Cassam, Quassim. (2007) The possibility of knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien , Vol.74 . pp. 125-141. ISSN 0165-9227

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Abstract

I focus on two questions: what is knowledge, and how is knowledge possible? The latter is an example of a how-possible question. I argue that how-possible questions are obstacle-dependent and that they need to be dealt with at three different levels, the level of means, of obstacle-removal, and of enabling conditions. At the first of these levels the possibility of knowledge is accounted for by identifying means of knowing, and I argue that the identification of such means also contributes to a proper understanding of what knowledge is.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Knowledge, Theory of
Journal or Publication Title:	Grazer Philosophische Studien
Publisher:	Editions Rodopi B.V.
ISSN:	0165-9227
Date:	2007
Volume:	Vol.74
Number of Pages:	17
Page Range:	pp. 125-141
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/45317

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