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A new consequence of Simpson's paradox : stable cooperation in one-shot prisoner's dilemma from populations of individualistic learners

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Chater, Nick, Vlaev, Ivo and Grinberg, Maurice (2008) A new consequence of Simpson's paradox : stable cooperation in one-shot prisoner's dilemma from populations of individualistic learners. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 137 (3). pp. 403-421. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.137.3.403 ISSN 0096-3445.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.137.3.403

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Abstract

Theories of choice in economics typically assume that interacting agents act individualistically and maximize their own utility. Specifically, game theory proposes that rational players should defect in one-shot prisoners' dilemmas (PD). Defection also appears to be the inevitable outcome for agents who learn by reinforcement of past choices, because whatever the other player does, defection leads to greater reinforcement on each trial. In a computer simulation and 4 experiments, the authors show that, apparently paradoxically, when players' choices are correlated by an exogenous factor (here, the cooperativeness of the specific PD chosen), people obtain greater average reinforcement for cooperating, which can sustain cooperation. This effect arises from a well-known statistical paradox, Simpson's paradox. The authors speculate that this effect may be relevant to aspects of real-world human cooperative behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science
Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Publisher: American Psychological Association
ISSN: 0096-3445
Official Date: August 2008
Dates:
DateEvent
August 2008Published
Volume: 137
Number: 3
Number of Pages: 19
Page Range: pp. 403-421
DOI: 10.1037/0096-3445.137.3.403
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access

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