Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login
  • Admin

Competence and ideology

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

Bernhardt, Dan, Câmara, Odilon and Squintani, Francesco (2009) Competence and ideology. In: Invited Speaker : London School of Economics, London, 24 Feb 2009 (Unpublished)

Research output not available from this repository, contact author.
Official URL: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/government/research/resgroup...

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

We develop a dynamic, 2-party citizen-candidate model in which candidates are distinguished by both their ideology and their valence. We provide sufficient conditions under which (i) the median voter is decisive and (ii) there exists a unique symmetric, stage-undominated, stationary perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In our dynamic setting, reputational concerns endogenize incentives to compromise. In equilibrium, we prove that higher valence incumbents compromise more, compromise to more extreme policies, and are re-elected more. We find that the correlation between valence and extremism varies across different cohorts: the correlation is negative for first-term representatives, but positive in the long-run stationary distribution of office-holders (large congress). This novel result might partially explain the conflicting findings in the empirical literature and theoretical single-election models. We then find that a FOSD improvement in the distribution of valences benefits all voters. More heterogeneity in valence benefits the median voter, but may hurt a majority of voters when voters are sufficiently risk averse. We expand the model to allow interest groups to invest in candidate valence and provide conditions under which the equilibrium expected policy choice of office holders is more extreme when interest groups have more extreme ideologies, reducing welfare of all voters.

Item Type: Conference Item (Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Official Date: 24 February 2009
Dates:
DateEvent
24 February 2009Completion
Status: Not Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Unpublished
Conference Paper Type: Paper
Title of Event: Invited Speaker : London School of Economics
Type of Event: Other
Location of Event: London
Date(s) of Event: 24 Feb 2009
Related URLs:
  • Organisation

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item View Item
twitter

Email us: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us