Constitutions and policy comparisons : direct and representative democracy when states learn from their neighbours
Hugh-Jones, David. (2009) Constitutions and policy comparisons : direct and representative democracy when states learn from their neighbours. Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.21 (No.1). pp. 25-61. ISSN 0951-6298Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629808097283
Voters in democracies can learn from the experience of neighbouring states: about policy in a direct democracy (`policy experimentation'), about the quality of their politicians in a representative democracy (`yardstick competition'). Learning between states creates spillovers from policy choice, and also from constitutional choice. I model these spillovers in a simple principal-agent framework, and show that voter welfare may be maximized by a mixture of representative and direct democratic states. Because of this, empirical work examining voter welfare under direct democracy may need to be reinterpreted. Also, I show that the optimal mix of constitutions cannot always be achieved in a constitutional choice equilibrium involving many states.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JZ International relations|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Journal of Theoretical Politics|
|Publisher:||Sage Publications Ltd.|
|Official Date:||January 2009|
|Number of Pages:||37|
|Page Range:||pp. 25-61|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
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