The Library
Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium
Tools
Tools
Tools
Basso, Henrique S. (2009) Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol.33 (No.8). pp. 1617-1629. doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2009.02.008
Research output not available from this repository, contact author.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2009.02.008
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of delegation in solving the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy using a microfounded general equilibrium model where delegation and reappointment are explicitly included into the government's strategy. The method of Chari and Kehoe [1990. Sustainable plans. Journal of Political Economy 98 (4), 783–802] is applied to characterize the entire set of sustainable outcomes. Countering McCallum's [1995. Two fallacies concerning central-bank independence. American Economic Review 85 (2), 207–211] second fallacy, delegation is able to eliminate the time inconsistency problem, with the commitment policy being sustained under discretion for any intertemporal discount rate
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | ||||
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control | ||||
| Publisher: | Elsevier BV | ||||
| ISSN: | 0165-1889 | ||||
| Official Date: | 2009 | ||||
| Dates: |
|
||||
| Volume: | Vol.33 | ||||
| Number: | No.8 | ||||
| Number of Pages: | 13 | ||||
| Page Range: | pp. 1617-1629 | ||||
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jedc.2009.02.008 | ||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
| Publication Status: | Published | ||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access | ||||
| Funder: | Economic and Social Research Council | ||||
| Grant number: | PTA-030-2003-01236 |
Request changes or add full text files to a record
Repository staff actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
