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The case for responsible parties

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Bernhardt, Dan, Duggan, John and Squintani, Francesco (2010) The case for responsible parties. In: Invited Speaker : Political Economy Workshop, Princeton University, New Jersey, 1 Mar 2010 doi:10.1017/S0003055409990232 (Unpublished)

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990232

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Abstract

Electoral platform convergence is perceived unfavorably by both the popular press and many academic scholars. Arguably, to paraphrase, "it does not provide enough choice" between candidates. This article provides a formal account of the perceived negative effects of platform convergence. We show that when parties do not know voters' preferences precisely, all voters ex ante prefer some platform divergence to convergence at the ex ante median. After characterizing the unique symmetric equilibrium of competition between responsible (policy-motivated) parties, we conclude that all voters ex ante prefer responsible parties to opportunistic (purely office-motivated) ones when parties are sufficiently ideologically polarized that platforms diverge, but not so polarized that they diverge excessively. However, greater polarization increases the scope for office benefits as an instrument for institutional design. We calculate the socially optimal level of platform divergence and show that office benefits can be used to achieve this first-best outcome, if parties are sufficiently ideologically polarized.

Item Type: Conference Item (Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Official Date: 1 March 2010
Dates:
DateEvent
1 March 2010Completion
Number of Pages: 18
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055409990232
Status: Not Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Unpublished
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Conference Paper Type: Paper
Title of Event: Invited Speaker : Political Economy Workshop
Type of Event: Other
Location of Event: Princeton University, New Jersey
Date(s) of Event: 1 Mar 2010
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