Peter, Fabienne (2007) Rawls' idea of public reason and democratic legitimacy. Politics and Ethics Review, Vol.3 (No.1). pp. 129-143. doi:10.3366/per.2007.3.1.129

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Abstract

Critics and defenders of Rawls’ idea of public reason have tended to neglect the relationship between this idea and his conception of democratic legitimacy. I shall argue that Rawls’ idea of public reason can be interpreted
in two different ways, and that the two interpretations support two different conceptions of legitimacy. What I call the substantive interpretation of Rawls’ idea of public reason demands that it applies not just to the process of democratic decision-making, but that it extends to the substantive justification of democratic decisions. I shall argue against this interpretation and suggest a procedural
interpretation instead. On this view, public reason is invoked when it comes to the political justification of the principles that should govern the process of democratic decision-making, but not – at least not directly – in relation to the content of public deliberation.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title:	Politics and Ethics Review
Publisher:	Edinburgh University Press
ISSN:	1755-0882
Official Date:	2007
Dates:	Date Event 2007 Published
Volume:	Vol.3
Number:	No.1
Page Range:	pp. 129-143
DOI:	10.3366/per.2007.3.1.129
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Description:	Also presented at Rawls Workshop, University of Bochum, February 2012
Related URLs:	http://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10....

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