Endogenous choice of electoral rules in a multiparty system with two major dominant parties
Xefteris, Dimitrios and Matakos, Konstantinos (2009) Endogenous choice of electoral rules in a multiparty system with two major dominant parties. In: ECORE Summer School, Brussels, 09-12 Jun 2009 (Unpublished)Full text not available from this repository.
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In this paper we develop a basic model of endogenous choice of electoral rules in a multiparty system with two major dominant parties, that have a positive probability to win the election, in an environemnt of uncertainty about the outcome of the election (adding extra non-dominant ones does not alter the results). Using quasi-lexicographic preferences over the number of seats necessary for a party to form a single-party government (i.e win the majority of the seats in the parliament and pass legislation at will) we explore the choice of the electoral law by the parties. We show that the minor parties never agree to an electoral reform that moves away from the Proportional Representation system (PR). We also show that in the case where the electoral competition among the two dominant parties is non-trivial there exists a unique and stable equilibrium were a unique new electolar rule is being adapted by the parliament in substitution of the pre-existing PR rule. That is we show that there exist strategic incentives that drive the two dominant parties to collude in the presence of uncertainty about the outcome of the elections. The key factor that drives the result is the desire of the parties to secure the majority of the seats in the parliament and not just win the upcoming election. Hence by agreeing to distort the electoral rule in their favor not only they increase their utility (by increasing the number of seats of the potential winner) but they also increase the probability that the winner will form a single-party government. The paper in e¤ect shows that under an uncertain political environment the two dominant parties have an incentive to collude in favor of stability (single-party governments) and practically change the political environment from multi-party to a two-party system (by eliminating the e¤ect the third party has on the formation of the government). To conclude we also show that the equilibrium with the above characteristic does in fact exist and it is also unique and stable. In an extension of this model we relax the assumption of common priors about the strength of the dominant parties and we explore the role of electoral reform as a signalling mechanism.
|Item Type:||Conference Item (Paper)|
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JC Political theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Date:||10 June 2009|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Version or Related Resource:||Xefteris, Dimitrios and Matakos, Konstantinos (2009). Endogenous choice of electoral rules in a multiparty system with two major dominant parties. In: 8th Conference on Research on Economic Theory & Econometrics. Tinos, 8-12 July 2009.|
|Conference Paper Type:||Paper|
|Title of Event:||ECORE Summer School|
|Type of Event:||Conference|
|Location of Event:||Brussels|
|Date(s) of Event:||09-12 Jun 2009|
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