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Subgame perfect cooperation in an extensive game
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Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2010) Subgame perfect cooperation in an extensive game. In: MINT Seminar : Models of Influence and Network Theory, Paris, 15 Oct 2010 (Unpublished)
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Official URL: http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/membre/seminaire/MINT/MI...
Abstract
This paper brings together two of the most important solution concepts of game theory -- subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game and the core of a cooperative game. Our approach rests on two fundamental ideas: (1) Given an extensive game, the formation of a coalition leads to a new game where all the members of the coalition become one player. (2) At the origin of any subgame, the only possible coalitions consist of players who have decision nodes in the subgame. Thus, the set of feasible coalitions depends on the decision node of the game. We stress that the two fundamental ideas can be used to investigate alternative cooperative notions within the context of an extensive form game. As a particular example, we introduce the concept of the subgame perfect gamma-core. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the gamma-core of an extensive game of perfect information.
Item Type: | Conference Item (Paper) | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Official Date: | 15 October 2010 | ||||
Dates: |
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Status: | Not Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Unpublished | ||||
Conference Paper Type: | Paper | ||||
Title of Event: | MINT Seminar : Models of Influence and Network Theory | ||||
Type of Event: | Workshop | ||||
Location of Event: | Paris | ||||
Date(s) of Event: | 15 Oct 2010 |
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