Scharf, Kimberley A. (2010) Public funding of charities and competitive charity selection. Discussion Paper. Centre for Economic Policy Research, Coventry.

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Abstract

Evidence on the price elasticity of private donations to charities and on the crowding out effect of donations by government grants suggests that a redirection of government funds from tax incentives for giving towards direct grants could increase total charity funding. This raises the question of why tax incentives for giving are used instead of direct grants. This paper shows that if government grants to charities face verification constraints, switching from direct grants to donation incentives can produce a pro-competitive effect on charity selection, raising the value of charity provision per dollar of funding.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Discussion Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Series Name:	CEPR Discussion Paper
Publisher:	Centre for Economic Policy Research
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	August 2010
Number:	No.7937
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Related URLs:	Publisher
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/45246

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