The Library
Markets and contracts
Tools
Tools
Tools
Bisin, A., Geanakoplos, J.D., Gottardi, P., Minelli, E. and Polemarchakis, Herakles. (2011) Markets and contracts. Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol.47 (No.3). pp. 279-288. ISSN 0304-4068
Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.017
Abstract
Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common with economies with default, incomplete contracts or price rigidities. Competitive equilibria exist and anonymous markets are viable. But, for a generic economy, competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained suboptimal: there exist Pareto improving interventions via linear, anonymous taxes.
| Item Type: | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics |
| Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0304-4068 |
| Date: | May 2011 |
| Volume: | Vol.47 |
| Number: | No.3 |
| Number of Pages: | 10 |
| Page Range: | pp. 279-288 |
| Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.017 |
| Status: | Peer Reviewed |
| Publication Status: | Published |
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
| URI: | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/45166 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
