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How incidental values from the environment affect decisions about money, risk, and delay

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Ungemach, Christoph, Stewart, Neil, 1974- and Reimers, Stian. (2011) How incidental values from the environment affect decisions about money, risk, and delay. Psychological Science, Vol.22 (No.2). pp. 253-260. ISSN 0956-7976

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797610396225

Abstract

How different are £0.50 and £1.50, or "a small chance" and "a good chance", or "three months" and "nine months"? Our experiments show that people behave as if these differences alter after incidental everyday experiences. Preference for a £1.50 lottery rather than a £0.50 lottery was stronger after exposure to intermediate supermarket prices. Preference for "a good chance" of winning rather than "a small chance" was stronger after predicting intermediate probabilities of rain. Preference for consumption in "three month" rather than "nine months" was stronger after planning for an intermediate birthday. These fluctuations offer a direct challenge to economic accounts which translate monies, risks, and delays into subjective equivalents by stable functions. The decision by sampling model, in which subjective values are rank positions constructed from comparisons with samples of monies, probabilities, or delays, predicts these effects and indicates a primary role for sampling in decision making.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Science > Psychology
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Economics -- Psychological aspects, Money -- Decision making -- Testing, Risk -- Decision making -- Testing, Time -- Decision making -- Testing
Journal or Publication Title: Psychological Science
Publisher: Sage
ISSN: 0956-7976
Date: February 2011
Volume: Vol.22
Number: No.2
Page Range: pp. 253-260
Identification Number: 10.1177/0956797610396225
Status: Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Funder: Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC)
Grant number: RES-000-22-3339 (ESRC), RES-062-23-0952 (ESRC)
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URI: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/4470

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