Performance pay and teachers' effort, productivity, and grading ethics
Lavy, Victor. (2009) Performance pay and teachers' effort, productivity, and grading ethics. American Economic Review, Vol.99 (No.5). pp. 1979-2011. ISSN 0002-8282Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.1979
This paper presents evidence about the effect of individual monetary incentives on English and math teachers in Israel. Teachers were rewarded with cash bonuses for improving their students' performance in high-school matriculation exams. The main identification strategy is based on measurement error in the assignment to treatment variable that produced a randomized treatment sample. The incentives led to significant improvements in test taking rates, conditional pass rates, and mean test scores. Improvements were mediated through changes in teaching methods, enhanced after-school teaching, and increased responsiveness to students' needs. No evidence was found of manipulation of test scores by teachers.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
L Education > L Education (General)
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Journal or Publication Title:||American Economic Review|
|Publisher:||American Economic Association|
|Official Date:||December 2009|
|Number of Pages:||33|
|Page Range:||pp. 1979-2011|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
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