Cassam, Quassim. (2008) Knowledge, perception and analysis. South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol.27 (No.3). pp. 36-48. ISSN 0258-0136

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Abstract

A point that Strawson often emphasized in his writings is that the concepts of knowledge and perception are closely linked. For example, the idea of such a link does important work in his exposition and defence of a causal analysis of perception. According to this analysis a material object M is perceived by a subject S only if M causes an experience in S. Why should this be? One reason, according to Strawson, is that such a causal requirement on perception is implied by perception’s knowledge-giving role. This is one sense in which, in the words of Strawson's last book, 'we could not explain all the features of the concept of sense perception without reference to the concept of knowledge'.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Knowledge, Theory of, Perception
Journal or Publication Title:	South African Journal of Philosophy
Publisher:	Philosophical Society of Southern Africa
ISSN:	0258-0136
Date:	2008
Volume:	Vol.27
Number:	No.3
Page Range:	pp. 36-48
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/45322

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