Brewer, Bill (1998) Levels of explanation and the individuation of events : a difficulty for the token identity theory. Acta Analytica , Vol.13 (No.20). ISSN 0353-5150.

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Abstract

The paper argues that the nature of commonsense psychological explanation as a special kind of causal explanation in which events are made intelligible as being "reasonable from the subject's point of view" undermines the orthodox attempt to reconcile the causal efficacy of the mind with the existence of physical explanations of all of a person's physical movements. Given their radically different guiding principles, it is implausible to expect both the physical and the psychological explanatory schemes to identify the very same explanatory units and interconnected webs of causal explanatory events. I propose and develop an analogue of Wiggins' conceptualist realism for the events which are brought to light by each of these explanatory projects; and I explain why this is perfectly compatible with the existence of physical explanations of all physical events.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Causation, Human behavior -- Philosophy, Mind and body
Journal or Publication Title:	Acta Analytica
Publisher:	Springer Netherlands
ISSN:	0353-5150
Official Date:	1998
Dates:	Date Event 1998 Published
Volume:	Vol.13
Number:	No.20
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit:	1 August 2016
Date of first compliant Open Access:	1 August 2016

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