Vertical integration and firm boundaries : the evidence

Lafontaine, Francine and Slade, Margaret E., 1940- (2007) Vertical integration and firm boundaries : the evidence. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.45 (No.3). pp. 631-687. ISSN 0022-0515

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.45.3.629


Item Type:Journal Article
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Divisions:Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):Business enterprises, Vertical integration, Consolidation and merger of corporations
Journal or Publication Title:Journal of Economic Literature
Publisher:American Economic Association
ISSN:0022-0515
Date:September 2007
Volume:Vol.45
Number:No.3
Page Range:pp. 631-687
Status:Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:Open Access
Funder:Leverhulme Trust (LT)
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