Peter, Fabienne (2012) The procedural epistemic value of deliberation. Synthese, Volume 190 (Number 7). pp. 1253-1266. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0119-6

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Abstract

Collective deliberation is fuelled by disagreements and its epistemic value depends, inter alia, on how the participants respond to each other in disagreements. I use this accountability thesis to argue that deliberation may be valued not just instrumentally but also for its procedural features. The instrumental epistemic value of deliberation depends on whether it leads to more or less accurate beliefs among the participants. The procedural epistemic value of deliberation hinges on the relationships of mutual accountability that characterize appropriately conducted deliberation. I will argue that it only comes into view from the second-person standpoint. I shall explain what the second-person standpoint in the epistemic context entails and how it compares to Stephen Darwall’s interpretation of the second-person standpoint in ethics.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Knowledge, Theory of
Journal or Publication Title:	Synthese
Publisher:	Springer Netherlands
ISSN:	0039-7857
Official Date:	9 May 2012
Dates:	Date Event 9 May 2012 Published
Date of first compliant deposit:	21 December 2015
Volume:	Volume 190
Number:	Number 7
Page Range:	pp. 1253-1266
DOI:	10.1007/s11229-012-0119-6
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access

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