Debiasing context effects in strategic decisions : playing against a consistent opponent can correct perceptual but not reinforcement biases
Vlaev, Ivo and Chater, Nick. (2008) Debiasing context effects in strategic decisions : playing against a consistent opponent can correct perceptual but not reinforcement biases. Judgment and Decision Making, Vol.3 (No.6). pp. 463-474. ISSN 1930-2975Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://journal.sjdm.org/vol3.6.html
Vlaev and Chater (2006) demonstrated that the cooperativeness of previously seen prisoner’s dilemma games biases choices and predictions in the current game. These effects were: a) assimilation to the mean cooperativeness of the played games caused by action reinforcement, and b) perceptual contrast with the preceding games depending on the range and the rank order of their cooperativeness. We demonstrate that, when playing against choice strategies that are not biased by such factors, perceptual biases disappear and only assimilation bias caused by reinforcement persists. This suggests that reinforcement learning is a powerful source of inconsistency in strategic interaction, which may not be eliminated even if the other players are unbiased and the markets are efﬁcient.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science
Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
|Journal or Publication Title:||Judgment and Decision Making|
|Publisher:||Society for Judgment and Decision Making|
|Number of Pages:||12|
|Page Range:||pp. 463-474|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
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