Bernhardt, Dan, Duggan, John and Squintani, Francesco (2009) The case for responsible parties. American Political Science Review, Vol.103 (No.4). pp. 570-587. doi:10.1017/S0003055409990232

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Abstract

Electoral platform convergence is perceived unfavorably by both the popular press and many academic scholars. Arguably, to paraphrase, “it does not provide enough choice” between candidates. This article provides a formal account of the perceived negative effects of platform convergence. We show that when parties do not know voters' preferences precisely, all voters ex ante prefer some platform divergence to convergence at the ex ante median. After characterizing the unique symmetric equilibrium of competition between responsible (policy-motivated) parties, we conclude that all voters ex ante prefer responsible parties to opportunistic (purely office-motivated) ones when parties are sufficiently ideologically polarized that platforms diverge, but not so polarized that they diverge excessively. However, greater polarization increases the scope for office benefits as an instrument for institutional design. We calculate the socially optimal level of platform divergence and show that office benefits can be used to achieve this first-best outcome, if parties are sufficiently ideologically polarized.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Journal or Publication Title:	American Political Science Review
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
ISSN:	0003-0554
Official Date:	2009
Dates:	Date Event 2009 Published
Volume:	Vol.103
Number:	No.4
Number of Pages:	18
Page Range:	pp. 570-587
DOI:	10.1017/S0003055409990232
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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