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Cassam, Quassim (2010) How we know what we think. Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale (No.68). pp. 553-569. ISSN 0035-1571.
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Abstract
Assuming that knowledge of our own beliefs is usually epistemically and psychologically immediate a natural question is: how is such immediate self-knowledge possible? I examine and criticize Richard Moran's response to this question and develop a different account. My alternative draws on the idea that immediate self-knowledge results from the operation of a sub-personal monitoring mechanism. I express doubts about the extent to which knowledge of our own beliefs is immediate, and suggest that some versions of the immediacy intuition rest on a confusion between belief and judgement.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale | ||||
Publisher: | Presses Universitaires de France | ||||
ISSN: | 0035-1571 | ||||
Official Date: | October 2010 | ||||
Dates: |
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Number: | No.68 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 17 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 553-569 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access | ||||
Description: | Special issue on the self edited by B. Longuenesse. |
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