces. In Julian Go’s words, the occupying power’s efforts in social engineering predated ‘modernization theories of democratization later proposed in the 1950s’. Officers were convinced ‘that economic development stimulated by American capital would undo the putatively medieval social condition in the two colonies and stimulate sociopolitical development’. However, G. A. May has pointed to the early ‘hearts and minds’ campaign’s ‘relative failure’. Indeed, many civilians cooperated with the U.S. authorities during the day but at night they regularly served the guerrillas. Furthermore, the success of public instruction campaigns existed in many locations only on paper: schoolbooks were lacking in Batangas, school buildings were inadequate, and teachers unqualified – to name only a few of the many problems.  

When Americans resorted to civilian concentration in the Philippines, officers were influenced not only by the contemporary examples of the British in South Africa and the Spanish in Cuba but also by previous American experience of establishing ‘reservations’ for native Americans during the ‘Indian Wars’ in North America earlier in the 19th century. In the ‘concentration zones’ in the Philippines tens of thousands of people died in the space of a few months from malnutrition and disease. In all our cases ‘the war of numbers’ has been politically exploited and the problem of statistics has challenged several generations of historians. Due to unreliable or fragmentary evidence it is doubtful if the precise number of deaths, as a result of civilian internment in each of our cases at the turn of the 19th and 20th century, will ever be established. This is especially true for the Philippines, where it is difficult to separate deaths in the ‘concentration zones’ from the even greater number which followed as a result of epidemics of cholera and other diseases.
In the light of the concentration-order for Batangas province and the accounts which followed of abuse and torture committed by U.S. troops, not only American anti-imperialists sensed a link between ‘butcher’ Weyler’s way of warfare in Cuba and the methods being resorted to by the American forces in the Philippines. If the Spanish army’s similar anti-guerrilla strategy had brought about the recent American ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Cuba, was the U.S. army in the Philippines acting according to the laws of ‘civilized warfare’ recently embodied in the Hague Convention of 1899?28 Sustained by the idea of a ‘civilizing mission’, American public opinion was persuaded that analogies were not necessarily parallels and took comfort from the contemporary British example in South Africa where extensive imperial experience and military necessity, it was argued, had justified their actions. In 1902 the Boston Journal argued that how civilian dislocation and internment were implemented determined ‘whether it is a harsh method or not’.29

Moreover, the Filipinos were regarded as an ‘inferior race’, superstitious, fragmented, politically immature and incapable of self-rule. ‘Filipino independence’, declared Theodore Roosevelt, would be ‘like granting self-government to an Apache reservation under some local chief’.30 Through policies of ‘chastisement’ and social engineering the Americans embarked on a ‘civilising mission’ in the Philippines to bring about a cultural transformation in which colonialism was claimed as a benevolent form of nation-building. Thus, both in Cuba and the Philippines, the occupying powers resorted to civilian concentration in order to defeat the insurgents and, as Emily Hobhouse put it in her book about the contemporary situation in South Africa, The Brunt of the War and Where it Fell (1902), it was the non-combatant civilians who suffered most.
SOUTH AFRICA (1900-1902):

The concentration camps established by the British military in South Africa (1900-1902) have remained the most controversial and highly mythologised aspect of the South African War (1899-1902). Small wars are big wars to those that lose them and this war was more important than either the first or second world wars in the making of 20th century South Africa and in firing the furnace of Afrikaner nationalism which blazed its way to political dominance in its aftermath. For Britain, this was the most extensive, costly and humiliating war fought between 1815 and 1914 and the greatest of the wars accompanying the European ‘scramble for Africa’. By March 1900, over 200,000 British and Empire troops (30,000 volunteers came from Canada, Australia and New Zealand) were fighting Boer forces numbering no more than 45,000. By 1902 this war was costing £1.5 million a week. What began as a colonial war, a Boer-British conflict over the Transvaal republic, soon developed into a regional war, with civil war dimensions to it, involving the whole population – black as well as white. This was not just a ‘white man’s war’ and historians have spent the past 30 years exploring the involvement of the black population in it. They have revealed how war went on at many different levels in South Africa between 1899 and 1902 apart from the battlefields which have so preoccupied military historians. Many of the conflicts which then erupted into open warfare were home-grown, internally generated out of the recent South African past. The arrival of the British army enabled some of the conflicts endemic within South African society to become part of the Boer-British struggle.  

The South African camps were first established by the British military as ‘protection camps’ for Boers who had surrendered (Hendsoppers) and their families to prevent them being re-commandeered by Boers who were still fighting
on commando (*Bitterenders*). After the British annexed the two republics in mid-1900, without effectively occupying them, this was a real danger. Soon, however, other refugees, mostly women and children (some of them the families of Boers who were still fighting) who had been displaced from their homes were forced to join them and already by late 1900 a blurring had occurred between ‘protection camps’ for surrendered Boers and ‘concentration camps’ for other civilian refugees. Many surrendered Boers initially supported the policy of concentrating the women and children in camps in their home districts, where they allegedly could be protected and fed by the British. Before the high mortality in the camps became generally known, some Boers still fighting on commando and unable to look after their families encouraged them to go there. The British hoped that the existence of the camps might bring a speedy end to the war since they announced that burghers on commando, who laid down their arms and took an oath of neutrality, could join their families in the camps, whereas they risked losing everything and having their farms confiscated or burnt if they continued to fight. ‘They love their property more than they hate the British’, declared Milner, the British High Commissioner. Those caught on the battlefield were treated as prisoners-of-war and sent overseas to P.O.W. camps. The earliest refugee / concentration camps were already in existence by September 1900, but the number of their inmates was small until the beginning of 1901. Then, the harsh ‘scorched earth’ and ‘clearance’ policy, initiated by Lord Roberts and systematically adopted and extended as an anti-guerrilla measure by Lord Kitchener (after he had succeeded Lord Roberts as the Commander-in Chief of the British army at the end of November 1900), swept tens of thousands of civilians – black and white – off the veld and into hastily improvised tented camps, established along the railway lines for military monitoring and supply
purposes, in an operation for which there had been no adequate planning.
Assuming that the war would soon be brought to an end, these camps were expected to be a short-lived, temporary measure; but, as the guerrilla war dragged on, they became part of a much wider counter-guerrilla military strategy which included a guerrilla-catching network of thousands of blockhouses connected by barbed wire and manned by over 50,000 soldiers and African auxiliaries.34

**The South African camps reconsidered:**

The general picture of the British concentration camps in South Africa was established by Afrikaner nationalists in the decades after the war. They developed a powerful mythology of victimhood and suffering which fed into the emerging Afrikaner nationalist movement for which the deaths of 27,927 Boer civilians in these camps (the suspiciously precise figure calculated by the Transvaal archivist P.L.A. Goldman in 1906 by a suspect methodology) became a key reference point for the rest of the 20th century.35 After the political transition in South Africa in the 1990s, African nationalists re-worked these camps as sites of common African and Afrikaner victimhood and ‘shared suffering’ at the hands of British imperialists. What is extraordinary is not these efforts at quarrying the past for present purposes of nation-building – all nationalists do this – but the lack, until very recently, of any substantial, empirical and dispassionate research into these camps for which the surviving evidence is far richer, more detailed and extensive than that for any of the other cases of concentration camps considered here. Our recent research, in British and South African archives, has led to conclusions which are very revisionist of the established picture.

The counter-guerrilla purpose of these camps during the protracted, guerrilla phase of the war (1900-1902) needs to be emphasized. These were not
‘punishment’ camps for a defeated enemy, as was the case for the Herero and Nama in German South West Africa (Namibia) during the war of 1904-1908. As Lord Roberts made clear, the Boer camp inmates were regarded as British subjects who were expected to become part of a self-governing, white minority-ruled dominion within the British Empire. Although these were called ‘concentration camps’, the terms ‘refugee camps’ and ‘burgher refugee camps’ were also used to denote what were essentially internment camps for civilians. These were clearly distinguished from the P.O.W. camps to which captured Boer combatants were dispatched, both in South Africa and overseas. A further distinction was made between the system of about 40 ‘white’ camps, established mainly in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony and administered by the Department of Burgher Refugees from headquarters in Pretoria and Bloemfontein, and the quite separate system of about 60 ‘black’ camps (‘native refugee camps’) which were organized by the Department of Native Refugees. These two systems of camps need to be considered separately since their differences are so marked.

Understandably, it is the number of deaths in these camps which have preoccupied all who have written about them. The ‘white’ camps had about 150,000 inmates, mostly women and children, along with a small number of their ‘black’ domestic servants. Utilizing the surviving camp registers, death certificates and lists of camp deaths published in the Government Gazettes we have established a database of over 100,000 Boer camp inmates and estimate the total Boer camp deaths at around 25,000. This is less than Goldman’s figure but a good deal more than the official British total of 20,139. The thousands of deaths in the ‘black’ camps were omitted from the picture until B. Spies and P. Warwick established that there were 14,154 recorded deaths, a figure which is certainly an underestimate of the total deaths which occurred. In 2001, S.V. Kessler made an
estimate of 20,000 but too much of the evidence about the ‘black’ camps has been destroyed for the precise total to be known.\textsuperscript{37} Our research has led us to conclude that the total number of deaths in these camps for whites and blacks was at least 40,000.

The system of ‘white’ camps was administered from two headquarters, in Bloemfontein and Pretoria, with weekly statistical ‘returns’ and monthly reports from each camp along with reports from medical officers and inspectors most of which were forwarded to London and some of which were published in government Blue Books.\textsuperscript{38} This reflects the highly developed administrative systems of the British War Office and Colonial Office and the existence in South Africa of an effective civil government under the hawk-eyed British High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner. It was he who, in April 1901, insisted that individual details of the deaths of Boer civilians in the ‘white’ camps be published weekly in the Government Gazettes. ‘We owe it to their relatives’, he said.\textsuperscript{39} As the mortality increased, reaching a peak in October 1901, these entries occupy many pages of these publications and, together with the revelations in the Blue Books, fuelled the public outcry. The paper trail left by the administrative system for these camps reveals not only facts and figures but also how these were queried and checked at each stage of their collection.

It has long been known that the majority of these deaths (three quarters of them were of children under 16 years of age) were due to epidemics of measles and its accompanying complications. Measles is a highly infectious and deadly disease now, as then, especially amongst children in undeveloped countries, though the development of inoculation has greatly reduced its mortality record since the 1960s. What had been feared were typhoid epidemics. Typhoid also
occurred in some of the camps and caused the deaths of around 8,000 British soldiers in what the British army came to regard as ‘the last of the typhoid campaigns’; but there were only four recorded British deaths from measles. Unlike the British troops, the Boers came from a thinly scattered, rural ‘frontier’ population which had little previous contact with measles and thus an extremely low immunity to the disease. Swept from their homes into hastily improvised, overcrowded, tented camps by the British army, with inadequate food, shelter, sanitation and medical supervision in the early months, they succumbed in epidemics which spread from camp to camp during 1901 – when extensive measles epidemics and mortality also occurred outside the camps for which we have no comparable record. The camp records reveal the desperate situation in many of the camps during the early months with some camp superintendents being described by visiting inspectors as ‘at their wits’ end trying to meet their responsibilities’ and begging the British forces not to send more people in to camps where there was a raging measles epidemic and where facilities were already stretched beyond their limit. Their pleas were usually ignored by a military only too ready to hand over responsibility for civilians to the civilian authorities. Contingents of several hundred Boer civilians, mostly women and children, were regularly ‘dropped off’, often without any advance notice, in a state of weakness and exhaustion after many days on the march. The mortality rates reached a peak of over 400 per 1,000 per annum for brief periods in some camps.

These shocking mortality rates caused a public outcry in Britain when they were first revealed in mid-1901 by Emily Hobhouse, who had visited some of the camps. Her role is a striking example of the working of a free press in wartime and the 19th century non-conformist conscience in action. The British
government was pushed into dispatching the first ever all women’s Commission of Enquiry to investigate the situation under the redoubtable leadership of Millicent Garrett Fawcett. The reforms which this Ladies Committee recommended were promptly enacted.\textsuperscript{42} The administration of the camps, having been transferred from military to civilian control, came under the sustained scrutiny of the Colonial Office and its officials rather than that of the otherwise preoccupied War Office. The accommodation, funding, food rations and sanitation in the camps were improved. Doctors, teachers and nurses were hastily recruited in Britain and dispatched to the camps. What Milner called some ‘Indian geniuses’ arrived in South Africa to bring Indian experience to bear on the administration of the camps in South Africa.\textsuperscript{43} The large influx of new camp inmates ceased. Historians have assumed that these developments, and especially what T. Pakenham called ‘the magical effect’ of the rapid implementation of the Fawcett committee’s recommendations, brought about the dramatic improvement in the camps and the fall in mortality by the end of 1901.\textsuperscript{44} Yet our research shows that incremental reforms in the camps were already underway, that the measles epidemics were already over, and mortality in many of the camps had markedly declined before these reforms came into effect. The epidemiological dynamics of measles (including epidemic ‘fade out’ with the end of large new influxes of susceptible people) need to be integrated into the analysis.

A quite separate system of ‘black’ camps was organized by the Native Refugee Department under the leadership of the capable and well-intentioned Canadian, Captain de Lotbinière, whose reports form our most important source of information since most of such detailed data as was ever collected about individual ‘black’ camps was later destroyed. There were an even larger number of ‘black’ camps though many of these were short-lived holding centres.\textsuperscript{45}
‘black’ camps in this war were ‘farm and labour’ camps in which African families, who had been displaced by ‘clearing’, were settled on unoccupied land close to the railway system guarded by British forces. There they were dumped and largely left to themselves to construct temporary huts or shanties. These ‘black’ camps were regarded by the British as a labour reservoir from which men were dispersed for long periods all over South Africa to meet the huge labouring needs not only of the British army but of private employers as well. For this they were paid at the rate of a shilling a day. Meanwhile, the women and children – who, as in the ‘white’ camps, formed the bulk of the population in the ‘black’ camps – were expected to cultivate their own subsistence and sell any surplus. Some of the ‘black’ camps acted as satellites from which labour was drawn for menial tasks in the ‘white’ camps. Captain de Lotbinière was expected to keep start-up costs to a minimum and to move rapidly towards making the ‘black’ camps self-supporting. Certainly, they had far fewer staff and resources than the ‘white’ camps and experienced some of the same epidemics, though disease-specific data is largely absent. Particularly in relation to the expectation that these camps would cultivate their own subsistence and cost little, the ‘black’ camps are very different from the ‘white’ camps and would seem to have more in common with the concentration centres in Cuba. In the organization of concentration camps in South Africa, racial categorization played a crucial role.

The ideas and ideology which the British brought to bear on the camps they established in South Africa were influenced by previous experience in Ireland (during the Famine in the 1840s) and India (where cholera and famine camps had been set up during the 1870s and 1880s) and by administering workhouses, the Poor Law and social welfare in England itself. Wherever possible, the important thing, as the camps administration put it, was ‘not to
pauperize the people’ and reduce them to dependence on hand-outs. Creating schools and employment – within or without the camps – was regarded as good for morale and would enable the inmates to ‘earn their rations’ and even to become self-supporting, be taken off the rations list and, in many such cases, to leave the camps. The South African camps were not prisons – many of them were not even fenced in until late in the war – and Brodrick (Secretary of State for War) made it clear that they were not penal and any of their inmates who could support themselves should be allowed to go to the towns. The camp registers reveal how many of the inmates moved about, in and out of the camps: to join relatives in other camps or to find employment and reside in nearby towns. But this was wartime, many had witnessed the destruction of their homes by the British army (30,000 farmhouses were burned down), permits were needed for travel, and most had nowhere else to go.

The presence of Boer men of working age in the camps has been largely air-brushed out of the picture by Afrikaner nationalists who thought they should have been out fighting the British not living in camps and earning wages from them. So far, we have found over 13,000 and practically all of them were in some form of paid employment: either within the camps as guards, police, inspection teams, builders, carpenters, brick-makers, shoe-makers etc. or in the nearby towns. The camp registers also reveal the considerable number of Boer men in the camps who took the oath of allegiance and left the camps to take up active military service with the British in the Burgher Corps, formed for the purpose, where their pay was twice as much as they received in camp employment. Their importance to the British was as scouts and guides with an intimate knowledge of the terrain and the likely hideouts of the commandos amongst whom some of them had once lived. They were hated by the Boers still fighting and, if caught,
were court-martialled and shot. A. Grundlingh’s research reveals that about a quarter of the Boers still fighting at the end of this war, were fighting on the British side. Their wages could markedly improve the situation for their families. How do we know this? Because we have found records of the Transvaal camp shops, run by Poynton Brothers, some with takings of over £1,000 per month from camp inmates. Money was earned and spent in these camps on a scale that has been totally left out of the picture. The British camps in South Africa cost about £2.5 million to run. And what was the second highest item of expenditure – after food and camp supplies? The surprising answer is: wages to camp inmates. More was spent on this than on the total wage bill for the official camp staff. Wages were not only paid to the men but also to many of the young women who became probationer nurses in the camp hospitals, assisted in camp inspections, or taught in the camp schools – where, by the beginning of 1902, more Boer children were attending school than had ever been the case in the pre-war republics. The opportunity the camps offered for social engineering and the acquisition of training and skills which would be of benefit to those who acquired them after the war was over, were all part of the imperial mind-set of the British in South Africa as in many later colonial situations.

When a peace settlement was finally reached by the Treaty of Vereeniging on 31 May 1902, the British hoped that post-war policies of reconstruction, reconciliation and the move towards self-government (accelerated by the new Liberal government in Britain during 1906-1907) would result in a united, transformed, white minority-ruled South African dominion in which the British influence would prevail. Having won the war, they lost the peace to a mobilized Afrikaner nationalist movement which swept into power as soon as elections were held. The Union of South Africa, which came into being in 1910, was Boer-led
and Boer-dominated and skilfully achieved under the leadership of Botha and Smuts. The deaths of all those Boer civilians in British camps, especially of women and children, were unintended but they were deaths all the same; and they have cast a long shadow over Boer-British relations ever since.

CONCLUSIONS:

In all our cases, ideological concepts, the exclusion of the enemy from ‘civilisation’ or blunt racial attitudes of superiority were used to justify the intensification of warfare. The resort to civilian internment, involving a blurring of the fragile border between combatants and non-combatants, became acceptable. In a rapid process of racializing the ‘enemy’, U.S. soldiers increasingly envisaged the whole Filipino population as hostile and racial categorization thus played a key role in sanctioning extreme measures of warfare and in condoning high civilian losses. In Cuba, civilian concentration was accompanied by the rural districts being declared as ‘free fire zones’: everybody outside the fortified towns was considered as an insurgent and treated as such. Inside the fortified towns neglect, incompetence, and lack of resources resulted in mortality on a scale that shocked the world and fuelled the American intervention.

But in Spain, people were too preoccupied with the miserable health and supply situation of their own army overseas and the terrible state of its returnees from Cuba – skeleton-like men, shaken by tropical disease – to really care about the Cuban civilian population. Indignation about the Cuban situation reached Spain’s liberal opposition party through the American and liberal press and it used this to challenge the government. In the case of the Philippines, the high civilian death-rate amongst the Filipino population and the atrocities committed by American forces during the anti-guerrilla war there aroused few demonstrations of public
concern in the United States apart from that of a few academics and the steadfast members of the Anti-Imperialist League. In Britain, by contrast, the press and public opinion were far more exercised about the situation in the South African camps than about the typhoid epidemics amongst British troops. The scale of mortality in those camps led the Liberal Party leader, Campbell-Bannerman, to accuse the government of fighting the war in South Africa by ‘methods of barbarism’ and did much to prick the bubble of jingoistic imperialism which had accompanied the war.

At first sight, there might seem to be more differences between the camps examined in this article than aspects in common. Fortified and sometimes fenced towns in Cuba, with internees herded together in old warehouses, barracks, or improvised huts, had little in common with British tented camps, though many of the British camps for the wartime refugees who flocked to the towns, also began in already existing buildings. Concentrados in Cuba, like the inmates of the ‘black’ camps in South Africa but unlike those in the ‘white’ camps, were also expected to cultivate their own subsistence and serve as a labour reservoir, building fortifications for the Spanish and maintaining the island’s infrastructure, for which they were sometimes paid. Here, too, the idea behind these work schemes was to enable men to maintain their families although in practice they contributed little to defusing the critical humanitarian situation. Neither the Cuban nor the South African cases can be compared with the degree of forced labour in the German military’s camps in Namibia (1904-1908) which, in contrast with the three other cases examined here, were not established essentially as part of an anti-guerrilla strategy. They also differed in terms of organization and administration. Whereas, in South Africa, the British developed centralized camp administrations for both the ‘white’ and the ‘black’ camps, in Cuba local
committees (mayor, military commander, church, and local elite) were left to care independently for the destitute and compete for scant resources from the Captain-General. A distinguishing feature in Cuba was the element of class-warfare inherent in civilian concentration where wealthy property-owners (who had paid their taxes and could afford volunteer forces to protect their estates) were excluded. In this respect, civilian concentration acknowledged and strengthened unequal property and land-owning structures by sweeping ‘unlawful residents’ away. In South Africa, after the war, the British re-instated the pre-war social order, assisted the Boer landowners to return to their farms, and did nothing to change the position of the African population. Just as the British in South Africa liked to refer to their ‘protection’ and ‘refugee’ camps, Spanish Generals also claimed in Cuba to ‘protect’ refugees from abuse and interference by the insurgents. Furthermore, it was argued that the rural population (‘savages’) would benefit from the ‘civilizing’ influences of concentration and urbanization. Ideas of social engineering were – as we have shown – much more explicit in South Africa and were well developed by the U.S. in the Philippines. But the rhetoric of the ‘civilising’ or ‘modernizing mission’ should not blind us to the fact that, in all these cases, the rationale for the camps was essentially military.

The military purpose of the camps, as a counter-guerrilla strategy in wartime – of separating insurgents from any support by civilian non-combatants – is the common denominator of the camps in Cuba, South Africa and the Philippines. As part of an anti-guerrilla strategy this was not new. The attempt to ‘isolate’ the civilian population from insurgent guerrilla-fighters emerges as a characteristic feature of anti-guerrilla warfare. Referring to the well-known work of C. E. Callwell, the British military historian, I. Beckett, emphasizes that the resort to civilian concentration emerged ‘entirely independently in different
armies faced with the same kind of difficulties’. He makes a strong case for a structural understanding of anti-guerrilla policies. Recent research also indicates that in areas such as southern Africa, where British and German colonial powers were neighbours, they were ready, in a limited way, to assist each other during the first decade of the twentieth century at a time when there was a mounting antagonism between them in Europe. Indeed, in Cuba, South Africa, the Philippines and Namibia, the different colonial powers were well informed about the ‘small wars’ of their contemporaries and could be said to have learned from each other’s counter-guerrilla measures, during the suppression of colonial rebellions, as well as from previous guerrilla wars. In some cases, individual soldiers drew on experience in several of these conflicts. Therefore, we would argue that the colonial development of concentration camps can be understood at best as a combination of structural factors and situational decisions that were influenced by both the personal experience of the decision makers and the example of other colonial powers.

The colonial development of concentration camps, examined in this article, was part of a process which continued during the twentieth century with the later appearance of the ‘new villages’ in Malaya, the ‘camps de regroupement’ in Algeria, the camps during the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya, and the ‘strategic hamlet’ system in Vietnam. We would argue that none of these have much in common – either in purpose or in organisation – with the Nazi camps in Germany (from 1933) or in occupied Europe (1939-1945). Our goal is to point the way ahead for future work on the diverse phenomenon of forced civilian concentration which, in the twentieth century, was by no means limited to Europe or to European colonial arenas.
This article has been developed out of a presentation given by us at a conference on ‘Helpless Imperialists: Imperial Failure, Radicalization, and Violence’ at the Institute for Advanced Study, Freiburg University, in January 2010. We wish to record our thanks to Gregor Thum and Maurus Reinkowski for their invitation to participate in that conference. Iain Smith also thanks Elizabeth van Heyningen (University of Cape Town), his co-researcher on the South African camps, and the Wellcome Trust for their generous funding of that project.

1 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 440. See on Arendt’s work King & Stone, eds. Hannah Arendt and the Uses of History. See also, Madley, ‘From Africa to Auschwitz’, and Olusoga and Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust: Germany’s Forgotten Genocide and the Colonial Roots of Nazism

2 Henderson, Failure of a Mission, 29.

3 This is currently the subject of research by members of A. Kramer’s team based at Trinity College, Dublin: [http://www.tcd.ie/warstudies/projects.php#concentration](http://www.tcd.ie/warstudies/projects.php#concentration). The camps in Nazi Germany (1933-1939) are the subject of a recently completed research project led by N. Wachsmann at Birkbeck College, London: [www.camps.bbk.ac.uk](http://www.camps.bbk.ac.uk). See also Caplan & Wachsmann, eds. Concentration Camps in Nazi Germany.

4 Henderson, Failure of a Mission, 29.

5 Furthermore, a clear distinction is drawn between concentration and extermination camps. See Orth, System, 25-26, 337.

6 For a recent critical assessment of this literature see Gerwarth & Malinowski, ‘Hannah Arendt’s Ghosts’, 279-300.

7 For the fullest recent study of this case see Olusoga & Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust.’

8 See for an overview of different camps and their functions, Kotek & Rigoulot, Le siècle des camps.


11 Kitchener to Brodrick (War Office), 21 June 1901. Kitchener Papers, 30/57/20/2, National Archives, Kew.


13 See for an overview, Pérez Jr., Cuba, 77-96.

14 Echauz, Lo que se ha hecho, 5 & 24-30. ‘Instancia dirigida al Comandante General de Sancti Spíritus por varios vecinos del Cuartón de Jobosí solicitando se les permita trasladarse a sus respectivas fincas para erradicar el brote de la epidemia extendida con la reconcentración de familias’, 6 February 1870, Archivo General Militar de Madrid (AGMM), Ultramar/Cuba (U/C) 5841.40; Pérez Guzmán, Herida profunda, 41 & 45.

15 For 1896, official statistics ascribed 9,052 deaths out of 17,897 to this tropical illness which the Spanish medical service did not know how to control. Larra, Datos para la historia, 5-7, 22, 28-
29, 39 & 41-42; Tone, ‘How the Mosquito (Man) Liberated Cuba’, 283-84. Spanish combatants deaths from ‘Bajas de oficiales y tropa durante toda la campaña’, 22 October 1898; AGMM, U/C 5791.2.

16 See both, orders and lists on rations in AGMM, U/C 4921. Tone, War and Genocide, 9, 93, 142; Foner, Antonio Maceo and Bajuras, 2057, 172. For a nationalist interpretation see Roig, La guerra libertadora, 135-144.

17 Cardona & Losada, Weyler, 206; Diego, Weyler, 24; Millis, Martial Spirit, 59-60; Foner, Spanish-Cuban-American War, 77, 106-107, 110.

18 Cited in: Elorza & Hernández, Guerra de Cub, 157-158.

19 One of the few exceptions were the republicans of Francisco Pi i Margall and his newspaper El Nuevo Régimen that advocated independence for Cuba.

20 See for disinfection stations implemented at the city’s entry of Pinar del Río, Archivo Provincial Pinar del Río, Gobierno Civil de la Colonia, Actas Capitulares, libro 10, entry of 27 October 1897, 54.


22 AGMM, U/C 5741.2 & 5809, 3441 & 3444.

23 A good start on the published literature is provided by Linn, U.S. Army and Counter-Insurgency.


26 Go, ‘Imperial Power’, 208-09; May, Batangas, 158-160.

27 On the difficulties regarding civilian deaths see Gates, ‘War-related Deaths in the Philippines’ and May, ‘150,000 Missing Filipinos’.

28 For the difficulties with irregular warfare in the international treaties see Nurick & Barrett, ‘Legality of Guerrilla Forces’, 563-583.


30 Milner to Kitchener, 31 October 1900; Milner Papers, 45, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

31 Maurice & Grant, Official History, vol. IV, 568-576; Pakenham, The Boer War, 536-537.


33 Milner to Kitchener, 31 October 1900; Milner Papers, 45, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

34 Spies, Methods of Barbarism?, 250-51, 288; Warwick, Black People, 150-51.


36 Reports etc. on the Working of the Refugee Camps. Covering over a thousand pages these include (for 1901-1902) Cd. 608, 694, 789, 793, 819, 853, 893, 939, 942, 902, 934, 936, 1161.
39 Milner to Sir Hamilton Goold-Adams, 4 April 1901; Goold-Adams Papers, file 1, Rhodes House Library, Oxford.
41 Emily Hobhouse has generated an extensive literature. See Fisher, That Miss Hobhouse, and especially her own publications and the two volumes of her letters edited by van Reenen, Emily Hobhouse and Hobhouse Balme, To Love One’s Enemies.
42 Report on the Concentration Camps in South Africa of the Committee of Ladies, Cd. 893.
44 Pakenham, The Boer War, 518.
47 Brodrick to Kitchener, 21 June 1901. Kitchener Papers 30/57/22/(2), National Archives, Kew.
48 Grundlingh, The dynamics of treason.
50 See van Heyningen, ‘A tool for modernisation?’.
52 Callwell, Small Wars.

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**Internet Resources:**

[www.camps.bbk.ac.uk](http://www.camps.bbk.ac.uk)


[http://www.tcd.ie/warstudies/projects.php#concentration](http://www.tcd.ie/warstudies/projects.php#concentration)