Bernhardt, Dan, Campuzano, Larissa, Squintani, Francesco and Câmara, Odilon (2009) On the benefits of party competition. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.66 (No.2). pp. 685-707. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.007

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Abstract

We study the role of parties in a citizen-candidate repeated-elections model in which voters have incomplete information. We first identify a novel "party competition effect" in a setting with two opposing parties. Compared with "at large" selection of candidates, party selection makes office-holders more willing to avoid extreme ideological stands, and this benefits voters of all ideologies. We then allow for additional parties. With strategic voting, citizens benefit most when the only two parties receiving votes are more moderate. With sincere voting, even with three parties, extreme parties can thrive at the expense of a middle party; and whether most citizens prefer two or three parties varies with model parameters.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Journal or Publication Title:	Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0899-8256
Official Date:	July 2009
Dates:	Date Event July 2009 Published
Volume:	Vol.66
Number:	No.2
Number of Pages:	23
Page Range:	pp. 685-707
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.007
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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