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The possibility of knowledge

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Cassam, Quassim. (2007) The possibility of knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien , Vol.74 . pp. 125-141. ISSN 0165-9227

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Official URL: http://www.rodopi.nl/senj.asp?SerieId=GPS

Abstract

I focus on two questions: what is knowledge, and how is knowledge possible? The latter is an example of a how-possible question. I argue that how-possible questions are obstacle-dependent and that they need to be dealt with at three different levels, the level of means, of obstacle-removal, and of enabling conditions. At the first of these levels the possibility of knowledge is accounted for by identifying means of knowing, and I argue that the identification of such means also contributes to a proper understanding of what knowledge is.

Item Type:

Journal Article

Subjects:

B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy

Divisions:

Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy

Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):

Knowledge, Theory of

Journal or Publication Title:

Grazer Philosophische Studien

Publisher:

Editions Rodopi B.V.

ISSN:

0165-9227

Official Date:

2007

Dates:

Date	Event
2007	Published

Volume:

Vol.74

Number of Pages:

Page Range:

pp. 125-141

Identification Number:

10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.001.0001

Status:

Peer Reviewed

Publication Status:

Published

Access rights to Published version:

Restricted or Subscription Access

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