Cassam, Quassim. (2002) Representing bodies. Ratio, Vol.15 (No.4). pp. 315-334. ISSN 0034-0006Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9329.00195
According to the bodily awareness thesis (BAT), awareness of one’s own body is a necessary condition for the acquisition and possession of concepts of primary qualities such as force and shape. I discuss two arguments for this thesis. The acquisition argument for BAT focuses on the role of bodily sensation and action in the acquisition of the concept of force. I suggest that this argument requires us to conceive of the content of sensation as both representational and non–conceptual. The objective reality argument for BAT claims that awareness of one’s own body is an essential component of those experiences which are required for a proper grasp of concepts of primary qualities. I conclude by arguing, in opposition to Sartre and Merleau–Ponty, that there is no incoherence in the idea that one’s body is a thing among other things.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Ratio|
|Publisher:||Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.|
|Page Range:||pp. 315-334|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
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