Information revelation and anti-pandering in elections
Kartiky, Navin, Squintani, Francesco and Tinnx, Katrin (2011) Information revelation and anti-pandering in elections. In: Invited Speaker : Political Economy Workshop, New York University, 21 Oct 2011 (Unpublished)Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/Squintani_102111...
We study a Downsian model of elections in which two candidates who are primarily office-motivated have policy-relevant private information. A conventional intuition is that electoral competition bene�ts voters by inducing candidates to choose (constrained-)efficient platforms. A countering perspective is that inefficiencies obtain because candidates distort their platforms toward the voters' prior beliefs, i.e. they pander. We �nd that both intuitions are incorrect for familiar classes of information structures. In our model, office-motivated candidates have an incentive to exaggerate their private information, i.e. to anti-pander. While platforms can still reveal information, equilibrium voter welfare is limited. Our main result is that voter welfare in the Downsian game cannot be any higher than under \dictatorship" by a single non-ideological politician; furthermore, if both candidates have a positive probability of winning in the Downsian game, voter welfare is strictly lower. Normatively, we also show that pandering would improve efficiency; while this is incompatible with office-motivated candidates, it would be an equilibrium were candidates benevolent.
|Item Type:||Conference Item (Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
J Political Science > JC Political theory
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Date:||21 October 2011|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Version or Related Resource:||Kartiky, Navin, et al. (2011). Information revelation and anti-pandering in elections. Invited Speaker : Department of Economics. Boston University, Boston, 18 Oct 2011. Kartiky, Navin, et al. (2012). Information revelation and anti-pandering in elections. Invited Speaker : Monterey Theory Workshops. University of Wisconsin-Madison, 13 Apr 2012. Kartiky, Navin, et al. (2012). Information revelation and anti-pandering in elections. Invited Speaker : Political Economy Seminar Series. Northwestern University, 16 Apr 2012. Kartiky, Navin, et al. (2012). Information revelation and anti-pandering in elections. Invited Speaker : Washington University in St. Louis. St. Louis, 19 Apr 2012.|
|Conference Paper Type:||Paper|
|Title of Event:||Invited Speaker : Political Economy Workshop|
|Type of Event:||Other|
|Location of Event:||New York University|
|Date(s) of Event:||21 Oct 2011|
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