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The partnered core of a game with side payments
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Reny, Philip J., Winter, Eyal and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2012) The partnered core of a game with side payments. Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 39 (Number 2-3). pp. 521-536. doi:10.1007/s00355-012-0651-9 ISSN 0176-1714.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0651-9
Abstract
An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players.We show that the relative interior of the core of a game with side payments is contained in the partnered core. For quasi-strictly convex games the partnered core coincides with the relative interior of the core. When there are no more than three partnerships, the sums of the payoffs to partnerships are constant across all core payoffs. When there are no more than three players, the partnered core satisfies additional
properties. We also illustrate our main result for coalition structure games.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Social Choice and Welfare | ||||
Publisher: | Springer | ||||
ISSN: | 0176-1714 | ||||
Official Date: | 2012 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Volume 39 | ||||
Number: | Number 2-3 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 521-536 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1007/s00355-012-0651-9 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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