Peter, Fabienne (2007) Democratic legitimacy and proceduralist social epistemology. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Vol.6 (No.3). pp. 329-353. doi:10.1177/1470594X07081303

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Abstract

A conception of legitimacy is at the core of normative theories of democracy. Many different conceptions of legitimacy have been put forward, either explicitly or implicitly. In this article, I shall first provide a taxonomy of conceptions of legitimacy that can be identified in contemporary democratic theory. The taxonomy covers both aggregative and deliberative democracy. I then argue for a conception of democratic legitimacy that takes the epistemic dimension of public deliberation seriously. In contrast to standard interpretations of epistemic democracy, however, the conception I put forward avoids procedure-independent standards of correctness. Instead, it relies on a procedural social epistemology and defines legitimacy entirely in terms of the fairness of procedures. I call this conception of democratic legitimacy `Pure Epistemic Proceduralism'. I shall argue that it should be preferred over `Rational Epistemic Proceduralism', the conception of legitimacy that underlies the standard interpretation of epistemic democracy.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title:	Politics, Philosophy & Economics
Publisher:	Sage Publications Ltd.
ISSN:	1470-594X
Official Date:	2007
Dates:	Date Event 2007 Published
Volume:	Vol.6
Number:	No.3
Page Range:	pp. 329-353
DOI:	10.1177/1470594X07081303
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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