Peter, Fabienne (2008) Pure epistemic proceduralism. Episteme, Vol.5 (No.1). pp. 33-55. doi:10.3366/E1742360008000221 ISSN 1742-3600.

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Abstract

In this paper I defend a pure proceduralist conception of legitimacy that applies to epistemic democracy. This conception, which I call pure epistemic proceduralism, does not depend on procedure-independent standards for good outcomes and relies on a proceduralist epistemology. It identifies a democratic decision as legitimate if it is the outcome of a process that satisfies certain conditions of political and epistemic fairness. My argument starts with a rejection of instrumentalism–the view that political equality is only instrumentally valuable. I reject instrumentalism on two grounds: (i) because it fails to respect reasonable value pluralism and to recognize the constitutive role of democratic procedures for legitimacy in pluralist societies, and (ii) because it neglects the constructive function of democratic decision-making. I then consider two alternatives to pure epistemic proceduralism: David Estlund's version of epistemic proceduralism and a Deweyan account of epistemic democracy. I argue that only pure epistemic proceduralism can make good on both shortcomings of instrumentalism, whereas each of the other two approaches only makes good on one and neglects the other.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title:	Episteme
Publisher:	Edinburgh University Press
ISSN:	1742-3600
Official Date:	2008
Dates:	Date Event 2008 Published
Volume:	Vol.5
Number:	No.1
Page Range:	pp. 33-55
DOI:	10.3366/E1742360008000221
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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