An economic model of strategic electoral rule choice under uncertainty
Matakos, Konstantinos and Xefteris, Dimitrios (2011) An economic model of strategic electoral rule choice under uncertainty. Working Paper. Coventry: Department of Economics, University of Warwick. The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) (No.917). (Unpublished)Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...
We study electoral rule choice in a multi-party model where parties are o¢ ce-motivated and uncertainty over the electoral outcome is present. We show that when all dominant parties (parties with positive probability of winning the elections) have su¢ ciently good chances of
winning, then they agree to change the PR with a more majoritarian rule. We identify the exact degree of disproportionality of the new rule and we prove that it is increasing in the expected vote share of the minority parties (parties with zero probability of winning). The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for such collusion in favour of a majoritarian rule are: a) the high rents from a single-party government, b) su¢ cient uncertainty over the electoral outcome and c) ideological proximity of the dominant parties.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
J Political Science > JC Political theory
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Series Name:||The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)|
|Publisher:||Department of Economics, University of Warwick|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||March 2011|
|Number of Pages:||34|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
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