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Levels of explanation and the individuation of events : a difficulty for the token identity theory
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Brewer, Bill. (1998) Levels of explanation and the individuation of events : a difficulty for the token identity theory. Acta Analytica , Vol.13 (No.20). ISSN 0353-5150
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Abstract
The paper argues that the nature of commonsense psychological explanation as a special kind of causal explanation in which events are made intelligible as being "reasonable from the subject's point of view" undermines the orthodox attempt to reconcile the causal efficacy of the mind with the existence of physical explanations of all of a person's physical movements. Given their radically different guiding principles, it is implausible to expect both the physical and the psychological explanatory schemes to identify the very same explanatory units and interconnected webs of causal explanatory events. I propose and develop an analogue of Wiggins' conceptualist realism for the events which are brought to light by each of these explanatory projects; and I explain why this is perfectly compatible with the existence of physical explanations of all physical events.
| Item Type: | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy |
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Causation, Human behavior -- Philosophy, Mind and body |
| Journal or Publication Title: | Acta Analytica |
| Publisher: | Springer Netherlands |
| ISSN: | 0353-5150 |
| Date: | 1998 |
| Volume: | Vol.13 |
| Number: | No.20 |
| Status: | Peer Reviewed |
| Publication Status: | Published |
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
| References: | Antony, L. 1989: 'Anomalous Monism and the Problem of Explanatory Force', Philosophical Review 98, pp. 153-87. Ayers, M. 1991: Locke (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul), 2 vols. Davidson, D. 1980a: 'Freedom to Act', in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 63-81. — 1980b: 'Mental Events', in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 207-25. — 1980c: 'Psychology as Philosophy', in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 229-39. — 1984: Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press). — 1986: 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', in E. LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), pp. 307-19. Dennett, D. 1969: Content and Consciousness (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul). — 1989: The Intentional Stance (,Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press). Descartes, R. 1986: Meditations on First Philosophy, trsl. J. Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Hornsby, J. 1980: Actions (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul). — 1985: 'Physicalism, Events and Part-Whole Relations', in E. LePore and B. McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), pp. 444-58. Lennon, K. 1990: Explaining Human Action (London: Duckworth). McDowell, J. 1985: 'Functionalism and Anomalous Monism', in E. LePore and B. McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), pp. 387-98. Peacocke, C. 1979: Holistic Explanation (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Wiggins, D. 1980: Sameness and Substance (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). |
| URI: | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/45467 |
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