Optimal taxation, imperfect competition and tax enforcement policies
Galmarini, Umberto (1993) Optimal taxation, imperfect competition and tax enforcement policies. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.
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Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b1415159~S1
This thesis contains four papers in the area of Public Economics.
Chapter 1 looks at producers' taxation in a model of vertically related oligopolies.
Both ad valorem and specific taxes are considered and formulae expressing their effects
on prices and profits are derived, showing how these depend on factors such as demand
conditions, technology and market structure. Conditions for taxation to cause price
overshifting and to raise profits are given. Also, tax instruments are compared in terms
of the amount of revenue collected and the effect on the price for the final good.
Chapter 2 applies the results of the previous paper to the analysis of tax reforms.
Vertically related oligopolies result in welfare loss for two reasons. Firstly, upstream
oligopolists set the price of the intermediate good above marginal cost and this causes
aggregate production inefficiency. Secondly, downstream oligopolists introduce an additional
price-cost margin. The analysis focuses on tax reforms, where the government
aims at reducing the welfare loss by levying taxes and subsidies on producers while
raising no revenue.
Chapter 3 focuses on the design of income tax enforcement policies in a principalagent
framework. The existing literature assumes risk neutral taxpayers while this
chapter considers the case of risk averse agents by assuming a kinked linear utility
function. When individuals have the same attitude towards risk, it is shown that the
optimal policy is such that income reports below a given threshold are audited at the
probability level just sufficient to induce truthful reporting, whereas those above it are
not audited. This makes the effective tax schedule to be quite regressive. Instead,
if attitudes towards risk vary across taxpayers, the numerical results show that the
optimal audit policy causes only a limited regressive bias, for income reports above the
threshold meet a positive probability of audit.
Chapter 4 examines the Presumptive Income Coefficients (PIC) audit policy, a
scheme recently introduced in the Italian tax code and aimed at reducing tax evasion
in the non-corporate sector. The tax agency applies the PIC to observable production
costs to get an estimate of taxpayer's income, or presumptive income. The probability
of audit is then dependent on the gap between presumptive and reported income.
This issue is examined in a setting where the game between the taxing authority and
taxpayers is modelled in a principal-agent framework.
|Item Type:||Thesis or Dissertation (PhD)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Taxation, Oligopolies, Income tax, Tax evasion|
|Official Date:||July 1993|
|Institution:||University of Warwick|
|Theses Department:||Department of Economics|
|Supervisor(s)/Advisor:||Ireland, Norman J. ; Myles, Gareth D.|
|Extent:||v, 161 leaves|
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